JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
191<br />
Irvin Goldman, and Peter Weiland that the $3 billion increase in the CRM metric was due<br />
primarily to the $33 billion increase in the size of the CIO portfolio over the same period:<br />
“There are two related issues. The first is the $3b[illio]n increase in CRM RWA<br />
between January and February, from $3.1bn to $6.3bn. The second is that your<br />
group believes that the absolute level of CRM RWA we calculate was high to<br />
begin with in Jan[uary]. The second question requires us to explain our models to<br />
the satisfaction of your team. I am in London and spoke with Javier today and we<br />
will make this an urgent matter.<br />
Based on our models, though, we believe that the $3bn increase in RWA is<br />
entirely explained by a $33bn notional increase in short protection (long risk) in<br />
your portfolio between Jan[uary] and Feb[uary]. ...<br />
Peter Weiland and your mid-office confirm this $33bn notional increase in long<br />
index risk. Further we both agree that this position change results in a change of<br />
about $150mm[million] (a decrease) in 10%CSW. Per our models, a roughly<br />
10% capital charge ($3bn) on this $33bn increase in risk is reasonable.<br />
Also, to be clear, there has been no model change on our end; the change in RWA<br />
for tranches has hardly changed over the month.<br />
I understand that we have to build your confidence in our models themselves but,<br />
given our models, we believe the increase in RWA is well explained by the build<br />
up in your risk positions.” 1084<br />
Mr. Venkatakrishnan attributed the increase in CRM directly to the additional long<br />
positions in the Synthetic Credit Portfolio, and denied any fault in the QR model. Ms. Drew<br />
emailed his explanation to Mr. Macris and Mr. Martin-Artajo, copying Mr. Goldman and Mr.<br />
Weiland, and added: “Not consistent with your take. Let's discuss thurs.” 1085 Expressing<br />
concern at the discrepancy, Mr. Macris forwarded the email exchange to Mr. Martin-Artajo<br />
appending the question: “what is going on here?” 1086<br />
The next day, March 8, 2012, Mr. Martin-Artajo disputed Mr. Venkatakrishnan's<br />
explanation of the CRM calculation in an email to Ms. Drew and Mr. Macris, copied to Mr.<br />
Goldman and Mr. Weiland. He denied that the portfolio had increased by $33 billion and also<br />
asserted that SCP’s increased long index positions did not involve the type of credit tranche<br />
positions normally analyzed by the CRM:<br />
1084<br />
3/7/2012 email from C.S. Venkatakrishnan, JPMorgan Chase, to Ina Drew, CIO, and others, “CIO CRM<br />
Results,” JPM-CIO-PSI 0001815.<br />
1085<br />
3/8/2012 email from Ina Drew, CIO, to Achilles Macris, CIO, and others, “CIO CRM Results,” JPM-CIO-PSI-<br />
0001815.<br />
1086<br />
3/8/2012 email from Achilles Macris, CIO, to Javier Martin-Artajo, CIO, “CIO CRM Results,” JPM-CIO-PSI-<br />
0001815.