K. This is the 1st working draft of vol. VI. It still ... - From Marx to Mao

162 MAO TSE-TUNG
pal force to the flanks or to the rear, in stopping or slowing down
his operations, and ultimately in dissipating his fighting strength so
that the enemy’s units are crushed one by one and he is precipitated
into a situation where, even by rapid and deceptive actions, he can
neither advance nor retreat.
(1) Destroy railroads and highways within the area of action, as
well as important structures along the roads. Telephone lines and
telegraph systems are especially important.
(2) Destroy the enemy’s principal or secondary supply depots.
(3) Destroy the enemy’s storehouses of food and military equipment.
(4) Strike in the enemy’s rear, at his baggage train, or at his
mounted and unmounted couriers, as well as at his mounted scouts,
FROM MARX
TO MAO
⋆ NOT FOR
CHAPTER VI
COMMERCIAL
etc. Also seize the provisions and ammunition that the enemy is
bringing up from the rear to the front.
(5) Strike at the enemy’s independent task groups and at the inhabited
areas that he has not yet solidly occupied.
(6) Mobilize and organize the popular masses everywhere and
aid them in their own self-defense.
(7) Destroy airfields and military depots of the air force in the
enemy’s rear.
OPERATIONS
DISTRIBUTION
1. ACTION
1. The first principle lies in careful and secret preparation, and
in rapid and sudden attack. Fierce wind and heavy rain offer a favorable
occasion for a guerrilla attack, as do thick fog, the darkness
of night, or circumstances in which it is possible to strike at an exhausted
enemy.
2. The operations of a guerrilla unit should consist in offensive
warfare. Whether its numbers be great or small, such a unit can
nonetheless appear where it is not expected and, in its attacks, take
advantage of the enemy’s lack of preparation. But when there are