International Relations in the Twenty-First Century - Krieger School ...

International Relations in the Twenty-First Century - Krieger School ...

Sigma Iota Rho

Undergraduate International Relations Research Journal

The New Diplomat:

International Relations in the

Twenty-First Century

Highlights of Spring 2011


Politics and Policy

Pages 2 - 6

Issues in



Pages 6-12

T he J ohns H opkins U niversity


The Middle East

Pages 12-17 Pages 18-19

Beltway Politics and

American Ideals

Volume 1 Issue 1

Political and


Relations Theory

Pages 19-22

New Diplomat

Staff 2011-2012

Editors-in-Chief: Mark Brennan & Jillian Martynec

Senior Editors: Prateik Dalmia, Josh Fordin, Alyssa Forster, Hannah Holliday, Patrick Lynch, & Anisha Singh

Statement of Intent

The New Diplomat serves as a forum for undergraduates interested in international relations to exchange and distribute

ideas. The journal is a synthesis of all varieties of academic and intellectual thought related to international relations. The

Journal is affiliated with the JHU Internationl Studies Honor Soceity, Sigma Iota Rho. Additionally, the New Diplomat is

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An Empire of Waste: How American Environmental Imperialism is Trashing Our Planet

Emma Huvos

Political Science

Class of 2013

The Anthropocene: A call for 21st century global environmental governance

Nigel Lewis

International Studies

Class of 2012

Brazilian Amazonian Genocide and Economic Solutions

Maura Coughlin

International Studies, Economics

Class of 2011

The Rise of American Unilateral Hegemony as a Guide for the Evolution of China as a

Global Power

Brian Diederich

International Studies

Class of 2012

U.S. Foreign Aid and Objectives Do Not Promote Middle Eastern Democracy

Nicole Salter

International Studies

Class of 2012

The Druze: Survival Without Nationhood

Evan Fowler

International Studies

Class of 2013

The American Dream: One Size Fits All

Maxi Gumprecht

International Studies and East Asian Studies

Class of 2012

Dangerous Games: Does Realism Accurately Explain Conflicts in the Nuclear Age?

Philippe Mauger

International Studies & Mathematics

Class of 2013

Pages 2-4

Pages 4-6

Pages 6-9

Pages 9-12

Pages 12-13

Pages 13-17

Pages 18-19

Pages 19-22

Page 1

EnvironmEntal and EnErgy SEcurity

An Empire of Waste:

How American Environmental Imperialism is Trashing Our Planet

Emma Huvos, Political Science, Class of 2013

When it comes to levels of consumption

and the production of waste, the United States

is unequivocally a world leader. A 2008 study

showed that people living in the United States

consume resources and produce waste at an

average rate that is 32 times higher than the rate

in the developing world. 1 To frame that another

way, Americans produce more waste –over 1,500

pounds per person per year—than people in any

other country in the world. 2 Such astronomical

rates of consumption and waste production

have a profoundly negative impact on the environment,

yet consumption and production

levels continue to rise, largely unchecked, in the

United States. Wolfgang Sachs writes, “infinite

growth…is based on self-delusion, because the

world is a closed space, finite, and of limited

carrying capacity.” 3 It seems hard to imagine that

such large-scale self-delusion would be possible

in an era where information and knowledge can

be shared around the globe with the click of a

button, and science and technology are advancing

at high speeds. We in the developed world,

however, are so far removed from the reality of

our consumption and waste production patterns

that self-delusion is simple, and infinite growth

seems like a realistic possibility. Globalization

has enabled us to become increasingly distanced

from the consequences of our consumption and

production, and has created a system that encourages

practices of environmental imperialism.

The practice of environmental imperialism,

in which less developed countries must pay

the price for American consumption and waste

production, enables the United States to buy into

the myth of infinite growth. Until the developing

world throws off the chains of the American

Empire of Waste, consumption and waste production

patterns in the United States are unlikely

to change.

Imperialism, as defined in The Dictionary of

Human Geography, is “the creation and maintenance

of an unequal economic, cultural, and

territorial relationship, usually between states

and often in the form of an empire, based on

domination and subordination.” 4 Environmental

imperialism functions in much the same way as

traditional imperialism. The dominant power, in

this case the developed world and more specifically

the United States, creates and maintains an

unequal relationship with the subordinate power,

in this case the developing world, by imposing

the environmental costs of their practices upon

the subordinate power. Although the United

States consumes and produces at a rate exponentially

higher than any developing nation, it is

developing nations that must bear the negative

externalities of American development.

Nowhere is the ideology behind American

environmental imperialism better summed up

than in Lawrence Summers’ 1992 World Bank

memo. Summers, an American economist and

Director of the White House National Economic

Council under President Obama, endorsed the

“migration of the dirty industries to the LDC’s

[less-developed countries],” arguing, “I think

the economic logic behind dumping a load of

toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable.”

Summers bases his view in part on

the idea that because people in less-developed

countries have shorter life spans and lead less

healthy existences than people in more developed

countries, the effects of toxic waste and

pollution on their health are less important. 5 The

idea that the cost effectiveness

of dumping waste in poor areas

outweighs the environmental,

physical, and moral costs is a

guiding tenet of environmental


The roots of today’s problems

of overconsumption and

environmental imperialism can

be traced back to the industrial

revolution. Starting in the

eighteenth century, the industrial

revolution led to widespread advancements

in arenas such as agriculture, manufacturing,

transportation, and technology. Thanks to the

industrial revolution, mass production continues

to become faster, easier, and cheaper, resulting

in increases in both the perceived need for consumption

and in the amount of industrial and

post-consumer waste being produced. Jennifer

Clapp describes garbage as a “twentieth-century

phenomenon” that arose out of various developments

including the rise in use of synthetic materials,

a focus on affordability and convenience

over durability, and the concept of planned

obsolescence. 6 The advances made as a result

of the industrial revolution have spawned an

ongoing movement of ever-increasing production

and consumption that has become deeply

entrenched in American society.

As the amount of waste being produced in the

United States rises, state and federal governments

must scramble to find ways to dispose of

this waste as cheaply and efficiently as possible.

Especially in urban areas, landfills are running

out of space, making it necessary to look farther

afield for waste storage solutions. Americans

with higher education and more financial sway

tend to be successful in keeping waste dumps

out of their neighborhoods, thereby forcing the

waste onto communities without the means to

put up an effective resistance. Clapp notes, “it is

widely recognized that poor neighborhoods and

communities, including those made up largely

of people of color of Native peoples, tend to

be targeted for the siting of landfills and other

toxic activities.” 7

In her TED Talk, “Greening the Ghetto,”

environmental justice advocate Majora Carter

uses the example of her own neighborhood in

the South Bronx to demonstrate that American

economic imperialism exists even within our

nation’s borders. Carter outlines how patterns

of development in the United States, fueled by

“white flight,” real estate redlining, and other

race and class based divisions have led to the

creation of regions of environmental discrimination

in both rural and urban areas across the

country. She emphasizes the myriad health

problems that occur as a result of environmental

injustice and poor land use decisions. In addition

to the toxins that contaminate communities

housing waste sites, people are less likely to be

an active presence in their community if it is not

environmentally safe. This contributes to issues

ranging from obesity due

to lack of exercise and

fresh food availability to

higher crime rates as a

result of deserted outdoor

spaces. Ultimately, American

taxpayers from all

social classes must shoulder

the burden of providing

assistance to those

who are unhealthy and

unemployed as a result of

environmental discrimination. Carter believes

that the solution to these problems lies in “greening

the ghetto” and creating an array of new

“green collar” jobs through which the United

States can benefit both environmentally and economically.

Carter’s views stem from the concept

of environmental justice, which she defines as

the belief that no community should have more

environmental benefits or more environmental

burdens than any other. 8 It is hard to argue with

the logic of this argument, and yet environmental

injustice continues to plague communities across

the United States.

The relocation of consumer consequences

onto the weaker members of society is a clear

example of imperialism: it draws on economic,

cultural, and territorial factors to create and

maintain an unequal relationship between the

powerful and the weak. 9 The United States does

not limit itself to imposing waste and pollution

solely on its own disadvantaged citizens. Thanks

to globalization, new patterns of international

trade have developed which allow the United

States to export waste around the world.

Globalization enables interconnecting

economic, cultural, and knowledge pathways

between countries, but it also facilitates the exporting

of waste to foreign countries. Waste now

travels between nations along the same trade

paths facilitated by the increasing interconnection

of a globalized world. Globalization has the

paradoxical affect of both shortening and lengthening

distances. Advances in transportation and

communication allow us to feel closely linked

with nations around the world. At the same time,

however, the complex international trade patterns

of globalization allow us to take an “out of

sight, out of mind” approach to the byproducts

of our consumption. 10 Jennifer Clapp describes

this process as the “distancing of waste,” a

process with harmful environmental side effects

In her TED Talk, “Greening

the Ghetto,” environmental

justice advocate Majora

Carter uses the example of

her own neighborhood in the

South Bronx to demonstrate

that American economic imperialism

exists even within

our nation’s borders.

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that “occurs when key decision makers- producers

and consumers- are separated from the

decisions that directly lead to the generation and

disposal of waste.” 11 The distancing of waste occurs

at many points throughout the consumption

process. In the United States, industrial waste

created in the production process of consumer

goods is often forgotten because so many of our

goods are imported from other countries. At the

end of the consumer chain, the waste American’s

produce is collected by outside entities and

transported to other areas of the United States

or even to foreign countries. Americans have

no tangible link to the negative externalities of

their consumption, and thus have the freedom to

ignore the severe consequences associated with

such rampant overconsumption.

American environmental imperialism

wraps around the globe, impacting developing

nations on practically every continent. The

United States is currently shipping vast amounts

of its “recyclables” oversees to nations where

the environmental and health safety protocols

surrounding the recycling process are far less

stringent. Studies show that as much as 80%

of “recycled” electronic waste in the United

States is actually shipped to other countries for

processing. 12 This practice enables the United

States to save a significant amount of money

on disposal processes that could otherwise be

extremely expensive. When recycling occurs

without proper guidelines and oversight, however,

the environmental and health risks are

massive. One of the most dangerous types of

recycling currently being exported is electronic

waste. Televisions, computers, and other pieces

of electronic equipment contain a wide variety

of dangerous materials including lead, mercury,

and cadmium. The toxic components of these

electronics take a severe toll on the local environment

as well as on the health of the workers

who engage in small-scale, hands-on recycling.

The developing world’s most vulnerable citizens

tend to be those who take on the biggest risks

in the international waste trade. The process of

shipping hazardous recyclables “exploits women

and child laborers who cook circuit boards, burn

cables, and submerge equipment in toxic acids

to extract precious metals such as copper.” 13 The

danger to children is especially high, since their

bodies are still developing and are thus more directly

affected by toxic materials. In

addition to the long-term environmental

and health costs associated

with such poorly regulated recycling

processes, there is another, more

short-term risk associated with this


The Frontline World film

“Ghana: Digital Dumping Ground”

highlighted another, unforeseen, risk of environmental

imperialism. Large amounts of American

“e-waste,” including hundreds of thousands

of discarded hard drives, are shipped in bulk

to Ghana for recycling. Ghana has come to be

recognized as a hotbed for international cyber

crime, and the vast majority of hard drives arriving

in the country have not been properly destroyed

so as to prevent the theft of personal information.

Thieves can purchase American hard

drives and gain easy access to financial records

as well as information that could be used for

identity theft or other scams. The United States’

dirty, exploitative empire is exposing us to risk

on a number of levels. The situation in Ghana

shows that developing countries have learned

how to capitalize on environmental injustice at

the expense of the United States. 14

Putting an end to the international elec-

tronic and hazardous waste trade

will be a lengthy and challenging

process. The United States shows

little interest in shouldering the financial,

environmental, and physical

health burdens of their waste,

and has blatantly skirted international

measures designed to reign

in the problems of waste exportation.

In 1992, the Basel Convention

on the Control of Transboundary Movements

of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal

was launched with support from countries

around the world. The United States is currently

the only developed country that has not ratified

the Basel Convention, and the Basel Action

Network (BAN) notes, “while the United States

talks a good talk about the principle of Environmental

Justice at home for its own population,

they work actively on the global stage in direct

opposition to it.” 15 The United States’ actions

in regard to the Basel Convention speak just

as loudly about environmental imperialism as

Lawrence Summers’ World Bank memo. As

long as wealthy, white Americans are not suffering

the negative effects of their consumption

habits, the United States apparently feels no

need to change any of its practices.

Equally disturbingly, many developing

nations actually welcome the hazardous waste

trade as a means of advancing their own global

economic position. In the film, a waste trade

broker in Asia explains that engaging in the

waste trade is a necessary step on the path to

development. He views the risks associated

with the trade almost as dues that developing

nations must pay before they are eligible to join

the ranks of the developed world, commenting

“sometimes you have to sacrifice something

to get something.” 16 For many poor people in

developing nations, the waste trade is the only

available way to earn a living. By scavenging

bits of metal from old electronics, or reselling

equipment that still works, they can earn just

enough to survive. Others welcome the availability

of second hand electronics in regions

where such technology is

a rarity. Although some

developing countries,

such as Indonesia, have

taken steps to ban the

import of foreign waste,

there are countless others

that have not. 17 As the

amount of waste being produced continues to

grow, the risks facing underprivileged people in

developing countries grow as well.

Wolfgang Sachs describes the vicious cycle we

have fallen into as a result of the global fixation

on “development” and economic success, writing,

“this overruling imperative drives developing

countries further into self-exploitation,

for the sake of boosting exports, and industrial

countries father into the wasteful and destructive

mania of accelerated production, for the

sake of protecting their markets.” 18 The diffu-

American environmental

imperialism wraps around

the globe, impacting developing

nations on practically

every continent.

1 Jared Diamond, “What’s Your Consumption Factor?” The New York Times, January 2,

2008, accessed March 14, 2011,


2 Jennifer Clapp, “The Distancing of Waste: Overconsumption in a Global Economy,” in Thomas

Princen, Michael Maniates & Ken Conca, Eds., Confronting Consumption, Boston: Massachu-

sion of Western values such as unlimited production,

consumption, and free market economic

growth has created a global system that nurtures

environmental imperialism. The American “Empire

of Waste” is growing vaster each day, but,

like every imperial empire before, it is destined

to fall. History has demonstrated time and again

that even the largest, strongest imperial powers

eventually collapse.

American environmental

imperialism is not

sustainable, and it will

not last forever. While it

is impossible to predict

when the empire will

disintegrate, a variety

of recent events can be

viewed as signs that

change is coming. Grassroots environmental

movements are gaining strength, and environmental

awareness is spreading, spurred by the

increasingly obvious effects of climate change.

From a political standpoint, the recent uprisings

in the Middle East and North Africa have

demonstrated that long-oppressed populations

are finding their voices and standing up to their

oppressors, and it is quite possible that these

movements will spread to people oppressed by

the developed world’s practices of environmental

imperialism. The question, therefore, is not

whether or not environmental imperialism will

collapse, but how the developed world will adapt

to that change.

The United States now has two options: wait

until a massive uprising or catastrophic environmental

event puts a sudden end to current

consumption and waste production practices, or

work proactively to find solutions before it is too

late. If America waits to change until its hand

is forced, the results are likely to be detrimental

to both environmental and economic wellbeing.

If the United States acts now, however, and

voluntarily dismantles its Empire of Waste, the

benefits will be tremendous. The sooner we act,

the more environmental damage we can prevent,

a choice that will have long-term positive implications

for the entire planet. From a financial

standpoint, it is equally important to take rapid

action. Society is now entering into a “second

industrial revolution” marked by the development

of green technologies such as solar and

wind power. China is already well ahead of the

United States in capitalizing on these opportunities.

It is important to act now and find sustainable,

environmentally friendly, and profitable

solutions to the problems of overconsumption

and waste overproduction.

The United States is in a state of denial.

Current production and consumption patterns are

drawing on resources that do not exist, creating

a deficit that jeopardizes the future of our planet.

The harmful byproducts of this production and

consumption are being exported to the developing

world through the unsustainable practices of

environmental imperialism. Changes need to be

made, and it is the responsibility of the global

community to ensure that they are made sooner

rather than later. Until the United States begins

to hold itself accountable for its waste, levels of

consumption and waste production will continue

to rise unchecked, causing potentially irreparable

damage to the environment.

The United States now

has two options: wait until

a massive uprising or

catastrophic environmental

event puts a sudden end to

current consumption... or

work proactively.

setts Institute of Technology, 2002, 160.

3 Wolfgang Sachs, The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as

Power, London: Zed Books, 2010, 25.

4 R.J. Johnston, Ed., The Dictionary of Human Geography, Oxford: Blackwell

Publishing Ltd., 2000, 375.

Page 3

5 David Harvey, “The Environment of Justice,” in Frank Fisher and Maarten A. Hajer, Living

With Nature: Environmental Politics as Cultural Discourse, Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1999, 153.

6 Clapp, in Confronting Consumption, 159-161

7 Clapp, in Confronting Consumption, 164.

8 Majora Carter, “Greening the Ghetto,” TED Talk, 2006.

9 Johnston, 375.

10 Ken Conca and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Eds., Green Planet Blues: Four Decades of

Global Environmental Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010) 59.

11 Clapp, in Confronting Consumption, 157.

12 The Basel Action Network, Exporting Harm: The High-Tech Trashing of Asia

(2002) 4

13 Charles W. Schmidt, “Unfair Trade e-Waste in Africa,” Environmental Health

Perspectives (Volume 114, Number 4, April 2006, A232-A235) A234.

14 Frontline World, “Ghana: Digital Dumping Ground.”

15 The Basel Action Network, 28-29.

16 Frontline World, “Ghana: Digital Dumping Ground.”

17 Clapp, in Confronting Consumption, 165.

18 Sachs, 117.

The Anthropocene:

A Call for Twenty-First Century Global Environmental Governance

Nigel Lewis, International Studies, Class of 2012

Climate change is a global phenomenon.

Its effects are not limited to a specific locale,

country, or, region, but rather, they have international

ramifications. As Wolfgang Sachs

states best, “local acts such as driving a car or

clearing a forest add up, when multiplied, to

global imbalances. They turn beneficial cycles

into vicious ones that undermine the reliability

of nature.” 1 Sachs’ assertion could not be more

pertinent today because over time, nature has

become idiosyncratic. This suggests that these

“global imbalances” actually exist. Using a

similar argument made by Paul Crutzen, the

objective of this paper is to demonstrate that we

are living “we are in the Anthropocene;” 2 the

Anthropocene characterizes the past 200 years

in which human behavior has drastically altered

planetary processes - or in Sachs’ language,

caused “global imbalances” in planetary functions.

I will argue the following:

1. Greenhouse gas (carbon dioxide, nitrous

oxide, and methane) emission rates, as well

as periodic reversals in winds and ocean

currents in the equatorial Pacific Ocean – i.e.

El Niño – both reinforce that we are in the


2. Recognizing the Anthropocene is important

for global security. Increased global warming

is projected to amplify environmental

disasters, thereby forcing migration and

fostering conflict;

3. Regime-based global environmental governance

is unable to cope with and combat the

challenges brought on by the Anthropocene/

climate change. Given these circumstances,

I posit that we need to establish a new doctrine

for global environmental governance

though civil society organizations. For this

essay, I define civil society organizations as

forums in which individuals with a shared

set of concerns convene to better the environment.

Moreover, I assume that these

groups contain proactive individuals who

want to protect the environment in order to

safeguard their future.

Present levels of greenhouse gases in the

atmosphere indicate that human behavior has

driven and will continue to drive global warming.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change’s (IPCC) “Forth Assessment Report:

Climate Change 2007” confirms this trend by

contrasting pre-industrial concentrations (i.e.

levels before 1750) of carbon dioxide, methane,

and nitrous oxide with those today. Through ice

core analysis, the report found that worldwide

atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations have

increased from a pre-industrial value of about

280 ppm to 390 ppm,” due in large part to fossil

fuel use. 3 Similarly, methane has risen from its

pre-industrial level of approximately 715 ppb to

1774 ppb in 2005 due to “anthropogenic activities,

predominantly agriculture and fossil fuel

use.” 4 Lastly, nitrous oxide has increased to 319

ppb in 2005 from about 270 ppb before 1750

because of agricultural activity. Collectively,

augmentations in greenhouse gases’ concentrations

lead to global warming. Greenhouse

gases cause infrared radiation emitted by the

sun to linger in the atmosphere, raising global

temperatures. Given current concentrations of

greenhouse gases, the IPPC projects that temperatures

will rise from 2°C to 6°C over the

next century. 5 Even if greenhouse gases levels

were to stabilize, global warming would persist

for centuries due to the time scales associated

with climate processes and feedbacks.” 6 These

findings stress that human activity has provided

a platform for continued global warming, meaning

that erratic weather patterns like El Niño

will carry on.

Since the 1970s, El Niño has been

occurring more frequently and with greater

damaging impact as a result of anthropogenicinduced

global warming. 7 In With Speed and

Violence: Why Scientists Fear Tipping Points

in Climate Change, Fred Pearce reminds us

that El Niño has gone from occurring every six

years between the mid-19 th and late 20 th centuries,

to now happening every three and a half

years from the mid-1970s onwards. As a result,

we have seen more global natural disasters.

1982 saw “the most severe El Niño of the 20 th

century.” 8 1998 – “the warmest of the twentieth

century, perhaps of the millennium” – was

a year of acute El Niño. 9, Some of the impacts

include rampant forest fires in Europe and the

Americas, extreme floods in Eastern Africa,

and ice storms throughout the US and Canada.

More recently, there were two El Niños in 2002

and 2004. We can attribute El Niño’s regularity

in recent years to global warming caused

by human activity. As Kevin Trenberth, head

of climate analysis at the National Center for

Atomic Research, has demonstrated, since the

late 1970s humans have caused global temperatures

to increase, thus accounting for “the recent

spate of strong and frequent El Niños.” 10 Trenberth

notes that El Niños are no longer able to

distribute heat normally nor “handle the amount

of energy in the system”. 11 Thousands of years

ago, El Niño operated according to changes in

the tropical hydrological cycle and not humaninduced

climate change. 12 The fact that El Niños

over the past 30 years are attributed in large part

to human-induced global warming suggests that

humanity has had a detrimental impact on the

environment. Thus far, we have firmly established

that human behavior has had acute repercussions

on the environment, and now we will

move on to see why Paul Crutzen is correct in

saying “we are in the Anthropocene.” 13

The increased levels of atmospheric

greenhouse gases in the post-industrial era,

coupled with persistent and forceful occurrences

of El Niño both illustrate that indeed, “we are

in the Anthropocene.” 14 The Anthropocene is

defined as “the past two centuries or so, during

which human activities are seen to have dominated

some key planetary processes,” including,

but not limited to, climate systems. Also,

intrinsic to Anthropocene is the idea that “abrupt

[climate] change seems to be the norm, not the

exception,” meaning that extreme weather patterns

and events are not idiosyncratic, but rather

defining aspects of our present climate system. 15

Regarding the former, it is evident that our

anthropocentric behavior has impaired global

temperature mechanisms. Since 1750, there

have been higher atmospheric greenhouse gas

concentrations, resulting in higher atmospheric

temperatures and, more intense and frequent El

Niños. In addition, our actions have dominated

climate systems to both the point where global

warming would continue even if greenhouse gas

levels were to stabilize and to the extreme in

which El Niño is neither able to distribute heat

normally nor “handle the amount of energy in

the system”. 16 Concerning the latter, recent El

Niño episodes are indicative of abrupt climate

change becoming the norm. As we demonstrated

above, global warming factors into “the recent

spate of strong and frequent El Niños, and

given that El Niño has gone from taking place

about every six years to now every three and a

half years, this indicates that global warming is

normalizing itself. With today’s weather patterns

reflecting intensified climate change, recognizing

that we are living in the Anthropocene is important

because it impacts global security. We will

examine this causality in two parts, first explaining

that environmental catastrophes can force

migration, and ultimately lead to conflict. Using

this explanation, I will then argue that one can

see more conflict because continued anthropocentrically

caused climate change would prompt

more environmental disasters, leading to additional

migration and more conflict.

Extenuating environmental circumstanc-

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es oblige people to resettle elsewhere, and this

forced migration can lead to conflict in the absorbing

area. 17 To date, problems with freshwater

availability, weather-related natural disasters,

and land degradation, amongst other factors,

have triggered migration. Rafael Reuveny demonstrates

this in his article, “Climate change-induced

migration and violent conflict,” in which

he examines 38 cases of environmental migration

across Africa, Asia, Latin America, North

America, and Russia. To cite an example, since

the 1950s, Bangladesh has experienced constant

floods, storms, and droughts, and consequently,

between 12 and 17 million Bangladeshis have

migrated intrastate or out-of-state to countries

like India. 18 Similarly, in Ethiopia between 1984-

1985, approximately 600,000 Ethiopians were

forced to move from both north-central Ethiopia

and the Awash River basin to (south)west

Ethiopia and the Wollo Region. Environmental

factors such as droughts, famine, and forest fires

led to this forced relocation. 19 Also, in Haiti from

the 1970s to the 1990s, deforestation, erosion,

land scarcity, and land degradation compelled

about 1.3 million Haitians to move to the Dominican

Republic and the United States. 20 In all

three cases, the migration fostered conflict in

the absorbing areas. The arrival of Bangladeshi

environmental migrants in India has caused ethnic

tensions between the Bangladeshis and local

“Amidst the wailing sirens of the rescue operations undertaken in the name of some life-

boat ethics, the pressure on peoples and countries to conform to an emergency discipline

will be high.” – Wolfgang Sachs

residents, ultimately resulting in an insurgency

during the 1980s and 1990s. In Ethiopia, there

were disputes between the migrants and farmers

in the absorbing areas over land, and in the

Haitian example, the migration led to civil unrest

and urban violence in the Dominican Republic

and the United States. Ultimately, Reuveny finds

that “environmental migration is pushed by several

environmental factors acting concurrently,”

as seen with, for example, 27 cases of land degradation,

17 cases of deforestation, 15 cases of

water scarcity, 7 cases of storms, and 9 cases of

floods. 21 Given that we are in the Anthropocene

and that global warming will persist, it seems

inevitable that climate change would intensify

these environmental factors and would further

perpetuate climate change-related migration.

Climate change is projected to intensify

migration in the future. In the 2006 Stern

Review on the Economics of Climate Change,

economist Nicholas Stern posits, “the melting

or collapse of ice sheets would raise sea levels

and eventually threaten at least 4 million Km 2 of

land, which today is home to 5% of the world’s

population.” 22 The IPCC confirm these findings

in stating that snow cover and glacier losses are

likely to intensify in the future, thereby “reducing

water availability, hydropower potential, and

changing seasonality of flows in regions supplied

by meltwater from major mountain ranges

(e.g. Hindu-Kush, Himalaya, Andes), where

more than one-sixth of the world population currently

lives.” 23 Consequently, these projections

would place about 200 million people globally

at increased risk of facing climate-change induced

forced migration. 24 With more migration

to come with future climate change, increased

conflict seems inevitable. Taking into account

all that I have argued thus far regarding climate

change, the Anthropocene, climate changeinduced

migration and conflict, it is imperative

that we have international environmental

legislation and governance that are able to meet

today’s challenges.

In the past 40 years, global environmental

regimes and laws – i.e. environmental governance

– has evolved to reflect changes in social,

political, economic, cultural, and environmental

norms. We observe these changes between the

1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment,

held in Sweden, the 1992 UN Conference

on the Human Environment, and the 2002

World Summit on Sustainable Development,

held in South Africa. Over this time, almost all

governments have established national environmental

bureaus, the scientific community

has better understood climate change, and more

than 1,000 international environmental cooperative

accords, agreements, and treaties have been

ratified and taken effect. 25 Although international

environmental governance has been

able to adapt with time, the ability of today’s

international environmental regimes’ ability to

combat climate change and its consequences is

limited by sovereignty; this sovereignty grants

states the right to have “decisionmaking auton-

omy over matters falling within their territorial

jurisdiction,” and many states use this right to

solve environmental problems on their own. 26

Global warming, El Niño, climate-change induced

migration and conflict are not constrained

by states’ inability to coordinate at the international

level. If we want to overcome the tension

between solving environmental challenges

and states’ right to sovereignty (henceforth, the

‘ecology-sovereignty’ tension/struggle), we

must take a new approach to global environmental

governance. I propose that we can meet

climate change challenges through global civil

society organizations.

Shifting environmental governance from

international regimes to global civil society networks

is the solution. First, civil society groups

are apolitical. Unlike international regimes, the

actors in civil society schemes are independent

“of the public, state apparatus, the private,

household realm [and] the atomistic market.”

27 As such, this solves the ecology-sovereignty

struggle, and international environmental regimes

could delegate policy making to global

civil society organizations concerning global

warming, El Niño, climate-change induced

migration and conflict. Second, civil society

organizations provide an outlet for improving

human-environment interactions. For example,

Brazilian activist Chico Mendes used civil society

organization to lead initiatives to preserve

the Amazon, resulting in the Brazilian government

overturning its deforestation laws in and

1 Ibid, 117.

2 Fred Pearce, With Speed and Violence: Why Scientists Fear Tipping Points in Climate Change,

Boston: Beacon, 2007, Print, 21.

3 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007, Publication, IPCC Fourth As-

increasing protection of the Amazon. Through

global civil society networks, environmentalists

could help increase public awareness about

climate change and its damaging consequences,

and thus, encourage humans to be environmentally

conscious in their behavior. States and

international regimes do not have an interest

in neither raising environmental consciousness,

nor “describing [the] entire social reality

“ of human-environment relations because they

are preoccupied with the sovereignty issue. 28

Lastly, civil society networks help assure that

large-scale environmental projects improve, and

not degrade, the ecosystem. In examining civil

societal responses to World Bank, Inter-American

Development Bank, and Asian Development

Bank projects, Mark Buntaine confirms that

active civil societies play a critical role in ensuring

that these, and arguably other, multilateral

regimes are held accountable for their actions

and to the highest environmental standards when

executing various environmental plans. 29 In summary,

an international civil society framework is

a viable option for global environmental governance

because it will overcome the sovereignty

challenge and has the capacity to ensure proper

environmental stewardship.

Paul Crutzen is correct: “we are in the Anthropocene.”

30 Over the past few centuries, satisfying

our anthropocentric wants has cost us a healthy

ecosystem and, instead, has produced a positive

feedback loop that fosters climate change.

As a result of emitting ever-increasing levels

of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane,

we have drastically altered our climate system.

Henceforth, global temperatures will continue

rising over the coming centuries. This means

that we will see more of El Niño and its destructive

effects in the future. Moreover, climate

change will amplify environmental disasters.

This will further promulgate forced global migration,

and consequently provide a catalyst for

conflict. Collectively, these impacts underscore

the need to have a global environmental governance

framework capable of taking swift and

bold action to address pressing environmental

issues. As such, the international environmental

governance system should be premised upon

global civil society networks as it 1) overcomes

the limitations with our present state and regimebased

environmental governance apparatus

and 2) facilitates resolving environmental challenges.

Hopefully, this proposed environmental

framework will help reverse the Anthropocene’s

effects and lead us on the road to a an ecosystem

that is not driven by anthropocentric behavior.

However, we must not forget to ask ourselves:

will we ever realize there is a world outside of

anthropocentrism and that we are dependent on

the environent?

sessment Report: Climate Change 2007, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change. Web. 23 Mar. 2011, .; ppm = parts per million.

4 Ibid; ppb = parts per billion.

Page 5

5 Luca Marchiori and Ingmar Schumacher, “When Nature Rebels: International Migration,

Climate Change, and Inequality,” Journal of Population Economics, 24.2 (2011):


6 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007.

7 El Niño is “a periodic reversal of ocean currents, winds, and weather systems that

stretches across the equatorial Pacific Ocean, halfway around the planet at its widest

girth. It is a redistributor of heat and energy in the largest part of the world’s oceans,

which kicks in when the regular circulation systems can no longer cope” See Pearce,


8 Ibid, 191.

9 Ibid, 19.

10 Ibid, 192.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid, 21.

14 Ibid, 21.

15 Ibid, 22.

16 Ibid, 192.

17 The absorbing area refers to the receiving locale hosting migrants that moved for

environmental reasons.

18 Homer-Dixon 1999; Kalbag 1983; and Swain 1996 – See Rafael Reuveny, “Climate

Change-induced Migration and Violent Conflict,” Political Geography, 26.6 (2007):


19 Hafiz and Islam 1993; Lee 2001; Shelley 1992 – See Reuveny, 663.

20 Catanese 1999; Myers 1993; Roper 1996 – see Reuveny, 664.

21 Reuveny, 622.

22 Stern, 56.

23 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007

24 See Stern, Nicholas. “Implications of Climate Change for Development.” Stern Review:

The Economics of Climate Change. New York: Cambridge UP, 2007. 111. The National

Archives - HM Treasury. Web. 24 Mar. 2011. .

25 Ken Conca and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, “Introduction,” Green Planet Blues: Four Decades

of Global Environmental Politics, Boulder, CO: Westview, 2010, Web, 3-7.

26 Conca et al., 57.

27 Conca et al., 62.

28 James C. Scott, “Nature and Space,” Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to

Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven: Yale UP, 1998, Print, 22-23.

29 I draw from Mark Buntaine, whose work I was introduced to at the 2011 International

Studies Association Conference in Montreal. See Mark Buntaine, “Are Multilateral Development

Banks Risk-Averse or Opportunity-Seeking? Evidence from Environmental

Financing Decisions,” Thesis, Duke University, 2011, Print.

30 Pearce, 21.

iSSuES in intErnational dEvElopmEnt

Brazilian Amazonian Genocide and Economic Solutions

Maura Coughlin, International Studies and Economics, Class of 2011

Genocide is an uncomfortably common phenomenon

in the history of mankind. It has taken

place in various forms across every inhabited

continent, evolving throughout the centuries.

Different populations have been targeted by their

oppressors for different reasons and these genocides

have taken place under numerous auspices.

This makes both identification and prosecution

of genocide a difficult feat for the international

community. Debates continue over which groups

of individuals are protected under the sole legal

definition of genocide, the UN Convention on

the Prevention and Punishment of The Crime of

Genocide. In the case of the indigenous populations

of the Brazil, much like native peoples

throughout the rest of the world, even the strictest

reading of genocide definitions includes the

Amerindians as a protected class. The genocide

of the Amazonians has both

historically and contemporaneously

taken form in a

variety of ways and no single

cause could ever realistically

be pinpointed. What appears

clear though is that the push

for the economic development

of the native lands has greatly

encouraged the abuse of indigenous

peoples and their lands

in the name of resource extraction.

These economic forces, in conjunction with

underlying ideas of racial superiority, have led

to both mass physical destruction of indigenous

populations and lands and the nearly complete

dissolution of individual group autonomy.

While no legal proceedings have taken place

against the Brazilian government, this paper

posits that since the colonization of Brazil by the

Portuguese, genocide has occurred against the

indigenous peoples of the Amazon region, as

well as in other parts of the country. Although

early methods of genocide took the form of outright

murder and were often based upon overt

racism, the genocide of Brazilian Amazonians

in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has

been based more upon the disruption of their

way of life and dislocation from their lands,

resulting in mass extinction. While genocide

is often approached from various perspectives,

this paper seeks to explain how basic economic

principles, predominantly the extreme push for

natural resource exploitation and the denial of

respected property rights, have incentivized this

genocide and can be more broadly applied to

genocide of indigenous peoples in many colonial

and neo-colonial settings.

Brazilian Treatment of Natives as Genocide

“genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in

whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

a. Killing members of the group;

b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its

physical destruction in whole or in part;

d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” 1

The definition above, borrowed from the

UN Convention, remains the only legally recognized

definition of the “crime of crimes”. While

this definition is useful in the case of the Brazilian

Amazonians by clearly establishing that

the indigenous populations of the Amazon are

indeed an internationally protected group, its

discussion of the means of genocide is slightly

vague in terms of the modern destruction of the

Amazonians. Historical relations between the

Brazilian state and the indigenous peoples of the

land coincide more clearly with the emphasis the

UN Convention places on physical destruction

of the group. The more subtle genocide of the

Amazonians, however, is better understood as a

combination of physical destruction of resources

and destruction of group autonomy and culture.

For the sake of this paper, a broader definition of

genocide will be implemented. As such, genocide

will be viewed as Raphael Lemkin described it

in terms of both the “destruction of the national

pattern of the oppressed group” and “the imposition

of the national pattern of the oppressor” on

the victimized group or the previously occupied

territory. 2

Beginning with the Conquistadores, the

indigenous lands of Central

and South America were encountered

with an intent “not

to discover…but to possess in

entirety the lands which previously

had been enjoyed by the

native populations and to alter

radically, indeed irreversibly,

their usage in ways which

suited the incomers’ own quite

different economic and cultural

requirements.” 3 Since

then, massive numbers of indigenous peoples

have been wiped out in the name of the “development”

of the lands and the Brazilian economy.

While numbers vary, it is estimated that in 1500

there were roughly 5 million indigenous inhabitants

in modern day Brazil, but by the year 2000,

that number had dropped to a mere 350,000.

Within that destruction, around 500 ethnic popu-

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lations were completely eliminated. In recent

decades, the population of Indigenous Brazilians

has remarkably been growing, despite continued

mistreatment. It is unlikely, however, that

populations will ever approach original levels. 4

While the treatment of natives by the Brazilian

state and population has become less outwardly

violent, much of the same attitudes towards

indigenous rights remain in practice, making this

increase in population even more impressive.

In order for such a drastic decline in the

population of the indigenous Brazilians to be

deemed genocide, there is required to be a genocidal

intent on the part of the perpetrators, in this

case the Brazilian government. In September

1910, the Brazilian government founded the

Indian Protection Service (SPI), replaced in December

1967 by the National Indian Foundation

(FUNAI). 5 Both bodies, charged with managing

indigenous relations and protection were eventually

plagued by accounts of abuse of power

and indigenous peoples. Although government

policy did not explicitly seek to exterminate the

indigenous people of the land, economic policies

have brought about the complete disruption

and endangerment of indigenous survival

within the region. Moreover, the fatal outcomes

of these economic policies were both logically

foreseeable and proven in practice. Nonetheless,

the Brazilian government continued to allow

such development projects to reduce the indigenous

populations and even encouraged it with

economic incentives for cattle ranchers despite

the known consequences of such ranching

expansion. 6 Other development projects, such

as hydroelectric projects, clearly required the

complete displacement of numerous indigenous

groups, and in at least one instance, the government

agency of FUNAI actively expelled all

medical workers helping indigenous people cope

with newly introduced diseases from a region of

development, knowingly increasing the risk of

death. 7

Under the definition of genocide adopted in

this paper, it is not just the physical destruction

of the indigenous peoples for which the Brazilian

government is either directly responsible or

complicit, but also the destruction of national

autonomy. As such, where the government’s

goals did not dictate the extermination of the

indigenous populations, its policies required

the destruction of their political and economic

autonomy. 8 General Ismarth de Araújo Oliveira,

former president of FUNAI even conceded that

“it is impossible to stop the process of development

of the country with the argument that

Indians should be protected”. 9 The governmental

organization charged with the protection of the

indigenous population itself put native protection

second to economic progress. This led another

former FUNAI president, Antonio Cotrim

Soares, to resign when he no longer could stand

“to contribute to the enrichment of economic

groups at the cost of the extinction of primitive

cultures”. 10 It was a well-known fact among

government officials that economic policies of

Brazil were being executed at the cost of the

indigenous peoples.

Such treatment of native peoples, malicious

at times and negligent at others, has occurred

throughout all of Brazil. The focus of this paper

is simply on those natives within the Amazonia

region, as this population continues to face new

threats as the Amazon undergoes development

projects as one of the few remaining frontier

regions. Brazilian Amazonia is the single largest

continuous area of tropical forest in the world,

despite its record of depletion. 11 By 1990, 9.6%

of the Amazon had been cleared. 12 While presently

much attention is paid to the environmental

costs incurred by the destruction of the rain

forest, these destroyed lands also represent a

disruption of territorial inhabitation and boundaries

among numerous native groups. Early

colonial relations mark a complete disregard for

the well being of native populations, despite the

fact that as early as 6 June 1755, the Portuguese

crown formally named natives as free citizens,

to be self governed and socially equal to the

settlers. 13

Economic Development as Genocide: Comparative

Advantage, Property Rights, and

Public Goods

While more has been and currently is at

play in the physical and cultural destruction of

the Brazilian Amazonians than simply economics,

a few basic economic principles can be seen

to encourage the Brazilian government to continue

the mistreatment of indigenous peoples

and lands. In the era of a globalized economy,

Brazil stands as one of the more advanced

developing economies, often referred to as a

“semi-periphery” state or one of the BRIC (Brazil,

Russia, India, China) economies, occupying

a place between the developing and developed

worlds. As such, goals of development dominate

the economic policies of the Brazilian government.

There are various economic factors

that gauge a state’s level of development, the

most basic of which is gross domestic product

(GDP) per capita. Brazilian economic policy is

therefore largely concerned with increasing the

GDP both nationally and per capita.

In 2004, GDP per capita was at 3,325 USD,

although income distribution is highly skewed

with a Gini coefficient of 0.6. 14 Numbering

188 million in 2006, Brazil has the 5 th largest

population in the world. 15 A large population

provides a state with a sizable domestic market,

useful in the early years of domestic industrial

development. Often states in such a position

look to extract as much

short term wealth from

their natural resources and

productive comparative

advantage and use that accumulated

capital for long

term, state led investment

into targeted and lucrative

industries. Once strong industrial

niches are created,

domestic industries are able

to compete internationally

and increase national

wealth through global trade. Economic development

today is no longer viewed as something

to be achieved gradually, as was the case

with the earlier economies of Britain and the

United States. Modern development looks to

the examples of Germany, Japan, and the Asian

“Tigers” (South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore,

and Taiwan) as models of rapid and sustained

economic progress. Such development requires

fairly heavy state involvement, what is often

termed a “developmental state”. In such an arrangement,

the alleged “invisible hand” is not

trusted to bring about economic growth quickly

enough and state involvement is designed to

direct industrialization.

Although there is no consensus on an ideal

method of economic development, a rough

pattern of economic policies can be observed

among recent developmental successes. Many

countries begin with “Primary Product Export,”

in which raw materials are exported in large

quantities in order to accrue enough wealth and

Under the definition of genocide

adopted in this paper, it is

not just the physical destruction

of the indigenous peoples

for which the Brazilian government

is either directly

responsible or complicit, but

also the destruction of national


foreign exchange to cover the costs of development

of specific industries. Then, states select

targeted industries to build up, providing subsidized

investment in these sectors to minimize

risks for the entrepreneurial class. These infant

industries use the domestic market demand to

increase their wealth, while the state offers some

form of international protection (often in the

form of the political profanity of trade restrictions).

Once these industrials are developed,

trade is opened and global competition begins

evolving as the nation moves into the production

of more advanced goods and services. While an

abhorrently simple description, the process of

development highlights the heavy involvement

of the state in incentivizing economic progress.

This is critical in that it indicates the culpability

of the Brazilian state in the genocidal consequences

of its economic policies.

Trade, both domestic and international, is

based on the principle of comparative advantage,

first put forth by economist David Ricardo

in 1817. 16 A simple explanation of comparative

advantage holds that every individual economy,

whether local or national, has a relative strength

in its ability to produce specific products over

others. These advantages are often based initially

on climate and natural resource endowment and

later on levels of specialization and available

technology within production of certain sectors.

As economies begin to engage in trade with

one another, each individual economy is able to

focus its production on the goods and services

in which it has a comparative advantage. By

trading these goods and services with economies

with different production capabilities, economies

no longer need to exert effort in to the production

of goods in which they have a comparative

disadvantage. Such transactions allow individual

economies to specialize their production and

use their resources and labor more efficiently,

improving the economic efficiency of all parties

involved. 17

Brazil has sought to capitalize on the country’s

natural resource advantages and tropical

climate to increase national

product. In terms of natural

resources, Brazil is a vastly

wealthy nation. Brazil has

some of the largest reserves of

minerals and industrial metals.

In 1967, enormous deposits

of iron ore were found

in the Amazon, in addition to

the vast quantities of bauxite

in the same location. Then, in

the 1970s coal deposits were

discovered in Amazonia, followed

by the discovery of oil. 18 The region of the

Brazilian Amazon, it appeared, is the source of

a massive natural comparative advantage for the

Brazilian economy, if only these natural resources

could be exploited for monetary gain. Sadly,

throughout the majority of the history of Brazil,

the environmental impacts of these economic

endeavors were broadly ignored. 19

At the time of colonial independence in

1822 the Brazilian government was highly

dependent on the export of the cash crop of coffee.

20 As the nineteenth century came to a close,

it was the exportation of rubber that dominated

the economy, a production based in the Amazon

region. 21 Rubber production in the Amazon

required the region to undergo rapid settlement

by workers and industrialists and exposure to

the machinery and pollution of rubber producing

businesses. 22 As such, the well being of

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Page 7

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native peoples and the land they occupied were

was disregarded as Brazil came to dominate the

world market for rubber, supplying 90% of the

world’s supply, making rubber exports amount

to 40% of Brazil total exportation in 1910. 23

The destruction of the Amazon caused by rubber

production became compounded by the

emergence of cattle ranchers, migrants, loggers,

gold miners, mining companies, speculators, and

hydroelectric project development. 24 Deforestation

by logging companies and hydroelectric

developers continues today, with an enormous

80% of deforestation coming from illegal logging.

25 Even as recently as 2007, monthly rates

of 366 square miles lost from deforestation were

recorded, with higher commodity prices acting

as the stimulus for farmers to clear forest to

make space for additional crops. 26

These industrial advancements, although

pursued for seemingly economic purposes,

have wreaked havoc in the Amazon. As early as

1940, then-President Vargas arrived in Amazonia

“with the purpose of seeing to the practical

possibilities of putting into execution a plan for

the systematic exploitation of the wealth and the

economic development of the great valley”. 27

The 1960s saw the “Massacre at Parallel Eleven”

where the Cintas Largas Tribe was slaughtered

in the name of mineral deposits. 28 1970 brought

about the plan for the Trans-Amazon highway,

with thousands of kilometers completed by

1974. 29 This rapid building process brought with

it the spread of disease to indigenous populations

near construction sites, including influenza and

venereal disease, vastly a product of the rape of

indigenous women. 30 Even in the late 1980s, the

gold rush in the Roraima region brought 40,000

prospectors in contact with the 10,000 members

of the Yanomami tribe, resulting in mass indigenous

casualty from disease, river pollution, and

shootings. 31 In response to this massacre, Aristides

Junqueira, the Attorney General of Brazil,

stated that “the multiplicity of homicides” taking

place were “without doubt, genocide” due to the

ethnic grouping of the victims. 32 These isolated

incidents are only a fraction of what occurred

but are indicative of the ways in which economic

development projects, in conjunction with the

disregard of the Brazilian government towards

the indigenous peoples, continued the genocidal

practices long known in frontier regions.

Under egalitarian principles, the well being

of the individual parties involved in an economic

transaction is ensured by the presumption of

individual utility maximization. An economic

entity, it is rationally assumed, will not participate

in an exchange of goods and services that

decrease its utility. If an individual owns a piece

of land, he will not trade that piece of land to a

business unless the compensation he receives for

the land provides him with an equal or higher

level of utility. Similarly, the business will not

purchase the land from the individual unless it

values that land at a rate at or above the price demanded

as compensation. This basic mechanism

of exchange allows for the economic efficiency

described above taking place. As displayed by

the historical relationship of territorial autonomy

between the indigenous people and the Brazilian

state and businesses, such a mutual utility

maximization did not occur. While the racial and

political underpinnings for it are unique to Brazil

and vary across indigenous-settler instances

globally, one of the most apparent economic reasons

for the exploitation of native lands leading

to genocidal conditions is the lack of recognized

property rights of the natives to the lands they


Property rights refer to the legal determination

and protection of both which individuals

possess the rights to determine whether or not

actions will take place with regards to a given

area of land and also the limitations on what

sorts of activities and transactions can occur.

According to the Coase Theorem, if property

rights are assigned and recognized, bargaining

can occur between parties ensuring both parties

are equally or better off prior to the exchange.

33 For the purposes of this analysis, it is

the former aspect of the definition of property

rights that is of importance. In the case of the

Brazilian Amazonians, and indigenous populations

worldwide, respected property rights are

minimal or nonexistent. This

economic explanation is well

supplemented at this point by

a socio-political analysis of

the racial thinking involved

in Brazilian-indigenous relations.

Property rights are considered

to be a socially constructed

idea, often reflecting

an earlier phase in a society’s development

towards “modernity”. As a socially and politically

constructed idea, property rights, when

not universally ensured, reflect dominant social

and political norms of the time. Throughout the

history of the Americas (Brazil included), and

through today truthfully, descriptions of Amerindians

have been based upon images of savages

and socially and economically backwards

people. As such, as Mark Leven describes, “The

natives had already forfeited their land rights by

dint of who they were and how they behaved”. 34

The Brazilian government and industrial sector

has viewed indigenous forms of economic exchange

as automatically inefficient and illegitimate,

and this has led to immediate disregard

for the economic agency of native peoples. 35

In the absence of property rights, an area of

land is treated as if it is what is referred to as a

public good. Lacking respected ownership, the

Amazon rainforest has been treated as though it

is a public good, for use at no cost. This incentivizes

the overuse and abuse of the land because

businesses looking to develop projects in

the area view the inputs they acquire from the

land as free of cost. While the Coase Theorem

mentioned above describes economic efficiency

in the presence of mutual property rights, in the

case of the Amazon, the government acts as the

sole agent in control of the lands occupied by

indigenous peoples. This translates into practice

by the land occupied by native peoples being

treated as though it is uninhabited, with relocation

of indigenous groups considered common

practice. Such dislocation of peoples, as shown,

continually results in the death and suffering

of countless people in the name of industrial


Economics as a Disincentive?

Despite a large domestic market and strong

endowment of natural resources, Brazil has

remained a highly dependent nation. Its economy

remains dependent on foreign demand for

manufactured goods and relies on direct foreign

investment for adequate levels of capital investment.

36 Recent years have seen a political shift

in Brazil with relation to international lending

organizations, including claimed severing of

ties between the Brazilian government and the

World Bank and International Monetary Fund

and the global economic downturn hurting the

IMF more than the Brazilian economy. However,

as the global economy settles back down,

institutions such as the World Bank and IMF are

Lacking respected ownership,

the Amazon rainforest

has been treated as though it

is a public good, for use at

no cost.

in position, along with sources of international

aid, such as the United States, to influence the

direction of some aspects of the Brazilian economy.

It is common practice for lending organizations

or donor nations to include stipulations in

their loans to developing nations such as Brazil.

The World Bank has already made public note of

its commitment (at least in words) to the promotion

of the rights and well being of indigenous

populations throughout the world. The Bank has

already undertaken 671 projects to improve the

well being of native peoples. 37 It is fathomable

that leverage from such organizations and donor

nations, stipulating the preservation of indigenous

lands and autonomy, could help improve

the territorial situation of indigenous populations.

Admittedly, circumven-

tions of such legal restrictions

has become common place in

many nations, including Brazil

where some legal property

protection for native peoples

exists, but the potential

remains as donor nations are

demanding more monitoring

and accountability from their aid recipients.

More assertively, sanctions have become

very popular in politics, often as a response to

human rights abuses. 38 Sanctions are viewed as

an internationally legitimate means of discouraging

genocide by either depriving a repressive

regime of needed funds or increasing the cost of

genocide and decreasing the cost of population

protection. 39 In the case of the Brazilian Amazonians,

since much of the modern genocidal conditions

are created by economic incentives, these

sanctions could serve to put a tangible price for

the government on the exploitation of the Amazon,

a previously “free” good. While logical

in principle, sanctions are often poorly implemented

and slow to act. More precise sanctions,

however, might prove more effective. Sanctions

on specific financial and trade sectors can be

tailored to work in precisely the industries on

which Brazil is most dependent. As a country

heavily dependent on demand for exports by advanced

economies, strong, targeted sanctions by

the United States and the European Union could

prove fruitful, so long as they coincide with better

monitoring and enforcement. 40

Although the degree to which economic

exploitation has encouraged the genocide of

indigenous populations globally has made

solutions something vastly too little and too

late, an obvious solution to the historical and

contemporary analysis above would be universally

respected property rights for indigenous

populations. Although they may exist in law,

the key to preventing the further reduction of

native populations in the name of economic

exploitation is the protection of their territorial

and economic agency. While coercive pressure

might make such exchanges of land take place

regardless of formally recognition of territorial

rights and modern social and political pressures

in Brazil push for the assimilation into the

Brazilian economy of all individuals, ensuring

respected property rights for natives is the first

step towards leveling the field between the two

groups. In other instances, indigenous groups

have brought to court issues of property rights

violations, but with mixed results.

In the case of the Wik tribe in Austrailia, it was

decided that while they do have legal right to

certain lands as specific by the Native Title Act

of 1993, when there are multiple claims to land

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between the Wik people and another entity leasing

the land (the grantee), “To the extent that

there is any conflict in the rights, the rights of

the grantee (for example, the pastoralist) prevail”.

41 In order to create sufficient agency for

indigenous populations to maintain autonomy,

their rights to land must be strengthened so as to

make them equals to non-native citizens in both

law and practice.


While none of the proposed economic

solutions can erase the damage already done,

they may serve to help continue the miraculous

population growth seen among the indigenous

populations in Brazil in recent years. The genocide

of the Brazilian Amazonians and broader

indigenous population, however, could not have

been prevented with solely economic measures

because the oppression and “destruction of

national pattern” of the Amazonians resulted

from more than just economic exploitation

and lack of agency. Genocides are complex

phenomenon, involving all aspects of society.

They cannot be accurately stripped down to one

explanatory variable because they are products

of the broader social, political, and economic

contexts of their time. It is clear, however, that

United Nations, 1948

2 Lemkin 1944, i

3 Leven 2005, 11

4 Gomes 2000, 2

5 Gomes 2000, 77; 83

6 Baer 2008, 333

7 Mouget 1990, 98-99; Treece 1990, 270-271

8 Leven 2005, 13

9 Davis 1977, 89

10 Ibid, 68

11 Baer 2008, 332

12 Ibid, 335

13 Hemming 2004, 3

14 Baer 2008, 2

15 Ibid, 6

16 Ison and Wall 2007, 394

17 McDowell, Thom, Frank, and Bernanke 2006, 430-441

18 Ibid, 5-6

19 Ibid, 311

20 Ibid, 19

21 Ibid, 22

The Rise of American Unilateral Hegemony as a Guide for

the Evolution of China as a Global Power

Brian Diederich, International Studies, 2012

As the world became increasingly

globalized throughout the twentieth century,

the entire global political structure—including

how a hegemon would rise and act within the

new international system—forever changed.

The United States mastered the new contours

of this system through its policy of ‘embedded

liberalism’ on political and economic fronts,

thereby exploiting globalization instead of

being trampled by it. As China continues its

rise towards global hegemony on the back of its

strong economic growth, it has begun to mirror

the same model the United States had used on its

path to power: strategic economic partnerships,

utilization of international organizations, and

interventionalist action throughout the globe.

in the context of neocolonialism (in terms of the

Brazilian nation acting as colonizers in the native

regions), an economic perspective can shed

light on the means through which the subtle,

seemingly legitimate developmental policies

of a nation can create foreseeable conditions

that bring about both the physical and cultural

destruction of an indigenous population.

Genocide has shown its ugly face throughout

history in many political situations, colonialism

and neocolonialism being just two

varieties. Colonialism is somewhat predisposed

to be genocidal, as it is based upon an unequal

economic and political relationship between the

native population and the colonizing power and

the imposition of the aspirations of the colonizing

power upon the native lands and peoples

without negotiation. Such arrangements of power

relations set the stage for the domination of

one group over the other, and in the case where

the native group stands as an insurmountable

obstacle for the process of development, the native

group is often eliminated in order to proceed

with development. Colonial relations are

not enough to bring about genocide, although

under Lemkin’s definition adopted in this paper,

one is hard pressed to cite colonial relations that

did not destroy the national pattern of the native


The example of the Brazilian Amazonians,

and colonial genocide more broadly, fits into a

22 Ibid

23 Ibid

24 Ibid, 333

25 Ibid, 333, 334

26 “Brazil Amazon Deforestation Soars” 2008).

27 Davis 1977, 22

28 Ibid, 78-79

29 Ibid, 14, 63

30 Ibid, 66-67

31 Treece 1990, 264

32 Garfield 1995

33 Ison and Wall 2007, 208

34 Leven 2005, 18

35 Bodley 2002, 146-147

36 Baer 2008, 3

37 World Bank News & Broadcast 2009

38 Lopez 2000, 67

39 Ibid, 68

40 Ibid, 78

41 Sheehan and Wensing 1998, 11

The United States began its path into

global hegemony by establishing itself within

the economic sphere as the international

financial and monetary standard in the world

community. The key point within this approach

was the Bretton Woods Agreement of July

1944. This agreement resulted in substantial

economic benefits for the United States that

would only help to reinforce its hegemony:

the establishment of the United States dollar

(USD) as the dominant reserve currency,

and the progressive integration of states into

international organizations favorable to the

policies of the United States—primarily the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the

World Bank. In an ever-interconnected world,

larger theme apparent throughout modern genocide

studies: the way in which oppressor groups

commit genocide against a population in the

pursuit of a utopian idealization of society. For

the British and Americans in North America, the

forging of a new, strong nation across the continent

brought about the elimination of existing

populations with valuable lands and unprepared

immune systems. In the case of the Holocaust,

the notion of an ethnically pure Germany was

the driving force. In the case of the Brazilian

Amazonians, the utopian vision of the Brazilian

state was based around economic development

and global economic power. No detailed explanation

of genocide is without exception, but this

paper hopes to provide a perspective through

which the longer term, evolving process of the

vast extermination of the Brazilian Amazonians

can be observed while emphasizing the economic

principles those in the West find commonplace

and benign. If such incidents are to be eliminated

from future human relations, subtleties must be

brought to light in order to be addressed sooner.

It is clear in this case that seemingly harmless

ideas of economic progress can aid in the destruction

of a population, and it is this author’s

belief that the more people educate themselves

on the manners in which genocidal policies occur,

the more likely such policies can be identified

and eliminated before the loss of human life.

the placement of the American dollar as the

reserve currency permits the United States to

purchase goods at a significantly lower rate in

comparison to other actors, which are forced to

exchange their currencies with each transaction

and pay a transaction cost which, over time,

accumulates to create a substantial advantage for

the issuing state. In addition, the state issuing

the reserve currency can essentially print an

infinite amount, thus allowing its central bank

to possess an unlimited supply of reserves. In

addition, it also allows the state issuing the

currency to borrow money at a better rate, due

to the fact that there will always be a larger

market for its currency. As Barry Eichengreen

states, the United States is now “borrowing short

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and lending long because [as a result] it has a

more efficient financial system”. 1 Secondly,

the establishment of the IMF and the World

Bank as the predominant international financial

organizations gave the United States the ability

to ‘condition’ other states to fit the American

political and economic interests within its

own model. The International Monetary Fund

required states to obey its economic policies

of low government expenditure, raised interest

rates, and large scale privatization, among other

policies in exchange for financial assistance and

the ‘green light’ for foreign investors.

Through these specific policies—often

implemented regardless of the domestic

situation—the United States shapes the

international community to fit its economic

interests. As Joseph Siglitz states in his article

‘Broken Promises’, the International Monetary

Fund enters a nation, in this case Ethiopia,

seeking to transform its domestic economic

structure to fit the demands and examples of

the American capitalist model. This strategic

policy, dubbed the ‘Washington Consensus’,

emphasized that “the states should focus on

full employment, economic growth, and the

welfare of its citizens and that state power

should be freely deployed, alongside of or, if

necessary intervening in or even substituting

for market processes to achieve these ends”. 2

The strategy of the IMF funneled states on the

periphery, particularly those in Latin America

and Asia, into the mainstream, Americandominated

economic structure through intricate

conditionality, thus allowing for the United

States to maintain its economic dominance

as well as its global hegemony. Through the

integration of the rest of the international

community into its own economic model, the

United States was able to maintain and promote

its place as the sole superpower.

In addition to its promotion of American

economic liberalism, the United States has

also utilized the new globalized system to

exert its influence through increased political

and military intervention on an unprecedented

scale, strategic integration into international

organizations, and unilateral resistance to

various international pressures. After the end

of the Second World War and the resulting

start of American hegemony, the United States

abandoned its isolationist ways and became

increasingly involved in international affairs,

including the domestic affairs of other states.

As the world became further globalized, states

were more capable of acting on a global scale,

an ability the United States certainly exploited.

Immediately after the end of the Second World

War, the United States began its policies of

international involvement via the Truman and

Eisenhower Doctrines, which essentially stated

that the United States would provide economic

and military support for any state threatened by

encroaching Communist actors, and the Marshall

Plan, which provided financial support for states

domestically destroyed by the previous war.

These policies—the epitome of the United

States’ ‘containment’ plan for Communism

throughout the Cold War—demonstrate how

the United States began expressing its interests

on a global stage: through intervention into

the domestic affairs of other states and global

trends on a level never before seen on the

international level. This new strategy came to

fruition through various military and political

interventions the US undertook in previously

untouched spheres of the word: first with the

Korean War from 1950 to 1953, followed by

the Cyprus conflicts of 1964 (i.e. the Johnson

Letter), the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1975,

the Opium Issue with Turkey in the early 1970s,

the Gulf War from 1990 to 1991, and Bosnia-

Herzegovina in 1992 to 1995 and Kosovo

in 1999, and into the twenty-first century

as well: especially with the current War on

Terror, materialized in the simultaneous Wars

in Iraq and Afghanistan, and additional recent

American involvement in the Korean Peninsula.

Before the World Wars, the United States rarely

exited its own limited sphere of influence, with

the exception of the brief Barbary Wars in the

early nineteenth century. Each of these events

demonstrates how—in comparison to the period

prior to American dominance after the World

Wars—the newly globalized system permits

states to intervene in affairs across the globe, all

for the sake of promoting one’s own interests.

Due to globalization, and especially with the

changing atmosphere due to the advent of the

War on Terror at the turn of the century, the

United States could now intervene and exert its

influence in any corner of the globe.

Secondly, through its policy of

‘embedded liberalism’ the United States

both integrated into and emphasized the

importance of international organizations

while simultaneously maintaining its unilateral

identity, remaining essentially free of all

international pressure. The United States was

a founding member of the United Nations

and utilizes its seat on the Security Council

frequently. The US also integrated itself into

various other international organizations and

agreements such as the North American Free

Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Group of 8,

the International Atomic Energy Agency, the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development, among others; and observer

or dialogue partner status in various other

organizations. This integration allowed the

United States to exert its influence within the

globalized system in a diplomatic forum via

‘soft power’ instead of relying on its more hard

line approaches.

In addition, despite the high level of

American integration, the United States

maintains its unilateral capabilities despite

existing in this globalized world. An example

of such nonconformity is with the Kyoto

Protocol: despite being the major source of

carbon emissions and a major international

player, the United States refuses to become a

party to the Protocol despite the compliance

of thirty-seven other major states. 3 The United

States, despite emphasizing the importance of

integration into international organizations in

an increasingly globalized international system,

seeks to maintain its unilateral capabilities

in order to remain the sole hegemon. In a

world defined by globalization, the United

States has utilized this transformative and

transitional state to place itself as the primary

actor on the world stage while forcing other

states to condition themselves into limiting

international organizations. The United States,

as the sole hegemon, is able to act unilaterally

while simultaneously suppressing the freedom

of action of other states within the international

system. Through globalizing its economic,

political, and diplomatic interests and integrating

its influences into the international status quo,

the United States has become the hegemon in an

absolutely unipolar world.

The Republic of China, in its rise and

pursuit of hegemony within the globalized

system, is following the example set by the

current hegemon, the United States, and its

proven path to global power and influence. In

our current dire, global economic recession,

China, in a fashion much similar to the

United States, has placed itself in a position

to become the new financial and monetary

powerhouse of the world. The first manner in

which China has slowly started to dominate the

international economy is through its financing

of international debt. For example, the Chinese

government currently owns approximately

$700 billion in American debt. 4 In addition,

China has now offered to purchase all of the

debt of the recent default and bankrupt state of

Greece as well. 5 In controlling a nation’s debt,

China gains relative leverage against that state

within the international arena; the debtor has

no claim against the lender as long as there

is an outstanding debt. Secondly, in a similar

way as to how the United States dollar gained

supremacy via the Bretton Woods Agreement

in 1944, the Chinese yuan has remained strong

during the subsequent collapse of other powerful

currencies, most notably the American dollar

and the Euro, especially after the recent failure

of the Irish economy. 6 This strength has been

exhibited through the recent ‘currency war’

that has erupted amongst major international

powers. In light of the recession, major industrial

states have been forced to manipulate their

own interests and exchange rates in order to

The Chinese Governemnt currently owns approximately $700 billion in American debt,

in controlling a nation’s debt China gains relative leverage against that state.

compete with the potency of the yuan, all due to

the combination of the substantial, exponential

growth of the Chinese economy while all others

have failed in recent times and the supposed

self-manipulation of the Chinese currency. 7

The result of this ‘currency war’ is that now

the international community has been forced to

unofficially declare the Chinese yuan as the new

international standard for economic strength

through the scramble of other states to compete

and keep pace with Chinese growth. While this

is not quite as official as the agreement which

established the priority of the US dollar over

sixty years ago, the effect upon the international

economy is becoming quite similar.

In the increasingly globalized atmosphere,

the United States exerted its influence

everywhere from the Korean Peninsula to

the Western Balkans and Southeast Asia.

Yet again following the American model of

globalized hegemony, China is also entering

into new domains and spheres of influence.

Within the past several decades, Chinese

foreign and economic policy has stretched to

parts of the world previously untouched by

the nation’s influences: the African continent,

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the Caribbean, and the South Pacific, all in

addition to its already existing relations with

its immediate regional neighbors. Firstly and

most noticeably, Chinese influence in Africa

has increased significantly in roughly the past

decade. With the advent of Jiang Zemin, the

former President of the People’s Republic of

China (PRC), and his ‘Go Out’ policy, Chinese

business began reaching into new, untouched

corners of the globe. 8 This policy encouraged

Chinese businessmen to conquer world markets,

and Africa was the perfect destination: both

regions experienced a common history of

Western domination and colonialism, and similar

struggles for autonomy and independence.

Through the strategy of ‘dollar diplomacy’,

China and Africa have forged a strong

relationship built upon arms sales, oil trade,

large infrastructure projects, and also the use of

‘health diplomacy’ as well. In 1999, the total

Sino-African trade volume was $6.5 billion.

However, by 2005, the amount of trade had

reached $39.7 billion before it jumped to over

$55 billion only a year later in 2006, making

China the second largest trading partner of

Africa after the United States. In addition, nearly

one third of all Chinese oil supplies come from

the African continent, and

a majority of China’s arms

production is sent west to

Africa every single year, only

deepening their economic

ties. 9

In addition, Chinese

industries have undertaken

a variety of infrastructure

projects, creating a strong

flow of Chinese foreign

investment into the region. In Nigeria, it has

financed an $8.3 billion railway from Lagos

to Kano 10 ; in Angola and Zambia, the vital

Benguela railway line originally built by the

British linking Zambia to the Atlantic port city

of Lobito in Angola was to be reconstructed

by the Chinese 11 ; in Guinea, a free industrial

package was created in 2006, including a mine,

dam, railway, and a refinery, all financed by

EximBank, who in return receives aluminum at

a preferential rate 12 ; in Algeria, a one thousand

kilometer railway built by Chinese workers 13 ;

and in Sudan, the construction of pipelines and

the completion of Port Sudan within several

years. 14

Furthermore, China has undertaken a kind of

‘health diplomacy’ on the continent in which it

wins over the public opinions of various African

states through the establishment of much needed

medical institutions. For examples, in September

of 2001, China promised the Democratic

Republic of Congo 31 hospital units and 145

other smaller health care centers throughout

the nation. 15 Finally, China’s influence is not

existent solely in the economic sphere; it has

expanded its peacekeeping and military presence

in the region as well. In January 2005, Chinese

peacekeeping forces were sent to Liberia, in

addition to others already sent to the Democratic

Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and the Ivory

Coast. In sum, China has developed an intricate

trade, investment, and peacekeeping relationship

with an Africa desperate for the financial and

political support of a major international player.

Secondly, China has recently acted ever

father from its traditional sphere of influence

in the Caribbean. The use of trade, credits, and

investment has been designed to ease the region

China has undertaken a kind

of ‘health diplomacy’ on the

continent in which it wins

over the public opinions of

various African states through

the establishment of much

needed medical institutions.

away from American overdependence. As the

Caribbean political leaders have had issues with

the recent Bush administration, China has been

more sympathetic to the Caribbean position

globally and has stepped up military training

exercises in the region in direct response to

several sanctions placed upon the Caribbean for

not directly following the wishes of the United

States. A prime example of China’s recent

dedication to the region is in an arrangement

made in which asphalt from Trinidad and

Tobago would be used to construct stadiums

for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics in

exchange for new infrastructure via foreign

direct investment. 16 By exerting influence and

sympathy to regions traditionally exploited

and suppressed by Western powers, China has

begun to exert its global authority in regions

of the world previously untouched by Chinese

foreign policy.

Thirdly, China has taken a new stance on its

relations with the South Pacific as well, seeking

a relationship that will link the two regions

like never before. In 2006, Chinese Premier

Wen Jianbao announced that the People’s

Republic of China would increase its economic

cooperation with Pacific Island states. 17 The

PRC would provide more economic aid, abolish

tariffs for exports from the least developed

states of the Pacific, annul the debt of some of

these same states, distribute

free anti-malaria medicines,

and provide for over two

thousand Pacific Island

government officials and

technical staff. 18 Overall,

through extending its reach

into previously untouched

regions of the world, China

has developed itself into a

new global hegemon. The

United States was once the only nation capable

of expressing its interests upon distant regions

of the world; yet now, China has gained and

begun exploiting a similar ability, taking hold

upon regions exhausted with or isolated by the

traditional Western capitalist economic and

political system.

In addition to increasing bilateral relations

with states, China has increased its presence

within various international organizations

as well. Like the United States, China also

possesses a seat on the United Nations

Security Council, and has arguably utilized

its veto powers much more

efficiently and commonly

than the United States.

China has vetoed Taiwan’s

reception of ‘non-member

entity’ status 19 , sanctions on

Zimbabwe 20 , and abstained

from voting on the 1991

Gulf War Resolution. In addition, China has

included itself either as a member or observer

in numerous regional organizations, including

the Association of South Eastern Asian Nations

(Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Laos,

Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,

and Vietnam), designed to promoted regional

stability; the East Asia Summit (ASEAN

nations in addition to India, Australia, and

New Zealand); the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization, founded in June 2001 to promote

regional stability and counter-terrorism

efforts 21 ; and more recent the ‘six-party talks’ to

resolve the conflicts of the Korean Peninsula. 22

All of these factors—from China’s

growing economic prominence to its increased

involvement in international affairs, all

following the American path to hegemony

within the context of globalization—has led

to the rise of a new world power. Due to this,

some have argued that this shift in the global

power structure has led to a replacement of the

traditional ‘Washington Consensus’ with the

new ‘Beijing Consensus’. This new international

model is shaped upon four key points, all

demonstrated by the examples given previously

in this paper. The first is non-interference in

economic affairs. The Beijing Consensus states

that, “if you are an African country and you have

a raw material that China wants, then China

will do business with you, no matter what the

West thinks of your government or your human

rights record”. 23 The second point is strategic

structural development. Throughout Africa,

Chinese companies are busy building hospitals,

dams, government offices, and stadiums and also

refurbishing facilities abandoned by Western

companies, with the aim of improved African

productivity. China’s newly developed work

force can provide large numbers of engineers,

technicians, and specialized workers at a low

cost, something that Western countries cannot

or are reluctant to do, thus providing China

with a competitive advantage over Western

competitors. 24

The next point is friendship and mutual

respect. China has cultivated a dynamic

of mutual respect in its foreign relations,

revering the domestic choices which its

African partners makes, unlike the more

exploitive and dependence-creating Western

policies—i.e. structural adjustment programs

via the International Monetary Fund. Chinese

culture strongly encourages respect for both

one’s leaders and one’s followers, emphasizing

that respect improves relationships and leads

to success. Furthermore, Chinese culture sees

each individual as being responsible for his

or her own fate; thus, African quality of life

is not China’s responsibility. The last point of

the ‘Beijing Consensus’ is the priority of the

Chinese model of development. China operates

under the influence of its own developmental

history, which first focused on economic

development, only planning civic development

once the first objective had been completed.

In China’s approach, the ‘democracy first’

political and ‘structural adjustment’ economic

models touted by the West are not universally

applicable, and China provides African countries

with another option: infrastructure first, then

economic reforms, finally

after which civic reforms

may come. 25

China has risen to

global prominence by

following the American

model for strength within

the context of globalization

and altering it to include rather than exploit

developing states of the world. As the American

model begins to falter under the pressures of

the current economic recession, international

criticism of its unilateral actions – particularly

in Iraq – and the failure of various diplomatic

efforts, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ shall slowly

begin to overtake it. As China’s foreign policy

and economic arms extend across a larger

portion of the globe, gaining the support of

regions shunned by the current international

status quo, the People’s Republic of China

will rise to new hegemonic heights, forever

reformulating the political and economic norms

of the international, globalized system, exactly

as the United States began to do only fifty years


China has taken a new stance

on its relations with the South

Pacific as well, seeking a realtionship

that will link the two

regions like never before.

Page 11

Barry Eichengreen, “Sterling’s Past, Dollar’s Future: History Perspectives on Reserve

Currency Competition, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005, http://, p. 13.

2 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2005, p. 10.

3 “Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ramification”, United Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change, 14 January 2009,

4 “Major Foreign Holders of U.S. Treasury Securities 2008”, United States Treasury

Department, 2008,


5 “China Offers to Buy Greek Debt”, Al-Jazeera Online, 3 October 2010, http://english.

6 NY -Times Online

7 Ny Times Online.

8 Friedrich Wu, “The Globalization of Corporate China”, Seattle: National Bureau of

Asian Research, 2005,


9 “China-Africa Relations”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of

China, 25 April 2002,

10 Yuan Wu, La Chine et l’Afrique: 1956-2006, Chinese Intercontinental Press, 2006, p.


11 Ibid, 31.

12 Ibid, 23.

13 Ibid, 32

Spring 2011 Spotlight

u.S. dEpartmEnt of StatE

BurEau of nEar EaStErn affairS

The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs deals with diplomatic relations and foreign

policy with the majority of Middle Eastern countries including Iraq, Iran,

Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. In the last decade, the Bureau partially reoriented

itself to examine issues such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and political

reform in more detail.

U.S. Foreign Aid and Objectives Do Not Promote Middle

Eastern Democracy

Nicole Salter, International Studies, 2012

The United States of America has been providing

various states in the Middle East foreign

aid since the Cold War. Many people argue that

such foreign aid should be used to promote democratic

processes in these states. Because American

foreign aid has tended to support autocratic

regimes, they criticize the role that American

foreign aid has played in the region. However,

the aim of American foreign policy in the Middle

East has rarely been to promote democracy in the

Middle East. U.S. foreign aid has been used as

a tool to promote U.S. security and encourage

peace, and although it could be used to promote

more democratic processes in the Middle East,

neither the Middle Eastern governments nor the

U.S. government are likely to support such policies

because of the risk to their government for

the former and the security risks for the latter.

Foreign aid became an important part of

the American national security policy during the

Cold War. Through the Eisenhower Doctrine, the

U.S. “dispensed tens of millions of dollars” to

various countries in the Middle East, including

Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi

Arabia. The Doctrine also allowed the U.S. to intervene

in the region to protect the states against

the spread of communism. 1 The purpose of this

aid was solely to prevent communism from entering

and spreading in the Middle East, such

as when Jordan faced political upheaval due

to King Hussein’s dismissal of Prime Minister

Nabulsi for attempting to resume diplomatic relations

with the Soviet Union. Spreading democracy

was not the goal of U.S. foreign aid during

the Cold War. Additionally, the Marshall Plan,

Peace Corps, USAID, and the Alliance for Progress

were all American foreign aid programs that

aimed to prevent the spread of communism. 2

Since America viewed communism as a huge

threat, the U.S. used aid to help other countries

14 Ibid, 31

15 Drew Thompson, “China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the “Beijing Consensus” to

Health Diplomacy,” The Jamestown Foundation Online, 13 October 2005, http://csis.

org/files/media/csis/pubs/051013_china_soft_pwr.pdf, p. 3

16 “Trinidad and Tobago Recognizes China’s Full Market Economy Status,”

People’s Daily Online, 1 February 2005,


17 “China Offers Aid Package to Pacific Islands,” China Daily Online, 5 April 2006,

18 Ibid.

19 John Tkacik, Jr. Taiwan’s ‘Unsettled’ International Status: Preserving US option in

the Pacific, the Heritage Fondation: 19 June 2008,


20 “Russia, China Veto U.N. Sanctions on Zimbabwe”, CNN News Online, 12 July


21 CIA World Factbook: China’s. US Central Intelligence Agency. 2010. https://www.

22 NY Times

23 “China in Africa: Developing Ties,” BBC News Online, 3 July 2007.

24 Justin Turin, “China’s Beijing Consensus: An Alternative Model for Development”,

Student Pulse: Online Student Academic Journal,


25 Ibid.

fight communism, which then prevented the

spread of communism, which was a U.S. policy

objective during the Cold War.

In the 1970s, President Nixon and Secretary

of State Henry Kissinger began using foreign

aid to encourage peace in the Middle East, which

was another major policy objective for the United

States. For example, through economic inducements

as well as political and security assurances,

the U.S. “convinced Israel to make further concessions

in the peace talks.” 3 This method of offering

aid and security to both sides, eventually led to

peace between Egypt and Israel, and as a result,

these two countries receive the greatest share of

U.S. foreign aid. In order for the U.S to convince

Israel to pull out of 13 percent of the West Bank

at the Wye River Memorandum in 1998, the U.S

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Page 12

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accepted Prime Minister Netanyahu’s request for

“$1.2 billion in new aid to cover the costs of [.

. .] redeployment [and to] placate members of

his government.” 4 Without this U.S aid, it is unlikely

that Israel would have agreed to withdraw

and make peace with its neighbors. Although the

promise of more U.S foreign aid failed to generate

a final status agreement between Israel and Palestine

at Camp David in 2000, the U.S. foreign aid

was extremely important during the peace talks/

conferences because it helped with the practical

costs associated with the agreements as well as

placated the domestic governments.

In these two major U.S policy objectives—to

prevent the spread of communism and to promote

Arab-Israeli peace—the U.S. was not focused on

spreading democracy. In order for the U.S. to

promote democratic development through foreign

aid, there has to be an objective to do so.

There are also many reasons why the U.S. would

elect not to offer aid with democratic reform

Peter L. Hahn. “Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957.” Presidential

Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1. (Blackwell Publishing, March 2006), 40.

Steven Radelet. “Bush and Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 5. (Council on

Foreign Relations, 2003), 106.

Scott Lasensky. “Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American Foreign

Aid.” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 2. (The Middle East Institute, 2004),


Lasensky, 224.

The Druze : Survival Without Nationhood

Evan Fowler, International Studies, Class of 2013

A Jewish state in Palestine was formed on

May 14, 1948, the day before the British Mandate

expired. The Declaration of the State of Israel

stipulated that the state would “promote the

development of the country for the benefit of all

its inhabitants.” 1 It also said that the state would

“uphold the full social and political equality of

all its citizens, without distinction of religion.” 2

Israel’s founders understood the need for equality

among the different ethnic groups. The Jewish

people, as a minority themselves, pledged to

guarantee the rights of others. This included the

Druze, a religious community situated mainly

in the Galilee who would command “a special

standing among [Israel’s] minority groups.” 3 The

Druze and the Jews shared a common destiny: “a

destiny of minorities.” This allowed the Druze

“to understand the psychology of the persecuted

Jewish minority.” 4 The Israeli-Druze partnership

would be based on “pragmatic political and

military considerations”. 5

The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates

that the Druze population in the Middle

East is about one million, with the majority in

Syria and Lebanon. 6 Unlike in Syria and Lebanon,

the Palestinian Druze community is small.

The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics estimated

in 2005 the Israeli Druze to be 124,300. 7 A small

number of Druze also live in Jordan. While

they speak Arabic and have a culture that can

be defined as ‘Arabic,’ the Druze can be defined

as “‘Arabs with a vengeance’” because of their

persecution at the hands of other Muslims. 8

By the eleventh century, Shia Islam had

become divided. Shia Ismailism disagreed with

mainstream Shia on the legitimacy of the imams.

Ismailism became the doctrine of the Fatimid

state. In 996, al-Hakim Biamrallah ascended

requirements. A major concern would be what

would happen if the states receiving aid did become

democratic? A newly elected government

could be more anti-American than the previous

administration and then refuse to work with the

U.S. 5 Since the U.S. is so dependent on oil from

the Middle East, such a change in attitude could

be detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. also

fears that more democratic processes could lead

to more “terrorist” or extremist groups assuming

power, just like Hamas and Hezbollah did, which

could also potentially threaten U.S. security.

This is the fear that the U.S. had with the

2011 revolution in Egypt. The U.S. saw a choice

of a dictator or “rule by hostile Islamists.” 6 Even

though the Egyptians were protesting for democratic

reforms, the U.S. assumed that if President

Mubarak was overthrown, then the Muslim

Brotherhood or some other religious group

would take over and that they would not comply

with U.S. objectives the way that President

Mubarak did. After President Mubarak stepped

down, President Obama assured the Egyptian

people that the United States would continue its

the throne to become the sixth Fatimid caliph.

Al-Hakim, who is seen by the Druze as a messianic

figure, issued a unitarian doctrine. After

the issuing of this “Divine Call…Al-Hakim was

proclaimed the manifestation of Divinity.” 9 This

new movement boiled down to one idea: “the

strict and uncompromising unity of the Deity.” 10

This new movement was fundamentally

different from Islam. It advocated a change of

the imam system, since “after the Divinity had

manifested itself in al-Hakim, the Ismaili messianic

belief…was replaced by the final triumph

of unitarianism.” 11 It also disagrees with Islam

on the interpretation of some of the most critical

precepts of Islam, including fasting and

the Hajj. Even in regards to prayer, the Druze

believe that there is no need to face Mecca during

prayer because “God is everywhere and not

confined to Mecca.” 12 The Druze abandoned

the seven pillars of Islam, and instead adopted

“seven Unitarian principles.” 13

The Druze faith molded together ideas

from many different sources including “Islamic

monotheism...Greek philosophy and Hindu

influences,” and it drew on these sources to create

an experience based in wisdom and piety. 14

The Druze religion separated its followers into

two groups: the uqqal (initiated) and the juhhal

(uninitiated). The uqqal have “full access to the

Druze Canon” while the juhhal “receive oral religious

instruction but are never allowed access

to [the Druze Canon].” 15 Since only a few had

access to the inner workings of the religion, the

Druze “remain shrouded in thick webs of secrecy.”

16 The Druze also incorporated the “idea

of metempsychosis,” which meant that “when

a Druze died his soul reappeared in a new body

elsewhere.” 17 This also meant that a Druze’s

financial support to Egypt. 7 The U.S. is likely

to use this support—which currently consists of

$250 million in economic aid and $1.3 billion

in annual military aid—to continue to influence

Egyptian politics and keep Islamist groups out

of complete control. Stability and cooperation

are important U.S. objectives in the region and

will influence U.S aid to Egypt. Democratic reform

comes second to these objectives and the

U.S. will encourage democratic reform only so

long as it does not threaten U.S. security.

Promotion of democratic reform has not been

a central feature of U.S. foreign aid to the Middle

East and is not likely to be in the near future.

U.S. uses foreign aid to achieve its national security

objectives such as preventing the spread

of communism and to fostering peace between

the Arabs and Israelis. The consequences of using

foreign aid to promote democratic reforms

in the U.S. could potentially threaten U.S. interests

in the region as well as U.S. national security,

and therefore, it is improbable that the U.S.

will adopt such an objective in its future foreign

aid packages.

Edward N. Muller. “Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the

United States, and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World.” International Studies

Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Blackwell Publishing, December 1985), 460.

Jeremy Kinsman. “Democracy Rising: Tunisia and Egypt, When Idealists Got It

Right.” Policy Options. (Dossier, April 2011), 38.

David E. Sanger. “Obama Presses Egypt’s Military on Democracy.” The New York

Times. Feb. 11, 2011.

time is predetermined. Fatalists, they believe that

God sets the term of each Druze’s life, and nothing

they can do will change this.

After their emergence, the Druze faced

persecution from the Islamic establishment of

the time. If Shi’ism was an offshoot of orthodox

Islam, then the Druze were heretics because

the very status of Muhammad and the first

caliphs was rejected” in favor of Al-Hakim. 18

This persecution, or mihna, was very important

for the burgeoning faith because it signaled “not

only brutal persecution but also an inner experience:

the Druze believe that by mihna their

faith is being put to the test.” 19 The Druze also

believe the mihna will be repeated before the

Last Judgment. Moreover, the mihna drove them

into the “most defensible zones of the mountains

in Greater Syria” in order to avoid future persecution.

20 This isolation would be an important

military tool and would allow them to develop

“quasi-independent principalities withinthe

Sunni empires.” 21 The mihna also established

the need for “takiyya,” which, “legitimizes affectation,

deception, and lying as defense measures

in dangerous situations” because “hiding

one’s Druze identity can be necessary posing

in a threatening environment.” 22 This skill is

necessary because “the survival capacity of [the

Druze] rested upon dissimulation at certain moments”

of persecution. 23

The mihna closed the Druze society off,

creating “a closed and non-missionary religion,”

because the Druze were afraid of infiltration into

their ranks. 24 This only added to the secrecy of

the religion and it made it nearly impossible for

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missionaries to work with the Druze because “a

Druze is born and never converted from another

faith…[and] will not himself accept a conversion.”

25 By keeping their faith in secrecy it also

keeps it “from the reach of those, who being

unprepared to accept its message, could misinterpret

and corrupt its truth.” 26

The Druze exercise refinement and very

good manners, which translates into a “Druze

community [which] is known to possess the

highest codes of ethnical, moral and social

behavior.” 27 Truthfulness is paramount to the

Druze. Liquor and other intoxicants are prohibited.

Elders are given a prestigious role in all

aspects of Druze life and are consulted often.

Slavery and polygamy were among the earliest

transgressions to be rejected by the Druze. Mutual

aid is also important since all unitarians are

connected, and therefore there exists “the obligation

to mutual assistance…[and] the responsibility

of the rich to care for the needy.” 28

From the beginning, the Druze “preached

equality” and “rejected the traditionally entrenched

belief that woman was inferior to

man.” 29 Polygamy was ended, and women were

allowed to divorce, which was a marked difference

from the Muslims whose “women seemed

‘little better than slaves.’” 30 Druze women were

literate and articulate and also formed a large

part of the uqqals.

The fighting ability of the Druze is a defining

characteristic. Their expertise stemmed from

the Druze’s ever-present “hand of foreign rulers

– Mamluks and Turks – and the permanent

problem of local competitors – Muslims and

Bedouin.” 31 Military training became standard

and the community could mobilize all its forces

when threatened. This was drawn from the idea

of “mutual security – Hifz al-Ikhwan – as a

sacred obligation,” no matter which community

was attacked. 32

After fleeing the persecution of the Fatimids,

the Druze resettled “in Mount Lebanon

east of Beirut in the Shouf.” 33 The Druze were

present during the arrival of the Crusaders, and

they “consistently supported the struggle against

[them].” 34 It was in Mount Lebanon that the Druze

established local autonomy, with exceptional

growth under the dynasties of the Ma’anids

(1516-1697) and Fakhr al-Din II, a Druze feudal

lord, “who by 1613 ruled from Antioch in the

north to Safed in the south.” 35 Fakhr al-Din II

is a revered figure in Druze history, known for

his modernization efforts. Most importantly, his

reign “represented a period of peace and freedom

for the Lebanese Christian community,”

which was different from their treatment under

the Ottomans. This treatment encouraged them

to move “in large numbers to south Lebanon.” 36

Eventually, the Ottomans became disillusioned

with his rising power, and he was killed in Istanbul.

But his legacy in history remains intact

because for all Lebanese, “he is the father of

Lebanese independence and nationalism.” 37

After Fakhr al-Din II’s death, Lebanon

lost its autonomous status. “All who governed

after him did so under dominant Turkish rule,”

and the Turks hated the Druze for their martial

prowess, their struggles for independence; as the

majority group, the Ottomans could elect no one

else as Lebanon’s leader. 38 A few Ma’anid Druze

followed Fakhr al-Din II, but in 1697 the Lebanese

feudal lords elected Bashir Shihab I. A

nail in the coffin for the Druze occurred in 1756

when Emir Mulhim Shibab converted his sons

to Christianity. This, along with the “succession

of the Maronite Yusuf Shihab in 1770 finally

set the seal to the Druze decline.” 39 For the first

time, the Druze were no longer the dominant

group in Lebanon.

Druze society “has never been formally

tribal but familial and factional,” and this

means power was and is held by predominant

Druze families. 40 The Arslans and the Joumblatts

dominated Lebanon, while Syria had

the Al-Atrash. Palestine was watched over by

the Halabi and the al-Din. In spite of this, the

Druze were still confident in the belief that they

could unite as “a durable survival strategy in a

threatening environment.” 41 The Turks though,

would use the split between the Arslans and the

Joumblatts. This internal strife, along with the

invasion of Ibrahim Pasha in the 1830s, left the

Druze weak.

Tensions between the Druze and the Maronites

erupted in a civil war in 1841-1842. The

conflict created “motives for revenge” and “an

increasing sense that [the Druze] must intensify

defensive measures.” 42 The French threw their

support behind the Maronites against the ‘Muslims.’

This minor civil war had implications for

the Ottomans, too. On the one hand, the Turks

“conspired to create hatred and dissent between

the two communities”; they felt that this would

make governing the Lebanese easier. 43 But they

also recognized the need for some restraint and

in 1842, established “a dual regime…to provide

an equitable administration for the Druze and

Christian populations.” 44 This partition of power

was never a viable option.

By 1846, “ a far larger number of Maronite

Christians than Druze were reported to inhabit”

Lebanon. 45 The Druze enjoyed the benefits

of the divided rule, and they had proven their

abilities in battle against the Maronites in 1841-

42. But the Maronites were upset at the power

of the Druze and were “encouraged in their

discontent by the Turks, their own clergy and

France.” 46 War finally came in 1860. The Druze,

with insufficient numbers, requested help

from the Lebanese Druze who had migrated to

southern Syria, and they came under Al-Atrash

leadership. The civil war of 1860 “was the

most horrific” of the civil wars of Lebanon’s

mid-nineteenth century, and showcased “multiple

ghastly bloodbaths.” 47 In the end, it took

European intervention to end the conflict, with

French forces deployed in Lebanon to protect

the Maronites and punish the Druze. The lives

of thousands of Druze chiefs were spared from

French vengeance by the British, which led the

Druze to hold the British with high regard. This

high regard would be shattered though, with

theinfamous Sykes-Picot Agreement” which

“delivered the Druze of Lebanon and Syria to

France” in 1916. 48

On June 9, 1861, Lebanon was made “an

autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire”

as a result of the 1860 conflict. 49 While feudalism

had officially ended, the Ottomans circumvented

the change by appointing feudal lords to

government posts. At this time, many Druze immigrated

to southern Syria, which became the

new, Jabal al-Duruz. Suwayda was transformed

into the latest Druze capital. Across the Middle

East, Druze life continued, with minor uprisings,

until the First World War.

When Turkey joined the war in 1915, it suspended

Lebanon’s autonomy. While the Druze

were not outward proponents of Arab nationalism

due to its Islamic nature, they were also

opposed to Turkish encroachment. Many Druze

fought with the Arabs. When the Allies won,

France settled in as the occupiers of Lebanon in

1918, much to the chagrin of the Druze. In 1920,

the San Remo Conference awarded France their

Mandate over Lebanon and Syria. On September

1, 1920, France announced the establishment

of Greater Lebanon. The Druze, who had once

dominated the landscape, were now “a small minority

of about six percent within the total population

of what had become Greater Lebanon.” 50

Likewise, the Druze were being marginalized in

Palestine, due to the growing tension between

Jews and the Arabs. It was in Syria, united in the

Jabal al-Duruz, where the Druze could be optimistic.

In 1922, “a separate state in Jabal Druze

was proclaimed” with its capital at Suwayda. 51

It was first governed by Salim al-Atrash, who

died in 1923. A French officer, Captain Carbillet

replaced him. It was his oppression and his

The Druze faith molded together ideas from many different sources including “Islamic

monotheism...Greek philosophy and Hindu influences.”

expulsion of Druze chiefs that catalyzed the

1925 Syrian Revolution. What began as a Druze

effort under Sultan Al-Atrash against the French

in Suwayda became a general revolt as Syrian

nationalists joined the fray. The Syrian Revolution

ended in 1927 but with Al-Atrash, they led

a revolt that showed Arabs the Druze could be

“loyal Syrians, dedicated Muslims, or patriotic

Arabs.” 52 But the revolt ended in failure, and the

Druze would have to remain content with local

autonomy. Jabal Druze as a state endured until

it was included in Syria in 1936. France recognized

Syrian independence in 1946. Without

foreign sponsors or regional allies, the Syrian

Druze were at the mercy of the Arab majority. In

1953, when dissidents began a campaign against

President Shishakli, Jabal Druze “was chosen

to signal violent revolt against Damascus.” 53

Shishakli massacred many Druze in an assault

on Suwayda, and the revolt was over by 1954.

Shishakli was soon overthrown though, and he

fled Syria. He would be killed a decade later

by Nawaf Ghazaleh, a Syrian Druze avenging

Shishakli’s Jabal campaign.

The ideology of the Ba’ath Party would be

a political tool for “mobilizing rural minority

groups into national political and military life.” 54

The Druze welcomed the concept, because they

felt it was a political cover for maximizing their

collective needs. Through this the Syrian Druze

increased and prospered admirably,” mostly on

account “of the Ba’ath Party.” 55 This is because

as long as a Syrian pledges their support “to the

fiction of a Ba’athist democracy and a socialist

economy, one can happily profit,” which most

of the Syrian Druze do. 56 But over the course of

Syrian history from its independence, it has been

the Druze’s “military vocation that captures their

communal spirit.” 57 Unfortunately, Jabal Druze

failed to develop as rapidly as other areas and

the Druze as a community failed to match the

successes of individual Druze. Whether or not

they wanted it, their fates were linked with all of


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In Lebanon, the French Mandate only stirred

the sectarian pot between the Maronites, the

Druze and newfound Sunni and Shiite Muslims.

When the French Mandate ended in 1943,

the Lebanese created the National Pact, which

was a power sharing agreement between the

different groups of Lebanon. The pact did not

clearly award a position to the Druze like the

other communities. And in the end, the National

Pact didn’t work “and served only to divide the

people.” 58

In 1949, Kamal Joumblatt formed the

Progressive Socialist Party and thrust it into

this Lebanese spectrum. The PSP was estab-

lished under the auspices

of “socialism, democracy,

secularization, and Arab

nationalism,” and its leader

advocated reform and a

common Lebanese identity.

59 Druze followers dominated

the PSP. The other

dominant political party was

Maronite Pierre Gemayel’s Kataeb. In the 1958

crisis, the Druze community of Lebanon was

The Maronite Christians

eventually began, in 1982, to

reopen old wounds with the

Druze...there were also some

problems among Druze serving

in the IDF.

split. The PSP, led by Kamal Joumblatt, “aligned

with radical Nasserite forces” while the Yazbaki

Druze, led by Emir Majid Arslan, remained

neutral. Arslan, unlike Kamal Joumblatt, was “a

staunch supporter of the government and of the

Maronite Christians.” 60 American forces arrived

in July 1958 to stop the PSP’s rebellion “against

the well-armed ‘Syrian Popular Party.’” 61 But

American policy on Lebanon was vague, until

General Fouad Shihab became Lebanon’s new

president. Lebanon then fell into a tense calm,

which erupted in 1975 with the beginning of the

Lebanese Civil War.

The Palestinians had been forcibly removed

from Jordan in 1970 by King Hussein’s army.

Their destination had been Lebanon, and the

Palestinians generally sought to supplant the

Lebanese government by enforcing the laws and

controlling matters on their terms. Kamal Joumblatt,

the socialist leader of the PSP, “aligned

his people with the Palestinian-PLO forces”

and Emir Majid Arslan opposed them, instead

believing in “system stability in Lebanon” and

disagreeing with Palestinian interference into

Lebanon’s domestic politics. 62 The Maronites

also provided some spark, as it was Maronite

President Bechara el-Khoury who admitted an

excess of Palestinian refugees. Charles Helou,

another Maronite president, signed the 1969

Cairo Agreement which “gave the PLO uncontrolled

and unrestricted freedom to attack Israel

from Lebanon” and “virtually established the

PLO as a state within the Lebanese state.” 63

Kamal Joumblatt grouped together radical

Lebanese forces into the Lebanese National

Movement in order “to confront the internationally

supported rightist Christians.” 64 The groups

included the PSP and twelve other organizations,

including communists and pro-Nasser factions,

all held together by Joumblatt. The Palestinians

were quick to throw their lot in with the Movement.

In the spring of 1975, the conflict began in

earnest. Kamal Joumblatt’s Lebanese National

Movement was initially successful, supported by

both the Palestinians and the Syrians. But soon,

in a reversal of policy, the Syrians “came to the

rescue of the rightist Christians.” 65 The Druze

“opposed the military intervention of Syria” and

Kamal Joumblatt was assassinated in 1977, possibly

by Syrian or pro-Syrian forces. 66 Kamal’s

legacy endured though, as he “sought not to

exterminate the Lebanese state but to rebuild the

political system on new foundations.” 67 Fighting

flared up after a brief calm in 1978, but the

only ones fighting were the PSP—now under

the control of Walid Joumblatt, Kamal’s son.

In March 1978, Israel sent forces into

southern Lebanon as part of Operation Litani.

This invasion led to the creation of the United

Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Israel

then added to the war by “supplying arms,

ammunition, military training, and expertise

to the Lebanese Maronites.” 68 Israel invaded

Lebanon again in June of 1982. Israel eventually

reached Beirut on June 14 th and began their

campaign against the PLO fighters though PLO

forces would be evacuated on August 21 st under

an international peacekeeping force. Bashir Gemayel,

an Israeli asset in Lebanon, was elected

to be President of Lebanon

in August of 1982, only to

be assassinated. Throughout

this period, “the Druzes, as a

community, had continued to

refrain from joining.” 69

The Maronite Christians

eventually began, in 1982, to

reopen old wounds with the

Druze. The Israeli soldiers, whether they knew

it or not, “were upsetting Lebanon’s precarious

balance among minorities seething with mutual

hatred and revenge.” 70 There were also some

problems among Druze soldiers serving in the

Israel Defense Forces who sided with the Lebanese

Druze. Maronite and Druze atrocities were

rampant, and even the neutral Yazbaki Druze

were not exempt. Since the Druze couldn’t

counterattack the Israeli-backed Maronites,

they played defense, and they were unbeatable,

“armed by Syria, assisted by the Sunnis, and

invigorated by a hardy sense of native militarism.”


President Amin Gemayal, before stepping

down in 1988, appointed General Michel

Aoun as the new Prime Minister. Competing

against a Syrian-supported

civilian government, Aoun

consolidated his power

and announced a war of

liberation against Syrian

forces in Lebanon. Walid

Joumblatt’s organization

was one of the pro-Syrian

forces that would help oust

him. The 1989 Taif Agreement acted as the

document of national reconciliation and tried

to balance out Lebanon’s confessional system.

After fifteen years, the Lebanese Civil War had

come to an end.

Since the end of the Lebanese Civil War,

Lebanon has focused on postwar reconstruction.

It has seen the disbanding of most of the

militias, which was required by UN Security

Council Resolution 1559. It saw the evacuation

of Israeli forces in May of 2000. A 2001 visit to

the Shouf by the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah

Boutros Sfeir ameliorated relations between the

ancient enemies and helped “cement a reconciliation

ending the blood feud.” 72 The 2004

Constitutional amendments allowed pro-Syrian

President Emile Lahoud to extend his term.

Joumblatt argued it was unconstitutional and

another Druze, Marwan Hamadeh, was wounded

for his opposition. It was the extension of

Lahoud’s term limits that caused “’The Bristol

Gathering,’” a meeting of Christian anti-Syrian

groups that for the first time included “previous

Syrian allies, most prominently Joumblatt.” 73

The assassination of former Prime Minister

Rafiq Haririr in 2005 sparked changes, including

the withdrawal of the Syrian troops. One of

Hariri’s staunchest allies was Walid Joumblatt,

Druze have lived in Palestine

since the beginning of the

Druze faith. The community

expanded under Fakhr al-Din

II’s rule because he encouraged

a policy to settle Druze.”

who “more openly defied Syria than Hariri.” 74

The assassination of Hariri was exactly what

Syria didn’t want because “one time enemies,

Maronites, Druze, and Sunnis” all united. 75 The

controversy behind Hariri’s assassination remains

a contentious issue and the verdict by the

Special Tribunal for Lebanon could upset Lebanon.

Walid Joumblatt’s main concern is that the

court’s indictment could lead to a Sunni and Shia

conflict, and he has gone back and forth on his

support for it.

Hizbollah, the Shi’ite political and paramilitary

group, is also a rising power in Lebanon.

Supported by Syria and Iran, and having fought

Israel in the 2006 Lebanon War, the group has

faced a strong adversary in the Druze. In 2008,

“heavy clashes erupted south of Beirut…between

mainly Shia and Druze militants.” 76 Some

Druze supporting Hizbollah also switched sides,

which proves a recurring theme: “politics suddenly

taking a backseat to deeper feelings of

loyalty to the clan…against the outsider.” 77 Israel

must be careful though in finding a common ally

with Joumblatt. While a clear majority of Israeli

Druze support military service, Walid Joumblatt

has told Israeli Druze to not enlist. Joumblatt

has also claimed “Israel was waiting for the

right conditions to attack the Arab world” and

said that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is an

Israeli proxy to attack Hizbollah and that it must

be ignored. 78 Israel should also be wary because

recently Joumblatt “reconciled with Hizbollah

leader Hassan Nasrallah,” and met with Syrian

President Bashar Al-Assad, apologizing for his

anti-Syrian rhetoric. 79

Druze have lived in Palestine since the

beginning of the Druze faith. The community

expanded under Fakhr al-Din II’s rule because

he “encouraged a policy to settle Druzes in Palestine

for defense of the southern frontiers” and

additional migrations occurred later. 80 Today’s

Druze community is mostly centered “in Western

Galilee and on the slopes of Mount Carmel”

and there is a sizeable population

of Druze in the Golan

Heights. 81 While they could

rely on the other Druze in

crises, the Druze in Palestine

still faced persecution which

inspired a tendency among

them to ally themselves with

other minorities” including

the Jews. 82 Through this tendency, the Druze

have proved to the Jews that “of all the Arab

communities in Israel the Druze are the most

loyal.” 83

The Druze community of Palestine was

extremely rural, and most Druze were peasants

in mountain villages. Their situation differed

“because they lacked organized institutions,

an educated class, economic means, and an

agreed-upon leadership.” 84 During the British

Mandate, the Druze saw the emerging conflict

as one that was “between Sunni Muslims and

Jews, a religious strife in which they had no part

and from which they could stay aloof” because

it didn’t threaten them. 85 The Jewish population

endorsed this, and by 1936, the Jews were trying

to get “the Druze [to] maintain their neutrality”

to discourage Syrian and Lebanese Druze from

joining the Arab cause. 86

By the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, an alliance

between the Druze and Jews had been cemented,

due to efforts made during the Mandate. Yitzhak

Ben-Zvi in a 1930 report, “first instituted

a policy of pursuing friendly relations with the

Druze,” and he believed “these acts of friendship

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[were] a necessary precursor to the important objective

of forming links with the [other] powerful

Druze communities.” 87 It was this policy that

ensured only a few Druze took part in the 1936-

1939 revolt. Additionally, the Druze had once

been receptive to Arab nationalism, but by 1948,

it had fallen out of favor mostly because of Arab

nationalist attacks and because of “the demand

by the Muslim Wakf in 1942 to take over control

of Jethro’s Tomb, the holiest site of the Druze.” 88

At the onset of the 1947 Civil War, the

Druze had adopted no clear policy. While some

Syrian Druze created a unit

in the Arab Liberation Army,

the Druze in Palestine mostly

remained neutral. It was this

unit, who would later tell

the Haganah of “their desire

to change sides and fight

alongside the Jews.” 89 In late

summer of 1948, the IDF created a Druze unit,

and theincorporation into the IDF of an Arabicspeaking

unit” was politically beneficial and

showed the “’faithfulness of the Druze towards

the State.’” 90

By the end of the war, many Palestinians

had fled their homes. But “almost all Palestinian

Druze remained and no Druze villagers were expelled.”

91 A Jewish-Druze alliance had been born

out of pragmatic need and fit in with a larger

Israeli policy goal of developing ties with other

Middle Eastern religious minorities. It also fit in

with the Israeli policy of ‘divide and rule,’ which

was “aimed at weaning [the Druze] away from

the larger Palestinian Arab community by fostering…the

notion that Druze ethnicity and identity

make them distinct.” 92 In a system that “allows

each religion…to govern itself in matters of

faith,” a state can show its tolerance of different

religions, but can also utilize the system to “assign

benefits…based on the individuals’ membership

to a certain ethnic or religious group.” 93

The new situation between the Druze and

Jews was not always easy, especially as immigration

to Israel increased. But the Druze chose

“co-existence,” and “campaigned vigorously for

equal rights to match those enjoyed by the Jewish

citizens.” 94 This search for rights was catapulted

forward by the “sense of the ‘covenant of

blood’ that Jews and Druze had inaugurated in

the framework of the military.” 95 The Druze had

seen “two possibilities: living as a minority in a

Jewish state, or living as a minority in a Muslim

state.” 96 Based on their historical relationship

with other Muslims, it wasn’t hard to see that

this, combined with “mainly economic” benefits,

led the Druze to the Jews. 97

This search for rights manifested itself in

“communal juridical autonomy” which came

in 1957 after Israel declared it was “extending

legal recognition to the Druzes as a religious

community.” 98 This separate religious status was

one “that neither the Ottoman government nor

the British authorities in Palestine granted the

Druzes.” 99 In 1961, Israel created a “Religious

Council for the Druze,” and Druze courts were

allowed in 1962. 100 Even a Druze Zionist Society

sprouted up. The Druze therefore separated

themselves from the other Arabs in Israel and

created an Israeli Druze identity.

Formally, the Druze were integrated into

Israel in 1970 when “Druze affairs were no

longer handled by the government departments

in charge of Arab minority matters.” 101 This

decision was also influenced by the bravery of

the Druze in the 1967 Six Day War, where the

Druze “distinguished themselves in battle.” 102

Additionally in 1975, all military classifications

were opened to Israeli Druze, which meant they

were not restricted to a “‘minorities unit’ or the

Border Police.” 103 The net effect of all these

gains was the cultivation of the Druze belief

“that military service was a positive privilege

that was bestowed only on those in whom the

government of Israel believed and trusted.” 104

Therefore, even if the economic standing of the

Druze is not on par with Jews, “because of their

military service, the economic situation of the

Druze community and its standing in the eyes

of the Jewish majority has clearly improved.” 105

General Druze dissatisfaction and feelings

of alienation still resonated amongst some

younger Druze, and their

reaction was to side with

the Arabs. This dissatisfaction

arose in the late 1950s

from economic and social

challenges. These feelings

culminated in 1972 when

the Druze Initiative Committee

surfaced, which “sought to solidify a

Druze-Arab alliance in opposition to Israel.” 106

Many people were drawn to its message because

of the low living standards and lack of

services in Druze villages, even though the

Druze had served in the IDF. The effect of the

army’s ‘covenant’ and other integration effects,

as well as “greater government interest

in the 1980s to improve the material conditions

in Druze villages,” helped Druze-Israeli relations.

107 But as long as “the basic infrastructure

for caring for the Druze community…lags far

behind that of the Jewish population,” there

will continue to be problems. 108 So, even if “the

Arabs’ [including the Druze] standard of living

has risen consistently over the years,” there

is still a significant gap between the Arabs and

the Jews. 109 Additionally, any “progress of the

Arab sector in Israel is to be measured by the

size of the disparity with the Jewish sector,” so

reducing this gap is necessary in order to create

equality for the two communities. 110

The 1982 Operation for Peace in Galilee

magnified the solidarity of the Druze. The

Druze were upset by Israeli support for the

Maronite Christians, and in 1983, they saw an

“Israeli-supported Maronite momentum in the

Shouf Mountains” which left the Druze IDF

members in “a military maneuver that threatened

their ethnic-religious community.” 111 This

By the end of the 1947 war...

“almost all Palestinian Druze

remained and no Druze villagers

were expelled.” A Jewish-

Druze alliance had been born.

led some Druze soldiers to

side with their co-religionists.

Throughout the hostilities,

the Israeli Druze tried to

show Israel that the Lebanese

Druze “neither had nor ever

had had any case against

Israel” 112 The Druze maintain their community,

and rely “upon instinctive brotherhood more

than political nationhood.” 113 Being a Druze

will always mean Druzehood over Israeli loyalty.

One of the biggest problems is the question

of the Druze in the strategic Golan Heights.

Since 1967, the Druze of the Golan Heights

have been trapped between Israel and Syria.

When most “of the 110,000 Syrians” that lived

in the Golan left in 1967, the few that remained

included nearly 13,000 Druze.” 114 In 1981, the

Golan Heights Law was passed and “the law,

jurisdiction and administration of the State” was

extended to the Golan Heights, which required

the Golan Druze to accept Israeli citizenship. 115

The Golan Druze reacted in a “six-month general

strike” that demonstrated “’steadfastness’

and unbending resistance to occupation.” 116

The Druze kept their Syrian citizenship

and contended that their “family ties with other

Druzes within Syria compelled them to dissociate

from Israel.” 117 They were acting in a rational

manner. If the Golan Heights were to be returned

to Syria, they could be persecuted for any expressed

Israeli allegiance. The Druze did not demand

much from Israel, all they asked for was a

“return to the status quo.” 118 The Golan Heights,

with the influx of Israeli settlements, is an issue

that must be addressed in any peace settlement

with Syria. But as an Arab Christian refugee,

Yusif Tannous recounted in 2000, “our Druze

brethren remained in the village and looked after

our property as best they could within the limit

allowed them.” 119 In the Golan Heights, it is

about a Golan identity over anything else. The

2006 Hizbollah War brought up another problem

as the Galilee Druze appeared to “support the

operation being waged in southern Lebanon”

while the Golan Druze said “the vast majority of

their community backs Hizbollah.” 120 Many of

the Israeli Druze argued that as long as the target

was Hizbollah and not Lebanese civilians, then it

would be supported.

One existential issue that the Druze face is

the idea of Israel as a Jewish state. Benjamin

Netanyahu has “made recognition of the legitimacy

of the Jewish nation-state a prerequisite

for any final agreement” and many other Israelis

“consider it essential that they are recognized not

just as members of a religion but also as a people

with historic rights to a sovereign state.” 121 The

problem is simple to understand in the mindset

of the Israeli Arabs. If Israel is the state of the

Jews, then “Israel is not the state of any non-

Jew living in it.” 122 If anyone should understand

the fine line between a religious identity and an

ethnicity, it should be the Druze. There is even

some evidence for Druze support for Israel as

a Jewish state, from a 2007 Druze-Circassian

forum that rejected a proposed multi-cultural

constitution and argued that they “are unwilling

to support a substantial alteration to the nature

of this state, to which [they] tied [their] destinies.”

123 Israel has come a long way in providing

for its Druze community, but it is up to Israel

to continue to work with them to address their

concerns and the equality gap.

Lasting peace between Israel and Lebanon

and Israel and Syria must consider the Druze

community as a whole, because of the communal

relationship that binds them together. When

the Shishakli regime persecuted Syrian Druzes

in 1954, Lebanese Druzes

pledged their assistance

and Syrian Druzes sought

to come to the aid of Lebanese

Druzes in 1958. Even

during the Lebanese Civil

War, Israeli Druzes wanted

to support their comrades “in the throes of the

Shouf mountain fighting.” 124 Regardless of their

geographical distance, ethno-religious ties unite

the Druze communities. And the Druze have

likewise encountered success on the political

stages of their countries.

The question of the Druze in the Golan and

their divide between Israel and Syria must be

kept in consideration, especially considering

remarks by Benjamin Netanyahu that “Israel

will never withdraw from the Golan Heights.” 125

This, coupled with the fact that “for the first

time, the number of Jewish settlers in the Golan

may soon exceed the nearly 20,000 Arab residents,”

may cause lingering problems. 126 There

are some glimmers of hope though for the Druze

in the Golan Heights. A 2004 trade deal overseen

The question of the Druze in

the Golan and their divide

between Israel and Syria must

be kept in consideration.

- Continued on Next Page -

Page 16

- Continued from Previous Page -

by Ariel Sharon allows Druze to exchange their

apple crops with Syria. This deal has allowed

Syria to “show sovereignty over the occupied

region and solidarity with its people” and has

given Israel a “glimmer of the open borders and

free trade” that could be possible under a peace

treaty. 127 It is confidence building measures such

as these that “have a part to play in a gradual,

mutual de-demonization” that is necessary for

any peace agreement. 128

In a similar sense, any agreement leading to

the creation of an independent Palestinian state

must keep the Israeli Druze in mind. Recently,

the absence of Druze participation…in the

peace process…frustrates many Druze” because

they have continued to show their loyalty. The

Druze also have a significant influence on Israeli

politics even though “the Israeli Druze com-

prise 1.6 percent of the total population.” 129 In

the 2009 elections, five Druze candidates were

elected to the Knesset, “a totally disproportionate

number, considering the tiny size of their

population.” 130 If the Druze are to live in peace

with a Palestinian state, then the Palestinians

must recognize the historical ties the Druze

have with Israel and temper resentment for the

privileges the Druze have enjoyed. An Israeli-

Druze identity has been created, through military

service, patriotism, and a host of benefits

from the Israeli government. Israel must reinforce

this commitment and improve it, no matter

where the peace process goes.

Because “the state system and political map

of the region have been finalized,” the Druze

have shown the world “that survival does not

depend on having an independent state” and

that instead, survival can come “by striving for

integration and equality within the countries.” 131

1 Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, New York:

Penguin, 2008, Print, 81.

2 Laqueur and Rubin, 82

3 Naim Aridi, “The Druze in Israel,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 Dec 2002, Web. 24 Oct. 2010, .

4 Kais Firro, The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History, Leiden: Brill, 1999, Print, 2.

5 Kirsten E. Schulze, Martin Stokes, and Colm Campbell, Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Rights in the

Middle East, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996, Print, 153.

6 Aridi.

7 Israel, “Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010: Population, by Religion Table 2.2, by Shlomo

Yitzhaki, The State of Israel, Sept. 2010. Web, 28 Nov. 2010. .

8 Firro, The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History, 5.

9 Najib Alamuddin, Turmoil: The Druzes, Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, London: Quartet, 1993, Print, 44.

10 Nejla Abu-Izzeddin, The Druzes: A New Study of Their History, Faith, and Society., Leiden: Brill, 1993, Print, 111.

11 Firro, The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History, 12.

12 Alamuddin, 46.

13 Firro, The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History, 14.

14 Aridi.

15 Firro, The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History, 14-15.

16 Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, Jefferson: McFarland & Co.,

2002, Print. p. 93.

17 Ibid, 96.

18 Ibid.

19 Firro, The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History, 15.

20 Ibid, 16.

21 Ibid, 16.

22 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 96-97.

23 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 97.

24 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 96.

25 Alamuddin, 59.

26 Abu-Izzeddin, 119.

27 Alamuddin, 57.

28 Abu-Izzeddin,123.

29 Alamuddin, 63.

30 Alamuddin, 64.

31 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 97.

32 Ibid, 96.

33 Ibid, 99

34 Abu-Izzeddin, 134.

35 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 99.

36 Alamuddin, 82

Abu-Izzeddin, 192.

37 Abu-Izzeddin, 197.

38 Alamuddin, 100.

39 Ibid, 103.

40 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 94.

41 Ibid, 94.

42 Alamuddin, 117.

43Alamuddin, 121.

44 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 100.

45 Ibid.

46 Alamuddin, 128.

47 Ibid, 132.

48 Ibid, 11.

49 Ibid, 133.

50 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 102.

51 Ibid, 103.

52 Ibid, 104.

53 Ibid, 105.

54 Ibid, 105.

55 Robert Brenton Betts, The Druze, New Haven: Yale UP, 1988, Print. 110.

Milton Esman and Itamar Rabinovich, Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988, Print,


56 Betts, 110.

57 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 105- 106

58 Alamuddin, 151.

59Esman and Rabiniovic, 194.

60 Alamuddin, 157.

61 Ibid.

62 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 107.

63 Alamuddin, 168.

64 Ibid, 169.

65 Ibid, 176.

66 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 108.

67 Yusri Hazran, “Lebanon’s Revolutionary Era: Kamal Junblat, The Druze Community and the Lebanon State, 1949 to 1977,”

The Muslim World 100.1 (2010): 157-76, Wiley Online Library, John Wiley & Sons, 19 Jan. 2010. Web, 23 Nov. 2010. .

68 Alamuddin, 182.

69 Ibid, 188.

70 Ibid, 189.

71 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 108.

72 Ed Blanche, “Syrian Pullout Brings No Respite for Lebanon,” The Middle East: 1-4,

The CBS Interactive Business Network, Sept. 2001, Web, 24 Nov. 2010, 1. .

73 Michael Young, “Ghosts of Beirut,” Foreign Policy, The Washington Post Company, 29 Mar. 2010. Web, 24 Oct. 2010, 2.


74 Young, 2.

75 Michael Dunn, “A Beirut Spring,” The Estimate (24 Mar. 2005), Middle East Institute, Web, 23 Nov. 2010. .

76 Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanese Army Caught in Crossfire between Druze and Hezbollah Gunmen,” The Times Online,

News Corporation, 12 May 2008. Web, 15 Nov. 2010, 1. .

77 Nicholas Blanford, “Hizballah’s Toughest Foe in Lebanon,” Time Magazine, Time Warner, 13 May 2008. Web, 24 Oct.

2010. .

78 Patrick Seale, “Rumors of War,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,

The CBS Interactive Business Network, July 2010. Web, 24 Nov. 2010, 1. .

79 George Baghdadi, “Lebanese Leader Eyes Return to Syrian Fold,” CBS News, CBS Broadcasting Company, 31 Mar.

2010. Web, 23 Nov. 2010. .

80 Alamuddin, 204.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Betts, 110.

84 Zeidan Atashi, “The Druze in Israel and the Question of Compulsory Military Service,” The Jerusalem Letter 464 (2001),

Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 15 Oct. 2001. Web, 24 Oct. 2010. .

85 Firro, The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History, 22.

86 Firro, The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History, 25.

87 Schulze, Stokes, and Campbell, 146.

88 Atashi, “The Druze in Israel and the Question of Compulsory Military Service.”

89 Schulze, Stokes, and Campbell, 148.

90 Ibid, 150.

91 Ibid, 152.

92 Kais Firro, “Reshaping Druze Particularism in Israel,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30.3 (2001): 40-53, Print, 41.

93 Linda M. Kassem, “The Construction of Druze Ethnicity: Druze in Israel between State Policy and Palestinian Arab Nationalism,”

Diss. Ed. Laura Jenkins, University of Cincinnati, 2005, OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center,

The Ohio Library and Information Network, Web. 24 Oct. 2010, 13. .

94 Alamuddin, 206.

95 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 109.

96 Laila Parsons, The Druze between Palestine and Israel, 1947-49. London:

Macmillan, 2000, Print, 143.

97 Parsons, 142-143.

98 Firro, “Reshaping Druze Particularism in Israel,” 45.

99 Jacob Landau, The Arabs in Israel: A Political Study, London: Oxford UP, 1969,

Print, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 13.

100 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 109.

101 Betts, 101.

102 Landau, 13.

103 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 110.

104 Atashi, “The Druze in Israel and the Question of Compulsory Military Service.”

105 Ibid.

106 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 110.

107 Ibid, 112.

108 Nissim Dana, The Druze in the Middle East: Their Faith, Leadership, Identity and Status, Brighton: Sussex Academic,

2003, Print, 113.

109Asʻad Ghanem, The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 1948-2000: A Political Study, Albany: State University of

New York, 2001, Print, 3.

110 Ghanem, 44.

111 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 110.

112 Zeidan Atashi, Druze & Jews in Israel: A Shared Destiny?, Brighton: Sussex Academic, 1997, Print, 146-147.

113 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression,112.

114 R. Scott Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13.2

(1984): 48-64, Print, 50.

115 Laqueur and Rubin, 239.

116 Sakr Abu Fakhr, “Voices from the Golan,” Journal of Palestine Studies 29.4 (2000): 5-36, Print, 7.

117 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression,111.

118 Kennedy, 59.

119 Abu Fakhr, 11.

120 Jonathan Finer, “For Druze Across Middle East, Loyalty Depends on Location,” The Washington Post, The Washington

Post Company, 25 July 2006. Web. 23 Nov. 2010. .

121 Isabel Kershner, “Some Question Insistence on Israel as Jewish State,” New York Times, 24 Oct. 2010. Web. 26 Oct.

2010, 1. .

122 Boas Evron, “Community as a State,” Palestine-Israel Journal 1.2 (1994), Print, 1.

123 Yoav Stern, “Druze, Circassian Forum: Israel Should Remain a Jewish State,” Haaretz Schlocken Family, 3 Jan.

2007, Web. 24 Nov. 2010, 1. .

124 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 112.

125 Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu: Israel Will Never Withdraw from Golan,” Haaretz, Schlocken Family, 5 Aug. 2009, Web. 23

Nov. 2010. .

126 Scott Wilson, “Golan Heights Land, Lifestyle Lure Settlers,” The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, 30

Oct. 2006, Web. 22 Nov. 2010. .

127 “Israel and the Golan Heights: A Would-be Happy Link with Syria,” The Economist, The Economist Group, 19 Feb.

2009. Web. 24 Nov. 2010. .

128 “Israel and the Golan Heights: A Would-be Happy Link with Syria.”

129 Atashi. Druze & Jews in Israel: A Shared Destiny?, 142.

130 Yoav Stern, “Elections 2009 / Druze Likely to Comprise 5% of next Knesset, despite Small Population,” Haaretz,

Schlocken Family, 1 Jan. 2009. Web. 24 Nov. 2010. .

131 Mordechai Nisan, “The Minority Plight,” The Middle East Quarterly 3.3 (1996): 25-34, Print.

Atashi, Druze & Jews in Israel: A Shared Destiny?, 186.

132 Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel’s Control of a National Minority, Austin: University of Texas, 1982, Print,


133 Atashi, Druze & Jews in Israel: A Shared Destiny?, xiv.

134 Laqueur and Rubin, 82.

135 Atashi, Druze & Jews in Israel: A Shared Destiny?, 189.

Page 17

Figure 1

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peace treaty, or one country adjusts its strategy

according to how it is faring. Figure 1

Notice that while diplomacy does not have to

settle the conflict, it is deemed to have succeeded

if the countries avoid war. Likewise, diplomacy

is not listed as a war strategy, and is instead

assumed to operate on a different level, always

remaining an option between the belligerents.

Note that guerrilla warfare is treated as a mostly

defensive tactic to be used in one’s own country.

It should also be mentioned that the exporting of

terrorism is excluded in this model.

Once both states are at war, that is, once diplomacy

has failed, the situation collapses to

zero-sum game; in a war, one country seeks to

maximize its chance of winning and its opponent

seeks to minimize this.

Ghost deterrence: deterrence without a deterring


The conflict revolved around control

over the Falklands islands. 7 During the war,

Britain had absolute nuclear superiority and a

strong conventional superiority over Argentina. 8

Argentina was, however, far from a weak conventional

power. Historically, both decided to

wage a conventional war, which Britain won. 9

What does a mathematical model reveal about

this choice? Let P(V) represent the probability

of victory for Britain. Britain wants to maximize

this probability, and Argentina wants to minimize

it. Since Britain has conventional superiority,

its probability of victory using conventional

warfare is P(V) > 0.5 (it has a more than an even

chance of winning).

If it uses nuclear weapons, the probability

of victory for Britain initially appears to

be P(V)=1. Since Argentina does not possess

nuclear weapons, a conventional or guerrilla war

could only be sustained in the Falklands as long

as Britain does not use nuclear weapons. Argentina

is led to take a hypothetical threat of nuclear

war very seriously, and it must not push Britain

too far. However, if Britain were to use nuclear

weapons, the resulting world reaction would

be calamitous. This is hard to quantify, but a

conventional victory over Argentina would be

preferable for Britain. Sinking the islands with

nuclear fire would not be a winning solution for

Britain. Indeed, the effectiveness of a nuclear

strike is in some sense irrelevant here; what matters

is the severe international backlash that the

use of atomics would entail. Thus, a very conservative

estimate would represent the probability

of a British victory using nuclear weapons

as P(V) = 0.1. This is in keeping with a highly

conservative estimate that the Falklands would

be worth one tenth of their value in terms of

power politics after a nuclear strike. The actual

number is mathematically unimportant, as long

as it is agreed that a nuclear strike on Argentina

would be less profitable than a conventional

fight, given British conventional superiority.

The key conclusion is that even though

the use of nuclear weapons maximizes Britain’s

chance of defeating Argentina militarily, it is

not an optimal choice for winning the war. The

international system is seen to have a strong

effect in curbing the use of these weapons by

making them unpalatable. The fact that the

international system is able to force a state to

expand significant conventional means and risk

its army instead of utilizing nuclear weapons

for a quick victory with no casualties on its side

is a clear argument against the weakness of the

international system.

Would Argentina be able to use guerilla

warfare? The answer is most likely no, due to

two facts: first, the Welsh population was not

clearly on its side, second its main military

strength was not based in the Falklands. 10 Offensive

guerrilla warfare is almost an impossibility

given conventional weapons. A small

group of commandoes can only operate for so

long in an unfriendly and unknown environment,

without local help to replenish supplies

and hide them. As such, P(V) = 0.9 in this case.

Mathematically, both Argentina and

Britain should pursue a saddle point strategy.

Following a pure strategy Nash equilibrium,

that is, playing a saddle point strategy when a

saddle point is present, has been proven to be

the most optimal strategy. 11 Table 1

In the erroneous model above, if P(V) =1 for

nuclear war, Britain would follow a saddle point

strategy and choose nuclear war, while Argentina

would choose conventional warfare to

minimize its loss. The nuclear war option would

be what is dubbed a “dominating column” as all

of its entries are superior or equal to the equiva-

Table 1

Table 2

lent option in the other column. 12 It is clear that

Britain will always play a dominating column as

a strategy. The impact of this erroneous model

would be to always declare nuclear war if one

had nuclear weapons. However, this is clearly

not the case. Nuclear weapons have not been

used in any wars since their use in World War

Two, yet numerous wars were fought since then

with at least one side having nuclear weapons.

Table 2

In this model, conventional war becomes the

dominating column; Britain will thus choose

conventional war, and Argentina will choose

conventional war. This is exactly what happened

in the Falklands War.

Here, a hypothetical Argentina is not able to

establish nuclear deterrence through an arsenal

of nuclear weapons, but because the very act of

using nuclear weapons for a hypothetical Britain

carries costs that are too high to bear. From this

model, deterrence can work if Argentina, or any

other country, keeps the war localized and does

not let it escalate. If Argentina pushes Britain too

far and British security becomes seriously threatened,

this ability of deterrence without nuclear

weapons quickly diminishes. The ability to deter

a nuclear attack without nuclear weapons will

be called “ghost deterrence.” In effect, it is not

deterrence by the state in question, nor the fact

that the system as a whole will move against the

use of atomic weapons, but more the belief and

the fear that the system will do just this. 13 This

reveals a certain stability in the international system.

The international system shackles a country’s

ability to wage war; in this light, realism’s

claims about an anarchic international system

must be re-assessed.

However, this is completely dependent

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Page 20

Table 3

Table 4

- Continued from Previous Page -

upon the fact that Britain has conventional

superiority over Argentina. Let a hypothetical

war be declared between Country A and

Country B, where Country A has overwhelming

conventional superiority and Country B has

nuclear weapons. “Ghost deterrence” does not

apply here because both states are faced with a

credible and time sensitive threat to their very

existence. Realists would argue that this makes

the international system weak. This, however,

overlooks that deterrence is an evolving factor

and that weakness in this extreme case does not

imply weakness in another, such as the Falklands

War example. Table 3

In this case, because Row 1 Column 2

is a saddle point, where country A will choose

to fight a conventional war and country B will

choose to fight using nuclear weapons. This is

similar to the situation in WWII. 14 The U.S. saw

Japan as having conventional superiority in their

home islands. They predicted very heavy casualties

if they invaded, and instead decided to use

atomic bombs. 15,16 Furthermore, the decision to

drop the second bomb clearly undermines the

argument that nuclear weapons were used because

their potential was not well known. It was

used precisely because its potential had been

proven to be immense by the utter destruction of

Hiroshima. 17 The mathematical model reveals an

incentive to strike with nuclear weapons. This

situation is quite troubling, and is at odds with

Waltz’s view that nuclear weapons will not be

used in wars. 18 Indeed, the fact that many developing

countries are numerically superior, seen as

willing to take very heavy losses, and unlikely to

have nuclear weapons casts further nuclear proliferation

in a bleak light. 19 Not all realist explanations

are in agreement with Waltz’s, however,

so this is not a completely scathing critique. 20

It is apparent that conflicts must be localized

and that the stability of countries is to be

guaranteed for this system to work. As soon as

a country faces the possibility of extinction, it

will weigh the cost-benefit ratio of nuclear war

and decide it must use its full arsenal. If Argentina

had launched attacks on Britain directly, the

British decision to fight solely a conventional

war could have been overturned. However, by

keeping the conflict isolated to a region that was

not vital for Britain’s survival, a non-nuclear

state like Argentina could have been victorious

over a nuclear-armed state. Two examples of

this are Korea and Vietnam. “Ghost deterrence”

worked in these two countries because the

United States was rightly fearful of the repercussions

of using nuclear arms in conflicts that did

not challenge their ability to function as a state. 21

The realist model argues just this. It states that

wars are essentially about balance of power and

that the states’ existence must not be gambled.

The fallacy of the single model

One key aspect of these mathematical

models is that each side will construct its own

table of options and associated cost-benefits,

based on its analysis of the situation. What one

country might see as vital to their self-preservation,

another might believe not to be worth

a fight. As opponents misunderstanding each

other, nuclear war becomes more likely. As has

been shown, nuclear weapons do not prevent localized

conventional wars. However, these wars

have a possibility to escalate as one side begins

to lose. Each side will see such an escalation

differently. One such extreme miscalculation

was Imperial Japan’s hope that Pearl Harbor

would demonstrate Japan’s superiority in such

a crushing way that the United States would not

engage in prolonged warfare. With this in mind,

a miscalculation becomes the greatest risk; the

belligerents are forced to prevent escalation and

fight at whatever level is established. Realism

concludes that nuclear weapons make states far

more careful. What the mathematical models

reveal is that nuclear wars do not necessarily

prevent wars; they simply greatly encourage

the non-nuclear power to play its cards at a low

level to maximize its chance of victory. This

goes against Kenneth Waltz’ conclusion that

nuclear weapons prevent wars. The difference

of valuation makes escalation of a conflict to a

nuclear threshold quite possible.

Nuclear deterrence: lessons from the Cuban

Missile Crisis

In this section of the paper, the following four

claims are made about the Cuban Missile Crisis:

1- At the time, U.S. strategists believed that the

Soviet ground army would defeat the combined

Table 5

Table 6

Table 7

European and U.S. forces deployed in Europe in

48-72 hours. 22

2- A Soviet nuclear first strike would not be devastating

enough to prevent at least a partial U.S.


3- A U.S. nuclear first strike would not be devastating

enough to prevent at least a partial Soviet


4- A U.S. conventional first strike would not give

a large advantage to the U.S.

5- A Soviet conventional first strike would not

give a large advantage to the Soviet Union.

Table 4

This is the only information the U.S. has since it

does not know whether the Soviet Union is rational

and how it values each option. Table 5

The U.S. picks Column 1 both if they play

their prudent strategy (which seeks to minimize

losses) and their optimist strategy (which seeks

to maximize gains). Diplomacy is a dominating


Similarly, this is the only information the Soviet

Union will use, as it will not risk its existence

on the rationality and possible valuations of the

United States. Table 6

The Soviet Union picks row 1 both if they play

a prudent strategy and an optimistic strategy.

Diplomacy is a dominating row for the Soviet

Union. Diplomacy-diplomacy is a saddle point.

If diplomacy had not been seen as fair to both as

in the table underneath (perhaps if the U.S. had

not promised the removal of the Jupiter missiles

from Turkey) a Soviet conventional attack could

have been favored. Table 7

The realist explanation that the Soviet Union, as

an unbalancing force, was bound to remove the

missiles does not completely fit with this model.

According to realism, the balance of power

favors the status quo. The Soviet Union was not

powerful enough to challenge the U.S. so close

to the U.S.’s interests, and the Soviet Union

retreated to avoid global war because its vital

interests were not at play. However, this view

that the Soviet Union had been completely politically

defeated is only half true. 23 Granted, the

Soviet Union realized that the U.S. considered

its vital interests to be threatened and adjusted

their payoff as such. However, the removal of

the missiles from Turkey was “an integral part of

the agreement on which the crisis was resolved”,

as outlined at the tripartite conference in Moscow

in January 1989 (which involved Cuban,

Page 21

Soviet, and American historians and prominent

figures). 24 Indeed, Andrei Gromyko stated that

the Soviet Union had a solid foundation to consider

that their removal was part of the terms on

which the crisis was resolved.” 25 Diplomacy is

always the strategically favorable outcome, and

wars only start when diplomacy fails. A policy

of partial appeasement is a logically viable

course of action, but only if the winning side is

willing to offer a face-saving compromise. The

fact that the Soviets accepted the humiliation

of the Cuban Missile Crisis goes a long way to

show that asymmetric concessions can be successful.

Realism draws the right conclusion in

stating that states should not upset the balance of

1 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great

Power politics, New York: W. W. Norton &

Company, 2001, 14, 22.

2 Herbert Gintis, Game Theory Evolving: A

Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling

Strategic Interaction, New Jersey: Princeton

University Press, 2009, xvi.

3 Ubiratan D’Ambrosio, “Mathematics and

Peace: Our Responsibilities,” Introduction to

special section, “Analyses: Mathematics, Peace

and Ethics,” eds. U. D’Ambrosio and M. Marmé,

in Zentralblatt für Didaktik der Mathematik

98, no. 3, June 1998: 64, 94.

John L. Casti, Reality Rules: 1 Picturing the

World in mathematics-The Fundamentals, New

York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1992, 3.

4 D’Ambrosio, 64, 94.

5 Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A.

Simmons, Handbook of International Relations,

London: SAGE Publications, 2005, 188.

6 Jürgen Scheffran, “Calculated Security?

Mathematical Modelling of Conflict and Cooperation”.

From Dina A. Zinnes, John V. Gillespie, Mathematical

Models in International Relations,

Abingdon: Praeger Publishers, 1976, 390.

7 Ibid, 5.

power without being seriously opposed. However,

it does not point out that in such conflicts,

promoting a diplomatic solution with some reciprocity

remains the key to a stable system. In

effect, the main flaw with realism is to assume

that reciprocal nuclear war is very unlikely. 26 If

the diplomatic option is non-existent and conventional

forces are seen as lacking, a country

may believe it has no choice but to use nuclear



In effect, realism consistently understates the

key role played by diplomacy and the international

system. A game theoretic approach

8 Daniel K. Gibran, The Falklands War: Britain

Versus the Past in the South Atlantic, Jefferson:

McFarland & Company, Inc., 1998, 81.

9 Ibid, 1.

10 Ibid, 18, 77.

11 E. Arthur Robinson and Daniel Ullman,

Mathematics and Politics, Unpublished, version

7/10/08, chapter 15, p. 1.

12 Gintis, 108.

13 David Shukman, Tomorrow’s War: the

Threat of High-Technology Weapons, New

York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1996, 51.

14 Louis Morton, “The Decision to Use the

Atomic Bomb:, From Robert J. Art and Kenneth

N. Waltz, The Use of Force: Military Power

and International Politics, Maryland: Rowman

& Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2009,189.

15 Morton, 181,183.

16 Sir George Sansom, Japan’s Fatal Blunder,

from Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, The

Use of Force: Military Power and International

Politics, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,

Inc, 2009,177.

17 Louis Morton, 191.

18 Kenneth Waltz, “More May be Better”, From

Scott D. Sagan, Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread

of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate Renewed, (New

acknowledges this role. It is by no means an

optimistic model as the coefficients for a peaceful

solution are not high. However, it takes a

more nuanced approach. It factors that the costs

of war become higher with the rising threat of

nuclear war, 27 the threat of asymmetric conflicts,

the rising economic costs of employing a hightechnology

conventional army, the growing

international distaste towards war-making as an

extension of politics, and a zero-loss mentality

towards warfare. 28 As the costs of war rise,

diplomacy and the international system become

more viable solutions -- something that realism

does not take into account.

York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 45.

19 David Shukman, 16.

20 Ibid, 27.

21 Morton H. Halperin, “The Korean War”, from

Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Use of

Force: Military Power and International Politics,

Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,

Inc, 2009, 202-203.

22 Magnus Clarke, The Nuclear Destruction

of Britain, London: Billing and Sons Limited,

1982, 116.

23 Jonathan Schell, The Seventh Decade:

the New Shape of Nuclear Danger, New York:

Metropolitan Books, 2007, 133.

24 David A. Welch, James G. Blight, and

Bruce J. Allyn, “The Cuban Missile Crisis”,

From Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, The

Use of Force: Military Power and International

Politics, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,

Inc, 2009, 226.

25 Ibid.

26 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations:

The Struggle for Power and Peace, New

York: McGraw-Hill, 2006, 6.

27 Schell, 10.

28 Shukman, 13, 49-50.

Perspectives on International Relations

Editorial Board

Johns Hopkins Undergraduate Research Journal

The Importance of Multifaith Dialogue in the Middle East

In a nonconventional fashion, we will begin this editorial about

Middle Eastern peace with a true antidotal story about a small nonprofit

organization in West Africa, Africa Consultants International

(ACI). Since 1984 ACI has worked extensively on a variety of mat-

One might wonder why the

language of Senegalese peace

builders is remotely relevant

to the Middle East?

ters including HIV-AIDS

and reproductive health

initiatives in Senegal. Peer

NGO’s had been involved in

peace building in the region,

and ACI was involved in

issues of social justice as well. In the late 2000s, ACI successfully

revolutionized the logic and impetus behind peace building.

Prior to the late 2000s, conflict-transformation in Senegal had

been encouraged by – among other voices – a variety of non-

Wolof and non-French speaking interests. In Dakar, several high

caliber peace-building programs existed, but were not offered in

local languages. ACI, in partnership with the United States Agency

for International Development, the British Embassy, and a handful

of other non-profits began a process in which they developed a

high-caliber peace-building curriculum in French. This curriculum

was implemented in 2009, and soon after they began training peace

builders from across West Africa.

One might wonder why the language of Senegalese peace builders

is remotely relevant to the Middle East? The answer is in ACI’s

curricula-revolution where lessons and ideas for Middle Eastern

peace exist.

The common theme between Senegalese (before ACI’s initial

contributions) and Middle Eastern conflict-negotiation is that they

were deeply mired in dialogue barriers, though the substantive nature

of the conflicts themselves differed. In West Africa, the Senegalese

Wolof speakers and the Cote d’Ivoire francophones could not

be effectively trained by the English speaking peace-builders. This,

in turn, meant they could not effectively build peace among groups

and within communities. On a more theoretical level, in the Middle

Page 22

East, we find that both the conflict and the peace building efforts

are marred by a lack of religious dialogue. More simply, the lack

of interfaith dialogue within the region is a significant perpetuating

factor of the conflict.

Now, using the same logic as ACI – how can one most effectively

contribute to improving the status quo in the Middle East?

We assert that a key to the Middle Eastern peace process lies in dialogue

and communication between religions. There is a significant

component of the conflict that is rooted in religious ideals and religiously

shaped cultural traditions. The Abrahamic faiths that define

the Middle East must learn to speak to each other in the interests of

peace building.

This dialogue must exist on two tiers, neither more important

than the other. We believe the dialogue should exist at the highest

governmental level so that diplomacy between states can be

productive. As in all negotiations, a complete understanding of the

subject material is necessary for concession and conviction in arguments.

As climate change negotiation lends itself to the quantitative

prowess of technical negotiators, Middle Eastern negotiators must

understand the religions that define the region. And we believe

there is no better way to understand religion than through interfaith


The second tier of dialogue must be inter- and intra-population.

We stress that intra-country dialogue is important because within

one state there often exists great religious and cultural diversity.

Why transcend borders when there may be fantastic cultural and

religious diversity within a country? Looking for more parallels to

Middle Eastern peace and West African peace building, we find it

telling that peace builders were trained to work with two populations

within the same state and nation in Africa. However, of course interpopulation

dialogue is also important in the peace process.

Because America has played a large role in foregoing Middle

Eastern peace in the last century, we turn our attention to American

interfaith gestures. In particular, President Obama launched

an interfaith initiative, “inviting institutions of higher education to

commit to a year of interfaith cooperation and community service

programming on campus.” What better a place to encourage multifaith

dialogue than in America’s academic and intellectual repositories,

that are often simultaneously so religiously and ethnically

diverse? Secondly, the International Institute of Education – a close

collaborator of the State Department – has recently started administering

a fellowship (the Ibrahim Leadership and Dialogue Project) to

promote multifaith understanding in the Middle East. Students of all

Abrahamic faiths visit Saudi Arabia and Israel in the same journey,

and exemplify the religious tolerance that exists in the United States.

We see these two initiatives as a part of a potential future wave

of interfaith dialogue. As West Africa taught – the solution to any

conflict begins with dialogue and understanding.

Page 23

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