JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
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And as with VaR and CRM, the CIO’s CSW10% model produced a lower risk profile for the<br />
SCP than the bank’s standard approach. 1150<br />
206<br />
On March 30, 2012, eight days into the CIO’s CSW10% limit breach, the head of the QR<br />
group, Mr. Venkatakrishnan, emailed Chief Risk Officer John Hogan, questioning the divergent<br />
results of the two models, but also noting that risk was increasing under both:<br />
“John: CIO’s 10% CSW by my group’s model estimate is long 245mm of risk;<br />
their own models (run by Weiland) quote $145mm. I don’t understand the<br />
difference in the models and don’t know how good a measure of risk 10%CSW is<br />
for their book. But I spoke to Ashley and we agree that 10%CSW has been<br />
trending up for CIO, by either their model or ours.” 1151<br />
A few days later, on April 2, 2012, Mr. Venkatakrishnan announced that he had identified one<br />
source of the discrepancy between the two versions of the CSW10% model: “One source of the<br />
model difference is that the capital models operate at the level of individual names but the CIO’s<br />
desk models operate at the level of indices---so the effect of name concentrations may be<br />
captured differently.” 1152<br />
When the Subcommittee asked the OCC about the two models, Michael Sullivan, the<br />
OCC Deputy Comptroller for Risk Analysis, told the Subcommittee that the risk metric was a<br />
straightforward measure of price movements in derivatives, and there was no legitimate reason<br />
for a discrepancy in how the CSW10% metric was calculated. 1153<br />
As with the VaR and CRM,<br />
subsequent developments showed Mr. Venkatakrishnan’s model to be more accurate in<br />
measuring risk.<br />
At the same time the accuracy of the CSW10% metric was under scrutiny, the trend in its<br />
movement was clear and should have been alarming. The graph reprinted below was developed<br />
by JPMorgan Chase and included in a May 2012 presentation to provide bank managers with<br />
background on the risk profile of the Synthetic Credit Portfolio. In the graph, losses increase as<br />
the curve moves up the y-axis. 1154<br />
1150 JPMorgan Chase did not have a standard CSW10% model that it applied bankwide, in the same sense as its VaR<br />
model. Instead, the QR team had developed a CSW10% calculation as part of another model. Subcommittee<br />
interview of C.S. Venkatakrishnan, JPMorgan Chase (10/25/2012).<br />
1151 3/30/2012 email from C.S. Venkatakrishnan, JPMorgan Chase, to Oliver Vigneron, JPMorgan Chase, “CIO 10%<br />
CSW,” OCC-SPI-00070715.<br />
1152 4/2/2012 email from C.S. Venkatakrishnan, JPMorgan Chase, to John Hogan, JPMorgan Chase, and others,<br />
“CIO DAY 1,” OCC-SPI-00070715.<br />
1153 Subcommittee interview of Michael Sullivan, OCC (11/7/2012).<br />
1154 5/3/2012 email from Irvin Goldman, CIO, to Douglas Braunstein, JPMorgan Chase, and others, “CSW 10%,”<br />
with attached JPMorgan Chase presentation entitled “CIO Synthetic Credit: Risk background information for<br />
upcoming meetings,” slide entitled “Risk metrics and limits: CIO limits structure,” JPM-CIO-PSI-H 0000546-556,<br />
at 551.