K. This is the 1st working draft of vol. VI. It still ... - From Marx to Mao

244 MAO TSE-TUNG
never conquer China. The day will come — indeed already has in
some areas — when she will be forced into a passive role. When
hostilities commenced, China was passive, but as we enter the second
phase of the war we find ourselves pursuing a strategy of mobile
warfare, with both guerrillas and regulars operating on exterior
lines. Thus, with each passing day, we seize some degree of initiative
from the Japanese.
The matter of initiative is especially serious for guerrilla forces,
who must face critical situations unknown to regular troops. The
superiority of the enemy and the lack of unity and experience within
our own ranks may be cited. Guerrillas can, however, gain the initiative
if they keep in mind the weak points of the enemy. Because
FROM MARX
TO MAO
of the enemy’s insufficient manpower, guerrillas can operate over
⋆
vast territories, because he is a foreigner and a barbarian, guerrillas
can gain the confidence of millions of their countrymen; because of
the stupidity of enemy commanders, guerrillas can make full use of
their own cleverness. Both guerrillas and regulars must exploit these
enemy weaknesses while, at the same time, our own are remedied.
Some of our weaknesses are apparent only and are, in actuality,
sources of strength. For example, the very fact that most guerrilla
groups are small makes it desirable and advantageous for them to
appear and disappear in the enemy’s rear. With such activities, the
enemy is simply unable NOT to cope. A similar FOR liberty of action can rarely
be obtained by regular forces.
When the enemy attacks the guerrillas with more than one column,
it is difficult COMMERCIAL
for the latter to retain the initiative. Any error,
no matter how slight, in the estimation of the situation is likely to
result in forcing the guerrillas into a passive role. They will then
find themselves unable to beat off the attacks of the enemy.
It is apparent DISTRIBUTION
that we can gain and retain the initiative only by a
correct estimation of the situation and a proper arrangement of all
military and political factors. A too pessimistic estimate will operate
to force us into a passive position, with consequent loss of initiative;
an overly optimistic estimate, with its rash ordering of factors,
will produce the same result.
No military leader is endowed by heaven with an ability to seize
the initiative. It is the intelligent leader who does so after a careful
study and estimate of the situation and arrangement of the military
and political factors involved. When a guerrilla unit, through either
a poor estimate on the part of its leader or pressure from the enemy,