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day life were eroding. Ethnographic work on Maluku revealed a broad spectrum of diversity andchange in the religious beliefs and practices of those registered as Muslims and Christians in theprovince, with “conversion” a recent and ongoing process for many official believers, even well intothe 1990s. 61Patterns of migration to and within Maluku increased the diversity of religious practice. Ethnic tensionsgrew between both Christian and Muslim “natives” and immigrants over economic resources,property relations, village elections, and other issues. 62 “Muslims and Christians attended the samestate schools and universities, viewed the same television programs and movies, spoke the same linguafranca, and competed for the same opportunities”: trends toward social homogenization across the religiousdivide were evident. 63 In Ambon city, Protestant and Muslim neighbourhoods and houses ofworship were often found in close proximity, and Ambonese and migrants of different faiths mingledin the streets, the schools, the shops, and the offices of government. 64A Prelude to Violence: RumoursSeveral events preceded the outbreak of violence in Maluku that are widely assumed to have increasedtensions and hostilities. The first event was a rumour claiming that Maluku’s governor Saleh Latuconsina,himself a Muslim, had replaced “all 38” top civil servants in the province with Muslims. Thisaccusation of a one-sided policy appeared in an anonymous pamphlet in October 1998. 65 The governorvehemently affirmed the importance of a ‘balance’ between Protestant Christians and Muslims. 66 Hehad indeed, however, appointed a non-Protestant deputy governor and a non-Protestant provincial secretary.Thus, the Christian elite were removed from the three most powerful positions in the province. 67A second precursor at the end of 1998 was a meeting between Christian and Muslim communal leadersconvened by Latuconsina to alert them to guard against rumours of preparations for violence.Apparently, both sides went home and improved existing communication networks that largely reliedon churches and mosques connected by cellular and regular phones. 68 It remains unclear, however, towhat extent concrete warnings were given by the governor, and if the warnings were in regard torumours of attacks along religious lines, or to merely any kind of provocations between the communities.Student demonstrations against the military in Maluku may have increased the military’s aspirations toensure its domination in spite of the reformist agenda in Jakarta. From 16 to 18 November 1998, thousandsof students from the State University of Pattimura and Indonesian Christian University of theMoluccas held a series of demonstrations in Ambon decrying the dual-function of the military in frontof the District Military Command (Korem) of Pattimura. 69 Echoing the demands of the student-ledReformasi movement that forced Suharto to step down, the Ambonese student movement demanded an616263646566676869Sidel, Riots, Progroms, Jihad, 172.ICG (2002) Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku. Asia Report N°31; Sidel, Riots, Progroms, Jihad, 174.Sidel, Riots, Progroms, Jihad, 174.Sidel, Riots, Progroms, Jihad, 191.Aditjondro, Guns, Pamphlets, Handie-Talkies.Van Klinken, Gerry (1999) What caused the Ambon violence? Perhaps not religious hatred but a corrupt civil servicesparked the bloodletting. In: Inside Indonesia 60, Oct-Dec 1999, 2.Van Klinken, What caused the Ambon Violence?, 2.Spyer, Fire without smoke, 7.Hasan, The radical Muslim discourse, 5.23