Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
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CHALLENGING THE HEGEMONY I<br />
The gist of <strong>the</strong> two-lines struggle is this: not long after <strong>the</strong> Chinese<br />
economy had recovered from <strong>the</strong> Great Leap Forward <strong>the</strong>re were rival<br />
lines of thought within <strong>the</strong> CCP on China’s future development. One<br />
line of thought was advocated by Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of <strong>the</strong> State,<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r by <strong>Mao</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Chairman of <strong>the</strong> CCP, <strong>the</strong> ruling communist<br />
party.<br />
By <strong>the</strong> early 1960s Liu did not seem to object to <strong>the</strong> idea that something<br />
had to be done in China or protests <strong>and</strong> turmoil against <strong>the</strong> CCP<br />
similar to those in Hungary <strong>and</strong> Czechoslovakia would occur.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> two chairmen had completely different views on what<br />
<strong>the</strong> problems were <strong>and</strong> what measures to take. The Liu line of thought<br />
saw <strong>the</strong> problem organizationally as CCP grassroots corruption by<br />
elements from outside <strong>the</strong> party. The <strong>Mao</strong> line, however, saw <strong>the</strong><br />
problem as being ideologically inside <strong>the</strong> party. Liu was of <strong>the</strong> idea that<br />
<strong>the</strong> communist cadres at grassroots level in rural China were ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
bribed by <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer l<strong>and</strong>lords or corrupted by capitalist thoughts of<br />
com<strong>for</strong>t, pleasure <strong>and</strong> greed. There<strong>for</strong>e measures had to be taken to<br />
uncover <strong>the</strong> embezzling <strong>and</strong> corrupted cadres. Moreover, those measures<br />
should be imposed from top to bottom <strong>and</strong> from outside <strong>for</strong>ces<br />
organizationally to wipe out <strong>the</strong>se elements of corruption. In contrast,<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>Mao</strong> line of thought was that <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong> grassroots cadres<br />
were ei<strong>the</strong>r innocent or just following policies from above. Corruption<br />
<strong>and</strong> embezzlement were just symptoms of a deeper problem of<br />
ideology, <strong>the</strong> ideology of capitalist values <strong>and</strong> beliefs. To change <strong>the</strong><br />
ideology fundamentally, measures had to be taken to correct those<br />
inside <strong>the</strong> party who made <strong>the</strong> policies. For <strong>Mao</strong> <strong>the</strong> organizational<br />
measure of dismissal or punishment of this <strong>and</strong> that cadre at grassroots<br />
level would not solve <strong>the</strong> root problem. The fundamental solution had<br />
to come from changes of values <strong>and</strong> beliefs, <strong>and</strong> those changes<br />
required a cultural revolution. Hence <strong>the</strong> idea of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cultural</strong> <strong>Revolution</strong><br />
was developed. The above is only a sketch of <strong>the</strong> two-line struggle;<br />
a more detailed explication <strong>and</strong> articulation can be seen in Wang Li<br />
(2001), one of <strong>the</strong> chief radicals who interpreted <strong>Mao</strong>’s ideas during <strong>the</strong><br />
beginning of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cultural</strong> <strong>Revolution</strong>. 10<br />
In what follows next I will present a brief case study of how <strong>the</strong> twoline<br />
struggle developed between <strong>Mao</strong> <strong>and</strong> Liu during 1964–65. This<br />
case is presented here along <strong>the</strong> lines of Ming Mu (2007), which<br />
appeared on Zhurengong website. In <strong>the</strong> e-media debates most of <strong>the</strong><br />
participants do not sign <strong>the</strong>ir real names <strong>and</strong> I believe Ming Mu is a<br />
pseudonym. I cite this source as an example because I find it totally<br />
convincing <strong>and</strong> Ming Mu, unlike o<strong>the</strong>r e-media debates participants,<br />
cites documentary sources such as Bo Yibo (1997), Feng Xianzhi (1996),<br />
Liu’s letter to <strong>Mao</strong>, Liu <strong>and</strong> <strong>Mao</strong>’s speeches as well as records of <strong>the</strong><br />
central committee of <strong>the</strong> CCP work conferences.<br />
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