Ethiopia SOCODEP CE - main report - IFAD

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Ethiopia SOCODEP CE - main report - IFAD

PROJECT EVALUATION

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Southern Region Cooperatives Development

and Credit Programme

Completion Evaluation

November 2008


Document of the

International Fund for Agricultural Development

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project

(SOCODEP)

Completion Evaluation

November 2008

Report No. 1909-ET


Overall Responsibility

Lead Evaluator

Associate Evaluator

Consultants:

Team Leader

Team Members

Evaluation Team

Mr Luciano Lavizzari, Director, Office of Evaluation

Mr Andrew Brubaker, Evaluation Officer

Mr Michael Carbon, Associate Evaluation Officer

Mr Richard C Carter

Mr Michael Assefa, Cooperatives and Capacity Building Specialist

Mr Tsegaye Asafaw, Credit and Microfinance Specialist

Mr Ayele Gebremariam, Socio Economist

Photo on cover page:

Ox ploughing in Wolayta Zone

Source: Evaluation Mission 2007


Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project

IFAD Loan Nos. 342-ET, SRS 37-ET, BSF Grant BG-29-ET

Completion Evaluation

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms iii

Exchange Rate iv

Map of Project Area v

Executive Summary vii

Agreement at Completion Point xvii

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. COUNTRY BACKGROUND 2

A. Project Background 2

B. Objectives and Methodology of the Evaluation 7

III. PROJECT PERFORMANCE 8

A. Design Features 8

B. Implementation and Outputs 10

C. Restructuring of Service Cooperatives 12

D. Provision of Loans to Cooperatives and their Members 13

E. Attaining Project Objectives 20

F. Assessment: Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency 27

G. Performance of IFAD and its Partners 29

IV. PROJECT IMPACTS 30

A. Rural Poverty Reduction Impacts 30

B. Sustainability and Ownership 32

C. Innovation, Replicability and Scaling-Up 33

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 34

A. Overall Assessment 34

B. Conclusions 35

C. Recommendations 37

D. Questions for the Forthcoming Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) 37

APPENDICES

1. Summary of Project Objectives 39

2. Project Costs and Financing 41

3. SOCODEP Timeline 43

4. Reconstructed Logframe for SOCODEP 45

5. Trainings carried out by SOCODEP 63

6. Evaluation Mission Itinerary 67

7. Organisations and Individuals Interviewed 69

8. Bibliography 73


TABLES

1. Statistical Data 3

2. SOCODEP Objectives 4

3. SOCODEP Numerical Targets and Achievements 12

4. Loans Made Through SOCODEP for Individual Activities 14

5. Rural Roads Constructed by SOCODEP (in km) 17

6. Changes in Service Cooperative Performance between 1993 and 2006 22

7. SOCODEP: Achievement of Specific Objectives 28

8. Project Ratings Summary 35

FIGURES

1. Budget Costs by Component (million US$, total 22.72m) 5

2. Main Project Stakeholders 6

3. SOCODEP: Quantitative Achievements against Targets at Appraisal 20

4. Cooperatives: Findings from the Evaluation 21

BOXES

1. Two Examples from Individual Beneficiaries of OMFI Loans 14

2. Three Case Studies of Women Loan Beneficiaries 23

3. Four Examples of Ox-loan Beneficiaries 25

ANNEXES*

1. Development of Cooperatives and Institutional Capacity Building

2. Evaluation of Credit and Input Supply Component of SOCODEP

3. Socio-Economic Impact

* All annexes are available from IFAD’s Office of Evaluation (evaluation@ifad.org).

ii


Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACE Agricultural Cooperatives in Ethiopia Project

AfDB African Development Bank

AIDB Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (now DBE)

AISCO Agricultural Inputs Supply Corporation

BOARD Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development

BOFED Bureau of Finance and Economic Development

BOH Bureau of Health

BSF Belgian Survival Fund

BWMED Bureau of Water, Mines and Energy Development

BPWUD Bureau of Public Works and Urban Development

CBE Commercial Bank of Ethiopia

CBO Community Based Organizations

CLP Core Learning Partnership

CPD Cooperatives Promotion Department

CPE Country Programme Evaluation

CPM Country Programme Manager

DBE Development Bank of Ethiopia

EB Ethiopian Birr

GoE Government of Ethiopia

HIV/AIDS Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome

HSC Health and Sanitation Committees

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFI International Financing Institution

(W)IGA (Women’s) Income Generating Activity

ILO International Labour Organisation

KDP Kafa Development Programme (formerly SUPAK-S)

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MOFED Ministry of Finance and Economic Development

MTR Mid-term Review

NBE National Bank of Ethiopia

OE Office of Evaluation

OMFI Omo Micro Finance Institution

PC/PCU Programme Coordination Unit

PCR Project Completion Report

PSC Project Steering Committee

RA Roads Authority

RR30/RR50 Rural Roads 30/50 Vehicles per Day Design Standards

RUFIP Rural Financial Intermediation Project

RWAT Rural Women’s Affairs Team

SACCO Savings and Credit Cooperative

SC(s) Service Cooperative(s)

SNNPRS Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State

SO Special Objective

SOCODEP Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project

SRAB Southern Region Agricultural Bureau

SSE Small Scale Enterprise

SUPAK-S Sustainable Poverty Alleviation Kaficho-Shakicho (renamed KDP)

TA Technical Assistance

UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services

USAID United States Agency for International Development

US$ United States Dollar

VOCA Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance

VRDF Veterinary Revolving Drugs Fund

WIGA Women Income Generating Activities

WSHBS Water Supply, Health and Basic Sanitation

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Ethiopian Birr to one USD

9.50

9.00

8.50

8.00

7.50

7.00

6.50

6.00

5.50

5.00

Exchange Rate (US$ to Ethiopian Birr)

Oct-93

Oct-94

Oct-95

Oct-96

Oct-97

Oct-98

Oct-99

Oct-00

Oct-01

Oct-02

Oct-03

Oct-04

Oct-05

Oct-06

iv


Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project

(SOCODEP)

Completion Evaluation

Executive Summary

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction. The Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project

(SOCODEP) was undertaken in the Southern Region of Ethiopia between 1994 and 2005. This

document is the completion evaluation report for the project. The evaluation mission took place

between 17 th September and 11 th October 2006. It was conducted by a four-man team and the conduct,

analysis and reporting of the evaluation has been carried out according to the Office of Evaluation

(OE) guidelines for project evaluations.

A. Country Background

2. Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a very large (1.1m km 2 ), very diverse (geographically and ethnically), and

extremely poor country. It ranks 170 th out of 177 countries in the current (2006) Human Development

Rankings. The predominantly rural population depends heavily on subsistence agricultural production,

the vast majority of which exists under rainfed conditions. Cash incomes are very low except in

coffee-producing areas, and access to rural financial services is very limited. Physical infrastructure

(roads, power supplies, water and sanitation, and telecommunications) is very poorly developed.

Population growth, increasing prevalence of the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immuno-

Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), environmental degradation, and increasing climate instability are

among the trends which add to the challenges of poverty alleviation in Ethiopia. Politically, Ethiopia

has undergone a virtually continuous process of change since the 1974 revolution in which Emperor

Haile Selassie was overthrown. The Marxist rule of the Derg from 1974 to 1991 led to many reforms,

but the authoritarian use of power over the peasantry did not change, or if anything, it became more

restrictive. After the fall of the Derg in May 1991, a slow process of liberalisation of economy and

political systems has taken place, but there is still a long way to go before the rural population will be

fully able to participate in a free market and transparent democratic processes of government. There is

no doubt that Ethiopia is a very difficult country in which to make progress in terms of development

and poverty alleviation.

3. The Southern Region. At 232,000km 2 , the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples

Regional State (SNNPRS) is one of the four largest Regions in Ethiopia (out of the 9 Regions and 2

City Authorities into which the country is presently divided). It is probably the most diverse Region in

ethnic terms, and it contains some of the most remote and wettest parts of Ethiopia. At the time of

project commencement in 1994, the Region consisted of 53 Woredas (districts), and had a total

population of about 11m. Twelve years later, at the time of the completion evaluation the number of

Woredas had grown to 133 and the total population to about 14.5m. Mean population density in the

Region has consequently increased from about 47 to 63 per km 2 , but these averages hide a great deal

of variation; at Appraisal in 1994, population densities were thought to range from less than 10 to over

500 per km 2 . Rainfall, temperatures, altitudes, cropping patterns, infrastructure, and cultures vary

widely within the Region.

B. The Project

4. The project. SOCODEP was one of the first significant internationally funded interventions in

Ethiopia following the fall of the Derg in May 1991. The Project aimed to respond to the then new

legislation (Proclamation 85/1994) concerning Cooperatives, which ostensibly set out a means of

turning the former Government-imposed and politically-dominated Producer Cooperatives of the Derg

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into farmer-owned viable business entities serving their members’ interests. In particular, it aimed to

make rural finance (specifically micro-credit) available to so-called Service Cooperatives and their

members. The Principal Objective of the Project was to “increase agricultural productivity and raise

income levels of the rural poor through support to Service Cooperatives’ development in order to

facilitate efficient provision of sustainable services to members”. The Project had 7 specific objectives

which are set out in Table ES1 and further elaborated in the reconstructed logframe in Appendix 4.

Together these objectives were designed not only to turn Service Cooperatives (SCs) into effective

vehicles for the service of their members, but also to deliver some specific services (road construction,

veterinary drug supply, health facility up-grading, and provision of water supply and sanitation

services) directly through the relevant Government organs. The Water Supply, Health and Basic

Sanitation Component (WSHBS) was separately financed by the Belgian Survival Fund as a later

addition to the Project.

Table ES1. SOCODEP Specific Objectives

SO1 Provide a model for developing Ethiopian cooperatives under the new legislation,

particularly with respect to improvement of financial intermediation services in rural areas,

which could be replicated in other areas of the country.

SO2 Increased capital and income among the rural poor in the project area through off-farm

income-generating activities particularly for women and families in densely populated areas

with limited land for farm expansion.

SO3 Strengthen the SRAB to carry out its mandate with respect to cooperative development.

SO4 Provide credit to meet financial requirements for agricultural inputs and draught oxen and

facilitate the supply of inputs through support to local traders and cooperatives.

SO5 Relief of livestock health constraints, particularly with respect to draught animals, through

provision of veterinary drugs.

SO6 Improve access of rural families to services and markets by rehabilitating and maintaining

rural roads.

SO7 (BSF Component) Reduce the burden of disease in 8 woredas of the SOCODEP area

C. Objectives and Methodology of the Evaluation

5. Overall objectives. The main objectives of the evaluation were to: (i) assess the performance

and impact of the SOCODEP project; and (ii) generate a series of findings and recommendations that

would serve the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Government of the

Ethiopia, and other donors in designing and implementing similar projects and programmes in the

future.. The special focus of the evaluation, as highlighted in the Approach Paper, was to be on

Cooperatives Development, Rural Microfinance, Socio-economic impact, and Institutional Capacity-

Building.

6. Evaluation methodology. The evaluation followed OE’s guidelines for project evaluations. 1

The evaluation team conducted a field visit to the project area and interviews with key stakeholders.

The evaluation notes the limited range of reports and other documents available through the project

and partners due to the frequent moving of the project office which made it challenging to find many

documents.

1 This included assessing the project against internationally recognized evaluation criteria, namely: (i) project

performance, including relevance, effectiveness and efficiency; (ii) impact on rural poverty; and

(iii) performance of partners involved in the project, including IFAD, government institutions, and others.

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7. However, the core documents were available and provided a sufficient source of secondary data

for the evaluation. As per standard OE practice, a Core Learning Partnership (CLP) 2 was constituted

for the evaluation, which provided critical inputs and views at key stages of the evaluation process.

II. PROJECT PERFORMANCE

A. Implementation and Outputs

8. Cooperatives restructuring (US$0.95m, four per cent of total budget at Appraisal).

Cooperatives under the former Government (the Derg) were an instrument of Marxist ideology and

coercion. A great deal of work would have to be done to turn these into autonomous businesses owned

and democratically controlled by their members. The number of cooperatives restructured through

SOCODEP under the new legislation exceeded the Appraisal target, 200, by about 30 per cent. Credit

delivery (US$7.68m, 34 per cent of total budget at Appraisal).

9. Credit was to be delivered to cooperatives for their own businesses (flour mills, shops, produce

marketing) and through the cooperatives to the individual members (for farm inputs, incomegenerating

activities, small-scale enterprises, and work oxen). The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia

(CBE) was to be the channel for disbursement of loans to the restructured cooperatives. Overall, the

disbursement of loans fell below target, at EB 18.76m by the time of closure of this project

component. This is a little over US$2.0m or approximately 30 per cent of target. This low number of

loans disbursed was attributable partly to project design shortcomings and partly to problems

encountered during project implementation. Specific factors included: CBE’s lack of experience in

rural credit implementation; delays in loan processing; lack of capacity in the restructured Service

Cooperatives (SC) to borrow and on lend; and defaults in loan repayment.

Promotion of Off-farm Income Generating Activities (US$0.29m, 1 per cent)

10. Small enterprise promotion was undertaken through a pilot project involving training at the

Rural Technology Centre, Sodo, and subsequent loans to individuals setting up in business. Training

was provided to 226 beneficiaries, in bamboo work, tailoring, weaving, spinning, woodwork,

beekeeping and pottery. Loans for subsequent business development amounted to EB 55,456

(approximately US$8,000), three percent of the target, in total over the entire project period. The

Women Income Generating Activities (WIGAs) performed much better providing 7,600 loans (76

percent of the target) to women.

Institutional Capacity Building

11. Capacity-building, through training and provision of physical resources, was a major aspect of

the project. Explicit capacity building inputs focused on Southern Region Agricultural Bureau

(US$2.80m, 12 per cent of total budget) to enable the Bureau to deliver support to the SCs and CBE

(US$0.39m, two per cent) to provide effective rural finance to the SCs. But there were significant

allocations also to the other Regional Government organs involved (Water, Health, and Roads), as

well as to the cooperatives themselves.

12. As far as physical resources are concerned, the project provided large numbers of vehicles (65

cars, three buses, 300 motorcycles), as well as office accommodation, office equipment and roadbuilding

equipment. Perhaps unsurprisingly, disbursement for these items proceeded quickly, with

2 Members of the partnership included: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Bureau of Finance

and Economic Development, Bureau of Agriculture and rural Development, Southern Nations, Nationalities and

Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS), Department of Cooperatives, SNNPRS, Rural Women’s Affairs Team,

SNNPRS, Bureau of Health, SNNPRS, Bureau of Water Resources, SNNPRS, Planning and Programme

Department, Rural Roads Authority, SNNPRS, Sodo Rural Technology Centre, Commercial Bank of Ethiopia,

Omo Microfinance Institution, the Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions, Former SOCODEP

Project Director, field presence officer, and the IFAD Country Programme Manager.

ix


large overdrafts on the vehicles and equipment category being highlighted in the 1997 and 1998

United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) Supervision Reports.

Road Construction (US$4.70m, 21 per cent)

13. The target at Appraisal was for the rehabilitation and heavy maintenance of a total of 700 km of

rural roads, to a design standard that would permit labour-based maintenance. In the end, 122 km was

constructed, to a higher standard (and consequently higher unit cost) than originally agreed. Thus

reducing the amount of construction and rehabilitation possible and requiring machine-based

maintenance in the future.

Veterinary Revolving Drugs Fund (US$1.89m, 8 per cent)

14. This was intended to be a complement to other project activities – specifically to help to protect

the livestock which were involved in ox loans and credit for small ruminants. The first purchases of

drugs under this component were delayed significantly, taking place in 2001, and resulted in only

about 19 per cent of the budgeted funds being disbursed by the time of closure of the project loans.

Water Supply, Health and Basic Sanitation (US$4.02m, 18 per cent) – Belgium Survival Fund

(BSF) Funded

15. Despite the assessment of a pre-Appraisal mission in 1993 that “…water supply is not a major

problem in many parts of the project area … and in areas where needs are pronounced several NGOs

are providing assistance”, a formulation mission addressing this and the wider issues of health and

sanitation was sent in 1996 and the component commenced in 1999. This component has performed

well meeting its targets related to health services (through construction, rehabilitation, equipping and

training) and construction of water supply points in the 8 component Woredas.

B. Assessment Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency

16. Relevance. SOCODEP addressed some real needs of the rural poor in southern Ethiopia (need

for credit, need for improved market access, need for better health services and environmental health)

and it was consistent with the government’s regionalization programme. At the time of design the

rhetoric of the new Government and the framing of the new legislation made working through service

cooperatives attractive and promising. However the use of service cooperatives as the channel for

services to the poor turned out to be a significant design weakness. Similarly, the project had limited

choices for partners with rural finance experience and should have been addressed with greater

seriousness.

17. Effectiveness. The Project achieved some, but not all of its objectives. The Specific Objectives

(SO) 1, 3, and 5 were mostly not met. These include SO1, providing a model for developing Ethiopian

cooperatives under the new legislation, SO3 strengthening the Southern Regional Agricultural Bureau

(SRAB) to carry out its mandate with respect to cooperative development, and SO5 relief of livestock

health constraints, particularly with respect to draught animals, through provision of veterinary drugs.

Specific Objectives 2, 4, 6 and 7 were met to varying degrees and include SO2 increasing capital and

income among the rural poor in the project area through off-farm income-generating activities, SO4

providing credit to meet financial requirements for agricultural inputs and draught oxen and facilitate

the supply of inputs through support to local traders and cooperatives, SO6 improving access of rural

families to services and markets by rehabilitating and maintaining rural roads, and SO7 (BSF

Component) reducing the burden of disease in eight woredas of the SOCODEP area.

18. Efficiency. Given the difficult operating environment in Ethiopia the project could have been

more efficient if it had been more realistic and less ambitious. The vast geographic area, poor

infrastructure and communication meant that the projected resources were not optimally used. Also,

the overall emphasis on the Project’s numerical outputs (i.e. exceeding the number of restructured

cooperatives) rather than the quality of those outputs, has resulted in a significant amount of wasted

resources. As a result, many of the project’s activities were diluted to the extent that they failed to

x


achieve their intended outcomes. Efficiency would have been greatly enhanced if the project design

had concentrated on a smaller project area, involving a smaller number of SCs, and provided greater

intensity of effort and resources.

Cooperatives Restructuring

C. Project Impact by Component

19. The number of cooperatives restructured through SOCODEP under the new legislation

exceeded the Appraisal target by about 30 per cent. However, the quality of the restructuring and reorientation

undertaken has not translated into an effective cooperatives sector in the project areas. The

cooperatives encountered in this evaluation, and many others for which data was obtained, are

suffering significant problems of poor management, misappropriation of funds and de facto

bankruptcy. The findings of the evaluation in this regard are not new. To quote the internal review of

the project carried out in 1999: “…with such limited capital, unprofitable business, increased

misappropriation, weak management, absence of member education, and poor participation of

members, the conceptual framework of promoting economically viable cooperatives … could not be

achieved.” 3 Three years later, at the time of closure of the main loans, the situation had not changed

significantly: “…the state of some cooperatives restructured under the project appear to be weak and

in the worst case on the verge of bankruptcy … most restructured cooperatives critically need the

support of the project …” 4 . In short, although SOCODEP re-registered about 267 cooperatives under

the new law, it failed to re-orient the officers and members of those organisations, and leave behind a

strong and sustainable cooperatives sector.

Credit Delivery

20. The disbursement of loans achieved approximately 30 per cent of its target. Although many

cooperatives and individuals received and benefited from loans, many of the target populations did

not. Loans for cooperatives’ own businesses were generally unsuccessful. Because the cooperatives

found that they could not compete with the leaner and fitter private sector, the majority of these

ventures failed, and the cooperatives failed to repay their loans. Loans to individuals were generally

much more successful, with ox loans being particularly popular (although the required ox insurance

was not popular, and it failed to pay out in the majority of cases of mortality). Loans to women for the

multiplication and fattening of small ruminants were also especially valued, and repayment rates were

high. In general, repayment of loans was better in the western part of the project area than in the east

and south-east.

21. CBE learned in the course of the project that provision of rural microfinance is a very different

activity to the provision of commercial, urban, loans. It found it was ill-equipped to manage this

project component, and it withdrew in 2002. The transfer of this component to the Region’s only Omo

Micro Finance Institution (OMFI) in the last few months before closure of project loans was the only

solution to a crisis. Because of the difficulties experienced by CBE, and the poor performance of

many of the cooperatives, the opportunities for cooperatives or individuals to access further loans has

been curtailed. Real benefits enjoyed by individuals made a difference for a time, but they may not

have brought about lasting change.

Promotion of Off-farm Income Generating Activities

22. Small enterprise promotion was undertaken through a pilot project involving training at the

Rural Technology Centre, Sodo, and subsequent loans to individuals setting up in business. The

impact of this activity on a few individuals was significant; however, the extent of that impact was

negligible.

3 SNNPRS Cooperative Office (1999) Comprehensive Analaysis of Current Situation and Requirements of

Cooperatives in SOCODEP Areas, April 1999, Awassa.

4 UNOPS Supervision Report, April 2002.

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Institutional Capacity Building

23. A great deal of training was carried out (estimates suggest that nearly 57,000 individuals

received some form of training). Individuals have benefited to some extent, but the ability of the

project stakeholder institutions to perform more effectively, during and subsequent to the project, is

questionable. A lasting impact on the institutions involved has been severely undermined by the

capacity buildings component’s ad hoc nature 5 and by the frequent Government restructuring and redeployment

of personnel.

24. SOCODEP’s capacity-building efforts largely ignored issues of attitude change, organizational

reform, and policy dialogue. These were major omissions.

Road Construction

25. The roads built are of good quality and have benefited those people living near them. The

Roads Authority has been left with a useful pool of heavy equipment for future road construction

work. As far as SOCODEP outcomes are concerned however, the aim of this aspect of the project was

to extend access to markets for cooperatives and their members. As with other project components, a

few people have benefited from the component, and its main shortcoming has been its limited reach.

Veterinary Revolving Drugs fund

26. The component was able to provide temporary relief for the few participants who were able to

access the fund. At the time of the evaluation, drug shortages were being felt, and animal health

problems were reported to be increasing, especially in those areas where tyrpanomiasis is prevalent.

Water Supply, Health and Basic Sanitation (US$4.02m, 18 per cent) – BSF funded

27. In some respects the WSBHS component has delivered the most visible and potentially

successful aspects of the entire project, with its most effective aspects being the strengthening of

health services (through construction, rehabilitation, equipping and training) and construction of water

supply points in the eight component Woredas. However, the functional sustainability of water points,

and the utilisation of improved excreta disposal facilities at household level, are areas of concern. In

particular, user fees for water point maintenance are too low, and access to spare parts for hand pumps

is extremely problematic.

Integration Across Components

28. SOCODEP was a multi-component project, involving at least 7 Regional Government organs 6 ,

three financial institutions 7 , and numerous other stakeholders 8 . There were important potential

synergies between components and stakeholders. The cooperatives were fundamental. Their capacity

to function as viable democratic business entities would determine the extent to which all the

individual project beneficiaries would gain. In the event, their lack of effective re-orientation and

capacity-building has limited the extent to which individual men and women have enjoyed the benefits

of cooperative membership. Credit disbursement depended on the sound functioning of both the

cooperatives and CBE, as the financial intermediary. Neither the cooperatives nor CBE were effective

in channelling loans to individual members. Institutional strengthening of Government organs was

greatly limited in its impact, because of the unsystematic and incomplete way in which it was done,

and because of frequent Government restructuring. Supply of veterinary drugs, construction of roads,

enhancement of health services, and construction of water supplies and sanitation facilities were

5 The evaluation team could find no evidence of any systematic training needs assessment.

6 Those responsible for Agriculture, Cooperatives, Veterinary Services, Water, Health, Finance & Planning,

and Roads, organised in different ways at different times.

7 CBE, OMFI, and Ethiopian Insurance Corporation.

8 Cooperatives and their members, contractors, and consultants.

xii


carried out as separate activities, and in the case of the first two, very little was actually achieved. The

potential synergies were not realised, and the project as a whole could not be described as integrated.

D. SOCODEP Assessment

29. Table 2 summarizes the ratings attributed to the project by the evaluation, with the average

ratings given to project evaluated in 2005 for comparison. On many criteria SOCODEP scored one

point under the 2005 average. Impact on physical, financial and human assets is comparable with 2005

averages, but the performance of the Southern Region Government is assessed as particularly below

the 2005 average. Because of fundamental weaknesses in project implementation, caused partly by

unrealistic design, partly by insufficiently decisive management, partly by insufficient political

commitment, and partly by externalities including frequent Government restructuring and reshuffling,

SOCODEP is assessed overall by this evaluation as ‘Moderately unsuccessful’ (rating of 3).

Table ES2. SOCODEP Project Performance: Rating Summary

Evaluation Criteria

Project performance

SOCODEP Rating

2005 Project

Evaluations Average

Relevance 5 5

Effectiveness 3 4

Efficiency

Partner performance

3 4

IFAD 3 4

Government 3 4

BSF 4 -

UNOPS

Project impact

4 4

Agriculture Productivity 3 -

Physical and Financial Assets 3 4

Human Assets 4 4

Institutions and Services 2 -

Social Capital and Empowerment 2 4

Food Security 3 4

Environment and Common Resource

4 4

Base

Markets 2 -

Overall impact 3 -

Sustainability 2 4

Innovation, Replicability and Scaling-Up 3 4

Overall assessment 3 -

Source: The Evaluation Mission 2007

V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND KEY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE

A. Conclusions

30. As with most multi-component projects, the project performance and impacts of SOCODEP

have been mixed. There seems little doubt that the Project has had a net benefit to the Region, to

individuals in Government, and to some of the target beneficiaries. The key questions relate to

understanding how the benefits could have been greater, and what lessons can be learned for present

and future projects in Ethiopia and further a field.

31. Context. SOCODEP was one of the first significant internationally funded interventions in

Ethiopia following the fall of the former Marxist-Leninist regime (the Derg) in May 1991. The Project

aimed to respond to the then new legislation concerning Cooperatives, which ostensibly set out a

means of turning the former Government-imposed and politically-dominated Producer Cooperatives of

xiii


the Derg into farmer-owned viable business entities serving their members’ interests. In particular, it

aimed to make rural finance (specifically micro-credit) available to so-called Service Cooperatives and

their members.

32. Design. The Project aim, as described in paragraph 31, was an imaginative attempt to respond

to the then new legislation concerning Cooperatives. However, this was an ambitious and in hindsight

an unrealistic goal. A number of factors contributed to the difficulties faced by the SOCODEP. First,

the Region’s size, diversity, poor infrastructure and poverty posed numerous development challenges.

Second, the project underestimated the obstacles to and rate of beneficial change and the capacity of

the government for implementation in the post Derg period.

33. Quality of project delivery. SOCODEP concentrated on delivery of numerical outputs, such as

cooperatives restructured, credit disbursed, trainings delivered, drugs purchased, ilometres of road

constructed, water points built, and so on. Insufficient emphasis was placed on the quality of these

outputs. For example, insufficient consideration was given to the intensity and duration of activities

required to achieve the desired quality standards. In particular, the human factor of individual and

group (community, cooperative, institution) attitudes were addressed minimally. For example, the

design was too optimistic about the speed with which the former model of cooperatives, centrally

controlled by the government, could be turned around into a member-owned and member-controlled

viable business model. To turn around a failing, politically-established cooperative to become a viable

business serving its members, or to bring about community ownership and management of a water

point demanded a great deal of attention to quality of the investment, not just numbers.

34. However, some of the activities such as upgrading of health facilities and training of staff and

community health workers performed better.

35. Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency. The project objectives and activities were relevant to

needs of the rural poor in southern Ethiopia (e.g., in terms of the need for credit, improved market

access, better health services and environmental health) and were consistent with the government’s

regionalization programme. The Project was moderately ineffective achieving some, but not all of its

objectives. Similarly, the project was moderately inefficient. Given the difficult operating environment

in Ethiopia, the project could have been more efficient if it had been more realistic and had less

ambitious objectives and coverage. The vast geographic area, poor infrastructure and communication

meant that the projected resources were not optimally used.

36. Sustainability. SOCODEP’s benefits are unlikely to continue, partly due to the lack of a

defined exit strategy. Moreover, institutional sustainability is limited and on-going access to credit,

and water supply is not assured.

37. Innovation. At the time of design, SOCODEP’s focus on cooperatives and credit represented a

response to the apparent liberalization of national politics and economics, and to the change in

cooperatives legislation. Unfortunately, the country context changed rapidly and the design became

less relevant given the new context. Despite the positive efforts at the Mid-term Review (MTR), the

design adjustments were not adequate given the changing realities. On another issue, the BSF

component introduced an effective monitoring and evaluation system, which however was not

integrated into the other project components. As the project was overstretched and its components

were not integrated, SOCODEP offered little opportunity for the learning being generated to be feed

back into the project. Hence, the evaluation considered the project to be moderately unsuccessful in

terms of innovations, replicability and upscaling.

38. Policy dialogue. SOCODEP was largely responsive to policy changes and government-led

restructuring. There is little evidence however of the project contributing to IFAD’s effective

engagement in policy dialogue in the country.

39. Participation. Probably the single greatest assurance of sustainability at the level of households

and communities is through real commitment to beneficiary participation. However, the evaluation

found that ensuring beneficiary participation in an area with a weak tradition of participation is

xiv


challenging and requires greater commitment in terms of time and resources. As such, approaches

which build on existing social capital (i.e., using indigenous Community Based Organizations), rather

than working through structures imposed from above and outside the beneficiary communities, are

most likely to succeed in the short and long term.

40. Integration. This evaluation report has highlighted at a number of points the lack of integration

between the numerous stakeholders and components within SOCODEP. Although integration is not

easy, particularly given the restructuring of government organs and redeployment of personnel, it is

the only way to create synergies which can maximize the impact of limited budgets.

41. Management. The management model used by SOCODEP limited its effectiveness and

responsiveness to rapid contextual changes that occurred during project implementation. The Project

Coordinator, attempted to harmonize and synchronize the work of several Government organs and

other stakeholders over whom he has no real authority. And support from IFAD through supervision

mission mounted annually by the designated cooperating institution the United Nations Office for

Project Services (UNOPS) was insufficient. However, it should be recognized that during the time of

SOCODEP, IFAD did not have modalities such as direct supervision or field presence to support

project implementation. Although, IFAD was responsive in using the tools it had at the time, for

example by undertaking an early and useful MTR and facilitating the inclusion during implementation

of the important BSF component.

42. Weak linkages between partners during implementation. The linkages between the key

stakeholders have mainly been achieved by the efforts of the Project Coordinators (four in total, at

various stages of the Project), IFAD’s Country Programme Manager (CPM), and UNOPS. The Project

Coordinator’s role was challenging because of his inherent lack of authority, and the CPM’s role is

distant from the day-to-day project management issues to do more than provide general support and

guidance. Also, annual visits by a cooperating institution are insufficient to rescue an underperforming

project. Consequently, the effectiveness of the partnership was limited. Partnership with

the private sector was not a viable option in the early years of the Project, but this option could have

been pursued as implementation progressed. The extent to which partnerships outside of the project

were developed by the implementing stakeholders is limited.

B. Recommendations

43. Design. It is recommended that consideration be given to interventions which are far more

focused in terms of numbers of beneficiaries to be reached and geographic coverage, within the overall

framework of IFAD’s targeting policy. This would ensure greater synergies across activities and

ultimately deeper impact on rural poverty. Similarly, the project duration should be long enough to

achieve the desired results and in particular take into account the time needed to implement attitude

and cultural changes. Project management structures should be kept simple to ensure the integration

and harmonization among different implementing agencies.

44. Quality of Project Delivery. It is recommended that greater attention be given in future project

design and implementation to country context issues, and the identification of indicators of quality,

and actions necessary to achieve real and lasting impact, alongside those relating to numerical outputs.

45. Policy Dialogue. It is recommended that more explicit attempts be made to engage in policy

dialogue with Government and other development actors, where appropriate and required involving a

wider range of national and international specialists, rather than just IFAD and cooperating institution

staff.

46. Participation. It is recommended that future IFAD-funded projects and programmes in

Ethiopia pay more attention to people’s participation, especially as it has not been a tradition of

development practice in Ethiopia in the past.

47. Integration. In future multi-component projects, it is recommended that greater attention be

paid to the linkages between the components and between those agencies responsible for delivering

xv


them. The evaluation team is in favour of projects which involve multiple components addressing the

diverse needs of target populations – but the difficulties of integrating such efforts should be carefully

considered.

48. Management. Management is more than coordination or supervision, and it should be

addressed with greater rigour in future projects and programmes particularly in challenging contexts as

found in SOCODEP. Projects need to be much more decisively managed. It is recommended that new

approaches be explored, either through IFAD itself taking a more hands-on role during execution,

facilitated by the Fund’s field presence officer, which allow closer monitoring and follow-up to

implementation.

49. Role of the field presence officer. The field presence officer can, among other tasks, provide

implementation support to IFAD-funded operations and has the potential to enhance partnerships and

policy dialogue in Ethiopia. Hence, the country presence should be further strengthened, so that it can

play a greater role in enhancing IFAD’s development effectiveness in Ethiopia.

C. Questions for the Forthcoming Country Programme Evaluation (CPE)

50. In view of the CPE for Ethiopia which is planned for 2007, a number of key questions arise

from the present evaluation, which should be addressed in that context. These are:

• Have the present project identification, formulation and appraisal processes encouraged the

setting of unrealistic targets and spreading project of activities too thinly? If so, how can

these tendencies be avoided in future?;

• Are the existing project identification, formulation and appraisal processes sufficiently

participative, in a country in which participation is not a strong tradition? If not, can they be

made more so?

• To what extent have the detailed capacities of project stakeholder institutions been routinely

assessed at the formulation stage, in order to design appropriate capacity-building

programmes? What improvements can be made to this process?

• What has been the impact of the BSF contributions in Ethiopia? How can the partnership be

enhanced in future activities?

• How can the present model of project management and supervision be modified to create a

significantly greater degree of the Programme Coordination Unit (PCU) authority and

effectiveness, without de-coupling projects from the implementing institutions? Should

separate project management structures be set up, perhaps using consulting firms, or can the

existing PCU framework be made more effective? How could the field presence officer be

more effective? What model best fits the Ethiopian context? Should clearer guidelines be

framed, setting out responsibilities for taking actions on supervision and MTR

recommendations? Where does the buck stop in terms of project management?; and

• In view of the weak performance of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) in some Ethiopian

projects, how can a monitoring culture be encouraged, and how can manageable frameworks

be developed and implemented for monitoring of project performance, reflecting both

quantitative and qualitative achievements?

xvi


Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project

(SOCODEP)

Completion Evaluation

Agreement at Completion Point

I. BACKGROUND AND CORE LEARNING PARTNERSHIP

1. The Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project (SOCODEP) was one of

the first significant internationally funded projects in Ethiopia following the fall of the former Marxist-

Leninist regime (the Derg) in May 1991. The Project aimed to respond to the then new legislation

(Proclamation 85/1994) concerning Cooperatives, which set out a means of turning the former

Producer Cooperatives into farmer-owned viable business entities serving their members’ interests. In

particular, it aimed to make rural finance (specifically micro-credit) available to so-called Service

Cooperatives and their members.

2. The project was implemented in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State

(SNNPRS), which is one of the four largest Regions in Ethiopia and is probably the most diverse

Region in ethnic terms, and it contains some of the most remote and wettest parts of the country.

SOCODEP was fully implemented from September 1994 until December 2005. More specifically, the

components funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (excluding the

water, sanitation and health component) were implemented from September 1994 to July 2002, a total

of nearly 8 years with the Mid-term Review (MTR) at the end of 1996. Work on the Belgium Survival

Fund (BSF) component (i.e., the one on water, sanitation and health) commenced in November 1998

and continued until the Project was finally closed in December 2005. The responsibility for

implementing the project changed several times, but began with Southern Regional Agricultural

Bureau (SRAB) and eventually migrated to the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development

(BOFED). The evaluation of the project was conducted in late 2006/7 by IFAD’s Office of Evaluation

(OE).

3. Following usual practice for OE evaluations, a Core Learning Partnership 1 (CLP) was

established providing critical inputs at key stages in the evaluation, including comments on the main

evaluation deliverables.

II. MAIN EVALUATION FINDINGS

4. Design. The Project aim, as described in paragraph one, was an imaginative attempt to respond

to the then new legislation concerning Cooperatives. However, this was an ambitious and in hindsight

an unrealistic goal. A number of factors contributed to the difficulties faced by the SOCODEP. First,

the Region’s size, diversity, poor infrastructure and poverty posed numerous development challenges.

Second, the project underestimated the obstacles to and rate of beneficial change and the capacity of

the government for implementation in the post Derg period.

1 Members of the partnership included: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Bureau of Finance

and Economic Development, Bureau of Agriculture and rural Development, SNNPRS, Department of

Cooperatives, SNNPRS, Rural Womens Affairs Team, SNNPRS, Bureau of Health, SNNPRS, Bureau of Water

Resources, SNNPRS, Planning and Programme Department, Rural Roads Authority, SNNPRS, Sodo Rural

Technology Centre, Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Omo Microfinance Institution, the Association of Ethiopian

Microfinance Institutions, Former SOCODEP project Director, field presence officer , and the IFAD country

programme manager.

xvii


5. Quality of project delivery. SOCODEP concentrated on delivery of numerical outputs, such as

cooperatives restructured, credit disbursed, trainings delivered, drugs purchased, kilometres of road

constructed, water points built, and so on. Insufficient emphasis was placed on the quality of these

outputs. For example, insufficient consideration was given to the intensity and duration of activities

required to achieve the desired quality standards. In particular, the human factor of individual and

group (community, cooperative, institution) attitudes were addressed minimally. For example, the

design was too optimistic about the speed with which the former model of cooperatives, centrally

controlled by the government, could be turned around into a member-owned and member-controlled

viable business model. To turn around a failing, politically-established cooperative to become a viable

business serving its members, or to bring about community ownership and management of a water

point demanded a great deal of attention to quality of the investment, not just numbers.

6. However, some of the activities such as upgrading of health facilities and training of staff and

community health workers performed better.

7. Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency. The project objectives and activities were relevant to

needs of the rural poor in southern Ethiopia (e.g., in terms of the need for credit, improved market

access, better health services and environmental health) and were consistent with the government’s

regionalization programme. The Project was moderately ineffective achieving some, but not all of its

objectives. Similarly, the project was moderately inefficient. Given the difficult operating environment

in Ethiopia, the project could have been more efficient if it had been more realistic and had less

ambitious objectives and coverage. The vast geographic area, poor infrastructure and communication

meant that the projected resources were not optimally used.

8. Sustainability of the SOCODEP’s benefits are unlikely to continue, partly due to the lack of a

defined exit strategy. Moreover, institutional sustainability is limited and on-going access to credit,

and water supply is not assured.

9. Innovation. At the time of design, SOCODEP’s focus on cooperatives and credit represented a

response to the apparent liberalization of national politics and economics, and to the change in

cooperatives legislation. Unfortunately, the country context changed rapidly and the design became

less relevant given the new context. Despite the positive efforts at the MTR, the design adjustments

were not adequate given the changing realities. On another issue, the BSF component introduced an

effective monitoring and evaluation system, which however was not integrated into the other project

components. As the project was overstretched and its components were not integrated, SOCODEP

offered little opportunity for the learning being generated to be feed back into the project. Hence, the

evaluation considered the project to be moderately unsuccessful in terms of innovations, replicability

and upscaling.

10. Policy dialogue. SOCODEP was largely responsive to policy changes and government-led

restructuring. There is little evidence however of the project contributing to IFAD’s effective

engagement in policy dialogue in the country.

11. Participation. Probably the single greatest assurance of sustainability at the level of households

and communities is through real commitment to beneficiary participation. However, the evaluation

found that ensuring beneficiary participation in an area with a weak tradition of participation is

challenging and requires greater commitment in terms of time and resources. As such, approaches

which build on existing social capital (i.e., using indigenous Community Based Organizations), rather

than working through structures imposed from above and outside the beneficiary communities, are

most likely to succeed in the short and long term.

12. Integration. This evaluation report has highlighted at a number of points the lack of integration

between the numerous stakeholders and components within SOCODEP. Although integration is not

easy, particularly given the restructuring of government organs and redeployment of personnel, it is

the only way to create synergies which can maximize the impact of limited budgets.

xviii


13. Management. The management model used by SOCODEP limited its effectiveness and

responsiveness to rapid contextual changes that occurred during project implementation. The Project

Coordinator, attempted to harmonize and synchronize the work of several Government organs and

other stakeholders over whom he has no real authority. And support from IFAD through supervision

mission mounted annually by the designated cooperating institution the United Nations Office for

Procurement Services (UNOPS) was insufficient. However, it should be recognized that during the

time of SOCODEP, IFAD did not have modalities such as direct supervision or field presence to

support project implementation. Although, IFAD was responsive in using the tools it had at the time,

for example by undertaking an early and useful MTR and facilitating the inclusion during

implementation of the important BSF component.

14. Weak linkages between partners during implementation. The linkages between the key

stakeholders have mainly been achieved by the efforts of the Project Coordinators (four in total, at

various stages of the Project), IFAD’s Country Programme Manager (CPM), and UNOPS. The Project

Coordinator’s role was challenging because of his inherent lack of authority, and the CPM’s role is

distant from the day-to-day project management issues to do more than provide general support and

guidance. Also, annual visits by a cooperating institution are insufficient to rescue an underperforming

project. Consequently, the effectiveness of the partnership was limited. Partnership with

the private sector was not a viable option in the early years of the Project, but this option could have

been pursued as implementation progressed. The extent to which partnerships outside of the project

were developed by the implementing stakeholders is limited.

III. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS AGREED BY PARTNERS

15. The following recommendations from the evaluation have been agreed upon by the GOE and

IFAD.

16. Design. It is recommended that consideration be given to interventions which are far more

focused in terms of numbers of beneficiaries to be reached and geographic coverage, within the overall

framework of IFAD’s targeting policy. This would ensure greater synergies across activities and

ultimately deeper impact on rural poverty. Similarly, the project duration should be long enough to

achieve the desired results and in particular take into account the time needed to implement attitude

and cultural changes. Project management structures should be kept simple to ensure the integration

and harmonization among different implementing agencies.

17. Quality of project delivery. It is recommended that greater attention be given in future project

design and implementation to country context issues, and the identification of indicators of quality,

and actions necessary to achieve real and lasting impact, alongside those relating to numerical outputs.

18. Policy dialogue. It is recommended that more explicit attempts be made to engage in policy

dialogue with Government and other development actors, where appropriate and required involving a

wider range of national and international specialists, rather than just IFAD and cooperating institution

staff.

19. Participation. It is recommended that future IFAD-funded projects and programmes in

Ethiopia pay more attention to people’s participation, especially as it has not been a tradition of

development practice in Ethiopia in the past.

20. Integration. In future multi-component projects, it is recommended that greater attention be

paid to the linkages between the components and between those agencies responsible for delivering

them. The evaluation team is in favour of projects which involve multiple components addressing the

diverse needs of target populations – but the difficulties of integrating such efforts should be carefully

considered.

21. Management. Management is more than coordination or supervision, and it should be

addressed with greater rigour in future projects and programmes particularly in challenging contexts as

found in SOCODEP. Projects need to be much more decisively managed. It is recommended that new

xix


approaches be explored, either through IFAD itself taking a more hands-on role during execution,

facilitated by the Fund’s field presence officer, which allow closer monitoring and follow-up to

implementation.

22. Role of the Field Presence Officer. The field presence officer can, among other tasks, provide

implementation support to IFAD-funded operations and has the potential to enhance partnerships and

policy dialogue in Ethiopia. Hence, the country presence should be further strengthened, so that it can

play a greater role in enhancing IFAD’s development effectiveness in Ethiopia.

xx


Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project

(SOCODEP)

Completion Evaluation

Main Report

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This document is the Evaluation Report prepared following the Completion Evaluation Mission

to the Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project (SOCODEP). The mission was

carried out between September 17 th and October 11 th 2006 by a team of four external evaluators 1

accompanied in the field by two officers of the Southern Region Government 2 and assisted in the

Regional capital by the former Project Coordinator 3 .

Interviewing members of the Argoba cooperative, Gimbo Woreda, Kafa Zone

Source: Evaluation Mission 2007

1 Richard Carter, Team Leader; Ayele Gebre-Mariam, Socio-economist; Tsegaye Asfaw, Microfinance

Specialist; and Michael Assefa, Cooperatives and Capacity-building Specialist. Andrew Brubaker was the

Evaluation Officer from OE responsible for the evaluation.

2 Ato Berhanu Asfaw, Cooperatives Promotion Sector Head; Ato Fekadu Tadesse, Rural Women’s Affairs

Team Expert.

3 Ato Shimekit Gebretsadik.

1


II. COUNTRY BACKGROUND

2. Ethiopia is a large (1.1m km 2 ), very diverse and extremely poor country and both its population

density and growth rate are higher than the average for east Africa (Table 1). Ethiopia was rated 170

out of 177 in the Human Development rankings in 2006. There is little incentive for farmers to

produce surpluses for distant markets where they will receive very low prices, even in areas where this

is possible. Coffee is Ethiopia’s main export, securing the livelihood of 700-800,000 households. In

the rural areas, over 32m people live on less than US$0.50 per day. Subsistence agriculture is the main

source of income for 87 per cent of rural households. Agricultural productivity and income levels are

low and fluctuate due to periodic climatic shocks. Livestock (72 per cent of households own livestock)

is the primary asset to cushion weather shocks. Other than climatic variability, the main direct causes

of rural poverty are an ineffective and inefficient agricultural marketing system, underdeveloped

transport and communication networks, very basic manual production technologies, limited access of

rural households to support services, and environmental degradation (soil erosion and deforestation).

3. The fundamental causes of poverty however are political, social and cultural. The political basis

of poverty relates to the ways in which power has been exercised by successive Governments –

particularly over land and resources, and in relation to individual freedoms, and the consequent failure

to empower rural households and communities. The social and cultural aspects of poverty concern the

disadvantages which some occupations and most rural women experience in terms of marginalisation

and lack of ready access to health care, education and employment opportunities. Female-headed

households are more likely to be food insecure than male-headed households. Furthermore, the

political and social elements have combined to discourage participation by rural poor people in

decisions that affect their livelihoods.

A. Project Background

4. SOCODEP’s origins. SOCODEP was one of the first significant internationally funded

interventions in Ethiopia following the fall of the former Marxist-Leninist regime (the Derg) in May

1991. The Project aimed to respond to the then new legislation (Proclamation 85/1994) concerning

Cooperatives, which ostensibly set out a means of turning the former Government-imposed and

politically-dominated Producer Cooperatives of the Derg into farmer-owned viable business entities

serving their members’ interests. In particular, it aimed to make rural finance (specifically microcredit)

available to so-called Service Cooperatives and their members.

5. The Principal Objective of the Project was to “increase agricultural productivity and raise

income levels of the rural poor through support to Service Cooperatives’ development in order to

facilitate efficient provision of sustainable services to members”. The Project had 7 specific objectives

which are set out in Table 2 and further elaborated in the reconstructed logframe in Appendix 4.

6. Together these objectives were designed not only to turn Service Cooperatives (SCs) into

effective vehicles for the service of their members, but also to deliver some specific services (road

construction, veterinary drug supply, health facility up-grading, and provision of water supply and

sanitation services) directly through the relevant Government organs. The Water Supply, Health and

Basic Sanitation Component (WSHBS) was separately financed by the Belgian Survival Fund as a

later addition to the Project.

2


Table 1. Statistical Data

Area and Population

Total area 1,127,127 km 2

Population Approx. 74 million

Population density 65 inhabitants/km 2

Average population density for East Africa 43 inhabitants/km 2

Population growth 2.36 per cent per year

Average population growth for East Africa 2.18 per cent per year

Number of ethnic groups > 80

Number of dialects

Economy and Agriculture

Approx. 200

Per cent of population living in rural areas (2003) 84

Contribution of agriculture to GDP 42 per cent

Contribution of agriculture to exports 75 per cent

Per cent total labour force employed in agriculture 81 per cent

Average GDP growth 1993-2003 4.7 per cent

GDP growth in 2005 9 per cent

per cent total land area arable 45 per cent IFAD

per cent total land area cultivated 9 per cent

per cent cultivated land irrigated


Table 2. SOCODEP Objectives

Principal objective: increase agricultural productivity and raise income levels of the rural poor

through support to Service Cooperatives’ development in order to facilitate efficient provision of

sustainable services to members.

SO1 Provide a model for developing Ethiopian cooperatives under the new legislation,

particularly with respect to improvement of financial intermediation services in rural areas,

which could be replicated in other areas of the country.

SO2 Increased capital and income among the rural poor in the project area through off-farm

income-generating activities particularly for women and families in densely populated areas

with limited land for farm expansion.

SO3 Strengthen the SRAB to carry out its mandate with respect to cooperative development.

SO4 Provide credit to meet financial requirements for agricultural inputs and draught oxen and

facilitate the supply of inputs through support to local traders and cooperatives.

SO5 Relief of livestock health constraints, particularly with respect to draught animals, through

provision of veterinary drugs.

SO6 Improve access of rural families to services and markets by rehabilitating and maintaining

rural roads.

SO7 (BSF Component) Reduce the burden of disease in 8 woredas of the SOCODEP area

Source: Appraisal Report and Approach Paper

7. Project targeting. The special programming mission (1991) distinguished between the more

highly populated Woredas on the east side of the project area (Wolayta), where the carrying capacity

of the land was thought to have been exceeded, and “the rest of the project area”, which had been

neglected previously, but where population pressure was less. Poverty was said to be “… widespread

and fairly evenly distributed…”, and consequently it was “… not considered appropriate to further

refine definition of the target group within the project area on the basis of poverty criteria”. Although

the re-assessment of the nuances of poverty within the project area was not a specific objective of the

evaluation, it would appear that this rather general assessment at Appraisal was somewhat simplistic.

8. Project timescale at appraisal. The project was designed to be implemented over a six year

period. On this basis, as the loans became effective in 1994, the project completion would have been

July 2000, with loan closure in July 2001.

9. The project budget at appraisal (Figure 1). At completion actual expenditure was split

approximately 61 per cent from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 21 per

cent from GoE, 15 per cent from the Belgian Survival Fund (BSF), two per cent from Commercial

Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), and 1 per cent from Beneficiaries.

4


Figure 1. Budget Costs by Component (million US$, total 22.72m)

Water Supply &

San, 2.28 (10%)

Health &

Nutrition, 1.57

(7%)

Roads, 4.70 (21%)

Veterinary Drugs,

1.89 (8%)

Source: Appraisal Report

WSHBS Mgt &

Coordination, 0.17

(1%)

Support to CBE,

0.39 (2%)

5

Training of SCs,

0.95 (4%)

Credit line thro

CBE, 7.68 (34%)

SSE Promotion,

0.29 (1%)

Support to SRAB,

2.80 (12%)

10. A Note on terminology. The main form of cooperatives which were established and active

under the previous Government (The Derg), between the 1974 revolution which overthrew Emperor

Haile Selassie and the fall of the Derg in 1991, were known as Producer Cooperatives. These were

instruments of socialism and Government control, and by popular approval they were

comprehensively looted and destroyed by their members when the Derg fell. Service Cooperatives

(SCs) co-existed with the Producer Cooperatives, but did not have the same political significance, and

many continued to function through the political changes and up to the present day. Most SCs are now

referred to as Multi-purpose Farmers’ Cooperatives. The legislation (Proclamations 85/1994 and

147/1998) makes no reference to different named types of cooperatives, while allowing a wide range

of flexibility in terms of objectives.

11. Components. The achievement of the Project objectives necessitated the implementation of 7

key project components, namely:

• restructuring of service cooperatives;

• provision of loans to cooperatives and their members;

• institutional strengthening/capacity-building of project stakeholders;

• setting up a veterinary revolving drug fund;

• rural roads construction;

• rural water supply; and

• improvements to rural health services and sanitation.

12. In section II, the achievements under each of these components, and the degree to which the

specific objectives have been met, are addressed in detail. The wider impacts of the project are

described and assessed in section III.

13. Project stakeholders. The list of Project stakeholders is long, and complicated by the numerous

reorganizations within the Southern Region Government. Figure 2 shows the main stakeholders in a

simplified form.


Source: Appraisal Report

Regional

Agricultural

Bureau:

Cooperatives

Promotion,

Sodo Rural

Technology Centre:

Skills Training for

Small scale

Enterprise

Development.

Figure 2. Main Project Stakeholders

Financial

Institutions:

Commercial Bank

of Ethiopia, Omo

Cooperatives

and their

Members

14. Organizational structure. The planned organizational structure for the project was as follows:

the Southern Regional Agricultural Bureau (SRAB) would have overall responsibility for the project.

The Project Coordinator would be the Head of SRAB’s Cooperative Promotion Department. A Project

Steering Committee would draw its membership from:

• SRAB Chief (Chair);

• Project Coordinator (Secretary);

• Representative, Ministry of External Economic Cooperation;

• Head, SRAB Planning and Project Services;

• Head, Rural Credit Department, CBE;

• Chief, Regional Finance Bureau;

• Head, Regional Bureau for Planning and Economic Development;

• Chief, Regional Bureau for Public Works and Urban Development;

• Deputy Chief, Field Operations, SRAB;

• Heads of participating Zonal Agricultural offices; and

• Head, Agricultural Inputs Supply Corporation (AISCO) Regional Coordination Office.

15. Numerous changes in organizational structure took place during implementation. These are

outlined in section II.B.

16. Project timescale. With agreed extensions, the original components of SOCODEP (that is,

excluding the water, sanitation and health component) ran from September 1994 until July 2002, a

total of nearly eight years with the Mid-term Review (MTR) at the end of 1996. Work on the BSF

component commenced in November 1998 and continued until Project closure in December 2005,

extending the project to 11 years in total.

17. Progress at key steps. The timescale conceals a number of important points related to

implementation and performance over the project period, however:

• by the time of the Mid-Term Review– carried out in November-December 1996, report dated

March 1997 – a total of 77 Service Cooperatives had been restructured, only EB 4.975m

(approx. US$790,000 or ten per cent of the US$7.68m originally allocated) had been

disbursed in the form of loans, the veterinary revolving drugs fund had not commenced

operation, and no roads had yet been completed. The water supply, health and basic

sanitation (BSF) component was still three years away from commencement;

6

Regional (Rural)

Roads Authority:

Road Construction

and Maintenance

Regional

Bureau of

Health: Health

and Sanitation

components

Regional

Bureau of

Water

Resources:


• the supervision mission which followed the MTR (October 1997) referred to a situation of

crisis and unacceptably low pace and efficiency; a year later the 1998 supervision report,

although presented in a more up-beat manner, clearly indicated poor progress in most

components; and

• even at the time of the March 2002 supervision visit, although “about 225” service

cooperatives had been restructured, still only EB 18.83m (approx US$2.28m) had been

disbursed in loans. This represented 42per cent of the reduced credit line of US$5.42m

recommended by the MTR. The Women’s Income Generating Activities (WIGA) subcomponent

had recorded strong performance, as had the Water Supply, Health and Basic

Sanitation (WSHBS) BSF project. However, only 74.5km of road rehabilitation and heavy

maintenance had been completed – 10 per cent of the appraisal target of 250km

rehabilitation and 450km heavy maintenance. Four months from planned loan closure in July

2002, US$10.2m (45per cent of the original budget) remained unspent 5 .

B. Objectives and Methodology of the Evaluation

18. Overall objectives. The main objectives of the evaluation were to: (i) assess the performance

and impact of the SOCODEP project; and (ii) generate a series of findings and recommendations that

would serve IFAD, the Government of the Ethiopia, and other donors in designing and implementing

similar projects and programmes in the future. The special focus of the evaluation, as highlighted in

the Approach Paper, was to be on Cooperatives Development, Rural Microfinance, Socio-economic

impact, and Institutional Capacity-Building.

19. Evaluation methodology. The evaluation followed OE’s guidelines for project evaluations. 6

This included making an assessment of the SOCODEP project according to internationally recognized

evaluation criteria, namely: (i) project performance, including relevance, effectiveness and efficiency;

(ii) impact on rural poverty; and (iii) performance of partners involved in the project, including IFAD,

government institutions, and others.

20. The approach used for the Evaluation Mission therefore was largely a critical review of

secondary data, and triangulation through correlation of different data sources, a field visit to the

project area, semi-structured interviews, focus groups discussions and comparisons with other donor

funded projects namely the IFAD/AfDB-funded the Rural Financial Intermediation Project (RUFIP) 7 ,

Netherlands supported the Kafa Development Programme (KDP) 8 , and the United States Agency for

International Development (USAID) supported the Agricultural Cooperatives in Ethiopia Project

(ACE) 9 . Specifically, the evaluation included key informant interviews which were held with all

relevant Government organs and other stakeholders at National, Regional, Zonal and Woreda levels.

At National level, the Federal Cooperatives Agency, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development,

and Commercial Bank of Ethiopia staff were interviewed, as well as personnel from the RUFIP and

the Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (VOCA) projects. At Regional level, officers from

the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development,

Bureau of Health, Bureau of Water, Mines and Energy, and the Rural Roads Authority were

interviewed. Government officials were interviewed in two of the five project Zones (Kafa and the

former North Omo – now Gamo Gofa and Wolayta) and one of the two special Woredas (Derashe). A

5 2002 Supervision report, paragraph 27.

6 This included assessing the project against internationally recognized evaluation criteria, namely: (i) project

performance, including relevance, effectiveness and efficiency; (ii) impact on rural poverty; and

(iii) performance of partners involved in the project, including IFAD, government institutions, and others.

7 Rural Financial Intermediation Project.

8 Kafa Development Programme, formerly Sustainable Poverty Alleviation Kaficho-Shakicho (SUPAK-S)

9 Agricultural Cooperatives in Ethiopia project, implemented since 1999 by ACDI/VOCA (a merger between

the NGOs Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative

Assistance).

7


total of ten of the original 33 project Woredas were visited, and discussions held with Government

officials. In each Woreda visited, project-assisted cooperatives were identified and interviews were

held with officials and members. In this way a total of 14 cooperatives were visited, and data collected

on many more. Whenever possible loan beneficiaries were interviewed, and their number in this

evaluation exceeds 20. Four of the six project roads were traveled, and three of the Woredas visited

were chosen specifically because of their inclusion of the BSF component.

21. Secondary sources. The evaluation made good use of available secondary sources of data 10 .

The standard project documentation (Appraisal, Mid-Term Review, and Supervision Reports) was

very valuable, but special note is made of the internal reports carried out in 1999 11 and 2001 12 , which

contained some very valuable and critical insights, the significance of which appears to have been

somewhat overlooked at the time. The recently completed and extremely thorough external Project

Completion Report (June 2006) was of great value too, especially for its data on Project achievements.

Our assessment ratings have however frequently diverged from those of the external Project

Completion Report (PCR), concurring more closely with those of the MTR, Supervision Reports, and

internal project reports. This matter is elaborated further in section II.D of this report.

22. Rating scales used. In section III of this report the assessment ratings of project and partner

performance and impact follow IFAD’s 6-point rating scale, with scores of 6 representing the highest

achievable, and 1 the lowest. The verbal descriptors of the rating scale scores are those set out in the

December 2005 edition of the IFAD Office of Evaluation’s (OE) Evaluation Manual 13 .

III. PROJECT PERFORMANCE

A. Design Features

23. Country context. Again Ethiopia is an extremely poor country and ranks 170 out 177 on the

Human development rankings. Ethiopia’s size, diversity, poor infrastructure and poverty pose

numerous development challenges. The worsening trends in population pressure, environmental

degradation, communicable disease and climate instability add to these challenges. Politically,

Ethiopia has undergone a virtually continuous process of change since the 1974 revolution in which

Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown. The Marxist rule of the Derg from 1974 to 1991 led to many

reforms, but the authoritarian use of power over the peasantry did not change, or if anything, it became

more restrictive. After the fall of the Derg in May 1991, a slow process of liberalisation of economy

and political systems has taken place, but there is still a long way to go before the rural population will

be fully able to participate in anything approaching a free market and transparent democratic processes

of government. Thus there is no doubt that Ethiopia is a very difficult country in which to make

progress in terms of development and poverty alleviation.

24. Project design context. Most if not all of the development challenges posed by Ethiopia’s

context were known in the early 1990s, and recognised in the Appraisal Report. However, in

retrospect, there was an unrealistic optimism about the rate at which beneficial change (e.g. to the

SCs) could take place, and an implicit assumption that the Government institutions involved were

fully committed to that change process.

10 The evaluation notes the limited range of reports and other documents available through the project and

partners due to the frequent moving of the project office which made it challenging to find many documents.

However, the core documents were available and provided a sufficient source of secondary data for the

evaluation.

11 Comprehensive Analysis of Current Situation and Requirements of Cooperatives in SOCODEP Areas,

April 1999; Brief Summary of Comprehensive Study on the Small Scale Enterprise and Income Generating

Activities, May 1999.

12 A Baseline Survey Report on Small Scale Enterprises in SNNPR, September 2001.

13 IFAD Draft Evaluation Manual. Office of Evaluation, December 2005, and subsequent enhancements.

8


25. The Project correctly identified some of the key difficulties of the Region’s farming households,

namely their inability to access credit and some key services, and poor infrastructure. At the time of

design the Project was imaginative in responding to the new Cooperatives legislation which promised

a significant liberalization of the sector and it included six relevant but only loosely integrated

components. However the project design was flawed in a number of important respects, which are

explained in the following paragraphs.

26. The Project area was too large. With its centre in Awassa, the Regional capital, the most distant

parts of the project area were at least two days’ drive away, and often inaccessible in the rainy season

which stretches from April to September (the western parts of the project area are some of the wettest

in Ethiopia) 14 . The sheer size of the project area diluted the impacts of nearly all the project activities,

and helped to undermine sustainability. The Project had a scatter-gun effect, delivering significant

benefits to a relatively small number of individuals (a few tens of thousands) within a much larger

population (4-6m population of the project Woredas, out of the Region’s 14.5m 15 people).

27. The Project duration at design was too short. It was entirely predictable that a new Regional

authority, with no experience of handling projects financed by external donors or IFIs, would take

considerable time to get up to speed. The fact that relatively little was achieved between project

commencement in 1994 and the MTR in 1996 is testimony to this. Similar experiences were observed

in the Special Country Programme, evaluated in 2004 16 . Furthermore, there was no effective start-up

phase during which personnel were effectively oriented to the goals and modus operandi of the

Project.

28. The design was over-optimistic about attitude change. The design exhibited too optimistic a

view of the speed with which the former model of cooperatives – instruments of coercion and control

by the former Government – could be turned around into a member-owned and member-controlled

viable business model. Such a change in mind-set, understanding, attitude and practice was never

going to take place quickly. Even now, 12 years after the first reforming legislation, there is a long

way to go.

29. The Project was never fully owned by Southern Region Government. It is understood that the

negotiations which gave rise to SOCODEP took place between the Federal Government and IFAD,

and that the Southern Region Government was not involved in the process. Furthermore, it was

explained to the evaluation team by senior Government officials that external project financing has

correspondingly reduced Federal and Regional allocations of funding which otherwise would have

been spent at the discretion of the Regional bureaux. These two factors have contributed to a lack of

ownership by the Region. These issues should have been understood and taken into account at the

design stage.

30. The partnerships were too weak given the project complexity. At design, the project was to be

managed from one Government Bureau (SRAB), with major inputs from two other stakeholder

institutions (CBE and the Bureau of Public Works and Urban Development (BPWUD) – later to be the

Roads Authority). The Rural Technology Centre at Sodo was to be involved in the pilot development

of small-scale enterprises. The addition of the BSF component brought in three other Bureaux (Water,

Health, Finance and Economic Development). When CBE withdrew, the Omo Micro Finance

Institution (OMFI) took its place. Project complexity grew, but project ownership and coordination,

and the ability to manage a multi-sectoral project did not.

31. The Project had no single logical framework and its many components and stakeholders were

not well integrated. This was a multi-component, multi-stakeholder project, but its parts and its actors

14 Even in Kaffa Zone, a relatively accessible part of the western side of the project area, one day’s drive from

Awassa, only 4 out of the 10 Woredas were accessible at the time of the evaluation (September-October 2006).

Some parts of the Zone lie up to 3 days’ walk from the nearest road.

15 Population estimate for 2005.

16 http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/country/pf/ethiopia.pdf

9


were never fully harmonized and integrated. The logical framework used in this evaluation, and a

corresponding version used in the external PCR, had to be reconstructed from the narrative

descriptions in the Appraisal documents and MTR Report. The lack of integration 17 of project

components was in large part (but not only) due to the constant restructuring of Government organs

and the consequent redeployment of personnel, a feature of Ethiopia’s Government over at least the

last two to three decades.

32. Implementation mechanisms set out at design were bound to weaken effectiveness and impact.

The design was unrealistic about the mechanisms of implementation. Even without the numerous reorganisations

of Government offices and the constant reshuffling of staff which have characterized the

Derg and post-Derg period, the assumption that the Government staff at Regional, Zonal and Woreda

level would effectively implement a new project according to a set of externally introduced ideas and

expectations – including western free-market ideas of business and of cooperative development - was

over-optimistic. The Appraisal Report foresaw this: “Cooperatives Promotion Department (CPD) staff

lack practical business promotion, management and marketing know-how. Their training has been for

cooperatives under a socialistic system, which is no longer relevant in Ethiopia, and major

reorientation is required in the context of operations under a market economy”. In reality this major

reorientation never took place.

33. In relation to specific project components, the selection of the CBE as the vehicle for

transferring credit to service cooperatives was a mistake in hindsight. The Development Bank of

Ethiopia (DBE) then known as the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (AIDB) was an

alternative at the time, having greater experience of providing rural credit services than CBE. The

design of the Veterinary Revolving Drug Fund (VRDF) was extremely cumbersome, as evidenced by

its very delayed commencement (the first drugs being acquired in 2001, 7 years after the Project

began). The inclusion of a rural roads component was a strong design feature, although the assumption

that service cooperative members would maintain the new roads was flawed. The later decision to

upgrade the road design standard (from RR 30 to RR 50), with corresponding implications for

construction costs (a 5-fold increase per km) and maintenance (non-suitability for labour-based

maintenance) produced good quality roads; however, it limited the reach of this project component.

Water supply was deliberately omitted at the design stage, then a few years later introduced through

the BSF component. The BSF intervention, while much more focused (in only 8 woredas rather than

the original 33 of SOCODEP as a whole), in effect represented a separate project, having little relation

to the rest of SOCODEP. Overall, SOCODEP was a multi-component, multi-stakeholder, project,

which began with a focus on Cooperatives and Credit and the corresponding institutional Capacity-

Building, but which, by adding Veterinary Drugs, Roads, and later Water, Health and Sanitation, still

failed to become an integrated project. A notable omission from the project design was that of markets

– for agricultural inputs and outputs, and the products of small-scale enterprises.

B. Implementation and Outputs

34. Project achievements. Table 3 summarizes the main project numerical targets and

achievements, which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

35. Institutional structure during implementation. Reference has already been made to the

changes in institutional structure, which took place during the project. The main changes are

highlighted here, in order to place the project achievements in context:

• The project as described at Appraisal was to be managed by the Head of the Cooperatives

Promotion Department of SRAB (as Project Coordinator), and guided by a Project Steering

Committee (PSC);

• Over the course of the project, the post of Project Coordinator was held by four different

individuals, each serving for 2-3 years, so interrupting continuity. Successive Supervision

17 Noted also in the 2002 Supervision Report.

10


missions reported on the weaknesses of the project coordination unit and ineffective

guidance by the project steering committee;

• For the first two years of the project a liaison office in Addis Ababa served the main project

coordination office in Awassa. This was closed in 1997, against the better judgment of the

United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) 18 ;

• The organ of the Southern Region Government which was central to the functioning of the

project, namely the Cooperatives Promotion Department started out as a department of

SRAB, then became a full Bureau, and subsequently became a department of the Regional

Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development. These re-organizations inevitably affected

the effectiveness of this organ of Government;

• After the MTR, and with the commencement of the BSF component (which involved two

more Bureaux of Regional Government), the PCU migrated from the Bureau of Agriculture

and Rural Development (BOARD) to the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development

(which had been recently created from the two former separate Bureaux of Finance and

Planning). This move was probably necessary because of the widening of SOCODEP’s

activities, but it caused some understandable resentment in the Cooperatives Promotion

Office; and

• CBE, as the channel for disbursement of credit to the project cooperatives, soon found itself

in difficulties, recording this in an internal report dated January 2001. By July 2002 CBE

terminated all loan disbursements to cooperatives.

36. The frequent changes to the institutional structure of the project, the weak capacity of some

players, the limited real authority of the Project Coordinators, and the influence of those with greater

power, provides the context within which the (limited) achievements of the project should be seen.

18 UNOPS Supervision Report December 1997, paragraph 12.

11


Aspect

Table 3. SOCODEP Numerical Targets and Achievements

Appraisal

Target

Revised Target

(at MTR)

12

Achieved

Percentage

of MTR

Percentage

of Appraisal

Cooperatives

Coops restructured (No.) 200 150 267 178 134

Credit

Individual loans for inputs 60000 6,219 10

WIGA loans 10000 7,600 76

Ox loans 50000 14,579 29

Flour mills & maize shellers 170 23 14

Coops with loans for Marketing 75 98 131

Coops with loans for Stores 75 0

Coops with loans for Shops 200 66 33

Credit disbursed (US$m) 7.68 Reduce by US$1.4m 2.96 43 39

Small-scale Enterprise Development

Vocational Training (trainees) 215 316 147

Jobs created 2,100 Negligible

Loans for SSEs (EB) 2,200,000 55,456 3

Veterinary Revolving Drugs Fund

Veterinary drugs (US$m) 1.89 Increase by US$0.58m 0.29 12 15

Roads

Rehab to RR 30 standard (km) 250 Reduced to 125km 122 98 49

Heavy maintenance (km) 450 0 0

Health and Sanitation

Health facilities upgraded 8 N/A 8 100

Human RDF locations 8 N/A 8 100

Household latrines 1,000 N/A 2,320 232

Household refuse pits 1,000 N/A 269 27

Water Supply

Waterpoints - new and rehab 164 N/A 171 104

* Source: Appraisal Report, MTR, internal PCR, external PCR

C. Restructuring of Service Cooperatives

37. Restructuring of Service Cooperatives (now known as Multi-Purpose Farmers’ Cooperatives).

At Appraisal it was recognised that the Cooperatives Promotion Division of SRAB had experience of

supporting cooperatives under a socialist economy, but that there was no experience of supporting

cooperatives established “…in accordance with international principles of cooperation”. It was further

recognised that “…even before disturbances at the time of the change in Government, which resulted

in looting and destruction of some cooperatives’ property, SCs were not operating efficiently”.

SOCODEP therefore aimed to turn SCs into financially viable autonomous organisations which would

provide sustainable services in the future. The Cooperative Development component of the Project

had three sub-components, namely training, small-scale enterprise promotion, and institutional

support. SOCODEP would train and equip Government Cooperatives staff, appoint professional

managers to SCs, train Cooperatives officers and members.

38. The Project more than met its numerical targets in terms of re-organising SCs under the new

legislation. The Appraisal target of 200 cooperatives restructured 19 was exceeded by about 30 per cent.

A great deal of training of SC staff, executive committees and members was also carried out 20 . It is

estimated 21 that almost 57,000 individuals in Government or cooperatives received some form of

19 This target was reduced by the MTR from 200 to 150.

20 Project Completion Report, June 2006, Annex II, Table 2 reproduced as Appendix 2 of this Report.

21 External PCR, June 2006, Annex II, Table 2.


training, varying in duration from one day to two years, and much of the shorter-term training was

targeted at cooperative officers and members.

39. In terms of achievement, it is clear that although the project activities resulted in significant

numerical outputs, the quality of those outputs (the extent of cooperative re-orientation and the

enhancement of business competence) could have been much higher. Comparison of SOCODEP

activities with those of the USAID-supported VOCA/ACE project suggest that an intensive

programme of well-designed and structured training by very experienced individuals, with sound

monitoring and follow-up, was needed to achieve the project goals.

D. Provision of Loans to Cooperatives and their Members

40. Credit. Loans which were initially channelled through CBE (until the withdrawal of this Bank

in 2002), and later through Omo Microfinance Institution (OMFI), were used for two main purposes:

(a) financing the activities of the Cooperatives themselves (consumer shops, flour mills, purchase and

sale of agricultural produce), and (b) individual loans to cooperative members (for purchase of work

oxen, purchase of sheep and goats for fattening or rearing, and investment in small-scale enterprises).

Because of the weak business skills of many of the cooperatives, the first of these have been largely

unsuccessful (except in the coffee producing areas, where marketing of coffee has been lucrative),

while many of the individual loans supplied to cooperative members have made a real difference to the

lives of the recipients (see sections II.C and III).

41. Loan disbursement and recovery for cooperative activities (flour mills, consumer shops and

produce marketing) have generally fallen short of target. Initially, the rehabilitation and installation of

160 flour mills was planned, but only 13 new flour mills were installed and 10 were rehabilitated at a

total cost of EB 1.1m. The flour mills performed poorly and the recovery rate of the loans was also

very poor at 47 per cent. The operations of most flour mills were discontinued because of poor

maintenance and stiff competition from private flour mill operators. A total of 66 loans were provided

to SCs for operating consumer shops. The total disbursement was EB 2.1m, i.e. 53 per cent of the

EB 4.0m initially budgeted. Although the repayment of the loans was reported to be 93 per cent, at

present most consumer shops are not operational due to lack of maintenance and competition from the

private sector. The fact that cooperatives cannot generally compete with the private sector in flour mill

operation and consumer shops is evidence of their lack of business-orientation. In respect to produce

marketing service, 98 SCs received a total loan of EB 2.45m, 130 per cent of the Appraisal target, and

the loan repayment was 77 per cent.

42. Loan disbursement for individual activities of SC members generally did better than those for

cooperative activities, although repayment rates were often low. In particular 7,600 loans to women

for fattening and multiplication of small ruminants, petty trading and other activities were made, and

in their case, repayment rates were high, especially after Omo Microfinance took over from CBE. Box

1 sets out two case studies of women beneficiaries, both of whom benefited from loans supplied

through small group membership along the pattern established by OMFI. These illustrate in a positive

way what is possible.

43. An observation made during the evaluation was that the loan repayment culture differs

significantly between the west and east of the project area. In the west, individuals take great pride in

repaying loans, and they take great care not to risk going to their graves in debt. In the east and southeast

of the project area however this culture does not appear to be so strong, and defaulting is more

prevalent 22 .

22 The reasons for this difference in repayment culture are not clear, but the evaluation team was not the first

to observe it.

13


Box 1. Two Examples from Individual Beneficiaries of OMFI Loans

Lateshe Lache, aged 35, a house wife with six children, with 9th grade education, was a member of

Sake SC in Woyde Woreda in Wolayta Zone. She became a member of one of the groups organized in

the area by the OMFI. Subsequently, she was provided with a loan of EB 500 by OMFI through the

Sake SC to carry out butter trading. She said the loan of the first cycle was properly utilized for the

intended purpose and she made a profit of EB 300. Upon settling her debts, she was again provided

with a second cycle loan of EB 500 for the same type of petty trading activity and managed to make a

profit of EB 360 and fully settled all her debts to OMFI. With a continuous success, she was granted a

third cycle loan of EB 1,000 and reportedly made a profit of EB 700. Subsequently she repaid all her

debts to OMFI. However, as her business continued to expand, she borrowed for a fourth cycle loan

amount of EB 4,000 to carry out and expand her trade activities, mainly the butter and grain trading

activities. Lateshe was extremely happy about her trade business activities and, as a result, she was

highly optimistic for further success in her trade. She said she has a house worth EB 15,000 and other

assets.

Bezunesh Mena, aged 30, a house wife with two children, became a member of Wachiga SC in Sodo

Zuria Woreda in Wolayta Zone. Subsequently, she joined a group organized by OMFI and got access

to a loan of EB 250. She utilized the loan for grain and butter trading activities and made profits. After

one year, she fully repaid her loan, and with the profits she established a small bakery., while

continuing her butter and grain trading activities. Bezunesh has carried out her business activities for

the last ten years, and now she own a house worth EB 10,000 plus 3 cows and a pair of draught oxen.

She also works as a family planning agent in her community and gets EB 75 per month, working two

days per week. However, she spends most of her time attending her usual business activities.

* Source: The Evaluation

44. The total disbursement of the credit component of the project was generally low, both for

cooperative and individual member activities. Table 4 illustrates this for the individual member

activities. Overall, EB 20.7m (approx US$2.96m) was disbursed to and through SCs, representing

about 39 per cent of the target at Appraisal.

45. The project failed to provide a wider range of microfinance services other than credit and ox

insurance. Although SOCODEP correctly identified lack of access to credit as a limiting factor for

farmers and cooperatives, and although insurance was a condition of ox loans, other financial services

– especially savings - do not seem to have been considered for inclusion, and the ox insurance

programme did not serve its clientele well 23 .

Table 4. Loans Made Through SOCODEP for Individual Activities

Purpose of loan Target at Appraisal Achievement Comments

Input supply

60,000 individual

beneficiaries of input

credit at average of

EB 150 per farmer.

Total loan utilization

EB 2.01m, reaching

6,219 SC members.

22 per cent achievement in terms of credit

disbursed; 10 per cent in terms of

beneficiaries. Recovery rate 68 per cent.

WIGA

Loans to 10,000

women.

7,600 women

recipients (76 per

cent of target).

Average loan EB 300 (approx US$45).

Total disbursed EB 2.2m (approx US$

320,000). Recovery rates 79 per cent

(CBE) and 99.8 per cent (OMF).

SSE

170 enterprises;

2,100 jobs created.

negligible

Only EB 55,456 (approx US$8,000)

disbursed during entire project period.

Draught oxen

50,000 oxen

purchased.

14,579 oxen (29 per

cent of target).

Loan recovery rate 68 per cent; high

mortality (14 per cent); low payout from

insurance scheme.

* Source: PCR and Evaluation

23 The ox insurance scheme was not popular with loan beneficiaries, because it represented an additional

financial burden, and it only paid out in a minority of cases of mortality. This was most likely because of poor

administration of the claim execution process, in which the death of an ox had to be reported to the Cooperative,

cause of death verified by a Veterinary Officer, and completed claim forms delivered to the offices of the

Ethiopian Insurance Corporation.

14


Institutional Strengthening/Capacity-Building of Project Stakeholders

46. Institutional capacity-building. If institutional capacity-building is generally taken as

including changes to the policy environment, organizational reform, putting in place management

systems, technical and management training, provision of physical resources, and changing of

attitudes, then SOCODEP only partially addressed the matter of capacity-building of Government and

other stakeholder institutions. SOCODEP delivered a great deal of training (see Appendix 2) and

physical resources, to Regional and lower levels of Government, as well as to CBE, OMFI, and SC

personnel and members.

47. Training. In order to strengthen institutional capacity, 23 international and 39 domestic

trainings were delivered to 56,912 trainees from partner bureaux at all levels and SCs executive

committee, staff and members between 1998 and 2005. Eight of the distance learning students from

the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BOFED) are still following their MSc study in

Financial Management from UK in 2006, four years after the main project loans were closed.

48. At the time of Appraisal, the profound needs for training and re-orientation were clear: “…

Cooperative Promotion Department (CPD) staff lack practical business promotion, management and

marketing know-how. Their training has been for cooperatives under a socialistic system, which is no

longer relevant in Ethiopia, and major reorientation is required in the context of operations under a

market economy”. Two years later the mid-term review of the project said that: “…the basic

restructuring and the breaking up of the CPD into different teams requires redesigning the training

programme conceived at appraisal. A comprehensive cooperative promotion and training programme

for the next four years is considered to be necessary and urgent. It will replace all training that was

proposed for the remaining four years at appraisal and has been designed to ‘restart from scratch’”.

49. Physical resources. The stakeholder organisations received a good deal of physical equipment 24

including 65 cars (double cabin pick-ups and land cruiser station wagons) and 3 buses, 300

motorbikes, two newly built offices, computers, office furniture, 6-communication radios, and

different types of audiovisual equipment. Road building equipment including: 9 dump trucks, 3

bulldozers, 3 graders, 2 loaders, 2 rollers, many spare parts and other supplies were provided by the

project. But during this evaluation mission, and as has been the case during the Supervision missions,

the destination of some of the project vehicles was impossible to trace. It was also confirmed by the

Supervision missions 25 and during the evaluation mission that vehicles and other equipment were not

always used for the intended purposes.

Setting Up a Veterinary Revolving Drug Fund

50. Veterinary Revolving Drugs Fund (VRDF). The Veterinary RDF was implemented late in the

project, with the first drugs procurement in 2001. Discussions at Woreda level confirmed that the

acquisition of SOCODEP drugs made a significant contribution to the ability of Government

Veterinary personnel to provide treatments, but, as the PCR points out, the procurement process was

initially very cumbersome. Now that the RDF is dwindling, supplies to Woredas are reducing, and the

incidence of animal disease is increasing again.

51. Aim of the component. SOCODEP was not directly concerned with livestock production, but a

considerable amount of credit was provided for work oxen, and to women fattening small ruminants

and cattle. The objective of the VRDF therefore was “to provide limited relief of livestock health

constraints, particularly with respect to draught animals, through provision of veterinary drugs”. This

was intended to improve animal health in the project area, verified by reduced mortality rates and

incidence of diseases. The sub-component was intended to back-up the credit activities associated with

the supply of work oxen and women’s income generating activities involving cattle and sheep

fattening. The project was to finance the importation of a limited supply of veterinary drugs and

24 Information obtained from PCU.

25 eg the 2003 Supervision Report, paragraph 30.

15


allowances for veterinary assistance in the project area. The supply of drugs was expected to operate

on a revolving fund basis with the regional veterinarian advising on drugs to be purchased. At

appraisal, it was proposed that the funds allocated for this purpose would be held by SRAB with the

National Bank of Ethiopia. The sale and purchase of drugs was to be performed through the Zonal and

Woreda veterinary clinics. All drugs were to be sold to stockowners on a cash basis with a 25 per cent

mark-up. Funds collected from the sales were expected to be reconverted into foreign currency and

deposited in the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) account and used for future drug purchase.

52. Achievements. The operational modalities for the revolving fund were put in place in 1999.

The Regional BOARD received 6 vehicles and motorcycles to support the WIGA livestock fattening

activities and the administration of the fund. At Zonal and Woreda levels 140 veterinarians and

assistant veterinarians, and 300 veterinary technicians received training on the operation of the

revolving fund. Appropriate receipt and ordering forms for drugs were designed, printed and

distributed at field level. After drug purchase and distribution, follow up field visits were conducted to

check the sales and reporting system. According to the veterinary reports 313,140 animals have been

treated for trypanosomiasis; more than 20,000 animals were treated for various infectious diseases;

450,000 sheep and goats have been treated for internal parasites; about 500,000 animals have been

treated for external parasites; and more than 10,000 animals have been treated for other diseases. 26

53. Disbursement. A total of EB 10.7m (US$1.89m) was budgeted for the component. Actual

utilization was only EB 2.1m (19 per cent of allocated fund).

Rural Roads Construction

54. Rural roads construction. A total of 6 roads were constructed through SOCODEP, to a higher

standard than originally assumed (RR 50 rather than RR 30), and at a consequently much higher unit

cost. This meant that the Appraisal targets had to be revised downwards at MTR. However, despite the

relatively small amount of construction and its scattered nature, the quality of at least the four roads

traveled in this evaluation is good 27 , and the impact on those now able to use them 28 is significant.

Furthermore, the equipment provided to the Roads Authority has allowed it to continue construction

elsewhere, and this is expected to continue for some time to come.

55. A total of 122km of rural road construction was carried out. Table 5 shows the achievements of

this component. Unit costs varied widely, from approximately EB 36,000 (US$4,200) to EB 170,000

(US$20,000) per km.

56. Overall, the roads component, like many of the other components described so far, resulted in

useful achievements, but which fell far short of those anticipated at Appraisal. The main reason for

this was the raising of the design standards and hence unit costs of the roads constructed. Furthermore,

while it is acknowledged that SOCODEP had little influence on roads policy, a greater effort should

have been made in pursuing a labour-based maintenance strategy which would have been more

appropriate for the benefiting communities.

26 SOCODEP, undated, Veterinary Component Project Activity report.

27 As good, that is, as other non-SOCODEP roads travelled. However, gullying and erosion problems are

evident, and maintenance is needed.

28 Mostly on foot.

16


Road name

Table 5. Rural Roads Constructed by SOCODEP (in km)

Total

length

(km)

Year

started

17

Year

completed

Cost

(EB)

Total

beneficiaries 29

Gazer – Tolta 22.0 2001 2004 3,343,078 29,661

Arba Minch –

Zigiti

21.5 2001 2004 3,657,797 38,900

Chiri - Udadish 22.5 2001 2004 1,916,711 8,920

Shewa - Bench-

Maji

12.0 2002 1998 1,499,238 46,000

Gojeb - Argoba 10.0 1997 1997 357,518 5,373

Wajifo - Boreda 34.0


constructed two motorized water schemes from spring sources and one motorized scheme from a

shallow borehole 31 . In total 171 new or rehabilitated water points were constructed (as against target at

Appraisal of 164).

59. The quality of construction of the water points seen in the evaluation was generally adequate,

but the water points were not well separated from livestock and drainage was poor. Upkeep and

maintenance of water points betrayed weaknesses in community ownership and management, issues

which are explored further in section III.

60. Training of local artisans and the community to construct and operate water facilities. A total of

311 members of Community Water Committees received training in the management of water points,

financial management and environmental hygiene, sanitation and health. In year 2000 two water

officers, 5 community organizers, 13 water committees and 15 water scheme operators were trained in

water supply management. In the same year, 175 water technicians and Water Committee members

received training. In 2003, 14 Woreda technicians were trained in the design and construction of water

supply systems 32 . The existing technical manual for the operation and maintenance of water supply

and sanitation facilities was simplified and made available to caretakers of water points. At least two

women were included in each Community Water Committee and every participating village was

represented at a community-training workshop.

A Public Tapstand in the Yakima Gravity Scheme,

Ofa Woreda, Wolayta Zone

Source: Evaluation Mission 2007

18

61. Overall, the water supply component

has the potential to deliver significant

benefits to the target populations. Improved

access to better quality domestic water can

lead to significant time savings for women in

particular, and it can contribute to improved

health. However, it is widely recognised that

significant health impacts are only achieved

through an integrated approach to water

supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion.

Because of weaknesses in the integration of

these three aspects, and because of the limited

emphasis on hygiene promotion, the

evaluation team had serious concerns about

impact in this area (on health, in particular).

Furthermore, concerns about functional

sustainability of water supply infrastructure

undermine the limited impacts achieved.

62. Health and sanitation. The construction, rehabilitation and equipping of health facilities, and

the training of staff and community members have no doubt contributed significantly to the

improvement of the health condition of local populations. There has however been little integration

between the activities focused on delivery of health services, and the supposedly health-targeted

activities of sanitation and water supply. In the case of sanitation, the reported high levels of latrine

construction 33 and ownership 34 may have more to do with the Government’s push through the Woreda

and kebele councils to increase coverage quickly, than with the BSF component itself. Some Woreda

officials admit privately that the top-down approach of Government may well be increasing numbers

of latrines, but that usage is another question.

31 IFAD, 2006. SOCODEP Project Completion Report.

32 IFAD, 2006. SOCODEP Project Completion Report.

33 Using local materials rather than concrete sanplats.

34 75 per cent in the BSF woredas, according to the BSF Impact Assessment.


63. Health centres and equipment. The health centers at Sawla and Karat were rehabilitated in

addition to a new construction of Health Station at Mure in Offa Woreda. Medical equipment ranging

from basic weighing scales to operating tables was supplied to 3 Health Centres and 2 Health Stations

in order to promote improved health care delivery. Non-medical equipment was also supplied to the

health facilities and to three Zonal health offices. Revolving Drug Funds were set up in 8 health

facilities.

64. Transport and logistical support. Two twin cab pick-ups and 22 motorcycles were supplied

and added to the pool of transport, which distributes drugs and vaccines and is used for the supervision

of health services.

65. Training. Under the health and nutrition sub-component was expected to cover (i) training of

qualified physicians, nurses and anesthetists in emergency surgery; (ii) training of 24 trainers to

provide in service training for health workers; (iii) training of 80 health workers in health

management; (iv) training of 80 health workers and 80 traditional birth attendants; (v) training for 12

nutrition officers; (vi) training for a Monitoring and Evaluation Officer on participatory Monitoring

and Evaluation (M&E) methodologies; and (vii) training for health and administrative staff on

prescriptions and use of essential drugs. 35

66. Results achieved in training health department staff. Nine clinical staff were trained in

anesthesiology; 18 health staff were trained as trainers and 77 were trained in health management.

Nutrition training was provided to 26 nutrition officers and 18 general health staff. Refresher training

was provided in aspects of health service delivery to 86 health workers and 50 sanitation officers

received training on latrine installation and community health activities. A total of 92 environmental

health officers attended refresher training in environmental sanitation, financial management, and the

operation of the drug revolving fund. In addition, the focal person in the Regional Health Bureau

attended a degree course in community health for one year in planning and community organization. 36

67. Results achieved in training the communities. A total of 43 village people were trained to

become Primary Health workers and 21 were trained to become community health agents. An

additional 190 existing Community Health Workers and 42 Traditional Birth Attendants received

refresher training. More than 760 members of the Kebele Health and Sanitation Committees were

trained in basic health and sanitation. The community based voluntary workers have become

community educators, mobilizing the community to promote health and basic sanitation in the

villages. 37

68. Basic sanitation sub-component. A total of 227 demonstration latrines were constructed in

public places such as schools, health facilities, SCs and Kebeles. 2,320 household latrines were

constructed. 68 demonstration public refuse pits and 269 household refuse pits were constructed.

Members of the Health and Sanitation Committees (HSC) carried out campaigns in promoting

sanitation. 38

69. Overall, the health and sanitation component has delivered significant improvements in health

facilities, training and equipment in the 8 BSF project Woredas. However, long-term impact and

sustainability of these interventions are a matter of concern, as all these services need on-going

investment and support.

70. SOCODEP achievements. Figure 3 summarizes 20 numerical achievements of SOCODEP as

compared to the targets set at Appraisal.

35 FAD, 2006. SOCODEP Project Completion Report.

36 IFAD, 2006. SOCODEP Project Completion Report

37 IFAD, 2006. SOCODEP Project Completion Report

38 Opp.Cit p.27

19


Achievement as % of

Appraisal Target

Figure 3. SOCODEP: Quantitative Achievements against Targets at Appraisal

250

200

150

100

50

0

Coops restructured (No.)

Individual loans for inputs

WIGA loans (No.)

Ox loans (No.)

Flour mills & maize shellers

Coops with loans for Marketing

Coops with loans for Stores

Coops with loans for Shops

Credit disbursed (USDm)

Vocational Training (individuals)

Jobs created

Loans for SSEs (EB)

Veterinary drugs (USDm)

Rehab to RR30 standard (km)

Heavy maintenance (km)

Health facilities upgraded

Human RDF locations

Household latrines

Household refuse pits

Water supply points

* Source: Appraisal Report, PCRs, Supervision Reports, and the Evaluation

E. Attaining Project Objectives

71. Specific objective 1. Provide a model for developing Ethiopian cooperatives under the new

legislation, particularly with respect to improvement of financial intermediation services in rural areas,

which could be replicated in other areas of the country.

72. The need for intensive re-orientation over several years, and the very mixed performance of

cooperatives in reality, puts in question the achievement of this objective. Because of weak

management and design flaws, the project failed to provide a replicable model. Even with more

intensive and concerted re-orientation, this evaluation team questions the appropriateness of the

cooperative model, except in situations where cooperatives are demonstrably advantageous, or where

there is no alternative. Cooperatives as businesses retain many of the features of Government-imposed

institutions, namely salaries, per diems, and a bureaucratic mentality. Consequently they often fail to

compete with the private sector.

73. At the end of the SOCODEP intervention, Cooperatives are weak. Working Paper 1 Table 1

presents a long list of weaknesses and causes of those weaknesses of 7 cooperatives assessed in the

evaluation. These include inability to compete with the private sector; misappropriation of funds; low

morale; lack of trust between members and cooperative officers; lack of management competence;

lack of full-time managers; and lack of on-going support from the Cooperatives office. Figure 4

summarizes this situation visually. During the evaluation, the opportunity was taken to compare the

approaches of SOCODEP and VOCA’s ACE programme in regard to the strengthening of

cooperatives. VOCA’s approach is more intensive, more organized, well monitored, and consequently

more effective in building the capacity of its target cooperatives. It should be noted however that

VOCA has been more selective in its choice of cooperatives than SOCODEP, focusing on merit rather

than need, and picking the ‘low-hanging fruit’ rather than taking the less discriminating approach of

SOCODEP. VOCA did not provide loans to cooperatives, unlike SOCODEP. Discussions with the

RUFIP programme revealed that, just as with SOCODEP, it is relatively easy to make quantitative

progress in terms of establishing or re-registering cooperatives, but to deliver well-planned and

effective training is much more time-consuming and demanding.

20


No full-time

manager

Poor governance

Misappropriation

of funds

Lack of capital

* Source: The Evaluation

Figure 4. Cooperatives: Findings from the Evaluation

74. In light of the present-day performance of cooperatives, the quality of restructuring and reorientation

of cooperatives delivered by SOCODEP has to be questioned. In the eastern and southern

parts of the project area (Wolayta, Gamo Gofa, and the special Woreda of Derashe visited in this

evaluation), many of the SCs are de facto bankrupt, and failing to provide useful services to their

members. In ventures where they compete with the private sector (consumer shops, flour mills) their

overheads exceed the combined profits and overheads of their private sector competitors – hardly

testimony to the business orientation of the cooperatives. In the west of the project area the

cooperatives are in a better state (the team visited Kafa Zone, but it seems that conditions are also

similar in Sheka and Bench Maji), but in areas where the private sector competes, the cooperatives still

cannot do better.

75. At MTR, it was clear that training of Cooperatives members and officers had thus far been

largely ineffective. The MTR Report recommended the urgent redesign and implementation of the

cooperative promotion and training programme, in its own words, “starting from scratch” with the reorientation

and training of individuals from both Government and the cooperatives themselves.

76. Between the MTR and the closure of the project, with the exception of the BSF component,

little appears to have changed. The anticipated institutional capacity enhancement which would result

from training and other capacity-building inputs has failed to adequately contribute to policy changes,

organizational reform, establishment of working systems (including a functioning M&E system), and

changing of attitudes. Furthermore, the partner responsible for cooperative development (the

Cooperative Promotion Department) has been less involved in the international and domestic trainings

than other stakeholders 39 .

77. Training needs assessment. Many of those interviewed during the evaluation expressed the

view that the majority of the trainings (particularly international trainings) were not organized in a

systematic way based on the needs of the project, but rather selected to benefit individuals who in the

end seem to have contributed little to the project. Furthermore, it is evident that the trainings provided

for the SCs did not bring about effective re-orientation and enhanced managerial capacity in the SCs.

39 See Appendix 5.

Low confidence of membership, limited participation by members, poor loan

recovery

Assets looted

following change

in Government

Internal

factors

Weak business and

management

capacity

Ineffective restructuring and lack of follow-up

support

21

External

factors

High maintenance

costs of flour mills

Lack of access to

wholesalers

Strong competition

from private sector

Difficulty of

accessing credit

Other external

factors (climatic

and price shocks)


The condition of many of the SCs (described above) is testimony to the limited impact of the training

provided.

78. By 2002, a few months away from closure of the project loans, it was noted that “…the state of

some cooperatives restructured under the project appear to be weak, and in the worst cases on the

verge of bankruptcy. If this is allowed to continue, such cooperatives may not survive as viable

entities. Moreover, most restructured cooperatives critically need the support of the project, including

training, follow-ups and technical assistance …”. 40

79. In the present evaluation, these concerns about the quality of the cooperatives restructuring

process, and the business viability of the cooperatives were magnified. Restructuring of the service

cooperatives in SOCODEP has contributed little to their transformation from the mentality of a

command economy to that of the free market. Out of seven SCs visited in the eastern part of the

project area, none were functioning before the establishment of a cooperative union in Wolayta Zone

in 2005. Most 41 of the cooperatives in Konso, Arba Minch Zuria and Chencha Woredas are not

functioning. Almost all suffer from high levels of outstanding debt. In the western project Zones,

cooperative performance is better, with lower levels of debt, and continued functioning of some

services. Table 3 illustrates the situation for 5 SCs in Arba Minch Zuria, Chencha, Boreda, and Soddo

Zuria Woredas (Gamo Gofa and Wolayta Zones).

Table 6. Changes in Service Cooperative Performance between 1993 and 2006

Service

Cooperative

Members Cash balance Birr

Outstanding loan

Birr

Misappropriation

Birr

1993 2006 1993 2006 1993 2006 1993 2006

Kolana

Shara

Dega 600 614 11361 22391 2736 63705 3597 0

Eazo 3561 1535 9725 461 0 51603 65113 70380

Gaga Gocho 1004 617 28000 17000 3155 20828 0 14444

Kokate 1552 613 1650 3587 25573 340893 0 40000

Wachiga 1760 1554 940 39235 329363 314161 16420 20000

* Source: The Evaluation

80. In relation to Cooperatives, overall two conclusions may be drawn: (a) SOCODEP, like many

projects, placed too great an emphasis on numerical outputs, and too little on the quality of those

outputs; and (b) the general preference in SOCODEP for working through cooperatives rather than

considering other groups having greater social capital (such as the indigenous Community Based

Organizations (CBO) which were well established at the time), that would have been a more viable

alternative.

81. Specific objective 2. Increased capital and income among the rural poor in the project area

through off-farm income-generating activities particularly for women and families in densely

populated areas with limited land for farm expansion.

82. The project provided credit to individuals, including women, for a limited period. This has

undoubtedly increased capital and incomes for some individuals through income-generating activities

and small-scale enterprises, although some have failed for lack of markets for their products.

83. Although many individuals benefited from loans provided through SOCODEP (Box 2), the

extent of achievement of this objective has been limited because of the under-performance of the

cooperatives re-structuring and credit disbursement aspects of the project.

40 2002 Supervision Report, para 39.

41 Out of 17 in total, 11 are completely non-functional, 4 partly functioning, and 2 functioning satisfactorily,

according to the Woreda Cooperatives Desks.

22


Box 2. Three Case Studies of Women Loan Beneficiaries

Belaynesh Keyito received a loan of EB 240 from a cooperative around Derashe town, Derashe special

woreda. She started selling vegetables and bought one sheep for EB 55 and sold the sheep for EB 175.

With the money obtained, she managed to send her three children to school and feed the family. She

owns farmland in her compound and grows potatoes, maize and onions.

Keito Taya has 3 children (one son, two daughters) and her children do not go to school. Her husband

died some years ago due to fight with a villager. Keito belongs to Mermere Cooperative, Derashe zone

of SNNPR. With a loan of EB 150 she bought one female sheep. The female sheep had 10 offspring.

Two of the offspring had 7 lambs. The eight sheep were exchanged for one ox. She fattened the ox and

sold it for EB 350. With the cash she bought an immature bull for EB 190. The rest of the money was

used for buying food for the household. She bought an ox for EB 400 but the ox died when being

trekked to her home. Later she sold some sheep and bought another ox. Now she owns 8 female sheep

and one donkey. The donkey is used as a beast of burden.

Lomitu Abebe belongs to Baha Cooperative, Decha woreda of Keffa zone. She is 25 years of age and

married and has three children (two sons, one daughter). Two of her children go to school. She

received EB 400 as a loan and bought four sheep for fattening. After repaying the loan she bought two

female sheep. One of the sheep had 6 offspring and the offspring were sold to buy a heifer. The other

had three offspring and the dam was sold. Now she has a heifer and one sheep. Some of the money

from the sheep sales were used for house construction, buying clothes for the family and running a tej

bet. She also sells beer and soft drinks. The family owns a plot of 2000-meter square of land on which

enset, taro, coffee, avocado and banana are grown

Source: The Evaluation

84. OMFI and continued access to credit. The credit repaid to OMFI as a consequence of Project

lending appears not to have been used as a revolving source of credit to the project cooperatives, but to

have been absorbed more generally into OMFI’s funds, and lent onwards through OMFI’s branch

offices. Although this has diluted the impact of SOCODEP on its target cooperatives and population, it

has allowed OMFI to extend its operations more widely in the Region. OMFI tends to work, not with

cooperatives, but with small informal groups established by its own branch officials – a better option

than the SOCODEP model.

85. The slow rate and low total amount of disbursement of credit would be less of an issue were

there the prospect of further rounds of credit being available to SCs and their members in the future.

However, the financial status of many of the cooperatives rightly disqualifies them from further

lending. This illustrates the fundamental importance of the quality of cooperative restructuring – this is

the foundation on which the rest of the project depended, and it has demonstrably failed.

86. Overall, the credit component of SOCODEP has been significantly under-spent, and it has

provided one-off loans with little or no continuity of access to credit. It has consequently been of

limited effectiveness. In retrospect, the channeling of credit through cooperatives (especially those

with the particular political history of those in Ethiopia) was probably not the best strategy. The

experience of SOCODEP has demonstrated that individuals can make good use of small amounts of

credit and (women especially) repay loans in a timely manner. However, it has also shown that

commercial banks are not necessarily the most appropriate lending organisations for rural credit and

cooperatives are not necessarily the most appropriate channels for lending. The effectiveness and

efficiency with which loans can be disbursed to and recovered from individuals depends to a very high

degree on the competence and professionalism of the intermediary organisations.

87. Specific objective 3. Strengthen the Southern Region Agricultural Bureau to carry out its

mandate with respect to cooperative development.

88. Staff development programmes through well planned practical trainings were anticipated to be

central to the whole SOCODEP implementation, with the aim of making the implementing staff

capable of delivering effective support to the SCs. Targeted training of participating cooperatives was

anticipated to lead to their emergence as independent viable business entities operating in a free

market economy by the time the project phased out. This objective has been partly achieved, through

23


provision of physical resources, and through the (temporary) impact of training and project

experience. However, most of the trained and experienced staff have now moved on, and the

extremely high level of Government restructuring and reshuffling has undermined this objective to a

great extent.

89. Training. A great deal of training has been delivered, but it has been of more benefit to

individuals than to the organisations which had responsibility for implementing SOCODEP. The

training delivered to cooperatives officers and their members appears to have had little or no impact on

the business viability of these organisations.

90. Training largely benefited individuals. It was evident from the evaluation that the trainings

provided may have significantly benefited individuals (in terms of knowledge or opportunities

advancement) from Government bureaux and SCs. However the benefit to the project and particularly

to the intended project purpose was minimal. The evaluation team was informed 42 that for example out

of 24 staffs of BOFED who have attended 13 types of international trainings; only 9 of them are now

retained by the Bureau.

91. Training in M&E was particularly ineffective. Although the appraisal document clearly

stressed the importance of establishing a sound monitoring and evaluation system right from the

beginning of the project, and most if not all of the subsequent Supervision reports reinforced this

point, M&E remained a major problem area through out the project life 43 . This was despite sending

two former project coordinators for MSc study in UK on Project Planning, M&E. It is still

questionable to what extent this particular training has contributed to the design of an M&E system for

the project.

92. Physical resources. A large number of vehicles and other items of physical equipment (roadbuilding

equipment, office equipment, and a few buildings) have been provided, and these have been

absorbed into the wider activities of the SNNPRS Government and the other institutions involved. No

doubt these have contributed to the enhanced effectiveness of those organizations, but, as several of

the UNOPS Supervision Reports observed, there has also been a good deal of misuse of project

vehicles over the course of the project.

93. Other aspects of capacity-building. The programme of institutional strengthening carried out

through SOCODEP failed to address wider issues of Government policy and strategy, organizational

reform, management systems, and fundamental attitudinal change. By restricting capacity-building to

the delivery of training and provision of physical resources, the objective of building Government

capacity to promote cooperative development was largely missed.

94. Capacity-building efforts did not positively influence institutional change. It appears that

institutional capacity-building efforts were restricted to delivery of training and physical resources.

There is no evidence that SOCODEP influenced Regional Government policy on cooperatives and

credit, nor that it led to organizational or management system reforms. On the contrary, frequent and

significant organizational changes took place in the organizations implementing the project, and these

had a detrimental effect on the ability of the project to function effectively.

95. In particular, capacity-building activities neglected to address fundamental attitudes. Despite the

recognition of the importance of re-orienting both Government personnel and cooperatives officers

and members, there is no evidence that this took place to any significant degree. To move from a

situation in which cooperatives were viewed as an arm of Government, and in which their

management was similarly bureaucratic, to the perspective in which cooperatives are independent

business entities is a very large step. There is still a long way to go in making this conceptual and

practical change.

42 This was clearly revealed during Oct. 8, 2006 meeting with BOFED Officials.

43 See supervision mission reports 2001-2005.

24


96. Overall, institutional capacity-building efforts have resulted in limited outputs for three main

reasons: (i) they focused on only two of the many relevant aspects of capacity-building, namely

training and physical resources. The issues of attitude change, policy reform and management systems

were not addressed; (ii) training was not planned and delivered systematically according to project

needs, and it probably had more benefit for individuals than for the organizations involved, and for the

project; and (iii) frequent restructuring and reshuffling of Government organs and their personnel

severely limited the effectiveness of capacity-building efforts.

97. Specific objective 4. Provide credit to meet financial requirements for agricultural inputs and

draught oxen and facilitate the supply of inputs through support to local traders and cooperatives.

98. Credit to cooperatives for their own businesses (consumer shops, flour mills, produce

marketing) have mostly been unsuccessful, except in areas of coffee production. Credit through

service cooperatives to individuals for oxen and small ruminants has been much more promising, with

many individuals benefiting. However, the culture of loan repayment has been variable, generally with

those in the western parts of the project area having a better repayment record.

99. Ox loans in particular made a big difference to the farmers fortunate enough to receive them

(Box 3). The main shortcoming in relation to meeting this objective was in terms of: (i) relatively

small numbers of loans disbursed, and (ii) lack of continuing access to loans.

100. Overall, the credit component was under-utilized; loans to cooperatives for their own business

activities were largely ineffective; loans through cooperatives to individuals were better used, but

repayment levels (with the exception of loans to women) were not impressive. Arguably the single

most important objective of the project – the delivery of small loans to poor rural farmers – was let

down by its limited reach, low prospects of sustainability and lack of continuity.

Box 3. Four Examples of Ox-loan Beneficiaries

Dana Dedetto is aged 55 years and belongs to Gagagocho Cooperative of Boreda Woreda, Gamo Gofa

zone. He is married and has 6 children (4 sons, 2 daughters). Due to the sudden death of his ox, he

used to cultivate by begging an ox from the community. He took credit for oxen purchase in 1999.

Now he cultivates 2ha of farmland and has set aside 1ha for grazing land. Currently he owns two oxen

and cultivates maize and teff and sells crops after harvest in markets. He sends his four children to

school and two are now employed as civil servants in the Woreda. As a result of the oxen purchase, he

uses improved household utensils and furniture. Instead of the traditional beds made of cattle hides he

uses a modern bed. The household members use plastic items for drinking water instead of pumpkins.

He states that his children are properly fed as well.

Darge Semane belongs to Gebele Beno Cooperative, Derashe Woreda and is 47 years of age. Three of

his children do farm work and one goes to school. He received an ox loan of EB 650, added EB 100 of

his own money, and bought an ox for EB 750. After fattening the ox, he sold it for EB 1400. With the

cash obtained, Darge bought an ox for EB 600, paid EB 77 for insurance of the ox, built a house,

bought clothing for his children and paid for medical treatment. He bitterly complains about the high

insurance cost he paid. As the locality is ridden with diseases, he also bought trypanocidal drugs for

treating his animals from trypanosomiasis. Currently he has one ox and cultivates 1.5ha of farmland.

The main crop he grows is maize.

A farmer named Temesgen Kebede lives in Bitta Cooperative, Bitta Woreda of Keffa zone. He

received an ox loan of EB 650 and used the ox for cultivation in the last four years. He has paid the

loan and interest. He has an arrangement with another farmer to cultivate his 2ha of land. He also

owns an enset plot of 0.25ha. Currently he has two oxen and sells grain for buying clothing for the

family and last year sold grain worth EB 1000.

Mammo Bongo is a farmer who belongs to Boha Cooperative, Decha Woreda, in Kefa zone. He is

married and has 6 children (4 sons, 2 daughters) and none of the children go to school. He bought an

ox with a loan of EB 600. After repaying the loan, he sold the ox for EB 880.The cash was used for

treating problems he had on his eyes. Now he has recovered from his illness and is intending to build a

house of corrugated iron sheet.

* Source: The Evaluation

25


101. Specific objective 5. Relief of livestock health constraints, particularly with respect to draught

animals, through provision of veterinary drugs.

102. This component started late, and is now winding down. It provided temporary relief, but now

there is evidence of increasing disease prevalence due to the inability of Government veterinarians to

provide drugs. There are no significant alternative suppliers of veterinary medicines than Government.

A better option than the one pursued in SOCODEP would have been the promotion of veterinary drugs

through the private sector.

103. The component only took off toward the end of the project (2000/01). Drugs for relevant

livestock diseases were bought by the government veterinary offices and made available to

stockowners. The government drug supply for a Woreda lasts about six months and drug shortages are

felt from July to September before the fiscal year budget is released. After the closure of the project in

2005, the incidence of diseases is reported to be increasing because the VRDF was dwindling. A better

approach to dispensing drugs to farmers may be the use of Community Based Animal Health Workers

selected from the community by the community and linked to drug vendors in Awassa and Addis

Ababa.

104. Overall, the achievement of the VRDF was limited. It started very late, and by the time of

closure of the project loans it had disbursed a very small proportion of its budgeted funds, despite the

great need for the benefits which it promised.

105. Specific objective 6. Improve access of rural families to services and markets by rehabilitating

and maintaining rural roads.

106. As far as it went, this component has improved access for many people 44 . Maintenance by

cooperative members alone was never going to be a viable option 45 , and the adoption of the

SOCODEP roads into the Regional road maintenance programme is a positive feature, as long as

Government budgets permit maintenance to actually be carried out. The heavy equipment provided by

SOCODEP will continue to be used and maintained for some time to come. This element of the

Project does give rise to some environmental concerns however: erosion, destruction of natural

vegetation, lack of restoration of quarries, and abandonment of equipment and materials are among the

negative aspects observed.

107. Design standards and maintenance strategies. The main issues in the roads component of the

project centre around design standards and maintenance strategies. The change to the project design

agreed after the MTR, in which the design standard (and hence unit cost) was increased from RR 30 to

RR 50 46 not only limited the amount of construction possible within a fixed budget, but had

maintenance implications too. RR 30 roads were more suitable for labour-based maintenance, while

RR 50 roads required heavy maintenance by a centralized authority. The expectation at Appraisal that

maintenance would be carried out by cooperatives was far-fetched, as it is not only cooperative

members who benefit from such access, but the wider community too. The communities in SNNPR

have allocated one day a week for community endeavours such as access roads construction, school

construction and maintenance, health facilities construction and maintenance, and soil and water

conservation, which is in line with the construction of roads of RR 30 standard and below.

108. In terms of achieving the project objective, two aspects are relevant. First, the change in design

standard significantly increased cost per km, and so greatly reduced the number of beneficiaries. Only

122km out of a target at Appraisal of 700km was achieved. Second, although the ability of some rural

44 Based on typical population densities, probably around 100 000 people live within 5km of the respective

roads.

45 Especially after the agreed alteration of design specification from RR 30 to RR 50 standard.

46 RR30 and RR50 refer respectively to road designs for 30 and 50 vehicles per day. The designs specify

different standards of drainage structures, gravel thickness and road width. The former RR standards have

subsequently been replaced by a range of functional design standards referred to by DS numbers.

26


people and communities to move themselves and their goods has improved, no other measures were

taken in SOCODEP to improve market access. Physical road access is only one necessary (but not

sufficient) condition for achieving better linkages to markets.

109. Specific objective 7. (BSF Component) Reduce the burden of disease in 8 woredas of the

SOCODEP area.

110. Probably the greatest effect on health will be through the upgrading of physical health facilities

and staff and community skills. The sanitation component will only have a significant effect if latrines

are actually used, and this is most likely if the Government strategy changes to a more persuasive and

participative approach. The water supply interventions made by the BSF project will have a significant

short-term effect on water quality and access for those living close by, but long term functional

sustainability is in serious doubt.

111. Evaluating health impact is particularly difficult, but the measures taken in the BSF component

at least provide some of the necessary pre-conditions for improved community health. However,

without a significantly increased focus on sanitation utilization, hygiene promotion and water supply

system operation and maintenance, these potential health benefits will fail to be realized.

F. Assessment: Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency

112. Relevance. SOCODEP addressed some real needs of the rural poor in southern Ethiopia (need

for credit, need for improved market access including rural roads, need for better health services and

environmental health) and it was consistent with the government’s regionalization programme. At the

time of design the rhetoric of the new Government and the framing of the new legislation made

working through service cooperatives attractive and promising. However the use of service

cooperatives as the channel for services to the poor turned out to be a significant design weakness. At

the time of project formulation, cooperatives were seen as an arm of Government, and public attitudes

to cooperatives would inevitably take a long time to change. As far as the selection of financial

intermediaries is concerned, at the time of project design there was limited choice. However, CBE’s

lack of experience in implementing rural finance, including through cooperatives, should have been

addressed with greater seriousness. Weaknesses in other project design features have been highlighted

above.

113. At a strategic level, the project was mostly consistent with the 1999Ethiopia Country Strategic

Opportunities Paper and the 2002 IFAD Regional Strategy particularly in its support in developing

rural financial services. Although the strategy provides a larger emphasis on establishing market

linkages. According to IFAD’s rating scale therefore we assess SOCODEP as ‘Relevant’ (rating of

5) 47 .

114. Effectiveness. The Project achieved some, but not all of its objectives. Table 4 summarizes the

extent to which each of the specific objectives were met, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. As

indicated in Table 7, Specific Objectives 1, 3, and 5 were mostly not met. Specific Objectives 2, 4, 6

and 7 were partially met (to varying degrees). According to IFAD’s rating scales therefore we assess

SOCODEP as ‘Moderately Ineffective’ (score 3) 48 .

47 “The project objectives are relevant to the needs of the poor or to IFAD’s country strategy” (IFAD OE

Project Evaluation Guidelines, December 2005)

48 “The project met only a few of its stated project objectives” (IFAD OE Project Evaluation Guidelines,

December 2005).

27


Table 7. SOCODEP: Achievement of Specific Objectives (see also Table 3 and Figure 3)

Specific Objective Achievement (quantitative) Achievement (qualitative)

SO1. Provide a model for

developing Ethiopian

cooperatives under the new

legislation, particularly

with respect to

improvement of financial

intermediation services in

rural areas, which could be

replicated in other areas of

the country.

SO2. Increased capital and

income among the rural

poor in the project area

through off-farm incomegenerating

activities

particularly for women and

families in densely

populated areas with

limited land for farm

expansion.

SO3. Strengthen the SRAB

to carry out its mandate

with respect to cooperative

development.

SO4. Provide credit to meet

financial requirements for

agricultural inputs and

draught oxen and facilitate

the supply of inputs

through support to local

traders and cooperatives.

SO5. Relief of livestock

health constraints,

particularly with respect to

draught animals, through

provision of veterinary

drugs.

SO6. Improve access of

rural families to services

and markets by

rehabilitating and

maintaining rural roads.

SO7. (BSF Component)

Reduce the burden of

disease in 8 woredas of the

SOCODEP area

* Source: The Evaluation

Numerical targets for restructuring

and re-registering cooperatives were

exceeded (130 per cent of Appraisal

target; 178 per cent of MTR revised

target).

Reach of small-scale enterprise

development sub-component was

very limited. The total amount of

training, and loans disbursed was

very small. Loans to women for

small ruminants were much greater

in number.

Training and vehicles budgets were

disbursed rapidly and fully. Many

trainings were delivered.

Numerical targets were not met.

Total loan disbursement was low,

and number of loan recipients fell

well below target.

Disbursement from the Veterinary

Drugs Revolving Fund was very

late and very limited in total

amount.

The total length of roads

constructed fell well below the

Appraisal target (which was revised

downwards at MTR).

The majority of the quantitative

targets for this component have

been met.

28

Many, if not most, restructured

cooperatives have failed to compete in

their business activities with the private

sector; many are in default of loan

repayments and ineligible for further

credit; many have suffered significant

levels of misappropriation of funds;

members lack confidence in the officers.

Some small businesses have been

assisted to take off, and the loans to

women for small ruminants have been

particularly effective. However,

continuity of access to credit is limited to

the reach of OMFI.

There is little direct evidence with which

to assess the quality of training needs

assessments and trainings delivered.

However, the indirect evidence suggests

that much of the capacity-building effort

has been ineffective.

Cooperative members have benefited

from individual loans, but not from

(failed) cooperative businesses. Loan

repayment rates (with some exceptions,

especially loans to women) have been

poor under CBE.

The Veterinary RDF was partially

effective for a short period. Its demise is

contributing to an increase in livestock

disease.

Those living within a few km of the new

roads have undoubtedly benefited, but

the elevated cost of the higher design

standard adopted has limited the reach of

this component.

The achievement of the component has

established the potential for sustained

health improvements. However, all

aspects require continuing support and

funding for long-term sustainability.

115. Efficiency. Because of the nature of the project no attempt was made to assess the economic

rate of return in the appraisal or completion reports. Thus, in the evaluation a number of qualitative

indicators are used to assess the efficiency of the conversion of project funds into outputs and

consequent impact. The four indicators outlined here are well established in project documentation,

and were confirmed during the evaluation mission.

116. First, the project contained a number of unrealistically ambitious design aspects (most notably

relating to the large geographical extent of the project area). The vast geographic area, poor


infrastructure and communication meant that the projected resources were not optimally used.

Second, the overall emphasis on the Project’s numerical outputs (i.e. exceeding the number of

restructured cooperatives) rather than the quality of those outputs, has resulted in a significant amount

of wasted resources. As a result, many of the project’s activities were diluted to the extent that they

failed to achieve their intended outcomes. For example, the generally poor quality of the restructuring

of the cooperatives, and the highly compromised institutional strengthening component weakened the

project significantly. Efficiency would have been greatly enhanced if the project design had

concentrated on a smaller project area, involving a smaller number of SCs, and provided greater

intensity of effort and resources.

117. Third, the regional context and many disruptions caused by changes in Government structures

further limited the ability of personnel to deliver services in an efficient manner (see para 28 and 33).

And fourth, the absorptive capacity of the Government institutions involved was limited to the extent

that significant sums of money remained unspent at the end of the project. At project completion, in

spite of several extensions to the project completion date, substantial amounts of IFAD’s loan funds

and also the BSF grant funds had not been fully utilized (only 68 per cent of the Loan Funds and 93

per cent of the Grant Funds were disbursed).

118. Also, the construction of roads to a higher standard than necessary raised unit costs and limited

the outputs achieved.

119. Some allowance has to be made for Ethiopia’s particularly difficult operating environment, so

according to IFAD’s rating scales we assess SOCODEP as ‘Moderately Inefficient’ (score 3) 49 .

G. Performance of IFAD and its Partners

120. Assessment of partner performance. IFAD’s Evaluation Manual requires a qualitative

assessment of each partner, and the partnership as a whole, against stated criteria selected from a list in

the manual 50 . In the following paragraphs each partner is considered in turn and assessed on IFAD’s

6-point rating scale, and the partnership as a whole is assessed.

121. IFAD. As the initiator and main source of loan funding for the project, IFAD bore an important

part of the shared responsibility for its successful execution. As successive supervision reports flagged

similar critical issues (problematic management, political interference, ineffective M&E, questionable

quality of cooperatives restructuring, poor performance of cooperatives, and lack of institutional

ownership of the project), new mechanisms should have been sought to improve project management,

rather than relying on the annual supervision missions by UNOPS. Although IFAD’s role was

supportive and responsible – including its initiation of an early MTR and follow-up actions and the

inclusion of the BSF component - it was insufficiently flexible and decisive in responding to the

problems raised by successive Government reorganizations and the reported lack of Government

ownership at the highest levels in the Region. However, it should be recognized that during the time of

SOCODEP, IFAD did not have modalities such as direct supervision or field presence to support

project implementation. Recognizing the many difficulties faced by the project (e.g. the credit

component) and the limited chance of making dramatic improvements IFAD let the project close with

about 35 percent of the IFAD loan unspent. Overall, IFAD delegated too much responsibility to

institutions which were not well prepared to perform effectively. The evaluation judges IFAD’s

performance moderately unsuccessful (rating of 3).

122. Government of Ethiopia (GoE). Although GoE observed the loan conditions and participated

in the project implementation, two factors seriously weakened its performance. The first was the

repeated reorganization of Government organs and the reshuffling of Government staff, to the point at

which institutional capacity-building was seriously undermined. Although such reorganizations were

49 “Poor use of resources: unit costs are above those of comparators, and rates of return are lower than

alternative investments and negative” (IFAD OE Project Evaluation Guidelines, December 2005).

50 “Participatory, Delegates, Coordination, Communication & Sharing of Information, Flexible, Supportive,

Decisive, Responsible, Learning” (IFAD OE Project Evaluation Guidelines, December 2005).

29


the prerogative of Government, little was done to compensate for their negative effects on the Project.

The second factor was the reported lack of political commitment at the level of the Regional Council,

and political interference with the project, to the point that the Project Coordinator’s role was

compromised in the early years of project implementation. At the beginning this was caused by a

disjoint between Federal and Regional Government actions, but even after the Regional Government

signed up to the project this did not significantly improve. CBE and OMFI. Commercial Bank of

Ethiopia was insufficiently committed to the goals of the project, and its reach did not extend to the

client groups which were the focus of SOCODEP. It had failed to understand the nature of the

business it was entering. As a late arrival (2001) to the project, OMFI was better placed to fulfill its

requirements. It has disbursed loans through service cooperatives, as well as through its own groups,

but since the closure of the IFAD loans it has apparently not operated the IFAD credit line as a

revolving fund to the SOCODEP cooperatives and their members, but rather used the repaid loans to

finance its wider lending programme. Accordingly, the Government’s performance is found

moderately unsatisfactory (rating of 3).

123. Belgian Survival Fund. The performance of BSF can only be assessed indirectly, through the

manner in which the WSHBS component was conducted. The far greater geographical focus (8

Woredas, rather than 33) 51 was no doubt instrumental in BSF’s effectiveness, and the component was

notable for the thoroughness of its capacity-building efforts and the continuity of its technical

assistance. However, the limited degree of integration of the BSF sub-component with the remainder

of SOCODEP, and the concerns over sustainability of the BSF interventions, led the evaluation team

to reduce what would otherwise have been a high rating to a somewhat lower score. BSF performance

is rated 4 (moderately successful).

124. Cooperating institution (UNOPS). The Supervising Institution is placed in a difficult situation

when its inputs are limited effectively to a single annual visit. The Supervision Mission Reports seen

by this evaluation team have been competently conducted, but the repeated flagging of critical issues

year after year makes it clear that a much stronger hand was needed to manage the project effectively

– not simply loan and project implementation supervision, but strong management and frequent

monitoring of progress. Accordingly, UNOPS performance is considered moderately successful

(rating of 4).

IV. PROJECT IMPACTS

A. Rural Poverty Reduction Impacts

125. Impact domains. IFAD considers the wider impact of projects under 9 impact domains. These

are set out in the following paragraphs, with comments on the intended and actual impacts of the

Project. Our evidence base here consists of the beneficiary interviews conducted, review of secondary

data, the evaluation team’s extensive past experience in the Region, and its professional judgments as

to the extent to which findings from a small sample can be extrapolated to the wider population. The

key areas of intended direct impact for SOCODEP were those of (a) financial assets (through credit),

(b) physical assets (roads, water and sanitation, health facilities), (c) human assets (skills and

knowledge), (d) institutions and services (strengthened Government organisations and functioning

service cooperatives), and (e) social capital and empowerment (through effective cooperatives).

Through delivering impact in these areas, SOCODEP was to have an indirect impact on agricultural

productivity, food security and on market access.

126. Agriculture productivity. This related to one of the two identified higher goals of the Project

(“increase agricultural productivity …”). The greatest impacts in this domain relate to the increased

access to work oxen and small ruminants for fattening and rearing (Boxes 1 and 2). This has been a

significant impact at the individual farmer level. However, because overall project impact on

agricultural productivity has been below expectations, the evaluation judges project impact moderately

unsuccessful in this domain (rating of 3).

51 Although these were still widely spread geographically.

30


127. Financial assets. Increasing individual financial assets was the second of the two identified

higher goals of the Project (“…and raise income levels of the rural poor…”. In many of the cases of

individual beneficiaries interviewed, increases in personal financial assets were evident. The

expectation was that service cooperatives would be effectively developed, “… to facilitate efficient

provision of sustainable services to members.” In the majority of the cooperatives interviewed, or for

which data were obtained (especially in Gamo Gofa, Wolayta and Derashe), the cooperatives are de

facto bankrupt. Furthermore, the enhancement of individual financial assets has had limited reach and,

for many of those who have benefited, the impact is likely to have been short-lived. Consequently, the

evaluation considers project impact on financial assets moderately unsuccessful (rating of 3).

128. Physical assets. Through accessing credit, cooperatives and their members were able to

increase their physical asset base. Numerous examples were encountered of individual loan

beneficiaries who had, for a time, increased their physical assets (in terms of livestock, housing, and

equipment for small-scale enterprises). See Boxes 1 and 2 for examples. Some communities have

benefited from improved physical assets in the form of rural roads, water supplies and latrines. Their

number however, compared to target beneficiary population, is relatively small. Furthermore, the

questions over sustainability, raised elsewhere in this report, threaten long-term impact. Overall,

considering their limited extent, the evaluation still finds project impacts on physical assets moderately

unsuccessful (rating of 3).

129. Human assets. Enhancement of human skills, knowledge and health were explicit aspects of

the Project. Training of Government staff, cooperative personnel and cooperative members had a

small impact, as judged by the effectiveness of the institutions involved. The impact of training given

has to be questioned. On the other hand, the health impact of parts of the BSF component – in

particular the upgrading of health facilities and training of staff and community health workers – had

the greatest potential impact. Project impact on human assets is therefore found moderately successful

(rating of 4).

130. Institutions and services. Institutional strengthening was a specific objective of the Project.

Changes to laws, policies, and “the rules of the game” were not. The impacts of the institutional

strengthening components of the Project were largely lost due to the constant reorganizations and

reshuffling of Government staff. The Project apparently had little or no impact at higher levels of

policy dialogue. Consequently, project impact on institutions and services is found unsuccessful

(rating of 2).

131. Social capital and empowerment. Collective capacity of cooperative members was to be built

under the new law, and through the restructuring process built into the Project. Service cooperatives

(now called multi-purpose farmers’ cooperatives) still represent rather artificial groupings of looselylinked

members. There is little evidence of the social capital of these groups being significantly

enhanced by the Project. Some women (but mostly men) have been personally empowered through

use of individual loans for small ruminants and for small scale enterprise development, but their

numbers are rather small in the context of the population of the project area. In all, project impact on

social capital and empowerment has been far below expectations and is thus judged unsuccessful

(rating of 2).

132. Food security. By implication, SOCODEP’s goal was to improve food security among

cooperative members. The Project’s impact on food security was indirect, and inherently not

measurable in this evaluation. However, the possession of work oxen, and the increase in livestock and

other physical and individual financial assets, may be assumed to have had some beneficial impact in

this domain. Considering its limited extent, project impact on food security is considered moderately

unsuccessful (rating of 3).

133. Environment and common resource base. SOCODEP had no specific objectives in this

domain. The Project was generally environmentally benign, neither increasing nor decreasing

people’s access to natural resources. The Roads component may have had a small unintended negative

environmental impact, but this was outweighed by its much greater socio-economic impact.

Environmental impact assessment should be given greater emphasis in this area in future. The

31


evaluation finds project impact on the environment and common resource base therefore moderately

successful (rating of 4).

134. Markets. Attention to markets and market access was an omission from the Project design. The

Project did little to increase access to markets, other than through financing a small amount of rural

roads. Market linkages are crucial to raise small farmers above subsistence level, but the Project

design omitted this key domain. Many of those trained in small scale enterprises subsequently failed to

go further, for lack of markets for their products. It should be noted that SOCODEP as designed

(covering much too large and disparate a geographical area) could not effectively address marketing

constraints, within its overall budget. However, there could have been opportunities to more directly

address marketing within Special Objective (SO)s 1, 2, 4 and 6 and with a design which was more

focused geographically, and addressing producers’ needs in a more integrated way, should have

considered markets for increased production as well as the outputs of small enterprises. As a result,

project impact on markets is considered unsuccessful (rating of 2).

135. Overall assessment of impact. The main beneficial impacts of the Project were largely limited

to those individuals who received loans through cooperatives, or who now benefit from physical

infrastructure and services such as roads and health facilities. In the case of credit, these impacts have

been relatively few in number, and short-lived. The expected impacts in relation to increased

individual financial assets (and consequent improved access to physical assets, agricultural

productivity and food security) were limited in extent and continuity. Some benefits of training

impacted beneficially upon individuals, but, with the exception of the BSF component, training and

capacity-building had limited impact on the institutions involved. Impact on social capital was very

limited, because of the largely ineffective restructuring of cooperatives. Consequently, in relation to

the scale presented in IFAD’s Evaluation Manual, overall SOCODEP impact is rated as moderately

unsuccessful (rating of 3) 52 .

B. Sustainability and Ownership

136. The inherent unsustainability of projects. Projects are by definition time-limited inputs of

resources to achieve stated goals. While the immediate project objectives may be met, it is unusual to

achieve real and permanent step-changes to institutions, services and the lives of the poor as a

consequence of short projects. Sustainability needs to be designed in from the beginning, and

interventions need to be long enough in duration and with clear exit strategies, or the achievement of

project objectives and impacts quickly fades into history. SOCODEP is no exception in having paid

too little attention to these issues.

137. Components of sustainability. The main aspects of sustainability relevant to SOCODEP relate

to (a) whether or not the enhanced capacity of the Project’s institutional stakeholders (Government,

cooperatives and lending agencies) will enable them to continue functioning over the long term, (b)

whether cooperatives and individuals will continue to have access to credit services, and (c) whether

physical infrastructure (water supplies, roads, buildings, vehicles and equipment) will continue to

function over time.

138. Institutional sustainability. This represents the least sustainable aspect of the Project. The

reorganizations of Government organs and the reshuffling of staff has greatly diluted the enhancement

of institutional capacity. Physical resources provided as part of institutional capacity-building

activities have been of significant assistance, but they have a limited life.

139. Continued access to credit. While the impact of individual loans has in many cases been a very

significant positive aspect of the Project, continued access to credit and other financial services is

more questionable. In its discussions with individual beneficiaries, the evaluation team found little

evidence that those who had benefited once from loans were able to continue to obtain further credit –

52 “The project generated rural poverty reduction impacts in fewer domains than expected (impact domains

that were relevant to the project as per design at the beginning and/or after revision) and to a lesser extent than

expected.” IFAD OE Project Evaluation Guidelines, December 2005.

32


despite their generally good repayment record. Many of the cooperatives visited, or for which data

were obtained, are now de facto bankrupt, and therefore ineligible for further loans.

140. Functional sustainability of physical assets. Roads constructed under the Project were

expected at Appraisal to be maintained by members of the restructured cooperatives. This was

unrealistic for two reasons, (a) because those benefiting from the roads are a much greater population

than simply the cooperative members, and (b) to expect community members to add an even greater

labour burden to their already over-stretched daily lives was impracticable. The fact that the roads

constructed under SOCODEP have been adopted under the Region’s road maintenance programme is

actually better assurance of sustainability than relying on community-based maintenance. The heavy

equipment supplied to the Region will allow other road construction activities to take place for some

time to come. In regard to water supply, the prospects for on-going functional sustainability of

especially handpumps and gravity water supply schemes are very poor. The financial contribution

made by households for repairs and maintenance are based on affordability rather than need, and they

are insufficient to cover the costs of repairs. Furthermore, spare parts are particularly difficult to

obtain, and insufficient attention has been paid to operation and management aspects of this

component.

141. Assessment of sustainability. In view of the very limited sustainability of institutional

strengthening efforts, the limited on-going access to credit, and the unlikely sustainability of the water

supply component, sustainability is assessed overall as unlikely (rating of 2) 53 .

C. Innovation, Replicability and Scaling-Up

142. Innovation. At the time of project design, SOCODEP’s focus on cooperatives and credit

represented a response to the apparent liberalization of national politics and economics, and to the

change in cooperatives legislation. The inclusion of the other components (veterinary revolving drug

fund, rural road construction, small-scale enterprise development) was not particularly innovative, and

their lack of integration represented a lost opportunity. The BSF component (water supply, health and

basic sanitation) in effect represented a new project, itself split into three components, and again the

opportunities for integration and synergy were largely lost.

143. Worth mentioning as being innovative at the time in Ethiopia, was the effective monitoring and

evaluation system of the BSF component. When the BSF component began it introduced a

comprehensive Baseline Line Survey and before project completion it undertook an Impact

Assessment Study. This M&E system, which did not exist for the other components, formed the basis

for developing trainings, capacity building, learning and measuring results that helped contribute to

the performance of this component. The innovative methodology of the Impact Assessment Study

made extensive use of local knowledge and participation, and used simple, inexpensive techniques for

impact measurement in the field.

144. Knowledge management. The collation and sharing of knowledge among the project

stakeholders was limited by the weak M&E which was repeatedly highlighted in Supervision reports.

After the MTR a number of internal assessments were carried out (dated 1999 and 2000), which

presented some critical and insightful views, but the extent to which these led to subsequent action

was limited. The lack of physical availability of internal and external project documentation is a

critical issue. Not surprisingly, the extent to which project experiences were used by project

stakeholders in useful policy dialogue at Regional or higher level was also very limited.

145. Replicability. The same factors which have limited the impact of institutional strengthening and

constrained the quality of many the project actions and outputs remain in place today. Were the

Project to be implemented today using similar mechanisms (ie operating through a Project

Coordinating Unit attempting to synchronize and harmonize the work of disparate Government

organs), similar outcomes would result. The model is not replicable.

53 “Hardly any of the supporting factors are in place”. IFAD OE Project Evaluation Guidelines, December

2005.

33


146. Scaling-up. The Project was over-stretched in terms of geographical focus, and the quality of

Project outputs suffered at the expense of quantity. It does not represent a successful pilot which can

be usefully scaled-up.

147. Overall assessment. SOCODEP had no significant innovative design elements, and in

implementation, little of the learning which was being generated was fed back into the execution of

the Project. There is little or no potential for replication or up-scaling. Therefore, innovation,

replicability and scaling-up are assessed overall as moderately unsuccessful (rating of 3) 54 .

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Overall Assessment

148. Outreach and targeting. SOCODEP was unsophisticated in its targeting. There was little

detailed understanding of the nature and variations of rural poverty within the Project Woredas, and

although some women benefited, their numbers were rather small. Even IFAD’s Country Programme

Issues Sheet (May 2006) refers to the view that “…poverty is somewhat evenly spread across rural

areas where 85 per cent of the population live…”, an assertion that is superficially true since most

rural people are very poor, but which hides significant variation, sometimes over small distances.

Furthermore there is also anecdotal evidence of elite capture as the individual beneficiaries of training

and loans were not selected in a uniform and transparent manner.

149. Attaining IFAD’s strategic objectives and the MDGs. To the extent that individuals have

benefited from loans, training in small-scale enterprise development, improved water, sanitation and

health facilities, and new roads, SOCODEP has gone some way to improving health and education,

and reducing poverty and hunger. This impact has however, generally been relatively short-lived.

150. Overall assessment. Table 8 summarizes the ratings attributed to the project by the evaluation,

with the average ratings given to project evaluated in 2005 for comparison. On most criteria

SOCODEP scored one point or more under the 2005 average. Relevance, Impact on physical, financial

and human assets is comparable with 2005 averages, but the performance of the Government is

assessed as below the 2005 average. Because of fundamental weaknesses in project implementation,

caused partly by unrealistic design, partly by insufficiently decisive management, partly by

insufficient political commitment, and partly by externalities including frequent Government

restructuring and reshuffling, SOCODEP is assessed overall by this evaluation as ‘Moderately

unsuccessful’ (rating of 3) 55 .

54 “The project had very few innovative elements in the project design and implementation. Lessons that

should have been learnt from the experience were not.” IFAD OE Project Evaluation Guidelines, December

2005.

55 “The project was rated just below expectations (category 3) for at least three of the six ratings, but none was

rated highly successful.” IFAD OE Project Evaluation Guidelines, December 2005.

34


Table 8. Project Ratings Summary

Evaluation criterion SOCODEP rating 2005 project evaluations average

Project performance

Relevance 5 5

Effectiveness 3 4

Efficiency 3 4

Partner performance

IFAD 3 4

Government 3 4

BSF 4 -

UNOPS 4 4

Project impact

Agriculture Productivity 3 -

Physical and Financial Assets 3 4

Human Assets 4 4

Institutions and Services 2 -

Social Capital and Empowerment 2 4

Food Security 3 4

Environment and Common Resource Base 4 4

Markets 2 -

Overall impact 3 -

Sustainability 2 4

Innovation, Replicability and Scaling-Up 3 4

Overall assessment 3 -

* Source: The Evaluation

B. Conclusions

151. As with most multi-component projects, the project performance and impacts of SOCODEP

have been mixed. There seems little doubt that the Project has had a net benefit to the Region, to

individuals in Government, and to some of the target beneficiaries. The key questions relate to

understanding how the benefits could have been greater, and what lessons can be learned for present

and future projects in Ethiopia and further a field.

152. Context. SOCODEP was one of the first significant internationally funded interventions in

Ethiopia following the fall of the former Marxist-Leninist regime (the Derg) in May 1991. The Project

aimed to respond to the then new legislation concerning Cooperatives, which ostensibly set out a

means of turning the former Government-imposed and politically-dominated Producer Cooperatives of

the Derg into farmer-owned viable business entities serving their members’ interests. In particular, it

aimed to make rural finance (specifically micro-credit) available to so-called Service Cooperatives and

their members.

153. Design. The Project aim, as described in paragraph 152, was an imaginative attempt to respond

to the then new legislation concerning Cooperatives. However, this was an ambitious and in hindsight

an unrealistic goal. A number of factors contributed to the difficulties faced by the SOCODEP. First,

the Region’s size, diversity, poor infrastructure and poverty posed numerous development challenges.

Second, the project underestimated the obstacles to and rate of beneficial change and the capacity of

the government for implementation in the post Derg period.

154. Quality of project delivery. SOCODEP concentrated on delivery of numerical outputs, such as

cooperatives restructured, credit disbursed, trainings delivered, drugs purchased, kilometers of road

constructed, water points built, and so on. Insufficient emphasis was placed on the quality of these

outputs. For example, insufficient consideration was given to the intensity and duration of activities

required to achieve the desired quality standards. In particular, the human factor of individual and

group (community, cooperative, institution) attitudes were addressed minimally. For example, the

design was too optimistic about the speed with which the former model of cooperatives, centrally

controlled by the government, could be turned around into a member-owned and member-controlled

35


viable business model. To turn around a failing, politically-established cooperative to become a viable

business serving its members, or to bring about community ownership and management of a water

point demanded a great deal of attention to quality of the investment, not just numbers.

155. However, some of the activities such as upgrading of health facilities and training of staff and

community health workers performed better.

156. Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency. The project objectives and activities were relevant to

needs of the rural poor in southern Ethiopia (e.g., in terms of the need for credit, improved market

access, better health services and environmental health) and were consistent with the government’s

regionalization programme. The Project was moderately ineffective achieving some, but not all of its

objectives. Similarly, the project was moderately inefficient. Given the difficult operating environment

in Ethiopia, the project could have been more efficient if it had been more realistic and had less

ambitious objectives and coverage. The vast geographic area, poor infrastructure and communication

meant that the projected resources were not optimally used.

157. Sustainability. SOCODEP’s benefits are unlikely to continue, partly due to the lack of a

defined exit strategy. Moreover, institutional sustainability is limited and on-going access to credit,

and water supply is not assured.

158. Innovation. At the time of design, SOCODEP’s focus on cooperatives and credit represented a

response to the apparent liberalization of national politics and economics, and to the change in

cooperatives legislation. Unfortunately, the country context changed rapidly and the design became

less relevant given the new context. Despite the positive efforts at the MTR, the design adjustments

were not adequate given the changing realities. On another issue, the BSF component introduced an

effective monitoring and evaluation system, which however was not integrated into the other project

components. As the project was overstretched and its components were not integrated, SOCODEP

offered little opportunity for the learning being generated to be feed back into the project. Hence, the

evaluation considered the project to be moderately unsuccessful in terms of innovations, replicability

and upscaling.

159. Policy dialogue. SOCODEP was largely responsive to policy changes and government-led

restructuring. There is little evidence however of the project contributing to IFAD’s effective

engagement in policy dialogue in the country.

160. Participation. Probably the single greatest assurance of sustainability at the level of households

and communities is through real commitment to beneficiary participation. However, the evaluation

found that ensuring beneficiary participation in an area with a weak tradition of participation is

challenging and requires greater commitment in terms of time and resources. As such, approaches

which build on existing social capital (i.e., using indigenous Community Based Organizations), rather

than working through structures imposed from above and outside the beneficiary communities, are

most likely to succeed in the short and long term.

161. Integration. This evaluation report has highlighted at a number of points the lack of integration

between the numerous stakeholders and components within SOCODEP. Although integration is not

easy, particularly given the restructuring of government organs and redeployment of personnel, it is

the only way to create synergies which can maximize the impact of limited budgets.

162. Management. The management model used by SOCODEP limited its effectiveness and

responsiveness to rapid contextual changes that occurred during project implementation. The Project

Coordinator, attempted to harmonize and synchronize the work of several Government organs and

other stakeholders over whom he has no real authority. And support from IFAD through supervision

mission mounted annually by the designated cooperating institution (UNOPS) was insufficient.

However, it should be recognized that during the time of SOCODEP, IFAD did not have modalities

such as direct supervision or field presence to support project implementation. Although, IFAD was

responsive in using the tools it had at the time, for example by undertaking an early and useful MTR

and facilitating the inclusion during implementation of the important BSF component.

36


163. Weak linkages between partners during implementation. The linkages between the key

stakeholders have mainly been achieved by the efforts of the Project Coordinators (four in total, at

various stages of the Project), IFAD’s Country Programme Manager (CPM), and UNOPS. The Project

Coordinator’s role was challenging because of his inherent lack of authority, and the CPM’s role is

distant from the day-to-day project management issues to do more than provide general support and

guidance. Also, annual visits by a cooperating institution are insufficient to rescue an underperforming

project. Consequently, the effectiveness of the partnership was limited. Partnership with

the private sector was not a viable option in the early years of the Project, but this option could have

been pursued as implementation progressed. The extent to which partnerships outside of the project

were developed by the implementing stakeholders is limited.

C. Recommendations

164. Design. It is recommended that consideration be given to interventions which are far more

focused in terms of numbers of beneficiaries to be reached and geographic coverage, within the overall

framework of IFAD’s targeting policy. This would ensure greater synergies across activities and

ultimately deeper impact on rural poverty. Similarly, the project duration should be long enough to

achieve the desired results and in particular take into account the time needed to implement attitude

and cultural changes. Project management structures should be kept simple to ensure the integration

and harmonization among different implementing agencies.

165. Quality of project delivery. It is recommended that greater attention be given in future project

design and implementation to country context issues, and the identification of indicators of quality,

and actions necessary to achieve real and lasting impact, alongside those relating to numerical outputs.

166. Policy dialogue. It is recommended that more explicit attempts be made to engage in policy

dialogue with Government and other development actors, where appropriate and required involving a

wider range of national and international specialists, rather than just IFAD and cooperating institution

staff.

167. Participation. It is recommended that future IFAD-funded projects and programmes in

Ethiopia pay more attention to people’s participation, especially as it has not been a tradition of

development practice in Ethiopia in the past.

168. Integration. In future multi-component projects, it is recommended that greater attention be

paid to the linkages between the components and between those agencies responsible for delivering

them. The evaluation team is in favour of projects which involve multiple components addressing the

diverse needs of target populations – but the difficulties of integrating such efforts should be carefully

considered.

169. Management. Management is more than coordination or supervision, and it should be

addressed with greater rigour in future projects and programmes particularly in challenging contexts as

found in SOCODEP. Projects need to be much more decisively managed. It is recommended that new

approaches be explored, either through IFAD itself taking a more hands-on role during execution,

facilitated by the Fund’s field presence officer, which allow closer monitoring and follow-up to

implementation.

170. Role of the Field Presence Officer. The field presence officer can, among other tasks, provide

implementation support to IFAD-funded operations and has the potential to enhance partnerships and

policy dialogue in Ethiopia. Hence, the country presence should be further strengthened, so that it can

play a greater role in enhancing IFAD’s development effectiveness in Ethiopia. .

D. Questions for the Forthcoming Country Programme Evaluation (CPE)

171. In view of the CPE for Ethiopia which is planned for 2007, a number of key questions arise

from the present evaluation, which should be addressed in that context. These are:

37


• Have the present project identification, formulation and appraisal processes encouraged the

setting of unrealistic targets and spreading project of activities too thinly? If so, how can

these tendencies be avoided in future?

• Are the existing project identification, formulation and appraisal processes sufficiently

participative, in a country in which participation is not a strong tradition? If not, can they be

made more so?

• To what extent have the detailed capacities of project stakeholder institutions been routinely

assessed at the formulation stage, in order to design appropriate capacity-building

programmes? What improvements can be made to this process?

• What has been the impact of the BSF contributions in Ethiopia? How can the partnership be

enhanced in future activities?

• How can the present model of project management and supervision be modified to create a

significantly greater degree of the Programme Coordination Unit (PCU) authority and

effectiveness, without de-coupling projects from the implementing institutions? Should

separate project management structures be set up, perhaps using consulting firms, or can the

existing PCU framework be made more effective? How could the field presence officer be

more effective? What model best fits the Ethiopian context? Should clearer guidelines be

framed, setting out responsibilities for taking actions on supervision and MTR

recommendations? Where does the buck stop in terms of project management?; and

• In view of the weak performance of M&E in some Ethiopian projects, how can a monitoring

culture be encouraged, and how can manageable frameworks be developed and implemented

for monitoring of project performance, reflecting both quantitative and qualitative

achievements?

38


Summary of Project Objectives

39

APPENDIX 1

Principal objective: increase agricultural productivity and raise income levels of the rural poor through support to

Service Cooperatives’ development in order to facilitate efficient provision of sustainable services to members

SO1 Provide a model for developing Ethiopian cooperatives under the new legislation, particularly with respect to

improvement of financial intermediation services in rural areas, which could be replicated in other areas of the

country.

O1.1 Service Cooperatives (SCs) restructured and registered under the new legislation

O1.2 Short term technical assistance provided, to facilitate:

- training of the staff

- development of accounting systems in the cooperatives

- development of auditing procedures to be followed by the Cooperatives Promotion Department (CPD)

O1.3 Long term technical advisory support provided to SCs

O1.4 The staff of SCs and Executive Committee members trained to enable them to effectively manage the SCs as

business organizations

O1.5 The members of SCs trained to enable them to actively participate in the decision making processes of the

SCs

O1.6 The CPD staff trained to reorient them in the operation of cooperatives in a free market economy and to

increase their skills in supervision and audit of the SCs.

SO2 Increased capital and income among the rural poor in the project area through off-farm income-generating

activities particularly for women and families in densely populated areas with limited land for farm expansion

O2.1 Growth of new Small Scale Enterprises (SSE) fostered by pilot projects to introduce new business ideas and

providing vocational training

O2.2 The amount and nature of credit services to SC members provided by SCs for SSE activities increased

O2.3 New forms of rural women’s groups capable of promoting development activities and facilitating access to

credit for their members promoted

O2.4 Participating banks’ experience developed and cost effective methods for rural lending to reach small

enterprises and rural women supported

SO3 Strengthen the Southern Regional Agricultural Bureau (SRAB) to carry out its mandate with respect to

cooperative development

O3.1 SRAB’s structural capacity to promote SC development enhanced

O3.2 SRAB’s capacity to monitor and evaluate SC development enhanced

SO4 Provide credit to meet financial requirements for agricultural inputs and draught oxen and facilitate the supply

of inputs through support to local traders and cooperatives.

O4.1 A credit programme is implemented for increasing agricultural development, production and marketing and

improving income levels of the rural poor

O4.2 Technical Assistance (TA) to facilitate training of the CBE staff provided (Rural Banking expert for 3

months)

O4.3 CBE staff trained in rural credit methodologies to improve their skills to effectively implement the credit

programme

O4.4 Transport facilities to CBE to facilitate effective implementation of the credit programme provided

SO5 Relief of livestock health constraints, particularly with respect to draught animals, through provision of

veterinary drugs.

O5.1 Access to veterinary drugs improved

SO6 Improve access of rural families to services and markets by rehabilitating and maintaining rural roads.

O6.1 Road construction equipment provided to Bureau of Public Works and Urban Development (BPWUD)

O6.2 Improvement of rural road network and access roads to SCs is properly planned

O6.3 250 km of the existing dry season roads rehabilitated to RR-30 standard

O6.4 Heavy maintenance on 450 km dry season roads carried out

O6.5 SCs regularly carrying out routine maintenance on the 700 kms of roads rehabilitated and heavily

maintained

SO7 (BSF Component) Reduce the burden of disease in 8 woredas of the SOCODEP area

O7.1 Sustainable and effective water supply provided to 8 woredas of the SOCODEP area

O7.2 Basic sanitation facilities provided and used by the 8 woredas of the SOCODEP area

O7.3 Institutional capacity of the Regional Water, Mines and Energy Development Bureau (RWMEDB) and

CBOs strengthened

O7.4 Sustainable and effective health facilities provided to 8 woredas of the project area


Water Supply &

San, 2.28, 10%

Health &

Nutrition, 1.57,

7%

Roads, 4.70, 21%

GoE, 4.06,

21%

BSF, 2.94, 15%

Project Costs and Financing 56

Budget Costs by Component (million US$, total 22.72m)

Veterinary Drugs,

1.89, 8%

WSHBS Mgt &

Coordination,

0.17, 1%

Support to CBE,

0.39, 2%

41

Training of SCs,

0.95, 4%

SSE Promotion,

0.29, 1%

Support to SRAB,

2.80, 12%

Credit line thro

CBE, 7.68, 34%

Actual Financing (million US$, total 19.65m)

Beneficiaries,

0.20, 1%

56 Source: Project Completion Report, June 2006

CBE, 0.46, 2%

IFAD, 11.99,

61%

APPENDIX 2


SOCODEP Timeline

43

APPENDIX 3

Event 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06

IFAD Preparation Mission

Pre-Appraisal

Baseline Survey of SCs

IFAD Appraisal Mission

Report & Rec of the President to IFAD's EB

Loans effective

SLA for credit line between MOF and CBE

Start-up Workshop

Establishment of PCU at SRAB, CPD

Formulation Mission for WSHBS (BSF) Component

Mid-Term Review

Move of PCU to Bureau of Cooperatives

Start-up Workshop for BSF Component

BSF Grant approved

Move of PCU to BOFED

Baseline Study for BSF Completed

BSF Grant effective

End of project, except Roads and BSF components

Closure of SRS 037-ET and credit part of loan 342-ET

Completion Report by GoE

End of Roads and BSF components

Closure of remaining loans

BSF Impact Study

BSF Grant closed

IFAD/UNOPS Completion Report Mission

Completion Evaluation


49

Reconstructed Logframe for SOCODEP

APPENDIX 4

OVI Targets Data sources (star * means data still

to be collected by evaluation team)

Principal objective: increase agricultural

For different population groups, the poor in particular,

- Socio-economic survey (SES)*

productivity and raise income levels of the rural members and non-members of SCs in the project area: -

poor through support to Service Cooperatives’

development in order to facilitate efficient

provision of sustainable services to members

Yields of main crops (maize, teff, sorghum, barley,

pulses and rape seed)

- Product quality

- Production cost

- Labour productivity

- Profitability of agriculture production

- Income level

SO1 Provide a model for developing Ethiopian - Number of financially sustainable restructured 200 - SRAB SC baseline survey; coop

cooperatives under the new legislation,

cooperatives

staff survey (CSS)*; SC financial

particularly with respect to improvement of

reports

financial intermediation services in rural areas,

which could be replicated in other areas of the

country.

- Cost of the cooperative development process

- Volume of services provided to SC members (i.t.o.

number of clients, value, units of inputs etc.)

- Financial reports

- CSS*; coop members survey

(CMS)*; SC activity reports

- Quality of services provided to SC members

- CMS*; CSS*

- Membership (number and nature)

- CSS*

- Nature and extend of replication of the SC

- Cooperative promotion bureau

development model

(CPB) reports; national and regional

- Government commitment to restructure SCs and

gov key informants (KI)*

carry trough policy changes

- New laws and regulations in

SNNPR; national and regional gov

KI*

O1.1 Service Cooperatives (SCs) restructured and - Nature and consequences of restructuring

- CSS*; ‘94&’98 coop proclamations;

registered under the new legislation - Consequences of registration

CPB KI*

A1.1.1 Restructuring of SCs - Restructuring process

- CSS*; Project progress reports

- Number of SCs restructured

200 (PPRs); CPB KI*; CPB reports


50

A1.1.2 Registration SCs - Registration process

- Number of SCs registered

A1.1.3 Appointment of paid SC

- Job description for SC managers

managers in all restructured SCs

(cost partly reimbursed for 3 first

years)

- Selection process

- Number of SC managers appointed

O1.2 Short term technical assistance provided, to - Duration of presence in first year (months)

facilitate:

- Duration of presence in second and fourth year

- training of the staff

(weeks)

- development of accounting systems in the - Application of improved accounting system within

cooperatives

SCs

- development of auditing procedures to be

followed by the CPD

- Application of improved audit procedures by CPD

A1.2.1 Recruitment of 2 training - Relevance of TOR

specialists in cooperatives

management, supervision and

audit

- Timely recruitment

A1.2.2 Development of training

- Adequacy of training needs assessment

programmes

- Training contents and design contributed by TA

A1.2.3 Preparation of curricula and

training materials

- Technical soundness of curricula and materials

prepared

- Pedagogical quality of curricula and materials

prepared

A1.2.4 Training of trainers - Duration of TfT

- Quality of TfT

- Number of trainers trained

- Competence of trainers trained

A1.2.5 Development of accounting

procedures for cooperatives

- Technical soundness of procedures

- Applicability of procedures

200

200

3 m

2 x 2 w

- CSS*; PPRs; CPB KI*; CPB

reports; regional cooperative register

- CSS*; PPRs; CPB KI*

- PPRs

- TA reports

- CSS*; SC accountancy documents

- CSS*; SC audit reports; Auditors*

- Updated TOR for TA

- PPRs

- Needs assessment report; CSS*;

CMS*

- Training documents

- Training documents and materials;

trainees*

- TfT report

- Trainees*

- TfT report

- Training reports; Trainees*

- Accounting manual

- CSS*; SC accountancy documents;

SC accountants*


51

A1.2.6 Development of audit procedures

for the cooperative auditors

- Technical soundness of procedures

- Applicability of procedures

- Audit manual

- CSS*; SC audit reports; CPB

auditors*

A1.2.7 Follow up of SCs and CPD - Nature and frequency of follow up - TA reports

operations

- CPB KI*

A1.2.8 Provision of guidelines for - Technical soundness of guidelines

- Guidelines

refresher courses

- Applicability and pedagogical quality of guidelines

- Trainees*

O1.3 Long term technical advisory support

provided to SCs

- Duration of presence 2 years - TA report

A1.3.1 Recruitment of a Cooperatives - Relevance of TOR

- TOR

Expert

- Timely recruitment

- TA report

A1.3.2 Guidance and technical advice to - Relevance, quality and adequacy of guidance and

- TA report; CSS*; CPB KI*

SCs in all aspects of their

operation

advice given

A1.3.3 Technical support to CPD - Relevance, quality and adequacy of technical support

given

- TA report; CPB KI*

A1.3.4 Half-year meetings between SC - Frequency and quality of the meetings

2 per - Meeting reports; PPRs; TA reports;

presidents to discuss operational

issues

- Number of participants

- Relevance of issues discussed and solutions found

year SC activity reports

- CSS*; CPB KI*

A1.3.5 Develop a platform for

- Platform/apex body development process

- TA report; CPB KI*

organization of an apex body - Nature of the platform

- CPB KI*; CSS*

- Existence and nature of the apex body

- CPB KI*; Apex body documents

O1.4 The staff of SCs and Executive Committee

members trained to enable them to

effectively manage the SCs as business

organizations

- Management capacity of SC staff and EC members - CSS*; CMS*

O1.4.1 Organize 4 training courses for - Training contents and design

- Training preparatory documents and

200 SC managers consisting of a 3

months induction course

- Number and duration of induction courses organized

- Number and nature of participants

4 x 3m

200

materials; trainees*

- PPRs

- Training reports


52

O1.4.2 Organize 5 day refresher courses

during subsequent years for SC

managers

O1.4.3 Train other SC professional staff

including storekeepers,

bookkeepers and shopkeepers

O1.4.4 Organize a study tour for 10

officers from the CPD and SC

managers to neighboring countries

O1.4.5 Sensitize and train 200 SC

executive committee members

O1.5 The members of SCs trained to enable them

to actively participate in the decision

making processes of the SCs

A1.5.1 Sensitization/orientation of all SC

members

O1.6 The CPD staff trained to reorient them in

the operation of cooperatives in a free

market economy and to increase their skills

in supervision and audit of the SCs.

- Quality of refresher training needs assessment

- Training contents and design

- Number and duration of refresher courses organized

- Number and nature of participants

- Number, duration and nature of courses organized

- Number and nature of participants

- Number of participants on the tour

- Relevance of visits

- Quality of the organization

- Sensitization/training contents and design

- Nature, number and duration of s/t activities

organized

- Number and nature of participants

- Number and nature of SC members present at

General Assemblies

- Nature of their participation during the GAs

- Nature and frequency of other forms of participation

- SC members’ understanding of SC objectives,

structure and functioning

- SC members’ understanding of their role in SCs’

decision making processes

- Sensitization contents and design

- Nature, number and duration of activities organized

- Number and nature of participants

- Knowledge and skills of CPD staff for managing

cooperatives in a free market economy

- Supervision and audit skills of CPD staff

- Needs assessment report; trainees*

- Training preparatory documents and

materials; trainees*

- PPRs

- Training reports

- Training preparatory documents and

materials; trainees*; PPRs

- Training reports

10 - Tour report; PPRs

- Tour preparatory documents; Tour

participants*

- Tour participants*

- S/T preparatory documents and

materials; S/T reports; PPR

1000

- CSS*

- CSS*; CMS*; SC activity reports

- CMS*; CSS*

- CMS*; CSS*

- CMS*; CSS*

- CMS*; CSS*

- Sensitization preparatory documents

and materials

- Sensitization reports; PPR

- CMS*; CPB KI*

- Idem


53

A1.6.1 Organize initial orientation

workshop for all senior staff

A1.6.2 Organize orientation training

course for 15 days for all staff in

the CPD

A1.6.3 Organize 2 month training courses

for 5 persons appointed as

cooperative auditors

A1.6.4 Organize 10 days orientation

course for 23 existing cooperative

auditors

A1.6.5 Organize 15 days orientation

course for 33 cooperative teams

A1.6.6 Organize orientation course in

business management of small

enterprises for zonal and woreda

cooperative promotion marketing

officers

A1.6.7 Organize 5 day refresher course

during each year of project

implementation to all cooperative

promotion staff and Rural

Womens’ Affairs staff

A1.6.8 Organize a study tour by 10

officers from the CPD and SC

managers to neighbouring

countries

- Quality of the WS (organization, interest of subjects,

effectiveness of activities…)

- Number and nature of participants

- Orientation training contents and design

- Number and nature of participants

- Duration of the training

- Audit training contents and design

- Number and nature of participants

- Duration of the training

- Audit orientation training contents and design

- Number and nature of participants

- Duration of the training

- Orientation training contents and design

- Number and nature of participants

- Duration of the training

- SSE management training contents and design

- Number and nature of participants

- Duration of the training

- Quality of refresher training needs assessment

- Training contents and design

- Number and duration of refresher courses organized

- Number and nature of participants

- Number of participants on the tour

- Relevance of visits

- Quality of the organization

158

5

2m

23

10d

15d

10

- Workshop preparatory documents

and materials; WS report; WS

participants*; CPB KI*

- WS report; PPRs

- Training preparatory documents and

materials; trainees*

- Training reports, PPRs

- Training preparatory documents and

materials; trainees*

- Training reports, PPRs

- Training preparatory documents and

materials; trainees*

- Training reports, PPRs

- Training preparatory documents and

materials; trainees*

- Training reports, PPRs

- Training preparatory documents and

materials; trainees*

- Training reports, PPRs

- Training needs assessment report;

trainees*

- Training preparatory documents and

materials; trainees*

- Training reports, PPRs

- Tour preparatory documents

- Tour report

- Tour participants*


54

SO2 Increased capital and income among the rural poor

in the project area through off-farm incomegenerating

activities particularly for women and

families in densely populated areas with limited

land for farm expansion

O2.1 Growth of new small scale enterprises

(SSE) fostered by pilot projects to introduce

new business ideas and providing vocational

training

- Change in assets and income through the

development of SSEs among different population

groups

- Change in assets and income through the

development of off-farm IGAs among different

population groups

- Change in scope, nature and profitability of SSEs

among different population groups

- Number and nature of SSEs created or supported

- Number of SSE employees

A2.1.1 Information to beneficiaries - Nature of information provided

- Number of recipients

A2.1.2 Study tour to India for 2 RTU - Number of participants on the tour

agents to investigate appropriate

commercial operations

- Relevance of visits

- Quality of the organization

- Lessons learned and used for project support

A2.1.3 Basic business training from ILO - Quality of training needs assessment

for selected RWAD and CPD staff - Training contents and design

- Number and duration courses organized

- Number and nature of participants

A2.1.4 National and international study

tours for entrepreneurs

- Number of participants on the tours

- Relevance of visits

- Quality of the organization

A2.1.5 3 Pilot SSE projects in 5 woredas - Quality of baseline survey

- Number and nature of pilot SSE projects

- Setting up process of the pilot SSEs

- Quality of pilot evaluation and lessons learned from

pilot SSEs

- Dissemination process of pilot experiences

A2.1.6 Investigation of potential to

develop spinning and weaving

- Duration of TA

- Quality of investigation report

- Dissemination and use of investigation results

- SES*

- Idem

- SES*; CSS*; PPRs

170 - PPRs, SSEs*

2100 - SSEs*

- PPRs

- CMS*

2 - Tour report; PPRs

- Tour preparatory documents; tour

report; tour participants*

- PPRs

- Training needs assessment report;

trainees*

- Training preparatory documents and

materials; trainees*

- Training reports, PPRs

53 - Tour report; PPRs

- Tour preparatory documents; tour

report; tour participants*

3

- Baseline survey report

- PPRs; SSEs*

- CPB and SC KI*

- Pilot evaluation report

- PPRs; CPB KI*; SSEs*

1,5m - TA report

- Investigation report

- PPRs; CPB KI*


55

A2.1.7 Vocational training to

entrepreneurs/artisans (480

months)

O2.2 The amount and nature of credit services to

SC members provided by SCs for SSE

activities increased

- Quality of training needs assessment

- Training contents and design

- Number and duration of courses organized

- Number and nature of participants

- Amount and nature of credit services provided by

SCs for SSE activities

- Number and nature of credit recipients

- Training needs assessment report;

trainees*

215 - Training preparatory documents and

materials; trainees*

- Training reports, PPRs

2100 - SCs financial reports; CBE reports;

CBE KI*; MFI reports; MFI KI*

- Idem; CMS*; SSEs*

- CMS*

A2.2.1 Information to beneficiaries - Nature of information provided

- Number of recipients

O2.3 New forms of rural women’s groups capable - Forms of women’s groups joining SCs promoted

- CSS*; women’s groups*

of promoting development activities and

facilitating access to credit for their

members promoted

- Number and nature of women joining these women’s

groups

- Volume of credit extended to women’s groups’

members

- Nature and volume of development activities

undertaken by women’s groups

- Competence of RWAD staff to support women’s

groups

- Women’s groups*

A2.3.1 Information to beneficiaries - Nature of information provided

- Number of recipients

- Women’s groups*; SES*

A2.3.2 Promotion of formation of - Women’s groups formation process

women’s groups

- Women’s groups formation promotion process

- Number and nature of groups formed

A2.3.3 Training of RAWD staff - Training contents and design

- Number of courses organized

- Number and nature of participants

- Duration of the courses

O2.4 Participating banks’ experience developed - Changes in loan recovery

and cost effective methods for rural lending

to reach small enterprises and rural women

supported

- Changes in cost of rural credit

No activities specified at appraisal - -

- Women’s groups*; SCs financial

reports; CBE reports

- Women’s groups*

- Women’s groups*; RWAD KI*

- Women’s groups*; RWAD KI*

- Women’s groups*; RWAD KI*

- CSS*; RWAD KI*

- Training preparatory documents and

materials; trainees*

- Training reports, PPRs

- SC financial reports; CBE reports;

CBE KI*; MFI reports; MFI KI*


56

SO3 Strengthen the SRAB to carry out its mandate

with respect to cooperative development

O3.1 SRAB’s structural capacity to promote SC

development enhanced

A3.1.1 Establishment of PCU (1 PC, I

FC, I PMEO, I RWA, 3 CPD staff,

2 auditors, 3 support staff)

A3.1.2 Acquisition of transport, office

and communication equipment

O3.2 SRAB’s capacity to monitor and evaluate

SC development enhanced

- SRAB’s approach to promote cooperative

development

- SRAB’s performance to promote cooperative

development

- PCU performance

- SRAB’s structural cooperative promotion capacity

- Composition of the PCU

- Clarity of roles of the PCU and its members

- Competence of the PCU members to fulfill their roles

- Adequacy of resources for the PCU

- Number and nature of vehicles acquired

- Number and nature of office and communication

equipment acquired

- Adequacy of equipment acquired

- State and maintenance of the equipment acquired

- Information collected, analyzed and disseminated for

management and steering

- Use of information collected for management and

steering

A3.2.1 Development of an M&E manual - M&E indicators developed

- Availability and quality of M&E manual

- Use of M&E manual

- CPB KI*; CSS*

- PPR*; CPB KI*

- PCU members*; CPB KI*

- PCU members*; CPB KI*

- M&E reports

- PPRs; CPB KI*

- M&E indicator list

- M&E manual

- CPB KI*; M&E reports

A3.2.2 Baseline survey - Availability and quality of baseline survey - Baseline survey report

- Baseline survey report

A3.2.3 Collection, analysis and

- Regularity and adequacy of monitoring reports at

- M&E reports

dissemination of monitoring data different levels

A3.2.4 Follow-up evaluation studies - Number and nature of studies - Evaluation study reports; PPRs


57

SO4 Provide credit to meet financial requirements for

agricultural inputs and draught oxen and

facilitate the supply of inputs through support to

local traders and cooperatives.

O4.1 A credit programme is implemented for

increasing agricultural development,

production and marketing and improving

income levels of the rural poor

- Amount of credit provided

- Destination of the credit provided

- Reimbursement rate

- Nature and number of households that received credit

- Nature and volume of credit extended

- Nature and volume activities financed by credit

- SC financial reports; CBE reports;

CBE KI*; MFI reports; MFI KI*;

CSS*; SES*; local traders*

- SC financial reports; CBE reports;

CBE KI*; MFI reports; MFI KI*;

CSS*; SES*; local traders*

A4.1.1 Provision of funds for credit line - Availability of funds to CBE and other MFI - CBE reports; CBE KI*; MFI

reports; MFI KI*

A4.1.2 Preparation of annual lending

programmes

- Annual lending programmes - Annual lending programmes

A4.1.3 Appraisal of loan proposals - Number and nature of loan proposals

- CBE reports; CBE KI*; MFI

- Number and nature of accepted loans

reports; MFI KI*; SC financial

reports

A4.1.4 Follow-up of loans - Regularity and nature of follow-up - CBE reports; CBE KI*; MFI

reports; MFI KI*

A4.1.5 Monitoring of credit programme - Regularity and nature of monitoring of the credit

- CBE reports; CBE KI*; MFI

implementation

programme implementation

reports; MFI KI*; PPRs

O4.2 TA to facilitate training of the CBE staff - Quality of training needs assessment

- Training needs assessment report;

provided (Rural Banking expert for 3

months)

- Training contents and design contributed by TA

- Quality of trainings given by TA

- Number and nature of participants

trainees*

- Training preparatory documents and

materials; trainees*

- Training reports, PPRs

No activities specified at appraisal - -

O4.3 CBE staff trained in rural credit

methodologies to improve their skills to

effectively implement the credit programme

- Skills of CBE staff to implement credit programme - CSS*; CBE KI*

A4.3.1 Training of 15 CBE loan officers - Training contents and design

- Training preparatory documents and

- Number of courses organized

materials; trainees*

- Number and nature of participants

- Duration of the courses

- Training reports, PPRs

O4.4 Transport facilities to CBE to facilitate

effective implementation of the credit

programme provided

- Number and nature of transport means provided - CBE KI*; PPRs


58

SO5 Relief of livestock health constraints, particularly

with respect to draught animals, trough provision

of veterinary drugs.

- Animal heath situation in the project area - SES*

O5.1 Access to veterinary drugs improved - Availability of veterinary drugs in the project area

- Access to veterinary drugs by animal breeders

- Use of veterinary drugs

- SES*

A5.1.1 Preparation of annual demand - Survey design

- Survey design documents

estimates

- Survey results (data collected and analyzed)

- Survey report

A5.1.2 Establishment of revolving fund - Volume of the fund established

- PPRs; NBE KI*; CSS*

account held by NBE

- Functioning of the fund

A5.1.3 Distribution of drugs. - Volume and nature of drugs distributed - PPRs; CSS*

SO6 Improve access of rural families to services and

markets by rehabilitating and maintaining rural

roads.

- Number of SCs benefiting from rehabilitated roads

- Number of SCs benefiting from heavy maintenance

on roads

- Cost of road improvement works

- Sustainability of road improvements

45

100

- CSS*; PPRs

- Idem

- Project financial reports; BPWUD

financial reports

- Roads’ actual appearance*

O6.1 Road construction equipment provided to

BPWUD

- Type and number of equipment provided - Equipment*; PPRs

A6.1.1 Preparation of specifications for

procurement of road construction

equipment

- Tender and procurement documents - Tender and procurement documents

A6.1.2 Procurement of equipment - Number of replies from sellers

- Procurement files

- Selection process

- Procurement manual; BPWUD KI*

- Timely delivery of equipment

- BPWUD KI*; PPRs

O6.2 Improvement of rural road network and - Correspondence of plans with project objectives

- BPWUD KI*

access roads to SCs is properly planned - Feasibility of plans

A6.2.1 Preparation of the roads

- Programming approach

- Programme preparatory documents;

rehabilitation and maintenance

programme

- Roads rehabilitation and maintenance programme

BPWUD KI*

- Programme

O6.3 250 km of the existing dry season roads - Length of dry season roads rehabilitated

250 km - BPWUD reports; PPRs; Roads’

rehabilitated to RR-30 standard

- Nature of rehabilitation work

actual appearance*

A6.3.1 Preparation of the rehabilitation - Plans drawn

- Plans and budget documents

works

- Budget estimated


59

A6.3.2 Supervision of rehabilitation

works

O6.4 Heavy maintenance on 450 km dry season

roads carried out

A6.4.1 Preparation of heavy and routine

maintenance works

A6.4.2 Supervision of heavy and routine

maintenance works

O6.5 SCs regularly carrying out routine

maintenance on the 700 kms of roads

rehabilitated and heavily maintained

A6.5.1 Preparation of routine

maintenance works

A6.5.2 Supervision of routine

maintenance works

- Number of visits to the works

- Rehab supervision reports; BPWUD

- Reporting and feed-back process

reports; BPWUD KI*

- Length of roads on which heavy maintenance has 450 km - BPWUD reports; PPRs; Roads’

been carried out

- Nature of heavy maintenance works

actual appearance*

- Plans drawn

- Budget estimated

- Plans and budget documents

- Number of visits to the works

- Rehab supervision reports; BPWUD

- Reporting and feed-back process

reports; BPWUD KI*

- Actual state of the improved roads

- BPWUD reports; PPRs; Roads’

- Regularity and nature of maintenance

- Cost of maintenance

actual appearance*

- Degree of involvement of SCs in maintenance

- CSS*

- Maintenance plans - Plans

- Number of visits to the works

- Reporting and feed-back process

- Rehab supervision reports; BPWUD

reports; BPWUD KI*

Added components with BSF grant funding since 1999 (as of Grant Agreement):

OVI Targets Data sources (star * means data still

Principal objective: enhance social and economic

standards through improved health and nutritional status

of poor rural households in 8 woredas of the SOCODEP

area

SO7 Reduce the burden of disease in 8 woredas of the

SOCODEP area

- Reduction of water borne disease

- Improved nutritional status

- Improved quality and quantity of assets

- Increased social/human capital through

knowledge and technology transfer

- Increased use of safe water and health

services

- Changes in behaviour due to increased

recognition of good health and hygiene

- Changes in water usage

- Improved institutional capacity to provide

water and health services

to be collected by evaluation team)

- Socio-economic survey (SES)*

- Available government health

figures

- PPRs

- Project M&E

- SES*

- Regional Water, Mines and Energy

Development Bureau (RWMEDB)

figures *


60

O7.1 Sustainable and effective water supply

provided to 8 woredas of the SOCODEP area

- Reliability of safe water source

- Accessibility of safe water source

- Changes in time spent collecting water

- Changes in quality and quantity of water

-

- PPRs

- Project M&E

A7.1.1 Construct hand-dug wells - Number of wells constructed 90 - PPRs

- Project M&E

A7.1.2 Protect additional springs - Number of springs protected 90 - PPRs

- Project M&E

A7.1.3 Rehabilitate hand-dug or drilled

wells

- Number of rehabilitated or drilled wells 40 - PPRs

- Project M&E

A7.1.4 Rehabilitate springs - Number of rehabilitated springs 35 - PPRs

- Project M&E

O7.2 Basic sanitation facilities provided and used by

the 8 woredas of the SOCODEP area

- Sanitation facilities utilized

- Changes in health practices

A7.2.1 Construct refuse pits and VIP latrines - Number of pits and latrines constructed 1,400 (1,200

of these for

demonstration)

A7.2.2 Conduct public awareness campaigns

to promote improved habitat practices

O7.3 Institutional capacity of the Regional Water,

Mines and Energy Development Bureau

(RWMEDB) and CBOs strengthened

- Number of trainings and quality

- Number of beneficiaries trained

- Water supply and sanitation knowledge and

skills of RWMEDB and CBOs enhanced

- Changes in services provided

- Health centre records *

- PPRs

- Project M&E

- PPRs

- Project M&E

- Training documents and trainee

surveys *

- PPRs

- Project M&E

- SES*

- Available RWMEDB figures

- CBO records *


61

A7.3.1 Provide Training - Number of trainings and quality

- Number of people trained

- Number of community water and health

centre committees established and still

functioning

A7.3.2 Assessment of water capacity of the

area

O7.4 Sustainable and effective health facilities

provided to 8 woredas of the project area

A7.4.1 Renovate, upgrade and equip health

centres

A7.4.2 Equip and supply w/ drugs additional

health centres and health stations

A7.4.3 Provide and train medical and

administrative staff for these primary

health care facilities

A7.4.4 Establish a revolving drug fund at

each facility, including the supply of

impregnated mosquito nets

A7.4.5 Strengthen the institutional capacity

of the RHB

- Training documents and trainee

surveys *

- PPRs

- Project M&E

- Conduct hydro-geological studies - Available RWMEDB figures

- Accessibility of health facilities

- Changes in use of health facilities

(particularly women and children)

- Health centre records*

- SES*

- Number of centres upgraded 2 - PPRs

- Project M&E

- Health centre records*

- Number of centres supplied 6centres

2stations

- Number of trainings

- Number of people trained

- Number of funds established

- Number of beneficiaries participating

- Use of bed nets

- Number of trainings and quality

- Number of people trained

- PPRs

- Project M&E

- Health centre records*

- Training documents and trainee

surveys *

- PPRs

- Project M&E

- PPRs

- Project M&E

- Health centre records*

- SES*

- Training documents and trainee

surveys *

- PPRs

- Project M&E


63

International training

Training Carried Out by SOCODEP (Source PCR, June 2006)

Type of Training Function of Trainee Place Trained

No. of Persons

Trained

APPENDIX 5

Year Duration Cost

Financial training Senior bank expert CBE UK 1 1998 5 weeks

Project planning Experts in cooperative office Belgium 2 1999 3 months

Project feasibility studies M&E Windhoek (Namibia) 1 May 2000 18 days

Project management

Financial Controller and

Project Coordinator

Rome and Turin 2 June 2000 1 month

Loan administration

Financial controller and

project coordinator

Nairobi UNOPS 3 2000 1 week

Loan administration

Financial Controller and

Project Coordinator

Nairobi UNOPS 3 2001 1 week

Loan administration

Financial controller and

Nairobi UNOPS 2 2003 1 week

project coordinator

Cooperative training Cooperative experts Kenya, Nairobi 20 2002 1 month

Project management Credit officers of CBE UK Bradford University 2 Sept./01 3 months

Project planning, monitoring and

evaluation

Project coordinator UK Bradford University 1 Sept./01 18 months

Water engineering Focal person Netherlands 1 Sept./03 18 months

Project planning, monitoring and

evaluation

Distance learning

Water engineering

Environmental health

IFAD implementation workshops

IFAD implementation workshops

IFAD implementation workshops

Project coordinator UK Bradford University 1 Sept./03 18 months

Bureau head and experts in

BOFED

Water Experts in Regions

and zones

Focal person from Health

Dept

PCU, FC and cooperative

head of zone and region

PCU, FC and experts from

the regional bureau

PCU, FC and experts from

the regional bureau

UK financial management 11

2004 (2) and

2005 (9)

24 months

and above

India Hydrabad 9 Nov/04 15 days

UK Liverpool 1 Sept./03 18 months

Zimbabwe 10 2000 1 week

Madagascar 7 2001 1 week

Zambia 6 2002 1 week


64

IFAD implementation workshops

PCU, FC and BOFED

Bureau heads

Mozambique 4 2003 1 week

IFAD implementation workshops

PCU, FC and BOFED

Bureau heads

Lesotho 4 2004 1 week

IFAD implementation workshops PCU and FC Rwanda 2 2005 1 week

Exchange visit

Bureau heads water and

health

Tanzania 4 2001 10 days

Training in M&E and impact assessment PCU and FC Tanzania 2 2005 10 days

Domestic training

IFAD implementation workshops

Bureau Heads, PCU,

financial controller and

M&E

Addis Abeba 5 1999 5 days

Training of water staff Experts zones and woredas 200 2005

Refreshment training Cooperative staff zones and woredas 476 2002

Refreshment training

Cooperative managers and

shopkeepers

zones and woredas 186 2002

Organisation and management, marketing,

credit and saving cooperative principles

Cooperative staff zones and woredas 574 2002

Experience sharing Committee members western zones 458 2002 1 week

Orientation about cooperatives Cooperative members Service cooperatives 789 2002 1 day

Management of animal health Veterinarians Zones 70 2002

Health and sanitation committee training Village committees Zones 102 2002 3 days 48,490

Hygiene education Community members Zones 27,341 2002 2 days

Women farmers training Female farmers Woredas 1,544 2001 - 119,400

Women affairs expert training Women’s affairs experts 201 2001 3 days

Women’s group managers training Women managers of IGA project zones 54 2001 19,300

Field visits IGA experts project zones 130 cooperatives 2001 23,650

Veterinary technical training Veterinary experts Project zones 300 2001 25,000

Development agent training Development agents Project zones 126 2001 8,200

New experts training Cooperative experts Awassa 8 2001

Committee members exchange visits Cooperative members Woredas 122 2001

Cooperative members training

Peasant Association

members

Cooperatives 10,179 2001

SC shopkeeper training Shopkeepers Cooperatives 36 2001


65

SC new shopkeepers training Shopkeepers Cooperatives 11 2001

SC new managers training Managers Cooperatives 39 2001

SC old managers training Managers Cooperatives 34 2001

Revolving drug fund training Health professionals Zone 34 2001 1 week

Environmental health training Health professionals Zone 23 2001 106,030

Community health agents training Community health agents Zone 5 2001 152,860

Traditional birth attendants training Traditional birth attendants Zone 25 2001

Cooperative staff training Cooperative staff 98 2000

Training committee members Peasant association members 613 2000

Shopkeepers 35 2000

Orientation for cooperative members Cooperative members 11,970 2000

Committee member training Cooperative members 74 2000

Community health agents training Community health agents 5 2000

Traditional birth attendants 25 2000

Public health workers 28 2000

Community health workers training Community health workers 18 2000

Computer training Focal person of health 1 2000

Water supply management training Water officers 2 2000

Community organisers 5 2000

Water committees 13 2000

Water operators 15 2000

Water technicians and water committee

2000

training Staff water committee Tello woreda 42

Staff water committee Konso S. woreda 7 2000

Staff water committee Chencha 49 2000

Staff water committee Offa 21 2000

Staff water committee Sodo 42 2000

Staff water committee Damot Galle 14 2000

Bank and credit disbursement training CBE experts Awassa 10 2000

Cooperative educational training Cooperative staff Zone 149 1998 7 days

Executive members Woreda 368 1998 3 days

Cooperative employed

1998 5 days

workers Woredas 118

Small scale enterprise training cooperative members Sodo town 149 1 1998

FC: Financial Controller, PCU: Project Coordination Unit, BOFED: Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, SC service cooperatives

1 Of those: 81 Small scale enterprises, 8 bamboo works, 7 weaving, 5 beehives, 48 tailoring


Evaluation Mission Itinerary, 18 th September-11 th October 2006

Date Activities

Mon 18 th Sept

Tues 19 th Sept

67

APPENDIX 6

Full team assembles in Addis Ababa. Introductions, logistics, making appointments.

Meetings with MoFED, RUFIP, VOCA, Obtaining fieldwork advance from UNDP. Travel

to Awassa.

Weds 20 th Sept Planning: familiarity with documentation, explanation of OE Evaluation Manual,

understanding of changes at MTR, findings of Supervision missions, content of BSF

component. Arranging meetings.

Thurs 21 st Sept Meetings with Regional Bureau officials (BoARD) and OMFI. Field work planning and

transport logistics. Introduction to Report structure.

Fri 22 nd Sept Meetings with Roads Authority, Bureau of Water Resources.

Sat 23 rd Sept Preparation of invitations for wrap-up meetings. Final field work planning.

Sun 24 th Sept

Mon 25 th Sept

Tues 26 th Sept

Team splits: Socio-economist to Gamo

Gofa Zone and Derashe Special Woreda,

with Expert from Rural Women’s Affairs

Team. Meetings with Woreda officials

and Service Coops in Boreda, Chencha,

Arba Minch Zuria and Derashe. Visits to

BSF activities in Chencha, and roads in

Chencha (Arba Minch-Zigity) and

Boreda Wajifo-Boreda). Travel to Sodo.

Team leader, Coops Specialist and Credit

Specialist to Addis Ababa.

Meetings with VOCA, RUFIP, CBE and

Cooperatives Agency.

Weds 27 th Sept Socio economist travels to Jimma Team leader to Jimma, Coops Specialist and

Credit Specialist to Arba Minch with Expert

Thurs 28 th Sept

Fri 29 th Sept

Sat 30 th Sept

Team leader and Socio-economist in

Kafa Zone. Discussions with Zonal

officials. Visits to Gimbo, Bita and

Decha Woredas. Visit to Gojeb-Argoba

road. Visit to BSF component in Bita

Woreda. Meeting with SUPAKS (now

KDP) CTA. Travel to Jimma.

from Cooperatives Promotion office.

Coops and Credit Specialists to Gamo Gofa

Zonal offices, and Arba Minch Zuria, Chencha

and Boreda Woreda offices. Meetings with

cooperatives in all three woredas.

Sun 1 st Oct Team leader and Socio-economist to

Sodo.

Coops and Credit Specialists to Sodo.

Debriefing for all team members, and planning of remaining fieldwork

Mon 2 nd Oct

Tues 3 rd Team leader and Socio-economist to Coops and Credit Specialists to Damot Weyde

Oct Wolayta Zonal offices, Ofa Woreda, BSF and Sodo Zuria Woredas, and visiting

water supply component and Mure

Health Post. Visit to Sodo RTC.

Drafting of Aide Memoire. Travel to

Awassa.

cooperatives. Travel to Awassa.

Weds 4 th Oct

Thurs 5 th Oct

Fri 6 th Completion of Aide Memoire and despatch to IFAD. Meetings with SNNPR Government

Oct

officials and other stakeholders. Drafting of Working Papers.

Sat 7 th Oct

Sun 8 th Preparation of presentations and final arrangements for wrap-up meetings. Meetings with

Oct other key informants.

Mon 9 th Oct Wrap-up meeting for SNNPR Government and other Awassa-based stakeholders. Travel to

Addis Ababa.

Tues 10 th Oct Wrap-up meeting for wider membership of core learning partnership, Addis Ababa. Final

team meeting.

Weds 11 th Oct Team disperses, team leader to UK.


Organisations and Individuals Interviewed

69

APPENDIX 7

Organisation Name and Position

Federal and national level

MoFED Ato Fisseha, Director

MoFED Ato Degene Demissie, International Financial Institutions

Commercial Bank of Ethiopia Ato Simon Assefa, Manager SME & Agricultural Loan Division

Ethiopian Cooperatives Agency Ato Bedru Dedgeba Ejabo, Deputy General Director

IFAD Ato Abebe, Field Presence

AEMFI Dr Wolday, Founding Director

RUFIP Ato Bahiru Haile, Manager Programme Coordination Office

RUFIP Ato Gedion Mekonnen, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer

ACDI/VOCA Wzo Brutawit Davit Abdi, Country Representative

ACDI/VOCA Ato Hine Hassenu, Head Programme Support Section

ACDI/VOCA Ms Elizabeth Farmer, Ethiopia Programme Officer

Southern Region Government

PCU Ato Shimekit Gebretsadik

BOFED Ato Berigude Bancha Bagaje, Head

Ato Mamo Ketti, Dept. Head

Ato Legesse Hailemariam, PR Expert

Ato Zemenu Gebre, Development Cooperative Expert

Ato Shimekit Gebretsadik, PCU Coordinator

Ato Demissie Gebre, Dept. Head

Ato Alemu Belega, Team Leader

Bureau of Agriculture & Rural Development Ato Altaye Aboret, Head, Planning and Civil Service Department

Cooperative Promotion Sector Ato Birhanu Assfaw, Expert

Cooperative Registration and Legal Affairs Ato Woldegiorgis Demore, Team Leader

Cooperative Promotion Department (CPD) Ato Daniel Alemayehu, Acting Head

Ato Daniel Tewolde, Saving & Credit Expert

Rural Women Affairs Wzo. Belaynesh, Team leader

Ato Fekadu Tadesse, Expert

Ato Sisay, Expert

Bureau of Water Resources Ato Menu Abas, Coordinator

Bureau of Health Ato Demissie Bubamo, Environmental Health Team Leader

Rural Roads Authority Petros Gordano, Planning and Programme Department Head

Rural Roads Authority Ato Sisay Belachew Tadesse, Head, Road Maintenance Division

Regional Institutions

OMFI Ato Worku, Acting Head

OMFI Ato Worku G./Yohanes, Manager, Planning & Marketing,

Research Department

OMFI Ato Tamirayehu Meshesha, Auditor, Arba Minch Branch

Rural Finance Service Fund (RFSF) Ato Mathewos Rika, Head

RUFIP Ato Maru Argaw Unit Head, Rural Finance Intermediation

Programme, Awassa

Gamo Gofa Zone

Zonal Government Ato Feleke Meka, Cooperative Promotion Coordinator

Arbaminch Zuria Woreda Cooperative Promotion

& Input Desk

Ato Alemayehu Gezahegn, Representative

Arbaminch Zuria Woreda Omo Micro Finance

Institute

Ato Tamirayehu Mersha, Auditor & Acting Head

Kola Dega Shara SC Ato Manaye Dercha, Accountant

Chencha Woreda Cooperative Promotion & Input Ato Yissak Lema, Cooperative Training Expert

Desk

Ato Demissie Gebre, Input Loan Expert


Eazo Multi-purpose service cooperative Ato Balango Bassa, Vice Chairman

Ato Banga Bale, Secretary

Gaga Gocha Multi-purpose service cooperative Ato Alemayehu Bassaye, Chairman

Ato Gauta Zema, Committee Member

Assistant Vet, Chencha woreda Ato Dagmawi Mammo

Acting Cooperative Head, Boreda woreda Ato Mateos Meskey

Cooperative Organizer, Boreda woreda Ato Tika Wantela

Cooperative Training expert, Chencha Woreda Ato Yishak Lemma

Cooperative Loan expert, Chencha Woreda Ato Demissie Gebru

Cooperative Loan Expert, Chencha Woreda Ato Lamrot Kassaye

Cooperative Team Leader, Arba Minch Zuria

Woreda

Ato Alemayehu Gezahegn

Welayta Zone

Zonal Government Ato Gebru Gebre Meskel, Cooperative Expert

Zonal Government Ato Badi Jebessa, Animal and Fisheries Resources Department

Expert

Zonal Government Ato Surafe Seifu, Cooperative Team Leader

Zonal Government Ato Dessalegn Dache, Water Resources Development Office Head

Zonal Government Ato Melkam Tadesse, Agriculture/Rural Development head

Zonal Government Elfnesh Adey CDC Coordinator

Sodo RTC Principal

Sodo RTC SOCODEP Focal Point Officer

Wolaita Zuria Woreda Cooperative Promotion & Ato Petros Dinase, Representative

Input Desk

Ato Wube Gejerso, Input Expert

Damote Woyde Woreda Cooperative Promotion Ato Nega Alemu, Head

& Input Desk

Ato Aklilu, Expert

Girara Multi-purpose service cooperative Ato Tadele Getena, SC Member

Ato Matiwos Zema, SC Member & Guard

Sake Multi-purpose service cooperative Ato Geletu Mega, Secretary for Control Committee

Wachiga Multi-purpose service cooperative Ato Lera Kobote Ex-Chairman (Now Kebele Chairman)

Ato Mena Afamo, SC Member

Kokate Multi-purpose service cooperative Ato Bogale Shiferaw, Accountant

Ofa Woreda Ato Yacob Kaba, Cooperatives Desk

Ofa Woreda Ato Bereket Bekele, Cooperatives Expert

Yakima Cooperative Ato Mamo Tanga, Chair, and Members

Mure Health Post Ato Fisseha Solomon, Nurse

Kaffa Zone

Zonal Government Ato Teshager Semerab, Expert in Animal Health, Kefa Zone

Zonal Government Ato Tashome Mamu, Expert, Cooperatives Desk

Zonal Government Ato Negalign Berhanu, Head Health Department

Zonal Government Ato Meseret Adeko, Head, Water Resources Department

Gimbo Woreda Ato Alemayu Adare, Cooperatives Accountant

Gimbo Woreda Ato Adamsu Tekolla, Assistant Veterinarian

Argoba Cooperative Members

Decha Woreda Ato Fokaru Mohammed, Cooperatives Expert

Baha Cooperative Exec Committee and members

Chena Woreda Ato Girma Giji, Animal Health Technician

Chena Woreda Ato Tefere Agzo, Cooperatives Team Leader

Chena Woreda Ato Kassahun Gezaw, Acting Head, Water Office

Chena Cooperative Members

Chena Woreda Ato Geramo Takele, Head, Health Office

KDP (formerly SUPAKS) Mr Gerard Kiers, Chief Technical Adviser

Derashe Special Woreda

Animal Health Team Leader, Derashe Woreda Mekonnen Tilahun

Cooperative Team Leader, Derashe Woreda Birru Simalew

70


External PCR Team (met in May 2006)

IFAD Phillips Young, Team Leader

IFAD Miriam Cherogony, Rural Finance Specialist

IFAD Fatima Mohammed Ali, Health Specialist

IFAD Carl Lachat, Nutrition Specialist

Participants at Wrap-up Workshops

Awassa Workshop

OMFI Ato Worku Gebre Yohannes, Planning & business Development

Manager

Southern Region Roads Authority Ato Petros Godana, Planning and Programming Head

CPAIS Ato Berhanu Asfaw, Cooperatives Promotion Expert

CPAIS Ato Daniel Alemayehu, Cooperatives Promotion department Head

CPAIS Ato Wolde Giorgis Dimore, Cooperatives Regulatory and Legal

Affairs Department Head

Regional Veterinary Team Ato Sisay Kifle

Rural Womens Affairs Team Ato Fekadu Tadesse, Rural Women’s Expert

Water Resources Bureau Ato Menu Abas, Coordinator

BOFED Ato Mamo Ketti, Head NGOs and Development Cooperation

Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Wzo Belaynesh Gelaye

Development

SOCODEP/BSF Ato Shimekit G/Tsadick, Project Coordinator

SRA Ato Shemsu Shafi, General Manager

Addis Ababa Workshop

CHF Ms Leslie Gardiner, Program Advisor and Liaison Officer

ECA Ato Bedru Dedgeba Ejabo, Deputy General Director

71


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73

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baseline survey report and Reference for monitoring and evaluation). August 1999.

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook – Ethiopia, 2005.

FAO, Alemayeju Mengistu, Country Pasture/Forage Resource Profiles, Ethiopia, July 2003.

FAO, Land and Water Division, AQUASTAT, Irrigation in Africa in figures, AQUASTAT Survey

2005.

IFAD (1993) Ethiopia Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project (SOCODEP)

Appraisal Report Volume 1: Main Report & Annexes. Report No. 0498-ET, October 1993.

IFAD (1993) Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Board on a Proposed

Loan to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the Southern Region Cooperatives

Development and Credit Project including a Proposed Loan under the Special Programme for

Sub-Saharan African Countries Affected by Drought and Desertification. EB

93/50/R.82/Rev.1, September 1993.

IFAD (1994) Loan Agreement (Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project)

between Ethiopia and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Loan No. 342-ET,

01 February 1994.

IFAD (1994) Loan Agreement (Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project)

between Ethiopia and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Loan No. SRS-37-

ET, 01 February 1994.

IFAD (1997) Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Southern Region Cooperatives Development

and Credit Project (SOCODEP). Mid-term Review Report, 0722-ET, March 1997.

IFAD (1998) Financing Agreement (Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project –

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