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JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

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191<br />

Irvin Goldman, and Peter Weiland that the $3 billion increase in the CRM metric was due<br />

primarily to the $33 billion increase in the size of the CIO portfolio over the same period:<br />

“There are two related issues. The first is the $3b[illio]n increase in CRM RWA<br />

between January and February, from $3.1bn to $6.3bn. The second is that your<br />

group believes that the absolute level of CRM RWA we calculate was high to<br />

begin with in Jan[uary]. The second question requires us to explain our models to<br />

the satisfaction of your team. I am in London and spoke with Javier today and we<br />

will make this an urgent matter.<br />

Based on our models, though, we believe that the $3bn increase in RWA is<br />

entirely explained by a $33bn notional increase in short protection (long risk) in<br />

your portfolio between Jan[uary] and Feb[uary]. ...<br />

Peter Weiland and your mid-office confirm this $33bn notional increase in long<br />

index risk. Further we both agree that this position change results in a change of<br />

about $150mm[million] (a decrease) in 10%CSW. Per our models, a roughly<br />

10% capital charge ($3bn) on this $33bn increase in risk is reasonable.<br />

Also, to be clear, there has been no model change on our end; the change in RWA<br />

for tranches has hardly changed over the month.<br />

I understand that we have to build your confidence in our models themselves but,<br />

given our models, we believe the increase in RWA is well explained by the build<br />

up in your risk positions.” 1084<br />

Mr. Venkatakrishnan attributed the increase in CRM directly to the additional long<br />

positions in the Synthetic Credit Portfolio, and denied any fault in the QR model. Ms. Drew<br />

emailed his explanation to Mr. Macris and Mr. Martin-Artajo, copying Mr. Goldman and Mr.<br />

Weiland, and added: “Not consistent with your take. Let's discuss thurs.” 1085 Expressing<br />

concern at the discrepancy, Mr. Macris forwarded the email exchange to Mr. Martin-Artajo<br />

appending the question: “what is going on here?” 1086<br />

The next day, March 8, 2012, Mr. Martin-Artajo disputed Mr. Venkatakrishnan's<br />

explanation of the CRM calculation in an email to Ms. Drew and Mr. Macris, copied to Mr.<br />

Goldman and Mr. Weiland. He denied that the portfolio had increased by $33 billion and also<br />

asserted that SCP’s increased long index positions did not involve the type of credit tranche<br />

positions normally analyzed by the CRM:<br />

1084<br />

3/7/2012 email from C.S. Venkatakrishnan, JPMorgan Chase, to Ina Drew, CIO, and others, “CIO CRM<br />

Results,” JPM-CIO-PSI 0001815.<br />

1085<br />

3/8/2012 email from Ina Drew, CIO, to Achilles Macris, CIO, and others, “CIO CRM Results,” JPM-CIO-PSI-<br />

0001815.<br />

1086<br />

3/8/2012 email from Achilles Macris, CIO, to Javier Martin-Artajo, CIO, “CIO CRM Results,” JPM-CIO-PSI-<br />

0001815.

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