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TCP/IP Tutorial and Technical Overview - IBM Redbooks

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IKE phase 2: Setting up protocol Security Associations<br />

After completing the phase 1 negotiation process to set up the ISAKMP Security<br />

Associations, Host-A's next step is to initiate the Oakley phase 2 message<br />

exchanges (also known as Oakley Quick Mode) to define the Security<br />

Associations <strong>and</strong> keys that will be used to protect <strong>IP</strong> datagrams exchanged<br />

between the pair of users. (In the Internet drafts, these are referred to somewhat<br />

obtusely as “non-ISAKMP SAs.”)<br />

Because the purpose of the phase 1 negotiations was to agree on how to protect<br />

ISAKMP messages, all ISAKMP phase 2 payloads, but not the ISAKMP header<br />

itself, must be encrypted using the algorithm agreed to by the phase 1<br />

negotiations.<br />

When Oakley Quick Mode is used in phase 2, authentication is achieved through<br />

the use of several cryptographically based hash functions. The input to the hash<br />

functions comes partly from phase 1 information (SKEYID) <strong>and</strong> partly from<br />

information exchanged in phase 2. Phase 2 authentication is based on<br />

certificates, but the phase 2 process itself does not use certificates directly.<br />

Instead, it uses the SKEYID_a material from phase 1, which itself was<br />

authenticated through certificates.<br />

Oakley Quick Mode comes in two forms:<br />

► Without a Key Exchange attribute, Quick Mode can be used to refresh the<br />

cryptographic keys, but does not provide the property of Perfect Forward<br />

Secrecy (PFS).<br />

► With a Key Exchange attribute, Quick Mode can be used to refresh the<br />

cryptographic keys in a way that provides PFS. This is accomplished by<br />

including an exchange of public Diffie-Hellman values within messages 1<br />

<strong>and</strong> 2.<br />

Note: PFS apparently is a property that is very much desired by cryptography<br />

experts, but strangely enough, the specifications treat PFS as optional. They<br />

m<strong>and</strong>ate that a system must be capable of h<strong>and</strong>ling the Key Exchange field<br />

when it is present in a Quick Mode message, but do not require a system to<br />

include the field within the message.<br />

A detailed description of the phase 2 messages <strong>and</strong> exchanged information<br />

follows.<br />

840 <strong>TCP</strong>/<strong>IP</strong> <strong>Tutorial</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Technical</strong> <strong>Overview</strong>

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