“if you don't know what port you are sailing to, no wind is favorable”**

University reforms
marina fiedler/isabell Welpe*
“if you don’t know what port you are sailing to, no wind is
favorable”**
Appointment preferences of mAnAgement
professors***
AbstrAct
based on a survey of university management professors in German-speaking europe,
we analyze the relationship between individual and organizational characteristics and
university academics’ preferences in appointment decisions. senior faculty’s attitude
towards change proves to be a particular robust predictor of differences in appointment
preferences. faculty who were satisfied with university structures before any reforms
place greater value on high-quality monographs and the possession of the venia legendi.
faculty who welcome the aims of university reforms value prestigious journal
publications and international experience in applicants. our results confirm previous
homophily and similarity research by showing that university professors value characteristics
and qualifications that they themselves possess. our results also show that differences
in appointment preferences depend on whether universities are publicly or
privately financed, and their rank in the CHe reputation ranking.
JeL-Classifcation: A29, m20, m53, o31.
Keywords: Academic Careers; Appointment Preferences; bologna Process; individual
influencing factors; organizational Change; organizational influencing
factors; Personnel selection Decisions; selection Criteria; University reforms.
∗ Marina Fiedler, Assistant Professor, Phone: +49 (0)89 2180 2777, e-mail: fiedler@lmu.de; Isabell Welpe, Assistant
Professor, Phone: +49 (0)89 2023 8774, e-mail: welpe@lmu.de, Institute of Information, Organisation
and Management, Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, 28 Ludwig Street, 80539 Munich. Order
of authors is alphabetical. Both authors contributed equally to this work and should be considered cofirst
authors.
** Seneca, Epistulae Morales, VIII, 71, 3.
*** The authors would like to thank Sabine Aschmutat, Michael Beckmann, Susanne Blaszejewski, Julia Brandl,
Lars Fend, Egon Franck, Nikolaus Franke, Gunther Friedl, Dietmar Griechnik, Marc Gruber, Wolfgang
Güttel, Svenja Hagenhoff, Dietmar Harhoff, Silvia Heer, Joachim Henkel, Thomas Hess, Andreas Klein,
Markus Klein, Carmen Kobe, Christine Legner, Christian Lüthje, Theresa Michel, Kathrin Möslein, Rahild
Neuburger, Siegfried Numberger, Burkhard Pedell, Andreas Richter, Manfred Schwaiger, Karin Stenke, Tina
Syring, Daniel Veit, Birgit Verworn, Iwan von Wartburg, Wolfgang Weber, and Robert Wilken for their valuable
comments and suggestions. We are also indebted to Arnold Picot for his valuable guidance and suggestions.
We also thank all survey participants for their time and effort. We are grateful for the continuous support
of and cooperation with the German Association of Management Professors in this project. We thank
Ilse Evertse for her help in editing the manuscript.
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1 introduction
University reforms
Personnel selection is one of the most important tasks for knowledge-intensive organizations
(Singh and Crocker (1988); Derous and Witte (2001); Derous, Witte, and Stroobants
(2003); Zysberg and Nevo (2004)) such as universities, since their processes and
results depend mainly on the quality of their human capital (Klehe (2004)). Academic
organizations are shaped by faculty’s main tasks, which are research, teaching, and
academic self-management. These tasks are characterized by a high degree of variability,
a low degree of structure, and a high level of immateriality, which makes the design of
appropriate incentive contracts very complex (Fiedler, Welpe, and Picot (2006); Frey and
Osterloh (2006)). Consequently, the appointment of new faculty members, who have
to deal with a multiplicity of these tasks, is particularly important (Trieschmann et al.
(2000)).
Universities in German-speaking Europe are currently facing a number of formal and
informal institutional changes that put pressure to change on them: the implementation
of the Bologna Treaty, the reforms of the German ministry for education and research,
informal changes, and the increasing world-wide competition for students and faculty
between universities.
These changes influence faculty appointment decisions on the requirements that applicants
are expected to meet. Examples of these changes are the increased importance of
publication in prestigious journals, the apparently decreased importance of traditionally
valued publication outlets such as monographs and edited volumes, the seemingly
increased importance of the Anglo-American research paradigm, and the abolishment of
the venia legendi as a requirement for appointment to full professorship. In addition, the
conversion to Bachelor and Master degrees as well as the introduction of tuition fees could
also lead to applicants for professorships having to meet different requirements. In this
study our goal is to better understand the appointment decisions and criteria for faculty
positions. We believe that analyzing senior faculty’s preferences in the appointment of full
professors is interesting for several reasons. First of all, in a knowledge-intensive organization,
such as at a university, whose members are relatively independent and difficult to
control, successful organizational change is mainly determined by the selection of new
faculty members during such appointment decisions. The realization and implementation
of university reforms depends largely on whether university professors are selected in
keeping with the university reforms’ aims and requirements. It is particularly the appointment
of new faculty members that decides whether the formal and informal institutional
pressures lead to organizational change of the universities. Further, in a knowledge
society, exceptional importance is attached to the tertiary education sector (Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2006)), which is in turn mainly
influenced by the academic systems and the human capital they employ.
Previous research on personnel selection has focused mainly on psychometric aspects, the
decision between internal and external candidates and the fit between job applicant and
position (Klehe (2004)). The social process of personnel selection and the role of subjective
attitudes and criteria, and determinants of personnel selection decisions in partic-
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m. fieDLer/i. WeLPe
ular, has not been closely examined (Boone et al. (2004). In addition, as far as we know,
previous research has not empirically studied the appointment preferences of management
faculty. Since universities offer a unique context to study selection criteria and appointment
processes, we seek to address this research gap by asking the following research questions:
1. What are senior faculty’s preferences in appointment decisions for new faculty
members?
2. How do individual and organizational factors correspond with senior faculty’s preferences
when appointing an applicant to a full professorship?
Our purpose here is to investigate both of these questions by using recent survey data
obtained from active, full, university management professors in Germany, Austria, and
Switzerland. We wish to contribute to a better understanding of management faculties’
future orientation as well as to a better understanding of appointment criteria’s dependency
on individual and organizational factors. Universities offer an exceptional organizational
context for studying the antecedents of selection criteria. Universities differ from
other organizations in having higher job security in the selection committees, autonomy
of its employees, and a group decision nature of the appointment decision. Thus, influencing
factors on selection criteria identified in previous research might be different in
the special context of academia.
Surveying all three countries is meaningful, even though some planned reform measures,
such as the BMBF reform, have been implemented only in Germany. Nevertheless, the
three countries form a common labor market, and thus it is plausible to assume a strong
agreement with regard to their applicant preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we derive our hypotheses on the research
questions. Section 3 deals with the method and the data collection process, and in section
4 we present descriptive insights as well as confirmatory results. Section 5 discusses these
results and points out the implications.
2 theory And hypotheses: how individuAl And orgAnizAtionAl fActors
correspond to preferences on the Appointment of full professors
Studying preferences on academic appointments in the context of universities in Germanspeaking
Europe is particularly interesting, since the ongoing reforms and changes at
these universities offer the opportunity to better understand the individual responses of
senior faculty members to strong pressures to change and to adapt the organization of
their universities. Management faculty in German-speaking Europe has traditionally been
confronted with many different job-related qualifications, which have increased even more
under the newly formed institutional changes, such as reforms and the increasing popularity
of an Anglo-American research paradigm.
These recent developments, combined with the lack of structure and the high variability of
university faculty’s tasks, requires applicants for these positions to have an array of different
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University reforms
skills and qualities. These include, for example, publication in prestigious journals, publication
of high-quality monographs, influential publications, high-quality conference
contributions, taking risks in personal research, didactical skills and committed teaching,
acquiring the venia legendi, social and personal competence, international experience,
networking in the department to which one is applying, previous affiliation with a wellreputed
department and Habilitanden advisor, creativity and innovativeness, professional
suitability, skill in raising third-party research funds, practical experience, and the willingness
to take ownership towards academic self-management.
It is obvious that no single applicant can fulfill all of these criteria equally well. Nor is this
a real problem, because it is plausible to assume that due to recruiting faculties‘ differing
preferences, there are niches for candidates with different qualification profiles. However,
we find it interesting to study what determines the preferences of university management
professors and how these preferences affect the demands made on applicants.
2.1 How At titudes Correspond to CHAnges in Appointment preferenCes
Research findings on the management of appointments and change lead to the assumption
that attitude to change has a crucial effect on preferences (Janis and Mann (1977);
Morison and Elting (1988); Hauschildt (1993); Lau and Woodman (1995); Greenwood
and Hinings (1996); Picot, Freudenberg, and Gassner (1999); Harris and Ogbonna
(2000); Picot and Fiedler (2002); Armstrong and Stassen (2004)) where it concerns an
applicant’s requirement profile.
For example, a case study by Morison and Elting (1988) demonstrates that an obvious lack
of acceptance of change aims and measures leads to resistance. Morison and Elting (1988)
describe resistance in the following stages: “ignorance/no response”, “maximum logical
and rational negative response” and “open hostility”. These reactions are also observed by
Janis and Mann (1977) and Hauschildt (1993) who distinguish between the conditions
“carry on as before”, “protective avoidance behavior” and “panic”. This behavior can be
explained as the desire to maintain the status quo (Jaeggi and Wiedemann (1963); Gerl
(1975); Duncan (1978); Böhnisch (1979); Schulze (1983); Picot (1993); Staehle (1985);
Marr and Kötting (1992)), but also as a fear of change (Carlisle (1976); Fulmer (1983))
and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance (Festinger (1978)). Greenwood and Hinings
(1996) formulate this similarly, maintaining that a key requirement for successful organizational
change is that the group affected by change should be dissatisfied with the status
quo and have a value commitment towards change aims and measures.
We can also assume that senior faculty who prefer the status quo to the reforms have
different preferences concerning applicants than faculty who welcome the changes and
their new objectives. Prior to the reforms introduced by the Federal Ministry for Education
and Research (BMBF), the prerequisite for appointment to a professorship was
primarily to obtain the venia legendi by means of writing a “Habilitationsschrift” (Backes-
Gellner and Schlinghoff (2004) and Müller-Camen and Salzgeber (2005)). However,
according to the university reforms initiated by the BMBF, the venia legendi should be

m. fieDLer/i. WeLPe
abolished and replaced with junior professorships. Doing so was supposed to promote
greater independence for junior faculty as well as international exchange .
In addition to these two university reform objectives, other objectives are a reduction in
the age of candidates when first appointed as full professors, a higher proportion of female
university professors as well as the rededication of resources, for example, the conversion
of “Habilitanden” positions into junior professor positions and rededicating professorships’
resources as faculty and university resources (o.V. (2000)). Together with these
formally planned change measures, it is clear that as a group, management faculty is also
confronted with a whole series of changes, such as being able to achieve a “Habilitation”
not only by means of a monograph, but also by publishing in prestigious journals (Kieser
(2004); Müller-Camen and Salzgeber (2005); Fiedler, Welpe, and Picot (2006)). Thus, for
our second research question, we assume the following relationships:
The greater the satisfaction with the status quo of university structures prior to the 1999 university
reforms, the…
H1: … greater the preference for applicants with high-quality monographs.
H2: … greater the preference for applicants with a venia legendi.
The greater the acceptance of the 1999 university reforms objectives, the…
H3: … greater the preference for applicants with prestigious journal publications.
H4: … greater the preference for applicants with international experience.
Furthermore, a series of studies give rise to the assumption that the length of employment
and the experience in a profession has a strong influence on selection decision . Larwood
et al. (1995); Pfeffer (1983); Shepherd, Zacharakis, and Baron (2003) and Staw and Ross
(1980) point out that experience is frequently negatively related to support of change
(Staw and Ross (1980); Pfeffer (1983); Larwood et al. (1995)). This can be explained
through the stated preferences for the status quo. Prior to the introduction of changes
to the university system, monographs and venia legendi were the primary requirements.
Consequently, we presume that
The longer the evaluator has been active as a university professor, the…
H5: … greater the preference for applicants with high-quality monographs.
H6: … greater the preference for applicants with a venia legendi.
2.2 tHe influenCe of HomopHily on Appointment preferenCes
Some of the most robust findings from psychology are that selection decisions are generally
influenced by personal bias and specifically by a desire for homophily, which is the
tendency to associate and bond with others who are similar (McPherson, Smith-Lovin,
1 Legal action taken against Bavaria, Saxony, and Thüringen in this regard was lost, consequently, the venia legendi
was not abolished and is still regarded as a qualifying measure.
2 See, e.g., human capital decisions Franke et al. (2008) and referenced literature.
8 sbr 60 January 2008 -31

University reforms
and Cook (2001); Mollica, Gray, and Trevino (2003); Bacharach, Bamberger, and Vashdi
(2005); Sommers (2006)). From an economic point of view, this can be explained by the
reduction in the costs of adaptation of mental models and representations and increased
ease of communication (Durrett and Levin (2005); Makela, Kalla, and Piekkari (2007)).
Similarity is also rewarding because the individual’s self-image is positively confirmed and
the need to belong is supported .
In the context of this study, we believe that similarity of having a venia legendi, having
international experience, the age at which the evaluator was first appointed as a full
professor, and the reputation of the department are of importance for the appointment
decision:
H7a: Management professors who have a venia legendi prefer applicants with a venia
legendi.
H7b: The longer the management professor has spent time abroad, the greater the preference
for applicants with international experience.
H7c: The older the management professor was when first appointed, the older the maximum
age indicated for management professors in their first appointment.
H7d: The higher the CHE ranks the reputation of the management professor’s university
within the management studies area, the greater the preference for applicants who come
from a reputable chair.
2.3 tHe influenCe of A university’s finAnCing sourCes on Appointment
preferenCes
Almost 80% of the German universities are state financed (Kehm (2004)). The remaining
20% are predominantly financed by tuition fees, contributions, and donations from other
private financiers (Kehm (2004)). The difference in the sources of funds implies that there
are also differences regarding the appointment of academic personnel. Because they are
essentially more dependent on their students and practice partners’ satisfaction for their
financing than are publicly financed universities, private universities might attach greater
importance to committed teaching and practical orientation. Therefore, we assume that
private financing of a university is associated with the following aspects:
Private financing of a university is associated with…
H8: … a preference for teaching.
H9: … a preference for practical experience.
3 Mental models lead the decision makers to identify the problem structure, thus reducing the problem-solving’s
complexity, see Johnson-Laird (1983); Senge (1990); Barr, Stimpert, and Huff (1992); Kim (1993); Schrader,
Riggs, and Smith (1993); Schrader (1995).
4 See Franke et al. (2008) for an overview of similarity literature.
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m. fieDLer/i. WeLPe
3 method
3.1 determining tHe populAtion And extrACting tHe sAmple
To conduct our study, we request information on appointment processes in management
studies directly from the persons involved in the appointment processes. Doing so makes
it possible for us to obtain a valid survey of senior faculty’s assessments, characteristics,
and preferences.
A precondition for the empirical survey in this study was, first of all, the creation of an
address database of all management university professors in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.
We started with a list based on the Association of University Professors (VHB),
which we checked, updated, and complemented for the study. The selection criteria for
inclusion in this study’s database were a formal status as a full university professor employed
at a German, Swiss, or Austrian university. Exclusion criteria were a college professorship
(FH-professor), employment at a vocational academy (Berufsakademie), emerita persons,
and academic positions held abroad. If we were in doubt, we telephoned or emailed the
respective university professor for further information and clarification. In total, we identified
884 university professors who met our selection criteria. Of these, 80% were from Germany
(n = 704), 13% from Austria (n = 114) and 7% from Switzerland (n = 66).
3.2 development of tHe QuestionnAire
Since different institutional changes are underway in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland,
we developed different versions of the questionnaire for university management professors
in all three countries. However, we focus our analysis of the attitude towards changes in
appointment preferences on Germany, since it is the biggest of the three countries. Thus,
only the German version of the questionnaire contains questions on attitudes towards
change in the universities’ systems.
To control for possible distorting factors, we use a series of measures in drafting the questionnaire.
First of all, we wished to ensure that answers would not reflect “social desirability”.
We did so by guaranteeing anonymity in the analysis as well as promising not
to pass the data on to third parties. Guaranteed anonymity in the analysis is considered
a reliable control of social desirability (Crowne and Marlowe (1964); Mummendey
(1981)). In addition, the questionnaire instructions noted that there were no “incorrect”
or “correct” answers. Furthermore, we controlled for the tendency to confirm or acquiesce
by using differentiated scales (seven-point rating scales) and, as far as possible, unambiguously
formulated items. According to Jackson (1976) this method is the most efficient
way to control for acquiescence. In addition, the formulation of the questions encouraged
the respondents to present their “expert opinions” rather than to simply agree with all the
given items. In the questionnaires we randomized the sequence in which we presented
appointment preferences to the respondent. By doing so we could control for common
method bias effects (Podsakoff et al. (2003)) triggered by the order of the questions.
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University reforms
The external validation of the questionnaire was completed between February and April
2006. In total, we conducted 30 pilot studies with university personnel. This was followed
by revisions of the instrument for the appointment criteria, choice of variables, scale levels,
and the answer formats. We discussed questions on possible appointment criteria, definitions,
specifying the research questions through the identification of implementation
and acceptance problems. Our intention was to improve both the questionnaire and the
survey’s validity and design aspects.
3.3 implementAtion of tHe survey
We conducted our survey of the university professors between April and May 2006, using
a standardized online questionnaire. Announcements and cover letters concerning the
survey gave the target group clear information, which was aimed at eliciting their correct
response behavior and a high level of participation. This would be reflected by a high rate
of return and willingness to meticulously answer the questionnaire. This is particularly
important, as rates of return of only 10% to 30% are common in questionnaire studies
(Wieken (1974)), and because researchers should take data distortion into account if there
are too many unreturned questionnaires (Binder, Sieber, and Angst (1979)).
In total, 405 academics filled out the questionnaires. The rate of return thus amounts to
46%, which we regard as very satisfactory. The exceptionally high rate of return can also
be viewed as an indication of the subject’s topicality and relevance for university professors.
To assess the representativeness, we compare the control sample with the basic
population (see section 3.1.). With minor deviations, the distribution of the various
countries corresponds to the basic population’s distribution (rates of return per country:
Germany 81% (n = 330), Austria 12% (n = 47), Switzerland 7% (n = 28)). On the
whole, this sample is therefore a sound and sufficiently representative database.
3.4 vAriAbles
dependent vAriAbles
Appointment preferences. On a seven-point scale, the respondents indicated how important
they think it is that applicants for a chair should fulfill the following characteristics
and criteria: The applicant … 1)… has written very good monographs, 2) … has a venia
legendi, 3) … has published in prestigious journals, 4) … has international experience,
5) … comes from an acknowledged faculty, 6) … is committed to teaching and 7) … has
several years of practical experience.
Age at first appointment. The respondents indicated the maximum age that an applicant
should not have exceeded at his/her first appointment to a professorship in management
studies.
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m. fieDLer/i. WeLPe
independent vAriAbles
Satisfaction with the status quo of the structure of management studies prior to
reforms. We built an index to measure this variable using the following six indicators: How
satisfied were you with 1)…the C-remuneration (C-Besoldung), 2)… the venia legendi
as quasi-compulsory qualification for university professors, 3)… the management studies
publication paradigm that primarily took books and German publications into consideration,
4)… the organizational design of affiliated Habilitanden at the Chair of the Advisor,
5)… the current proportion of skilled foreign researchers at management departments, and
6)… the overall management structures. Cronbach’s Alpha approximates 0.82.
Acceptance of the university reform objectives. We built an index to measure this variable
with the following seven indicators: How much do you appreciate the following
university reform objectives: 1) More international journal publications by German
academics, 2) A higher degree of autonomy for junior researchers (Habilitanden) (e.g.,
own resources), 3) A reduction in the age at first appointment in management, 4) A higher
proportion of qualified researchers from abroad, 5) A higher proportion of female professors
in management, 6) The conversion of “Habilitanden” positions into junior professor
positions, and 7) The rededication of professorship resources as faculty and university
resources. Cronbach’s Alpha approximates 0.76.
CHE ranking. From the respondents’ information about the university where they are
employed, we created a new variable based on the ranking of the respondent’s department
in the CHE research reputation ranking for management departments.
Experience as a professor. To determine the respondents’ experience as professors, we
subtracted their first year of appointment from 2006.
Financing of the university. We asked the professors whether the university where they
work is predominantly privately or publicly funded.
Venia legendi. We asked the professors whether they have a venia legendi.
Age at first appointment. To calculate the respondents’ age at their first appointment, we
subtracted their date of birth from the year of their first appointment.
Number of sojourns at universities and institutes abroad. We asked the professors to
indicate the number of universities and institutes abroad where they had to date spent
more than 6 months.
4 results
4.1 desCriptive results
4.1.1 Appointment preferenCes
Table 1 contains both the mean values of the 26 appointment preferences according to the
VHB commissions and the average appointment preference values as determined over the
entire sample of German, Austrian, and Swiss university professors. The table shows that
12 sbr 60 January 2008 -31

Table 1: Appointment preferences according to commissions – part 1
Preferences
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Commission
banking/finance 52 x 5.90 3.92 .12 3.02 5.83 .38 .1 5.2 5.29 3. 8 3. . 5 5. 0 .15 . 5 3.19 5.12 5.52 .02 3.83 2. 9 3. 2.19 3. .90 5.52
σ 1.22 1. 1. 8 1.53 0.98 1. 9 1. 9 1.29 1.3 1. 1.5 1.9 1.39 1. 1 1. 8 1. 1 1.2 1. 1. 1. 1.5 1.52 1.31 1. 0 1.03 0.92
bus. taxation 20 x 5. 5 5.05 5.35 3. 5 .00 .95 . 0 5. 5 5. 0 . 0 .80 5.55 5.85 . 0 .50 3. 0 5. 0 .05 . 5 .30 3.20 . 0 2.00 3.15 .80 5.85
σ 1. 1.23 1.31 1. 0. 9 1. 3 1.88 1.2 1.19 1.5 1. 1.23 0.93 1. 0 1. 1. 9 1.19 1.00 1.35 1.3 2.0 1.31 1.2 1. 3 1. 1.18
5 x .80 5. 0 5.80 5.00 . 0 5. 0 5. 0 5.80 5. 0 3.00 2. 0 5. 0 5.80 . 0 . 0 2.20 5. 0 5.00 5. 0 5.00 2.80 3.80 1.80 2.80 . 0 5.20
Univ.
management
σ 0. 5 1.1 1.30 2.00 0.55 1. 1.1 0.8 0.89 2.00 1.1 2.51 1.30 1.52 2.30 1.30 1.1 2. 5 1.1 1.58 1.30 1.92 1.30 2. 9 2.88 0.8
11 x 5.3 .55 . 2.82 5.2 3.82 .18 5.2 5.3 3.55 .00 . 3 5.20 3. .2 3. 5 5.09 5.82 .00 .00 2. 3 .00 2. 3. 3 . 5.3
international
management
σ 1.03 1.13 1.21 1.1 1.2 1. 1.89 0. 9 0. 1.51 1.2 2.28 1. 2 1.3 1.2 1. 3 1.30 1.1 1. 1 1. 1 1.5 0. 1.29 1. 8 1. 3 1.21
Logistics 13 x .00 .00 .15 3. 5.5 3. 3. 5. 5.08 .38 . 5.85 5. 2 .92 5.08 3.23 5.15 .08 5.08 5.23 2.92 .85 2. .08 5.00 5.
σ 1.35 1.22 1.3 1.33 1.13 1. 2 1. 9 1.05 1.19 1. 1 1. 1 1.0 1.12 0. 0.8 1.30 1.28 1.0 1. 1 1.2 1. 1 1.3 1.51 1.38 1.58 1.20
marketing 59 x 5.98 .15 . 3.15 5.88 . 1 . 9 5.1 5.08 .19 .15 5.20 5. . 5.02 3.12 5.3 .08 .55 .1 3.08 . 1 2.15 3.2 .93 5.59
σ 1.11 1. 0 1.59 1. 2 1.22 1. 2 1.9 1.59 1. 1 1. 1. 1. 8 1. 1.29 1.3 1. 3 1.53 1.15 1.52 1.5 1. 1. 1. 5 1. 1.31 1.21
University reforms
sbr 60 January 2008 -31 13
x 5.00 5.00 5.1 3. 1 .8 3.8 .29 .5 5.00 3.8 .1 5.5 .29 3.5 3.5 3.29 5.00 5. 1 3.8 .00 3.00 3.8 2. 1 3.5 .1 . 1
Public
management
σ 1.83 1.15 1.0 1.50 0. 9 1.5 1.80 1.2 1.53 1. 8 1. 1.81 0. 1. 2 1. 0 1. 0 1. 1 1.11 1. 1.83 1.91 1. 1.50 0.98 1.95 1.25
5 x .20 5.00 . 0 3. 0 5. 0 3.20 5.20 5.80 5. 0 . 0 . 0 5. 0 .00 5.00 5. 0 3.80 5. 0 5.80 .80 . 0 3. 0 5.20 3. 0 . 0 .80 5.80
operations
research
σ 0.8 1. 1 0.89 1.3 1.52 1. 9 0.8 0.8 0.55 1.52 0.55 1.82 0. 1 1.22 1.1 1.10 0.55 0. 5 1.30 1.3 1.52 0.8 0.89 1.52 0.8 0. 5
organization 3 x .00 .58 5.1 3.81 .0 . 5. 5. 2 5. 3.83 3.83 .53 5.9 . 1 5.03 3. 5.83 5. 5 . .33 2.9 . 1.9 3.5 5.00 5.5
σ 1.12 1. 1. 2 1.55 0.98 1.81 1.3 1. 8 1. 1.5 1. 0 2.0 1.2 1.3 1.59 1. 5 1.21 1.18 1. 0 1.53 1.80 1. 1 1.28 1. 8 1.3 1.13
Human resources 25 x 5. 0 .3 5.12 3. 8 5.9 .38 5.1 5. 2 5. 3.0 3.00 . 5. 9 . 0 . 2 2. 1 5.80 5. . 3 .12 2. 2 5.00 1. 0 3.38 5.25 5. 0
σ 1.53 1.50 1.5 1. 8 0.8 1. 9 1.80 1.25 1.38 1.3 1. 2.1 1.0 1.32 1. 3 1.3 1.00 1.05 1. 1. 1. 9 1.35 0.9 1.53 1.11 1.22
19 x .00 5.00 5.2 .05 5. 9 .53 .32 5.53 5.3 .11 .3 5.58 5. .53 5.00 3. 5.3 .05 . 8 .58 2.95 . 3 1.89 2. 8 5.00 5. 8
Production
management
σ 1.15 1.3 1.10 1.5 1.18 1. 3 1. 0 1. 3 1. 1. 5 1.50 1. 3 1.2 1.58 1. 0 1. 1 1. 0.85 1.29 1.2 1. 5 1. 1.3 1.83 1.53 1.00
x = mean; σ = standard deviation; Numbers 1-26 in the column headings denote the respective appointment preferences. Compare this with the legend of the continuation of
table 1. The exact wording of the questions is displayed in table 5.

m. fieDLer/i. WeLPe
Table 1: Continuation: appointment preferences according to commissions – part 2
N 1 2 3 5 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 15 1 1 18 19 20 21 22 23 2 25 2
Preferences
Commission
Accountancy 2 x 5.81 .8 5.02 3.31 5. 8 .39 . 5.31 5. 3 .05 .0 5.10 5.8 . 2 . 3.2 5.50 5.8 .31 .18 3.03 .5 2.02 3.03 5.02 5. 8
σ 1.19 1.3 1.35 1.35 1.05 1. 1. 5 1. 8 1.52 1. 1 1. 9 1. 1.23 1.5 1. 3 1. 9 1.0 1.08 1.38 1. 1 1.8 1.88 1.3 1. 0 1. 8 1.28
18 x 5.83 .22 . 3.33 5. .0 .39 .83 5.1 3. 3.89 . 5. 8 . 1 5.0 2. 2 .89 5. 3.5 3. 1 3.28 3.5 2.1 3.00 . 2 5.00
technology and
innovation management
σ 1.38 1.59 1.03 1.5 1. 1. 1. 2 1.0 0.8 1.85 1. 5 2.0 1.1 1. 9 1. 1.18 1.5 1. 1. 5 1. 1 1. 1 1.50 1.38 1.9 1.02 1.2
11 x 5.3 . 5.2 .2 5. .18 5.18 5.82 5.82 3.82 3.91 .82 .2 .82 5.3 3.90 5. 3 .00 .55 .55 3. 3 5. 5 2. 5 3.3 5.3 5. 3
environmental
economics
σ 1.50 1.50 1. 2 1. 9 1. 5 1.89 1. 1. 0 1.5 2.0 2.2 1.89 0. 9 2.09 1. 3 2.18 1.35 1.3 1.21 1.21 1. 8 0.93 1.92 2.01 1.12 0.90
52 x 5. . 0 .58 3.2 5.81 .83 . 0 5.25 5.12 3. 0 3. 5 .90 5.81 .35 . 9 2.85 5. 5.88 .90 . 9 3. 3 .33 1. 9 2. 9 . 3 5.
Computer studies
in economics
1 sbr 60 January 2008 -31
σ 1.2 1. 1. 9 1.3 1.01 1. 1.9 1.30 1. 1 1.38 1. 0 1.5 1.25 1. 1 1.59 1. 1 1.18 1.15 1.32 1. 2 1. 5 1. 9 1.19 1. 5 1. 1.18
1 x 5.00 3.00 .00 .00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 2.00 3.00 .00 .00 5.00 .00 3.00 5.00 .00 5.00 5.00 2.00 5.00 2.00 1.00 5.00 5.00
Philosophy of
science
σ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
other x .50 5.25 . 5 3.50 5.25 .50 3. 5 5. 5 5. 5 3.50 2.33 .00 .33 5. 5 .25 2.50 .50 .00 .25 3.50 3.50 .00 2. 5 .50 5.50 5.50
σ 1.00 1.2 2. 3 1.00 1. 1 2.52 2.22 0.50 0.50 1. 3 1.53 1.15 0.58 1.2 0.9 2.38 1.00 0.82 3.20 2.08 1.29 1. 3 2.22 2.38 1.00 1.29
Total 400 x 5.80 4.48 4.76 3.42 5.79 4.42 4.58 5.31 5.34 3.87 3.92 5.00 5.74 4.46 4.83 3.17 5.45 5.85 4.47 4.27 3.07 4.36 2.07 3.23 4.92 5.51
σ 1.2 1.50 1.50 1. 9 1.10 1. 0 1.80 1.35 1.39 1.58 1. 5 1.80 1.29 1. 1.55 1. 0 1.29 1.20 1.51 1.52 1. 1. 0 1.35 1. 1 1.3 1.1
x = mean; σ = standard deviation.
1 = Prestigious journal publications; 2 = Study and text books; 3 = Monographs; 4 = Publisher volume; 5 = Influential publications; 6 = Conference contributions; 7 = Accepts
research risks; 8 = Didactics; 9 = Committed teaching; 10 = Comes from a reputable faculty; 11 = Comes from a reputable chair; 12 = Venia legendi; 13 = Social and personal
competency; 14 = Substantial international experience; 15 = Any international experience; 16 = Good departmental network; 17 = Creative and innovative; 18 = Subject fit;
19 = Has DFG third-party funds; 20 = Has EU third-party funds; 21 = Practical experience; 22 = Academic self-management; 23 = No potential competition; 24 = Similar research
paradigm; 25 = Probability of acceptance; 26 = Presentation.

University reforms
on the whole, the criterion “subject fit” scores best with 5.85, followed by the criterion
“prestigious journal publications” (5.8), “influental publications” (5.79) and “social skills”
(5.74). At the lowest end are the criteria “applicant does not compete for resources” (2.07),
“applicant has substantial practical experience” (3.07) and “applicant is already connected
with the departmental network” (3.17). From table 1 we can infer the differences between
the VHB commissions’ assessment of the different appointment criteria. Besides the 26
criteria that we offered to assess, there may be further criteria relevant to appointments.
This option was not really utilized and these suggestions diverge from what is required,
ranging from: The applicant … “… should pursue his/her own research initiatives and
not fashionable themes” to “… should have contacts in practice” and “… willingness to
relocate” and “availability outside the teaching semester”.
Table 2 shows the average values of the appointment criteria subdivided into Germany,
Austria, and Switzerland. It appears that on average, university professors from Austria
assess the importance of appointment criteria slightly higher than the Swiss and German
university professors. However, on the whole, the assessments of the criteria’s importance
are similar for all three countries.
Table 3 shows the appointment criteria’s average values as expressed by respondents at
private and publicly financed universities. It appears that in principle, university professors
at public universities evaluate their appointment criteria similarly, but with slightly
varying emphases.
Table 4 shows the average values of the appointment preferences of the top, middle, and
lowest groups in the CHE research reputation ranking of management faculties. The
evaluation of appointment criteria’s importance differs more between these three groups
than between countries, publicly and privately financed universities, and between VHB
commissions. On average, faculties in the lowest group of the CHE ranking have higher
demands for applicants than do the faculties belonging to the central and top groups.
4.1.2 rAnking of Appointment preferenCes
Because the appointment preferences were determined by means of a seven-point scale,
which, in principle, allows all criteria to be equally important and/or unimportant, we
wanted to know the preference sequence of at least the most important criteria. Thus, two
weeks after the first survey, we sent a second questionnaire in which we asked the respondents
to rank the eight most important criteria. 428 professors participated in this second
questionnaire. It appears that the three most important criteria, determined in the first
survey (subject fit, publication in prestigious journals, and social skills), were also regarded
as most important in the direct ranking.
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m. fieDLer/i. WeLPe
Table 2: Appointment preferences according to countries
N 1 2 3 5 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 15 1 1 18 19 20 21 22 23 2 25 2
Germany 330 x 5. 5 . 2 . 2 3. 0 5. 3 .39 .59 5.33 5. 0 3. 8 3.89 .8 5. . 1 . 3.22 5. 5.8 . 0 .29 3.05 . 3 2.05 3.20 .89 5.50
σ 1.2 1.52 1. 8 1.52 1.09 1. 1 1.81 1.3 1. 0 1.5 1. 5 1.81 1.30 1. 9 1.5 1. 3 1.29 1.23 1. 1.51 1. 0 1. 2 1.32 1. 9 1.3 1.18
Austria x .0 .9 5.21 3.83 5.98 . .55 5.19 5.19 . 9 . 3 5. 5. .85 5.19 3.13 5.53 .0 3.81 3.8 3. 1 3.8 2.21 3. 5.0 5.39
σ 1.28 1. 1. 1. 9 1.28 1.52 1. 5 1.31 1.30 1.50 1. 3 1. 0 1.22 1.29 1. 2 1.5 1.20 1.08 1. 1 1.5 2.12 1.5 1.38 1. 1.15 1.00
switzerland 28 x .0 .5 . 8 3.15 .0 .29 .50 5.5 5.11 .0 3. 5.32 5.93 . .89 2.59 5.5 5. 5 .19 . 8 3.21 .50 1.9 3.0 5.0 5.89
σ 1.20 1.2 1. 1.23 0.90 1. 1 1. 3 1.20 1.3 1.50 1.55 1. 1.18 1.50 1. 3 1.25 1. 0 1.00 1.88 1.53 1. 1.35 1. 8 1.8 1. 9 0.88
Total 405 x 5.80 4.49 4.77 3.44 5.79 4.42 4.58 5.33 5.35 3.88 3.92 5.00 5.75 4.46 4.82 3.17 5.45 5.86 4.48 4.28 3.10 4.37 2.06 3.22 4.92 5.52
σ 1.2 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.11 1. 0 1.80 1.35 1.39 1.5 1. 5 1.81 1.29 1. 1.5 1. 0 1.29 1.20 1.52 1.52 1. 5 1. 0 1.3 1. 1 1.35 1.1
1 sbr 60 January 2008 -31
Table 3: Appointment preferences according to university financing
1 2 3 5 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 15 1 1 18 19 20 21 22 23 2 25 2
3 x 5.82 . . 3. 3 5. 8 . 3 .5 5.2 5.32 3.88 3.93 5.01 5. 0 . 2 . 8 3.1 5. 5.8 . 9 .25 3.0 .35 2.0 3.2 .91 5.53
mainly government/public
financing
σ 1.2 1.52 1.5 1.55 1.12 1. 3 1.81 1.3 1.39 1. 0 1. 8 1.81 1.30 1. 8 1.58 1. 3 1.25 1.20 1.53 1.53 1. 1 1. 0 1.3 1. 0 1.35 1.13
28 x 5. 5 . 8 .5 3.39 5. 9 .25 . 1 5.8 5. 3.8 3. 8 .5 .0 5.0 5.3 3.32 5.32 5.5 .1 .21 3. . 2.18 2.89 . 9 5.3
mainly private
financing
(e.g., donation)
σ 1.29 1.25 1.00 0.99 0.9 1. 1. 3 1.15 1. 2 1. 1 1. 0 1. 9 1.18 1.12 0.95 1.39 1.5 1.20 1. 1 1. 2.0 1.5 1. 2 1.91 1. 5 1.22
Total 395 x 5.81 4.48 4.74 3.43 5.78 4.42 4.58 5.31 5.35 3.88 3.92 4.98 5.73 4.47 4.82 3.17 5.46 5.85 4.46 4.25 3.08 4.36 2.07 3.24 4.90 5.51
σ 1.2 1.50 1.50 1.51 1.11 1. 1 1.80 1.3 1. 0 1.59 1. 1.81 1.29 1. 1.55 1. 1 1.2 1.20 1.53 1.52 1. 1.59 1.3 1. 1 1.3 1.1
x = mean; σ = standard deviation.
1 = Prestigious journal publications; 2 = Study and text books; 3 = Monographs; 4 = Publisher volume; 5 = Influential publications; 6 = Conference contributions; 7 = Accepts research
risks; 8 = Didactics; 9 = Committed teaching; 10 = Comes from a reputable faculty; 11 = Comes from a reputable chair; 12 = Venia legendi; 13 = Social and personal competency;
14 = Substantial international experience; 15 = Any international experience; 16 = Good departmental network; 17 = Creative and innovative; 18 = Subject fit; 19 = Has DFG thirdparty
funds; 20 = Has EU third-party funds; 21 = Practical experience; 22 = Academic self-management; 23 = No potential competition; 24 = Similar research paradigm; 25 = Probability
of acceptance; 26 = Presentation.

Table 4: Appointment preferences according to CHE-reputation ranking
1 2 3 5 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 15 1 1 18 19 20 21 22 23 2 25 2
CHe-top-group 39 x .18 3.51 3.92 2. 2 5.82 3.95 .15 .85 5.00 .11 .3 .58 5. . 2 . 9 2.85 5.59 5. .51 .23 2. 9 3.59 1. 3.00 . 9 5.18
σ 1.0 1.5 1. 3 1.23 0.91 1.81 1. 1. 1 1.3 1.29 1. 5 1.8 1.2 1. 3 1.51 1.58 0.85 1. 8 1.39 1.5 1.5 1.5 0. 0 1. 3 1.5 1.1
CHe-middle group 232 x 5. 8 .52 .80 3. 5 5. 2 .39 . 9 5. 5.50 3. 3. .8 5.82 . 8 .90 3.20 5. 5.92 . 2 .2 3.0 .58 2.03 3.2 .98 5.55
σ 1.29 1.53 1. 2 1.53 1.08 1. 1 1.8 1.33 1. 0 1. 3 1. 9 1.81 1.2 1. 9 1.58 1. 2 1.33 1.18 1. 1.51 1. 2 1.59 1.30 1. 2 1.32 1.1
CHe-Low group 10 x .20 5.50 5.30 .30 5.90 . 0 . 0 .30 .10 3.80 .20 5.20 .30 3.50 .10 3.10 5.10 . 0 . 0 . 0 3. 0 .80 2.80 3.20 . 0 5.90
University reforms
sbr 60 January 2008 -31 1
σ 0.92 0.9 1. 9 1. 2 0.88 1.3 1.5 0. 0.5 1. 8 1. 2 1. 8 0.82 1. 3 1.10 1. 0 1.10 0.52 1.0 1.0 1.35 1. 8 1.93 1. 9 1. 0.5
Total 281 x 5.77 4.42 4.70 3.37 5.74 4.34 4.62 5.39 5.46 3.73 3.85 4.84 5.81 4.44 4.84 3.15 5.48 5.88 4.60 4.27 3.04 4.45 1.98 3.23 4.90 5.51
σ 1.2 1.5 1. 8 1.52 1.05 1. 1.81 1.35 1.38 1.58 1. 0 1.80 1.2 1. 8 1.5 1. 1 1.2 1.22 1. 1.50 1. 9 1. 2 1.28 1. 2 1.3 1.1
x = mean; σ = standard deviation.
1 = Prestigious journal publications; 2 = Study and text books; 3 = Monographs; 4 = Publisher volume; 5 = Influential publications; 6 = Conference contributions; 7 = Accepts research
risks; 8 = Didactics; 9 = Committed teaching; 10 = Comes from a reputable faculty; 11 = Comes from a reputable chair; 12 = Venia legendi; 13 = Social and personal competency;
14 = Substantial international experience; 15 = Any international experience; 16 = Good departmental network; 17 = Creative and innovative; 18 = Subject fit; 19 = Has
DFG third-party funds; 20 = Has EU third-party funds; 21 = Practical experience; 22 = Academic self-management; 23 = No potential competition; 24 = Similar research paradigm;
25 = Probability of acceptance; 26 = Presentation.

m. fieDLer/i. WeLPe
Figure 1: Ranking of the eight most important appointment preferences
Rancing (8 = highest inuence; 1 = lowest inuence)
Prestigious journal publications
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Social competency
Person-Subject Fit
Creative and innovative
Presentation at
Criteria for appointment decisions
4.1.3 Clustering of Appointment CriteriA
Appointment invitation
Venia Legendi
18 sbr 60 January 2008 -31
Didactics
International experience
To identify groups of university professors with similar preferences, we conducted a cluster
center analysis based on the 26 appointment criteria . Table 5 shows the appointment
criteria’s average values per cluster. It appears that cluster 1 attaches special importance to
publications in prestigious journals and international experience. In comparison to the
other clusters, cluster 2 has below-average applicant requirements for most of the criteria.
In comparison to other clusters, cluster 3 has above-average applicant requirements for
most of the criteria. Cluster 4 attaches above-average importance to the fact that applicants
should not compete for resources and should follow a research paradigm similar to
theirs. Cluster 5 assigns above-average importance to whether the applicant has published
very good monographs and textbooks.
4.1.4 Appointment exClusion CriteriA
On the question of which criteria could lead to an applicant’s exclusion from the appointment
procedure, the following were frequently cited: arrogant behavior and a lack of collegiality,
no “Habilitation”, and no subject fit for the advertised position.
5 We first conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis to determine the optimal number of clusters.

Table 5: Appointment preferences according to cluster allocation
Cluster 1 2 3 5
Weight x
Preferences N 0 3 121 82 83
1 ... has prestigious journal publications (e.g., in journals ranked A+, A and b according to the vHb-Journal) .50 5.88 5. 0 .09 5.01 5.81
2 ... has published very good studies and text books (e.g., high circulation, setting standard in field) 3.93 3.00 5. 0 3. 9 5.05 . 8
... has published very good monographs (e.g., well received in the academic community, published with
3
.10 3.35 5. 1 .22 5.31 . 8
prestigious publishing house)
... has very good publisher volumes (e.g., with the most important authors and content of the field) 2.99 2.3 .55 2. 3.51 3. 5
5 ... has published influential publications (e.g. frequently quoted contributions with high impact factor), .03 . 9 .12 5. 5. 0 5.
... has very good conference contributions (e.g., at conferences with travel allowance supported by vHb and DfG) . 9 3.1 5.28 3.99 .13 .
... takes risks in his/her research (e.g., investigates research questions regardless of whether the results can be easily
. 1 2. 9 5. 9 3.5 5. 3 .58
published
8 ... has very good didactical abilities (e.g., very good teaching evaluations) 5.31 3.30 .1 . 3 5. 5 5.33
... very engaged in teaching (e.g., shows total commitment for and interest in the central idea and realization of
9
5.33 3.1 .12 . 2 5.95 5.3
lectures)
10 ... comes from a faculty with an excellent reputation 2. 1 2. .8 .5 3.3 3.89
11 ... comes from a very respected chair/habilitanden advisor 2. 1 3.1 .8 . 3. 2 3.92
12 ... has a venia legendi 3. 3.95 5. 0 5.5 5.5 5.01
... has high social and personal competency (e.g., skills in communication, team work, consensus and
13
5. 1 .05 .38 5. 3 .0 5.
conflict-handling skills, empathy, reliability)
1 ... has substantial research and teaching experience abroad (e.g., position abroad) 5.30 3. 0 5.02 . 3 3.13 . 8
University reforms
sbr 60 January 2008 -31 19
15 ... has some research and teaching experience abroad 5. 3 3.5 5. 9 5.0 3. .85
1 ... has a good network at the department where he/she has applied 2. 0 2.81 .0 3.52 2.30 3.1
1 ... is creative and innovative 5.5 3.81 .03 . 5.81 5.
18 ... is very suitable for the advertised position 5.2 5.28 . 8 5. 2 5.99 5.8
19 ... has raised DfG third-party funds .5 . 9 5.30 .12 3.39 .
20 ... has raised funds from other third-parties such as the eU and the bmbf .1 3.98 5.30 .02 3.31 .28
21 ... has several years of practical experience (e.g., at least two years in practice) 2. 1.8 .5 2. 1 2.5 3.1
22 ... is totally commitment to academic self-management 3.83 2. 5.33 3.9 . 1 .39
23 ... not a potential competitor for resources 1. 1 1. 0 2.50 2. 2 1. 3 2.09
2 ... has a similar research paradigm to mine 2. 2.58 3. 9 3.83 2.5 3.2
25 ... would probably accept the position . .05 5.51 5.10 .51 .92
2 ... gives an excellent application address 5. 9 . 0 .05 5.50 5.33 5.53

m. fieDLer/i. WeLPe
Table 6: Correlation tables of hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7d
Age at first
appointment
stays
abroad
venia
legendi
University
financing
experience
CHe-top
group
Common
goals
satisfaction
previously
reputable
chair
international
experience
Journal
publica-
venia
legendi
monographs
tions
monographs r 0.35 –0.17 0.01 0.18 0.40 –0.11 –0.21 0.26 –0.01 0.0 0.02 0.10
p 0.000 0.001 0.8 1 0.001 0.000 0.0 3 0.000 0.000 0.820 0. 28 0. 2 0.0
venia legendi r –0.16 –0.08 0.32 0.53 –0.27 –0.0 0.16 –0.05 0.27 –0.09 0.03
p 0.003 0.1 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.318 0.005 0. 15 0.000 0.102 0.5 8
Journal publications r 0.35 0.00 –0.26 0.37 0.13 0.02 –0.01 –0.03 0.02 –0.18
p 0.000 0.9 0.000 0.000 0.02 0. 52 0.921 0.535 0. 1 0.001
international experience r 0.12 –0.28 0.42 0.00 0.12 0.15 –0.05 0.18 –0.01
p 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.953 0.035 0.008 0.3 0.001 0.921
reputable chair r 0.27 –0.13 0.12 0.13 0.00 –0.0 –0.03 0.0
p 0.000 0.018 0.0 5 0.020 0.9 3 0.21 0.5 0 0.305
satisfaction previously r –0.47 –0.10 0.21 –0.10 0.19 –0.17 0.03
p 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.102 0.001 0.00 0. 00
Common goals r 0.01 0.0 0.17 –0.03 0.11 –0.08
p 0.8 0. 9 0.00 0.5 0.0 0.18
CHe-top group r 0.05 –0.12 –0.03 0.00 –0.15
p 0.392 0.01 0. 51 0.98 0.013
experience r –0.18 –0.0 0.25 –0.19
p 0.001 0. 9 0.000 0.001
University financing r –0.05 0.01 –0.10
p 0.318 0.85 0.080
venia legendi r –0.08 0.08
p 0.158 0.129
stays abroad r –0.12
p 0.025
N 332 330 332 330 329 2 32 391 350 50 35 3 3 2
minimum 1 1 1 1 1 9 0 1 1 0 0 30
maximum 2 9 1 3 2 1 8 55
mean . 3 .8 5. . 0 3.90 2 . 1 31.05 0.15 12.15 1.0 0.9 0.85 3 .2
standard deviation 1. 9 1.81 1.2 1. 9 1. 5 . 9 . 0.3 9.11 0.2 0.2 1.29 3.8
20 sbr 60 January 2008 -31

4.1.5 differenCe between first And subseQuent Appointments
University reforms
To the question of whether there should be a maximum age for the first appointment of
the new generation management academics, 61.4% of the respondents answered positively
and 38.6% negatively. The maximum age given for a first appointment was on average 40,
with a range between 34 and 55. Of the respondents, 69.3% are of the opinion that the
age threshold should be adjusted for time spent with the family, while 30.7% rejected this.
Nevertheless, 49.8% favored an age threshold adjustment for time spent in practice.
To the question of whether the applicant’s gender would make a difference in an age threshold
adjustment due to time spent with the family, 64.2% answered that it would not. However,
30.6% would rather see an age threshold correction for female applicants, while 0.7% would
rather consent to an age threshold correction for male applicants. For 96.9% of the respondents,
gender plays no role in an age adjustment for time spent in practice, contrary to age
correction for time spent with the family. Examples of comments on the question of time
spent with family are: “the applicant must have nurtured and spent time with children and
dependents” but also “researchers are judged on their output not on their family situation”.
We also asked the respondents whether they attach different appointment criteria weights
to a first appointment than to subsequent appointments. Some 25.9% allotted different
weights to criteria at first appointments, and 74.1% applied equal standards to first and
subsequent appointments. To the question of which criteria should be weighted higher
at first appointments, academic potential, and the quality of publications were frequently
mentioned. To the question of which criteria should be weighted lower at first appointments,
raising third-party funds and the number, not the quality, of published papers
were frequently mentioned. Examples of comments on the question of which criteria that
should be weighted lower at a first appointment, are “I would require fewer publications
in A-journals but there should be some” and “criteria that are only fully realizable as a function
of time, e.g. number of sojourns abroad, number of double blind reviewed contributions”
as well as “the thematic range of the papers”. Examples of comments on the question of
which criteria should be weighted higher at first appointments, are “age, prestigious journal
publications (has only recently become more important), origin (university, chair holder)” and
“publications are weighted higher, commitment to university service work far less”.
4.1.6 AggregAted preferenCes
One of the aims of our paper is also to provide applicants for professorships with concrete
suggestions on appointment committees’ preferences.
Prior research has established that group decision-making differs in process and outcomes
from individual decision-making (Bainbridge (2002); Brodbeck et al. (2007)). In the
selection of applicants to a full-professor position, individuals do not ultimately make
appointment decisions. Instead, these are always the decisions of appointment committees
as a group. Thus, we have aggregated all the faculty lecturers’ assessments as an evaluation
of specific appointment criteria on a faculty level. Figure 2 shows management faculties’
sbr 60 January 2008 -31 21

m. fieDLer/i. WeLPe
aggregated preferences on the dimension “applicant has very good journal publications”,
and “applicant has high social and personal competency”. We use only contributions from
faculties where at least three professors responded.
Figure 2: Journal publications and social and personal competency
applicant has prestigous journal publications
4.2 ConfirmAtory results
applicant has high social competency
Table 6 shows the average values, sample size, minimum and maximum values, and the correlations
between the dependent, independent, and control variables as expressed in hypotheses
1, 2, 3, 4 and 7d and tested with the German sample. On a bivariate level, the correlation
between the variables of the hypotheses are significant and in the hypothesized direction.
Table 7 shows the average values, sample size, the minimum and maximum values, and
the correlations between the dependent, independent, and control variables expressed in
hypotheses 5, 6, 7b, 7c, 8, and 9. We tested these hypotheses using the entire sample of
German, Austrian, and Swiss university professors. Tables 8 and 9 show the results of the
regression analyses.
22 sbr 60 January 2008 -31

Table 7: Correlation tables of hypotheses 5, 6, 7b, 7c, 8, and 9
own age at first
appointment
own international
experience
own venia
legendi
experience University
financing
teaching Practical
experience
Age at first
appointment
international
experience
venia
legendi
monographs
monographs r 0.30 0.03 0.0 0.37 0.24 0.29 –0.0 0.03 0.05 0.08
p 0.000 0.589 0. 55 0.000 0.000 0.000 0. 0.53 0.285 0.09
venia legendi r –0.0 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.17 –0.0 0.28 –0.0 0.01
p 0.208 0.3 2 0.01 0.2 3 0.001 0.21 0.000 0.2 2 0.835
r –0.14 0.05 0.26 0.09 0.11 –0.0 0.23 –0.02
international
experience
p 0.022 0.3 2 0.000 0.081 0.023 0. 22 0.000 0. 1
Age at first
r 0.05 –0.13 –0.11 –0.05 0.01 –0.23 0.21
appointment
p 0. 08 0.029 0.080 0. 29 0.8 5 0.000 0.001
teaching r 0.28 0.12 0.0 –0.0 –0.01 –0.02
p 0.000 0.018 0.2 3 0.2 0.858 0.
Practical
r 0.15 0.09 –0.11 0.18 0.09
experience
p 0.00 0.0 5 0.02 0.000 0.080
experience r –0.17 –0.0 0.23 –0.22
p 0.001 0.2 2 0.000 0.000
University
r –0.10 –0.02 –0.08
financing
p 0.0 3 0. 15 0.1 3
own venia legendi r –0.08 0.13
p 0.122 0.010
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r –0.13
own international
experience
p 0.015
N 05.00 03.00 03.00 283.00 0 .00 0 .00 39 .00 395.00 398.00 385.00 38 .00
minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 3 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 29.00
maximum .00 .00 .00 55.00 .00 .00 3 .00 2.00 1.00 8.00 55.00
mean . 5.00 . 0.01 5.35 3.10 12. 0 1.0 0.9 0.95 3 .98
standard deviation 1.51 1.81 1. 2.99 1.39 1. 5 9.28 0.2 0.23 1.31 3.80

m. fieDLer/i. WeLPe
Table 8: Results of the regression analyses for hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7d
Column 1 2 3 5 8 9 10
H1: sig. H2: sig. H3: sig. H : in- sig. H d: sig.
mono-
venia
Journal
ternarepugraphslegpublicationaltableenditionsexperience
chair
satisfaction with the
structures in management
before the reforms
0.36 0.000 0.43 0.000 –0.09 0.2 9 –0.10 0.218 0.2 0.001
Agreement with the aims
of the university reform
0.03 0. 0 –0.01 0.85 0.32 0.000 0.32 0.000 0.03 0. 8
CHe-top-group –0.15 0.022 –0.03 0. 1 0.10 0.1 2 –0.01 0.912 0.20 0.003
experience 0.21 0.003 0.09 0.193 0.01 0.899 0.08 0.253 0.1 0.058
University financing 0.03 0.59 0.00 0.9 3 –0.05 0. 0 0.0 0.3 1 –0.01 0.92
venia legendi –0.05 0. 3 0.1 0.005 –0.05 0.503 –0.05 0. 13 –0.21 0.002
Age at first appointment 0.18 0.005 0.0 0.3 5 –0.13 0.05 0.05 0. 3 0.1 0.021
stays abroad 0.08 0.20 0.01 0.885 –0.05 0. 33 0.1 0.035 0.03 0. 8
F-value 8.35 0.000 10.32 0.000 5.2 0.000 .38 0.000 .9 0.000
R² 0.25 0.29 0.1 0.20 0.1
Adjusted R² 0.22 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.13
Preference for applicants who have written very good monographs. Column 1 of table 8
shows that the predictor variables explain 22% of the variance of the dependent variable
“preference for applicants with very good monographs”. The regression results
show that satisfaction with management structures prior to the university reforms has
a significantly positive effect on the dependent variable “preference for applicants with
very good monographs”. These results confirm Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, it appears
that departments, that the CHE ranks high in research reputation have a significantly
smaller preference for applicants with very good monographs than do departments in
the middle and lower groups. Moreover, column 1 in table 9 shows that senior faculty’s
tenure is significant and positively aligned with the preference for applicants with very
good monographs. These results confirm Hypothesis 5.
Preference for applicants with venia legendi. Column 3 of table 8 shows that predictor variables
explain 26% of the variance of the dependent variable “preference for applicants
with a venia legendi”. The regression results show that satisfaction with management
structures prior to the university reforms has a significant positive effect on the dependent
variable “preference for applicants with a venia legendi”, thus confirming Hypothesis
2. Column 3 in table 9 shows that senior faculty with longer terms of employment
favor applicants with a venia legendi, which confirms Hypothesis 6. Column 3 of table 9
shows that management professors who have a venia legendi prefer applicants with one,
which confirms Hypothesis 7a.
2 sbr 60 January 2008 -31

University reforms
Table 9: Results from the regression analyses for hypotheses 5, 6, 7b, 7c, 8, and 9
Column 1 2 3 5 8 9 10 11 12
H5: sig. H : sig. H b: sig. H c: Age sig. H8: sig. H9: sig.
mono-
venia
Abroad
at first
teach- Practice
graphs
legendi
appointmenting
experience 0.33 0.000 0.13 0.0 0.08 0.233 –0.0 0. 91 0.2 0.000 0.19 0.00
University
financing
venia
legendi
0.0 0.521 –0.0 0.30 0.11 0.099 –0.0 0.299 0.13 0.0 3 0.21 0.000
–0.03 0. 8 0.24 0.000 0.01 0.889 –0.0 0.5 –0.0 0. 95 –0.13 0.029
stays abroad –0.0 0.51 –0.0 0.335 0.16 0.01 –0.22 0.001 –0.05 0. 3 0.19 0.003
Age at first
appointment
0.1 0.00 0.09 0.139 0.02 0. 8 0.20 0.002 0.03 0. 50 0.12 0.059
F-value .12 0.000 5.39 0.000 2.28 0.0 8 5.80 0.000 3.1 0.009 8.02 0.000
R² 0.11 0.10 0.0 0.11 0.0 0.1
Adjusted R² 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.0 0.12
Preference for applicants with prestigious journal publications. Column 5 of table 8 shows that
predictor variables explain 14% of the variance of the dependent variable “preference for
applicants with prestigious journal publications”. The regression results show that if the
faculty agrees with the university reform objectives, it has a significant positive effect on the
dependent variable “preference for applicants with prestigious journal publications”, thus
confirming hypothesis 3.
Preference for applicants with international experience. Column 7 of table 8 shows that predictor
variables explain 17% of the variance of the dependent variable “preference for applicants
with international experience”. The regression results show that agreement with university
reforms’ objectives is significant and positively associated with the dependent variable “preference
for applicants with international experience”, thus confirming hypothesis 4. Hypothesis
7b is also confirmed, as column 5 of table 9 shows that university lecturers’ number
of sojourns abroad is significant and positively aligned with their preference for applicants
with similar experience.
Preference for applicants from reputable Habilitation advisors. Column 9 of table 8 shows that
the predictor variables explain 13% of the variance of the dependent variable “preference for
applicants from reputable Habilitanden advisors”. The regression results show that professors
from universities whose management faculties’ research reputation the CHE ranks as
belonging to the top group have a significantly stronger preference for applicants from reputable
Habilitanden advisors than do professors from low- and middle-ranked faculties. This
sbr 60 January 2008 -31 25

m. fieDLer/i. WeLPe
result confirms Hypothesis 7d. Moreover, it appears that satisfaction with management structures
prior to the university reforms has a significant positive effect on the dependent variable
“preference for applicants from reputable Habilitanden advisors”.
Maximum age at first appointment. Column 7 of table 9 shows that predictor variables
explain 9% of the variance of the dependent variable “maximum age of applicants at their
first appointment”. Hypothesis 7c is confirmed by the finding that the older the university
professors were at their first appointment, the higher is the maximum age that they indicate
for applicants at the time of their first appointment. Furthermore, the greater the number of
foreign universities and research institutes at which professors have spent time, the lower is
the maximum age that they indicate for management professorship applicants.
Preference for applicants with good didactic skills. Column 9 of table 9 shows that predictor variables
explain 4% of the variance of the dependent variable “preference for applicants with
good didactic skills”. Hypothesis 8 is confirmed by the finding that management professors
at a privately financed university prefer applicants with good didactic skills. Moreover,
it appears that management professors with more experience prefer applicants with good
didactic skills.
Preference for applicants with practical experience. Column 11 of table 9 shows that predictor
variables explain 12% of the variance of the dependent variable “preference for applicants
with practical experience”. Hypothesis 9 is confirmed, because we find that university professors
at privately financed universities prefer applicants with practical experience. University
professors with a venia legendi have significantly less preference for applicants with practical
experience than those without one.
5 discussion And implicAtions
The aim of our study was to analyze how the individual and organizational factors correspond
to senior faculty’s preferences regarding appointment decisions. Thus, we focused specifically
on the analysis of the effects that attitudes towards the changes at the German universities
have on appointment preferences.
We also wished to examine whether university professors and potential applicants for a professorship’s
characteristics that are similar between influence appointment preferences. In the area
of organizational characteristics, we paid special attention to the differences in appointment
preferences of university professors employed in privately and publicly funded universities, and
to those at universities whose research reputation the CHE ranks as being in the top group
compared to those at management departments ranked in the middle and lower groups.
We also confirm that universities in general and the management departments in Germanspeaking
Europe in particular are, at the present time, a suitable context for the analysis of
personnel selection decisions and organizational change. By looking at homophily effects in
the university context and in the context of organizational change, our study answers the need
for research on inclusion of the specific context of personnel selection decisions (Jackson and
2 sbr 60 January 2008 -31

University reforms
Schuler (1995); Williamson and Cable (2003)).
Our results further show that homophily is a significant predictor in personnel selection decisions
even in the context of massive change. At least two different interpretations come to mind
to explain these results. First, the results are in line with previous findings in similarity and
homophily research (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001)) and complement these in
the context of universities, which are characterized by high autonomy in their selection decisions.
Second, the results could also be an indication that individual and psychological motives
are stronger than organizational motives. Another possible interpretation is that the management
professors in our study did not actually perceive a strong pressure to change, and therefore
did not succumb to this pressure in their personnel selection preferences. On the other hand,
previous research shows that strong external change can lead to “the closing of ranks” in organizations
and to even more homophilous personnel selection decisions (Boone et al. (2004)). Thus,
counterintuitively, reproducing homosocial strategies can happen in times and circumstances
when it is least expected (and perhaps most beneficial) from the organization’s perspective.
Is homosocial reproduction detrimental for organizations that are facing pressure to change?
Some authors (Schneider (1987)) suggest that it is, but others (Schaubroeck et al. (1998))
argue that it is not necessarily harmful. So far, no study has empirically tested the organizational
consequences for homosocial preferences in hiring decisions for organizations. A few
qualitative studies suggest that homosocial strategies can have both positive and negative
outcomes, depending on factors such as team heterogeneity, communication, and resources,
and environmental complexity.
Our results on the influence of homophily are of particular interest, given the ongoing institutional
pressures for organizational change in the university systems. The preference for applicants
similar to oneself might be at odds with the attainment of the change goals as put forth by
the German Ministry for Education and Research. For example, previous studies have already
shown the effect of homophily on the spread of gender inequalities (Dick and Nadin (2006)).
Our results show that satisfaction with management structures prior to the university reforms
has a positive effect on the preference for applicants with good monographs and those with a
venia legendi. Moreover, it appears that university professors who were satisfied with management
structures prior to the university reforms also prefer applicants from a reputable chair.
These findings demonstrate that successful organizational changes presuppose dissatisfaction
with the previous situations and conditions as expressed in the literature to date (Greenwood
and Hinings (1996)). Our study shows that when they make their appointment decisions,
university professors who support the organizational changes prefer applicants who have international
experience and have been published in prestigious journals. A further interesting
finding is that the more strongly professors approve of the university reform objectives, the
less likely they are to prefer applicants with a venia legendi.
However, our results should be viewed in the light of their limitations, which have to be taken
into account for the interpretation and generalizability of the results. First, results from nonexperimental
and non-longitudinal research design can only be interpreted causally with great
caution (Cliff (1983); Biddle, Bank, and Marlin (1987)). Second, in Section 3.2 we discussed
sbr 60 January 2008 -31 2

m. fieDLer/i. WeLPe
the restrictions of our questionnaire survey method. In addition to minimizing social desirability,
we assessed one of the independent variables by using an objective external criterion.
Every time questions are investigated for which there are insufficient archived or other objective
data available, as is the case in this study, researchers must resort to subjective measures
(Kumar, Stern, and Anderson (1993)). A subjective evaluation was also required for this
study, regardless of the availability of objective data, because, based on the question and the
hypotheses, only the faculty members themselves offer an opportunity to gain information
about the subjectively experienced. Furthermore, some regression models explain only a small
part of the variance in the dependent variables. This suggests that in future studies, researchers
might want to include additional dimensions of homophily or subjective attitudes.
Our study is also limited in that the assessment of importance of selection criteria does
not equal actual behavior in a personnel selection situation. In addition, personnel selection
decisions in a university context are often group decisions, thus we cannot infer group
outcomes from individual preferences.
On the whole, the results demonstrate that in a university context, in which few sanctioning
measures are possible, organizational changes presume both dissatisfaction with
existing structures and approval of the desired organizational changes.
To date, research finds that experience can be related to the rejection of change (Staw and
Ross (1980); Pfeffer (1983); Larwood et al. (1995); Shepherd, Zacharakis, and Baron
(2003)). Our findings also confirm this. For example, senior faculty’s length of employment
has a positive influence on their preference for applicants who have written very
good monographs and have a venia legendi, thus maintaining the status quo. Length of
employment also has a positive effect on the preference for applicants with good didactic
skills as well as practical experience.
Due to the differences in public and private universities’ financial structures and target
groups, we concluded that there would be differences in their preferences regarding applicants.
The results show that management professors at privately financed universities value
an applicant’s didactic skills and substantial practical experience to a greater degree.
Our results also show that in the future, applicants will face the problem of having to
satisfy a diversity of preference patterns. Due to the differences in the private and public
universities’ requirements, applicants might, for example, decide quite early to focus on a
type of university and try to fulfill its appointment criteria. In the future it will likely be
impossible for applicants to have an equal degree of all the characteristics required by the
various types of universities.
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