Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
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HOW A MEDICAL DOCTOR DOCTORS HISTORY<br />
had not only <strong>the</strong> power but <strong>the</strong> intention of freezing <strong>the</strong> Chinese<br />
people’s st<strong>and</strong>ard of living.<br />
As it is common knowledge, most of <strong>the</strong> concrete economic policy<br />
measures that were responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> people’s st<strong>and</strong>ard of living<br />
were not designed, let alone implemented, by <strong>Mao</strong> himself. The policies<br />
of monopoly sale <strong>and</strong> purchase of agricultural produce, <strong>the</strong><br />
rationing of commodities <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> grades of salaries, some implemented<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e <strong>the</strong> Great Leap Forward <strong>and</strong> some after, were designed<br />
by people like Chen Yun, Li Fuchun <strong>and</strong> Bo Yibo. The policy of<br />
squeezing <strong>the</strong> peasantry <strong>and</strong> controlling consumption was based on<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviet model to accumulate capital <strong>for</strong> industrial development.<br />
In fact <strong>Mao</strong> was not happy with China’s copying <strong>the</strong> Soviet Model<br />
of economic development in which everything was planned from <strong>the</strong><br />
centre. The Great Leap Forward was an attempt to find an alternative<br />
in which planning was not concentrated in Beijing. An indication of<br />
this idea is <strong>the</strong> fact during <strong>the</strong> Great Leap Forward all <strong>the</strong> important<br />
conferences about policies were not held in Beijing but locally:<br />
Zhengzhou, Wucahn, Hangzhou, Shanghai <strong>and</strong> Nanning. Clearly <strong>Mao</strong><br />
wanted a decentralized model of development in which various levels<br />
of leadership <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> broad masses of workers <strong>and</strong> farmers participated<br />
in <strong>the</strong> planning process of economic construction. It was largely<br />
due to <strong>the</strong> work along this direction during <strong>the</strong> Great Leap Forward<br />
<strong>and</strong> later in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cultural</strong> <strong>Revolution</strong> that China’s post-cold war re<strong>for</strong>ms<br />
were able to develop differently from those of <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer Soviet Union<br />
<strong>and</strong> to succeed (Shirk 1993).<br />
<strong>Mao</strong>’s strategy of a different approach was not only premised on <strong>the</strong><br />
fact that <strong>the</strong>re were not enough technical <strong>and</strong> professional experts in<br />
China when <strong>the</strong> Communists took over power. More importantly, as<br />
brilliantly analysed by Schumann (1968), <strong>Mao</strong> did not want <strong>the</strong> professional<br />
<strong>and</strong> technical elite to monopolize economic planning <strong>and</strong><br />
management. He wanted <strong>the</strong> non-expert to lead <strong>the</strong> expert (waihang<br />
lingdao neihang) <strong>and</strong> wanted politics to control economic activities <strong>and</strong><br />
ensure that 1) a correct political line was upheld <strong>and</strong> 2) <strong>the</strong> masses <strong>and</strong><br />
revolutionaries who were not experts were not marginalized in<br />
production <strong>and</strong> construction.<br />
Of course to do that <strong>Mao</strong> had to bring <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs along, <strong>and</strong> in trying<br />
to bring his colleagues along he was very often bullying <strong>and</strong> dictatorial.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> day, most, if not all, of <strong>Mao</strong>’s colleagues did go along<br />
<strong>and</strong> some of <strong>the</strong>m even went fur<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>Mao</strong> intended. According to<br />
Chen Boda (Chen Xiaonong 2006), it was Bo Yibo, Chair of <strong>the</strong> powerful<br />
Economic Commission who was responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> backyard furnaces.<br />
In fact <strong>the</strong> three fatal ideas all came from Bo: China could catch up <strong>the</strong><br />
UK in two years (in this he was supported by Liu Shaoqi), that industry<br />
should focus on <strong>the</strong> production of iron <strong>and</strong> stee, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong> target<br />
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