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MANAGEMENT SUPPORT<br />

Stephan Stubner/Torsten Wulf/Harald Hungenberg*<br />

MANAGEMENT SUPPORT AND THE PERFORMANCE OF<br />

ENTREPRENEURIAL START-UPS – AN EMPIRICAL ANALY-<br />

SIS OF NEWLY FOUNDED COMPANIES IN GERMANY<br />

ABSTRACT<br />

We analyze <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>fered by venture capital<br />

firms <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>. Based on <strong>the</strong> reasoning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

resource-based view, we use a sample <strong>of</strong> 106 German <strong>start</strong>-up companies to derive <strong>and</strong><br />

empirically test several hypo<strong>the</strong>ses. Our results show that <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>fered by venture capital firms has an impact on <strong>start</strong>-up <strong>performance</strong>. However,<br />

we cannot find clear moderating effects <strong>of</strong> founder team <strong>and</strong> company-specific<br />

variables. We discuss <strong>and</strong> interpret <strong>the</strong>se results <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir implications for practice.<br />

JEL-Classification: C42, L14, L25, L84, M13.<br />

Keywords: Empirical Analysis; Entrepreneurial Start-<strong>ups</strong>; Management Support; Venture<br />

Capital Firm.<br />

1 INTRODUCTION<br />

Entrepreneurial <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> are those newly founded companies that try to enter, or sometimes<br />

even open up, a market with innovative products or services. In <strong>the</strong>ir earliest development<br />

stages, <strong>the</strong>se <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> are very <strong>of</strong>ten hampered by a scarcity <strong>of</strong> critical resources,<br />

<strong>of</strong> which fi nancial capital <strong>and</strong> <strong>management</strong> capacity are <strong>the</strong> most predominant (Köhler<br />

(2003)). Many researchers note that <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> capacity, defi ned as a lack<br />

<strong>of</strong> individuals who possess <strong>the</strong> knowledge, capabilities, <strong>and</strong> experience necessary to h<strong>and</strong>le<br />

leadership <strong>and</strong> day-to-day <strong>management</strong> problems, has a negative eff ect on <strong>the</strong> development<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> (Klemm (1988); Wupperfeld <strong>and</strong> Kulicke (1993); Arndt (1995); Schefczyk<br />

(1999a); Hellmann <strong>and</strong> Becker (2000); Schefczyk (2000a); Strascheg (2001)). Th eir<br />

* Stephan Stubner, Research Assistant, <strong>and</strong> Torsten Wulf, Pr<strong>of</strong>essor, Chair <strong>of</strong> Strategic Management <strong>and</strong> Organisation,<br />

H<strong>and</strong>elshochschule Leipzig, Jahnallee 59, 04109 Leipzig, e-mail: stephan.stubner@hhl.de; torsten.wulf@<br />

hhl.de. Harald Hungenberg, Pr<strong>of</strong>essor, Friedrich-Alex<strong>and</strong>er-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Lehrstuhl für Unternehmensführung,<br />

Lange Gasse 20, 90403 Nürnberg, e-mail: hungenberg@wiso.uni-erlangen.de.<br />

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MANAGEMENT SUPPORT<br />

reasoning is that because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> shortage <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> capacity <strong>the</strong> founders are, among<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r things, forced to take care <strong>of</strong> all operational tasks, such as recruiting personnel,<br />

setting up marketing plans, or legal issues, instead <strong>of</strong> devoting <strong>the</strong>ir time <strong>and</strong> energy to<br />

improving products <strong>and</strong> services or developing <strong>the</strong> market (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, <strong>and</strong><br />

Woo (1991); Zemke (1995); Schefczyk <strong>and</strong> Pankotsch (2002)).<br />

Venture capital (VC) fi rms have long since become aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> problems that <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong>ten face during <strong>the</strong> early stages. Th erefore, most venture capital fi rms nowadays not<br />

only <strong>of</strong>f er <strong>the</strong>ir clients fi nancial capital, but also <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> (Amit, Glosten,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Muller (1990); Busenitz, Moesel, <strong>and</strong> Fiet (1997); Casamatta (2001); Jain (2001)).<br />

Th is <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> not only includes knowledge transfer in specifi c fi elds, such as<br />

strategic <strong>management</strong>, organization design, marketing or process streamlining, but also<br />

networking activities or coaching founders <strong>and</strong> senior managers (Geigenberger (1999);<br />

Schefczyk (2000b); Feinendegen et al. (2001); Nathusius (2001); Brinkrolf (2002)). Th e<br />

VC fi rms <strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>and</strong> also anecdotal stories about successful <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> in <strong>the</strong> press <strong>and</strong><br />

consultants’ reports, constantly stress <strong>the</strong> positive eff ect that <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> has on<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> (Barney et al. (1996)). As a consequence, <strong>the</strong> relevance <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> for <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> is now widely accepted. Many <strong>start</strong><strong>ups</strong><br />

even state that <strong>the</strong>y actively search for both fi nancial capital <strong>and</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong><br />

when cooperating with a venture capital fi rm <strong>and</strong> that <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong> real benefi t is expected<br />

from <strong>the</strong> latter (Mittendorfer (2001); Stadler (2001); Strascheg (2001)).<br />

Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> few empirical studies that do analyze <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> show inconsistent results<br />

(Sapienza <strong>and</strong> Gupta (1994)). Some studies <strong>support</strong> <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> a positive relationship<br />

between <strong>the</strong> two variables (Sapienza <strong>and</strong> Timmons (1989a); Sapienza <strong>and</strong> Timmons<br />

(1989b); Sapienza (1992); Schefczyk (2000a); Schefczyk (2000b)). O<strong>the</strong>rs fi nd diff erent<br />

results <strong>and</strong> conclude that no clear relationship exists (Rosenstein et al. (1989); Rosenstein<br />

et al. (1993); Barney et al. (1996)). Additionally, most research on this subject is not<br />

done from <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up, but from <strong>the</strong> viewpoint <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> VC fi rm, <strong>and</strong> is<br />

focused on North American companies (Sapienza <strong>and</strong> Timmons (1989a); Sweeting <strong>and</strong><br />

Wong (1997); Schefczyk (1999b)). Th us, it seems that so far, no research has suffi ciently<br />

explored <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong><br />

<strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>, <strong>and</strong> especially not for non-U.S. fi rms.<br />

For this reason, our main aim in this paper is to present <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> an empirical study<br />

that analyzes <strong>the</strong> contribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by venture capital fi rms to<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> in Germany. We base our study on a survey<br />

<strong>of</strong> founders <strong>and</strong> managers <strong>of</strong> a sample <strong>of</strong> 106 German <strong>start</strong>-up companies. In Section 2,<br />

we provide an overview <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical positions that have been used in o<strong>the</strong>r studies<br />

to explain <strong>the</strong> relevance <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> for <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong><br />

<strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>. We show that <strong>the</strong> resource-based view is a particularly relevant perspective for<br />

<strong>the</strong> research question at h<strong>and</strong>. Th us, from a resource-based viewpoint, we derive <strong>and</strong><br />

empirically test several hypo<strong>the</strong>ses on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>. In<br />

Section 3 we describe our research design, both <strong>the</strong> sample selection <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> defi nition<br />

<strong>and</strong> measurement <strong>of</strong> variables. Sections 4 <strong>and</strong> 5 present, discuss, <strong>and</strong> interpret <strong>the</strong> main<br />

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S. STUBNER/T. WULF/H. HUNGENBERG<br />

results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> study. We close with a discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> implications for fur<strong>the</strong>r research <strong>and</strong><br />

for corporate practice.<br />

2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES<br />

Research on <strong>the</strong> relationship between venture capital fi rms <strong>and</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong><br />

is based on a variety <strong>of</strong> diff erent <strong>the</strong>ories, with <strong>the</strong> principal agent <strong>the</strong>ory being one <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> most popular approaches (Amit, Glosten, <strong>and</strong> Muller (1993); Bosh<strong>of</strong>f (1995); Amit,<br />

Br<strong>and</strong>er, <strong>and</strong> Zott (2000); Manigart <strong>and</strong> Sapienza (2000); Bonnet (2001); Brettel, Th ust,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Witt (2001); Low (2001); Jessen (2002)). However, in our study, <strong>the</strong> principal agent<br />

approach is less appropriate, because our focus is on a special aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationship<br />

between VC fi rms <strong>and</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>, namely <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong> on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>. Th e <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> that a <strong>start</strong>-up<br />

company receives is a valuable resource that has a positive eff ect on <strong>the</strong> company’s <strong>performance</strong>.<br />

Th erefore, <strong>the</strong> resource-based view is a more suitable <strong>the</strong>oretical approach in this<br />

case, even though it has seldom been applied in this context in <strong>the</strong> past (Brown <strong>and</strong><br />

Greene (1997); Manigart, Baeyens, <strong>and</strong> Van Hyfte (2001); Maula (2002)).<br />

Th e resource-based view has become prominent, particularly in strategic <strong>management</strong><br />

research over <strong>the</strong> last 20 years, as a <strong>the</strong>oretical explanation for sustained competitive advantage,<br />

<strong>and</strong> thus <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> companies. It is based on <strong>the</strong> assumptions that markets are<br />

imperfect <strong>and</strong> that resources are heterogeneously distributed among companies. Building<br />

on <strong>the</strong>se assumptions, <strong>the</strong> resource-based view regards <strong>the</strong> idiosyncratic resources <strong>of</strong> a<br />

company as <strong>the</strong> main source <strong>of</strong> its competitive advantage (Wernerfelt (1984)). According<br />

to Barney’s (1991) study, such “resources include all assets, capabilities, organizational<br />

processes, fi rm attributes, information, knowledge etc. controlled by a fi rm that enable<br />

<strong>the</strong> fi rm to conceive <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> implement strategies that improve its effi ciency <strong>and</strong> eff ectiveness.”<br />

However, not all resources <strong>of</strong> a company have <strong>the</strong> potential to become a source<br />

<strong>of</strong> competitive advantage. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, such strategically relevant resources must fulfi ll fi ve<br />

requirements (Peteraf (1993)): First <strong>of</strong> all, <strong>the</strong>y have to be valuable, i.e., <strong>the</strong>y must have a<br />

positive impact on <strong>the</strong> effi ciency <strong>and</strong> eff ectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fi rm. Secondly, <strong>the</strong>se resources<br />

should be rare. Th is means that <strong>the</strong>y must not be widely available <strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> same time<br />

must be in high dem<strong>and</strong>. Additionally, <strong>the</strong>y must not be easy to copy or transfer, so that<br />

competitors cannot easily imitate <strong>the</strong>se resources. Finally, resources are only strategically<br />

relevant if no substitutes exist, meaning that no o<strong>the</strong>r similar resources are available that<br />

generate <strong>the</strong> same benefi t (Peteraf (1993); Chi (1994); Barney (1991)). Intangible assets,<br />

such as know-how, <strong>management</strong> skills, industry contacts, or a br<strong>and</strong> name that are <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

very complex <strong>and</strong> company-specifi c, have a high potential <strong>of</strong> fulfi lling <strong>the</strong>se fi ve requirements<br />

<strong>and</strong> becoming strategically relevant resources (Hall (1992)).<br />

Th e resource-based view’s reasoning can explain <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered<br />

by venture capital fi rms on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>. Especially in <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

earliest development stages, <strong>the</strong>se <strong>start</strong>-up companies are generally marked by a scarcity<br />

<strong>of</strong> resources necessary to successfully compete in a market (Achleitner <strong>and</strong> Bassen (2002);<br />

Christensen (2003)). Mostly, <strong>the</strong>ir resource base in this phase is limited to <strong>the</strong> knowl-<br />

140 SBR 59 April 2007 138-159


MANAGEMENT SUPPORT<br />

edge, experience, <strong>and</strong> motivation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> founders, but o<strong>the</strong>r important resources, such<br />

as fi nancial capital, <strong>management</strong> capabilities, industry experience or important contacts<br />

to o<strong>the</strong>r players in <strong>and</strong> around <strong>the</strong> respective industry, are missing (Amit, Glosten, <strong>and</strong><br />

Muller (1990); Ch<strong>and</strong>ler <strong>and</strong> Hanks (1998); Klemm (1988)). However, since a timely<br />

pro<strong>of</strong>-<strong>of</strong>-concept <strong>and</strong> a rapid market entry are vital for <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong><strong>ups</strong>,<br />

<strong>the</strong>y cannot build up <strong>the</strong>se resources <strong>the</strong>mselves, but must acquire <strong>the</strong>m from outside<br />

(Bamberger <strong>and</strong> Wrona (1996)). Th us, <strong>the</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by VC fi rms is<br />

one way <strong>of</strong> closing this resource gap. Venture capital fi rms are capable <strong>of</strong> providing such<br />

<strong>support</strong> because <strong>the</strong>ir investment managers have <strong>of</strong>ten been entrepreneurs <strong>the</strong>mselves,<br />

possess a background in <strong>management</strong> consulting, or have been in higher <strong>management</strong><br />

positions <strong>of</strong> larger companies. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, VC fi rms can build on experience made in<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>start</strong>-up companies where similar problems have occurred <strong>and</strong> been solved before<br />

(Gupta <strong>and</strong> Sapienza (1992); Norton <strong>and</strong> Tenenbaum (1993); Bascha <strong>and</strong> Walz (2001);<br />

Nathusius (2001); Krauss, Güdel, <strong>and</strong> Schwarz (2001); Arthurs <strong>and</strong> Busenitz (2003)).<br />

Th e <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by VC fi rms can thus be regarded as a rare <strong>and</strong> valuable<br />

resource for <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>, thus fulfi lling <strong>the</strong> fi rst two requirements <strong>of</strong> a strategically<br />

relevant resource.<br />

We can also argue that no equivalent substitute for this type <strong>of</strong> resource exists, since most<br />

<strong>start</strong>-up companies do not have <strong>the</strong> fi nancial means to hire <strong>the</strong> <strong>management</strong> consultants<br />

or experienced managers who would be able to <strong>of</strong>f er <strong>the</strong> same kind <strong>of</strong> <strong>support</strong>. Fur<strong>the</strong>r,<br />

<strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> cannot be easily imitated or transferred to o<strong>the</strong>r companies, because<br />

<strong>the</strong> situation <strong>of</strong> every <strong>start</strong>-up company is at least slightly diff erent, e.g., concerning <strong>the</strong><br />

industry context or <strong>the</strong> background <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> founders, thus requiring<br />

diff erent actions. Th erefore, according to <strong>the</strong> resource-based view, <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong><br />

is a strategically relevant resource that has a positive eff ect on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong><br />

<strong>start</strong>-up companies.<br />

However, this argumentation only holds true if <strong>the</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> that VC fi rms<br />

deliver is <strong>of</strong> high quality <strong>and</strong> specifi cally designed to <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> portfolio company.<br />

If this requirement is not met, i.e., if VC fi rms <strong>of</strong>f er only a st<strong>and</strong>ardized form <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong>, this resource will not become a source <strong>of</strong> competitive advantage, since it<br />

would not be valuable or rare, <strong>and</strong> would also be imitatable <strong>and</strong> transferable. All in all, this<br />

means that <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> can only fulfi ll <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong> a strategically relevant<br />

resource <strong>and</strong> have a positive impact on fi rm <strong>performance</strong> if it is <strong>of</strong> high quality. Past<br />

research shows that such a high quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered is ensured if <strong>the</strong><br />

venture capital fi rm provides <strong>the</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up with investment managers who<br />

are well informed about <strong>the</strong>ir portfolio company, who dedicate a lot <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir time to this<br />

company, <strong>and</strong> who have <strong>the</strong> relevant knowledge <strong>and</strong> competencies. A high level <strong>of</strong> information<br />

is important, because company-specifi c <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> can only be delivered<br />

if investment managers are always aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> problems that <strong>the</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up company<br />

faces (Higashide <strong>and</strong> Birley (2002)). Dedicating a high share <strong>of</strong> total working time to a<br />

specifi c <strong>start</strong>-up company has a positive eff ect on <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>,<br />

because only <strong>the</strong>n will investment managers be able to give <strong>the</strong> detailed advice necessary<br />

to solve <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up company. Finally, only an investment manager who<br />

has <strong>the</strong> necessary knowledge <strong>and</strong> experience will be able to deliver good advice. Industry<br />

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S. STUBNER/T. WULF/H. HUNGENBERG<br />

<strong>and</strong> functional experience, as well as a clear underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up problems <strong>and</strong> social<br />

competencies, are particularly relevant in this context (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, <strong>and</strong> Woo<br />

(1991); Betsch, Groh, <strong>and</strong> Schmidt (2000); Wong (2002); Welpe <strong>and</strong> Dowling (2002)).<br />

Th ese factors ensure that <strong>the</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by VC fi rms is <strong>of</strong> high quality<br />

<strong>and</strong> tailored to <strong>the</strong> specifi c needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respective <strong>start</strong>-up company. In turn, <strong>the</strong> high<br />

quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>the</strong>n has a positive eff ect on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong><br />

<strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>. Th is reasoning is refl ected in hypo<strong>the</strong>sis 1:<br />

Hypo<strong>the</strong>sis 1: Th e quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by venture capital fi rms is positively<br />

related to <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies.<br />

As we noted in <strong>the</strong> introduction, very few empirical studies have addressed <strong>the</strong> relationship<br />

between <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>,<br />

<strong>and</strong> most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se studies do not exclusively analyze <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>, but<br />

instead look at <strong>the</strong> overall relationship between venture capital fi rms <strong>and</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies,<br />

<strong>and</strong> only partly address <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se studies found<br />

a positive impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> or related aspects on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>up<br />

companies. Schefczyk (2000a; 2000b) for example, in a study <strong>of</strong> German venture<br />

capital fi rms, identifi ed <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> as a major success factor <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies.<br />

Similarly did Frederikson et al. (1990; 1997), in a survey <strong>of</strong> investment managers in<br />

venture capital fi rms <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> managers <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> in <strong>the</strong> United States,<br />

fi nd a positive psychological eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>. Sapienza (1992) as well as<br />

Sapienza <strong>and</strong> Timmons (1989a; 1989b) were able to detect a positive relationship between<br />

<strong>the</strong> type <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> intensity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interaction between investment managers <strong>and</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up<br />

companies <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>’ <strong>performance</strong>. MacMillan, Khoylian, <strong>and</strong> Kulow (1989), in<br />

contrast, could not fi nd clear pro<strong>of</strong> for a connection between <strong>the</strong> intensity <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>. Similarly, Rosenstein et al. (1989; 1993) show<br />

that <strong>the</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by VC fi rms has no signifi cant infl uence on fi rm <strong>performance</strong>.<br />

Th ese inconsistent fi ndings lead us to believe that <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> should not be analyzed<br />

in isolation, but that o<strong>the</strong>r variables might play an important role in this context.<br />

Building on <strong>the</strong> reasoning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> resource-based view, two gro<strong>ups</strong> <strong>of</strong> variables seem to<br />

be particularly relevant: factors related to <strong>the</strong> founder team as well as company-specifi c<br />

factors (Amit, Glosten, <strong>and</strong> Muller (1990); Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, <strong>and</strong> Woo (1991);<br />

Busenitz, Moesel, <strong>and</strong> Fiet (1997); Busenitz <strong>and</strong> Fiet (1999); Schefczyk (1999a); Betsch<br />

et al. (2000); Wong (2002)). Several empirical studies indicate that factors related to <strong>the</strong><br />

founder team have an eff ect on <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> (Amit, Glosten, <strong>and</strong> Muller (1990); Busenitz,<br />

Moesel, <strong>and</strong> Fiet (1997); Schefczyk (1999a)). In this context, it is argued that <strong>the</strong> impact<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by <strong>the</strong> venture capital fi rm is <strong>the</strong> lower <strong>the</strong> more experienced<br />

<strong>and</strong> larger <strong>the</strong> founder team is. Larger <strong>and</strong> thus more heterogeneous teams are<br />

believed to be less dependent on external advice. Similarly, for founder teams with extensive<br />

work <strong>and</strong> leadership experience or with a strong educational background in <strong>management</strong><br />

a smaller impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> on company <strong>performance</strong> can be expected,<br />

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since <strong>the</strong> resource gap that <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> is supposed to close is not very large in<br />

this case (Shepherd (1999); Shane <strong>and</strong> Venkataraman (2000); Shepherd et al. (2000);<br />

Sexton <strong>and</strong> L<strong>and</strong>ström (2000)). Th us, we develop hypo<strong>the</strong>sis 2:<br />

Hypo<strong>the</strong>sis 2: Th e impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong><br />

<strong>start</strong>-up companies is negatively infl uenced by <strong>the</strong> size <strong>and</strong> by <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong><br />

experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> founder team.<br />

Company-specifi c factors, particularly <strong>the</strong> size <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> age <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up company, may<br />

also have an impact on <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>. In this context, some researchers argue that in older<br />

<strong>and</strong> larger companies, <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> is less important, since <strong>the</strong>se companies<br />

have built up <strong>the</strong> relevant resources <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>and</strong> thus do not need to acquire <strong>the</strong>m<br />

from outside (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, <strong>and</strong> Woo (1991)). Hypo<strong>the</strong>sis 3 refl ects this<br />

reasoning:<br />

Hypo<strong>the</strong>sis 3: Th e impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong><br />

<strong>start</strong>-up companies is negatively infl uenced by <strong>the</strong> size <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> age <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>start</strong>-up company.<br />

Figure 1 summarizes <strong>the</strong> hypo<strong>the</strong>ses on <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> as well as <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> moderating<br />

variables.<br />

Figure 1: Overview <strong>of</strong> research hypo<strong>the</strong>ses<br />

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3 RESEARCH DESIGN<br />

3.1 SAMPLE SELECTION<br />

Because our aim is to empirically analyze <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong>f ered by venture capital fi rms <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> in<br />

Germany, <strong>the</strong> relevant population comprises all VC-funded <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> in Germany. Since<br />

no <strong>of</strong>fi cial listing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se companies exists, we had to compile one from diff erent sources.<br />

Th e commercial database Germanhot100, a listing <strong>of</strong> a variety <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies in<br />

Germany published by <strong>the</strong> H<strong>and</strong>elsblatt group, served as a basis for this compilation<br />

(Germanhot100 (2002)). We updated <strong>and</strong> enlarged this database through interviews with<br />

major VC fi rms operating in Germany. During <strong>the</strong>se interviews, information on <strong>the</strong> <strong>start</strong>up<br />

companies in <strong>the</strong> portfolio <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se fi rms was disclosed. Additionally, we analyzed press<br />

releases <strong>and</strong> newspaper articles to complete <strong>the</strong> listing. Th us, we were able to identify 516<br />

<strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> which were operating in Germany in 2002 as <strong>the</strong> relevant population<br />

for this study. Th is listing was confi rmed in interviews with leading scholars <strong>and</strong><br />

practitioners in <strong>the</strong> German venture capital market.<br />

In September 2002, we sent out a written questionnaire to at least one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> founders or<br />

<strong>the</strong> managing directors <strong>of</strong> each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se 516 companies. 215 questionnaires were returned<br />

– equivalent to a response rate <strong>of</strong> 41.7 percent. We had to exclude 22 returned questionnaires<br />

from <strong>the</strong> analysis because <strong>the</strong>y came from companies that were not fi nanced by<br />

venture capital <strong>and</strong> thus did not receive any <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>. 87 recipients delivered<br />

only partial information, so <strong>the</strong>se questionnaires also could not be used for our analysis.<br />

Th is led to a fi nal sample <strong>of</strong> 106 <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>.<br />

Th e corresponding response rate <strong>of</strong> 20.5 percent compares favorably with <strong>the</strong> respective<br />

rates <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r mail surveys that have targeted founders or executive managers (Miller,<br />

Burke, <strong>and</strong> Glick (1998)). Interviews with a selected number <strong>of</strong> founders <strong>and</strong> managing<br />

directors who had not returned <strong>the</strong> questionnaire <strong>and</strong> a subsequent statistical analysis<br />

revealed no signifi cant diff erences between responding <strong>and</strong> non-responding companies.<br />

3.2 DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES<br />

Management <strong>support</strong> measures: we use seven diff erent measures to assess <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by VC fi rms. Six <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se measures are related to characteristics<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> investment managers, <strong>and</strong> serve as indicators <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong> that <strong>the</strong>y are able to deliver to <strong>the</strong>ir portfolio companies. Th ese measures are<br />

<strong>the</strong> investment managers’ level <strong>of</strong> information on <strong>the</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up company, <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong><br />

working time that <strong>the</strong>y dedicate to <strong>the</strong>ir portfolio company, <strong>the</strong>ir functional <strong>and</strong> industry<br />

experience, <strong>the</strong>ir familiarity with <strong>start</strong>-up problems, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir social competencies. We<br />

measure <strong>the</strong>se variables from <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> founders <strong>and</strong> managing directors <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies.<br />

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To assess <strong>the</strong> variables, we fi rst asked all respondents to evaluate on a scale from one (“very<br />

well informed”) to fi ve (“poorly informed”) how well <strong>the</strong> relevant investment managers were<br />

informed about <strong>the</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up (Higashide <strong>and</strong> Birley (2002)). We also asked founders <strong>and</strong><br />

managing directors to estimate <strong>the</strong> percentage <strong>of</strong> total working time that <strong>the</strong> investment<br />

managers dedicated to <strong>the</strong>ir company. Finally, <strong>the</strong> respondents had to evaluate <strong>the</strong> investment<br />

managers’ functional <strong>and</strong> industry experience as well as <strong>the</strong>ir familiarity with <strong>start</strong>-up problems<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir social competencies on a scale ranging from one (“very good”) to fi ve (“insuffi<br />

cient”) (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, <strong>and</strong> Woo (1991); Betsch et al. (2000); Wong (2002)).<br />

In addition to using characteristics <strong>of</strong> investment managers, we also measure <strong>the</strong> quality<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> a subjective evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> founders or managing directors<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies. For this purpose, we asked all respondents to rate <strong>the</strong> quality<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> which <strong>the</strong>y received on a scale ranging from one (“very good”)<br />

to fi ve (“insuffi cient”). Even though such a subjective evaluation has its weaknesses, particularly<br />

with regard to respondents’ bias, it is <strong>the</strong> only way <strong>of</strong> directly measuring service<br />

quality, <strong>and</strong> has been successfully applied in similar studies to assess, e.g., <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong><br />

consulting services (H<strong>of</strong>f mann (1991); Eff enberger (1998)).<br />

Performance measures: Due to <strong>the</strong> specifi c characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies,<br />

no single measure can fully mirror <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se companies. For this<br />

reason, empirical studies normally use a set <strong>of</strong> diff erent indicators to measure <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong> newly founded companies (Schenk (1998); Damodaran (2001); Achleitner <strong>and</strong><br />

Bassen (2003)). Here, we use a similar approach. We measure <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong><br />

<strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> four diff erent indicators, two objectively assessable measures<br />

– absolute EBITDA <strong>and</strong> earnings growth – <strong>and</strong> two measures that require subjective evaluation<br />

by <strong>the</strong> respondents – <strong>the</strong>ir assessment <strong>of</strong> goal achievement <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir evaluation <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> on <strong>the</strong>ir fi rms’ <strong>performance</strong>. To determine <strong>the</strong> objectively<br />

measurable <strong>performance</strong> indicators, we asked all respondents to classify <strong>the</strong>ir companies<br />

according to <strong>the</strong> EBITDA level that <strong>the</strong>y had reached in 2001 into categories ranging<br />

from one (“below 0 €”) to fi ve (“more than 2 mill. €”). Pre-test interviews had shown that<br />

this EBITDA range was adequate <strong>and</strong> that an absolute fi gure such as EBITDA would be<br />

more easily accessible than would relative fi gures such as ROA or ROE, which are normally<br />

preferred in empirical research. At <strong>the</strong> same time, we do not consider that using absolute<br />

EBITDA fi gures is a major problem, because most companies in <strong>the</strong> sample were <strong>of</strong> comparable<br />

size, so that <strong>the</strong> diff erence between absolute <strong>and</strong> relative fi gures is negligible.<br />

In addition to <strong>the</strong>se absolute fi gures, we also asked respondents to classify <strong>the</strong>ir companies<br />

according to <strong>the</strong> EBITDA growth rates that <strong>the</strong>y had reached in <strong>the</strong> three years 1999<br />

through 2001 into categories ranging from one (“growth <strong>of</strong> more than 50 percent”) to nine<br />

(“decline <strong>of</strong> more than 50 percent”). We use <strong>the</strong> median <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se categories over <strong>the</strong> three<br />

years as a second <strong>performance</strong> indicator. We chose <strong>the</strong> median values over three years to<br />

control for outliers in single years (Merz, Weber, <strong>and</strong> Laetz (1994); Davidsson <strong>and</strong> Wiklund<br />

(2000); Damodaran (2001); Jessen (2002)). To determine <strong>the</strong> more subjective <strong>performance</strong><br />

measures, we fi rst requested <strong>the</strong> respondents to assess <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> goal achievement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

companies in <strong>the</strong> years 1999 through 2001 on a scale ranging from one (“fully achieved”)<br />

to fi ve (“not achieved at all”). We use <strong>the</strong> median <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ratings over <strong>the</strong>se three years as <strong>the</strong><br />

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<strong>performance</strong> indicator. Finally, we asked each founder or managing director in <strong>the</strong> sample<br />

to subjectively evaluate <strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> on <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> his company on<br />

a scale ranging from one (“very positive eff ect”) to fi ve (“very negative eff ect”).<br />

Founder team measures: We use four variables to assess founder team characteristics: <strong>the</strong><br />

size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> founder team, <strong>the</strong> average work <strong>and</strong> leadership experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> founders, <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir educational background in <strong>management</strong>. We measure <strong>the</strong> size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

founder team as <strong>the</strong> total number <strong>of</strong> founders <strong>of</strong> each <strong>start</strong>-up company. We defi ne work<br />

<strong>and</strong> leadership experience as <strong>the</strong> average number <strong>of</strong> years <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respective experience <strong>of</strong><br />

all founders in a company. Finally, to determine educational background in <strong>management</strong>,<br />

we create a dummy variable that takes <strong>the</strong> value one if at least 50 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> founders<br />

have an educational background in business administration.<br />

Company-specifi c measures: We measure company size as <strong>the</strong> revenues <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respective<br />

company in 2001. We defi ne company age as <strong>the</strong> total number <strong>of</strong> years between <strong>the</strong> foundation<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> company <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 2001.<br />

4 RESULTS<br />

4.1 DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW<br />

Th e presentation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> this study <strong>start</strong>s with a brief descriptive overview <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

companies in <strong>the</strong> sample with particular emphasis on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> levels which <strong>the</strong><br />

companies reached. Afterwards, correlations between <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> diff erent <strong>performance</strong> measures as well as <strong>the</strong> moderating variables are analyzed in<br />

more detail, before fi nally several regression models are presented. At <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 2001, <strong>the</strong><br />

companies in our sample averaged 4.2 years. Th ey comprise a variety <strong>of</strong> industries, with<br />

<strong>the</strong> majority (75 percent) being in <strong>the</strong> biotechnology, s<strong>of</strong>tware, internet, <strong>and</strong> media businesses.<br />

Th e companies in <strong>the</strong> sample are small: <strong>the</strong> revenues <strong>of</strong> 25 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> companies did<br />

not exceed €500,000 in 2001, more than 55 percent achieved revenues <strong>of</strong> less than €1.5<br />

million, <strong>and</strong> only roughly 8 percent recorded revenues <strong>of</strong> more than €10 million.<br />

Th e majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> companies in <strong>the</strong> sample, 79.4 percent, still incurred losses in 2001.<br />

Only 20.6 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> companies reached a positive EBITDA, which in no case<br />

exceeded €2 million. In <strong>the</strong> years 1999 to 2001, <strong>the</strong> earnings development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> companies<br />

in <strong>the</strong> sample is varied. Between 42.4 <strong>and</strong> 48.1 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> companies reported<br />

increasing earnings in those three years, but for between 37.5 <strong>and</strong> 39.6 percent, earnings<br />

declined in that time period. Never<strong>the</strong>less, for all three years many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> companies stated<br />

that <strong>the</strong>y achieved <strong>the</strong> goals that <strong>the</strong>y had set for <strong>the</strong>mselves for <strong>the</strong> years 1999 through<br />

2001. Between 44.4 <strong>and</strong> 62.2 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents indicated that <strong>the</strong>y had ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />

met <strong>the</strong>ir objectives completely or to a large extent in <strong>the</strong> three relevant years. 21.6 to<br />

32.3 percent said that goals were at least partly achieved, <strong>and</strong> only between 16.2 <strong>and</strong> 23.2<br />

percent felt that <strong>performance</strong> targets were hardly met or not achieved at all.<br />

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Finally, <strong>the</strong> subjective evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> to <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> companies in <strong>the</strong> sample shows that 38.7 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents believed that <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong> had a positive, or even a very positive, impact on <strong>the</strong>ir company’s <strong>performance</strong>.<br />

At <strong>the</strong> same time, 47.2 percent stated that <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> had no eff ect at all, <strong>and</strong> 14.1<br />

percent even saw negative or very negative consequences <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>.<br />

Th e evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by venture capital fi rms is<br />

normally distributed among <strong>the</strong> companies in <strong>the</strong> sample. 34.3 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents<br />

rated <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> as ei<strong>the</strong>r good or very good. 23.6 evaluated it as<br />

satisfactory, but 41.5 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents believed that <strong>the</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong>f ered by <strong>the</strong>ir VC partner was ei<strong>the</strong>r barely suffi cient or even insuffi cient (Figure 2 ).<br />

Figure 2: Evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong><br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

SBR 59 April 2007 138-159 147<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Th e descriptive overview <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sample shows that both <strong>the</strong> perceived quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> diff erent <strong>performance</strong> indicators are more or less normally distributed<br />

among <strong>the</strong> companies in <strong>the</strong> sample. Th erefore, we want to know how <strong>the</strong> two sets<br />

<strong>of</strong> variables are correlated.<br />

4.2 ANALYSIS OF CORRELATIONS<br />

To analyze <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by<br />

VC fi rms <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>, we compute rank correlations.<br />

Figure 3 shows <strong>the</strong> corresponding matrix <strong>of</strong> correlation coeffi cients. Th e matrix indicates,<br />

fi rst <strong>of</strong> all, that <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> measures are hardly correlated with each o<strong>the</strong>r. Only


S. STUBNER/T. WULF/H. HUNGENBERG<br />

between <strong>the</strong> variables “goal achievement 1999-2001” <strong>and</strong> “earnings growth 1999-2001”<br />

do we fi nd a signifi cant correlation. Th us, we conclude that <strong>the</strong> four <strong>performance</strong> indicators<br />

measure diff erent aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies.<br />

For <strong>the</strong> relationship between company <strong>performance</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>,<br />

<strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> correlation analysis give us reason to believe that in general, such a relationship<br />

does indeed exist. In fact, three <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> four <strong>performance</strong> indicators show significant<br />

correlations with at least two <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> measures. Th e<br />

<strong>performance</strong> measure “subjective evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>” is even<br />

signifi cantly related to all seven quality measures. Only for <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> indicator “earnings<br />

growth 1999-2001” could we fi nd no signifi cant correlation with any o<strong>the</strong>r variable.<br />

When we examine <strong>the</strong> relationship between founder team variables <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>, we fi nd only a very few signifi cant correlations. We fi nd that<br />

<strong>the</strong> founders’ work <strong>and</strong> leadership experience have a signifi cant eff ect on goal achievement.<br />

However, we do not observe consistent results for o<strong>the</strong>r founder team <strong>and</strong> <strong>performance</strong> variables.<br />

Nor do we fi nd a signifi cant relationship with fi rm <strong>performance</strong> for <strong>the</strong> two companyspecifi<br />

c variables, company age <strong>and</strong> size.<br />

Th e results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> correlation analysis lead us to believe that <strong>the</strong>re is a relationship between<br />

<strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> delivered by VC fi rms <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong><br />

<strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>. Never<strong>the</strong>less, regression analyses are necessary to test <strong>the</strong> full model.<br />

4.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS<br />

To fully explore <strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> as well as <strong>of</strong> founder team<br />

<strong>and</strong> company-specifi c variables on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies, we develop<br />

several regression models. As <strong>the</strong> correlation analysis has already indicated, <strong>the</strong>se models<br />

show signifi cant results for three <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> four <strong>performance</strong> indicators. Only for <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong><br />

measure “earnings growth 1999-2001” fi ndings were not signifi cant. Th erefore, we<br />

omit this <strong>performance</strong> indicator from <strong>the</strong> following. For all regression models, additional<br />

tests show that <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong> homoskedasticity <strong>and</strong> normal distribution were met<br />

<strong>and</strong> that we could observe nei<strong>the</strong>r collinearity nor autocorrelation.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> fi rst set <strong>of</strong> regression models, we use “EBITDA in 2001” as an output variable. Altoge<strong>the</strong>r,<br />

we develop four regression models for this output variable. Th e fi rst <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se four<br />

models comprises only <strong>the</strong> seven quality-<strong>of</strong>-<strong>management</strong>-<strong>support</strong> measures as predictor<br />

variables. In <strong>the</strong> second model, we add <strong>the</strong> founder team variables, <strong>and</strong> in <strong>the</strong> third model<br />

we include <strong>the</strong> company-specifi c variables. For <strong>the</strong> fourth model, we add interaction variables<br />

<strong>and</strong> use <strong>the</strong> forward method instead <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hierarchical method that we applied in<br />

<strong>the</strong> fi rst three models. Figure 4 gives an overview <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> four regression models.<br />

148 SBR 59 April 2007 138-159


Figure 3: Matrix <strong>of</strong> rank correlations<br />

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MANAGEMENT SUPPORT<br />

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Figure 4: Regression models for EBITDA in 2001 as output variable<br />

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150 SBR 59 April 2007 138-159<br />

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As fi gure 4 shows, all four regression models are signifi cant <strong>and</strong> explain between 30.7 <strong>and</strong><br />

40.6 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> variance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> output variable. Th e most important contribution<br />

comes from <strong>the</strong> quality-<strong>of</strong>-<strong>management</strong>-<strong>support</strong> variables, which account for 30.6 percent<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> explanation <strong>of</strong> variance. Th e founder-team <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> company-specifi c variables add<br />

ano<strong>the</strong>r 5 <strong>and</strong> 4.9 percent, respectively. Never<strong>the</strong>less, in <strong>the</strong> full model (model 3) only<br />

two coeffi cients are signifi cant, those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> variables “share <strong>of</strong> work time” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> investment<br />

manager <strong>and</strong> “industry experience” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> investment manager. Two o<strong>the</strong>r variables,<br />

“founder team size” in model 2 <strong>and</strong> “company age” in model 3, just barely miss <strong>the</strong> range<br />

<strong>of</strong> signifi cance. From <strong>the</strong>se results we conclude that a higher EBITDA can be reached if<br />

<strong>the</strong> investment managers <strong>of</strong> VC fi rms dedicate a greater share <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir time to <strong>the</strong>ir portfolio<br />

company, <strong>and</strong> if <strong>the</strong>y have <strong>the</strong> relevant industry experience. O<strong>the</strong>r variables play only<br />

a minor role. Th us, contrary to expectations, we do not fi nd a clear eff ect <strong>of</strong> founder-team<br />

<strong>and</strong> company-specifi c variables on fi rm <strong>performance</strong>.


MANAGEMENT SUPPORT<br />

Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> reduced model 4 shows that <strong>the</strong> founder-team <strong>and</strong> company-specifi c<br />

variables do infl uence EBITDA as part <strong>of</strong> interaction terms. In fact, model 4 shows that<br />

<strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> work time that investment managers dedicate to <strong>the</strong>ir portfolio<br />

company is increased if founders have very little industry experience <strong>and</strong> if <strong>the</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up<br />

company is relatively large. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> functional experience <strong>of</strong><br />

investment managers is higher in older companies.<br />

We compute a second set <strong>of</strong> four regression models for <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> measure “subjective<br />

evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>” as an output variable. Th e fi rst <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong>se four models takes into account <strong>the</strong> variables that measure <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong>. Th e second <strong>and</strong> third models add <strong>the</strong> founder-team <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> companyspecifi<br />

c variables. For <strong>the</strong> fourth model, we again add interaction variables <strong>and</strong> use <strong>the</strong><br />

forward approach instead <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hierarchical method. Figure 5 gives an overview <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se<br />

four regression models.<br />

Figure 5: Regression models for subjective evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> as output variable<br />

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As fi gure 5 shows, all four regression models are highly signifi cant <strong>and</strong> explain between<br />

42.2 <strong>and</strong> 48.4 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> variance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> output variable. Again, <strong>the</strong> most important<br />

contribution comes from <strong>the</strong> quality-<strong>of</strong>-<strong>management</strong>-<strong>support</strong> variables, which account<br />

for 42.2 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> explanation <strong>of</strong> variance. Th e founder-team <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> companyspecifi<br />

c variables add ano<strong>the</strong>r 4.8 <strong>and</strong> 1.4 percent, respectively. However, <strong>the</strong> relevance<br />

<strong>of</strong> single variables for <strong>the</strong> explanation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dependent variable changes compared to <strong>the</strong><br />

fi rst set <strong>of</strong> regression models. In <strong>the</strong> full model (model 3), only <strong>the</strong> coeffi cient <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> variable<br />

“subjective evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>” is signifi cant. Two o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

variables, <strong>the</strong> work experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> founders <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir background in <strong>management</strong>, just<br />

barely miss <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> signifi cance in model 2. From <strong>the</strong>se results we conclude that a<br />

more positive evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> is largely caused by a higher<br />

perceived quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>. O<strong>the</strong>r variables play only a minor role. Again,<br />

we fi nd no clear eff ect <strong>of</strong> founder-team <strong>and</strong> company-specifi c variables on fi rm <strong>performance</strong>.<br />

Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> reduced model 4 shows that founder-team variables have at least<br />

some infl uence on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> variable “subjective evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong>”, namely as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interaction terms. In fact, model 4 indicates that <strong>the</strong><br />

eff ect <strong>of</strong> social competencies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> investment managers is increased if <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

founders has an educational background in <strong>management</strong>.<br />

We perform a fi nal regression analysis for “goal achievement 1999-2001” as an output<br />

variable. For this measure only <strong>the</strong> reduced model shows signifi cant results. In this model,<br />

we add all <strong>the</strong> variables, including <strong>the</strong> interaction terms, <strong>and</strong> apply <strong>the</strong> forward method.<br />

Figure 6 gives an overview <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> resulting regression model.<br />

Figure 6: Regression models for goal achievement 1999-2001 as output variable<br />

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MANAGEMENT SUPPORT<br />

As fi gure 6 shows, <strong>the</strong> regression model is highly signifi cant <strong>and</strong> explains 24.2 percent <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> variance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> output variable. Also in this case, <strong>the</strong> quality-<strong>of</strong>-<strong>management</strong>-<strong>support</strong><br />

variable plays an important role. Never<strong>the</strong>less, it is again a diff erent role from that played<br />

in <strong>the</strong> fi rst two sets <strong>of</strong> regression models. Th e degree <strong>of</strong> familiarity <strong>of</strong> investment managers<br />

with <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies is <strong>the</strong> dominant variable in this model. Additionally,<br />

an interaction term has a signifi cant coeffi cient: <strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> work time<br />

that investment managers dedicate to <strong>the</strong>ir portfolio company is increased if <strong>the</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up<br />

companies are bigger.<br />

Th e results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regression analyses <strong>support</strong> <strong>the</strong> fi ndings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> correlation analysis <strong>and</strong><br />

indicate that <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> has a positive eff ect on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>. Th e regression analyses show that for almost all measures <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>and</strong> for three <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> four <strong>performance</strong> indicators, such<br />

a positive relationship exists. Th us, <strong>the</strong> fi ndings <strong>support</strong> hypo<strong>the</strong>sis 1. However, we do not<br />

fi nd any infl uence <strong>of</strong> founder-team <strong>and</strong> company-specifi c variables on fi rm <strong>performance</strong><br />

apart from interaction eff ects. In addition, <strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interaction terms is to a large<br />

extent contrary to expectations. We fi nd that <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> is even more important<br />

in bigger <strong>and</strong> older companies <strong>and</strong> for founders with a background in business administration.<br />

Th erefore, <strong>the</strong> fi ndings do not <strong>support</strong> hypo<strong>the</strong>ses 2 <strong>and</strong> 3.<br />

5 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION<br />

Th e description <strong>of</strong> our results shows that <strong>the</strong>re is a positive relationship between <strong>the</strong><br />

quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by venture capital fi rms <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>. Th us, <strong>the</strong> central hypo<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> this study, hypo<strong>the</strong>sis 1, receives<br />

<strong>support</strong> from <strong>the</strong> empirical analysis. Th ese results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present study confi rm earlier<br />

fi ndings by Sapienza <strong>and</strong> Timmons (1989a; 1989b), Sapienza (1992) as well as Schefczyk<br />

(2000a; 2000b), who also report a positive eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> on <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies.<br />

Never<strong>the</strong>less, we fi nd a signifi cant relationship only for three <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> four <strong>performance</strong><br />

measures. We observe an infl uence <strong>of</strong> diff erent measures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong> for <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> indicators “EBITDA in 2001”, “goal achievement 1999-<br />

2001” <strong>and</strong> “subjective evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>”. However, for<br />

“earnings growth 1999-2001”, we are not able to obtain signifi cant results. In view <strong>of</strong><br />

this lack <strong>of</strong> results for <strong>the</strong> latter measure, it can be argued that earnings growth is not a<br />

valid measure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>, since <strong>the</strong> size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> earnings growth that<br />

a company is able to realize in a given period <strong>of</strong> time depends to a great extent on <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>performance</strong> level that it had reached at <strong>the</strong> outset <strong>of</strong> this period. In fact, a company that<br />

enjoyed a relatively high EBITDA level in 1998 might have faced lower growth rates<br />

in <strong>the</strong> following years but still have shown a higher EBITDA in 2001 compared to a<br />

company that <strong>start</strong>ed from very low EBITDA levels in 1998 <strong>and</strong> achieved higher growth<br />

rates in <strong>the</strong> following years.<br />

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We fi nd a positive relationship with diff erent <strong>performance</strong> indicators for almost all <strong>the</strong><br />

quality-<strong>of</strong>-<strong>management</strong>-<strong>support</strong> measures. In our regression models, only <strong>the</strong> variable<br />

“level <strong>of</strong> information” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> investment manager is not related to any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong><br />

measures, perhaps because <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> information that investment managers have on<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir portfolio companies is not a strategically relevant resource for <strong>the</strong>se companies, but<br />

ra<strong>the</strong>r a prerequisite that all investment managers have to meet. However, we fi nd positive<br />

results for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r measures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>. Never<strong>the</strong>less,<br />

<strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regression analyses create <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong> relationship between<br />

<strong>the</strong> quality-<strong>of</strong>-<strong>management</strong>-<strong>support</strong> measures <strong>and</strong> diff erent <strong>performance</strong> measures are not<br />

completely consistent. In fact, diff erent quality measures have an eff ect on diff erent <strong>performance</strong><br />

measures. For example, EBITDA is mainly explained by <strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> work time<br />

that investment managers dedicate to <strong>the</strong>ir portfolio company, <strong>and</strong> by <strong>the</strong>ir industry experience.<br />

For goal achievement, <strong>the</strong> familiarity <strong>of</strong> investment managers with <strong>start</strong>-up problems<br />

is particularly relevant, <strong>and</strong> in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subjective evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>, <strong>the</strong> quality measure “subjective evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>support</strong>”<br />

makes <strong>the</strong> most signifi cant contribution. However, a closer look at <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> correlation<br />

analysis shows that all seven measures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> are<br />

very closely related (fi gure 3). Additional regression analyses show that each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> seven<br />

quality measures can be explained by <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r six measures. Th erefore, we argue that in<br />

<strong>the</strong> regression models, one or two <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality measures always take on <strong>the</strong> explanatory<br />

power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. Th us, even if certain measures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong><br />

do not have signifi cant coeffi cients in all regression models, <strong>the</strong>se variables still exert at<br />

least an indirect eff ect on <strong>the</strong> output variable. Th is means that combined, at least six <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> seven quality measures consistently refl ect <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered<br />

by venture capital fi rms. For this reason, we believe that in future empirical studies on<br />

this phenomenon, it is advisable to use diff erent measures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong>.<br />

Contrary to expectations, we fi nd no direct infl uence on fi rm <strong>performance</strong> for <strong>the</strong> founderteam<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> company-specifi c variables. We propose two diff erent reasons for this lack <strong>of</strong><br />

fi ndings: on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, it is possible that founder-team <strong>and</strong> company-specifi c variables<br />

are irrelevant for <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies. However, such an interpretation<br />

contradicts <strong>the</strong> fi ndings <strong>of</strong> earlier studies <strong>and</strong> is also not very plausible (Shepherd (1999);<br />

Shane <strong>and</strong> Venkataraman (2000); Shepherd <strong>and</strong> Ettenson (2000); Sexton <strong>and</strong> L<strong>and</strong>ström<br />

(2000)). In fact, particularly in <strong>start</strong>-up companies, <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> founders should be<br />

expected to make a diff erence. Th erefore, a second reason for <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> fi ndings becomes<br />

more probable. Th is reason relates to <strong>the</strong> fact that in this study, we assessed <strong>the</strong> founder<br />

variables from <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> founders <strong>the</strong>mselves. Th is self-assessment might be<br />

biased, that is, founders might, for example, overestimate <strong>the</strong>ir experience. Th erefore, we<br />

believe that additional research on <strong>the</strong> eff ect <strong>of</strong> founder team variables, e.g., from a venture<br />

capital company’s perspective, is necessary.<br />

Our belief that founder-team <strong>and</strong> company-specifi c variables actually have an eff ect on<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> is also <strong>support</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> results for <strong>the</strong> interaction variables.<br />

Th ese variables show that quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> becomes even more important<br />

if founders lack leadership experience, but also if <strong>the</strong> founders have a background in busi-<br />

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ness administration. Interestingly, <strong>and</strong> contrary to our hypo<strong>the</strong>ses, <strong>the</strong>se interaction terms<br />

also indicate that <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> becomes increasingly relevant in larger <strong>and</strong> older<br />

<strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>. Th us, we interpret <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> as a good means <strong>of</strong> helping founders<br />

cope with <strong>the</strong> increasing complexities that <strong>the</strong>y face while <strong>the</strong>ir venture is growing. Th ese<br />

fi ndings for <strong>the</strong> interaction terms, which contradict hypo<strong>the</strong>ses 2 <strong>and</strong> 3, call for fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />

research on <strong>the</strong> moderating role <strong>of</strong> founder team <strong>and</strong> company-specifi c variables.<br />

Th e issue <strong>of</strong> causality between <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> also deserves some fur<strong>the</strong>r attention. In fact, our study has<br />

shown only that <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> is positively related to <strong>performance</strong>.<br />

However, we cannot conclude directly from <strong>the</strong> data that <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> this <strong>support</strong> is<br />

actually <strong>the</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> higher <strong>performance</strong>. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>re are three main reasons to<br />

believe that such a causal relationship exists. First <strong>of</strong> all, we measure <strong>performance</strong> for <strong>the</strong><br />

time period following <strong>the</strong> assessment <strong>of</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>. Additionally, we<br />

fi nd a relationship between quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong><strong>ups</strong><br />

for a number <strong>of</strong> diff erent <strong>performance</strong> indicators. Finally, a number <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r studies<br />

also conclude that <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> has a positive eff ect on <strong>start</strong>-up <strong>performance</strong> (e.g.,<br />

Sapienza <strong>and</strong> Timmons (1989a; 1989b); Sapienza (1992); Schefczyk (2000a); Schefczyk<br />

(2000b)). Th erefore, it seems reasonable to regard <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> as<br />

a trigger <strong>of</strong> <strong>performance</strong>.<br />

6 CONCLUSION<br />

Th e results <strong>of</strong> our study give us reason to believe that <strong>the</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by<br />

venture capital fi rms has a positive eff ect on <strong>the</strong> <strong>performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up companies. Th is<br />

fi nding <strong>support</strong>s those <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r studies (Sapienza <strong>and</strong> Timmons (1989a; 1989b); Sapienza<br />

(1992); Schefczyk (2000a); Schefczyk (2000b)). Never<strong>the</strong>less, our results also confl ict at<br />

least in part with <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> yet o<strong>the</strong>r studies (Macmillan, Khoylian, <strong>and</strong> Kulow (1989);<br />

Rosenstein et al. (1989); Frederiksen et al. (1990); Rosenstein et al. (1993); Fredriksen,<br />

Ol<strong>of</strong>sson, <strong>and</strong> Wahlbin (1997)). Th erefore, we advocate fur<strong>the</strong>r research on <strong>the</strong> relationship<br />

between <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>and</strong> fi rm <strong>performance</strong>. Th is research should fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />

explore <strong>the</strong> eff ects <strong>of</strong> founder team <strong>and</strong> company-specifi c variables, which, contrary to<br />

expectations, we do not fi nd are relevant. In <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> cases, <strong>the</strong>ir interaction eff ect<br />

even led to results that contradicted our original hypo<strong>the</strong>ses. Additionally, <strong>the</strong> application<br />

<strong>of</strong> diff erent <strong>performance</strong> measures, e.g., relative measures like ROA or ROE, is necessary.<br />

Last but not least, a comparison <strong>of</strong> fi rms fi nanced by venture capital with <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> that<br />

did not receive such funding might yield interesting results on <strong>the</strong> relevance <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>support</strong>.<br />

Despite <strong>the</strong> need for fur<strong>the</strong>r research, we derive several implications for <strong>start</strong>-up companies,<br />

as well as for venture capital fi rms, from <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> our study. For <strong>entrepreneurial</strong><br />

<strong>start</strong>-up companies, we show that <strong>the</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong>f ered by venture capital<br />

fi rms does have a signifi cant <strong>performance</strong> eff ect. In this context, diff erent aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong> are <strong>of</strong> relevance, ranging from <strong>the</strong> investment managers’<br />

industry <strong>and</strong> functional experience to <strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> work time that <strong>the</strong>y dedicate to <strong>start</strong>-<br />

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S. STUBNER/T. WULF/H. HUNGENBERG<br />

<strong>ups</strong>, <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong>ir familiarity with <strong>start</strong>-up problems. Th erefore, we conclude that seeking<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>support</strong> <strong>of</strong> VC fi rms can be a valuable option for <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>, even though venture capital<br />

is believed to be an expensive form <strong>of</strong> fi nancing. Never<strong>the</strong>less, founders <strong>and</strong> managers <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong> should carefully select <strong>the</strong>ir venture capital partners.<br />

For VC fi rms that want to add value through <strong>management</strong> <strong>support</strong>, <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> our<br />

study show that a clear focus in selecting portfolio companies is necessary, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong><br />

number <strong>of</strong> companies in <strong>the</strong> portfolio should be limited. Only under <strong>the</strong>se conditions will<br />

investment managers be able to dedicate an adequate share <strong>of</strong> work time to <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>start</strong>-up<br />

companies, <strong>and</strong> to contribute <strong>the</strong> relevant industry, functional <strong>and</strong> <strong>start</strong>-up experience.<br />

Ultimately, <strong>the</strong> main argument <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> resource-based view must be taken into account by<br />

venture capital fi rms as well as by <strong>entrepreneurial</strong> <strong>start</strong>-<strong>ups</strong>. Management <strong>support</strong> will only<br />

become a strategically relevant resource for <strong>start</strong>-up companies <strong>and</strong> have a positive <strong>performance</strong><br />

eff ect if this <strong>support</strong> is <strong>of</strong>f ered in a diff erentiated <strong>and</strong> company-specifi c way.<br />

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SBR 59 April 2007 138-159 159


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