K. This is the 1st working draft of vol. VI. It still ... - From Marx to Mao

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ANTI-JAPONESE WAR
1939 it moved to the new market in Yanan and as well as selling
general goods set up a Chinese Medicine shop and a horseshoe-shop.
Its capital increased from a few hundred yuan to 20,000 yuan. Another
example is the Hezuo Store which grew from the co-operative
of the Anti-Japanese University. In June 1940 it moved to the new
market and set up branch stores at the three branch schools of the
Anti-Japanese University. Its capital increased from 80 yuan to
19,000 yuan. The Rear Services Store was at first a small stall with
30 yuan capital. By September 1940 it had expanded and its capital
had grown to 20,000 yuan. As well as selling goods it also set up a
dyeing shop. Originally many official organizations and schools did
not have shops. Around this time they also collected capital and
FROM MARX
TO MAO
people together and set up business either independently or in part-
⋆
nerships. At the time the business done by all the publicly owned
stores depended on trading goods mainly from Suide, Dingbian and
Fuxian counties, in particular the cloth, paper, writing-materials
required by the official organizations, schools and troops themselves,
and the matches, raw cotton and so forth required by the common
folk. During this period the official organizations and schools set
up over sixty large and small stores in Yanan, Suide and Dingbian,
not including those run by the army. In addition, there were many
that did not set up premises but depended on one or two people and
a few animals to trade NOT goods along FOR the roads, calling it “floating
trade”. According to statistics for October 1941 the stores under the
control of the Rear Services’ committee for store administration were
the Xibei Store, the COMMERCIAL
Xibei Vegetable Co-operative, and fourteen large
and small stores including the Hsinghua, the Hezuo, the Jiaotong,
the Xinxin, the Xingmin, the Minxing, the Biahuo, the Junmin, and
so forth. The Central Administration Bureau had twenty stores.
We really relied DISTRIBUTION
on commerce to pass through a serious crisis
during that year. It solved great problems of supply. For example,
during the first half of 1941 the Central Committee’s Finance and
Economy Office and the official organizations and schools relied
on the twenty large and small stores run by 113 staff with 296,800
yuan capital to earn a profit of 256,000 yuan which supplied 48 per
cent of their daily running-expenses. The Rear Services system with
capital of 706,000 yuan made 810,000 yuan profit in the same period,
which supplied 45 per cent of their daily running-costs.
However, commerce during this period had one great fault: excessive
dispersal and no centralized leadership. Furthermore, al-
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