Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

President Edwards seems to have no conception of any but unipotent causes. He does not see how
a cause can have a possible effect, and yet the effect not necessarily result. It is true that in the realm of
physical nature every possible effect necessarily becomes actual, but not so in the realm of mind. Within
that realm there are events--viz., free volitions-- which are dependent on their cause, and yet are not
necessarily connected therewith. Their existence is, "as it were, loose from its influence, and may attend it
or may not, it being a mere contingence whether it follows or attends the influence of the cause or not;" and
that is not the same thing as not to be dependent on it. When we say that one thing is dependent on another
for its existence we simply mean that it cannot exist without the other, and surely there is no inconsistency
in saying that a certain event cannot exist without a certain cause, and yet may or may not exist with it.
Of course, if any events exist, they are necessarily connected with their cause; but the point is, they
may not exist. Dr. Whedon says:
39
Will, Part II., Chapter II., pg. 97.
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It is admitted that in the order of nature, so soon as a thing begins to exist, so far as it does
exist, it necessarily exists, since it is impossible for the thing done to become not done. This
necessity is consequent and subsequent in the order of nature to the existence. 3. It is granted that
every volitional effect which comes into existence is "connected with its cause," is "dependent on
its cause," derives its existence from its cause, and would not exist as it does without the cause. 4.
But it is not admitted conversely, that the volitional cause depends on the effect, so but that it can
exist in all its fullness and completeness, without producing that effect; or that it is necessitated to
the effect. The proof is demanded that an agent cannot exist with full power to an act, without
performing that act. The proof is demanded, but has never been furnished, that an agent may not
be a sufficient or adequate cause without being a resultant cause.
If it be said that a cause without an effect is no cause at all, it is again merely a verbal
argument. We may define cause to be that in which power to [produce] the effect exists, and the
argument is voided. We may affirm that a cause potential to an effect which it does not produce is
still to be called thereto a cause. 39
President Edwards continues:
2. If there are some events which are not necessarily connected with their causes, then it will follow,
that there are some things which come to pass without any cause, contrary to the supposition. For
if there be any event which was not necessarily connected with the influence of the cause under
such circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow the influence of the
cause, or no; it might have followed, and it might not, when the cause was the same, its influence
the same, and under the same circumstances. And if so, why did it follow rather than not follow?
There is no cause or reason of this. Therefore here is something without any cause or reason why
it is, viz., the following of the effect on the influence of the cause, with which it was not necessarily
connected. If there be not a necessary connection of the effect on any thing antecedent, then we
may suppose that sometimes the event will follow the cause, and sometimes not, when the cause
is the same, and in every respect in the same state of circumstances. And what can be the cause
and reason of this strange phenomenon, even this diversity, that in one instance, the effect should
follow, in another, not? It is evident by the supposition, that this is wholly without any cause or
ground. Here is something in the present manner of the existence of things, and state of the world
that is absolutely without a cause; which is contrary to the supposition and contrary to what has
been before demonstrated. 40
Will, Part II., Section VIII., pq. 46.
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