Kuwait after the war..

Kuwait

CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment

Kuwait
Recovery and Security
After the Gulf War
Anthony H. Cordesman
/
' A Member of the lfierseus Books Group

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Copyright O 1997 by Antht~np H. Cordesman
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Cordesman, Anthony H.
Kuwait : recclverJI and sea1ri9 after fie Gulf War / Anthony H.
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List of Tnbles nad lllzlstrnfiorrs
Preface
Acknozukdg~n~~z ts
1 Introduction
Contents
Strategic Background, 1
Modernizatim a d Independence, 5
ix
xi
xiii
2 KuwaiFfs Extend Security: The Problem of fmn and Iraq 7
Kuwait and the Irm-Iraq War, 8
Kuwait and the Gulf Nr, 9
Kuwait and fie Gonthuing nreat
of hasion from Iraqf 11
Kuwait and Lesser Threats from Iraq, 14
Kuwait and Relations with Irm, 15
Kuwait and Relations with Suthern G~df
and Arab States, 15
3 Political and Economic Stability and Security
Kuwait" Oil Industry, 24
Kuwaiti Oil Production, 30
Plans to Expand Production, 33
Downstream and Wgst~m Irrvestments, 35
Kuwaiti Gas Reserves and Production, 37
Kuwait's Ecmol-ny Siince Che Gutf War, 38
Kuwait" Budget, Liquidity, and Debt, 43
The Need to Create Real Jabs for Native Kuwai.tis, 51
The Need for Structural Reform, 54
4 Internal Security
Ethic and Sectarim Divisio~~s, 59

Dependence on breign Litbor, 61
Broadening the Base of Political Power, h3
5 Kuwait's Military Forces
Kuwait's Borders, 70
Kuwait" Forces and Strategic Vuherabilities, 71
6 ECuwaiti Miti-tary Spending and Ams Imports
Military Spending, 73
Kuwaiti Arms Expenditures, 76
Kuwait" Recmt Major Arms Purchases, 79
Kuwait" Ams Purchases from the US, 81
Nuwait's Military Forces Before the Gulf War
The Kuwaiti Am-ty Before the Gulf War, 85
The hwaiti Navy Before Chc Grxlf War, K6
The Kuwaiti Air Force Before the Gulf War, 87
Kuwaiti Paramilitary Forces Before the Gulf War, 89
8 Rebuilding Kuwait's Forces Following the Gulf War
The Problem of Kuwaiti Military Manpower, 92
The Chdlenge of f3e-epipphg Kwaiti Forces, 95
9 Kuwait's Land Forces Since the Gulf War
Kuwaiti Army Modernization and Expansion, 37
Kuwaiti A rq Readir7ess and Warfighting Capability, 103
20 Kuwait's Naval Forces Since the Gulf War
Kuwaiti Naval Strength and Equipmt, 105
Kuwaiti Naval Iqeadiness md Warfighthg Capability, 102
21 Kuwait's Air Forces Since the Gulf War
Kuwaiti Air Force Equipment, 109
Kuwaiti Air Farce Land-Based Air Defense
iutd C"i/BM Systems, 113
Kuwaiti Air Force Readiness and
Warfighl-ing Capabihty, 114
Con fen is

Con fen ls
12 Kuwaiti Paramilitary and Internal Security Forces
Kuwaiti Security Measures, 116
The Impad tof the Kuwaiti Legal System, 117
Freedonn of Expression and Peaceful Dsscnt, 119
Treatment of Foreign Labor, 120
13 Strategic Interests
The Challenge of Self Drfense, 123
The Challenge of Regional Cooperation, 124
The Challer~ge of Relations with I-he U'nikd States
and the West, 126
The Challenge of fnteml Refom, 130
Nofes
Sources and Methods
About the Book and Author

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Tables and Illustrations
One: Key Economic fndicaturs in Kuwait
Two: Estimated hcrease in MJorld Oil Production
by Region and Country
Three: Comparative Oil Reserves and Production Levels
of the Gulf States
Four: Cost of Mahtabhg and Expanding Oil Production
h GCC Countries
Five: World Natural Gas Proven Reserves by Country
Six: Gulf and Gas Reserves and Production
Seven: Kuwaiti Budget Revenues and Expenditures
Relative to Earnings: 1984-1996
Eight: Gulf MiIitary Forces in 1996
Nher Key Kuwaiti Equ@nent Develogments
Ten: US Foreign Military Sates, Coxsrme~ial Ams Export
Agreements, Military Assistance Programs, and
hternatimal Military Education and Raining Programs
with Kuwait: FV 19851994
One: Kuwait: GDC Population Growth in Millions, and
Per Capita Income
Two: Kuwaiti Gross Domestic Product, Central Government
Expeditures, Military Expenditures, Total Impo&s,
Total Exports, and Arms Deliveries: 1983-1993
Three: Total Oil Reserves of the Gulf States
Four: Kuwaiti Oil and Natural Gas Liquids Total Pmduction
and Exports

Five: Total Gas Reserves of the Gulf States
Six: Kuwaiti Natural Gas Production
Seven: Kuwait: Balmce of Trade
Eight: Trends in Kuwait Budget Revenues md Expenditures
Nine: Trends in Kuwait Budget &venues
Ten: Kuwait: Liyuidity: 196&1993
Eleven: Kuwait: GDP by Sector
Twelve: Estimated Trends in the Kuwaiti Popdation
Durhg 1990-2035
Thirteen: Kuwaiti Mllitary Expenbiturcs, Total 1 mports,
and Arms Imports: 1983-1993
Fourteen: Kuwaiti GNP Per Capita Versus
Military Expmdih;lres Per Capita
Fifteen: Kuwaiti Arms Sales Agreelnents by Supplier Caulztry:
1987-1994
Sixteen: Kuwait: Military Maming-19'7"91996
Seventeen: Kuwait: Armored Weapons Strength-1979-1996
Eighteen: Kwiiit: Artilley Weapms Strength-19m-1996
Nheteen: Gulf Naval Ships by Category in 1996
Twenty: Kwait: Fixed Whg and btary Wing
Cornbat Air Strength-1979-1996
&e: Kuwait
TWO: Kuwaiti berl5y Facilities

Preface
This volume ir; part of an ongoing dynamir net assessment of the Gulf.
The project was concejved by David Abshire anb Rjchasd Fairbanks of
the Center for Strategic and International Studics, and focuses on the foreign
policy, military forces, plitics, economics, energy sector, and internal
security of each Gulf state, and US strategy and power projection
capabilities in the Gutf. Separak volumes are awailable on Kuwait, Iran,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and US forces. Balhrain, &an, Qatar, and the W E
are combined into a single volume.
Each of these volumes is hterlinked to provide comparable data on the
cufmt situation and trends i,n each countrq:, and to prtray the overdl
trends in key areas like the economy and. the military balance, The volume
on Iran provides a detailed graphic overview cJf the military trends
in the region, but each volume shukvs how the key econmic and military
developments in each countr). relate to the devel.oyments in other Gutf
countries.
At the same time, this series deliberately emphasizes nation-by-nation
analysjs, Iran and Iraq cleady deserve separate treabnent. The Southern
Gulf states are largdy indepmdent actors and are driven by separate
strategic, political, econontic, and military interests. fn spite of the creation
of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), there is little practical
pmgrrss in strategic, economic, or military cooperatim, and there are
serious rivalries and differences of strategic interczst between Bahrajn,
Kuwait, Omm, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, The Southern Gulf
cannot be understood in terms of the rhetork of the Arab Gulf Cooperation
Council, or by assumhg that developme~~ts i,n Bhrain, Kuwait,
%an, Qatas, Saudi Arabia, and the UPIE are similar and these states
have m identity of interest.
These Gulf studjes are also part of a broader dynamic nd: msessment
of the Middle East, and a sepasate study is available of the trends in the
Arab-Israeli military balance and the peace process. See Anthony H.
Cordesmm, Perilous Prospeciis, Boulder, Westviebv, 1996.

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Acknowledgments
This volume is part of a six-volume series reparting on a dynamic net
assessment of the Gulf. The px^oject was conceived by David Abshire and
Rchard Fakbanks af the Center for Strategic and I~~ternational Sbdies,
and is part of a brnader dynamic net assesment of the etntire Middle East.
The auEhor would like to thmk Khberly Goddes md Kiydm Batmmtjlidj
for their research and editing help in writing chis series, and. 17lmas
9idenstein and David, Hayward for helping to ecfit each volume.
Many US and international andysts md agencies played a role in commenting
on drafts of the manuscript. So did experts in each Southern
Gulf country. The aut.lnar camat achowledge these contributions by
name or agency but he is deeply grateful. The author would also like to
thank his colleagues at the CSIS who rwicwed varicrus manuscripts and
commented on the anatysis. 'These colleagues include Richard Fairbanks
and Arnaud de Borchgrave, and. his Co-Director of the MiddXc East Protjran-t,
Judith Kipper.

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Introduction
Kwait plays a critical role in any prqcction cJf the world's future oil supplies.
As of 1994, Kuwait had esti,ma.t.ed proven oil reserves of 94.8 to 96.5
billion barrels, or about 8.GCG to 9.I;7'X, of all world reserves, Most estimates
indicated that Kuwait has prohable Rscrrwes of at feast 4 billion banels
more.Wany of Kuwait's resemes are easy to extract and have recovev
costs of d y about $2 a basrei.-.I..2
Kuwait is also one of the tw major oil exporting powers that can
rapidry increase production in m emergency, an important fact that kvill
grow steadily over tim. The US Department of Energy esthates that
Kuwait will expand its pmduction frttrn a little over 2.3 million barrels
per day in 1995 to 3.1 (3.0-3.3) million barrels per day in 2000,3.8 (3.64.5)
milXion barrels per day in 2005, and 4.6 (4.0-5.3) million barrels per day
in 2010.3
At the same time, Kuwait's ggeography; small size, md limited population
make it one of the most vuherable Gulf states. Its location m Iraq's
border has been the some of continuing Iraqi threats, military con-
.frontation, and actual invasion. Its locatio~z within a k~ minutes flying
tirne of Iran has made it equally vulnerable to Iranian thrtzats and pressure.
Iranian aircraft attacked Kuwait several tilnes during the Iran-Irq
War1" Iranian naval forces attacked tankers and other ships moving to
Kuwait. Iranian mti-ship missiles attacked targets in Kuwait" harbors,
and Irmian intelligence sponsored bombings and terrorist attacks.
This cornbjnation of oil wcalth and geographical vul~wcability make
Kuwait a critical strategic pivot in a net assessment of the Gulf. The abjlity
of Kuwait, its neit;hbors, and the West tc:, deal with Iraqi intimiciation
or invasion largely determhes the seczrrity of the upper Gulf and the containment
of Iraq's pdtical and military ambitions,
Strategic Bachraund
Kwait is located in the far northwestern corner of fie upper Gulf
between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and kvithin a short distance of Iran. It is

2 Introdzret ion
MAP ONE Kuw-ait
one of the worZd% major oil powers, but it has a total area of mly 32,8110
square kilorneters-roughly the size af New Jersey; At its largest poht,
Kuwait is about 200 kilometers from north to south md l70 kilometers
from east to west. It shares a 242 kilometer border with lraq and a 222
Elometer border wi& Saudi Arabia. It has a 499 kilometer coastlhe an
the Gulf, and. its territory includes nine islands. Bubiyan and Warb;rh-

Tnf rodztcfion 3
two large islands in the north-are uninhabited but artl of strategjc
importance, because they border the Urn Qasr channel, which is Iraq's
only waterway with direct access to the Gulf.4
Like a number sf states in the upper Gulf, Kuwait can trace its history
as far back as that of Dilmm. Kuwait's rnodcrn history began in the early
1170Qsf when lfamilies from the Bmi Ukb clan of the haizah tribe
migrated from @tar to found the city of Kuwait. In 1765, these tribes
chose Sabah al Sabah as their rulhg sheik. He was succeeded by his son
AbduIlah, who was succeeded in turn by his son Jabair.
This line sf successisn established the tradition that the ruler sf Kuwait
is to be chosen by a com~cil of the Al Sab& family; after consultation with
other leading families. This decision had a major impact on the hture of
both Qatar and Bahrain. 'The Al m~alifa family, closely refated to the Al
Sabahs and a rivat for leadership of Kuwaik decided to seek a new power
base elsewhere h the Gulf. The Al aalifas first took control of Qatar and
then cmwrc.d Babrain with the aid of the Al Sabahs oE hwait.
By 1770, Kukvait was a fishing and tsacllng twn surrounded by tsiba)
iamilies who mgaged in nomadic agriculture. The role of the Al Sabah
Sheik cmsisted largely of negotiating with the atoman Empire, surrnunding
tribes, and other Gulf states. In 1775 the British East India Cornpmy
made its first contacts with Kuwait, Between 1775 and 1779, the
British-operated Persian Culf-Aleppo Mail Srwice was diverted throu$
Kuwajt fmm Persian-occupied Basra (today Iraq). At the same time, Ihe
rise of the Wahhabis and AI Saud iamily created a new center of power in
Arabia. These developments forced Kuwait to deal increasingly with the
British md Al Sauds, as well as the Ottoman Empire. Kuwait had little
trade or contact with the Persian Empire at this tirne.
By the late 377Os, the growiw regional competition between Britairr,
the Ottoman Empire, and the Persian Empire forced Kuwait to choose
one of the powers as a patron. In 1871, Abdullah Al Sabah X I allied Kuwait
with Turkey anci took the title of Qaimaqam, or pm"incial gowemor, h m
the Ottamm Sultan. These ties had little practical meanlng, however,
since the Ottoman Empire did not exert any significant control over
Kuwait,
Kuwait ended its ties to the Ottoman Empire in 1896. Abdullh A1
Sabah fE died in 1892. He was succeeded by Muhammad Ai Sabah who
died four years later. AI Sabah's death trigge~d a struggll. for power that
was eventudly won by Muharak M Sabah, who kiled his bro"rhers during
the struggle. Illu:bxak oppowed Turkish influence so when the
atomans backed his rivals, he appmached Britain, which was concerned
with the growth of German influence in Turkey, constructim of Ihe
Berlin-to-Baghdad railway and pEans to link the railway to the port oi
Kuwait,

4 Introdzret ion
As a result, Britain and Kuwait signed a treaty in 1899 that promised
Kuwajt the British support in return for British control over Kuwait's foreign
pdicy Sheik Mubarak pledged that neither he nor his successors
would cede any territory, or receive the agents or representatives of any
foreign power, without. the British Govcr ent's consent. Britab agreed
to grant an annual subsidy to support the Sheik and his heirs and to provide
for Kuwait's protection, A British political agmt was appointed in
1904, who handled Kukvait's forcign affairs and s~zrrity. In =turn,
Kuwait enjoyed special t~aty relations with Britain,
Although Iraq has ma$e claims to Kuwait as an "inhrritcrr statef?o the
Ottoman Empire, Turkey had otnly limited sovereignty over Kuwail for a
period of 15 years, whiie Kuwait" ties to Britain lasted from 1899 until
1961 when Kuwait received fuli independence. Further, Bhtain negotiated
a treaty wif-;h the Ottoman Empire in 1913 that would have regularized
its new realationship with Kuwait, The outbreak of World Mrar X prevented
this trmty's ratgication, but Kuwait's souereipty receiVed de
facto recog~nitian long before Iraq came into existe~~ce.
Kuwait" aalliaxlce with Britain helped Sheik Mubarak consolidate his
power and make his sans its rulers. Sheik MuXllarak was succeeded by hfs
son Jabir (1915-17) and subsequently by another son, Salim (1917-21).
Su:bsequent Emirs were descdants of these two brothers, Sheik Ahmed
al-Jabir Al Sabah ruled from 1921 until his death in the 1950s. As a result
of this long reig~n, Mubarak's branch of the family became the dorninant
brmch of the Al S&& fmily until. 1950. This peaceful succession created
a new degree of inkmal stability within Kuwait.
Kuwait did, however, face increasing challenges from the outside. The
first challenge came f m Saudi Arabia, wfirich attacked north towards
Kwait in 1924, wcm a major battle at Al Jahrah, less than 40 Mometers
.from Kukvait City, and threatened to conquer the country This Icd to
British intervention in 1922, when SiP. Percy Cox, the British agent called
together the representatives of Kwait, Britain's nedy formed League of
Nations mandate, Iraqf and Satrdi Arabia fthetn the k1tanat-e of Najd).
The resulting negotiations led to the Treaty of Muhammara (Map 3,1992)
and the Protocol of Uyayr (December 2,1922).
mese two agreements arranged the boundaries of modern Kuwait,
although hwait Iost a signi.ficant amount of territory occupied by pro-
Kwiiiti Bedouin to Saudi Arabia, A new boundary with Saudi Arabia
was established, along with a Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zo~ne, m area
of about 5,180 sq. km. (2,m sq. mi.) which acltjoined Kuwait's southern
border. In December 1969, Kwait and Saulii Arabia signed an agreement
dividing the Neutral Zone (now called the Divided Zone) and demarcating
a new international. boundary. Both corntries now share the Divided
Zone% onshm and offshorn petroleum eyually.

Tnf rodztcfion 5
'f'he second challenge came from Iraq, whjch had ewrged as an in$epelrdent
Arab state follocving British efforts to partition t-he Mid& East
after World Mrar X and tke collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As has been
mentioned earlier, Iraq had no historical clairn to Kuwait. Kuwait% northern
border with Iraq had been established as part of the agreeme~~t Britah
had reached with Turkey in 1913, Iraq accepted this clainn when it was
tjiwn its independence from Turkey and accepted it again in the ""Agreed
Minutes ktween the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding
the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition, and Related Matters,',
which Iraq and Kuwait signed in 1932. Howwer, Iraqi nationalists began
to claim Kuwait to be legitimately part of Iraq as early as the mid-f920s,
and these claims laid the groundwork for later Iraqi clabs and threats to
Kuwait,
The third challenge was the discovery of oil in the l930s, which began
the transformation of Kuwait from a minor administrative port to a
modern state. In 1938, however, a combination of the worldwide Depression,
the collapse oE the pealing industry and a Saudi trade boycott created
a major economic crisis in Kuwait. Many leading merchants
~spcmeied by chatlenging the authority of the Emir. 'f'hey called for new
arrangements that would share any walth from. Kuwait's new oil concessions,
and a broader sharjng of pwer by the Al Sa.bahs, The merchants
first petitioned the Emir to achieve these goals, and then held unilater&
elections for a. Majlis. This body d y lasted for six months before
being suppressed by the Emir and other trifoaf leaders. However, its creation
laid the ground work for a contkuing Kwaiti interest in representative
government.
Modernization and Independence
The post war era saw Kuwait become a sipificant oil exporter. In 1950,
Salh Al Sabah, a member of the Salh brmch of the A1 Sabah family,
became Emir, replacing his predecessor, &mad al Jamir Al Sabah, who
had mled sisrce 1921, Salim confronted the need to modernize and share
Kwaitfs growing oil we&. Dwing the 1%(3s, the new Ernir created
much of the welfare system which has given Kuwait some of the most
advanced social services in the dewl~ping world. He also began a series
of negotiations with Britaim that =placed +e treaty of 1899 with a treaty
of friendship, which led to Kuvtrait's independence.
By the early 1960s, Kuwai.t began to move towards irtdepenbence, En
early 1962, the British withdrew their special court system, which handled
the cases of fortig~~ers residing in Kuwait, and Che Kukvaiti Government
began to exercise legal jurlisdictim under new laws drawn up by an
Egptian jwist. Emir Salim respcmded to the fall of the Iraqi monarchy,

6 Introdzret ion
Iraqi threats to Kwait, and thwat of radical Arab swialism, by issuifig
Kuwait's first constituti~n in November, 1962. This cmstitnxtio~~ estarblished
the Emir as a hereditary monarch, as welt as m Emir" Council,
and a popular National Assembly Mthose electorate was limited to the
descendants of: Kukvait's population in 1920. The first eleetion for the
National Assembly took place in 1963.
Salim died in 1965, and was repkced by his brother Sabah who ruled
Kuwait until December, 1927. Emir Sabah suspended the Natio~~al
Assembly in 1976, party because of the deep divisims within the assembly,
a d partly because of its cri"tcism of Iraq anci other neighboring
states. 'The National. Assembly was allowed to operate again in 1981largely
in response to the fall of the Shah of Iran. The Assembly was suppressed
again fn 4986, however, because of its growing demands for
power, its debates over a massive stock market .fraud, charges of corrwption
involving the royal. family, and debates that threatened to hrcase
tension with Kuwait" neighbors.
Sheik Jabir al Ahmad al Jabir A1 Sabah, a member of the Jabir branch of
the Al Shah became Emir in 1977, md continues to rule to this
day. He has designated Prime Minister 5aad al Abdullah as Salh AI
Sabah as his successor-foflow-ing a pattern in which the succession now
alternates between the Jabir and Salim branches of the iamity. Sheik Jabir
al Ahmad Al Sabah has been drsignated crown prince.

Kuwait's External Security:
The Problem of Iran and Iraq
Kuwait enjoyed relatively peaceful relations with its neighbars mtil its
independmce in 1961. Saudi Arabia did not press its claims to dispukd
tersitory and offshore dri1l;in.g =as as long as Kuwait remained under
British protection, Iraq recognized Kuwait" sindependence h 1932 and did
not challenge Kuwait% sovereipty while the Irayi monarchy =mined
dependent upon British szlpport and influence.
This situation changed dramatically after 1361.. The Iraqi monarchy fell
in 1958, and Ku~iait faced a growing threat hrn radical Arab nationalism.,
The fall of the Iraqi monarchy had created a radical Iraqi reghe
which claimed Krawait under the pretense that it had mce been part of
the Ottornm Empire and, consequently, was subject to Iraqi suzerainty.
This that was a rniljor factor leading to Kuwait's decisim to become
iully independent on June 19,1961.
Only a week after the withdrwal of British forces, Iraqi forcles moved
to the border. mese forces only halted when Britain rushed troops back
into Kuwa-it and it became cllear that the Arab League was prepared to
challenge Iraq's clairns. Eray siped an agrement in 1963 that appeared
to recog~~ize Kuwait" ssovereig~~ty~ and the border demarcatio~~ to which
Britain and Turkey had agrced. in 1913, but Iraq only did, so because of a
coup that killed the lrayi dictator who had origjnally threatened to
hvade Kuwait,
.After this border crisis, Kuwait attempted to deal with external threats
by adoplling a poticy of negotiation with any threatening power, and using
its oil wealth to compensate for its mil,it.ary wenltness. Kukvait gave moIIey
to the PLO and aid to radical Arab states. It prwided. funds to Syria and
Iraq, supported Arab trade and oil embargoes, and ternhated its t~aty
with Kritah in 1971 in an effnrt to show it no longer had colonial ties. It
bought militar). equipmt hrn the US and &rope, but established relations
with the Soviet Union in 1963, and eventually bou&t Soviet arms in
an eff-ort to mh~ixn,ize the risk of hostile Soviet pressure.

This policy of buying off 1-hrt.ats helped Kuwait both to reach an agree-
ment with Iraq in 1963, and get the votes it needed to join the UN. Nev-
ertheless, Iraq continued to make sporadic claims to Kuwait, and never
fnrmally abandoned its clairns to the Kwiiiti idmds of Bubiym and
Warbah. These islands are m the northeastern edge of the Kukvaiti-Iraqi
bosder. They control the Khor Ahd ALlah, the channel to fraq's ody
means of direct access to the Gulf md its naval base at Umm Qasr, and
are near its oil loadislg terminai in the Gdf off .hl Faw.
Iraq threatened. Kuwait again in 1965, 1967 and 1972. Iraq occupid
Kwiiitfs border post at Samita on March 20, 1973, in a furlher effort to
pressure Kuwait to cede its control of the islands in thc G d, This led to
the deployment of Saudi troops to the border. Iraq withdrew h early
April, "ot only after mediation by Yasser Arafat and another substantial
Kuwajti payntent to Iraq. Iraq thcn atteqted to lease Warbah and half of
Bubiyan in 1975 for a period of 99 years, According to some reports, Iraq
briefv sent troops into Kuwait agaill fn 1976, and only withdrctw after
another Kuwaiti payment."
Kuwait and the Iran-Iraq W r
Despite these difficulties, Kuwai.t was one of Iraq% most important allies
during the Irm-Iraq War. During 198M988, Kuwait supplied Iraq with
at least $13.2 billim in grants and loans, and with up to $22 billion in
overall assistance.b
Even so, Kuwait's ~lations with Iraq continued to be problematic, Iraq
again sought to kase Bubiyan and Warbah in 1980 and provoked another
bosder incident in 1983. When Kuwait again refused to lease the two
islands, Iraq sent a token force across the border. This Iraqi pssure kd
to a sudden visit to Baghdad by Kuwaiti Rime Minister Saad Sabah on
November 1&13,1984. %re again, Iraq was bought off by a substmt-ial
payment, although Iraq did establish a Hovexcraft base across the river
from Warbahe7
Control of BUbiyan and Wrbah became steadily more important to
Iraq dufing the eariy years of the Iran-lraq War because Iraq cod not
seem its access to the Gulf thugh the Shatt al-Arab kvaterway, whjch it
shared with Iran, The Skatt al-Arab suffered horn eight years of silting
and mhing during the course of the Iran-Iraq War, and Iran demmstrated
Chat its land-based anti-ship missiles could tqet any ships moving
into Ir4 waters h th Gulf.
As a ~sult, Iraq took steps to shift its shipping and naval operations as
.far south as possible. Iraq steadiXy expanded the sout.hern commercial
area of Basra, expanded the town of AI Zubqr; just to the southwest of
Basra, and expanded its naval base at lJmm Qasr. Iraq also moved south

into turitoy that probabty beft,nged to bait near Llmm Qasr and the
border town. of Safwan, and had expand& a canal calfed the Sha;n: a-
Basra from CJmm Qasr to a position midway beheen Rasra and .Al
Zubayr. This made the K,hor Abd Allah, the charnel from the Gulf to
Ulnm Qasr to the north of Bubyian and Warbah steadily more importmt,"
At the same the, Kuwait" support for Iraq created a threat from Eran.
&rhg 1980-1981, Iran ccmducted. several overflights and air strikes on
Kuwait to try to b~thidate it into reduckg its support for Iraq. Xrm also
attempted. to gain support from Iranians living in Kuwait, and from
Kuwaiti Shi'ites, wbich make up a substantial part of Ktlwaitfs pc,pulatinn.
mese problelxs with Iran grew more severe after 1982, when Xra~ian
iorces drove Iraq out of Iran and began to coul-tter-attack across the border
into Iraq. It was clear to Eran's leadership that Kuwaiti aid played a
critical role in giving Iraq the ability to survive Iranim attacks, and Iran
began to put military prcssure on Kuwait. While mast of Kuwai.t% Shi'ite
population prtwed loyal, Iran had some success in using Kuwaiti Shi5ites
to attack targets in Kuwait,
On December 12,1983, Shi3tes bombed the French md US embassies,
and 17 ShifiPes were later convicted of the bombing. In May, 1985, pro-
Irmian Shi'ites atteqted to assassinate the Emir of Kukvajt.. Iran's conquest
of Faw in 1986 brought it wit.hin striking distance of Kuwait. Pro-
Iranian Shi5tes bombed Kuwait's oil facilities in June, 19%, and in
Ja~uary, April, May; and June of 1987, Iraq's hcreashg strikes on tanker
and cargo traffic to Iran led Iran to retaliate by attackng tanker and cargo
traffic to Kuwait and Saudi hrabia-reatinl; a "tanker war" in the Gulf.
This "tanker war'qed Kuwait to seek US and Soviet assistmce in
"ref1aggingP' its tankers, Neither Kuwaiti military forces nor tbe GCC
could provide the naval and air capabilities necessary tc:, defend against
the Iranim threat. Kuwait was forced to turn to the West md the USSR
for aid, While the Sovict Union only provided token naval forces, the US
provided a major naval escort effort, supported by US special forces and
air mits bawd in the Gulf. The escort effort led to sjgnihcant naval
clashes beheen the US and Im during 1987 md 1988, which played a
sipificmt mle in Iran's eventuai defeat. It also led tc:, the first major landbased
anti-ship missile strikes on Gulf shipping. Iran fired at- least 10 Silkworm
missile at targets in Kuwaiti waters, farchg Kuwait to improve its
navy and deploy colxnterrnasurc. eyuipn-tent on its islands.
Kuwait and the Gulf War
Irm's defeat in the Iran-Iraq War only created a new threat to Kuwait's
security Muwait" suppmt of Iraq durislg th Iran-Iraq W;ar earned itself
little gratitude. While Iraq emerged as the victor in the Iran-Iraq War, it

had borrowed at least $3";7biion in loans from Kuwait a d its other Arab
neigkibors, as wcll as mssive addjtional loans fmm the West and Japan.
By late 1989, :Iraq desperately needed to reschedule its debts. The
~quired principat and interest on the nm-Arab debt alnne wouM have
cmsumed half of Iraq's $13 billion worth of annual oil rcvenues.9
At the same time, repayments of this scale scarcely suited Saddm
Hussein's grwing regional ambitions. Iraq had a mftitary budget of
$1,2.9 billion in 1990, which meant: Iraq was spending approximately $700
per citizen in a country with a per capita income of only $1,950." As a
result, Iraq began to demand forgivmess of its &at, loans during 3988
and 1989, and called for nekv grmt aid to be given to Iraq as the sole
defender of tbe Arab cause against Iran, Iraq also made new requests to
lease Warbah and parts of Bubiyan island fn 1989, and rejected the
attentpts of Kuwait's Emir to reach a gelneral border settlemetnt when he
visited I rilq in Septezmber, 1989.11
By mid-1990, Iraq% cash mserves were. only equal tcr three months of
imports and infl&ion was rzlnning at 40%. When Kuwait reftised to forgive
Iraq" debt, lease the islands, and agee to Iraq" soter border claims,
Iraq decided m war. Saddm Hussein accused Kuwait of ""stabbing Iraq
in the back'' and Iraqi ctreign rninister Tariq Aziz claimed that Kuwait
had '"implemented a plot to escalate the pace of graduaj systematic
advances towards Iraqi territory-" He claimed that the Kuwaiti government
had set up "military establishments, police posts, oil installations,
and arms on Xraqi territory" He also claianed that Kuwait and the UAE
were conspiring to keep oil prices low and wert. violating their oil quotas,
and that Kuwait was stealing oil from the liumalia oi field, whose
southern tip enters Kuwaiti territary.Iz
On August 2,3990, Iraq invaded a nearly defenseless Kuwait. It immediately
became apparmt that the GCC had no real military capability to
aid Kuwait. The GCC had supposedy created a 10,000-man Peninsulas
Shield Force in the mid-3980s but, in reality; this force consisted of little
more Chm a reinforced Saudi brigaclc based at Mafr &-Batin and token
detachments from other Gulf states, Further, the so-called GCC rapid
deployment force had little mobility and sustainaMity
The US responded bp forming the UN Coalition that fought the Gulf
War and liberated Kuwait. However, fraq's defeat has fefi a legacy of
Iraqi irredentism, Mthich has since been compomded by the impact of the
UN cease-fire terms and the creation of a new border between Kuwait
and Iraq.
Men the UN Security- Council accepted a cease-fim in the Gulf War m
April 3, 1991, it adopted terms that re~i~cl Iraq to (a) recognize the
ad~usted Kuwaiti-Trayi border, (b) accept a UN guarantee of the border,
(c) &W the UN to establish a peace observer force in a zone abng the

Iraqi-Kuvvait border 30 kilometers fn Iraq a d 5 kilometers in Kuvvait, fd)
reaffirm its commitment to the Chemical W;;rrfare Convelztion and
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties, (e) permit the UN to ensure the
destmction of all biological, chemical, and nuckar weapons, long-range
ballistic missiles, and related facifities, equipment, supplies, (f) accept liability
for Kuwait" losses, (g) assum Eability for all pre-war debts, (h)
rc-.htn? or account for all Kuwaiti prisoners, and (i) renounce terrorism.
Iraq accepted these terms on April 4,1991-
Kuwait and the Continuing Threat af Invasion from Iraq
Neither victot.). nor the cease-fire have ended the threat from Iraq, and
Kuwait, the US, and other ailied nations have repeatedly been forced to
react to new Iraqi provocations. In August and September of 1,992, the
confrontation between Iraq and the UN over the elimination of
weaponmf mass destruction, and :Iraq% ttreatment of its Shi'ites and
Kurds, forced hwait alld the U'S to transform their joint exercises into
a demmstration that the US could protect Kuwait agajnst any military
adventures by Iraq. 'The US rushed Patriot batteries to both Kuwait and
Bahrairt, conducted a test pre-positioning exercise called Native Fury
92, deployed a 1,300 man battalim from the 1st Cavaky Division, and
an mphibbus reinforcement exercise catled Eager Mace 92. The US
&so deployed 1,900 Marines and 2,4110 soldiers, including two armored
and two mechanized compmies.13
Kuwait faces the prospect of continuing Iraqi challenges to its new border
MIith Iraq. As part of the cease-fire terms, the UN set up a specid UN
Traq/:Kuwait Boundary Ucmarcation Commission. This commission
issued its final report on May 20,1993, and found that the original border
marking points had long vanished, md that Iraqi farmers had steadily
expanded their date farms to the south after the border was marked in
3923. As a result, correcting the border to the miginal lhle moved it to the
north and into territory that Iraq had occupied before World War 11.
The Secxtary General accepted the final report oi the CJN IraqiKuwait
Boundary Demarcation Commission, and the tlN Security Councit
adopted Resolution 833 on May 27, 7,943. Resolution 833 reaMirmed the
Commission% ffina dbemarcation of the fraq-kwait bosder, dcmandcd
that both states ~spect that border, md guaranteed the inviolability of
the border.
The new border offered Kuwait considerable advantages at the
expmse of Iraq. It gave Kuwait greater control over the Ratga and
Rumalia oil fiel$s in its norlt.lern border area, and reduced Xraqi access to
the port hcilities at ZJmm Qasr.l"t the same time, the new border created
political prc,bIems with Iraq. &1y six days aft-er the Sec~tary Gen-

erd accepted the =port, the Speaker of Iraq's Nationai Assembly stated
that Che new border would keep tensions in the region high. Iraq refused
to accept the new demarcation md Iraqi editorials, and Iran" media
made new claims to Kuwait as Iraq's 119th prowince.
Iraq crcated a scries of hddents in the border area during the rest of
1993 and througln most of 1994. In late 1934, Iraq then sent mgur forces,
includktg two Republican Guards divisions, into the border area. These
movements forced the US to rush land md air forces hto the area, md
led to a new crisis between Iraq and the UN.
The cmtinuing threat f m Iraq "oecame even more appartrnt on October
3,1994, \zrhen Iraq began to move its Elammurabi and A% Nida Republican
Guards divisions south from the area around Baghdad to positions
about 20 kilometers from the border with Kuwait. These two units were
the best equipped RepubIican Cuds divisions in the Iraqi Army. 'They
moved by rail and road with full ammunition loads and then deployed
in an attack capable formation which had one brigade forward and two
in the rea~, and a full complement of divisional artillery.
The Iraqi. movements not only involved two divisions of 9,000 to 10,000
men each, they hvolved the movement of FRW, SA-8, md mobile AA
units. Iraq also incrcascd the readiness of the Adnan and Baghdad divisions
of the Republican Guards in the north in a mamer that indicated
they might mwe south, md altered the deploymenis of the three Iraqi
divisions aZxeady in the south-the 54th MechaIlized Division, which was
about 40-50 kilometers from the border, the 2nd Armored Division, and
the 4th Republican Guards fnfantry Division, Iraq built up a tot& force of
7C),00%81),mO men, hvlnicfi led to si.gnifica,nt increases in the major
weapons positioned in the area no& of Kuwait, Irayi tank strength
increased from about 660 to 1,1Cftl, artillery strength from around 400 to
700, md OAfV stre~~gth from about 700 to 1,0Q0.15
More than my incident since tlne Gulf War, this Iraqi, buil.d-up illustrated
thr problems Kwait and the US face in dealing with a major Iraqi
challenge and the necessary respnse. 'The Kuwajti cakrinet met in emer-.
gcrncy session on October 7,1994, and decided to send lhe Kuwait army
to the border and put Ku~iait foxes cm full alert. It took 5-7 days to
defloy the kwaiti army fully, hhowever, and its efective fighting
strengtl-t was less than one heavy Iraqi Republican Guards brigadc,
Tlte US decided to send additional forces to the Gulf: on October 9 ta
supplement. l.he 13,000 WS personnel already in the thcater. -These
forces initially included the 18,000 men in the 1st Marine Expeditionary
Force, 16,000 troops from the US army 24th Infantry Division,
306 fixed wing aircraft (including A-lOs, F-16s, RP-4Cs, F-ISEs, F-ISCs,
F-Ills, EF-Ills, F-117s, ISTARS, F/A-l8s, B-52s, and E-3As, 58 helicopters
(inclueSing 54 AH-64s), two batteries of Patriot Missiles, and a

carrier battle group. The US subsequently deployed another 73 fixed
wing aircraft.
By October 12, the US had a total of 19,241. men in the Gulf area (1,923
Army, 11,171 Navy, 1,977 Marine, 3,844 Air Force, 173 Special Operations,
and 153 Joinl Task Force Headquarters), 'The US had two casrier task
iorces with 15 ships (counting me carrier battle group in the Red. Sea.) and
200 combat aircritft and was ir7 the process of depioying sipificant numbers
of aircraft.
US Army units we= beginnhg to join the prepositioned US armor in
Kuwiiit; and 5 Marine Corps Maritime Prepositionhg Ships, 8 US Army
Brigade Afloat Ships, and 6 USAF and US Army Prepositio~~hg Ships
were moving towards the Gulf. US forces were involved in joint exe~ises
with Kuwaiti forces in fie border area wilhin a matter of days, and the
US held a major, demonstrative armor-B-52-strike aircraft exercise before
the end of October. In contrast, the GuXf Cooperation Council was only
able to make a token co itment of the 17,000 mm Peninsula Shield
force-which lacked the combat capabiXity to play any si,gni.icmt rolc in
defending Kuwait.
Although Iraq backed down, witbd~w its forces, and then stated it
would recag~~ize the new border wif-;h Kuwait, it seems clear that this
Iraqi acceptance was little mom than a ploy tiIJled to try to put an end to
UN sanctions. In fact, there were new indications of Iraqi movements
against Kuwait in 1995. 011 August 8, 1995, two of Saddam Hussein's
sons-in-law, two of his daughters, and other mmbers of their family
defected to fordan. This defection was folowed by musual Iraqi move-
ments around Baghdad and in Southern Iraq, and rumors that Iraq may
attack Kuwait or make a demonstration near the border.
'T"lnese indications led Kuwait to create a new security zone near its cap-
ital. At the sme time, the U'S respmded by deploying naval task forces
where they could protect Kuwait as part of 'Q~peration Vigilant Sntinell."'
August 10, it alertecf fie carrier battle gmup that hciuded the Rao-
srmlt (CCG-K), the 8th Carrier Whg, the guided miss* cruiser Mz'ssisswi
(CGN), and the guided. missitc cruisers Hzre City (CG) and ;Ticoaderoga
(CC), as we11 as fie pided missile frigate Nkfidus (FFC). 'This force was
on station near Port Said by August U, with the capabaity to launch more
than 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles,
The US also alerted the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the
assatxlt ships Kearsarge (LHD) and Nnt;hvillr! (I.,FXlt), and the guided missile
destmyc3r Nu& PE), The 11th Marjne Expeditionary Unit (MEU) with
tJle assault ships Nao Orleans (LPH) and. JUFZ~~U (LPD), fie landhg ships
Gm~.sfock and Mf. fimm (I;,SD), and the TAC) Pecos, moved from positjons
near U?e Gutf of &men to the up-per Red Sea, wherc the MECT could. rapidly
deploy &rough Saudi Arabia. 'This force was also on stathn by August 12.

During all of this period, the carrier battle gmup in the new US 5th
Fleet in t-he Guf re~nained on station. 'This battle group included Ihe carrier
Lincoln (CCG-S), the 11th Carrier Miing, the guided missjle cmisers
Velta Gzr& Brirzcetotz, and C!jnlzcelEorsville (CC), the guided missile
destr0yt.r fm~m (DDC), the destroyers Mcritl and Elliot (DD), and the
guided missile frigates f~z~pmhnm and SlnrFc (FFC). The battle group in the
5th Fleet had the capability to dellver over 250 TomahaMlks.
Kuwait and the US &so decided to accelerate their joint exercises to
take place in August rather thm October. As a result, the US rushed some
28,1300 troops to the regim by mfd-Srptember, including 5,OW in the Eastern
Mediterranean. It cIeployed 8 prepositioning ships from Uiego Gitrcia
to the Gulf, with enougfn gear to sustaj.n 16,000 Marines in combat for 30
days, and 5/C)OffZ,O110 US Army troops. It lieployed four additional
preposi.tianing ships into the regio~z. It also prrzpared US Army troops i,n
the US for airlift to "marry up" with the heavy epiprnent for an armorcd
brigade that is prepor;itioned at Camp Doha in Kuwait.
The US sent 1,4610 tmps to the exercise frnm the 1st Cavalry Division
based at Fort Hood, Texas. It airlified an advance guard. of 398 soldiers to
acclimate themselves, and check the prepositimed equipment, and then
airlified the remaining forces, These troops wm deployed by August 17,
and were soon conducting a month-long joint exercise called '"peration
Il-ttrhsic Action" with Kuwaiti forces near the border. Memwhile,
another 3,900 US Navy and Mari,ne Corps force conduckd a joint
amphibious exercise with Kuwaiti forces called ""Eager Mace 96-1." This
exercise involved helicopter assautt landings, live fire trahhg, and surveillmce
operati~rrs.'~
Kuwait and Lesser Threats gram Iraq
Similar uncertainties rclgarding Iracfs future intentions exist as a result of
a recent dectine in Iraqi-prtwokd incidents along the border, lrqi infii-
trations and crossistgs dropped from several hundred a year durkg
1992-1994 to a few incidents a week in the spring of 1.995. However, this
decline seems to be a tmporary tactic rather than a commitment to a last-
ing cognition of Kuwait's bnrder,
f.'Mrthert the decline in incidents is partly the result of the deportation
of 1,501) lraqis living in tlmm Qasr (which occurred aft= Kuwait paid for
new housing), and partly the result of irnproved border surveillance and
the construction of a nearly 218 kilometer long security line. The border
is now monitomd by 300 unamed observers from more than 30 coun-
tries, as well as a bai-i;alion of armed Bmgladeshi soldiers The new secu-
rity line has a three meter deep trench, iollowed by a five met= sand
berm, and sensors which can detect the movement of vehicles. It is

acked by a patd road a d ouposts in the borcjer area, and Kuwait is
cmsidcrkg brtilding a second defensive line behind it with mines and
other barriers to halt an Iraqi military attack.17
It seems likeiy that Iraq will continue to assert its claims in the bcrrcier
area the moment it is given the political md military opportu11ity.1"
Kuwai"tas already had to abandon plans to allow Western oil companies
to ercplore and develf,~, its oil fields near the lraqi border because of the
risk of nekv clahes and incidents. Iraq, on the other hand, is aggressively
attempting to negotiate dcals with nations like Rrassia to exploit the fields
on its side af the border once the UN smctions are lifted.
Kuwait and Relations with Xran
Iraq is not the only exter~nal problem Kuwait faces. Iran .Crhreate~zed
Kuwai"teveraI times during the Iran-Irq War. It sent combat aixrafi into
Kwiiiti air space, eteployed combat ships in Kuwaiti waters, and fired 10
anti-ship missiles at ships and port 'acilities in Kuwaiti waters. Iran dsn
supported sabotage and terrorist attacks against tarigets in Kuwait.. Iran
still deploys land-based anti-ship missiles where they can cower shipping
into all but Kuwait's most soulhern ports, and can rapidly deploy air,
naval, mine warfare, unconventional warfare, and amphibious forces
against Kuwait" iislmds, waters, and mainland.
Kuwait and Iran have never reached full agreement on their respedive
offshore oil and gas rights. Iran and Kuwait have discussed the issue,
however, and there were reports that negotiations were underway in
mid-1995. In dealing with Iran, Kuwait has also chose11 dialogue over
ent, and has done so with some success. ft encouraged Iran to
export to Kuwait, and Frnported $87 million worth of gaods from Iran h
1994, versus exports of $6.6 million to $10 millio~~. Kuwait has also taken
measures to improve its relations with Iran by creating its first free-trade
zone at Kuwait City's Shweikh part.19
Nevert.Eteless, Kuwait camot ignore the risk that Iran may become
mort. threatening in the future. It may also h d it difficuXt to fully exploit
its offshorn oil and gas resources as bng as it is unable to reach a firm
agrement with Iran or faces the threat of Iranian attacks ~ II its offshore
Ifacilities,
Kuwait and Relations with
Southern Gulf and Arab States
Kuwait's rulhg family has kinship ties to the ruling family of Bahrah,
but Kuwait has rarely taken sides in the quarrels ol: the other Southern
Guif states. It has cmcentrated on improving its own security and has

encouraged efforts by the Gulf Cooperat.ion Council to improve the
defense of the Upper Gulf.
Kuwait has strongly encouraged GCC exercises in the Upper Gulf, and
the growth of thr GCC's Peninsular Shieid force, although it has had little
success in developing jntegrated GCC defenses in the area or combatefiectivc
interclperable GCC forces which can defend against Iraqi heavy
divisions. Kuwait has been effective, however, in getting strong GCC
political. support during the ""tiker war" wMh Iran h 15387-1988, and
during the Gulf Wac
Kuwait's relations with Saudi Arabia have been the key to ohtahirtg
support h dealing with Iran and Iraq and have been relatively good since
they siped a treaty in 1922. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia did argue occasitrnaily
over their respective rightli to the neutral zme &at had origirtaily
been estdished between them in order to give nomadic tribes freer
access to grazing rights. However, they reached a agreement over this territory
in 4966 md began to share the oil and gas =sources fn what they
now called the ""divided z011e."
Saudl Arahia providcd political support and troops to help Kuwait
when Iraq threatened its border fn the early 1960s. Saudi Arabia still did
not =cognize Ku\vajt.i snvcreignty over ali of h r n al-Maradem and
Qaruh, however, and Saudi Arabia dealt with a dispute over offshort.
drilling rights by sendhg troops to wcupy the two islaneis of k m at-
Maradem and Qaruh in June, 7,977. Coupied to disputes with Irm, these
tensions dclayed Krawait." fdl, exploitation of its oif shore oil resources.
Kuwait and Saudi cooperation improved after the fall of the Shah and
the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. Both nations began to cooperate more
closely in dealing with Iran and in aiding Iraq. h 1990, Saudi Arabia
played a key role fn the liberation of Kuwait, and in July, 1995, they
finally reached ag~ennent. over t-he demarcation of all Chcis land and sea
boundaries.'Wuwait and. Saudi Arabia are now participating in joint
exercises with the US in preparhg for the defense of their borders against
Iraq and are expanding some aspects of this coveration to include
BAsain,
In short, Kuwait's only sipificant problems with its neighbors stem
from the hability of the GCC to emerge as an effective military alliance,
the GCC" slow progress in develop& effective, integrated defense capabilities
with Saudi Arahia, and a feeiing in much of: the Southern GulE that
Kuwajt is "arrogant" and "u17cooperative"-a feeling that often seems to
be more a reactjon to Kuwait's weailth and focus on its own strategic concerns,
rather than the result of any action on Kuwait's part.
Kuwait has close relations with most Arab states. It has been slow,
however, to improve relations with Arab states that failed to support it:
during the Gulf War. Its relations with jordan and Yemen have improved

in cent years, but are still sorne\nrhat distant and Kuwait no longer provides
either cowltry with significant aid.
Kuwait has supported the Palestirtian Authority in some aspects of the
Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, but expelled many Jordanians and Palestinians
from Kuwait after the Cd War for sympathizing with Iraq. Many
Kuwai"tis bitterly resent what they perceive as Jordanj.an and Palestinian
betrayal cJf Kuwait, and Kwait has shqly ~duceef the number of foreign
Arab workers in Kuwait. It has been cautious in reaching out to
Israel, but relations are relatively friendly.

Political and Economic
Stability and Security
The recmt trends in the Kuwaiti economy are shown in Table One. The
longer term trends are summarized in Chart Che and Chart 'fiuo. Tahle
C)ne shows the impact of the Gulf War, Kukvait's subsequent recovery, its
dependence m oil exports and rcvcnues, and its acute dependence on the
ent. budget for vizt-ually every aspect of its economfc activity.
The oil sedor continues to provide more than 80% of all Kukvaiti government
retvesr~es~21
Chart One shows an estimate of the trends in Kuwait's GDP relative to
popdation and per capita income in constant 1987 dollars. Chart. Two
shows an estimate of the trends in Kuwait" GDE cmtral government
expmditures, military expmdihres, totai exports, and ams imports as
measured in constant 1993 US dolfars. While these charts arc complw,
they provide a clear picture of the tmb devastating impact of Iraq's invasion
on Kuwait's GDP and exports, and shoc?; the massi\le increases
Kuwajt had to make in cclntral governmem.t. expemdi.twrcs and military
expmditurcs to cope with the costs of the war. This expenditure was in
excess of $66 billion and cut Kuwait" reserve "find for Future Generations"
from nearly $100 biSlion to around $35 billion?*
Kuwait had to pay these costs after a long period of relativcty low oil
prices, which substantialty cut Kuvvaiti revenues during mu& of the
1980s. Chart me shows the World Bank estimates that Kuwait's GDF per
capita dropged by m averap of 0.8"/~ per year during 1979-1989.2"is
is a significant cut, although it is much smaller than the drop in GDP per
capita h most Southern Gull: states durhg this period. Kuwait was partially
able to coqensate for low oil prices by vlvestments in downstrt.am
and upstrem operatims and other activities.
At the same time, Chart me and Chart Two show that Kuwait recovered
retlatkely quick@ from the impact of the war. SiznjZarly, the CIA estimates
that Kuwait" GDP had recovered to the point where it had a purchasing
power equivalent of $30.7 billion in 1994. Petroleum and

TABLE ONE Key Economic Indicators in Kuwait
EIU Estimate' 199P 1991b 1992 1993 1994 1995
Production (1,000s of barrels per day)
Oil Exports (1,000s of barrels per day)
Average Oil Export Price (per barrel)
Oil Export Receipts ($US current billions)
GDP ($US current billions)
Per Capita GDP ($US current)
Total Government Revenue
($US current billions)
Total Government Expenditures
($US current billions)
Budget Balance ($US current billions)
Middk East Economic Digest Estimatee'
Population (Millions)
Native Kuwaitis
GDP ($US current billions)
Annual GDP Growth (percent)
Inflation (percent)
Unemployment (percent)
Total Foreign Debt ($US current billions)
(continues)

TABLE ONE (con f inued)
Middle East Economic Digest Estimate" 1994 1995 1996
Exports ($US current billions)
Imports ($US current billions)
Trade Balance ($US current billions)
Current Account ($US current billions)
Notes: aJanuary-July.
bSeptember-December.
lncludes crude oil, oil products, and LPG.
'Source: Adapted by Wayne A. Larsen, NSSP, Georgetown University, from the EIU, Country Profile, Kuwait, 1995-1996, pp. 10,11,17,27-31.
"Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from Middle East Economic Digest, February 23,1996, p. 8.

B
B
B
B
GDP ($Constant 87 Millions)
Per Capita Income ($Constant 87)
CHART ONE Kuwait: GDP, Population Growth in Millions, and Per Capita Income (in Constant $87 US Dollars).
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from International Energy ~ genc~ (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gm, Paris, 1995, pp.
305-309.

22 klilicrzf and Econontic Stability and Seczdrify
I CGE \
Military Expenditures
CHARWTMrO Kuwaiti Cross Domestic Product, Central Govmment
Expenditures, Militar)~ Expenditures, Total Imports, Total Exports, and Arms
Deliveries: 1983-1993 (in Constant $93 US AMiXfions). Source: Adapted by
Anthony FT. Gordesman from ACDA, World Mikz'tnl-y Expenditures nrzd Arnls
Transfers, 199&19941 ACDA/GPO, WasNngton, 49%.
petrochemicals accounted for over 50% of Kuwait's GDP and 90% of its
exports and gove ent revenues, Kuwait" only other major industries
were desalination, salt, food processing and constmc"cim, Aside from a
s~nail fishing industry, aagrkwlture accomted for well ul-rder 0.1% of
Kuwai"t"sGDT;", and Kuwait imported over 96% of its food. Kuwait" fforeign
debt totaled roughly $7.2 billion. f(luwait had only 525 cubic meters
of freshwater per capita, and over 75% of its potable water had to be distilled
or irnported.24

170fiCicnl nlzd Economic Stability aand Security 23
MAP TWO Kuwaiti Enerw Facilities
Kuwait" seconmy underwent a further recover). in 1995, It had largely
~huftt its prewar ability to exploit its massive d and gas resources. In
spite of marjor dracvdowns in foreign invcslmemt holdhgs to pay fnr the
Gulf War, Kuwait also managed to retain a major pool of investments to
help meet both its currmt funding needs and to provide income in the
.future- Kuwajt was aXso making significant new investm,mls h downstream
hdustries,
Kuwait rivals the UAE for the title of the wealthiest Gulf state in terms
of total savings and oil and gas resources per capita. As a result, it does

24 klilicrzf and Econontic Sfnbz'lity and Seczdrify
not face the same near and mid-term economic constraints as most of its
Southern Gulf neighbors. Kumit does, however, 'ace limits on its financial
resources. Xt used up a significant portion of its investment capital
during the Gulf War, and is still expc~riencing budget deficits that cmstrain
what its guvermnt can spend on defttnse, social services, and
development, Like the other Suuthern Gulf states, Krawait also faces the
need to reduce its dependence m foreign labor and encourage a more
productive private sector.
Kuwait's Oil Industyy
Kuwaitf"sil industry is the core of its satid wealth and ecmomy The
US Department of Energy (WE) estimates tbat Kuwait is one of the
largest oil powers in the world. Accordhg to the 'LKIE, Kuwait has an
estimated 94 billion barrels of recoverilble oil, or 9.4 percent of the
world's total, The Neutral Zone or Divided Zone area, which Kuwait
shares with Saudi Arabia, holds m additional 5 billio~~ barrels of reserves,
half of which belong to Kuwait. Kuwait also has gas reserves of 52.4 trillion
cubic feet (about 1.1% of the wrld totalf, and produces about 93.5
biHion cubic feet of gas per yeacz"
Table Two shows that the US Department of Energy estimates that
bait will steadily increase in fmportance as a world cJit producer, and
will produce 3.W.0 millims of barrclls per day by the early 2000~~ These
goals are close to those set by Kuwait, which seeks a production capacity
of 3.3 milfions of barrels per day by 2W0, and 3.8 millions of har~ls
per day by 2005-including 0.3 millions of barrels per day kom the Neutral
Zone.26
Table 7hree and Chart nree show an International E11ert;y iagmcy
(XEA) estimate of Kuwait's share of Gulf and world oil reserves and oil
production. These data furZher reinforce Kuwait's sh-ategic importance as
a major holder of oil =serves and oil pmdurer. It is fmportmt to note that
Kuwait" reserves rmk very close to those of Iran md Iraq, and that the
data on Kuwait reserves may well be more reliable,
Kuwait provides a slightly %her estimate of its proven oil =serves. It
estimates that it has 96.5 billion barrels of probTelI reswes, which it calculates
are 9.670 of the world total, Kuwait estimates that it has over 100
years of =serves at its current production rate of 2.06 million barrels per
day but any such estimates are tfneorctical bceause there has never been
a comprehensive seismic survey of its reserves. Two and three dimensional
sufveys are n w underway fn Kuwait's onshore and offshore
fields and the Neutral Zone, but will not be complete until around the
year 2000.'7

D Identified
Proven
llll Identified -i- undiscovered
Bahrain Iran Iraq Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UAE
CHART THWE Total Oil Reserves of the Gulf States (in Billions of Barrels),
Sazlrce: IEA, Middle East Oil nnd Cos, Paris, OECD, IEA, Annex 2, and data
povided by Bahrain and Oman. Bahrain" reserves are only 350 millim barrels
and do not show up on the chart because of scale-

TABLE TWO Estimated Increase in World Oil Production by Region and Country
2000 2005 2010
Count y/Region 1990 1992 Base Case Range Base Case Range Base Case Range
OPEC
Middle East & Gulf
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Total Gulf
Algeria
Libya
Total Middle East
Total OECD
us
North Sea
FSU*'
Eastern Europe
Asia
China
Indonesia
Australia
Other Asia
(continues)

TABLE TWO (continued)
2000 2005 201 0
Count ymeg ion 1990 1992 Base Case Range Base Case Range Base Case Range
Latin America
Venezuela 2.6 2.6 3.3 3.0-3.7 3.8 3.4-4.1 4.3 3.6-4.5
Mexico 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.0-3.4 3.3 2.9-3.5 3.3 2.8-3.5
Other
Sub-Saharan Africa
2.2 2.4 3.5 3.2-3.9 3.3 2.9-3.5 3.1 2.7-3.3
Gabon 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3-0.4 0.3 0.24.3 0.2 0.24.3
Nigeria 1 .S 2.0 2.4 2.S2.7 2.6 2.S2.8 2.8 2.4-3.0
Other 1 .8 1.9 2.1 1.8-2.5 2.0 1.52.2 1.9 1.4-2.1
World Total 69.6 67.4 78.6 72.5-86.6 84.2 72.6-91.4 88.8 73.7-94.7
"Less Syria and Egypt.
"Former Soviet Union.
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from HA, International Energy Outlook, 1995, Washington, DOE/HA-048(95), p. 29. The EIA, Oil
Market Simulation Model Spreadsheet, 194, data provided by the EM Energy Markets and Contingency Information Division, and EM,
International Energy Outlook, 1994, pp. 11-20.

TABLE THREE Comparative Oil Reserves and Production Levels of the Gulf States
Comparative Oil Reserves in 1994 in Billions of Barrels
Country Identified Undiscovered
ldentified and
Undiscovmd Proven % of World Total
Bahrain - - -
Iran 69.2 19.0 88.2
.35
89.3 8.9
Iraq 90.8 35.0 125.8 100.0 10.0
Kuwait
Oman
92.6
_.
3.0
-
95.6
-
96.5
5.0
9.7
NA
Qatar 3.9 0 3.9 3.7 0.4
Saudi Arabia
UAE
265.5
61.1
51 -0
4.2
316.5
65.3
261.2
98.1
26.1
9.8
Total
Rest of World
World
583.0
-
112.2
-
695.2
-
654.1
345.7
999.8
64.9
35.1
100.0
(continues)

TABLE THREE (continued)
Comparative Oil Production in Millions of Barrels per Day
1995
OPEC
DOEDEA Estimate of Actual Producfion Maximum Sustainable AnnOuncxd
Capacity
County Actual Quota 1990 1992 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 in 2000
Bahrain
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi
Arabia
UAE
Total
Gulf
World
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman fmm estimates in IEA, Middle East Oil and Gas, Paris, OED/IEA, 1995, Annex 2 and DOE/EIA,
International Energy Outlook, 1995, Washington, DOE/EIA, June, 1995, pp. 26-30, and Middle East Economic Digest, February 23,1996, p. 3. IEA and
DOE do not provide country breakouts for Bahrain and Oman. Reserve data estimated by author based on country data.

30 klilicrzf and Econontic Sfnbz'lity and Seczdrify
Most of Kuwait" oil reserves are located in the 65 billion barrel Greater
Ru,rgan are?a, southeast of Kuwait City This productive area contains the
Burgan, Magwa, and Ahadi fields. The Raudhatain (6-7.5 bjXlim barrels
of ~scrrves), 5abriya (3.84.0 billion barrels of reserves), and Minagish
fields (2-2.1 billion barrels of reserves) are located in northern Kuwait,
All of these fields have been produchg since the 19505, md. generally
contain heavy to medium cmde oil with gravities in the 30 to 36" APl
range, Two additior~al lqe oil fields were diiseoverczd in BM, alt-hottgh
their reserves still are unproven. The South Magwa field. contahs light
crude oil with a 35 to 40" API. The other field, located h northern Kuwait,
cmtahs heavy crude oil.28
Kuwait has five fields in the Neutral Zone, which it shares with Saudi
Arabia. These include fiaf-ji, with 6.3 billion barrels of reserves, Wafra,
with 1,7 billion barrels of reserves, South Umrn Gudair Wafra, with 0.45
billion barrels of reserves, Hsut with 0.2 billion barrels of reserves, and
South Fuwaris, with 0.04 billlon barrels of reserves. Kuwait also shares
the Ratga oil field with Iraq,
Kuwai"thas no petroleum law; the Emir of Kuwait, Sheik Jaber d-Ahmed
al-Sabah, has dthate authority over all major decisions rdating to oil.
The Sheik's principal advisor is the Oil Minister. A Supreme Petroleurn
Council was established h I974 to review all major decisions, This Com-
cil is chaired by the Forcrign Minister. Its membership includes six other
ministers, and members of the private sector appointed by the Emir.
Kuwait nationalized ali domestic and foreign oil assets on Uecember I,
1975, and created the :Kuwait Petrolem Gmpany (WC) in 1975. It is an
umbrella connpany for domestic and intmationiil subsidiaries that- han-
dle expf oration, pipelines, engineering, refinhg, markt-tting, petrochmi-
cals, tankers, aviation fuel, and the fining and marketing of products
for Kuwait's retail outlets,
The oil produced in the; KuwaikSaudl Neutral Zone is hared equally
between the two countries, The KPC owns a 10% share in the Arabim Oil
Company that operates offshore production in the zone, while Saudi Ara-
bia Texaco operates the onshore production.
Chart Four shows tbe trends in Kuwaiti oil production. Kuwait had
produced a total of about 27 billion bards of oil at the time Of the Iraqi
invasion in August, 1990, and had an extremely high mserve-to-produc-
tiltn ratio of 194/1.29 Kwaiti oi production peaked in 1974 at 2.94 mil-
lion barrels per day. Ktlwait produced oil at. a rate of about 1.0-1.9 million
barrels per day during 1930, and was producing at 1.9 millions of barrels
per day just before the Iraqi irtvasion. Including the Kuwaiti share of the

CHART FOUR Kuwaiti Oil and Natural Gas Liquids Total Production and Exports (in Thousands of Barrels Per Day).
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from International Energy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gas, Paris, 1995, pp.
252-256.

32 klilicrzf and Econontic Sfnbz'lity and Seczdrify
Neutral Zone, Kuwait: had a sustainable producticm capacity of 2.3 mil-
lions of barrels per day, and was operakg a totd d W98 welJs.30
Mrhm Iraq retreated in 1991, it used explosives on over 700 wells and
set about hC)O m fire and another 49 gushing-creating oil lakes. Iraq
damaged or destroyed all 26 of Kuwaitfs oil gathering centers. Kuwait
has since estimated that this damage cost it up to 3% of its recoverable
reserves, althou;h there is no way to make precise estimates and this
damage is still under study'31
Kuwait began reconstruction soon after the cease-fire, and phase one
continued until the end of 1991. We11 fims were extinguished some nine
months after the liberatio~~ and contracts were let to work over the old
wells and drill new ones. Contracts were let for the recovery of crude oil
from Kuwait" oil lakes, and about 1hillion barrels were recovered from
lalces totaling arou~ld 20 million bards. This phase of reconslructio11 cost
about $2.5 billion,
Phase Two of the ~constmction effort included rebuilding wells, gatbering
centers, pipelines, slorage tanks, refineries, and terminats. As of
1995, Kuwait had returned 18 of its 26 oil gathering centers to operation,
with a capacity of about 2.8 millions of barrels per day It had =worked
over 659 wells and drilled 111 new ones"
Phase Three is still underway md catls for the expansion of Kuwaiti
oil, gas, and petrochemical pmeiuction, and creating a total of 30 oil gathering
centers. Its total cost is estimated at four to six billion dollars.32
Pmduction has recovered relatively rapidly since the liberation," In
mid-1993, Kwait" soil output surpassed pm-war levels. fn 1994, Kuwait
produced an estimated 2.04 milio~~s of barrels per day, including 360,000
barrels per day of Neutral Zone production. Kuwait" 1995 production
capacity is estimated at 2.6 mftlion barrels per day.
While Ku\vajt.i oil exports to the United States have been rcldively
small, they have expanded from 40,000 barrels a day before the Gulf War
to around 240,000. Kuwait has restored its status as one of the world's
few oil powers that can serve as a major swing producer in the event of
an emergmcy The US Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that
Kwait and Saudi Arabia hold roughly 80 percmt of the wmldr~ excess
production capaciV.3 Other estimates also indicate that Kuwait faces relatively
low total capital costs in mintahing and expanding its oil production
capacity. 'I'hese data art- shown in Table Four, but it should be
noted that they m y sharply understate indirect costs and t-he full ifngact
of reccnt expansion plans.
'I'he DOE also estimates that :Kuwait% rapid postwar boost in oil production
has resulted in sme short-term probletns, An increased propctrtion
of water has been lifted in relation to oil at a number of wells, For
example, water cut at the 4.5-miltilm barrels per day Burgm field rose

170fiCicnl nlzd Economic Stability aand Security 33
TABLE FOUR Cost of Maintaining and Expanding Oil Prc3duction in GC6
Countries (1993-2000) (in Billion of CY33 US Dollars)
Cusf of Mai~zftaini~zg Cusf of ExpaF2tli~g
Cozlntq Capacity Capacity Total Cmf
Kuw-ai t
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Total
Source: The NCB Econnmisf, Issue No. 4, May, 1993, issued by the Natir~nal Co
Bank of Saudi Arabia as qrroted by Yousef H. Al-Ebraheem in a draft paper for the National
Defmse Universiq.
from K percent before the war to 2Ei percent in 1994. This &creasef hwever,
may be due to the rise in the number of periphery wds used in
reservoir management programs. In 1993, the state-owned Kuwait Oil
Company (KOC) commissioned country-wieie reservoir sfmulation studies.
The Mjnagish and Zlahair field studies reporkd damage ~su,lting
from well blowouts at the Mlnagish and Zubair fields. Studies on Burgm,
Umm Gudak, and other fields hawe ccmlpletim dates in mid-1995.35
Kuwait has three major export termhals on the Gulf coast near its
~fheries at Mha al Ahadi, Mha AbdulZah, and Shuaiba, and had a
fnurlh in the Neutraf Zone at Mina Saud that was destroyed during the
Gulf W;;rr* These three terminals were damaged durhg the war, but the
cmmrciaX port at Shuaiba opened in March, 1994, and oil shipent
=sued im 1992. 'f'he tot& export capatlility of Kuwait's tcrmimals is now
about 2.9 rnilljon barrels per day, and Kulivait is pf, ing to add two shgle
point moring buys. Oil storage capacity has been returned to its I6
million barrel pre-war level.
Plans Lca Expand Productiotz
Kuwait plms to steadily raise its oil prsductio~~.
'This increase in produe-
tion plays a major role in most estimates of the increases in world oil
exports necessary to suppm global economic vow& and lievclopment.
Kuwait plans to raise its crude oil production, excluding the Neutral
Zone, to 3 million barrels per day by the yeas 2000 md. 3.3-3.5 miXlion
barrels per day by 21105. This will invoke a number of new prt!jects in
western and northern Kuwait.36
Kuwait" financial difficulties and contract delays put several projects
on hold in 1994, but progrrss picked up im early 1995. Kwail's expansion

34 klilicrzf and Econontic Sfnbz'lity and Seczdrify
program will inclulie the fnstaflation of gasloil separation plants, gas
compression facilities, desalting plants, and chanced oil recovery systems
at several fields. Also, an injection plant is under construction to
provide pressure maintenance at the Minagish and Raudhakin fields. fn
March, 1995, the China Petroleum Engheering Construction Corporation
signed a $390 to $430 million contract to buil.d two crude oil gathering
centers in the western 2. billion barrel Minqish and Umm Gaidar fields.
Output from the fields will be raised from 1110,(f0(1 barrels per day at present
to 500,000 barmls per day in 1997. These fields will be linked by
pipeline to the Mina d-Ahmadi refheryYsy
Kuwait is also undertaking develcrpment work at the nart-hern 250,000barrels
per day Raudhatain, 130,000 barrels per day Satsriya, and 35,000
barrels per day-combined Ratga and abduliya fields. In 1992, British
Petroleum (BP) sig~~ed a three-year technical service cmtract to work on
the Minagish and Umm Gaidar fields, In February, 1995, this contract was
extended to inclulie technical support at the Raudhatain and Sahriya
fields. In Aug~~st 1994, Chevron signed a tecihnical service agreement similar
to BP'S according to which it would provide exploration, production,
and transportation assistance to KK's Burgan field's operations.
Kuwait is seeking to boost capacity through the cms"caction of gathering
centers in its western fields at Umm Gudair and Minagish. It
awarded the China Petroleum Corporation a $390 million contract in
December, 11995 to Iift capacjty from 1111,000 bards per day to 50C),(100
barrels per day38
'T"hese BP and Chevron contracts are important evidence oE Kuwait's
increaskt; willhg~~ess to al:low greater foreign upst..rearn involvemnt. h
February, 1995, the Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPC) decided to &er
IJSCs to fort-ip compania. Kwait stated that the reasons for this decision
included tecihnology transkr and a greater perceived i,ntemtio1zal
interest in KuwaitJs territorial integrity In June, 1995, however, Kuwait
decided tc:, delay such pfandecause it ccmctueted that the risk of new
clashes with Iraq offset the possible advantages to be gained from .foreign
involvement in Iraq-border arca oil field development in ensurislg foreign
support in the event of ano"rer crisis with Iraq.39
As of May, 11995, KPC's PSC proposal was still awaiting fjnd approval
from the Supreme Petdeum Council, If passed, a limited number of
companiewodd be asked to bid fnr a share of the work. They dght
hclude Amoca, BPf Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, C)ccidental, Royal Dutch/
Shell, and 7exaro. These firms are particularly interested in offshort.
BCs, which have better perceived development pmspects.
Kukvait is also cooperating with Saudi Arabia in expanding production
from the "Divided" or "Partitioned Neutral Zone" shred by
the two countries. Texaccr and fapan" Arabian Oil Company (AOC)

170fiCicnl nlzd Economic Stability aand Security 35
are the two foreiljn operators of the 4OU,0C)CI barrels per day Neutral
Zone shared by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In March, 1995, Texaco
received permission to boost its current production of 140,000 barrels
per day to almost 300,000 barrds per day by 3998. 'This will be accomplished
through new drilting and a 3-D seismic survey to discover
new reserves. Most work is expected. to occur at the South Umm
Gaidar, Wafra, and South Fawaris fields.
Kuwait is rumored to have given Texaco the developme~~t cmtract
partly because of the connpany" aabiliw to market heavia crude oil. As of
April, 1995, the AOC was continuing negotiations concerning cmcession
extensions far its 3f)t),0C)O barrels per day offshore production. Cumntly,
AOC% Neutral Zone concessions expire in ZOO0 md. 2W3, respectkely,
AOC is holding off on fur&er investment until these dates are extmded.""
Downstream and Upstream Irtvesbents
Kuwait operates three refheries at Mha a1 ad& Mha Abdullh, md
Shuaiba, md has a share in the =finery at Mha Saud in the Neutrd Zone,
Kuwait's =fining capacity was damaged severely durhg the war and the
Mina Saud and Shuaiha refineries were badly damaged. Kukvait lost much,
of its pre-W=, 770,OUO barrcls per day caparity, and only had 2W,000 barrels
per day of =finery ouput by early 4992. However, Kuwait" H00 miilion
downstream. recmstnactiur~ program was co~~pleted in mid-1994. Mka al
Ahmadi went from 370,000 barrels per day pre-war firoughput capaciq to
39f),W, Mina Abdullah boosted capacity from 49t),f)0(> to 225,WO, and
Shuaiba, inc~ased from 187,00C) to 1441000. Ntina Saud is not operating. KPC
is now focusing increasingly on high-value product exports, which rose 83
percent to W,01)0 barrels per day ktween 4993 to 1994.41
X17 May, 1995, KPC initiated a new pmgrm to complete final, smll
repairs and to begin =finery upgrades, The 200,000 bar~ls per day
Shuaiba =finery suffercrd the most damage from the war. At presmt,
capndty has been raised to 144,000 barrek per day. 'The new repair program
will work m restoring the 65,000 barrels per day processing unit as
well as upgmding the 20,O(ftl-harrelis per day hydmcracker's second
stage. Completion of the Shuaiba repairs is anticipated by 1997- The
390,000 barrels per day Mina al-Ahmadi rclfhery upgrade will involve
the cclnstruction of three units to produce unleaded gasoline for domestic
consumption. The $100 rnillion contract ws warded to Mitrsui and
will be completed by 1998. Similar upgrading will take ptace at the
smaller 225,000-barrelis per day Mina at-Abdullah ~finery.
Kuwait now plms to achieve a domestic refirrery capacity of 900,080-
1,000,000 barrefs per day by BOO. Xt is not seeking to expand its domestic
capacity much beyond this levef, but hopes to shift its refinv output to

3 6 klilicrzf and Econontic Sfnbz'lity and Seczdrify
mow valuable product streams. It aiso plans to expand its ownership of
foreign refineries to ellsure it has guarmteed markets.42
KPC is expancSjng its overseas downstream irtterests in the hope of
attaining a combined European and Asian refFz~ing capacity of 835,000
barrels per day by 2000. It is currently seeking 30,000 bmls per day of
refhing capacity in Europe and 400,000 barrels per day in Asia.
In May 3995, tw agreements with the state-owned Indim Oil Company
(1C)C) md Co&in Refheries Lixnit-rd (-I,) were ppeding. 'The IK deal involves a new $4.3 billion, 125,000 barrels per day refkery in
Orissa, India. Dclpmtfing on demand this proposed refhery's capaciq
may be rai,sed to 180,000 barrcls per day. The proposed CRL, lndian refinery
would. be located in Kerala and wwXd have a capacity of between
320,000 to 200,000 barrels per day.@
Kuwait Petroleum International (KPX) cmtrols the corntry's European
refhery system. This includes 130,000 to 150,000 barrels per day in capacity
from refheries Gulfhaven, Denmark and Rotterdam in the Netherlands.
Kuwait is looking to expand its European refinery system through
the acquisition of an Italian refhery, possibly the under-used 300,OO barrels
per day refinery in Sardhia. Kf'f is also pursuing talks with Italy's
Agip co~ncerning the possibility of acyuiring its 300,000 bmls per day
refinery h Mil.azza, Sicily Since 1993, KPI has been searchkg for a
=placement for its antiquated 100,000-barrels per day Naples refinery
aft- it fajled to meet Itaty's etnvimnxnental standards.
In February, 1995, KPC undertook a feasibility study concerning a possible
90,f)I)O barrels per day finery near Kararhi, Pakistan. Mso, a
30,000 bml per day refinery in Rayong, Thailand, is under discussion,
as we11 as a possible export reiineq lvcated near Pattaya on nailand's
southern coast. 11-1 South Africa, KPC is currently negotiating with Sasol
to acquire part of its %,C)@ barrels per day Natref rcflmery. KPC hopes
this acquisition would secure a market for its present 25,Q00 barn15 per
day worth of crude oil exports to South Africa.
Kuwait is also expanding its investments in petrochemicals.cas It has
been producing fertilizer since the mid-196lls, and had just started. building
a major complex at Shuaiba when the war began. In mfd-1993,
Kuwait's state-owned Petrochcntical Industries Company (PIC) and
Union Carbide Corporation formed a joint venture to build md operate
a world-scale petrochemical complex at Shuaiba. Construction of the
$2,3-biillior? facility began in late 4995, and the plant is due to be cornptctcd
in 1997. PIC and Union Carbide each have a 45 percent sharcl in
the prcrjeet, with the ~mainder =served for public offer. The complex
will include a 650,000 met.rjc ton per year (n?.t/ y) elf-tane cracker, 450,000
mt/y of polyethylme capaciv, and 350,000 mt/ y of ethylene glycol production.
After its completion fn 1997, the complex will primarily serve

170fiCicnl nlzd Economic Stability aand Security 3 7
Asian products markets. Kuwait is also negotiating with US hmoco Corporation
to build a $1 billjon armati.cs plant.4
KPC dso holds Santa Fe ExpZoration, which has production shares in
five LIK sector North Sea oil fields, Santa Fe Exptorafion also holds an 8.5
percent stake in the giant Brit ia is expected to come
m-stream in late 1996 with m ouput of 6UO miljion cubic feet per day and
50,OOC) barrels per day of ccmdensate. After startup, Santa Fe Exploration
wilX produce an estimated 14,00C) barrels per day. KuQec is mothcr foreign
upstream asset owned, by KPC. In 1994' it had an annual productjon
of mughly E,lftlfl barrels per day from operations im Auskalia, China, the
Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, and Tunisia. Kufpec" production is pxcdicted to
dsuble during 1995 after two new oil fidds in Yemen cone m-fine.4"
Kuwait has, however, been forced to sell a large share of its inf;ernational
investments in foreign upswan? operations,. Part of these sales
have gone to pay for budget deficits, and part to pay for the Gulf W.
Part occurred because the assets were not as pmfitable as Kuwait originally
expected. For example, in Nove~~ber, 1994, Kuwait mnounced its
htention to sell Smta Fe International's US subsidiary-Smta Fe Mherals-which
conducts exploration and production in North and South
herica, KPC had originally purchased Santa Fe in 1981 for $2.5 billion.
Dtlring the 39805, this subsidiary lost an estimted $3 billim.46
Kuwaiti Gas Reserves and Production
Table Five, Table Six, and Chart Five show that Kllwait ranks m mg the
twenty nation's with the world's largest gas reserves, although its
reserves am not large by Gulf standards, Muwait estimates that it has 1.5
trillion cubic meters, or 1.1% of the world's reserves.aA811 of Kuwait's gas
reserves are associated with oil fields, and all, of its natural gas prodwtion
is carried, w t by the Kuwait Production Compan)r
Kuwait has established gas gathering facilities and pipelimes, but its
efforts to find separate gas fields have failed. As a wsdt, the gas produc-
tion shown in Chart Six has varied with oil production-a trend reflected
in the decline in gas prc,duc"cicm during 1980-3985 and the massive drop
in produdion resulthg from Iraq's invnvion.
Chart Six shows that Kuwait made progress in utilizing its gas for dome*
tic needs md oil production purpmes before the Imqi jnvasion. The share
of hwit gas that was marketd m e from 42% in 1975 to 74% in 1%9, but
massive mounts had to be axed durhg the first pI-iase of the Gulf Wa.
The Kuwait gas industry suffered some war damqe. Three of Kuwait's
five gas booster stations were darnaged, and one was destroyed. MW-
ever, its LPG plant and bottling unit were not damagd. Gas production
and domesl;ic use has since recovered, but Kuwait acbally needs more

38 PoZiticuZ and Economic Stability and Security
TABLE FIVE World Natural Gas Proven Reserves by Country as of January 1,
1995 (Trillion Cubic Feet)
county Reserves Percent of World Total
World Total
Top 20 Countries
Former Soviet Union
Iran
Qatar
Abu Dhabi
Saudi Arabia
United States
Venezuela
Algeria
Nigeria
Iraq
Canada
Norway
Mexico
Malaysia
Netherlands
Indonesia
China
Kuwait
Libya
Pakistan
Rest of World
4,980.3
4,595.8
1,977.0
741.6
250.0
188.4
185.4
162.4
130.4
128.0
120.0
109.5
79.2
70.9
69.7
68.0
66.2
64.4
59.0
52.4
45.8
27.5
384.5
100.0
92.3
39.7
14.9
5.0
3.8
3.7
3.3
2.6
2.6
2.4
2.2
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.2
1.1
0.9
0.6
7.7
Note: The sum of the shares for the top 20 countries may not equal their total share due
to independent rounding.
Source: Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production, Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 92, No. 52
(December 26,1994), pp. 42-43.
gas than it produces, and was an importer from Iraq before the war.
Kuwait is now looking for other sources of gas.
Kuwait’s Economy Since the Gulf War
As the previous tables have shown, Kuwait’s post war recovery has been
relatively rapid. Kuwait was able to restore most of its urban services as
early as mid-1991. Despite some apocalyptic predictions, the 732 oil well
fires Iraq set during its withdrawal did not produce fatal environmental
problems, and all were extinguished by the end of October, 1991. Kuwait
was able to resume oil exports, and exported one million barrels per day
by mid-1992.

170fiCicnl nlzd Economic Stability aand Security 39
TABLE SIX Gulf and Gas Reserves and Production
Reserves in 2995
Percent Inkortd Producfior.~ in
Nation TCF BCM SZ~PP~Y 1993 (BCMl
Bahrain
Iran
lra y
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Gulf
Rest of VVortd
World Total
Note: "Other sources estimate 6,320-7,280 BCM for Abu Dhabi only,
Sourcr: The reserve and productic?n data are adapted by Anthony H. Ccdesman from
IEA, Middlrp East Oil and Gas, Paris, OECD, XEA, 1995, A~r-rczx 2.
Table One has already shown that Muwait" short term balmce of trade
is favorable, and other sources indicate that Kuwait has had a favorhle
trade bairncc durhg the last few years-with a szlrplus of $4.0 bil[io11 in
1993, $5.0 bi.llim in 1994, $2.35 billion in 1995, and an estimated surplus
of $2.10 biflion in 4996. In 1994, Kuwait had approxiinately $11.8 bittion
worth of exports.48
Chat Seven shows the longer term trends in Muwait" bbalasrce of trade.
It shws that Kwai"ci d exports have averaged over 2 million barrels a
day sinre August, 1993, and Kuwaiti oil =venues p w Iron? $5.9 bjllion
in 1992 to $9.3 billion in 1993, and an estimated $10.3 billion in 1994. h
spite of the war and same financing problems, the Kuwaiti GUI' grew by
over 22"h h 1993, md 13% in 19%. 'This gave Kuwait a GDP equivale~zt
of about $30 billion in 1994, total reserves of about 11 billion Kuwaiti
dinars, a d a per capita fncome of over $2C),U(SO a year.49
f(uwa,it does, however, face significant problem in reducing its
level of govmment spending and in restructuring its economy. Chart
011e has shown that Kuwait's real per capita incwe has dropped
steadily since the late 1970s for other reasons-largely the dedine in
oil prices and rise in. Kuwait" population. This chart is a warning that
even the wealthiest state must take careful account of the vulnerability
inherent in having a commodity-depende~~t economy and rapid
population grow the

Bahrain Iran Iraq Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UAE
CHART FIVE Total Gas Reserves of the Gulf Stats (in Billicms of Cubic Meters),
SOZITG~: Adapted by Anthany H. Cordesman from TEA, Middle East Oil n~zd Gas,
Paris, OQECD, IEA, 4995, Annex 2, and data provided by Bahrain and Oman.
Bahrain" sesemes are too small to show on the chart because of scale.

H Gross Production
Domestic Marketed
Reinjected
B Vented, Flared, & Lost
H Exported
CHART SIX Kuwaiti Natural Gas Production (in Billions of Cubic Meters). Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from
International Energy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gas, Paris, 1995, pp. 252-256.

-
-
El Total Exports
Cl Petroleum Exports
- Imports
U Trade Balance
Current Account (Trade Balance Less Transfers)
CHART SEVEN Kuwait: Balance of Trade (in Current $US Million). Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from
International Energy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gas, Paris, 1995, pp. 274-275, Central Bank of Kuwait, Quarterly Sfatistical
Bulletin.

170fiCicnl nlzd Economic Stability aand Security 43
Kuwait S Bzirdgeff Liq~tidity~ and Debt
In spite of Ku\vajt.'s oil weal%, the Kuwaiti government spends far more
than it receives by way of Evcnues. 7jble Seven shows that the government
established a pattern of deficit spending long before the Gulf War,
md that its total revezzues only exceeded its expenditures durhg one
year in the period between :E"Y19@/85 and 1995196,
These deficits wem relatively unimportant before the Gulf War because
they did not lully reflect income kom Kukvait's foreiw investi~ents. The
Kuwait gguvernment, however, was forced to make massive expendltures
during the Gulf War. Table Seven shows, however, that the gave
had to make massive direct expeinditurrzs to cope with Iraq's invasion oE
Kuwait, the struggle to liberate Kuwait, and wartirne darnage to the
Kuwaiti economy, It shows that Kuwait's deficits totaled over 14 billion
Kuwajti Dinnrs ($48 biXlion) in the three years following the invasion, and
that Kuwait" average deficit has exceeded me bjllion Kuwaiti Dinars in
every year since FY1992193. Flarths, the =duction in Kuwait's deficits
.from FW1994/1995 on~.vards has been largely the resWlt. of the fact that
Kuwait assumed oil prices of $22 a barrel in FY1.99.1-11995 and $23 a barrel
in FU"195/ 1996, and world prices rose to higher levels. Even then, the
rise in oil prices scarcely ended Kuwait's def eits. A signgicant peak in oil
prices in late 1995 md early 1996 was only estixnated, to have reduced
Kuwait" 1996 deficit from 1.3 billion Dinars to 1.0 billion Dinars ($3.32
billion)."O
The budget data in Table Seven also understate the true level of govent
spcrmding. Many of Kuwait" sexpenditurt-s to pay for the GulE
MiBr are "off budgetf3in the estimates shown in TabIe Seven. According to
one estinnate, Kuwait had to draw heavily on its Fund fnr Future Generations,
which totaled up to $100 billion befare the war, to help fund the
liberaticm. Kuwajt pledgcd up to $65 billion of this told to pay for Fhe
Gulf War-nearly 65% of the total assets it had invested. Kuwail then had
to obligate some $20 billion for repairs md modernization of its oil facilities,
make massive arms purchases to rebuild its military forces. It then
had to pay $20 billion more to repay bad loans stemming frm the collapse
of Kuwait" snregubted curb-side stock market-or Souq al-Mmafi-in
7,982." Ano&er estimate indicates Ku'cvait spent $49 billion dur.ing
the first seven mths of the hvasion, a total of $66.7 billion by the
end of FU199411995, and that this expendikre depleted Kuwait" total
ent-held fnreign investi~ents by at least 411%.52
Chart Eight and Chart Nine show the longer trends in Kuwait's
budgets and confirm the importance of budget rc-rduction anci fiscal
contsols. They show the impact of changing oit prices after the early
1980s, and the massive impact the Gull War had on Kuwait's deficit,

TABLE SEVEN Kuwaiti Budget Revenues and Expenditura Relative to
Earnings: 19M-1996 (MiXXions of Kuwaiti Dinars)
Trend: FY1984/2 985 to FY 2 99513 99653
OClzer Total Bfal
Fkcal Year Oil Ret~enues Receipts Reventtc. Expe~ditures DclJieit
Rezlenues
Oil Revenue
Other Receipts
Tbtal Revenues
Expm"dt ures
Wages & Salaries
Goods CZr Srvices
Transpol-t. & Equipment
Develc~pment Projects
MisceXlaneous Expenditure1Tramfers
Total Expenditure
Nef Dcjcil-
94/95
Budget
93/94 93/94 94/95 After 95/96
Approved Cfosi~tg Approved Additio~tral Approved
BztdpC Accozlnf Brddgef Allocnfio~z Budpt
Source: Adapted from the Middle East Ecorzotrric Lfigcsl, September 1, 1995, p. 6 and
Februav 23,196, p. 111; and Central Bank of Kuwait and Ministry of Finance.

8,000
6,W
4,000
2,m
0
Total Revenues
-2,000 Oil Revenues
H Investment Revenues
-4,000
4,000
W Defense/Security Expenditures
Surplus/Deficit
CHART EIGHT Trends in Kuwait Budget Revenues and Expenditures (in Millions of Kuwaiti Dinars). Source: Adapted by
Anthony H. Cordesman from International Energy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gas, Paris, IEA/OECD, 1995, pp. 277-278.

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170fiCicnl nlzd Economic Stability aand Security 47
oil earnings, and earnings from investments. They show that Kuwaitfs
revexrues have recovered sharply since the war, but that Kuwait has
continued to experience financial pressure because of its large reconstruction
costs and debts. During 1991-1993, it also faced major new
defense costs, a loss of investment revenue, and low oil prices- These
factors led, to a deficit of $18 billion out of total spending of $21 billion
in 1992.
The Kuwaiti budget deficit reached a wartime peak of about 7.3 billion
Kuwaiti Dinars in 199011991, and then dropped to 5.5 billion h 19921
1993, 1.6 billlon in 1993/1994, and 1.5 billion in 199411995,, At the same
time, Kuwait faced sudden emergency defense expenditures, like $500
million in casts to deal with the Iraqi movement to positions mar the
Kwait border in Oct&er 1994.- The gwe ent" fiscal debt levels also
increased, and deficit spending reached $6.2 billion out of total government
expenditures of $15.4 bitlion in 199415-with d y limited reductions
pdected for 1995/96.55
Some of Kukvajt's deficit spe~nding has gone into productive capital
investments like rebuilding the country and investing h oil and gas facilities,
but much continues to go to subsidies and welhre. Kuwait has no
direct taxation, and Kzxwait's Fhance Mkistry has stated that the country
spends ahwt $1.8 billjon a year m utifit-y subsidies and free health
care alone, h 1994, the Kuwaiti gove ent was still subsidizing 90% of
all electricity costs and 75% of all water costs, and still providing low-cost
telecommunications, free health care, and free housing. It was spending
$1 billion a year on suhsidizing water and powa, and $600 million on
subr;jdizing health care.56
These subsidies made little sense in a country as wealthy as Kuwait,
and led the Kuwaiti govemment to consider various econornic austerity
measures in 1994-many of which were similar to those being considered
or adopted by other Gulf states. The goverment examined the
possibility of cuts in government subsidies and welfare benefits,
increases in taxes, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and banking
sector reforms, selling electricity and water at market prices, privatizir-rg
telecommunicaticrns and charging market prices, indirect taxation,
and requiring some degsrre of private health insurance.
It soon became apparent, however, that the government faced major
practical and political probhs in implementing any such measurrs.
There were many areas hvhese it codif. not achieve immediate savings
because of the cost of reform. For example, charging for sewices like utitities
involved instalfing utility metering capabiliries fnr the first time. It
also ran into major political problexxs,. Coxnservatives argued that mast
Kuwai"tis were too poor to pay highr taxes and that incame disclosures
violate personal privacy,

48 klilicrzf and Econontic Sfnbz'lity and Seczdrify
Most importantly, Kuwait's next parliamentary elections are scheduled
for October, 1996 so few mmbers of the National Assennhly have any
incenthe to push for major fiscal reform before the election. As a msult,
the Kuwaiti government continues to temporize, and hait cmtinues
to use the capital it obtahs from selling foreign hvestments and borrowing
to pay for recovery from the war and support its socrial, benefits.
These factors led Kuwait to raise its debt ceiljng from $10 bi2lion to $33
billion after the Gulf War, and borrow $5.5 billion from hternational
banks. Kuwait afso drew down on its foreip investments to finance the
country's high public spending levels. Chart Ten shows that Kuwait
retained substantial liquidit-y in spite of these expenditures, but estimates
differ. The US government estimated in early 1995 that Kuwait had total
=serves of roughly $61 billion, with $23.2 billion in its General Resertie
md $4W5 billion in the Reserve Fund for F~~ture Generations.57 A,
Kuwai"t estimate made in early 1996 hdicates that Kuwait" total foreign
investments dropped from $113 billion (3.2 billion Kwaiti
the war to $46.7 billion (14 billion Kuwaiti Dkars), and that the Kuwaiti
governant was forced to reduce its fort;lgn investments by an average
of $500-750 million a mmth during 199S1996.58
Chart Eleven shows that the sectoral structure of Kuwait's GDP is less
dependent on oil than that of most Southern Gulf states, Kuwait's postwar
invesh-nents and reserves, hwever, art. very diffewnt from their p=-
Gulf War total of over $100 billion. Kt~wait's external debt has risen to
$R4 billion.39 Kuwait also owes a $5.5 billion syndicated loan to foreign
banks which must be paid by the end of 1996, and owes other small
amounts to offieid export credit agencies @CA). According to Kukvaiti
governant officials, these obligations will he paid on schedule and
aceordirzg to terns. Kuwait paid $2.486 billion in 1995, and this payfnent
will hcrease to $3,298 billion in 1996.60
Kuwait has, however, sotved one long-standing debt problem. The
collapse of the Souq al-ManaW-1 in 1982 created some $20 billion in
losses asld massive debt payments for stocks bought on nnargin. A "difficult
debts law" was passed in 1993 to schedule mpayment of these
debts, and Kuwaiti private inve?jtors faced the prospect of paying
about $8.3 billion (2,300 million Kuwait dinars) by September 7,1995, as
part of this legislation, After extended debate in the National Assembly
the government passed legislaticm that dclwed repayment in five
annual payments begiming on Decembcr 6, 1995. This solution could
have cost the economy up to $2.6 billion because of t:he delay in payments.
Fortunately for tk government, 5% of debtcrrs paid the amount
they owed by December, 1995.61
:Wluch now depends on Kuwait" ability to increase oil production
and the level of futurt? oil revenues. Higher oil prices did improve

Total Reserves Minus Gold
Foreign Assets
CHART TEN Kuwait: Liquidity: 1960-1993 (in Millions of US Dollars). Note: No data on foreign assets after 1992.
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from International Energy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gas, Paris, 1995, pp.
277-279, and based on IMF, International Financial Statistics.

CHART ELEVEN Kuwait: GDP by Sector (in Millions of Kuwaiti Dinars). Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from
International Energy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gas, Paris, 1995, pp. 265-266, Central Bank of Kuwait, Quarterly Statistical
Bulleh'n.

170fiCicnl nlzd Economic Stability aand Security 5 1
Kuwait's economic position in 1994 and 1995. Some estimates indicate
that Kuwait's oil revenues increased by 12-l4"h in 1995.62 If oil prices
remain relatively hi*, and government expenditures are controlled,
Kuwait's debt situation should ease and the economy should grw sig-
nif,cant.ly in 1996.
At the same tirne, higher oil =venues cannot elimixrate the govern-
ment's need to show fiscal restraint and suppcrrt for economic reforms.
As long as Che governmetnt fails to take firm action, and the National
Assembly block tax and. revenue reform, Kuwait will, emphasis welfare
over development and security and will have to draw stift further on its
general reserves.63
The Need to Create Red Jobs far Matitre Kuwaitis
KuwaiMdoes not have the same population and economic pressures as
the other Southern Gulf states, but it needs to sericrusly comider its future
as a society and how its citizens will play a role in its future economy.
Kuwaiheeds to create an economy that offers its citizens mal jab opportunities
and reduces its dependence on foreip lahor. It also needs to create
a large, productive private sector, in addition to its state controlled oil
and gas industries and service ixrdustries,
Chart TweIve shows that a ccmservative World Bank estimate projects
that Kuwait" population will grow from 15.9 million in 1995, ta
18.8 million by the year 2000, 2.1 mil.lion by 2005, 2.3 million by 2010,
and 2.6 million by 21)20. About 40% of Kuwait" native popdation is
now under 14 years of age. The total number of young men reaching
job age (15-19 years) will rise from 83,000 in 1995 to 117,000 in 2000,
drop to 111,f)1)0 in 2010, and then rise to 114,000 in m2O.M Kuwaiti esti-
mates indicate that 55% of Kuwait's population is under B, and that
6,000 to 10,000 more Kuwaiti males will enter the Zabor force each year
for the next 10-15 years.
Even today, far tao mmy Kuwaitis lack productive jobs and real
carcers, Petrolem still accounts for nearly half of Kuwait" GGT>P and
about 88% of its export and government =venues, Kuwait's mly indus-
tries other thm petroleum-related activity md desalinization are food
processing, buildjng materials, salt, md. construction, The government
controls nearly 90% of Kuwait" eccmomy-either directly or through
controls on targe-scale cmmercial operations.
Furher, nearly 92% of all employed Kuwaiti citiz,ens either work for
ent or a government-owned enterprise, and the state sector
makes up about 43% of- total government etnplayment, 'The cost of gov-
ernment personnel totaUed roughly $6.7 billim (2.0 billton Kuwaiti
P)inars) a year.65 In spite of government policies that supposedly encour-

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170fiCicnl nlzd Economic Stability aand Security 53
age limitations on the gove ent funded work force, the number of
Kuwajtis directly employed in government increased from 168,000 in
1988 to 248,000 in 15)94,&
W~ile no accurate figurns arc. awailable on the sectorai distribution of
Kuwait's labor force, World Bank estimates indicate that 74% of Kuwait's
labor hrce works in servire jobs (including government, governmntowned
firms, and the military), 24.7% in industry (including oil), and
1 3% in agricdture (including fishing).@
nere are less than 10,000 Muwa-itis employed. in the private sector. En
contrast, the nurrtber of expatriate workers in Kwait has increased h m
1,4 million in 19990, before the Gulf War, to 1.83 million h 1994,h8 'This
increase has taken place in spite of Kuwaiti discussion about reducing its
depmdence on ktreign labor after the Gulf War, anci the expulsion of
Palestinims, Jordmians, and Bidoan. The net resul"cas been to ""d-ArabizetXuwait
by importing more Asian workers, and foreign workrs
now make up 83% of the tcrtai work force and 99% of the work force in
the private sector.69
This reZiance on government employment is extraordinarily costly to
both Kwait's economy md its socic-ry. Kuwaiti ministers and intellectuals
may disagree on many issues, but not over the fact that the government
employs four to five Kuwaitis for every realjob. Further, there is an
equal cmsensus over the fact that most employed Kuwaitis do little mm than interfere With each ot.her"s efforts or complicate the operations of an
al~ady cumbersome and inefficient gave ent sector. As a result, there
are far more employed Kuwaifris that reduce the net ouput of the eccmomp
Chm increase it. Rou$hly 80% of all employed Kuwaitis have no economic
function of any kind; their jobs are memingless and a net liability
to the nation.
These problelxs are cmpou~zded by a lack of incentives to take real
jobs or be producthe, and an educational system that does little to prepare
most Kuwaif nationals for a productive role in the private sectoreither
educating them in areas with few job prospects or over-educating
them for the jobs available.
Kuwait's cradle-to-grave welfare society has pmvided free medical
carc, generous gifts and loans to defray the cost of weddings, funerals
and free housing. It offers foqiveness for mnst mis-investments in
Kuwait" '%me1 market," a house, interest free loans, free education
through graduation from college, and guaranteed employment after
graduation from college." It has not, however, provided a path towards
development or social cohesion based on social purpose..
h order for Kuwait to clevelop a morc pdu,cri,ve distributio~z of labor,
it will bave to shift native labor into industv and more producthe service
jobs. @er 9% percent of Kuwait's food is imported, and much of

54 klilicrzf and Econontic Sfnbz'lity and Seczdrify
the fishg and agricultural activity that does take place only does so
because of non-economic government subsidies" Small amounts of local
vegetables are grown by fanxers rclceking such subsidies, and lilmited
amounts are d d to neighboring countries. However, far too kw vegetables
are grokm to have any significant impact in meeting local food
needs, and, virtually no agriculhral production would take place if
Kuwiiit did not provide subsidies and low-cost water.7"
mese changes, however, require aggressive privatization. measures,
and ones which emphasize speed and scale over social equity, The
Kuwiiiti National Assembly is correct im poifiting out that there is Little
point in prjvdization wfiich mates private mor~opolies as a substitut.e
for existing gave ent monopolies. The end result of such measures
might simply he to cut jobs as the new owner made an operation mow
efficie~?t, bile transfersing profits from government to private hands. At
the same tis3ne, efforts to limit the size of individual invest~nents and prevent
the sale of operating entities to the private sector cdd sharpty
reduce e~~trepreneurial and cmpetitive activity' and the hcclrtive for
outside investment, Kuwait lacks suitable anti-trust and anti-monopoly
legislation, and srtftable co issions to manage utility industries and
regulate mti-trust activity.72
Kuwait does not need instant privatization, but it does need to act
quickly and decisively and to shatter the ""welfart- ethic" "that applies as
much to Kuwaiti hvestmeld as to go~rernment services, Kuwait also
needs far more joint ventures like the $2 billion petrochemjcal, plant it is
building as a joimt venture between the KuwaiZi Petrochemical Industries
Corporation and Union Carbide, and to take the risk of offering foreign
oil cmpanies acreage for explosatim md dweIopment.7"
The Need for Structural Reform
Per capita oil and fnvesmmt wealth are ~lathe-ven in a nation with
as mmy oil reserves as Kuwait. Some estimates bdicate that Kuwait's
native population will nearly double between 1995 and 2020, If such esti-
mates arc. wen approximately cormct, Kuwait needs the kind of struc-
tural economic =form that will allow privatization to create new jobs and
industries, and mducc its dependence on foreip labor.7Vt needs to offer
real career opportunities to both its ctrrrent citizens and many of its "for-
eignff workers md permanent residents like its Bidoan. Kuwait also
needs to face the reality that population growth is likely to mducc per
capita oil wealth even if oft prices =main at currcsnt or higher kvels and
production hcreases.
nese needs are recognized, in a World Bmk report issued in 1943,
which was published in Kuwait's local English press. 'I'his report advo-

170fiCicnl nlzd Economic Stability aand Security 55
cated an econornic program that would reduce the deficit, privatize many
ent-owned companies and services, reduce subsidies md promote
employment of Kuwaiti citizns In the pl-ivate sector. The US State
Department reports that most Kuwaiti officids agree with the overall
cmcltrsians of the report, but that Little has beern done to date to move
toward specific implementation of the report" recomendations. As a
result, a number of Ku~taiti and fmeign experts believe that the changes
listed below are required in the Kuwaiti government's structural policies.
Kuwait needs to:
a Reduce dependence 811 welfal.el and Rserve subsidies only for its
poor citizens. Water, electriciw, motor gasoline, basic foods, and
mmy services need to be priced at market levels and subsidies to citizens
need to be replaced with jobs md eco~~omic opportunities.
* Force radical reductims in the nurnber of foreign workers, with priority
for rczductions fn servants and in trades that af2ow the most
rapid, conversion to native labor* Charge high fees for fo~ign labor
permits and force all foreign labor to pay not only the cost of all govent
services, but pay a premium over cast.
a Force social changes in kwait by eliminating guaranteed employment
in the government and ensuring that government salaries lag
sharpf y behind those in the private sector. Kuwait's young and wefleducated
population needs to be given jabs, and Kuwaiti society
must adapt to the rca1i.t.y that its present dependence on foreign
labor is a major threat to Kuwaitfs snal identity and security,
a Eduea.t.e Kuwaitis to regard govcr nt jobs as havhg low status
and to understand that most government jobs arc now a net liability
to the Kuwaiti ecmomy. Freeze and then reduw the number of ciwil
servants" Restructure and down-size the civil service to focus on
productive areas of activity with a much smaler pool of manpower.
Cut back sharply on state employees by the year
a Restrzlcture the czdwationai system to focms on job trahhg and competitiveness.
Create strong new incentives for faculb- and students
to focus on job-~lated education, sharply down-size other forms of
educational funding and activity, and eliminate high overhead educational
activities without economic benefi.ts.
ElimiIlate ecmomic disincc;ntives for employers hiring native labor,
and create disincentives for hiring foreign labor.
* ShifZ all gwernment impacted goods and. services to market prices.
Remove distortions in the economy and unde~pricing of wter, oil,
and gas.
* Implement extensive privatization to increase the efiicicncy of
KUM"iiiti investments in downstream and upstream operations. Cre-

56 klilicrzf and Econontic Sfnbz'lity and Seczdrify
ate real jobs and career opportunities fnr native KuMiaitis, and open
investmelrt opportunikies up to a much wider range of: investors.
Kuwaifilnas alrcady begun this process but it needs to be sharply
accelerated to remove productive ac"civity from govemmmt control.
At the sme time, privatization must be managed in ways thatensure
afl Kuwaitis an opporh;tnity to share in the privatization
process. It should not he conducted in a way that benefits only a
s~nall elite group of investors md discourages popular confidence
and willhgness to invest in Kuwait.
Stop subsidizing Kuwaiti businesses in w~ which prtrvent realistic
ecmornic growth md develoipment, md which deprive the government
of revenue, Present policies skongly favor Kuwaiti citizens
and Kuwaiti-owned companks Income taxes are only levied on foreig~z
corporations and foreign inte~sts i,n Kuwaiti corporations, at
rates that may range as high as 55 percent of net income.
Tax earnings and sales with progressive taxes that reduce or eliminate
budget deficits, encowage local investmcmt, and create strong
disincentkes for the expatriation of capital, including all foreip
holdir~gs of capital and pmperty by members of elite and rulirrg
families. 'This will provide a key source of revezzue, and make the
distf-ibrrtion of income more equitable. Kuwait needs to ensure that
wealthier KuwaiWs make a proper contribution to social services
and defense,
* Alllaw foreign invesbent on mnre competitive terms. Kuwait cur-
~ntty allows fctrc-.ign investment in limited scrctors of the economy
in xninority parherships, and on term colnpatible with continued
Kuwaiti control of all basis economic actkities. Some sectors of the
ecmomy-including oil, banking, insurance a d real estate-have
traditionally been clrtsccf to foreign invest~~ent, Foreigners (with the
exception of natimaIs from some GCC states) are not permitted to
trade k Kutrvaiti stocks on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange, except
through the medim of unit trusts, Protection shodif. not, hobvever,
extend to the point where it eitimixtates efficiency and competitiveness,
or mstricts economic expansion. Foreign nationals, who represent
a majority of the popdalion, are prohibited fmln havirtg majority
ownership in virtually every business other than certa-in small
service-oriented businesses and may not own property (there are
some exceptions for citizens of other GCC states). Kuwait needs to
act on pr~osals such as allowing foreip equity participation h the
banking sector (up to 40 percmt) and in the upstream d sector
(terms still to be determhed).
* Rciorrn the structure of the budget to ensure that mst of the
nation's mvenues and foreign reserwes and earnings are integrated

170fiCicnl nlzd Economic Stability aand Security 57
into the national buliget and into the p g process. Clearly separate
royal and national hcome and in
* Place sharp limits m the transfer of state funds to prir\ces and members
of the royal family outside the actual nth$ family and transfers
of unearned income to members of other leading families.
Ensure that such family members are fully taxed on all hcome and
investments.
* Exlsure that alX income km enterprises with slate financing is
reflected. in the national budget and is integrated into the national
ecmomic develupment and pl
* Establish rzlt.hlessly demmdin-lg market criteria for evalwting and
making all major state and state-supp orted investments. Require
state invesh-nents to offer a conclusi\lefy higher rate of than
private investments. Demand detailed and jndepende~~t risk ssessmmt
and projections of cornparathe return on investment, with a
srtbstantiaf penalty for state versus prkately funded preects and
ver~turcs. Down-size the scale of progrants to rcduce i,nvestmemt and
cash flow costs and the risk of cost-escalation,
* Create new incentives to invest in local h~dustries and business and
disincentives for the expatriatio~~ of capital.
* Create market driven incentives for foreip investment in major oil
and gas prc?ljeds, refheries, and petrochemicai operations. Avoid offlset
requirements that simply create disguised u~~ernployzne~~t or
non-competitive ventures that act as a further state-sponsored distortion
of the economy
* Establish a firm rule of: law for all property, contract, permittiq, and
business activiv and. reduce state bureaucratic and permitting barriers
to private investment.
* Place national security spending on the same basis as other state
spendmg, and fully implement the law the National Assembly
passed in I993 to insure that all direct and indirect d&nse costsincluding
arms-are ~flected in the natio~~ai budget. Integrate it
iuliy into the national budget, including hvestment and equipment
purchases.
* Replace the present emphasis on j~~dging arms purchases of the
basis on initial procurement costs and technical features with a lull
assessment of life cycle cost-including training, maintenance, and
facilities.
* Cease buykg ams in an effort to win outside political support and
establish with specific pcedures and regulations for evaiuating the
value of" standardization and interoperabilit.y wiCh existing nati.onal
equipment and facili.lies, those of other Gulf states, and those of the
US and other power preection forces.

58 klilicrzf and Econontic Sfnbz'lity and Seczdrify
Subject all offset proposals mlating to gowernment military and
non-military expenditures abroad to the same risk and cost-benef t
analyses used by the private sector, and create independent auditing
procedures to ensure that offsets do not becorne a concealed
government s~~bsidy or a way of bcnditing influential government
officials,
Expand the number of voters for fie Naticmai Assembly. Continue
to allow Che expansion of political activity to elnsure the peaceful
resolution of hternal economic debates,
Deal with fie issue of the Bidoon and ercpand citizenship to de facto
Kuwaitis.
* Create a long-term planning effort focus@ on periods five, ten, and
twenty years into the futw to set gods for Kuwait" social, econonnic,
and military development, with special attentio~n to the prokllerns
of population growth, rcrtducing dependence on foreign labor,
diversifying fie wonomy, and tinking development to a clear set of
social goals. Use conthgency and risk malysis, not simply growthoriented
models,
At the same time, Kuwait's economic, social, md political refoms
must take account of strategir realities. No other country in the Gulf has
a clearer need for a strong defense and close security ties to its Southm
Gulf neighbors and the West. Kuwait" eecmornic vuZnerabilities are not
unique, but the same geography that has blessed Kuwait wjth oil has
cursed it with neighbors like Iran and I~aq.~5 Kwait's oil facilities and
urbaln areas will remain vuherable to air, missile, armored, md seaborne
attack. Kuwait will aiways be dependent on imports for virtually all of its
food. It has no arable land other than a small patch of irrigated land, and
only 8% of its terrgory can be used even for light grazing.
Kuwait" sports will remah wit.hin tlhe range of Iranian and Xrayi. antiship
missiles, and Kuwait will have to draw its water from easily targetable
desalillation plants. Kuwait has only about 0.01 cubic kilometcrs
of hkrnal renewable water resources. This only amounts to about 10
cubic meters per persm, one of the lowest levels ol any nation in the
~orld.~s As a result, Kuwait has developed massive desalhization facilities,
which have become even more import& now that it can no longer
import water from Iraq. Kuwait now must irnport at least 75% of its
potable water.T7

Internal Security
Kuwait is taking important steps to broaden its structure of power. The
elected National hsembly is increasingly active, and &:he mhg Al Shah
fmily is mabg a slow but steady Ismsition to increased popular partic-
nt. There is still sipififant tensio-n, however, between
the royal family and some pobtical groups in Kuwait. There is aIso tcnsion
between f(uuraitfs Sunnis-who cmtroE, the natids political leadership
and economy-and the Slzi'ite portion of the population. These tensions
have eased since the liberation, but some problems =main.
Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions
I'he CIA estilnates that &out 45% of Kuvvait's total population is native
Arab, 35% is other Arab, 9";?"0 is South Asia, 4% is of Iranim origin, md 7'/0
is "other." Islam is the state: religion and the Constitution states that
lslamfc law, the Sharik, is ""a main source of legislation." I'he CIA estimat-es
that the Muslim population is about 45% Sunni, 30% Shi'ite, and
IOc% other Muslimf although the State Department estimates that as many
as 40Y0 of Kuwait's population may be Shi"tes.7W~u~iait has a thy Arab
Christian minority (some of which are nat-ive hwaitis), which practices
freely, and. several leg* recognized expatriate congregations and
churches, inctuding a Catholic diocese, an hglican church Ahmadi,
md m Ameriem-sponsored Protestmt crhurch.
The US State Department reports that residents who arc members oi
~ligions not sanctioned by the Koran (e.g., Hindus, Sikhs, 'Jews, and Buddhists)
may not build places of worship, but m y worship in their homes.
The Government phibits missionaries to proselytize among Muslims,
but they may serve expatriate cong~tgations. The law prohibits religious
education for religions other than Islam, alt.hotlgh this law does not
appear to be strictly enforced. Tke Governmnt does not permit the
establishment of non-lstamic publishing comp"ni"mor trailling institutions
for clergyS7"

The main ethnic diwision within Kuwait's native population is between
Sunni and Shi'ite. The ruling family and many prominent families belong
to the denomislation of Sumi Islam, md the allocation of government
funds favors the Sumi clergy. Shi'ites art. free to conduct their liturgies
and rites without governmmt interference, and government welfare programs
do not discriminate against Shi5te Muslim cilizens, The State
Department does =port, however, that members of Kuwait% Shi5ite
mhority are gerzerally underrepreser~ted in high go~rernment positionsalthough
two Sh.i"ite Muslims were appointed to the Cabinet, a Shi"ite has
served as oil ministetr, a d a SWite was nmed to a high-rankhg mftitary
post h recent years.gO
Some observers think that the Kuwaiti governmmt has allowed the
political police, fnternd scrrtrrity foxes, and royal intelligence to investigate
and arrest individual Shi'ites withou"f:adequate cause. A number of
Kuwai"t Shi'ites have been sentmced for bonnbing md other terrorist
incidents in support of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, leaving an ad&tiond
legacy of rcsemtmemt. These ternsions inevitably affect Kuwait's
hternal security and may lead to new hcidents between Kuwait and
Iran over religious issues.
Kuwait also faces major problems in defh~ing its native population.
At the end of 1994, there were about 117,000 stateless people in Kuwait,
down from the prt?war level of about 220,000. :Mav of these stateless
persons are ""Bidoorr'~the term means ""without") The Bidoon are stateless
persons, usually of Iraqi, Jordanian Syrian, or Iranian descent, who
sided fn Kuwit prior to the Iraqi in\iasion. 'The US State Department
=ports that the Kuwaiti, goverment argues that many of the Bidoon
are actuaXly the citizens of other countries, who claim they am stateless
in order to remain in Kuwait, become citizens, and enjoy the generous
government benefits provided to citizens. Mmy Bidoon, howeves, have
had residency or ties to Kuwait for generations. Others immigrated to
Kuwait during the oil boom years and have effectivefy been ~sidents
for over a decade.81
These Bidoon exist in, a legal lido. As long as their citizenship or
~siciency status is undetermined, they do not have a legal right to
work or enroll their childre11 in public or private schools. Even Bidoon
born of Kuwaiti mothers are denied free education, many job opportunities,
social benefits, alld srrmetimes the right to remain in Kuwait
unless they are givm financial guarantees by a Kuwaiti citizen.82
If the Bid- travel abroad, there is no guarantee that immigration
authorilties will allw them to reentr~r Kuwait. hi2afiage poses special
hardships became thc offsprhg of malc Bidoor~ inlnerit t-he fatker's undetermined
legal. status. The Kuwaiti govemmt has established a review
pmcess which would regdarize the status of some of the Bidoon and

their famiies, especially for any Bidom who has serwed in the military or
security fnrces, and for the children born to marriages betwcen Bidoon
men and Kuwaiti women. However, the US State Department =posts
that this process of ~gulation is improvised, slow, and ineffective.
Kuwajti g0vernmem.t. offid& claim they recognize the hardships suffered
by the Bidnon, but so far have not proposed any remedial legislation.83
ent has elhinated the Bidoon from the census rolls, discontkued
their access to government-provided social services, and has
sought to deport many Bidom to other countries. The government also
has tried to p~vent the return of the Bidom who departed Kuwait during
Ihe Gulf War: It has frequently delayed or denied thm entry visas.
This policy imposes serious hardships md family separations. En 1993,
the governmat also decreed that Bidoon males may no longer serve in
the military ser~ices.~"
The Kuwaiti government bas also actjvely pursued a policy of reducing
the number of Iraqis, Paiestinians, ad other forcrign ~sidents sfnce
the liberation of Kuwajt i,n 1,941. This Icd to m y questionabIe deporta-
tions during 1991-1993 (although mmy were justified on internal secu-
rity gmunds). Most of the 400,OO pre-war Palestinian and Jordanian
workers residi.ng i,n Kucvait have been forced to leave Chc cowry,
because of the support that the PLO and Jordan gave to tray during the
Gulf War. C )th have been arrested, and mly about 7,11C)f) had work per-
mits in May, 1992.8"
The Kuwait govemmt nm opposes the entry of workers from
nations that sqported Iraq durinl; tbe Gulf Warf especially Palestinians,
Jordanians, md Yemenis, There were still an estimated 36,000 Palestini-
ans in Kuwait in 31996, but the State Department reports that the Kuwaiti
ent has delayed or dcnied the issuance of work and ~sidency
permits to persons in these groups, md has hhdered such workers from
sponsoring their families to join them in Kuwait in many cases. The gov-
ernment imposes further hadships by prtlhibiting schools from enrolling
the children of sueh persons without vatid residency pemits.
The government did, however, discontirrue its postwar practice of
arrestitlg and deporting Gazan Palestinians for violating residency laws
in 1,993. The government issued one year renecvable residency perm,jts to
5,OOU of the 8,0013 Gazana remaining in Kuwait, but did not seek to deport
those without residency permits.. Even so, a combi~~ation of legal md
social pressttres contjnws to make many Gazans have Kuwait.8"
Dependence on Foreign Labos
Kuwait faces eyually serious problems in terms of migration and depen-
dence on a foreip work force, atthough there is no apement on the

nurnbers involved. The Kuwaiti Public Aut)-tority for Civil Information
indicates that 796,994 native Kuwaiti and 1,957,322 expatriate residents
lived in Kuwait at the end of 199135. One British esthate hdicates that foreigners
make up 5040% of the total population in Kwait, and that 86%
of the work force is foreign." The CIA esl.mates Chat Kukvajt nokv has a
populatjon of about 1.8 million and a labor force of around 566,000, of
which up to 70% may be foreign."
Regardless of any uncertahties over numbers, several things are cfeac
Kuwait" fioseign labor increasixrglp comes from countries that do not present
a threat to Kuwait or a source of prltmtial demands for citizenship.89
Kuwajt's Asian populatinn has increased to about 9% of the total population,
with an additional 7% from outside the regim,
Kuwait also has taken steps to prevent such workers from beccmling a
new class of semi-permanent residents and to reduce related state subsidies.
Third-countr)i nationals employed in the private sector must earn
approximakly $2,000 a month, and public sectur employees about $1,.P00
a mnrrth, before they can sponsor their families in Kuwait. Residernt foreign
nationals are subject to stringent visa requirements, special taxes and
fees that are intended to both discrlumge their employment and limit
their ternllrc in Kuwait. Foreign workers also now have to pay for some
health. services, and Kuwait plans to charge new fees for foreigers in
other areas and is considering raising the charges to employers whtr hire
foreign labor,
nese measurcs still, however, leave KuwaiMependent on foreigners
fnr most of its services and industrial httor. This point was illustrated in
March, 1995, whe~n approxhately 700 KK workers took part in a weeklong
strike to demand pay incrttases and improved yromotimal opportunities
for Kuwaiti naticmals, who hcrld an estimated 68 percent of the
country's oil sector jabs. (Asian expatriates hold the remainder and are
paid substantiafly less.) Allhough the KOC workershunion claimed that
Kwiiitfs oil pmduction fell by up to 100,000 barrels per day during the
strikes, the strikers' ~olns were fi3led teqorarily, and no production losses
resulted,
tlcrwever, there arc. negatiwe side effects from :Kuwait% shift to Asian
workers, Many of Kuwait's former Palesthian and Jordanjan workers
regarded themselves as virtuaj residents, and spent most of tlteir mney
in Kuwait. In contrast Asian workers remit most of their earnings home
md spend very little in Kuwait. This alters Kuwait" balance of payments
and reduces local demand for cmsumr goods and services.%
Kuwait's currcllnt level of degendenw on foreip labor has ~sulted in
the kick of an effective work ethic mong native Kuwaitis, and some estimates
indicate that about half of employed Kuwaiti nationals are
employed in government or state-owed irtdustritls in positions that have

no productive output and are little more than disguised unemployment.
About 15,50C) Kuurait males enter the labor farce annuallyf and, whie this
number is small and unemployment is currently negigible, Kuwait's cur-
rent employrnmt struch;lre raises serious questims &out its abili.ty to
create a productive employment structure for its cjtizerns and offer its
youth meaningful camr opportunities.
Broadening the Base of Political Pnvver
Under Kuwait's Constitution, the Emir holds execuf;ive power and shares
legislative power with the National Assembly The Constitution does,
however, give the Emir the power to suspend its provisions and. rule by
decree. In 1986, the Ernir dissolved the National Assembly by suspending
the constitutinnal provisions on the Assernbly"~ election. The AssembIy
remained dissolved until 1992. The Emir had. previously dissolved the
Assernbly from 1976 tcr 1981..
h accordance with the practice of the ruling family, the Rime Mkister
is always the Crown Prince. The Prhe Mhister currently presides over a
16-member Cabhet, many of whose members come from the Al Sabah
family or other lcading Sunni famiIies"g1
Kuwait" pdtical leadership faces increasing demds by its citisns
for the sharing of political power. 'These dernaneis are partly a result of a
general desire h political liberalimtion. However, they refled criticism
by some elements of Kuwait sociew of the Ai Shah family Immediately
after the liberation, a number of promiment KuMtaiti citizens criticized the
rnyal family for failhg to prepare the country for wm and for showing
inadequate leadership during the fighting. Some elements of the Kuwaiti
~sistance also felt they we^ not givm proper recognition.
These tensions have resulted in a growing debate over the course of
political liberalization that has sometimes involved. the US. In June,
1992, the speaker of the National Courncil criticized the American
ambassador for "talking about demoeracy'"nd "encouraging the local
opposition." Kuwait's first, real post-war election took place in late Map
1992. Kuwaiti businessmen voted for the board of the Chamber of Commerce
and hdrastry. rhis election rcveated the extent to which Kuwaiti
public opinion called for bmader representation, Some 11,500 Kuwaiti
businessmen voted, and 23 of 24 seats went to candidates oppox""Jo
the current government.
Kuwait held elections for its National Assemb%y in October, 1992, but
these elec-tions were conducted under severe restrictions. The government
prohibited pditical parties, so candidates had to nomhate themselves.
The Emir blocked plans to organize seminars on the elections and
opposition elements were given only limited opportunfty to organize.

I'he votiz~g population was timited to men 24 years or older, who could
trace their Kuwaiti residence back to 1920 and had mainraked a residence
there until 1953. This constituency represented only 81,400 males
out of a total population of 601),0110, or 13.S0i0 of the population and 30%
of adult dtizens. Even so, inbrmal political groupwere active, 303 candidates
ran for the Assembfy" 550 seats, and almost the entire franchised
male populaticm ~gistered to vote in t-he election.
The election did, LittJe to suppress popular dissent. Mile the 50 whers
of the Clctoher 6,1992, election general@ supported continued rule by the
royal family a large majorit,v demmded better gowernment anli increased
legisi&ive cosltrol over the actions of the Emir and selnior mel~bers of the
ent. Nine of the 50 new members were Islamists, seven were
associated with Mm, 17 had served in the National Assembly which had
been suspmded by the Emir in 1,986, and nine had served in the National
Council, a surrogate legislature elected in 1990 by the Emit 1Phis meant
that a total of 35 out of 50 mmbers were Islamists, tradi~onal politiciam,
and secular liberills wfio had previously called far a parliament that could
put stronger checks and balances on the government,%
Since 1992, the Krrwaiti parliment has steadily increased its power.
It has held heated debates over the isszle of: power sharing, the fiscal
accountahjity of the Al Sabah famjly, and whether an open investigation
shczuld "o held into the events leadillg to Kwaitfs state of unpreparedness
on. August 2,1"39. The Assembly has beg~~ll to participate in
major budget and resource decisions, a d has ac.tively debated corrupticm
and waste in deknse spending, the sharing of the nation's wealth,
the royd family's management of the Fmd for the Future Generations
and Kuwait's naticmal investments, the repayment of debts owed
because of the collapse of Kuwait's stock market, the way in which priva.t.ization
is conducted, and the mount of" money that should be spent
on military forces, It has reshaped the repayment deadlines an Kuwait's
"difficult debt" and the outcome of many other important issues-93
The National bsernbly has also broadened the base of the Kwaiti
electorate. tn 1994 the Assembiy passed legislation extending the right to
vote to the sons of naturalized Kuwai.ti citizens-about 110,000 males.
According to the 1994 lawI citizens who have been naturalized citizens
for at least 30 years will also be elig-ible to vote in 1996," A mwjoslly oi
candidates elected in 1992 have also statecf that they favor extending the
vote to womn, although proposals to do so hnvc been delayed in a legislative
cornittee, The Emir and the Prirne Minister have publjcly stated
that they support political rights for women, but hawe made no apparent
effort to persuade the National Asse~~bly;~-?
Kuwait is slowly developing the eyuivalmt of political parties. The
ent officially bans political paties, but several h~formai btocs

have arisen that act like parties. 'These blocs played a major role in the
1992 elections and in the succeedhg National. Asse~~bly sessions. The
governant has made no effort to limit these groupings, which are organized
on the basis of co on ideologkal goals. May play a role as
"oppositionf"roups.
PubZic gatherings still must receive prior government approd as
must private gatherings of more than five persms that result in the
issuance of a public stdememt. As a result nnnst popular political activit.y
takes the form. of family-based., ahost excluskely male, social gatherjngs
known as 'Qiwaniyas." Most male adults, including the Emir, host and
attend diwaniyas, which discuss every possible topic. Shce 1994, these
druianyas have incwasingly been focused on the 1986 election and have
been more critical of the current members of National Assembly There is
grokving public dcbate over the hiiurc3 of the Assembly to take decisive
action on the budget deficit, halt waste and graft, the hture of the
Bidaan, and the use of the assets of the Kuwaiti fnveshnent Authorityy6
Thew tre~~ds towards jncrcascd power sharing seem likely to help
Kuwait cope with the socio-economic changes it must make over the
cming decades, rather than to threaten the regime or Kuwait's political
stlxbility. Kuwait: has the freest political climate of any Southern
Gulf country, and permits far more freedom of mdia and academic
dtrbate than its neighbors. Et is atso clear that the campaip for its October
5,1996, National Assembly elections are certah to be vigorous-to
say the least.
At the same time, there are reports that mernbers of the royal family
oppose the czlrmt level of fseedom for the National Asse~nbly, and some
have called for its suppression. Kuwait also still has some human rights
problems. 'The Kuwaiti government dissolved a nurrtber of unlicensed
pofitical groups in htagust, 1993-includjng the Kuwaiti Association to
&fend War Victims, a major hman rights group. This led to the resignation
of the members oE the Hostages and Missing Cornittee of the
National Assernbly Organizations like Amnesty International also claim
ent has hundreds of poiitjcal prisoners, and that the
State Securiv Court that tried Iraqi cotlaborators and other persons
charged wi& national security crimes, abuses humm rights.47

Kuwait's Military Forces
Kuwait faces potential threats from Iran and Iraq that make it the mast
vulnerable country in the Gulf. Table Eight shows the size of Kuwait's
fnrces relative to potential threats from :Iran and Iraq. This tahle makes it
clear that Kuwait must do everything it can to strengthen its forcm if it is
to develop its collective securiity capabilities, maintajn its sovereignty,
~ififorce its deterrence of Iran and Ira% and deal with low-level threats
and incursions.
At the same time, Table Eight shows that there is no foreseelable polnt
at which KuwaiZ, or any combination of Kwait and the other Southem
Gulf states, can provide Kuwait with sec~~rity against Iraq or secure
Kuwai"t"saccss through the Gullf. Kuwait is one of the mnst strategically
exposed states in the world, a d nothing it cm do by itself will give it the
abilily to defend against Iran and Iraq. Its vuherabjlity is me of: the ce1-ttral
realitjes affecting any efEort to create a stable mix of deterrent and
defensive capabitities fn the Gulf.
Iraq" invasion provided a brutal demonstration of that vuherability.
Kuwaih the other Southern Gulf states, and, the West must clearly recognize
this strategic imperative if my effort to encourage regional stabitity.
is to succeed, kwait was unprepared hr the invasion despite the fact
that several Kuwait. commanders had. advised Kuwait to put its forces on
the alert and move them into defensive positions. As a result, thr buk of
Kuwajt's military forces djsjntegrated durbg the first hums of Iraq's
invasion, Much of KuwaiVmmilitary equipment was captured and. much
of the rest was lost or &strayed. Only some of its aircrafc a few vessels,
and a lirnited amomt of land equipment escaped to Saudi Arabia.
Since the Gulf Wr, Kuwait has atteqted to rebuild its forces and correct
many of the military weaknesses that existed at the time of the Iraqi
invasion. fn August 1995, Kuwait's Minister of Defense, Sheik Ahmad
Hamoud al-Jaber al-Sab& annomced that Kuwait" army had recovered
85% of the effectiveness it had had before the Iraqi invasion, that Kuwait
hoped to fully rebuiid its forces over the next few years, and ht, "the

TABLE EIGHT Gulf Military Forces in 19%
Manpower
Total Active
Regular
National Guard & Other
Reserve
Paramilitary
Army and Guard
Manpower
Regular Army Manpower
Reserve
Tanks
AI N / Recce, Lt. Tanks
Arcs
Self Propelled Artillery
Towed Artillery
MRLs
Mortars
SSM Launchers
Light SAM Launchers
AA Guns
Air Force Manpower
Air Defense Manpower
-3 -3
44
2 %
a,
g %
2
!S 3
g
g3
Saudi
Iran Iraq Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Arabia* UAE Yemen
88
Pc:
52
88
a. 0.
5%
00
a
m,
4
8"
S
8""
2
a""
53
823
a. "",
E?*
0"
a
3
8"
C=1
FI1
(continues)

TABLE EIGHT (continued)
Total Combat Aircraft
Bombers
Fighter/Attack
Fighter/Interceptor
ReccelFGA Recce
AEW /C4I/BM
MR/ MPA*"
OCU/COIN
Combat Trainers
Transport Aircraft"
Tanker Aircraft
Armed Helicoptors"
Other Helicoptors''
Major SAM Launchers
Light SAM Launchers
AA Guns
Navy Manpower
Major Surface Combatants
Missile
Other
Patrol Craft
Missile
Saudi
Iran Iraq Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Arabia* UAE Yemen
(continues)

TABLE EIGHT (continued)
Other
Submarines
Mine Vessels
Amphibious Vessels
Landing Craft
Saudi
Iran Iraq Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Arabia* UAE Yemen
Notes: Does not include equipment in storage. Air Force totals include all helicopters, and all heavy surface-to-air missile launchers.
'60,000 reserves are National Guard Tribal Levies. The total for land forces includes active National Guard equipment. These additions total 262
AIFVs, 1,165 APCs, and 70 towed artillery weapons.
Tncludes navy, army, national guard, and royal flights, but not paramilitary.
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cardesman fmm International Institute for Strategic Studies Milita y Balance (ITS, London), in this case, the 1995-
1996 edition; Military Technology, World Dqmse Almanac, 1994-1995; and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance in the Middle East, 1993-
1994 (JCSS, Tel Aviv, 1994).

Kwait army is capable of safeguarding the swurity of Kuwait's borcters
md appropriately responding to any enelny movements, supported by
brothers in the GCC md friendly troops in the region:'%
Kuwait's military forces have been rebuilt and improved to the point
where they cm play animportant role in delnonstratjng that Kuwait has
the will to protect its sovereignty, They are developing an improved abi.l.ity
to deal with the kind of threatening mwernents, infiltrations, and
low-level anacks that Iran and Xraq cm use to intimidate Kuwait.
Kuwait" forces will, however, always be too weak to defend so vulnerable
a geographic position. Kuwait is dso hav% to reformulate the
ove~arnbitious and unrealistic plans for a 4l),O(JfS men force stmctrxre and
m;pjor equipxnent purchases it developed after the Gulf War. As a resultf
Kwait faces hard trade-of.fs between domestic and extemal politics, the
structural limits on its force expansion c~abilities, and its security needs.
Kuwait's Borders
Kuwait camot overcome the basic strategic reality that it is a small corn-
try with immense wealth with the wrong neighbors. Kuwait" total terri-
tory is 0171Y &out 17,800 square kilmeters, or rougt-tly the size of New
Jersey, but Kuwait has a 240 kilometer tong border with Iraq and a 222
kilometer border with Saudi Arabia. These borders p m t majjor prob-
lems for Kwait in preventing infiltrations and raids.
Since th Gulf War, Kuwait has attempted to improve the security of its
border by creating a 2137-218 kilometcr long ditch, smd wall, and barbed
wire fence to demarcate its border with Xraq. En xnid-1995, it had nearly
cmpleted construction of a system, with a three meter deep trench, fol-
htwcd by a five meter sad berm, equipped with sensors to detect the
movement of vehic1t.s." Kuwait idso built a pat-rot road dong the border
with observation posts and monitoring sensors. This security system is
operated by the Ministry of interior, and is similar to one under consid-
eration by Satlidi Arabia.
It is not clear exactXy what sensors Ku~tlait is now using or plms to
buy in the futurr-?. If the security zone is equipped with all of the techxlnogy
that was discussed during plans for its constrwtion, it will
have IR sensors, pressure sensors, electrified, wires, trenches, barbed
wire and electronic sensors. Contencling companies proposed different
approaches to creating such a system. montson-CSF and Thorn
favor~d infra-red sensors. Racal Comsec and Hughes favored terrestrial
ad press- cable sensors, and some experts prefermd tethered
aerostats carrying radars.
Kuwait is also studying optims for the creation of a second defense
barrier desiped to slow an armored adwance and equipped with mhes

and other anti-armor barriers. According to sow reports, work has
begun on such defe~~ses.
Kuwait reports that its securily system has been valuable in reducing
border infdtrations. These have dropped from several hunrfred a year
during 1992-1994 to a few incidents a week h the spring of 1995, 'This
drop, however, may also be the result of Iraqi efforts to persuade the UN
to ease its sanctions and tbr improved eft'crrts of UN forcles to secure. the
border area.700
In my case, Kuwait" boders will still be highly vulnerable to rapid
armored attitcks. Ku~iait" tterrain cmsists largely of dightly undulathg
desert plahs, and has few dcfe~~sive barriers. The only sig~~ificant eietsation
in the corntry is the A-Mu tf a Ridge, just north of the city of A1 'Jafira.
The pass through this ridge from the north into Kllwait City is the only
real defe17sjve position against Iraq. The gortr;e of A1 Bath (H& al-Sa.t.jn)
Iforms only a limited barrier to the west, The one defensive line north of
the Bay of Kuwait provides only a limited advantage tcr the defender, and
the road net betwee11 Kuwait City and Basra in Iraq allows rapid movement
of troops,
The desert in Northern Kuwait permits ~latively easy mcrvement by
armor, and there arc a nuntber of highways and major road links in the
area. Kuwait has some 3,080 kilometers of roads, 2,500 Elometers of
which are paved. There are far kwer mutes going into Kuwait horn the
West, but the British army demonstrated bring the Gulf War that a modem
arrnored forcc can cross the Hafr al Batixz gorge relativek easily anand
US forces showed &at an armored force can mwe relatively rapidly from
positims in lraq to the Saudi border by passing Kuwait to the wcst.
Kuwait's Forces and S'trategic Vulnerabilities
This geography not only demands strong forces, but forces with high
~adiness and rapid deployment cap"bi1iV Kuwait" lmd forces can only
be effective if they art? able to deploy to their deknsive posiaions before
Iraq attacks. Kuwait" air md naval forces must also be capable of movlng
to full combat ~adiness in a matter of hours. Kuwaiti air space is very vulneraible,
md Kuwait is vuherable to heliborne md air assault. It has seven
airfields, four of which arc paved and have runways 2,4W3,439 meters
long. There are many arras in Kuwait where paved roads and areas allow
rapid movement by helicqter. Most of Kuwait's territorial w&ers and
port areas arc vulnerable to long-rmge anti-ship missiles launhed from
nearby positions in Iran and Iraq. Kuwait has ~lativefy good maritime
surveillmcc capabilities, but its navigaion channels are vulnerable to
covert minehying by small craft, and much of its 499 kilorneter c0astlin.e
has areas where amphibious craft or raid% parties can lmd.

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Kuwaiti Military Spending
and Arms Imports
These threats and the shock of Iraq's invasion explain the trends in
Kwaiti military spending a d arms imports. Kuwait has been forced to
shift fmm a strategy of accommodating its mre powerful. neighbors to
one of strengthening its own forces and paying part of the cost of US
presmce and power projection. The ~sult has sharply increased the
amotmt Kuwait must spend on military preparedness,
Military Spending
A W estimate of Kuwaiti central gowe ent spending, military spending,
deXiveries of military imports, and totd export earnings is shokvn in
Chart Thirteen, These trends are shown in constant 1993 dollars, and
reflect the fact that Kuwaiti military expenditures took up only a relatively
moderate shm of Kuwaiti cclntral government expet~diturtls and
ams imports until the Gulf W.
Chart Fourteen shows the trends in per capita GUP and mibary expenditure
per capita in constant dollars and provides a similar picturc. of the
burdtln miZitary spending has placed on Kuwait in recltnt years. As has
been discussed earlier, the Gulf War phced a catastrophic burden on the
Kuwajti ecmonny and budget, althot~gb Kuwaiti exports ~covcred relatively
quickly and ditary spending dropped sharply after 1993.
According to US estimates, Kuwait vent over $1 billion
military forces (in current dollars) beghning in the early 1988s. It spetnt
around $1.5 bjllian during 1.983-1985-the period when it felt most
threatened hy Iran. ACP)A estimates that Kuwait spent $766 mittion m
defense in 1979, $892 million in 1980. $886 million in 1981, $1,157 million
in 198% $1,446 million in 1983, $1,415 million in 1984, $1,509 million in
1985, $1,287 million in 1986, $1,250 million in 1987, $1,1260 million in
1988, and $1,944 million in 1,989, l'hese expetnditurcs averaged around

Cl Military- Expenditures
W Total Exports
Arms Imports
CHART "THIIRTEEN Kuwaiti Military Expenditures, Total Impods, and Arms
Tmpc~rts: 1983-1993 (Constant: $93 Millions). Source: Adapted by Anthony FT.
Cordesman from ACDA, Wctl.ld Milz'tafy E;rper2dz'tu~s cdud Arlrzs Tra~sfers~
1993-1 994, ACDA/GPQ, Washington, 1995.
Sa/~-SY~ of Kuwait's GDC md 12% to 14% of its celztral governme~zt
expenditures.""t
These rnilitary expenditures rose to dramatic new heights after Iraqfs
invasion of Kuwait, ACDA estimates that Ku'cvajt. spent $13,2.10 million in
1990 and $16,030 million in 1991 to reequip and =train its forces, and to
provide aid to other Coaliit-ion forces, It spent $49,090 billion in W92,
larp;e:ly on necv orders of equipment to support its post&& War modernization
pIans. Spending then dropped back to $3.6a)*4 billion in 19%,
a d $3.086 billion in 1994.

Mililnfy Spending nlzd Arms Imports
CHART FOURTEEN Kuw-aiti GNP Per Capita Versus Military Expenditures
Per Capita (Constant $93). Sazlrce: Adapted by Anthany H. Cnrdesman from
AGDA, World Mililcnry Expendillltres nlzd Arnzs Tr~~tsjers, 2993-1994, Washington,
ACDA-GPO, 1995, Table 1,
Accordi~~g to Kuwaiti figures, military spending dropped back
towards prewar levels in 1993, with expenditures of $1.8 billion. They
dropped to a base level of $1.7 billion in 1994, and were estimated to be
$1.,6S billio~~ in 1995. T%ese figures, however, exclude some capital costs
for arms expenditures, many construction and infrastructure costs, and a
wide range af related service costs, The IISS estimates that Kuwait spent
$3.01. billion in 1993, $3.09 biltio~~ in 1994, and $2.91 billio~~ in 1995, %me
US experts believe that Kuwait's total military spending had continued to
total over $5 billion a year since 1993.102

Total Kwaiti military spendiw =ached $5.4 billicm in 199419%-
inclrading a $778 million elnergency j,ncrease to cover the llnexpected cost
of the Kuwaiti deployment to counter Traq's October, 1994 build-up on
Kuwait" border. It is not clear whe&er some $500 million in additional
spendi.ng to pay fos the deploymmt of US and other all,ied forces is
included in this total or has simply been taken from Kuwaitfs General
Reserve. Even these figlares, however, mean &at Kuwait is spading
about $1,907 per capita on military forces, versus $1,335 for Israel and
$1,204 for the tfS.103
Kuwait Arms Expenditures
Kwaitfs effort ta reequip anci expand its forces have also been costly and
have led to a bitter debate between the government and the National
Assembly over how much Kuwait slnould spend on armselOJ. In 1992, the
Emir issued a decree that catled for Kuwait to spend roughly $11.8 bitlion
on arms over the next twelve years. 'This plan met wilh strong objections
from the National Assembly once it canne to office, The Assembly criticized
both &E? total amount and fie way in which the government
selected weapons and military contractors,
The Finance and. Econumy Committee of the National Assembly
rejected the hninistry of Dcriense"s propom"to sped the money
allowed under the decree in July, 1993, and raised a wide range of
issues about the government" plans and methods of allocatin.g contracts.
As a result, fundjng of the modernization plan was delayed
until April, 1994, when the National Assembly voted an $11.7 billion
supplementary defense budget to be spent in increments over a 10
year period, and with enhanced supertdision by the National Assembly.
This compraxvlise cme only after the government agreed to
notify the Paationd Assembly of each year" spending from the supplementary
budget and the defense minister, ALI Safern at-Sabah, was
forced to switch places with the interior minister, Atitmad Hamoud al-
Jaber al-Sabah, because of Salem"s resistance to any campmrnise with
the National Assembly.105
The compromise raises questions about Kuwait" future ability to
fwd its force expansion plans. By the time the National Assembly
approved the compromise, Kwait had already spent bilIions of dollars
on new arms, and the $11.7 billion approved by the Natinnal,
Assmbly also has to cover the cast oE exercises with the US, and US
prepo"tioning in Kwait---which includes a $300 mfllion prepositioning
facility for a US merl-ranized brigade to be located south of
Kuwait CityNWWhjle the nurnbers are suspect, Kuwait has reported
that it spent $396 million on procurement outlays for arms in FY1994-

Milifnfy Spendirlg nlzd Arpns Imports 77
FY1995, and may sped only $3313 mitlian in FU1995-FUf996,107 As a
result, the totd funds awilable may not meet Kuwait's needs for new
equipment.
It is difficult to separate Kuwait's expendibres on arms from its purchases
of military equipment for allied countries during the paiod of
the Gulf War, but an ACDA estimate of the value of arms deliveries to
Kuwait in constant 1993 dollars is shown in Chart Thirteen. ACDA also
estimates that Kuwait took dc.ii\iery on $60 rnilljon worth of arms in cw rent dollars in 1979, $40 million in 1980, $120 million in 1981, $110 miL
lion in 1982, $130 million in 1983, $650 million in 19f14, $370 million h
19635, $180 million in 1986, $200 million in 1987, $260 million in 1988,
$470 million in 1989, $280 million in 1990, $480 million in 1991, $1,000
million in 1992, $750 million in 1993, and $250 million in 1994. These
data, on deliveries do not reflect the full outyear cost of major Kuwaiti
orders during the late 19805, or the surge in Kuwaiti orders after the Gulf
Wr, because of the delay between orders and deliveries and because
Kuwait has structured its payment schedules to avoid massive orders h
a single year.l0g
ACtlA indicates that Kuwait has shifted the some of its arms imports
as a result of the Gulf War. Kuwait took delivery on $3 ,345 million worth
of arms (in current doitars) during 1985-1989-the period before the Guff
War, Only $150 milllon worth came from the US, with $180 million worth
coming frcrm Russia, N50 rnjllion coming kom France, $110 milliorl coming
from the UK, $5 million from Eastern Europe, $20 milIim from other
European countries, and $430 million from other Middle Eastern countries
like Eapt.'@
h contrast, most of Kuwait" ddeveries shce the Gulf War have come
from the US. ACDA indicates that Kuwait took delivery on $2,040 million
worth of arms trmsfers between 1992-194. A. total of $1,800 million
came from the US, $100 million hom Frmce, and $140 million from other
states,""" Kuwait's arms defiveries during 1992-19% had a simftar pattern.
mey had a total wortrh of $2.040 billion. Kuwait received $1.8 billion
worth of arms horn the US, $100 million from France, $30 million horn
other Middle Eastern countries, $80 million from East Europem countires,
md $30 millio~~ from other states.111
&cent reporting by Rjchard f;, Grimmett of the Congressional
Research Service is summarized in Chart Fifteen. This chart indicates
that Kwait signed a total olfi5.7 billion worth of new arms agreements
during 1991-3994, versus a total of $3.8 bifriim during 1987-1990-a
similar period before the Gulf t2iar. Kwait placed nearly $3.4 bftlion of
these orders in 1993 alone. As a result, Kuwait ranked third in world
arms qreements during 1990-1993, although it did not number amoq
the top ten nations in 1986-1989.1'"

US Russia PRC Major Other AIL Tr,tal
Western Europe Others
Europe
CHART FIFTEEN Kuwaiti Arms Sales Agreements by Supplier Country:
1987-1994 ($Current Milliom), Sc7urc:e: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from
work by Richard F. Grimmrttt in Cc~fzzjentional Arms Transfers to Det~elllpiitzg
Nations, 1987-1994, Congressional Research Service 95-862f;, August 4,1994,
pp. 5657.

Milifnfy Spendirlg nlzd Arpns Imports
Kuwait's Recent Major Ams Purchases
Table :Nine provides a list of Kuwait's =cent major ams purchases. 'This
list shows that Kuwait" purchases are more focused on its military needs
than those of many Gulf countries, but it reflects the problems that arc
typical of all Southern Gulf states, Kuwait buys from too many countries
md buys too many specialized items of military equipment that are not
iully standardized, and interoperable withh its own forces.
The lack of substantive progress in ccrordinathg and standarclizing t-he
forces of the Gulf Cooperatinn Coutlcil mans that there is no overall sfandardization
of Kuwait" forces and those of other Gulf states-although
there is lhited stmdardization with the forces of Saudi Arabia-the only
state with land md air forces large and effective enovlgh to make a major
difference in the event of a large-scale Iraqi or Iranian attack. Similariy, the
lack of overaH pmgress in the coordinatim of Gulf lorces means that
Kuwait's purclnases are not part of any major missiorn systern, whether air
defense, mine warfa=, maritime surveillance or air attack, This lack of
true systems integration and stmddizatim forces Kuwait into major
disecanomies of scale, as it does all of the Southern Gulf states.
As might be expected, there is also onlly partial standardization with
US land and air forces, which now seem likely to he the only major Western
power projection forces that will s~~pport Kuwaii: in a n?ajor contingcrncy
Further, the items listed provide strong signs that Kuwait is returning
tc:, the pattern of making political purchases from every important
trading parher and supplier state-a pattern that may be goad poli;tks
but further complicates Kuwait's problems with sustainaibiliv and hteroperatbiiity
Table Nine shocvs that the impa,ct of the National ksentbly has not
been particularly pductive in improving the quality of Kuwait" aarms
purchases. Kuwait's dawn-sizing of its militaq modernization increasingly
seems to be mom political than fuxnctionnl. Spandjng limits are only
being applied with limited ~ gard to Kuwait" mmtary needs, and the
~sultir7g prtiblems are befng compounded by a growktg tendency to buy
.from certain countries to try to obtak their diplomatic support.
Furher, Kuwait is coming under hcreashg p~ssurc from European,
Chinese, and other sellers tc:, buy for such rt?asms. For example, French
President Jacques Chirac intervened in a campetition between France's
Aemspatiale and British Aerospace Qnamics in Februaq 1996. The
competition was over the safe of the MM-35 versus t-he Sea Skua missile,
and Chirac argued that Kuwait had agreed to give all naval contracts to
France for a period of 10 years, This is precisely the kind of arms sale policies
that Gulf state shdd pursue, and it may ultimately cost Kuwait
far more in lives than it saves in Dhars-ll"

TABLE NINE Key Kuwaiti Equipment Developments
* 218 M-1A2 US-made Abrams tanks.
* Kuwait has given up plans to replace its Icjw quality Yugoslav M-% supplied
tanks with 100-150 more M-1A2s.
* Purchasing 254 British Warrior AIFVs ($918 millicm), but- it has given up plans to
standardize on the Warrior, and buy the 45&600 it once considei~d,
* Filling out its armored strength by buying 125 M-113 ALPCs, 40 BMP-2, and 20
BLWP-3s.
* Plans to procure up to 263 wheeled armored vehicles.
* Taking delivery on large numbers of TOW and HOT, and at least 200 Carl Custav
84 mm rocket launchers, El~aXuating purchase of the Milan 3.
* Has reduced plans Ecw major order of new self-propelled-artillery weapons,
but is considering purchase of 24 more 1155 mm artillery systems. It is studying
the purchase of US, South African, and Swiss systems. It is also studying upgrading
its M-109 155 mm self-propelled howitzers to the M-409Ab Paladin
impro>vement package or to use the VSEL AS0 155 mm turret. Kuwait is also
attempting to sell its Auf-1s and repface them with the Giak Caesar 52 155 mm
self-propeifed or 155 TIZ towed weapon, and is considering a GIAT offer to
modernize its AuF-3s.
* Ordered MLRS in 1989, but had to cancel the order because of cast. It has ordered
27 Russian BM 30 9A52-2 Srnerch multiple rocket launchers to equip
three multiple launcher batteries in a separate regiment, but Kuwait may not
implement the order. Reported to be considering the purchase of the Russian
SS-200 ground-to-ground missile, andior Sakr-36 and Fatih rocket bunchers
from Egypt. Considering the purchase of a UAV for artillery targeting and surveiltance
purposes.
* Ordered 18 Sh0rt.s Starburst manportable anti-aircraft missile Eire units and 300
missiles and emsidering additional purchases of Starburst or Mistral Atlas. Also
considering the purchase of four batteries of ADATS, 13oland-3 with VT-1 missiles,
Alenia Aramaisf or AdSAMS-bvhich fires the Aim-l20 AM
* 8 Combat tantr?-.I 225-ton missile p atrol boats.
* 5 Sc~uth Korean Seagull cXass patrol boats.
* Studying orders of 4-45 8&95 meter offshore missile vessels displacing 1,500 to
2,000 tons.
* Other purchase plans include amphibious landing ships, naval helicopters with
anti-ship missiles, and a wide range of new weapons systems and sensors.
* 32 US F/A-18C and 8 F/A-18D fighters, AIM-8 Sidewinder air-to-air missileg
AIM-7x1' Sparrows, AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and Maverick AGM-
65G anti-shipianti-hard point missiles.
* Discussing longer term plans to order up to 35 more fighters, and may make an
initial buy of 12 FI A-1 8CID aircraft. Seeking to buy the AMRAAM and considering
a possible buy of the Mirage 2000-5 multi-role fighteu: Seeking to fund
such purchases by seXIing its remaining Skyhaw-h and Mirage F-1CTKs.

Milifnfy Spendirlg nlzd Arpns Imports 8 1
TABLE NINE fmnfz'r-zued)
* $"Eddying possible purchase of airborne alert aircraft and/or maritime patrol air-
craft. It may purchase the E-2C.
* VVould like to buy Hawk 100 trainers, or at least upgrade its Mark 64s,
* Considering the purchase of six more transpol"c*prc~bably 6-1 30s ancl/or Shorts
Sherpas,
* Originally examined the purchase of 16-20 AH-64A Apache attack helicopters.
Decided an 16 Blackhatvk UH-6OL helicopters with 500 HeUfire anti-armor mis-
siles, 38 Hellfire launchers, 11,500 Hydra rockets, 200 mm gun pods, and night
uisicln devices. Considering a foltc3w-on purchase af the AH-64A or aclditiclnal
UH-GOLs in the mid-term. ft is also cansidering the purchase of AS-532 Cougar,
Black Hawk, and IAR IAR-530 transport helicopters.
* Kuwait signed a cantract with Hu&es in Becembeu; 1992 to create a n w Xand-
based early warning system, refurbish an air operations center, and construct a
new radar site. The first phase of the new system-the Radar Preliminary Early
Warning System (RPEWS)-becam operational in 1994. The system is shelter
mounted, and integrates two af Kuwait" main search radars: A new ANIFPS
2 17 L-Band radar with a radome antema and an existing French TSR-2100 Tiger
S-Band radar at Kuwait City. Work is also undeiway to integrate an airborne L-
88 L-Band radar, mounted in an aerostat, into the system. Kuwait ordered a long-
range Thomsc)n-CSF TRS 22XX SBand radar.
* 5 batteries of Patriot surface-to-air missiles, with 210 MIM-104 PAC-2 GEMS
(Guidance Enhancement Missiies). Kuwait has considered buying six new bat-
teries of X-Hawk Phase ill fire unih and 342 MIM-23B Hawk missiles as well, but
delayed this decision pending a study of possible reconstruction of the equip-
ment for four I-Hawk batteries tvt-rich Iraq returned after the war. According to
some reports, it is considering an order for Russian SA-10 or SA-12 (S-300P14)
missiles.
Kuwait's Ams Purchases from the US
Kuwait's imports frm the U'S rose from $2.2 billion in 19861989 to $3.8
bitlion in 1390-3993, and did not rank among the top 10 in signing new
arms agreements in 1994. C;rimmettfs data, which are rounded to the
nearest $100 million, indicate Kuwait b0ugh.e $3-9 biilion of: the $5.7 bil-
lion total from the US, $600 million horn Russia, and $1,200 million
horn major Wst Europem nations, fnclueiing Britain, France, Germany,
and Italy114
Kuwait" arms deliveries during 1991-199.14 had a total worZh of $2.5
billion-reflecting the lag between new orders and lieliweries. Et received
$21 bilIior? worth of arms horn the US, $21)(3 million from n?ajor Western
European countries, $100 million from other Eurupean countries, and
$100 million from other states~l~~

The recent trends in Kuwaiti military hnports from the US are summarized
in Table Ten.. Reporthg by the US Uefe~~se Secwity Assistance
Agency reflects the fact that Kuwait siwed major orders for US F/A-18
air~aft before the Gulf War, and major new FXAS safes agreemats followi,ng
its Ljberatim der the Guif War. Kuwait ordered $2.9 b2l.j.m wrth
of arms in fiscal year 1993, although orders dropped, to more norm1 levels
in FY1994,
The rate of US deliveries to Kuwait, shows far less af a rise because of
the slow delivery of the F/A-18, and the fact that the mavl surge h
Kwiiiti orders followhg the Gulf Miar did not take place until E'U1993.
All US sales to Kuwait are cash trmsacltians. Kuwait does nat make use
of the International Mifitar). Education and Training (IMET) program,
and has received no recmt Wlitary Assistance Program (MAP) aid.116

TABLE TEN US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Commercial Arms Export Agreements, Military Assistance Programs (MAP), and
International Military Education and Training (IMET) Programs with Kuwait: FY1985-1994 ($Current Millions)
Foreign Military
Financing Program
Payment Waived - - - - - - - - - -
DoD Direct - - - - - - - - - -
DoD Guarantee - - - - - - - - - -
FMS Agreements 99.9 140.5 56.6 1,915.4 91.0 55.2 156.8 470.5 2,871.6 182.8
Commercial Sales 3.9 8.8 3.9 2.9 1.5 3.5 2.3 7.4 1.7 0.1
FMS Construction
Agreements - - - 4.2 - - 123.4 15.8 6.5 -
FMS Deliveries 33.7 67.3 58.4 41.0 46.4 51.5 75.9 815.0 829.6 225.5
MAP Program - - - - - - - - - -
MAP Deliveries - - - - - - - - - -
MAP Excess Defense
Articles Program - - - - - - - - - -
MAP Excess Defense
Articles Deliveries - - - - - - - - - -
IMET Program/
Deliveries - - - - - - - - - -
Source: Adapted from US Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military
Assistance Facts as of September 30,1994," Department of Defense, Washington, 1995.

Kuwait's Military Forces
Before the Gulf War
Kuwait faces unique challenges in utilizing these arms orders and
rebtritding its ditary forces. The Gulf War destroyed much of
hwait's ntilitary capa,l?ility in August, 1990, and has forced Kuwit to
try to recr~ate many of its previous rrrilitary capabilities while it is
simultaneously being forced to add new forces and capabilities to deal
with the threat from Iran and Iraq. Som of the prohlems Kuwait has
encountesed in meeting these challenges are the inevitable result of a
small nation qing to deal with major threats in the milist cJf post-war
rclconstruction. Other problems Kuwait encountered long before the
GuXf War, Thus it is necessary to understand the pre-war strengths and
weaknesses of Kuwait" forces in order to understand currmt militv
developments in Kuwait.
Kuwait" military forces had a paper strength of around 20,000 men at
the time Iraq invaded. This manpower included. large numbers of
Redouins who wcre not full dtizens. Kuwait was hcavily depende~~t on
hreign persome1 for its technic& support, service and logistic support,
maintenance, md training. These support personnel inclutled Jodanians,
Pakistrxnis, and Egyptians, some of .cvhorn were of mediocre. quality.
There were US, British, md Fmch military and contractor missions lfor
virkally atl of Kuwait's more aei\ianced and \Nestem-supplied mftitary
equipment. Hokvever, these teams only provided techical support and
often experienced problems with Kuwait's bureaucmcy
Kuwait did have a number of well trained officers, some of whom
attended Smdlaurst. Other Officers, and some NCQs and techicians,
had trained in the US, Pakistan, and Jordan, The ofiicer corps and NCOs
were relatively loyal and werl, recruited from the ruiing family and loyal
tribes. Unfortunately recruitment and promotion were often domhated
by favoritism, rather than performance. Kuwait also had severe difficulty
~cruiting its citizens into the mftitary, Its populatim before the Iraqi
hvasion was only about 2.2 million, and less thm 30% of this was native

Kwaiti. Only about 19,50(3 males =ached military age in 1990, and the
total male work force from ages 15 to 49-hcl~~ding expatriates-totaled
only about 4&080,H7
mile Kuwait tried to get its citizens to join the armed forces by offer-
ing good pay and privileges, .few volunteered in a country that oMered so
many more rewarding alternatives. In thory, Kuwait had a draft rclquir-
ing two years of service, except for uni\lersity students--who only had to
serve one year. mere hvere so mmy exempli.ons, however, t-hat the draft
existed largely on pay-er. As a result, most of the ""Kuwaitis" h the mili-
tary forces in 3990 were from tribal gmupe; that were not really citizms.
These Bedouin were raised as tribal levies and had no reason to be loyal
to the Kuwaiti, government. They were poorly treated and paid, and often
deserted.
The Kuwaiti Amy Beforg the Gulf War
Men the Gulf W;;rr began, Kuwait's total army manpower was less thm
16,000 men. While Kuwai.t% oorder of battte had tvvo armored brigades,
one mechanized brigade, and an artillery brigade with a self-propelkd
artilf ery reginne~~t and one surf ace-to-surface missile battalion, the reality
was littk moTe than a hollow shell, Its total arrny manpower was equivalent
to only two Western brigades, and all of its units were serioudy
undermmned.
Kuwait had hmited ability to employ its strength of 275 main battle
tanEcs (of Lvhich 165 were first-line Chieftains, 70 wem low quality Vickers
Mark Is, and 4C1 were obsolete Centurions), effectively in anything
other thm a set-piece defense. Even its Chieftain tanks werc undelrpowered
and etiperienced continuous c~verheating and maintenance
problcms.lm Kuwait had ordered the Yugoslav M-84, a variant of rchc
early Soviet T-72' as a replacement tank, but these werc not in service,
The M-84 has a fire control system superior to any '1-72s found in Iraq's
arse11aI and has a much more powerful engine. With the addition of better
ammunition, the M-84 woulcjl prove to be far more capable thn
many T-72s.
Kuwait had mare capability to use its lighter arlBor, but only in setpiece
defensive maneavers, This armm included 50 BMP-2 and. 100 AT-
105 Saxon and Saladin armcrmd fighti~~g vehicles, 100 Saracen a d 200
M-113 APCs, and "3 Ferret armared cars. It had British Scrorpicrns and
Soviet BNP-2 armored fighting vehicles on ord.er.ng Kuwait had bought
a wide range of anti-tank weapons, including the AT-4, BCM-73A
Improved TOW, X-ZOrl: M-47 Dragon, and Vigilant, and had 56 M-901
ITV armored TOW carriers. Kuwait also had 4,000 Improved TOW missiles
on order. Although this was a good mix of anti-tank weapons, the

army only provided uncertain trair~ing and support effort for its antiarmor
crews.
The artillery strength of the Kuwait Army included 36 M-109A2 selfpropelled
and 40 AMX Altark F-3 towed 155 rnrn howitzers, and approximately
16 old. M-101 towed 205 mm howitzers" However, the army had
no combat training in ushg such artillery beyond set-piece and firingrmge
exacises. Kuwait's surface-to-surface missile battalion had 12
FRK-7 launchers, but these had little more than symb~lic importmce.
Kuwait was gradually developing improved army land-based air
dtrfenses, although it had too many different types of weapons and was
poorly trained in operating them. Kuwait: had Soviet suppiied SA-%,
SA-6s, and ZSU 23-45, and two batteries of SA-8s. The US had refused
to sell it the Stinger missile systems, but Kuwait had mow %-?S, Egyptian
Sakr Eyes, and gun-missile defense systems on order. There were
reports of additimal orders for M-6s and SA-8s, and that :Kuwait had
orde~d Crotaie clr Sra Wlf light surface-to-air missile systems, but
Britain was then reluctant to sell Kuwait a key syste~~ in service in the
British navy because of the fear of loss of the details of the technology
to the USSR. l2O
The Kuwaiti army had a massive $100 million military complex about
hnienty miles from Kuwait City. These hcilities, however, owed more to
political convenience than strategy, and an effort to maintain high living
standards ract.ler than military dkctiveness. 'They were vurrerable to air
attack, and over-centralized both the deployment of Kuwait" fmes and
their support functicms in f'ixed locatims. Kuwait's army had poor over-
all trainhg, litre coordhation or effcsctive command above the brigade
level, and a main.tenance and logistic system where paper work often
took priority over military effectiveness. Fur&er, Kwait lacked tbe abil-
ity to deploy and susfain its brces in the field without foreign civilian
support, Kuwait had cmcluded an agreement with Turkey to provide
mow advanced training, but this effort came too late to affect its military
proficiency. l2%
The Kuwaiti Navy Before the Gulf War
Kuwaiwas just beginning to create a real navy when Iraq invaded, It had
fnrmed an 2,100 man naval force to =place its coast guarcl, but this force
was completely dependent on fo~ign contractors for training, nnainte-
nmce, logistics, and often actual operations, It was based at IZas al-
Qulayah and Shwiiikh, and had recmtly acquired $29 million worth of
new naval facilities, There we= major civil ship =pair facifities t?l. Kuwait
City's ShuwaiWn harbor, including a 19C) mekr floating dock with a
35,000 DWT repair capability.122

The core oE the Kuwait navy ccmsisted of eight Lurssen guided missile
patrol boats. Two of these boats were FPB-57s, and six were TMC-45s.
They were each equipped with 76 mm OTO Melara guns, twh 40 mm
gm% and four Exocet MIW-40 missile launchers. It should be noted that
these patrol boats had sme important limitations common to virtudly
all GCC naval vessels. They lacked air defense capa:bility, and while their
voice communications were good, they could not be integrated into a
data link exchange network. C~wing them also re~i~ct nearfy 60% of
Kuwait" native naval m
Kuwait received five 55meter South Korean missile patrol boats
begi"ning in August, 1,987, MIhich were based on Kuwait's offshorc
islands. The ships each had anti-ship missiles, helicopter pads, and. a
Hovercraft docking facitity. The ships were not fully combat ready, but
they did increase I(uwai.l's shalfow water defense capability. I(uwa,it
also had 47 small patrol craft, 4 modern British Ckeverton LCTs, 3
LClls, 3 LSUs, 4 tugs, 6 launches and some light coastd vessels and
suppmt craft. T7e KLfwaiti air force provided additional support in
the form of Super Purna helicopters equ.ipped with the Exocet missile
system.
Finally Kuwait had six SW-Q Hovercraft, Exocet-capablc SA 3QW
Diauphin XI helicopters, 20 Magnum Sedm patrol boats, two Italian 18.4
meter patrol boats, tw 20-meter Italian patrol boats, and more South
Korean patrol boats on order. It was negotiathg with the Netherlands to
buy two Afhaar-class mine hunters, and the htch Parliament had
approved the loan of two such vessels untit new production became
available.
Mile this naval strength was reasmable for a small navy, it dso
required a manpower base of 5,000-8,O(SO men in uniform, or 3 to 4 tilnes
the manpowr Kuwaii: actuatly possessed. Kuwait got arod some of
these requirements by being heavily dependent on foreign tecwcians,
but overall readiness was poor.
The Kuwaiti Air Force Before the Gulf War
Kuwait's 2,200 man air force was slowly improving its effectiveness
The air force had roughly 70 combat aircraft and 18 armed helicopters.
It had goad basillg facilities at Kuwait Internathad Airport, A bed Al
Jaber Air Base, and Ali .AL Salem Air Base. Housing and other facilities
were good.
Its combat strclll-rgth included 30 AA4KU/"T"A-4KU attack fighters,
some of which were being placed into storage to await the delivery of
new F-18 multi-role fighters which Kuwait had ordered from the US."""
The A-4s were adequate attack aircraft, but etid not have air cornbat

adars. They could only be used in dogfights where ground-based
radars or Kuwait's Mirage F-l,s guided them to a target. This made
them hopelessly inferior to Iraq" mmndern fighters h air-to-air connbat
capabitity
me air force had 212 necv Mirage F-1&K/CK fiaters and IZ Mark 64
Hawk COJPJ/trauler aircrafi. Kuwait's air weapms inventory includcd
AIM-9 Sidewinders, Matra Super R-5311, and R-S50 Magique air-to-air
missiles-wi& AS-I1 and AS12 air-to-surface missiles, and 12 AM-39 airto-ship
missiles on ordcr. Kuwait had also ordercd the French SA-365N
maritime attack system.
The Mirage F-l aircraft proved hard to maintain, however, and
Kuwait lost several of these aircraft in accidents, The radar of the
Mirage F-Is had liability prclblems and its 55 kilometer air intercept
range proved too short to meet Kuwait's operational needs, As a result,
Kuwait was forced to use its A-$ attack aircraft in a connbat air patrol
role when it needed to create an air defense screen. Further, Kuwait was
so short ol air force personnel that it contracted for Pakistani, service
and support crews.~~~
Kuwaiti training was adequate fnr interdictim and close air support
missions agaiinst targets that lacked good ground-based air defe~wes, but
was not suited for attacks on Iraqi forces. Kuwaiti pilots also had relatively
limited air-to-air combat training, and were severely hampered by
m hadequate air commmd and cmtrol system, and air warnlng and
surveillance coverage. Little effort was made to develop a force that could
maintain a high alert stms or work with the arn?y in effective combined
operations. 'The Mirage F-IS did, however, maintah a lhited alert status
during the ban-Iraq War.
These problems help explain why Kwait ordered 40 US F/A-18
fighters in July 1985, at a cost of $1.9 billion. 'The sale also included
I20 AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, 200 AIM-4 Sparrows, 40
AGM-@ Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and 300 Maverick &M-h5G
anti-shiplanti-hard point missiles. US approval of this sale, however,
only came after a bitter fight between the Reagan Administration and
Congress. In order for the Administration to win approval of the sale,
hwait had to give up its effort to order 200 IR Maverick AGM..Q5U
anti-tank missiles, Kuwait also had to agree to base the F/A-18s only
in Kuwait, not to acyuire a refueling capabilityf and to exchange one
A-4KU for every F/A-l8 delivered to Kuwait.
This compromise left Kuwait with limited levels of muni."tions stocks
fnr its new aircraft, and without an adwanced anti-tank weapoll for the
F/h-18. Furthet; the FlA-18s were not scheduled to begin delivery until
Januaryf 1992, and Kuwait was not scheduXed to receive its active
strength of 28 fighters and eight fitghter trbers until June, 19Sf and its

~maining four attrition aixraft until after 1994. This drawn out delivey
schedule meant increased tuhwlence and transition probkm. At the
same time, the F-18 sale promised to give Kuwait an advanced air
defenselair attack fighter, and alJvanced munitions and support facilities
which were standardized with those used by the US Navy and US
Marines and which could significantly ixnprove US over-the-horizon
~inf orcemclmt capability ""6
The Kuwait air force had nine trmsport aircraft, hcl~~ding one B-707-
200, six C-130-30s, and tvvo DC-9s.n7 The Air Force operated 46 heiicopters.
'f'hese inctueted 23-30 SA-32K Gazelle attack he%icclpters, 23 of
which we= equipped with HOT. They also hcluded 5-43 AS-332 Super
Pumas eyuipped with Emcet, and 10-3.2 SA-330 Pumas. It had 6 AS-332t:
Super Pumas on order. The helicopter crews had moderate training and
good f oreig~~ maintenmce support.
Kuwait had a French designed, semi-automated air defense, control,
and wmlirrg system, but it had only lidted low altitude coverage of
Iraq Irm md the Gulf. It also had lintited electrorlic warfare capabil.ityp
and readiness and uperational reliability, and Kuwait does not seem to
have been able to take &antage of some of the computerized katures of
the system because of softwart! and traini,ng problems.. The kwaiti Air
Force did benefit from data exchmges with the E-3As flying in Saudi Arabia,
but the quality of he data Ihks was uncertain. This system did not
allokv eitha Kuwaiti f ghters or its surfaceto-air misdes to react quicHy
and effectively enough to deal with 1ri-tni.m or Iraqi intmders in Kuwait's
air space.
In August. 7,990, Kukvait's Air Force had five batteries of lmprovecf
Hawk surface-to-air missiles with 24 twin launcher fire units, 12 SA-8
surface-to-air missile launcher units, and an unhown number of SA-7
and SA-34 mm portable surfaceto-air missiles. It also had 20 rnsn and 35
mm anti-aircraft guns, and may have had two Shahine batteries on orcier.
Kwait had serious prcihlems in absorbing its more sophisticated srtrfaceta-air
missiles. 'This became clear in 7,987, when efforts were made to resite
the missiles to deknd against attacks by 1ran"s Silkworm missiles. It
is mclear how many IHwk units were really combat-~ady hen Iraq
invaded. The US refusal to sell Ktlcvait Stinger missiles in Jme, 7,984, Icd
Kuwait to delay the purcbase of Hawk systems and buy some $327 mill
lion worth of light Soviet arms for its Army-none of which could be netted
into an effective air defense system.
Kuwaiti Paramilitav Forces Before the Gulf War
Finally, Kuwait had separate National Guards, Palace Guards, and Bor-
der Guards, Mthich were equipped with a total of 20 V-150 and 62 V-301)

Commado armo~d
personnel carriers. The Natic,d Guards were
intended for civil control asld had little xnilitary capability, The Min-
istry of the Interior ran special political and anti-terrorist police forces,
and was rc-rsponsibte for fnternal intelligence and security These secu-
rity and intel,l.igcnce forces had a poor reputation befnrs Iraq's inva-
sion, and their actions after Kuwait" liberation indicate that this repu-
taGi(zn was justified.

Rebuilding Kuwait's Forces
Following the Gulf War
Kuwait did not wait for its liberation to begin rebuilding its mmilitary
fnrces. It began to rebuild its air force and amy during Desert Shield, and
Kuwajti lmd and air u17jts played a significmt role in Desert Storm and
Kuwait" liberation. The GuIf War has, however, forced Kuwait to accept
the fact that it cannot tlbtaln security through political or financial means,
that the GCC carnot provide it wi& security against major regional powers
like Iran and fraq, md that it is dependent on outside powersmainly
the Usfor its security:
The Gul War has also forced r(u,wait to dr&icaliy re&kk its defense
phs md force structure, and to mcogniz,e a n er of major challenges
&at will Shape its fuktre strategic positicm. Cln the one hand, it has become
bmtaliy clear that hait must develop cornbat effective forces to deter
Iraq and km, to demmstratc? that it cm maintain its sovertligty, and to
show the US and its neighbsrs in the Southem Gulf that it can be a true
parmer in meeth~g external &wats. There is no way that Kucvait can return
to its pre-war palicy of relying on a combination of dlplimatic maneuverkg,
"aid'" to potcmtial thrtrats, and a limit4 detcrrmt force far its security
On the other hand, it is equally clear that Kuwait faces the followin&
m;pjor strategic problem in developing the military forces it needs for the
future:
* There is no way to overcome the geographic fact that Kuwait has no
strategic depth and will =main highly vuinerable to Iraq and Eran as
long as these nations have major military forces.
* It no longer is seeking force levels of 40,000 men, However, its present
goal of creating a roughly 30,000 man force witl not allow it to
defe~~d against an Iraqi or Tranim attack, and my be too large to be
practical. Further, its refusal, to offer full citizenship to the chadwn
of immfgmts, or Ridtlon, regadess of background and loyaity,
depsives it of a critical source of manpokver,

* It has acted m the conviction that its military forces must be purged
of any elements that m not fully loyal to Kuwait, leading Kuwait,
rightly or wrongly, to rcject about half oi its pre-invasion manpower.
* There is no near-term possibility that Saudi hraZnia and the other
GCC states could probride the lmd and air strengt.h. necessary to halt
an Iraqi attack before it seizes Kuwa-it, or provide the kind of air and
missile defense screen necessary to defend Kuwait against Iran,
* Egypt and Syria, are unlikely to provide m adequate &ab military
force under financial and political conditions that Kuwait finds
acceptable, and may be unable to project effective military power
this far from their home bases.
* The t"S cannot project armored and mechanized forces large enollgh
to defeat m Iraqi attack without either a mnth of strategic warning,
or a combination of prepositioned equipment, forward deployed
forces, and constmt training. At the same the, the effective use of
US air power rc.quirc.s access to both Saudi and Kuwaiti bases,
preposi.tioned mmikions, and a fully &em, and interoperable
combination of sheltered air bases, surface-to-air defenses, and C41
systems.
Since 1992, Kuwait has pursued a combination of restmcturing and
expmdb~g KuMiaiti forces, encouraging US pregosltionfng, stronger military
ties to Saudi Arabia, and discussions with other Arab states, It has
had some important successes in implementing this policy and in
~buftding its militay forces, but it still faces major challenges.
The Problem of Kuwaiti Military Mangoww
The most serious challenge Kuwait faces h rebuilding its military capabilities
is manpowes. Chart Sixtetrn shws the trends in Kuwaiti military
manpower, It is clear that Kwait has dways had a limited manpower
p d
to draw upon. Kukvajt. now has a tot4 of about 102,000 males
between the ages of 13 and li",78,400 beheen the ages of 18 and. 22, and
340,800 between the ages of 23 and 32. Kuwait: talks about a conscription
system, but this awmts mOre to short term vdmteers rather than real
conscripts. Half of its manpower is still. volunteer.""::
Fur&er, Kuwait: made its problems worse Zly faiIing to recruit most of
the members of the resistmce into its armed forces after the liberatio~~. It
has not attempted to enlist most of its Sky ite citizens, and has purged its
army of many of the 10,000 Bedouins, who were not full Kuwaiti cithens
ven though some fought against the Iraqis or in the resis-
tance. As a result, f(uwait% rremavljng pool of males of military age is
only about 160,WO men."""

I
Total Active
Army
Air Force
U Navy
CHART SIXTEEN Kuwait: Military Manning-1979-1996. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from various editions of
the IISS, Milifa y Balance, the JCSS, Milifa y Balance in the Middle East, and material provided by US experts.

In early 1996, Kwait had a total force of only 16,6011 actives, including
1,600 foreign personnel, 1,0011 men in the central staff asld 600 Emi,ri
Guards. It claimed to have some 23,700 reserves, with one month of
annuat training, but d y a small portion of this total semed to be
organized into reserve forces. Much of this manpower was composed
of fuil citizens. Haweves, there were large nmbers of Bangladeshi,
and Kwait had to bring back some cJf the Bedouin whom it had fired
from the armed forces to make up roughly one-third of this total- There
is no sign of a draft.130
There were =ports during 3993-199.2 that Kuwait faced serious morale
and leadership problems among its officers. According to Chese reports,
som officers believe their senior commanders wese often promoted
purdy for family and political reasons and deserted in the face cJf the
enemy wkn Iraq at;lacked. Some feel t%tc royal farnity ig~nored those who
iought in the resistance, and has allowed post-war contracts to be
warded on the basis of favoritisrn and cormption. They also question
the govanme"t'weforts to st.udy what wnt wmlng and learn Irom the
lessons of the was,
Things have improved, however, since the period hnmediately after
the liberation. In April, 19%, a group of senior officers sent the Emir a letter
calling for the investigation and. dismissal of Deiense Mhster Sheik
NaMlaf al-&mad al Sabah fnr failing to mcrbilize, for pulling forces back
.from the border shortly before-. the invasi.on, fnr ordering the Kuwaiti
tanks h the border area not to fire on the advancing Iraqi troops, and for
fleeing the country without gi"ing orclers to Kuwait's forces once the war
had begun. They also caXled for the in\restigation of Interior Minister
Sheik Salem Sabah al-Salem for taking no actjon to provide suitable
warning and internal security measures. The Emir dealt with this sihtation
by m'Aing Nawaf Mhister of Social Affairs and Labor, but he also
made ali-Salem the new Misrister of Defense,"l
In January 3992, the government faced serious protests by junior and
mid-grade officers. 'They demanded the resilr;natio~n of up to 100 military
officers and defense personnel, including 20 generals and a nunnber of
members of the royal fiiimily, Some 14 officers were retired, but this was
not szxfficicnt for miiitary or public opinjon. While the ncw Minister of
Defense, Sheik Ati Salcm Sabah al-Salem was able to improve his relations
with some of the military, he was rotated out of his po&tion in 3994
because of his conflict with the National Assembly over the size and control
of arms purchases. The royal family was also forced to replace
Kwaitfs chief of staff, Ma~or Genera1 Jabir al-a~alid AT SabA with Major
General Ali al-Mu'mh in the summer of 1999. General A1 Sab& had been
chief of staff during the Iraqi invasion, and had also been blamed for
Kwaitfs unprepart?cfnes~.l~~

Rebzrildilg Forces FoIEBwE'I~~ iilze Czrv War 95
US military oEficers who haw participated in joint p
exercises with Kuwait believe that the Kuwaiti fosrces now have much
stronger leadership, that the morale of Kuwaiti forces bas steadily
hproved since early 1994, and that the moraic. of the Kuwait offictir corps
is now relatively high. They believe the joint Kuwaiti-US response to Iraq's
movements in 1994 md 1995 has dme much to convince the Kuwaiti mditary
that they can serve a vital role in defending :Kuwait in the firbre.
The quality of- KLtwaitfs mnpower intake into enEsted ranks has also
improved since the Iraqi buil.d up m Kuwait" bbarer. Kuwait is tahg
in about 1,500 men per year, with 7Sf) votmteers and 750 coming from the
nati.onal service progrant. Kuwait is getting more volLtnteers of: a higher
quality but 1,500 men a year is not enough to meet its force goals.
Kwiiit" six of "drafteesrf and volunteers prltscmts prohlas, hwwer,
because so many citizens m rich and therefore hard to rccruit. Further,
the armed services cannut reject low qualiv volunteers and draftees
becaux of objections by the National Assembfy.
Kuwait no longer uses large numbers of Palestinians and Jordmians to
staff the Ministry of Defense's technical and support function, including
sow aspects of contracting and procurrmmt, because of the Gulf War.
However, Kuwait" military manpower is so law that many services still
have to be contracted to civilians, including many Asians. Kuwait
rc-.mai~~s heavity dependent on foreign personnel for its technical, service
and logistic support, and maintenance and training, and US, British, md
French military and, contmctor support missions. This lisnib Kuwa-iti sustainment
and reciepioyment capability in war the.133
The Challenge of: Re-equipping Kuwaiti Forces
Kuwajt faces problems in re-equipping its forces that arc almost: as seri-
ous as its manpwer problems. It must make uy fnr its wastime losses,
increase its holdings of major equipment, and seek to obtain supmior
technoloa as a partial compensation for Iraqi or Iranian mifitary superi-
ority It faces major uncerta.intries as to how much of the equipment Iraq
seized and then returned can ever be used again, and it almost certainly
will not be able to atlord its initial weaporls procurennent. plans. At the
same tirne, it must: (a) seek to make its equipment hteroperable with that
of U5 md Saudi forces-its major sources of reinforcement, (b) deal with
the political problem of atlocating arms sates in ways that encottrage
external support from. other powers like Britain, France, and Russia, and
(cf seek to improve interoperahifity a d standardization with its other
GCC allies at a time when they show little real hterest- in these issues"J34
Iraq stole some 9,000 major items of military equipment from Kuwait
during the invasion. Kuwait has only had mfxed success in covering

this equipment-although it sometimes has had mow success than it ini-
tiatly expected."s In early 1992, fihcik Ali Sabah hl Sab&-then Minider
of Defense-stated that Iraq would not give back the eyuipment, and
that, in any case, Kuwait could not use epipment the Iraqis had dam-
aged or worn out in cornbat-. He accused Jordan of hvol-king with Iraq to
ensure that Iraq can use the ZtIawks that it took from Kuwait, and indi-
cated that Kwait would reequip its forces on the basis cJf British,
Kuwajtif and U'S studies of Kuwaiti secmriv needs.136
Shortly theseafter, the currcnt Kuwaiti Dcputy Chief of Staff, Brigadier
General faber Ai Sabah, stated that Iraq had agreed to rr-?turn all capktred
equipmt.111 by the summer of 1992, and that this would include 6&83
Chieftaisr and 67 Vickers MBT-1 tanks, mmy Soviet BMP-2 armored
Qhting vehicles, 23 ikf-109M 155 howitzers, 12 120 mm mortars,
hmdreds of trucks, II aircraft, four heljcopters, and a number of small
craft and patrol boats.137
General AL. Sabah also indicated that
Iraq was actively testing its captured IHawks;
Some of the A4s Iraq had capbred had been so damaged that they
had to be flown back to Kuwait in slings;
* Six Mirage F-1s had been declased missing or destroyed,
* Four Hawk traiz~ers were rebn~ed in bad condition;
* Areturned C-I30 had bee11 seriously damged, and
* The patrczl: boats Iraq rctumed to Kuwait had, been damaged so
seve~ly that they had to be returned by lmd.138
Many of the tanks Iraq returned came back without their fire control
systems. The howitzers needed a major rebuffd, and the aircraft and helicoptern
wwere rnissing some of their navigation equipment Fwthet; in
early 1995, Kuwait indicated that it still bad not receked 15 Kuwaiti
FROG rockets, 225 Soviet-made armored personnel carriers, 55 M-YOI
armored persomel. carriers, 4,QaO TOW anti-tank guided missiles, three
portable anti-aircrafi system$ md. thousands of trucks. Since these are all
items that are of value to Iraq in ~huftding its forces, it seems douhtful
that Kuwait will now see their return.139
In short, Kuwait has been cmfi.ontt.d with having to either equip its
fnrces from the ground up, or rttty heavily on worn and darnat;ed equipment
which does not give it a techical edge over Iran and Iraq. It also
faces the problem that some of its key potential, suppliers are also interested
in fuhre sales to Iraq-a factor that already has led Kuwait tc:, begin
putting pressure on Russia and France to choose betwell the Ktlcvaiti
and Iraqi markets.140

Kuwait's Land Forces
Since the Gulf War
Kuwaitf"sarmy mnpower totaled aholxt 10,000 regulars in mid 1996.MI
I'he Army was organized into two active mechanized brigades, two
active arrnored brigades, one Emiri Guards Brigade, one reserve brigade,
one active artillery brigade, and one engineer brigade, It also had a 1,000
man commando battalion, These Kuwaiti ""brigades," "however, only had
about 1,000-1,500 mn, and one armored brigade W= still equipped
largely with "H~mvees" and was not scheduled to receke its full armor
until 1997. 'f'he total manning of the Kuwait Army was quivalent to
about one Western brjgade slire.l" The trends in Kuwaiti &my mannifig
are shown in Chart Sixteen.
Kwaiti has set a goal of crea~g four acti\re, full brigades, but a n
not possjble, These expe&s beliwe that E*;uwil. can
crd and w).l equipped. amared. brigades, md two
ing with a rapidly mi,bilhabk
reserve. T%ey also asert &at ssu& a force would be large e11ough to help
deter my sudden Iraqi incursions and to delay Iraqi fmes h g mu& for
US air md lmd power to begin to bcl effective in halting a miljor Iraqi attack.
Kuwaiti Amy Modernization and Expansion
The trends h Kuwaiti Army equipment are shown h Charts Seventeerz
and Eighteen. These charts show the slow rate of build-up before th Gulf
War, the devastata impact of tbr Gulf %r, md tbr Army's post-war
recovery Kuwait has, however, had to make major cuts in the army re-
equipment plans it developed, immediately after the Gulf Was. Kuwait
initially considered orderillg some 700 main battle tanks, a d matchifig
numbers of armored infantry fighting vehicles, artillery weapolls and
other systems. As has been expl.a.ined earlier, however, the National
Assernbly has placed growing lirnits m :Kuwaiti arms purchases, and
Kuwajt: has had to adopt considerably more modest gods.

Tanks
H APCs
AFVs
CHART SEVENTEEN Kuwait: Armored Weapons Strength-1979-1996. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from
various editions of the IISS, Military Balance, the JCSS, Milita y Balance in th Middle East, and material provided by US experts.

GT3ART EIGHTEEN Kuwait: A~illery Weapons Strength-1979-1 996.
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesrnan from IXSS, Militn~y Bnln~ce,
the JCSS, Military Bnl~nec ir-z fhc Middle Ensd, and material provided by US
experts.
Kuwait's operational tank strength now seems to include 85 Uugoslav
M-84s, out of a total of 150. The rest are in storage because of manpower
problems and a lack of spare parts. 23e M-84s tanks are variations of the
T-72 with medivcre armor and sighting syslems, and inferior ammuni-
tion, but have fire control systems superior to many early-model T-72s
including those T-72s currently in Iraq's inventory. Tnere are reports that
Kukvait is seeking Russian assistance in bringing the M-84s up to the stan-
dard of improved late-model T-72s by adding major improvements in fire
contrd capability and improved mmunition for the 125

100 Lnlzd Forces Since flze Gzky War
Kuwait had 16 M-1A2 tanks in early 1996, which were part of a $4.5 billion
order for 218 M-1A2 US-made Abrams tanks" These tanks will allow
Kuwait to equip two arrnored brigades with first-1ir\e equipment that is
far superior to any tanks in Irmian and Iraqi service and which are stmdardized
wif-;h the tmks in US and Saudi forces. Deliveries of the M-ls
began in August, 1995, and are to be complett.d by 1997. The first 16 tanks
joined Kwait's Shaheed., or "Martyrs Brit;ade.'"
At the same time, Kuwait has given up plans to replace its low-quality,
Yugoslav-supplied M-84 tanks with 100-150 more M-182s. Even the
two armored brigades it is alwady plaming to equip with M-1AZs are
only two-thirds manned, and Kuwait does not have the money to fund
a large purchase of more M-1A2s. As a result, it will probabty have to
continue to equip two brigades with the M-84 and other Russian combat
equiyment--1% Some experts believe it will equip its two active brigades
with US and British eyrriprnent and. its two mobilizable brigades with
hgostav and Russian equipment.
Kuwait" order for its M-l tmks also Uustrates the proble~xs Kuwait
and other Southern Gulf states bave when they hold weapons trials and.
attempt to choose eguipment cm the basis of operatimal merit rather than
poli.l-ics and technical. ciairns. 'The wing seller or seller nation inevitably
cries fowl and =sorts to politics.
Kuwait conducted a comparative test of the US M-1AZ and British
Challenger 2 tanks in 1992. The US M-1AZ proved to have the advantage,
with a top speed. of 65 km/b versus 50 for the Challenger 2, and
superior brakirng. It sccrred three hits out of th~e at 2,110t) meters versus
one out 01 three for the ChaUenger 2, 1,1) hits versus eight at 4,000
meters, six hits firing on a slope versus two, and four hrtnter-killer hits
in 32 seconds out of four fired versus three hits out of four in 66 seconds.
Similarly, the N-2 Bradfey out-scored the Warrior Mlith a 91)Uio hit
on the move score versus 16% for the Warrior, and three TOW hits out
of three firings versus one for the Wrrior. The results of these trials
became so controversial, however, that Kuwait made a political decision
to buy the VVarrior fitted with the Delco LAY-25 two man turret,
and to balance its future purchases betwen the US, Britain, and France
in an effort to ensure it will receive reixlforcements from both the US
and Europe."""
Kuwait's other armored vehicle strength seems to incllxde 46 BMP-2s
and 76 BMP-3s, about 153 M-113s' 40 Fhd APCs, 6 Tvf--Ci"i"$ same
amored mortar carriers, and roughly 20 special purpose and amored
engineering vehicles. Ku~iait may have 10-15 BDms and sow Ferret
and Saladin armored fighthg vehicles in storage, mese holdings represent
too many Qpes of equipment for a mall force, and it is clear that
Kwait urgently needs new modern infantry fighting vehictes,

Land Forces Siv~cc flze CzrY War 101
Kuwait is attempting to solwe this problcm by purchap;% 254 British
MiBrrior Alms ($918 miftion), but it has giva~ up plans to standardize on
the Mrarnor, and buy the 11.5040 it once considered.1" DeliveI.ies began
in mid-1945, and about 20 had been delivered as cJf August. A total of 136
of the Warriors will have therm4 imaging vision, Delco LAV-25 turrets
with 25 mm gms, two armored TOW anti-tank missile lamchers, and
ACE. 'They wiZI be used in the two regiments eyuipped with the M-1s.
The other Warriors will hcltude recovery vehicles which will tow support
trailers, command posts, and repair vehicles. Some will have high
mobiljty support trailers and special support epipment. Kuwait has
bought modem sinnulatio~~ and traiining systems for its Warriors, but it
will take two years for Kuwaiti forces to get lllf delivery of its order and
fuily convert to the new system.147
Kuwait is filling out its armored strengt.h. by buying 125 M-113 APCs,
$0 BMP-2 and. 20 BMP-3s. The BMPs will be used along with the M-&2s in
the Sixth Mechanized Liberation Brigade. These sales were part of the
defense agreement Kuwait and Russia signed in NovetJlber, 1993. The
agreement provides for up to $763 million in sales, and requises a Russian
reirtvestment in offset programs of at least $228.9 million.'48 It is considerj,ng
buying an armored system with a Chieftain body and a Piranha
turret with TOW missiles*
Kuwait also plans to procure up to 263 trYheeled armored vehicles at a
cost of $385 to $462 million. It: is evaluatjng an initial purchase of 80-130
vehicles for the Emis" guard., and the candidates include the Swiss
Piraha, Styer-Daimler Pmdur, 6 x 6, Textron LAV-300 6 X 6, and Russian
BTR-80. Many will be equipped with a LAV-25 25 mm turret or a Cockerifl
Mark :IXEAl 90 mm gun. Other purchases will hc1ude 108--110 mortar
carriers to provide fire support fnr Kuwait" mechanized forces and
new Warriors and ESMZ"-3se The main candidates are the Tt~rkish FMC-
Nurol M-113 with an armor mortar turret or a French 120 mm rifled mortar,
and the British AMS 120 mortar on a United Defense vehicle.
Kuwait is also examhing the purchase of a Piraha with the Blazer turret,
equipped with a 25 mm gun and VSHOMDS missile launcber,"g
'These plans may end up giving Kuwait too many types of vehicles
.from too many corntries and manzlfacturers, and too many light armored
vehicles that cannot directly engage Iraqi heavy amored forces in combat.
Kuwait does need light armored vehicles to deal with infiltration of
its bordcrs and other internal secwity missions, for air defense, and other
special purpose uses. Rathgr it might do better by giving prioriw to standardizjng
on the Warrior*
K~~wait's survivhg anti-tank weapolls and new orders hcltude large
numbers of TOW and HOT mti-tmk guided weapons, and at least 200
Carl Gustav 84 rnrn rocket iaunchers. Kuwait is evaluating purchase of

102 Lnlzd Forces Since flze Gzky War
the Milm 3 mm-portable anti-tank weapon and has bought 1,015 TOW-
2B missiles for its LJAV-125 equipped armared vehicles.'5"
Zn early 1996, Kuwait" aartiuery strength included 22 M-109A2 selfpropdled
155 mm howitzers, some M-56 and M-101 towed l05 mm hwitzers,
some 122 mm, 130 mm, and 152 mm weapons that seem to have
been captured from Iraq, and a few multiple rocket launchers. Kuwait
had 18 GMT GCT AuF-1 towed and 16 M-13AuE.'-3 self-propelled 155
mm artillery weapons in storagee1S1
Kuwait is establishing a mw artillery regiment with 24-36 155 mm selfpropelled
hwitzers and has the god of builefing up a force of 100 155
mm wearpms It has had to reduce its original plans for major orders of
new self-propelled artglery weapons, but is considerillg the purchase of
24 mm 155 mm artillery systems, It is cmsidering purtlhase of the US M-
109A6 PaladSn, the South African G-6, the British AS-90, and a Chinese
weapon.""
It is shdying an upgrade of its M-109 155 m self-propelled howitzers
to the M-209A6 Paladin improvement pxkage or is consid,ering
the use of the VSELAS90 155 mm turret, Kuwait is also attempting to sell
its Auf-1s and place them with the Giat Caesar 52 1% mm self-ppelled
or 155 TB tocved weapm, and is considering a GIN offer to modernize
its AUF-~S.~.~~
Kuwait ordered the Loral MLE in 1989, but had to cancel the order
because of its price. It has ordcred 27 Russian BM 30 9h52-2 Smerch multiple
rocket launchers, with a range of 70 kilometers, and had 9 in service
in eady 49%. I'hese weapons arc intmded to equip three multiple
launcher ba.t.teries in a separde gint tent. Kuwait is currently integrating
the Smesch, an effective long-range system, into its forces. As of yet, however,
Kuwait lacks the ahility to provide long-range targeting and battle
management systems to mke effective use of the weapn.
hwait is =posted to be considering the purchase of the Russian SS-
2(30 ground-to-gmund miss*, aaor Sakr-36 and Fatih rocket launchers
.from Egypt.1" Kuwait is also considering the purchase ol a UAV br
artj.l,lery targeting and surveillance purposes.
Kuwait" surviving army air defenses include SA-7s, SA-14s' ZSU-
23-4s and same 14.5 mm and 20 mm light anti-aircraft guns. Kuwait
ordered. 48 Shorts Starburst manportable anti-aircraft missile fire units
and 300 rnissiles in October, 1994. Ku~iait's air deknse brigade will
use the Starburst for air base defense and defending key strategic
sites, Kuwait is considering additional purchases of the Starburst or
the Mir;tral Atlas rnissile for deployment on "Humvee" 4 x 4 vehicles.
Trainil~g to use the Starburst was underway in Belfast in July 1995.
Kuwait is also considering the purchase of four batteries of mobile air
defense systems. 'f"he candidates fnclude the AUATS, Rohd-3 with

Land Forces Siv~cc flze CzrY War 103
VT-1 missiles, Alenia Aramais, and AdSAMS which fires the Aizn-120
AMRAAM rni~sile.~s~
Kuwait has placed additional orders with the US, many of which will
strengthen its armored warfart- capabifities. 'I'hese inctude 46 M-K8 tank
recovery vehicles, 52 M-577 command post carriers, 230 M-1064 martar
carriers, 1,178 machine guns, 967 STNCGARS digital radio systems, 132
M-998 troop and cargo carriers, 460 heavy epipment carriers, 130,000
rounds of tank ammunitio~~, and small arms ammunitio~~. Kuwait also
plans to order uy to 700 marnored '"umvee" troop carriers and large
nurnbers of 2.5 and 5 ton support vehicles.=b
Kuwaiti Army Readiness and Warfighting Capability
It will be at least three to five years before Kuwait can obtain delivery
of all the equipment it now has on order, absorb it into its force
structurc-r, anci provide suitable training. It also needs to create the
dedicated support, maintenance, and logistic capabilities needed to
figkt effectively against first-line Iraqi forces, fn terms of basing, the
Kuwaiti army must rt~huild its military complexes at virtually every
level, although many buildings were left intact. This task invnlves
expenditures of at least $275 million to repair all 11 of Kuwait's military
bases-157
Equipment and bashg problems are oz~ly part of the challenge Kuwait
faces in creating effective land forces. Although the Kuwaiti army is
improving, it still has a long way to go. Despite US and British training,
Kuwajt's restructured lmd forces stjll lack effective military capability in
maneuver warfarc, cannot fight effectively at night, do not have the ahility
to condiuct independent artiflev action, and art. unable to fight intensive
armored cambat.
The amy" movements to the bordcr to oppose the Iraqi build-up in
late 1994 indicated that Kuwait's ground foxes still move too slowly,
have tro&le movi,ng as a cahcsive force, and lack the abili"cy to deploy
and sustajn its forces in the field withvut foreign civilian support. However,
the Kuwaiti amy has made a major improvement in its ~adiness
and combined arms trahhg and performed well in command post and
field training exercises in 1995 and 3396, and with US and Saudi units h
the Peninsular Shield exercises in 1996,"g
Some of the army" prdlems should also be sharply reduced once it
has the to absorb its new equipment orders, Several redities, however,
will not change:
* Kuwait cannot solve its manpower problems wihout broadenixrg its
~cruiting base and sorne form of much mom cclmprehensive con-

104 Lnlzd Forces Since flze Gzky War
scription. U111ess Kuwait takes major new inifiatives to increase its
military manpower, it will atways have "hoII0\141' forces.
* Second, Kuwail. still over-emphasizes weapons and under-emphasizes
support, sustainahility rt?a$.iness, manewer capability, training,
and joint operations. Like most: So&hern Gulf forces, it. ennphasizes
the symholic value of Iarge purchases of modem hiardwarc
over integrated and balanced war-fit;hting capabiliq
* Third, Kuwait is tagng delivery on only enough modern armored
equipment to match one heavy &publican Guards division, The
KUM"aiti eyuipment will be qualitatively superior, hut cannot provide
hwait wilh more than a Lmited seif-defense c~abifity to deal
with low-intensiq land warfare in its border arca. This equipment
aiso will not be fully standarclized with the eguipment in US or
Saudi forces. The rest of Kuwait's equipment will consist of lowgrade
arrnor which may do as much to kill its crcws in intensive
combat with first-line Eraqi armm as to kill the ~lemy and there is
little c~trrent prospect that Kuwait can replace this mix of" low-grade
tanks and OAFVs before the year 2005, This may not be as critical a
probtem as it appears, though, because it is unclear whether Kuwait
really has the manpower to support a lmd force larger than two
first-line active arrnmd brigades. Kuwait" ccurmnt land force procuremat
plans do, however, violate common mse to the extent
that thy fail to use Kuwait's wealth to buy the superim techoloa
it needs to make up for its lirnited manpower.
* Finally, Kuwait will always be the single most vulnerable Gulf state.
Kuwajt City is wiChin a few hours drive of the Iraqi border, and
Kuwaiti population centers could be held. hostage h any conflict. US
and GulE air and land pwer would then have to take such hostages
into account. The US can improve its prcpositionhg cap&ili,ty and
reaction times, but cannot remain in place in Kuwait. This makes the
improvement of the Kuwaiti Army, and the development of Kuwait
forces that can deter and. delay an Iraqi defemse a critical military
prioriity;

Kuwait's Naval Forces
Since the Gulf War
Kuwai"taces e ~ aproblems l in restructuring its navy'sTChart Sixteen
shows the trends in K~lvvait naval manpower and the impact cJf the Gull:
War1" The Kuwaiti Navy had about 1,500 rnen in its naval forces in early
1996, inchding its Coast Guard. Kuwait" snad officers are trained by the
Briltish Kuvvait Defense Group, although a few cadets are. to be trained in
France and the crews of Its French-made ships are being trahed at sea by
Navfco. Kuwait is also training an additional 100 combat divers, inrluding
mhe clearers.16"
Kuwait's naval forces are based largely at El Adami and Shuwaifi.
Kuwaiaas signed a contract to rebuild and expand its main naval base
at Qalay* near Mina Sud, about 100 kilometers south of Kuwait City
which lraq destroyed in 19911, Kuwait has ordcred a new Rockwell-Gelsius
Tech cornand center and communications system to replace the
one etestmyed dufing the war.
Kuwaiti Naval Stxngth and Equipment
As Chart Nbeteen. shows, Kuwait has a relatively small navy compared
to other Gulf forces, Kuwait lost most of the 23 ships in its pre-war navy
during the fightiing fn 19530. These tosses inctueted its main force of eight
missile patrol boats.. By early 1996, however, its navy had built back to a
strengtl-r of six connbatants. These ships indude one FPB-57 missile patrol
boat (the Isliqiaf), and one TNC-4.5 missile patrol boat (the AI Sn~zbozlk).
Each of these two ships has one 7% mm QTO Melara gun, twin 40 m
guns, and four Exmet MM-40 missile launchers (2 twin launchers). The
WB-57 was fitted for minelayin$. Kuwait also has four 150 ton OPV-311)
class patrol boats built in Australia, and armed with 20 mm g~11s~"l
Sources dihr on KuwaiV's holdings of smaller patml boats. According
to one sour=, the fiwaiti Navy had 17 small patrol boats fmm Britass
Cougm Marine, and 12 Simmoneau Stmdard ir.rshorc patrol csaft.162

U Submarines
0 Major Missle Combat
W
M Major Other Combat
Missile Patrol
Other Patrol
20 U Mine
H Amphibious
H Landing Craft
15
10
5
0
Bahrain Iran Iraq Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UAE
CHART NINETEEN Gulf Naval Ships by Category in 19%. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Milifa y
Balance, 1995-1996, and material provided by US experts.

Ma.r?nl Fo9"~es Since flze Gzky Mitlr 107
Some of these boats were used by bait's forcles during the liberation of
Kuwait. According to other sources, Kuwait had three catamarans, three
33' ultra-fast patrol boats, three 35hltra-fast patrol boats, four 38' ultrafast
patrol boats, a d four smailer uttra-fast patrot b~ats.1~
Kuwait plans a further rnajor expansion of its navy, 'The five South
Korean Seagull class patl-of boats Kuwait had. ordered in 3986 were seized
by Eraq and destroyed during the war. Kwait, hokvever, expc~cts to take
delivery on five more ordered in 1988, md commissioned two Austrizlim
31.5 meter patrol bmts in 1994.
Kuwait ordercld eight Combattante-1225-ton patrol boats on March 27,
1995. mese ships are powered by MW enghes linked to waterjets, and
each is armd with a 10 mm L70 gm and a M-(j2120 mm gun. They will
be equipped later with either the Aerospatiale -15 or British Sea Skua
mti-ship missile and its associated radar, Matra Sadal or Shorts Seastreak
air defense missiles, chaff launchers, and ESM/ECM systems. The missifes
are expected t~ be orde~d in 1996, and the hips are to be etelhered
h 1997-1999.'";1.
Kuwait is likely to orcier four to six much lar;ger 8&95 meter offshore
missile vessels displacing 1,500 to Z,Of)(l tons. nese ship will be helicopter
carriers wi& anti-ship md anti-air missiles. There are thirtee~~ possible
candidates for this program from nine countries, ranging from 1,350
to 2,200 tons."h"
Other purchase plans hclude amphibious landing ships, naval, helicopters
with anti-hip missaes, and a wide ran@ of new weapons sys-.
tems and sensors. Kwait is considering the purchase of sonar-based surveillance
and detection systems to deal with the Irmian submarhe
threat, but seems to have given up plans to buy mixle vessels and appears
ing on foreip forces to deal with the mine warfare &reat. It is
considerkg the modernization and rebuildlrrg of one TNC-45 missile
patrol boat @I-Sn~buuk) and one FBP-S7 missile pah-ol boat (Isfiqlnl). Both
ships were captured by Iraq and survived, because they fled to ports in
Irm and Wahsain durhg the war."b
Kuwaiti Naval. Readiness and Warfi&ting Capability
If Kuwait coqlctes all. these ordcrs, it will acytlire a relatively large
nurnber of surface vessels for such a small country. Its navy may, how-
ever, be too large and be desiwed for the hvrong missions. Kuwait will
have mde a major investment in surface vessels, designed lart;ely to con-
front an Iraqi or Iranian surhce threat in an area where the real threat
may be from mines and anti-ship missile attacks on commercid ships,
and where Kuwait's vessels may find it difficult to defend agajnst Zran-
ian and Iraqi aixraft and long-range hnd-based anti-ship missiles.

108 Naval Forces Since the Gulf War
Kuwait might well have benefited more from investing the same money
in mine warfare capabilities, armor, or increased air power.
The Kuwaiti Navy also has limited readiness and low prestige. It com-
petes for resources with the Kuwaiti Coast Guard. This rivalry needs to
be eliminated if Kuwait is to concentrate its limited resources in ways
which create effective naval units.
In short, Kuwait is likely to remain dependent on the US and British
navies for anything other than very low level contingencies. This situa-
tion will be compounded by the fact that both Iran and Iraq can attack
virtually any maritime target in Kuwaiti waters with their long-range,
land-based anti ship missiles, and the fact that the Iranian Navy and
naval branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps can attack
quickly and with little warning. Kuwait has many of the same unique
vulnerabilities at sea that it does on land.

Kuwait's Air Forces
Since the Gulf War
The trends in Kuwaiti air force manning are shown in Chart Sixteen, and
the trends in Kuwait air strmgth are shown in Chart Twenty.167 As might
be expected, these trends have been heavily inflzrenccd by the inpact of
the Gulf War. Kuwait" air force now consists of about 2,500 men, with 7%
combat aircraft and XI armed helicopters, Its two main bases at Ali al-
Salern (&Jahxah) north of Kuwait City, and Ahmed a1 Jaber (al-Ahadi)
south of Kuwait City, suffered sesiolls damage during the war, but arc
now operation&, and =pairs on the base at Ali al-Salem were completed
in time to base Kuwait" sew FI A-18s there by late 1992.16ff
Kuwaiti. Air Force Equipment
Only a limited number of Kuwait" combat aircraft arc fully operational.
Kwiiit has only eight operational Mrage F-1BK/CK fighters, out of a
pre-war total of 23. It: has 12 surviving armed Hawk 64 trizhers, and 16
Shorts Tucanos organized as a counter-insurgmcy and training unit.
These aixraft have only limited operational capability against an Iranian
or Iraqi threat.
Kuwait has phased out its remahjng 20 A-4KUITA-4KU attack fight-
ers it had left at the end of the Gulf War, out of a p=-wilr total of 30.
Kuwajt's A-4KU/TA-QKU anack fighters and F-1BKIGK fighters are on
the market, and the operational aircraft of this type are used large@ for
sales demonstration puz)?oses.l@
As a result, Kwvajt relies h ost exclLtsively on its 40 F/A-18s, which
are organized into a fightcr/fighter ground-attack force. Kuwait took
delivery of its first 12 F/A-lt-iC/Ds in June, 49512, and delivery of its full
order of 32 US FI A-18C and 8 PIA-18E> fighters, AIM-9 Sidewinder air-
to-air missiles, AIM-7F Sparrows, AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles,
and Maverick AGM-656 anti-shipianti-hard point missiles was corn-
pleted by late 19994.

El Fighter/ Attack
Armed Helicopter R
Air I=orces Since flze Gzky War
CHART TWENTY Kuwait: Fixed Wing and Rotary Wing Combat Air
Strength----I. 979-1996.. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesrnaxl from TISS,
Mi;lr'l"n?y B~Zrlnce~ the ]CS$ Milifaly Balance ilil the Mic3ille Easf, and material
prc>vicied by US experts.
Kuwait also completed its initial pilot training at the US Navy Air Sta-
tion at Lenore, California, and began joint F/A-18 pilot training with US
Navy pilots in :Kuwaiti air space in March, 1993. Kuwait, however, is still
well short of its goal of 1.5 trained aircrew per aircraft, and has a critical
shortage of pilots. According to some reports, it had only 12 pilots for its
F/A-18s in 1996,lYQ
Kuwait began to make use of its F/A-18s during the border crisis of
October, 1994. The Kuwaiti Air Force carried out joint exercises with US
forces against targets only five kilometers from Iraq's forward deployed

Air Forces Silzee the Gztlj" War 111
forces. The Kuwaiti Air Force also ~mained m continuous alert during
the crisis. Twelve F/A-18s were kept loaded with either eight Mark 82
500 pomd bombs or 20 Ruckeyes. -These aircraft werc also armd with
two AIM-9s and two AIM-Zs, and some other F/ A-18s were armed with
Maverick.171
Zn early 1995, the Kuwaiti air force had two squadrons with a total
active ill-country strength of 3X FM-18Cs and 7 F-1KUs (one F/A-MC
and one FIA-18D are kept in the US for testing purposes). These
squadrms included the 9th and 25th squadron, Both squadrons were
capable of both attack and air defense missions, but one squadron
trained 60Y0 for the attack mission while the other trained 60Y0 for the
air defense mission. Both squadrons were deployed at .AI Jaber Air Base,
dong with 24 USAF A-10s from the 23rd Wh~g (horne-based at Pope Ar
Force Base).l72
This is a very limlted operatimlal force for a nation as vulnerable as
Kwait, and KwaiZ needs to expmd and moetemize its air force in several
other ways, It needs to acquire more modern, high-capability fighters,
to reach a decision regarciing purchase of an airborne warning aircraft,
to modernize its training and transport aircraft, to moder~ze its
helicopter fleet md provide m attack helicapter capability Moreover,
Kuwait needs to establish at least one additional air base as far to the
south as possibk, a modrm C4I/Bn/l system, and an advanced integration
)and-based air defense systent. Kuwait cannot accomplish all of these
tasks in the near future, but it is makhg progress in a nuber of arcas.
Buying and operating additional fighters will not be easy. Kuwait
codd not a&rd all of the new fighters it sought aft- the Gulf War, and
had to cancel m option to buy 38 addilional F/A-18s in 1992. It is, hawever,
discussing longer term plans to order up to 35 more. fighters, and
may make m initial buy of 12 F/A-I,KCI:/I) aircraft. Kukvait is also sceking
to buy the AWIMAFJL air-to-air missile from the US, which would
give it a major advantage over franian and Iraqi aircraft in beyond-visualrmge
codat caphiliy and improve its intemperahility \N.ith the Saudi,
and US air forces. Kuwait is also cmsidcring a possible buy of the lLlirage
2(3(30-5 multi-role fi@ter."3
Kuwait is seeking to hnd such purchases by selling its remaining
Skyhawks and. Mirage F-ICTKs. Kuwait refurhished 15 of its Mirage
FlCKIBKs with French aid by early 1995. It is seeking to sell these aircraff
to Ecuador, but my continue to operate them if it mnot sell them
or buy more F/A-18s,l7"
Kuwait is stdyktg the possible purchase oE airbcmle alert: aircraA
and/or mariFime patrol aircraft. It may purclase Che E-2C wl-tich pmvides
both the capability to detect md intctrcept twets at long ranges
and a mariltime surveillance capbility. 'f'he purchase would be an expen-

112 Air I"orces Since flze Gzky Mi17r
sive one, however, and Kuwait may chwse to rely m tlS and Saudi aircraft.
and aerostat mounted early warning radars,
Kuwait now operates a syuadm of 6-12 British Hawk Mark 64
trainer-fighters, and 16 Short Tucano 312 trairrer light attack aircraA (9 of
which are operatio~~al). Kt~wait is seekhg to sell the Tucanos, which are
now in the t"K. Xt would like to buy Hawk 100 trainers, or at least
upgrade its Mark 64s. Kuwait n w has several C-130 transport: aircraft, 1
K-9, and 3 tJ-100-30s. I(u.mil. is considering the purchase of six more
transports-pmbably C-130s and/or Skorts Sherpas.lT5
Many of Kuwait's helicopters were destroyed or seized during the war.
The Air Force did, however, build back three operatiand helicopter
sytladrons by earXy 1995. mese includcd 16 SA-342K Gazelle attack helicopters
equipped with HOT anti-tank guided missites, and 4 AS-332
Super Pumas and 8 SA-330 Pumas.
Attack helicopters oMer kwait a way of providrng rapid-reaction,
anti-armor defenses that can help make up for its hck of strategic depth
and deftnsive barriers. The SA-342Ks have not proved to be effective
anti-tank helicopters, however, and the HOT missiles are being removed,
Six of the aircrafi. are being armed with 20 mm cannons for border sur-
~reillance and counter-infiltration purposes and the others will be used as
light attack-trainer helicopters.
As a result, Kuwait is seeking to purchase modem attack helicopters. It
originalfy exarnined the purchase of 16-20 A-t-MA Apache attack heiicopters.
The Apache offered a nudes of unique advantages to a nation
like Kuwait. It is a highty let.hal day-night, atl-weather tank killer that can
quickly reach any position in Kuwait; and which can evade or s~~rvive
many of the mobile, short-range air defenses in Iraqi and Iranian fnrces.
Its Hellfire missifes can be used against lmding and smdl craft as well,
and it can perhm an arm& reconnaist;ance rnission with high survivability.
At the same tirne, the purchase of 16 AFX-64As had a cost of $692
million, and the AH-648 required mughy the same training and support
effort as a modem fighter aircrafte17h
nese cost issues led Kuwa-it to examine other attack helicopter
options, including the AH-1W, UH-@L Black Hawk, and Ka-511 Hokum.
Kuwajt decjded nr7. the UH-6OL in July, 1,995, and placed an order for 7.6
Blachawk WH-60L helicopters at a cost of $461 million. The order also
inclueted four spare TRIO General Electric engines, 500 Hellfire antiarmor
missiles, 38 Hellfire lauders, 11,500 Hydra 70 rockets, 200 mm
guns pods, and night vision devices. This order would save Kuwait
nearly $200 million. It wodd also give Kwait an attack helicopter with
many of the anti-armor capabilities of the sZf-2-MA, hcluding a FLXR plathrrn
and a laser designator, which could be used in the armed transport
mode. Kuwait is cclnssering a follow-on purchase of the AH-64A or

Air Forces Silzee the Gztlj" War 113
additional UH4QLs in the mid-term, as well as the Hellfire II missile, It is
also considering the purchase of AS-532 Cougar, Black Hawk, and tAR
fAR-530 tsanspmt helicopters.177
The Black Hawk sale, however, ran into stiff opposition from the US
military and is still pending approval. US officials are particularly con-
cerned with Kuwait" request to outfit the Black Hawks with a missile-
guiding desipator and other equipment used only by US Special E'czrces
units. Appnrently, one of the chief concerns is that Kuwait's proximity to
Iraq and its vulnerability to sudden attack codd. lead to the capture oi
this sensitive technology. Kuwaiti and US officials met in early December
1995, to find a cornpromise suilable to both sides. Tbe Kuwaiti govern-
ment is also awaiting the US government% decision regarding the possi-
ble sale of the Apache Lcmgbow to Kuwait.lT8
Kuwait now has two air bases. Its fighters arc located at its main hl
Jaber Air Base. This base suffered extensive darnage during the Gulf War
from both lrqi activity and US bombfng that destroyed 22 of its 2.3. shef-
ters. It has since been 75-SOoh restared, but it is clear that Kuwait needs a
third air base to increase its survivabjlitJi and dispersal, and the ability of
US and other power projection forces to reinforcle Kuwait. Kuwait has
plans to create a new base in Southern Kuwait, but it is not clear when
these plans will be funded.179
Kuwaiti Air Force Land-Based
Air Defense and CaVBM Systems
Kuwajt developed a lmd-based air dtfe~~se system with limited to moderate
capabilities before the fraqi invasion, This system used a Thornson-
CSF C"I/BM system tc:, control its fighters and Xflalvk missile nits to
ini:egra.t.e the data horn a rnix of A.P;I'/TIJS-32, AR-3D, and TRS 2230 radars
and two Z,i"tton AN/ ASQ-7?, systems to control its IHawks.180 Most of the
system was liestroyed during the war, and Kuwait mly had six fully
operational batteries of short-range air defenses in easfy 1995. Each battery
had one Sbguard radar, two Aspede surface-to-air missiie fire units,
and two twin 30 mm Oerlikctn guns.l81
As a result, Kuwait has had to create a new Imd-based air defelzse and
C"/BM system* Kuwait signed a $92 million contract with Hughes in.
Decen-tber, 1'392 to create a new land-based early warning system, refurbish
an air operations celzter, and cm~truct a new radar site. The first
phase of the new system-the Preliminary Early Warning %stem
(PEWS)-was accepted by the Kuwaiti Air Force in early 1996.1HZ The system
ir; shelter molmted, and integrates two of Kuwait's main search
radars: a new ANlFPS-117 L-Band radar with a radome antenna and an
existing French ?"fiR-2100 Tiger SBand radar at Kuvvait City

114 Air I"orces Since flze Gzky Mi17r
Work is also underway to integrate an airlnome 1.1-88 L-Rand radar,
mounted in an aerostat into the sy"em md to correct high temperature
operational environment prdblerns with the FPS-117. Kuwait also
ordered a long-rmge momson-CSF TRS ZZXX S-Rand three dimensional
radar cvith a detectiiol~ range of up to 450 Itilometers in March, 1995. 'This
radar will improve long-range surveillance at medium and high altitudes.
Kuwait has set up a training center fur the operators of its radars,
and it is the first cemter in the Gdf to train opemtors in the use of highdefinition
color displays and voice-operated technology,'8"
Kuwait has also hnproved its cooperation in C"I/BM with the US and
Saudi Arhia. Shce 1994, the Kuwaiti Air Force has begm1 joint operations
with US and Saudi aircraft that prepare it for joint air deknse and
air offensive operations with US and Saulii fighters. It can now operate as
part of the US AT0 system, and has digital links to the U'S Air Force
AWACS and JSTARS aircraft, The Kuwaiti Air Force has shown that it can
maintain an htegrated air traffic control system over Kuwaiti air space
and trmsmit low altitude radar data back to USAF command and control
airesft,
The mal test of Kuwait's success, however, will he its ability to provide
effective low-altitude radar coverage to supplelnent its medim-to-highaltitude
radar systems, acquire a much more advanced Phase I1 C4/battle
management system, and deploy modern heavy surface-to-air missile
defenses* Kuwait is now complethg Phase If of its air defe~~se system and
the major competitors arc Ilughes and Westinghouse. It has been cmsidering
the purchase of low-altitude surveillance radars like the I'homsm-
CSF mS21ilQ $Band radar.184
Kuwait is taking steps to acyr;rire an advanced surface-to-& missile
capability, Kuwait" main surface-to-air missile defenses will consist of
five batteries of Patriot surface-to-air missiles, with 210 MIM-184 PAC-2
GEMS (Guidmce Enhancement Missiles), ordered at a cost of $327 miflion.
Kuwait has considered buying six new batteries of IHawk Phase IH
fire units and 342 MZM-23B Hawk missiles as well, but delayed this decjsion
pending a study of possible reconstruction of the equipment for four
IHawk batteries which Iraq returned after the war. According tc-, some
reports, Kuwait is also considering an order for Russim SA-10 or SA-12
(S-3WPTJ) mis~iles~~~s
Kuwaiti Air Force Readiness
and Warfighting Capability
The Kuwaiti Air Force is nrtaLng real progress, and US experts now rate
Kuwaiti pilots as equivalmt in training and skill to their US counterparts.
i?nuch will depend, howver, on h w the Kuwaiti Air Force manages its

Air Forces Since the Gulf War 115
future arms purchases, wheCher it cm irrtprove its numbers of pilots and
tsajning ground crcws, md whet-her it can evolve beyond the "hights of
the air" kvel of mast Gulf air forces,
The Kwait Air Force needs a clearer strategic and tactical raticrnale
and needs to be able to traifl and operate as an integrated force, mther
than small. groups of ail-craft. It needs a clear concept of joint operations.
It also faces the limitatim that it cannot accomplish these goals in cfealhg
with more lhan a low level threat unless it is interoperahle with the Saudi
and US air forces, can operate ushg modern USAF C4I/RM systems, and
has the option of extending its strategic depth by operating out of bases
in Bahrah md Saudi Arabia.
It is not clear what degree of integratlion Kuwait can achieve with Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain in creatirrg a corncm air defense, maritirne surveillance,
and &eater ballistic ntissile defense system, Full-scale cmputerized
digital icntegration among all three countries is critical to providing
effective air and maritime defense in the upper G&. This would give the
Southern Gulf states an ""c.dge"" over Iran and Iraq, and effective interoperability
with US air and naval. forces.
It would be extremely desirable to develop such an integrated system
on a KC-'CV basis. Kuwait's slnall size and air space, common
border with Iraq, and proximity to Iran, all. requi'e Kuwait to have a
survivable air defense and land and maritime stlfweillance system. No
Kuwaiti-based system can provide such characteristics unless it is
htegrated into a Saudi system, preferaby with close links to Bahrain,
Qatar, and the UAE. At p-resnt, however, plans for impwed integration
are limited, and Saudi kabia's new Peace Shield system '~vould
have to be redesigned to provide optical fjber links to other countries.

Kuwaiti Paramilitary
and Internal Security Forces
Kuwait has few paramilitary forces other than a National Guard. This
fnrce has an authorized strength of 5,lftlt), atthough its actual strengl is
much lower. Kuwait does, however, have strong internal security forces-
The Mhister of Interior supervises Muwai.t% securiq apparatuis, which
inctuefes the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and h ait State
9curity (KSS). 'These two agencies investigate htrtmal, security-related
offensest h additim to the regular police.
Kuwaiti Security Measures
Although Kuwit has an elected National Assembly, it places tight cm-
trols on many aspects of political activity- Kuwait bans pot.itical parties,
and associations that arc not registered with the government, The gov-
ent prevents unrt;gi"ered human rig.hts groups frm holding pub?iic
meetings. It also has a policy of preventing the =turn of stateless, fraqi,
and Palestinian pelople who have strong family ties to Kuwait, and its
labor laws do not cover foreip-born domestic scrrwants.
These security measures need to be kept in careful perspecljve. They
have often been the subject of intense criticism by human rights orga-
nizations-particularly between 1991 and 1993, -hm the government
drove many foreigners out of Kuwait and conducted security trials to
punish those who had. aided Iraq during its occupation of Kuwait,
There is no doubt that there were many real abuses of human ri&hts
during this period. 'There is also no doubt that Kukvaiti internal secu-
rity procedures have never mt Western standards of human rights,
rules of evidence, or police procedures.
Kuwait, howeverp has been the target of aggressive Iranian and Iraqi
htelligence operations, and has had to deal with much more sew= inter-
nal, security threats than the other Southern Cuff comtries. From 1979 to
the present, it has faced constant problems with Iranian hteijigencle oper-

ations inside Kuwait. During the Iran-Iraq War these took the form of
aggressive sabotage, bombings, and assassination attempts"
Iraqi, irttelligcnce systematically infiltrated Kuwait durhg late I989 and
early 1990, buiiding on fntdligmce networks M"hich, in some cases, dated
back to the early 19ft0s. Mmy foreign workers-hcl~~ding many Palestinians
and jordanims-did collaborate with the Iraqi ocrcupyhg forces
and this sometimes resulted in the torture, killhg, or disappearance of
Kuwaiti citizens.
The US State Department also reports that Kuwait has ixnproved conditions
in prisons and dekntion caters, extcnded the Iranchise to the
sons of ~zaturalized citizelzs, md invited the International Labor Organization
(IILO) to Kuwait for consultations, It indicates that the Human
Rghts Committee of the National Assembly is playing a grwing role in
investigating important humm rights abuses, and has recmmelzded
imgrovenrents in prison conditions.186
Criticism of Kwait's internat security procedures must be tempe~d
with the understanding that Kuwait faces very real problems. Mile
KuwaiMdoes not follow Western human rights practices, it also faces far
more severe problems and threats than most Western gave
ther, Britain has been forced to adopt somewhat similw securjty practices
in dealing with the situation in Northern IreIand, as dld France when it
attempted to clteal with Algerian independence.
The Xmpact of the Kuwaiti Legal System
Like all Gulf slates, the Kttwaiti legal system allows the government to
deal with security cases differently from standard civil cases. The Constitution
provides for the f~edcrm from arbitritry arrest and detention, but
security forces do not always respect these rights. Security forces in
KuwaiKity somtimes set up checkpoints where they may briefly detain
individuals, Police officers must obtain arrest warrants f m state prtwecutors
before making arrests, though in misdemeanor cases the asrcsting
officer may issue them.l8?
Under the Penal Code, a suspect may not be held for more than four
days Mlithout charge* Security officers solnetintes prevent families from
visiting detainees during this confinement. After bur days, prosecutm
must eitber release the suspect or file charges. If charges are filed,
prosecutors may remand a suspect to m addfiional 21 days in detention,
Prosecutors may also ubtain court orders for further detention
pending trial*Igs
Detelrtion rules are djfferf-?m.t. fnr cases involving state security. fn such
cases, pmsecutoss may bold a suspect in detention for six months, and a
judge may authorize a longer confinement pending trial. After 21 days in

118 hranzz'lifaty and Internal Security Forces
detmtion, a liefendant has the right to petition for his release in the State
9czrrity Court. If the judge denies the mtion, the defendant may submit
another appeal 30 days after the rejection. In general, cases go to trial
between 21) and 30 days after arrest. The State Department ports that
there is no evide~~ce of long-term incommunicado dete~~tian, though
there are about 30 detainees fachg deportation, especially fragi citizens
and the Bidoon, who have been irm detention for more than a year.
Appraximately 1,850 people were in prison in 1994, of whom 400 are in
pretrial det@ntion.18"
About 75 pexent of the detainees face administrative deportation
orders which the Ministry of Interior can issue arbitrarily. There are no
trials for deportations and deportees do not have " he process." The
Government may eve1 nm-citizens, even those who have been longterm
residents, if it considers them security risks. The Governme~~t
may also expel forei.pers if they are unabIe to obtain or renew work or
~siciency permits. The State Department reports that the Government
deported 122 Iraqis and naticmals of countries that supported Iraq in
the Gulf War (primarily Yemen and 1ard.m) in 1994, well below the
3993 level. The Government also routinely deported Iranians and other
foreign nationals who have violated residency requirements or cammitted
other offenses,lqO
The judicial system is also part of the internal security system. It is
composed of the regular courts, which try crirninal and civil cases, and
the State Security Court, which tries cases of a security naturc; and the
Court of Cassation, M;hich is the highest level of jutJiciai appeal, During
periods of martiai law, the Emir m y adhorize ditary courts to try civilian
defendants, nere have been no martial-law trials since 1991. The
Emir has the collstitutional power to padon or co ute all sentences."'"
Both defendants and prosecutors may appeal verdicts of the State
Securily Court to the Court of Cassation, but the appellate court may d y
determine whether the lw was properly applied with respect to the sentence.
The Court of Cassat-ion cannot rule on guilt or innucence. Most
security trials are public, as was the case in the 19913: trial of 14 persons
accused in the foiled assassination plot against fnrmer P~sident Bush. In
Jw~e the State Scurity Court co~~victed I3 defendants and acquitted one,
It sentenced six defendants to death and seven to prism terms ranging
from six months to 1;Z years.
The State Department reports that this tniali, like other security trials,
did not meet internationally accepted standards with regard to an independmt
judiciary and the evidence requied for proving criminal wrongdoing.
It reports that the judges in martial-law courts have handed dokvn.
several death sentences based on confessions iapparently uhtained under
torture and that the courts later rr.hsed to reopen these trials. 'The sen-

tences were., however, comxnuted to imprisonment ranging from 10 to 21)
years. It also reports that the State 9curit;y Court ruled against excl~~dislg
the confession of the 14 persons accused of attempting to assassinate for-
mer US President George Rush-despite allegations raised by the defense
that the cmfessions were obtained by torture.
Freedom of Expression and PeacehX Dissent
Kuwait allows mom freedom of expression than most other states in the
Guif md fie RRibdle East, although it again has powerful leg& toots to
maintain internal security. The tl'S State Depnrtment reports that scveral
laws eznpower the Government to impose restrictions on the freedom of
speech and the p~ss, but the Goue ent did not apply these laws in
15394, The State Depart~aent also reports that academics conduct their
activities with no appamnt censorship of their teaching, research, or writings,
wbife subject to fie same restraints as the media with ~gard to criticism
of the Emir or Islm. Ordinary ejtizens are free to criticize the Government
at prrblic meetings and in the media.192
ent ended di~ct censorship in 3992. Journalists still, however,
censor thcmselv~, and the Press Law prohibits the puh)ication of
direct criticism of the Emir, official government communications with
other states, and material fiat "nzigbt incite people to commit crimes, create
hatred, or spread dissension mong the people."lg3
Newspapers are privately owned and are free to publish material on
many social, ecmomic, and political issues. They frequently criticize
government policies and officials, including the Prime Minister. Newspay-ers
must, however, obtain an operating license horn the Ministry of
Information. 'This licensing pwer allows the Government cmtrol over
the establishment of new publications. The law also stipuldes that publishers
may lose their license if their publications do not appear for six
mmths. This ""six-montW rule prevents publishers from publishing sporadicdy
and is not used to suspend or shut down existing nekvspapers.
Tndividuals must dso obtain permission frm the Ministry of Information
before publishing any prhted material, includi~~g brochures and
wall posters. Foreign journalists are not censored md the Governfnemt
permits them open access to the camtry.
The Gowemnt oms and controls the radio and television campnies,
alt-hough the Middle East Rroadcastjng Con?pany and Egyptian television
transmit to Kuwait without censorshiy. The gave
inhibit the purchase of satellite dishes. Citizens with such devices are free
to watch a vasiety of progranns, incluhg thosc broadcast from I~rael.1~4
The Ministry of lnformatim has a Censorship Bpartnnent that reviews
all books, films, videotapes, periodicals, and other imported publications.

120 hranzz'lifaty and Internal Security Forces
In practice, such censorship is sporadic anci ahed mostty at morally
offensive material; however, political, topics may be censored. The General
Organization of Printing and Publishing controls the prirzting, publishing,
and distribution of iz~formational materialely3
There are addjtional limits on poljtical activi? and legal controls that
allow the government to maintah internal securiy. All nm-governmentai
organizatims (NGOs) artr illegal unless they obtain a lieense from the
Ministry of Social hMairs and tabor. The Governrnelnt uses its power to
license as a mems of political control, The Mlnistry bas registemd over 55
NClOs, including professicmal groups, bar associaticms, and scientific
bodies. 'These groups receive governnnelnt st~bsidies for their operating
expenses. They must also obtain permission from the Minis try before
attending international conferences. Since 1985 the Ministry has issued
only two lkenses, incl~~dhg one in 1994 to the Union of Kuwaiti Wornens%rouys,
which is headed by the wife of the Crown Prince. The Ministry
has not approved other reguests for licenses on the grounds that previnusly
established NGOs already provi,de servi,ces similar to those
proposed by the petitioners,
'T"here are many private organizaticms wbose activities arc. largely
ignored by the government, However, the Cabhet issued a decree in 1993
ordering ali mregistered NGOs to cease such activitier;, md no osgmization
has chalienged this decree in court. In Sptember, 1994, the Mi-nistry
of Interior ordered three u~nregistered N'Gt)s to vacat-e the offices that
they had established in unused, governnnent buildings. The NGCk complied
with the order. Zn banning these unregistered NGOs, the gwernrnent
sought to dissolve groups whose efforts were not coordinated with
a governmnt committee workizlg for the release of missillg persons presued
to be held in Iraq. The Government viewed such groups as poiitically
unac~eptarble.'~"
Treatment of Foreign Labor
Kuwaiti tabor Law does apply to Kuwaiti nationals, but virtually all
Kuwaiti nationaf either work for the government or in family busirtess. As
a result, Kukvait's stabor legislation is largely a means of controll.ing foreign
labor, although it has been applied to Kuwaitis in a number of cases.
This legislation provides for direct negotiations between employers
and "laborers or Cheir representathes" h the private sedo~ Most agreements
are resolved in such negotiations; if not, either party may petition
the Ministry of Social Affairs and tabor for mediation. If mediaticm fails,
the dispute is referred to a )ahor arbitration board cornpsed of officials
from the High Court of Appeals, the Attorney Gmeral" oofiice, and the
Mhistry of Social Affairs and tabor.

The law limits the right to strike. It =quires all labor disputes to be
referred to colnpulsory arbitration if labor and mnagelnent camot rclach
a solution, The law does not have any provision guaranteejng that strikers
will be free from any legal or administrative action taken against them
by the State, Two strikes wcurrcd in 19%. me was called by cleaning
personnel in the school system for a pay raise, and a second by security
guards at the Social Welfare Ilorne to cdlect unpajd wages, The majority
of the strikers were foreign workers.
Kuwaiti law provides extensive protection for many classes of workers
and Kwait does have the best developed trade union system of any
country in the Gulf. Workers can join trade unions, and over 28,400 people
were organized in 14 unions in 1994, 12 of which are affiliated. with
the Kuwait Trade &ion E'ederation &WE;), the sole, legal trade union
federation.
At the same tirne, the government maintains powerful internal securiq
controls over union activity. Xt rrstrkts the right of association by prohibithg
all hvorkers knrn freely establisrhing trade unions. The law stipwlates
that workers may establish only one union in any occupational
trade, and that tbr unions may establish only one federation. The Bank
Miorkers Unim and the Kukvait Airways workers Union are independent.
The Governmnt has shown no sign that it would accept the establishment
of more than ofie legal trade unicm federation. The law stipulates
that any nekv unio~~ must include at least 100 workers, of whom at least
15 are citizens. This reguirernent discourages the establishment of unions
in sectors empl* few citizens, such as the construction industry and
domestic servmts.197
The governmnt subsidii.,es as much as 90 pescmt of most union budgets.
It can inspect the financial records of any union, and prohibit any
union from engaging in vaguely defined political or religious ac.li\rities.
The courts can dissolve any union for violating labor laws or for threatening
'"pubtic orcier and morals,f" The Emir may also dissolve a union by
decree, By Law, the Minidry of Social Affairs and Labor is authorized to
seize the assets of any dissolved unj.on. Althougtn no ranion has been dissolved,
the law subordinates &c legal existence of unions to the power of
the State.198
As is the case in all the Southern Gulf states, the treatment of foreign
workers presmts sipificant pmblems in terms of both internal securiw
and humm rights. Foreigners cmstit~re most of Kuwait" total work
force and more than one-third of its unionized work force. Yet the law
discrimhates against fomign workers by permitting them to join unions
only after five years of residency and only as non-voting members.
Unlike uni.m members who are citizens, ioreign workers do not have
the right to elect their leadership. The law =quires that union officials

122 hranzz'lifaty and Internal Security Forces
must be citizens. The ILO has criticized the five-year residency repirement
and the denial of voting rights for foreign workers. KTUF administers
an Expatriate Labor Office which is authorized to inwstigate complairttti
of foreign laborers and provide them with free legal advice. Any
.foreign worker m y suiilnnit a grievance to t-he I:.,abor Office, regardless of
mien status,'*
The Constiktion prohibits forced labor "except irr cases specified by
lahv for ndinnal mergelncy and with just remmration." Nonetheless,
there have been credible reports that ioreign nationals employed as
domestic servants have been denittd exit visas requested without their
employer's cmsent, Foreiw workers m y not change their elnployment
without permission from their orig-inal sponsors.
Oomeseic servants are particularly vulnerable to abuses, because they
are not protected by the Labor Law. h mmy cases employers exercise
som controi over their servants by holding their passports, although the
ent prohibits this practice and has acted to retrieve pawports of
maids invol\red in disputes.. By law, domestic servants who run away
from their employers may be tmatcd as criminals. In some reported cases,
employers ikgally L\lithheld wages from domestic scrrwants to cover the
costs involved in bringing them to Kwvajt. The State Department reports
that the government has done little, if anything, to protect domestics h
such cases.2~)~

Strategic Interests
Kwait faces serious strategic challenges. It must develop as effective a
sdgdefense cap&ility as is possible; it must reinforce its strategic ties to
the US as the ultimate guarmtor of its security; it must do as much as
possible to rehfortle its ties to other Southern Gulf states; and it must
move towards political, social, and ecmomic reform.,
The Challenge af Self Dclensle
Kuwajt is aka* doing a lot to jmprove its self-defcnse capabilities. It
must, however, deal with three serious problems if these efforts are to be
effective:
* First, Kuwait needs to make hrther reforms in the leadership of its
armed forces, and firmly emphasize military professionalism even
in ihe most senfor por;itions. Kuwait, more than any other Southern
Gulf state, faces urgent W~J. fighting needs. nese needs can only be
met if promotion and rank are based. on competence, rather than
family. T-hert. needs to be a much clearer understanding within the
highest echelons of the Kuwaiti gover ent that the loyalty of modem
armed forces is ultimately dependent on the belief by those in
the armed forces that they have a clear mission, that this mission is
being efficiently and honestly funded, and that their leadership is
the best leadership available,
* Secclnd, Kuwait needs to stop politicizing its arms purchap;es. It
needs rigorovls financial procedures, backed by acthe crim,inal prosecutjon,
to ensure there is no corruption in such purchases. There is
no doubt that the West-especially the US and Britah-have
aggressivrly oversold arms systems, asked Kuwait fnr unfair "burden
sharing" purchases, and contributed to a clhate where some
contracts have had dubious terms and kckbacks, Kuwait faces
threats, however, which, arc too serious for such politics, and it needs

to demonstrate to its armed forces and its people that ""business as
usual" does not extend to defe~~se.
* Most important, Kuwait as a whole needs to understand that
nothing the government and royal family does can be a substitute
for a public comitment to sharing in the bwden Oj: defense and
providing the manpwer Kuwait needs to make its forces effec-
tive. Kuwait cannot be defertded by criticizing the governn-tent
.from wit.hjn the security of a Diwania, or by hiring fnreigncrs to
substitute far its sons,
Kuwait has the capability to deal with these challenges, but neither
Kuwait nor its allies should have my illusions about the results* Kuwait
has no fowseeable prospect of being ahle to defend its own territory without
external aid. It requires substmtial additional arms deliveries if it is
to create even a limited regional deterrent or to acqui~ the levels oi
mlanitinns, weapons, and military facilities to albw either an Arab or US
force to come to its aid. Wthout such arms imports, Kuwait will be hopelessly
weak, Further, Kuwait" forces will rcmah dependent on foreigsr
technicians and suppmt during the next decade. It will be una:ble to use
its arms agaiinst any nation without supplier assistmce, although Iran
and Iraq could operate many Kuwaiti weapons systems if these we=
seized in a future invasion.
The Challenge al Regional Cooperation
The G& Cooperation Comcil has set good goals, but its membcrs have
hiled to support them. Regional cooperation offers no near or mid-term
prospect of offering the kind of reinforcements that could &kd Kuwait's
northern border. 'The unfortunate fact is that the Southern Gulf states are
hiling to make practical progress in virhally every major m a of colfec-
tive defense. While individual states and the Gulf Cooperafion Council
have sometimes shown &at they are capable of formulathg the right
plans md hetosic, they have either not made sufficient progress or have
failed to make any pmgress in many prioriv aws. 7'he Southern Gulf
states need to dewlop collective or integrated defcnse capat?ili.lries by:
* Creating an effective p1 ing system for cotlecti\le defense, and
truly standarctized and or htemperable forces.
* Integrathg C" md sensor nets for air and naval combat, including
BVR and night warfart...
* Creating joint air defense and air attack capabilities,
* Establishing effective cross reinforcement and tactical mdility
capabilitjes,

Setting up joint training, support, and infrastntcbre fadities.
Creating joint air md naval strike forces.
* Deplqhg joint land defenses of the Kuwaiti/Northwestern Saudi
borders, Today" Peninsula Shield force is more farce &an force. It
has political value, but negligible \.varCighting capability aga,inst
Iraqi armor.
Preparing for outside or over-the-horizcm rr.inforcerncmt.
Creating common advanced traiining sy&ems.
* Improved urban and urban area security for unconventional war-
fare and low intensity combat.
They need to pmcure interoperable or standardized equipment to pro-
vide the capabiliv to pe'fom the follwing missions:
* FXeavy armur, artillery, attack helicopters, and mobile air defense
equipment fnr defense of the upper Gtlff.
bteroperilbility md stmdardbation with US power pr4ectian forces.
* Interoperable offensive air capability with stand-off, dl-weather
precision weapons and anti-armor / anti-sh* capability.
a Intempesat?le air defense eqwipment, includiag heavy surface-to-air
missiles, BVRIASIVX fighters, AEW & surveii_lanre capability, A M
& ECM capability. (Growth to h'TRM and cruise missile defense
capability)
* Maritime surveillance systems, and equipment for defense against
maritkne surveillmce, and unconventional warfare.
Mine dtztedian md clearhg systems.
* Improved uhan, area, and. border securily equipment for uncon-
ventional tvarfare and low intensity conflict.
Advanced trahing aids.
* Suppart and sustai
Kuwait and its GCC parhers also need to develop coordinated pro-
curcment plans to eliminate the waste of defenae on:
a Uniyue eqzt@mnt types and one-of-a-kind modificatio~zs,
* "Glitter factor" wweapons; '"developmental" equipment and technol-
ogY*
a Non-interoperable weapons md sy "ems.
* Submarines and ASW systems.
Major surface warfare ships.
a Major eqwipment for divided or "dual" forces.
* New types of equipment whirh increase the maintenance, sustain-
ability, and training prohkm, or layer new types over old.

W~ik outside Arah forcles could help secure Kuwait, Egypt is the only
Arab nation that has the potential strength to provicle Kuwait with the
kind of sustajnahle and combat effective fasces needed to deal. with Iray,
and Egyptian forces are not structwd to prowide this kind of power projectinn
force. Even if Kukvajt: and Egypt rcactned a political and fil-tancial
agreement, Egypt lacks any thing approaching the high technology power
projection capabilities of the tlnited States.
At the same time, every improvement in regional cooperatio~~ will be
important, particularly within the Gulf and between Kuwait., Saudi Ara"
bia, and Bahrain. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia need to coordinate tiffhtiy on
lmd defense, At the same timef Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bhrain need
to integrate their air md missile defenses, air strike-attack capabilities,
and rnaritirne surveihce, rnine warfarcl, and surface defense capabilities.
.hfl three states need to recog~~ize that the GCC is not enough, that
the Peninsular Shield Force will only be as strong as its Kuwait-Saudi
component, and fiat it is the mukal cooperation among Bahrai~~,
Kuwait, and Saudi Ara:bia which will shape the mnst important elemmts
of their deterrent and defense capa"agities, and abjliv to support reinforcements
from fie Wst.
The Challenge of Kegations
with the United States and the TnJest
KuwaiWvvill myuirts the support of US and othr Western forces in any
serious crisis with Iraq and Iran until wefl after the year 2030. Kuwait
understood this when it signed a 10 year joint defense agreement with
the US on September 19,1991. This agreemat allowed the US to prep0sition
stocks and eyuipment m Kuwaiti soil and to deploy a squadron of
combat aircmA ia Kuwait while giving the US access to its ports and airfields
in an emerlfency
The agreement required Kuwait to pay the US $215 maim for prepositios~hg
aid and support, including $50 miltion in 1992. Prepositioning
was to include the equipment for three armored companies and three
rnechmized ccmlpanies, hclutling 58 M-3A2 tanks, M-2s, artrllery and
other equipment, plus the construction of some $125 million in storage
and reception facilities. A new US Army storage area is being constructed
some 40 kilometers south of Kuwait City.201
The qreernent also provided fos jnjnt training. Ktlcvaiti and US forces
cmpleted two joint exercises by Ma)r; 1932. C)ne involved 2,300 Marines
and the 0th- 1,000 special forces. It bas conthued regular joint exercise
tsajning ever since. The US also held its first joinl rnititary command exercise
with militar). commanders from the GCG states in Kuwait in December,
1994. Other series of exe~ises include Iris Gold, Eager, Eager Archer,

I-lomelmd Shield, tntrinsic Action, and Native Fury. Many of these series
hvolve Britain md France, as well. as Kuwait and the US.202
The need for strategic cooperation between the Kuwait and the US
became atl too clear in August and Srptember of 1992. The confrontation
between Iraq and the UN over the eliminat-ion of weapms of mass
destruction, and :Iraq% ttreatment of its Shi5tes and Kurds, forced the US
to transform US Army, Make Corps, and Navy exercises into a demon-
stration that Ihe US would protect Kucvajt agakst any military adwen-
tares by :Iraq, The US had to msh Patriot batteries to both Kuwait and
Bahrain, It also conducted a test pre-positiming exercise cafZed Native
Fury 92, deployed a 1,300 mm battalion from the 1st Cavalry Division,
and conducted an amphibious reixrforccment exercise called Eager Mace
92. It depbyed 1,400 Marhes and 2,400 soldiers, includillt; two armwd
and two mecfimized compmies,zQ3
This need for joint exercises became even more apparent in October,
1994, when lraq mwed its Hammurabi and AI Nida Republican Guards
divisions sou& from the area around Baghdad to positior~s about 20 kilometers
from the border with Kuwai.t, Although Iraq backed down, and
agreed to withdrw its forcles on October 9,1994, this crisis made it clear
that the rnititary bc-ltance in the Gulf is shaped by a contbination of US and
Kuwaiti actions and not by the GCC or mified action by the GCC.
The October, 1994 crisis again exposed the fact that Kwait had virtually
no strategic depth, and that both Iraq and Iran codd rapidly thrcaten
Kuwait in a crisis. It demmskated Kuwait's inabjlity to act alone, and
that the Gulf states must do everything possible to reduce the problems
the US faced in deploying its foxes, even with prepositio~zhg.
While the US was better prepared on this occasion for rapid movement
than in 1990, it took 72 to 96 hours for the first combat aircraft to
arrive. The closest US prepositiorri~~g ships were six days sailing away
h Diego Garcia, and it took well over a week for US Army forces in the
US to move by air, fully deploy to their prepositioned equipment in
Kuwait, and move to the border area in combat s~~stainable form.
While US power projection capabilities for mid-to-hi& intensity warfart?
were not tested during this confrontation with Iraq, the US Army
later issued briefings that indicated that even, with all, the force
improvements the US had progrannmed for 1998, it would still take 30
days to fully deploy two sustainable heavy &visions and one light
division, and '73 days to depIop the lcir~d of five division corps called
for in its Major Regional Contingency strategy.204
Fur&er, Kuwait and the US were confrcmted by new irrdications of
Iraqi mnvernents against Ku'cvajt. in i\rugust and %ptember, 1995. These
indications led Kuwait to create a new security zone near its capital, and
the US to rush naval reinfortlements and maritirne pregositioning ships to

the Gulf. 7'he US deployed a total of 12 prepositioning ships from Diego
Garcia and other locations to the Gulf, with elnough armor, artillery, food,
fuel, water, vehicles, and other eyujpmmt to sustajn a 16500 Marine
Corps MEF (Forwad), and a 35,000-17,OW man US Army force in cornbat?"
"ey also led Kukvait and the US to advance the date of a large
amphibious exercise called Eager Mace 96-1 to deter any Iraqi rnoves.~~~
The US and Kuwait cooperated again in January, 1996, when US intrelligene
concluded that Iraq had brought five armored &visions to sufficient
readiness to deplq to Kuwait with only five hours notice. The US
deployed 12 prepositioning ships nough to equip a Marine Division
and a US Army Brigade-ink the GLE~~. The US did not setnd troops, but
this move allowed the US to deploy up to 20,000 troops m short notice.
I'he US atso depfoyed additimal combat aircrafl to Bahrain and Kuwait,
md extended a jobnt exercise wif-;h Kuwait.
The t"S already had some 20,000 troops in the Middle East area, and
deployed 35 ships, and 14,000 sailors and US Marines, in its Fifth Fleet
between the Suez, Canal md hdian Ocean. "ese forces hcl~~ded the
Nirnifz carrjep battle group, and a Marine Corps amphibious ready grwp.
It is interesting to note that the US only had 250 naval personnel stationed
permanently ashore in Bahrah.207
It is clear, thedore, that Krawaiti strategic cooperation with the US will
be critical in the years to come, as will efforts to provide adequate power
projection md rapid response capabilities. Kuwait and the US have
already demonstrated that they can work well together, but this cooperation
can oniy be successful if the other Southern Gulf states provide
equal support, particdarly in improbring US prepctsitianing and rapid
deployment capabilities,
Although less urgmt, Kuwait must also ercpmd its strategic relations
with other countries. This is a challenge that Kuwait has done a goad job
of meeting. Xt has sigsled four defense aglleements with the UM since 1991.
It siped one 10 year pact with the UK on March 11,1942, which covers
technical and training assistmse and bilateral exercises and trilateral
exercises between Kuwait, the UK, and the US* These exercises have
already incIuded Blue Falccm, Free 5kyf Eager Mace, and Eager Sentq. It
signed another agreeme~nt on August 31, 1992 for techical cooperation,
and an arms sales protocol on September 22,1992. It reached a contracting
agreemat on December 2, 1992.2m
Kuwait reached its first defense agreement with France in 1969, and
made several major purchases of French arms in the 1970s md 1980s. It
siped two new agreements after the Gulf War on August 18, 1992, and
etoher 18, lf993. The first agreement provided for technical assistance,
modemizatian of the Kuwaiti Navy, and joint rnaneuvers like Gulf Pearl
and Pearl of the West. The second agreement established new legal con-

ditions for arms sales. Kuwait holds rczgutar hnd and naval exe~ises
with France, and began joint air exercises with France in Jme, l"394.2W
Kuwait established diplomatic relations with Russia in 1963, and
siped arms sales contracts with Russia in 1975 and 1982. It siped an
agrement with Russia on February 14, 1993, covering the exchange of
military delegations and inhrmation, and a cooperation agreement on
arms sales and joint exercises on November 29, 1993, Kuwait has since
carried out Exercise Rkka with Russia, and signed a major arms sdes
contract on August f3,1994. Kuwait signed an agrctement with China on
Mmh 24,3995, under which China will provide Kwait with aid to reor-
ganize its arm& forces, It has atso held three joint exercises with Che Itat-
ian Navy sisrce 1991.210
Kuwait" security ties to the West are critical to Kuwait's future secu-
rity. They do, however, present problems that bath Kuwait and its allies
must deal with in the future:
The first problem is that such ties create the risk that Kuwait will
become so dependent on states outside the region that it will not
property devdop its own defase capabilities, will become ovcrreliant
or1 otltside su,pport for low-level security cont.jngencks that
require a constant Kuwaiti effort and immdiate =action, and. will Jail
to assert its own sove~ipty Some of the National Assembly debates
over defe~~se are a warning that this may already be happening.
* The second is that dependence m the West will lead. Kuwait to
under-emphasize the importance of couective securiw with Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia, and the need to at least try to expand the capabilities
of the Gulf Cooperation CounciL So far, Kuwa-it has sought to
expad its collective securiiy &forts, but it atmost certainly needs to
do more.
* The third is that tics to so many countries will encourage buyislg
arms from wery possille source md politicizing arms purchaz~t
the expense of standardization, intemperability effective~~ess, and
waste. The prclvious discussion of fiwait's arms purchases provides
a nurnber of indications that this is becoming a serious problem.
The foutth is that Kuwait's growing dqendence on the US will lead
the US to abuse its hurben-sharhg negotiations with Kuwait, and to
seek more su~port than is really merited. nere are strmg indicatims
that the US is akeacliy abzlsk~g its burden-sbaring negotiat-io~w and is
askixlg for payments for very dubious charges, such as '"eprcciation'kn
the carrier battle gmup"t has deployed to the Guf.
nere is no reason Kuwait camot deal with these problems if both its
leadership a d the National Assembly art? wiilfng to accept their impor-

tance. Kuwait% leaderhip already seem to understand what needs to be
done, The question is whether its National Assembly can look beyond the
role of critic and focus on the nation" strategic priorities.
The Challenge of Internal Refam
No nation can be secure, or meet its strategic needs, without meeting the
needs of its own people. Ku'cvait has done well in adapting to the challenges
of reconstruction, and. its economy is mcovering, but Kuwait faces
fie same need to make internal reforms its the ather Southern Gulf
states. Ku'cvait must develop its own mswer to the probkrn of increasing
popular participation in political decision-making, Kuwait must
rt?defiMr its citizenship to include many of its Ridom and long-term "foreign"
~sidents.. It must simultaneously reduce its dependence on foreign
labor, create more jobs for Kuwaitis, and privatize much of its economy.
It must adopt fiscal forms and replace an unaffordable welfare
state with a new mix of social services md a much larger and more cornpetitive
private sector.
This is mt to argue that Kuwait must copy Western social, economic,
and political practices. In fact, atl of these reforms have been advocated
by many Kuwaitis and arc already the subject of public debate in Kuwait.
The problem in the GulE, however, is rarely expertise anci intelligence, it
is rather the need for cmmitment and action. It is also the understmding
on the part of its intellectuals, politically active citizms, and technocrats
that "'reform" involves far more t-t~an simply criticizing fie
nati.onfs leaders or seeking added political powec Kuwait's s~nall population
and. wealth give it more the in which to carry out such internal
=forms than is available to many of its neighbors. Even so, this time is
measured in years and not in decades.
As has been discussed earlier, these reforms should include efforts to:
a Reduce dependence 811 welfxel and Rserve subsidies only for its
poor citizens. Water, electriciw, motor gasoline, basic foods, and
many services need to be priced at market levels and subsidies to citizens
need to be replaced with jobs md eco~~omic opportunities.
* Force radical reductims in the nurnber of foreign workers, with priority
for rczductions in servants and in trades that af2ow the most
rapid, conversion to native labor* Charge high fees for fo~ign Labor
permits and force all foreign labor to pay not only the cost of all govent
services, but pay a premium over cost.
a Force social changes in kwait by eliminating guaranteed employment
in the government and ensuring that government salaries lag
sharpfy behind those in the private sector. Kuwait's young and wefl-

educated poputation needs to be givm jobs, and Kuwaiti society
must adapt to the rcality that its present dependence on forcign
labor is a major threat to Kuwait" nnational identity and security.
* Educate Kuwaitis to regard g m ent jobs as having 1w status
and to understand that most government jobs are now a net liability
to the Kuwaiti economy Freeze and then reduce the number of civil
servants. Restructure and down-size the civil service to focus on
productive areas of activity wi& a much smaller pool of Irranpower.
Cut back sharply on state employees by the year 2000.
* Restmcture the educational system to focus on job train% and cornpetitiveness.
Create strong new illcentives or faculty and students
to focus on job-related education, sharply down-siz other forms of
educational funding and activity, and eliminate high owerhead educational
activities with~u"f:co~~omic benefits.
* Eliminate economic disincentives for employers hiring native labor,
and create disincentives for hiring foreign labor.
* Shift all govcmment impacted goods md services to rnarket prices.
Remove distortions in the economy and underpkchg oi water, ail,
and gas.
* Implement extensive privatk,.t.ion to increase the efficiency of
Kuwai"t investments in downstream and upstmam operations. Create
real jobs and career opportunities fnr native Kuwaitis, and open
jnvestmelrt opportunikies up to a much wider range of: investors.
Kuwaifilnas alrcady begun this process but it needs to be sharply
accelerated to remove productive activity from govemmmt control.
At the sme time, privatization must be managed in ways that
ensure afl Kuwaitis an opporh;tnity to share in the privatization
process. It should not he conducted in a way that benefits only a
small elite group of jnvestors md discourages popular confidence
and willhgness to invest in Kuwait.
* Stop subsidizing Kuwaiti businesses in w~ which prtrvent realistic
ecmornic growth md develoipment, md which deprive the government
of revenue, Present policies strongly favor Kuwaiti citizens
and Kuwaiti-owned companks Income taxes are only levied on foreig11
corporations and foreign inte~sts i,n Kuwaiti corporations, at
rates that may range as high as 55 percent of net income.
* Tax ean~jngs and sales with progressive tartes that rc3duce or elhinate
budget deficits, encourage lcxal investment, md create strong dishccntives
for the expatriation of capiifal, including all foreig holdings
of capital anci property by members of elite and ruling hmfiies. This
will. pvide a key source of' revenue, and make the distribugon of
income more equitable. Kuwait needs to ensure that wealthier
KuwaWs make a poper mntribu~~n to social services and deknse.

* Ahw foreign investmnt on mcrw competitive terms. Kuwait currclnlly
allows foreign investmnt in lixnited sectors of Ihe economy,
in minority partnerships, and on terms compatible with continued
Kuwaiti control of all basic economic activities. Some sectors of the
ecmorny-includhg oil, banking, ins~~rmce and real, estate-have
traditionally been closed to foreign investment, Foreigners (with. the
exception of naticmals from sow GCC states) are not permitted to
trade in Kuwaiti stocks on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange, except
through the medium of unit trusts, Protection shodd not, however,
extend to the point where it elinninates efficiency and competitiveness,
or restricts eco~zomic: expansio~z. Foreign nationals, who represent
a majority of the population, are prohibit.ed fmm having majority
ownership in virtually every business other than certaill smafi
service-oriented bushesses md may not own property (there are
som exceptions for citizens of other GCC states), Kuwait needs to
act on proposals such as allwing foreip equity particripation in the
bankhg sector (up to 40 percent) md h the upstream oil sector
(terms still to be determined).
* Refom the structurt. of tbr budget to ensure that most of the
nation" revezzues md foreign reserves md earnhgs are integrated
into the national budget and into the planning process. Clearly separate
royal and national income and investment holdings.
* Place sharp limits on the transkr of state funds to princes and members
of the royal family outside the actual mhng fmily, and trans-.
fers of unearned income to members of other leading families.
Elnszxre that such hily rnmbers are fully taxed on all incorn and
investments.
* Ensure that all income from enterprises with state financing is
rclflected in the na.t.ional budget and is integrated into the nati.onal
economic development and planning program.
* Establish mthlcssly demanding market criteria for evaluatirrg and
makhg all major state and state-supported investments. Require
state investments to offer a conclusively bigher rate of return than
private investments. Demanli detailed and independent risk assessment
md projections of comparative return on hvest.nnent, with a
substantial penlalty for state versus privately funded projects and
venturczs. Dawn-size the scale of programs to =duce investment and
cash flow costs md the risk of cost-escalation.
* Create new incmtives to invest in local hdustries and business and
disincentives for the expatriation of capital.
* Create nnarket driven incentives for fo~ign in\restment in major oil
and ga~rOjects, refinerigs, and petrochemical operations. Avoid offset
~quirements that simply create disguixhemployment or

non-competitive vmbres that act as a further state-spcmsored distortion
of the economy
* Establish a firm rule of law for all property, cmtract, permitting, and
business activity and reduce state bureaucratic and permitting barriers
to private hvestment.
* Place nationd security spending on the same basis as other state
spending, and fully impleMent the law the Nationai Assembly
passed in 1,993 to insure that all direct and indirect defense costsincluding
arms-are reflected in the national budget. htegrate it
fuify into the nationat budget, including investment and equipment
purchases..
* Replace the present eznphasis on judging ams purchases of the
basis on initial procmement wsts a d technical featurlts with a M1
assessment: of life cycle cost-including training, maintenance, and
Ifacilities.
* Cease buying arms in an effort to win outside pohtical support and
establish speejfic proccdurcs and wgulations for evaiuating the
value of standadization and interoperability with existing national
equipment and facilities, those of other Gulf states, a d those of the
US md other power projection forces.
* Subject all offset proposals relating to govement military and
non-military expenditures abroad to the same risk a d cost-benefit
analyses used by the private sector, and create independent auditing
procedures to ensure that offsets do not become a cmcealed
ent sutnsiciy or a way of benefiting i~~flrrential gwe
officials.
* Expand the number of voters for the National AssemhIy, Cmtirtue
to allow the ercpansian of golitid activity to ensure the peaw"ful resolution
of internal economic d&ates.
* Deal with the issue of the Bidom and expand citizenship to de facto
Kuwaitis,
* Create a l011g-term pl ing effort focusing on periods five, ten, and
hnienty years into the future to set goals for Kuwait" social, economic,
and military development, with special attentim to the problems
of- pop"latio11 growth, reducing depertdence on foreign labor,
dkersifying the economy, and lhkirtg developmnt to a clear set of
social goals. Use cmtingency and risk analysis, not sirnp?w growthoriented
models.

Notes
Chapter 3
1. Oil altd Cos Jclumnl, September 23,1991, p. 62; 6; and IEA, Middle East Oil and
Gas, Paris, BECL)/IEA, 1995, Annwes 16 and 27.
2, The military manpower, force strength, and equipment estimates in this section
are made by the author using a wide range of sources, including computerized
data bases, interviews, and prss clipping wrvices. Most are impc~ssible to
reference in way~of use to the reader. The force strength statistics are generally
taken from interviews, and from the sources reference for each paragraph. The
data for the pre-Gulf LZrar estimates also draw heavily on his Ttze Gulf alzd the
S~"arcI.1 for SIrn tegk Sf.la biEify (Boulder, Wesb~iew, 4984) and Thc Czav mzd f k West
(Boulder, Westview, 1988).
Extensive use has also been rnade of the annual editions of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies 1CTz'litlal.y Bala~ee (IfSt;, London), in this case, the
1995-1996 edition, and of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The Military Bnlancc
in Ik Middle East UCSS, Tef hviv), especially the 4994-1995 edition and working
materials from the coming edition. Material has also been drawn from cornputer
print outs from NEXIS, the United States Naval Institute data base, and
from the DMS/FI Market Intelligence Reports data base, Other sources include
jn~~eS Defe~se Wcekty, December 14, lli391, p. 1174, March 28, 1992, pp. 52s531;
New York Tijfi~~es, January 14, 1992, p. 4; tondon Financial Ti"?nes, July 8, 1991, p. 3,
Janua~ 7, 1992, p. "4 Defense Nezus, February 10, 1992, g. 38; Theodore Crajg,
"Kuwait: Background, Restoration, and Questions for the Unit& States," Congressional
Research Sewice, 91 -2&8F;, May 21, 1992; Department of Defense, Conduct
of flze Persian Gulf' Wn1;. Firznl Report IQ CLI~Z~~@SS, Washington, Department of
Defense, AgriX, 1992, pp. 2-10; Mililla~y Eclznofo~ "World Defense Almanac for
4991-1992,'' published in early 1992; Foreign Affairs Division, ""Middle East Arms
Control and Rel ated Issues," Washingon, Congressional Research Service, 92 -
384E May 1, 1994; and Middle East Eco~zomic Digest., ""Special Report: Defense,,""
Volume 35, December 13,1991,
Weapons data are taken from many sources, including computerized material
available in NEXTS, and various editiom oE]aneS Figjzti~tg Ships Oane's Publishing);
Iafiznc's Naval Weapons Syslenfs (Jane's Publishing); JaneS Annor n~zd Artillery (Janers
Publishing); lane's I~gn~~kjy Weayot~~ Uane's Publishing); jar~e's Milz'lnjy Vehicles arzd
Logistics tJane's Publishing); jnne's Land-Blase Air Defense (Jane" Publishing); ]one3
All tfzc Worldf$ Aircraft Uane's Putxbshing); Jnrle's Bntf Eefield Sz~rvcillnizw Systems,
IPublishkg); kneS Radar and Ekctrorzic Wnfare Systems Uane's Publishing),
jatze"sC3I Systems Oane" Publishing); lane3 Air-Lnti~zclzed Weayotzs Systems (Janefs

Publishing); In~zr.3 Dqelase Rppoin5menl.s 6 Prucuremerzf Ha~zdbouk (Middle Ensf Edition)
(Jane's Publishing); Rnks of the World (8rrmard and Grafe); Weyer's Warskzi;
(Bernard and Grafeer); and Warpla~zes of tfzc World (Bei-nard and Crafe).
Other military background, effectiveness, strmgth, organizational, and history
data are taken from Anthony H. Cordesman, T!ze Gulf and th Searcti for Slrategk
Stability, Bout der, Wesbiew, 2984, The Gulf and tI:2(t Wesf, Boufdeq Weskiew, 1 988,
and Weapons of Mass Des5rueti;an ir-z the Midle Emt, London, Brassey%/ RUSX, 1991;
Anthany H, Cordesman and Abraham Wizper, The Lessons ofModern War, Volume
TI, Boulder, WeshriewI 1989; the relevant count^ or war sedions of Hex;berC. K.
Tiltema, bzterr-zatfonnl Gorzpict Since 1945, buldel; Westview, 1991; Department of
Defense and Depadment of State, Congressionnf Presentaliot? for Seeurl'fy Assis&nce
Prqmms, Fiscnl Ymr 2993, Washington, Department of State, 1992; various annual
editions of John Lraffin" sI"12e Wodd irz Conjlict or War Annttal, London, Brassey",
and Joh Keegan, Inkartd Armies, London, Macmillan, 1983.
3. The ranges shown cover the low and high case. The source of these projections
is EIA, Oil Market Simulation Mcjdel Spreadsheet, 1994, data prc>vided by
the EIA Enerw Markets and Contingency Idarmation Division, and EIA, Inter-
~afional Energy Ozltlook, 2994, pp. 11 -28.
4. For further details on the strategic history of Kuwait, see Helen Chapin
Meter, Persian C~ty States, Washingtonr Depadment of the Army DA Pam 550-1 85,
4993, and Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gt~ya~zd th West, Boulder, Wesh~iew~ 1994.
Chapter 2
5. Alfred B. Prados, ""lraq and Kuwait: Conflicting Histc>ricat Cfairns," Congressional
Rexarch Srvice, 91-34E January 11, 4991, p. 4.
6. Afnericatz Arab Afail"~, Fa11 1989, p. 30; Los Angeles Tirrres, December 2, 1990,
pp. M-4 and M-8; Theodore Craig, ""Kuwait: Background, Restoration, and Questions
for the United States," Congressional Research Service, 91-288F, May 21,
1992, p. 9.
7, Waslzitzgton Post, December 19, 1987, p. A-27.
8. Department of Defenx, Condr~ek c$ the Pemian Guy Wal.; Final Report to Congress,
Washington, Department of Defense, April, 1992, pp. 6-7.
9. Department: of Def'en,~, Conduck cf the Pemfan Guy Wg1;" Final Report to Congress,
Washington, Department of Defense, April, 1992, pp, 34.
20. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Perskn Gulf LZmr; Final Report to Congress,
VVashington, Department of Defense, April, 1992, pp. 34.
21, Alfred B. Prados, "Iraq and Kuwait: Conflicting Historical Claims," Can.gressional
Rewarch %rvict;3,91-34F, January 11,1991, p. 4.
22. FBIS NES9Q-138, Jufy 18, 1990, p. 21; Theodore Craig' *Kuwait: Background,
Restoration, and Questions for the United States,'Tongressisnal
Research Service, 91-288F May 21,1992, p. 8; Department of Defenw, Corzduct. of
the Persian Guy Wac Final Rqort to Coqress, Washington, Department of Defense,
April, 4992, pp. 2-10.
23, fizne's Defense Weekly, February 22, 1992, p. 274, March 7, 1992, p. 375,
August 1, 1992, p. A-40, August 4, 1992, p. A-14, August 8, 4992, p. 6, August

45, 1992, p. A-15; Dcfcnse NPWS, September 9,1991, p, 1, November 18,1991, p,
3, February 17, 1992, p. 3, June 15, 1992, p. 26; Stars and Stripes, March 3, 1992,
p. 8; Lorjdon Fina~lc-iat Timcs, July 8,1991, p. 3; 'MIasf~i~zgt~~t Post, August 28,1991,
p. A-7, September 6, 1991, p. A-24, August 15, 1992, p. A-15; Wasfzi~zgton T;;ntes,
December 6, 1991, p. A-2, August 5, 1992, p, A-4; R.uinfr'un Week, September 9,
1991, p. 21.
14. The border was laid out relatively quickly by a single British agent, Major
Joh More' and no follow-up effort was made to create a formal survey or border
markings. Economist, Fhruary 2.9, 19Zm p. 45; Plzz'ladelphia Itzquirer, Februa~ 20,
4992, p. A-46; Wall Street Jourrznl, December 5,1991, p. A-4.
15. Department of Defense backgrc>und briefing, October 20, 1994 (Federal
News Srvice); DeparZment of Defense handouts of Oct~ber 14,1994 and October
12, 3994; fanek Defevtse WeeF;bJ October 22,1994, p. 4, December 17,1994, p. 7; US
Army briefing sheet (undated) October, 1994; Congressional Research Sei-vice,
Iraq Crisis, October, 2994, A Cl'zmnology, 94-808F, October 24,1994.
16. This description is based on interviews with US experts, and Executive
News Service, August 2% 1995, 0329, September 19, 1995, 1014, September 27,
1995,0324; Washingtcyn Post, August 19, 1995, p. A-17.
17, Balf-imore Sur?, December 29,1995, p. 16A; Dqerzse Mews, April 18,1995, p. 40;
Wall Street lournal, June 27, 1995, p. A-10.
18. Dfetzsc NPZUS, April 18,1995, p, 40; Wr Jl Street jour~zal, June 27,1995, p. A-40.
19. Executive News Service, October 10,1995,0221.
20. CIA, World FaL"Ebook, 2995, ""Kuwait'" j~n~e"s~e~zse Weekly, July 29,495, p. 45.
Chapter 3
21 "Special Repc~rt Kuwait," MIIIdEc East Ecmontz'c Digest, Februav 23,1996, p. 7.
22. Estimates based upcm the data in ""Special Report Kuwait," Middle East Econontic
DQesl, Februa~ 23, 1996, p. 15; ACDA, Wrld Militar)~ Expenditures and
Arms Transfers, 499S1994, Table 1, and CIA, World Factbook, 1995, and Vousef H.
AI-Ebraheem, "The Gulf Economic Situation in the Next Decade: The Case of
Kuwait," National Defenw University Workshop on Gulf Sc-?curity, April, 1996, p.
10. Further statistical and analytic background is taken from material provided by
the World Bank, including "Wfl Arab Workers Prosper or Be Left Out in the
Twenty-First Century?," August, 19995; ""Forging a Par-tnership for Environmental
Actic>n," December; 19%; and "'A Population Perspective on Development: The
Middle East and North Africa," August, 1994.
23. World Bank, "Ec>rging a Partnership for Environmental Action," December;
4994; and "A Populatic~n Perspedive on Development: The Middle East and
North Africa," Washington, World Bad, August, 1994, p. 24,
24. CIA, Worl~Z Factbookl 11995, LIAE,
25. Energy Infarmation Agency (EZA), Irttertzatlitnnl Energy Outlook, 2994,
DOEIEIA 0484((34), July 1994, pp. 34-26; ETA, hztemational Pelrofezim Slntzcs
Report, DOE/EIA 0520(94)1), November, 1994, pp. 6-7, and International Pt*froleum
Encyclopedia, 1993, p. 280. These estimates have become increasingly more poiiti-

cal in recent years as each major prc~ducer in the Gulf has tried tcr exaggerate its
reserves and relative importance,
26. IEA, Middle East Oif and Gas, Paris, OECD/IEA, 4995, p. 158.
27- "Special Report Kuwait,'" Middle East Ecmo~rtic Digest, February 24, 1995,
pp. 42-16.
213. This dixussion of Kuwaiti energy developments is adapted fram material
provided in the I>OE/ETA Tnternet data base, ETA, analysis sedion, country chapters,
as accessed on July 15,1995 and March 9,1996; and XEA, Middle East Oil and
Gas, Paris, BECDIXEA, 2 995.
29. Oil attd Gns htat-rzal, Sptember 23,1991, p. 62,
30. IEA, Mid~jle East Qif alzd Gas, Paris, OECDIIEA, 1995, pp. 153-157.
31. IEA, Mi&Ee East Oil mzd Gm, Paris, OECD/IEA, 4995, pp. 153-157.
32- TEA, Middle East Oil n ~ Gas, d Paris, OECD/IEA, 1995, pp. 155-160.
33. Energy Informa tion Agency (EIA), Interr-.m tioior?nlt E~t~rgy Oz~tlook, 1994,
DOE /EXA 0484(94), July, 3.994, pp. 1 4-26; EXA, X?z temn timzal Petmleunz Stn t ~s
ReporI", Z>OE/EIA 0520(%)2), Nc~vernber, 1994, pp, 6-7, and International Petrofeunt
Encyclopedia, 1 993, p. 280. These estirna tes have become increasing1 y more political
in recent years as each major prcYducer in the Gulf has tried to exaggerates its
reselves and relative importance.
34, This discussion of Kuwait energy developments is adapted from material
provided in the DOE/EIA Intei-net data base, EIA, analysis section, country chapters,
as accessed on July 15,1995 and March 9,1996; and IEA, Middle East Oil and
Gas, Paris, OECD/IEA, 1995.
35. This discussian of Kuwait energy developments is adapted fram material
provided in the I>OE/ETA Tnternet data base, ETA, analysis sedion, country chapters,
as accessed on July 15,1995 and March 9,1996; and XEA, Middle East Oil and
Gas, Paris, BECDI XEA, 1 995.
36. "Special Repc~rt Kuwait,"%iddl'e Ensf Econufnic Digest, February 24, 4995,
pp. 12-1 6.
37. This discussion of Kuwait energy developments is adapted from material
provided in the DOE/EXA Internet data base, EXA, analysis section, country chapters,
as accessed on July 15,1995 and March 9,1996; and IEA, Middle East Oil arzd
Gas, Paris, OECDIXEA, 1995.
38. Middle EnsE Economic Digest, Februa~ 24,1995, p. 14.
39. Wall Street foz-lrrzal, June 27,1995, p. A-10,
40. This discussion of Kuwait energy developments is adapted from material
provided in the DOE/EIA Intei-net data base, EIA, analysis section, country chapters,
as accessed on July 15,1995 and Ma~h 9,1996; and TEA, Middle East 01'1 and
Gm, Paris, OECD/ IEA, 1995.
41. This discussion of Kuwait energy developments is adapted fram material
provided in the DOE/EIA Intei-net data base, EM, analysis section, country chapters,
as accessed on July 15,1995 and March 9,1994; and IEA, Middle East Oil and
Gas, Paris, BECDI XEA, 1 995.
42. "Special Report Kuwait,'" Middle East Ecmo~rtic Digest, Fdruary 24, 1995,
pp. 12-1 6.

138 Motes
43. This discussion of Kuwait energy developments is adapted from material
provided in the DOEJEIA Internet data base, EIA, analysis section, country chapters,
as accessed on july 15,1995 and March 9,1996; and IEA, Middle East Oil and
Gas, Paris, OECU/IEA, 1995,
44. "Special Report Kuwait," Middle Ensf Eco~zomic Diges".Sf February 23,1996, p.
15; New York Ti"r.rzes, July 17,1995, p. D-4,
45. This discussion of Kuwait energy developments is adapted frorn material
provided in the DOE/EXA Internet data base, EXA, analysis section, country chapters,
as accessed on July 15,1995 and March 9,1996; and TEA, Middle Easl Qil and
Gns, Paris, OECD/ IEA, 1995, Annexes IC and 21.
46. This discussion of Kuwait energy developments is adapted frorn material
provided in the DOEJEIA Intei-net data base, EIA, analysis section, country chapters,
as accessed on July 15, 1995 and March 9,1996; and IEA, Middle East Oil and
Gas, Paris, OECD/IEA, 1995, Annexes IC and 21.
47- Middts East Eeono~rtic Digest, February 23,1996, p, 14.
48. EIA, Monllzly E~lergy Reokw, August, 1995, p. 130; ""Special Report Kuwait,''
Middle East Economic Digest, February 24, 1995, pp. 9-22; CIA, World Factbook;
1994, pp. 220--21.
49. "Special Repc~rt Krawait,"%iddle Ensf Ecunufnic Digest, February 24, 4995,
pp. 9-22; CIA, World Factbook, 1994, pp. 22&221; Wall Street journal, June 4,1996,
p. A-44,
50. Wall Street foz-lrrzal, June 4, 1996, p- A-14.
51. This discussion of Kuwait energy developments is adapted from material
provided in the DOE/EXA Internet data base, EXA, analysis section, country chapters,
as accessed on July 15,1995 and March 9,1996; and TEA, Middle Easl Qil and
Gas, Paris, OEGDIIEA, 1995, Annexes 1C and 21.
52. Yousef H. Al-Ebraheern, ""Te Gulf Economic Situation in the Next Decade:
The Case of Kuwait," Natit2nal Defense University Workshop on Gulf Scurity,
April, 1996, g. 10.
53. It is typical of the serious conflicts in data on the Gulf that there are very
different figures in other Ministry af Finance documents. Another estimate of the
public budget in millions of Kuwaiti Dinars is as hllows:
Rez~en ues Expetzdr'Ezr ms Surylus/DeJieit
54. "SpeciaX Repc,E"c Kuwait," Middle East Economic Iligcsf, Februa~
24, 1995,
pp. 9-22; CIA, World hctbaok, 2995# 'Kuwait,"

55. Armed Frrrce Journal, August 4995, p. 22;
56. ""Jlilne? Defense Weekly, July 29, 1995, pp. 17-36; "Special Report Kuwait,"
Middle East Economic Digest, February 24, 1995, pp. 9-22; Special Report
Kuwait," Fdbruary 24, 1995, pp. 9-22; June 164, 1995; June 23, 1995, July 21,
4995, p. 41, August 41, 1995, pp. 40-11, August 25, 1995, p, 23, September 4,
1995, pp. 6-7.
57. Middle Enst Econontic Digcsf, July 21, 1995, p. 11; lane$ Dcfense Weekly, July
29, 1995, pp. 17-36; ""Special Report Kuwait," Middle East Econo~rtic Digest, February
24,1995, pp. 9-22.
58. Uousef I..{. Al-Ebraheem, ""The Culf Ecctnnmic Situation in the Next Decade:
The Case of Kuwait," NNional Defense University Wc~rkshop on Gulf Securit~
April, 4996, p. 12.
59, US State Department, Internet data base, economic report on Kuwai"c,
accesxd June 20, 4995; Middle East Ecorzumic Digest, July 21, 4995, p. 44; IatzcS
Deje~zse Weekly, July 29, 1995, pp. 17-36.
60. US State Department, Internet data base, economic repcrrt c~n Kuw-ait,
accessed Jme 20, 1995; M2dEe East Economic Digest, July 21, 1995, p. 11; lane3
Dfense Weekly, July 29, 2 995, pp, 1 7-36.
61. "Special Report Kuwait," Middle Enst Eco~zomic Diges".Sf February 23,1996, p.
8; Middle E~sl Economic Digest, July 21,1995, p. 11; ""Special Report Kuwaitl" Middle
Ensf Econufnic Digest, February 24, 1995, pp. 9-22; ""Secial Report Kuwait,""
Middle East Eco~romic Digest, February 24, 1995, pp. 9-22; CIA, frdorld Factb~ok~
1994, pp. 220-221; Middk Enst Eco~zomic Digest, June 16,1995, August 25,1995, p.
23, September 1, 2 995, p. 6.
62. EEA, Monthly Energy REZI~~U), August, 1995, p. 130; ""Special Report Kuwait/''
Middle East Economic Digest, February 24, 1995, pp. 9-22; CIA, World Factbook,
1994, pp. 220--21.
63. Middle East Eco~zumic Digest, July 21, 4995, p, 11; lane% Defettse Weekly, July
29, 1995, pp, 17-36; "'Special Report Kuwait," Middle Easl Economic Digest, February
24,1995, pp. 9-22; CIA, World Faetbook, 1994, pp. 220-221.
64, VVOrld Bank, World Pol~nln tion Project ions, 2 9962 995, Washington, VVorld
Bank, 1994; Middle Ensf Eco~zoitnic Digmt, July 28,1995, p. 11, February 23, 4996, p.
10; CIA IIVQdd Factbook, 1995, "Iran.'"
65, CIA, World hetbook, 1994, pp. 220--21; Middle Easl Econontzt: Digest, July 21,
1995, p. 11; JatzeS Befiilnse Wcekfy, July 29, 1995, pp. 17-36; &neS Defense Weekly,
July 29,1995, p. 18.
66. Ecctnnmist Intelligence Unit, Countty Profile: Kuwait, London, 1996, pp.
33-14; Yc~uwf H. AI-Ebraheem, "The Gulf Economic Situation in the Next Decade:
The Case of Kuwait," National Defeme University Workshop an Culf Siecurity;
April, 1996, p. 12.
67. CIA, WorI~i! Faclbook, 2995; Economist Intelligence Unit, Countly I"ruj!e:
Kuzuait, London, 2996, pp. 13-14. Further statistical and analytic backpound is
taken from material provided by the Wrld Bank, including "Will Arab TNclrkers
Prosper or Be Left Out in the Twenty-First Century?" August, 1995; ""Fbrgng a
Partnershi p for Envircjnmentai Action," December, 1 994; and '% Population Perspective
on Development: The Middle East and North Africa," August, 1994.

140 Motes
613, Economist Intelligence Unit, Colartlq Profile: Kuzonil, London, lli396, p. 10,
69. Economist Intelligence Unit, Count~y Profile: Kzazunil", Z,ondon, 1996, pp,
40-14; CIA, World Factbook, 1995; Economist Intelligence Unit, Countq Profile:
Kuzuait, London, 1996, pp. 13-14. Further statistical and analytic background is
taken from material provided by the World Bank, including "Will Arab Workers
Prosper or Be Left Qut in the Twenty-First Century?" Aupst, 1995; ""Fr@ng a
Part.nershxp for Envirc3nmentat Action," December, 1994; and ''A Population Perspective
on Development: The Middle East and North Africa," August, 1994.
'70. See Peter Carison, "'Castles in the Sand," Wastzizzgton Post Mngaziuze, Janua~
44, 4996; Mary Tetrault, "Gulf Winds," C~larre~tt Hislufy, 1996; E Gregory Cause,
01'1 Monnrcltis: Dor7testic and Security Ghallerzgcs in the Arnb Cztlf States, New York,
Council on Foreign Relations, 1994,
71. CIA, World Factbook, 299.5. Further statistical and analytic background is
taken from material provided by the Wrld Bank, including "Will Arab Workers
Prosper or Be Left Out in the "fwenty-First Century?'Wugust, 1995; "Forging
a Partnership for Environmental Action," December, 1994; and "A Aopu-
Xation Perspectirfe on Development: The Middle East and North Africarrf
August, 1994.
72. Middle East Eco~zomic Digest, February 24, 1995, pp. 9-22; Special Repad
Kuwait," kbruary 24, 1995, pp. 9-22; June 16, 1995, p. 8; June 23, 1995, July 21,
4995, p. 14, August 14,1995, pp. 10-44, August 25,1995, p, 23, September 1,4995,
pp. 6-7; Los Angel& Tin@$, June 27, 1 995, p. C-3.
73. Ncztr York I"i?rtes, July 17,4995, p. D-4; Wall SZreef Jotin-tal, June 27,4995, p. A-40.
74. CIA, Wodd Factbook, 1995, "Muwait"; World Bank, ""A Population Perspective
on DeveXopment: The Middle East and North Africa," August, 1994, p. 24.
75. "Special Report Kuwait,'" Middle East Eccmo~rtic Digest, February 24, 1995,
pp. 9-22.
76. Los Ar~geles Tiwimes, January 28,1992, p, C-4.
77. CIA, Wo~lcd Flilctbook, 154, NKuwait."
Chapter 4
78. CIA, World Ft~ctbook~ 2995, "Kuwait"'; Based on the Internet version of the
US State Department repc~rt on Hurnan Rights for 1994, Kuwait country chapter,
as accessed July 15, 1995 and March 9, 1 996; and IEA, Middle East Oil a ~ Gas, d
Paris, BECD/XEA, 1995, Annwes 1C and 21.
79.. Based on the Intermt version of the US State Department report on Human
Rights far 1994, Kuwait country chapter, as acceswd July 15, 1995 and March 9,
4996; and IEA, Middle East Oil and Gas, Paris, BECD/IEA, 4995, Annexes IC and 21.
80, Based on the Internet version of the US Skate Depadment report on Hurnan
Kghts for 494, Kuwait colxrntry chapter, as accesxd July 15, 4995 and March 9,
1996; and TEA, Middle East Oil and Gas, Paris, OECB/IEA, 1995, Annexes 1 C and 21.
81. Based on the Internet .\rerslc>n of the US State Department report. on Hurnan
Rights far 1994, Kuwait comt~ chapteu; as accesxd July 15, 1995 and March 9,
1996; and IEA, Middle East O-il and Gas, Paris, OECD/IEA, 1995, Annexes 1 C and 21.

82, See Peter Carlson, ""Castles in the Sand," Was/ritzgtn~~ Post Magazine, January
14, 1996; Mar)r Tetrault, "Gulf Winds," Cumnl. HisCofy, 1996; E Gregc~ry Gause,
Oil Mor?nrc!ties: hmcstic and Sec~rriZcy Glmtletzges itz ttw Arab Gulf Stares, New York,
Council on Foreip Relatians, 1994.
83. Based an the Inketnet version af the US State Department report on Human
Rights for 1994, Kuwait country chapteu; as accessed July 15, 1995 and March 9,
1996; and IEA, Middle East Oil and Gas, Paris, OECRIIEA, 1995.
84. Based on the Internet version of the US State Depadment report on Human
Rights far 1994, Kuwait country chapter, as acceswd JuXy 15, 1995 and March 9,
4996; and IEA, Middle East Oil and (;as, Paris, BECD/IEA, 1995, Annexes 1C and 21.
85. London ifiuznncial E~nes, February 26 19132, pp. 111-1 to 111-3, The Sunday Times,
January 49, 1392, p. 1; Time, August 5, 1994, p. 32; Washington Times, May 27,
1992, p. A-7,
86. Londo~z FE'rzn~lc.inl Tiwimcs, February 26, 1992, pp. 111-1 to 111-3, The Sur?d~y Elnes,
January 3.9, 1992, p. I; Ti"jrte, August 5, 1991, p. 32; Washington Times, May 27,
1992, p. A-7.
87. Harry Brown, ""Population Issues in the Middle East and North Africa,'"
RWI Jozarnnl, February 1995, pp. 32-43.
88. Middlc East Economic Digest, February 23,1996, p. 11; Harry Brown, ""Ppulation
Issues in the Middle East and North Africa," RRUSI Journal, Februa~~ 1995,
pp. 32-43; ""CIA, World Factbook, 2995, f'""K-ttwai"E"
89. CIA, World Factbook, 1995, "Kuwait,'"
90. Middle East Economic Digesf, February 23,1996, pp. 40-12,
91. Based on the Internet version of the US State Department report on
Human Rights for 1994, Kuwait country chapter, as accessed July 15,1995 and
March 9, 1996; and IEA, Middle Enst 01'1 a d Gas, Paris, OECDIXEA, 1995,
Annexes 1 C and 21.
92. GJzicagu Tribzcrje, November 3, 1991, p. 1-44; Wnshingtorz Post, November 7,
1991, p. 1, June 5,1992, g. A-l, June 6, 192, p. A-17, October 3,1W2? pp. A-1,3-14,
October 6,1992, p. A-18, October 7, p. A-2X; Wall Street jo~r~laf, Oct~)ber 24, 4699ZI
p. A-2; Joseph I? We, "Kuwaiti Oil Well Fires Updated,'" Congressional Rexarch
Se~vice, 94-313, June 26,1994; WasFzington Tifzes, May 28,1992, p. A-7.
93. Middle East Emlrom-ic Digest, F&rua~ 24, 1995, pp. 9-22; $pedal Report
Kuwait," Februa~y 24,1995, pp. 9-B; June 16,1995, g. 8; June 23, 195, July 21,1995,
p. 11, Augmt 11,1995, pp. 1&12, Aupst 22,1995, p. 23, Sptember 1,1995, pp. 6-7;
Los Angeles Ernes, June 27; 1995, p. C-3; Jnvle's I)@cjzse Weekly, July 29,1995, pp. 17-18;
Wasfzirtgtotz Etnes, August 2, 1W5, p. A-IQ Boston Glober Augmt 20, 1995, p. 2.
94. Based on the Internet ~~erslon of the US State Department repod on Human
Kghts for 4994, Kuwait cowtry chapter, as accessed July 15, 4995 and March 9,
1996; and TEA, Middle East 01'1 and Gas, Paris, OECB/IEA, 1995, Annexes 1 C and 21.
95. Based an the Internet version of the US State Department report on
Human Rights for 1994, Kuwait country chapteu; as accessed July 15, 1995 and
March 9, 1996; and SEA, Middle Enst Oil and Gas, Paris, BECDIIEA, 1995,
Annexes 1 C and 21,
96. Los Angeles Et~reii, June 27, 1995, p. C-3.

142 Notes
97'. Amnesty International, Report 199dt NW York, Amnesty International Pub-
lications, pp. 189-1 91.
Chapter 5
98, Reutess, August 5,1995: 0353,
99. Dqense News, April 18,1945, p. 10; Wall Street Jozrmnl, June 27,1995, p. A-1 Q.
1 00, Defense News, March 2, 1 992, p. 'i; July, 199% p. 29; Armed Forces foarrzal,
July 1992, p. 29.
Chapter 6
1 01. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Exyendi-
I~ires alzd Arms Transfers, 1991-2992, Washington, GPO, 1994, Table I, and ACDA
computer print out, April, 14, 1 996,
102. f~ne$ Dq~nse Weekly, July 29,1995, p. 18; Wasltir-zgton Times, August 2, 1995,
p. A-16; TXSS, Milifiary Bnla~zce, 2995-1996, "Kuwait.'"
103. J@ners D4ense Weekly, July 29,1995, p. 18; Wasltir-zgton Times, August 2, 1995,
p. A-46.
104. Arrns Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Milifnfy Ex;?indi-
I~ires alzd Arms Tra~zsfcrs, 1992-1992, Washington, GPO, 1994, Table I, and ACDA
computer print out, April, 14, 1996.
105, Armed Forces jou?-rzal, July, 11995, p. 25; Jnr~eS Defcnse Weekly, July 29, 4995,
p. 18; Wasfji~fgton Ernes, August 2, 1995, p. A-16.
106.. Dqc~zse Mews, February 15, 1993, p. 1, April 18, 1994, p. 1, May 9, 1994, p.
12, December 13, 1993; lane2 BeJclzse Weekly, October 29, 1994, p- 21; Maneyclips,
July 4 and 8,1993, Reuters European Business Report, February 24,1993, July 8,
4993, August 21,1993; Associated Press, January 29,1993,
10'7. Armed Forces International, August, 1995, p. 22.
108, Arms Control and Disarmament, Agency (ACDA), World Milita~y Expenditrlres
and Arrrrs Tra~sfirs, 2990, Wshingtan, 660, 1993, Table 111; Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), VdclrM Milifafy Expenditure and Arms Trnnsfirs,
3993-1994, Washington, GPO, 1995, Table 111, and ACDA computer print out,
April, 14,1996.
109, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Exyendi-
Cures and Arms Pansfers, 2991-1992, Washington, GPO, 1994, Table 11; Arrns Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expe~zdilures alzd Arms
Pansfers, 1993-1994, Washlngto>n, GPO, 1995, Table IX and ACDA computer print
out, April, 44, 1996.
110. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Milifa~y Expendi-
I~ires and Arms Trar~sfers, 1991-1992, Washingtan, GPO, 1994, Table 11; Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency QACDA), World Military Expenditures n~d Arms
Pansfers, 1993-1994, Washjngto>n, GPO, 1995, Tabte 11 and ACDA computer print
out, April, 14,1996.
111. Arms Cc)ntroi and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Militny Ex;?indi-
I~ires and Arms Tra~zsfers, 199&2995, Washingtcm, GPO, 1996, Table III,

142. Richard F. Grimmett Corzverttiorzd Arms Traplsfers l.0 the T!jilia World,
1986-3993, CRS 94-612E July 29,1994, pp. 57-59; Conventional Ar~ns Pansfers ko kJze
TI2il.d World, 1987-1994? C B 95-862Ft August 4,1994, pp. 5-3.
113. JaneS Defizrtse Weekly, February 28, 1996, p. 3.
144. Richard F. Grimmetc Corzverttiorzal Arms Traplsfers l.0 the T!jilia World,
2986-199 CRS 94-612F, July 29,1994, pp. 57-59; Cont~entionnl Arlrzs En~sfers to the
Tlzircl World, 1987-1 994, CRS 95-862E August 4, 1 994, pp, 5M9.
135. Richard E Grirnmett; C"nnztentiot~af Arlrzs Transfers to tlte Thid World,
1986-1993, CRS 94-612& July 29,1994, pp, 57-59; ConvenCional Ar~ns Pansfers ko kll~
TI2il.d World, 1987-1994 CRS 95-862Ft August 4,1994, pp. 5-3.
11 6. US Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), 'Toreign Military Sates,
Fctreign Military C]snstrudion Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of Sqtember
30,1994," Department of Defense, Wil.shin@pt"n, 1995.
Chapter 7
1 17. CIA, World Factbook, 3991, pp. 173-2 74,
118. Kuwait is cc>nsiclering up-engining the tanks with new British or German
engines. lane3 Dejetzse WedEy, February 28, 4987, p. 323.
11 9. WasZzi~zgfon Enzes, July 14, 15388, p. 2.
120, lane's Deje~se Weekly, January 30, 1987, p. 454
121. Jn~e's Defense Weekly, February 28,1987, p- 314 and March 7, 1987, p. 359.
122, 1 am indebted tcr Lt. Commander Jerry Fergusc~n, one of my students at
Georgetown University, for much of the research, and many of the insights, on
Gulf naval and air forces presented in this chapter.
1 23. The 76 mm and 40 mm gms can provide some air defense, but with little
lethality The TNG-45s have very complicated electronics, virtually all of which
are maintained by fc3reign tcltehicians. The uclice newark system used by the
TNC-45 is so slow that it is virtually hopeless far air defense operations and generally
creates cmfusictn and increases delay and vulnerability if any attempt is
made to use it,
124, Aircraft actually in storage included 12 Lightnings, 4 Hunters, and 9 BAC-
167 Stri kernasters.
125. The A-4s Iack an air intercept radar, and can only engage in visual combat
using guns or Sidewinder missiles, There are 12 Lightnings and 9 Hunters in
storage,
126. Dcfctzse Mews, August 8, 1988, p. 7; lane3 Defclase Weekly, August 13, 49815,
g. 246; Wlirstzirzgton Rmm, July 25,1988, p. 1; Newsweek, August- 25, 1988, p. 47.
127. Sources differ. T11e JCSS is shawn. The IlSS says 2 DC-9,4 L-1QO-320.
Chapter 8
128. Majctr sources include Anthony FT. Cordesman, Affcr fhe Slaum: Tke 611cl;rzgiz~g
Milit~z~y Balance irz trlte Middle East, Boulder, Wstrriew, 3.993; The IISS, Military
Balatance, 1995-1996, London, TISS, 1995; Tim Ripley, "Rebuilding the Kuwaiti Militaq"
Interr-.mtioiar?al Defcrzse Rcztiew, 2/1993, pp. 457-159; Forecast International,

144 Motes
DMS Market Intelligence Repc~rt, Kuwaik June, 11994; James Bruce, "Kuwait: Castle
in the Sand," "JlaneS Dqense Weekly? October 29, 1994, p, 21, July 8,1995, p. 15,
July 23,1995, pp. 17-36.
129. jl2~e's Defense Weekly, March 28,1992, p. 531, July 29, 1995, pp- 17-36.
130. Estimates of Kuwait" restruduwd forces are based on material provided
by the Kuwaiti Embassy, the Jaffee Center, the Congressianal Research Service,
and the ItS5, Milihry &lnnc~., 1992-1992, pp. 110-111 and Miliftrry Bnhnc~.,
2995-1996, "Kuwait'"; New York Tirilvges, January 14, 1992, p. 4; London Fz'nnnei~l
E~nes, February 26, 19132, p. TIT-1; D~efzse News, May 6, 1996, p. 29.
131, NPW York Times, May 24,1991, p. 8; Lurjdo~t Flnn~zcial Ernes, June 24, 4992,
g. 18.
132, New York Elnes, January 14,11992, p, 4; Lorzdarz FE'rznt~cial Times, July 8, 4991,
p. 3, February 26,1992, p. 111-1; JnneS B~ferrse Weekly, December 14, 1991, p. 11 74,
July 29,1995, pp. 17-36; Armed Forms Inferrzalio~zal, August, 1993.
233, j127.zefs Defense Weekly, March 28,19192, p. 531, July 29, 2 995, pp. 17-36.
134. Major xlurces include Anthony H. Csrdesman, After. the Stemz: flte Gfangin8
Milifat7j Balazce in tlte Middle East, Boulder, WesLview, 1993; "fhe IllSS Milita~y Bnlnnce,
1995-2996, London, ITSS? 1995; Tim Ripley, ""Rebuilding the Kuwaiti Militar~''
Inferr-znticlrznl Dqctzse Rcvviczo, 214993, pp. 157-159; Forecast Internatic?nal, DMS Market
Intelligence Report, Kuw-ajt, June, 1994; James Bruce, "Kuwait: Castle in the
Sand," jazze's D#i2nse Weekly, Qctcjber 29,1994, p. 21, July 29,1995, pp. 17-36.
135, Waslzirzgton Posf, January 11, 1995, p. A-12.
136. Defeplse Neros, February 40,1992, p. 38.
1 37, The E3M12s cost $m0 million. IISS, Mill'tlzry Balalzw, 399S1996, p. 138; JaneS
D~efzse Weekly, July 29,1995, g. 26.
138, Bcfense Nezos, F&ruary 24, 1992, p. 1 & 82.
139. Iraq also retains a number of items that have gc>tent.ial military value,
including 27 Hungarian busesf 100 Mercedes trucks, and 60 forkfifs. Wraslzingturz
Post, January 11,1995, p. A-12; Mew York Tifzm, Janua~ 11,1995, p. A-8.
140. Armed Forces Jout-rzal, July, 1995, p. 23.
Chapter 9
1 41. Major murrres include Anthony H. Cordesman, APer the Slor~rz: The Clazging
Militnr;! BQ!Q~FZL.IC in the MiddCe East, Boraldel; Westview 1993; The IISS MiIit.a~y Bnlnlzce,
2995-4996, London, IXSS, 1995; Tim RipXey *%&uiXding the Kuwaiti Military,'"
Tntetrzntional Deense Reai~zu, 211993, pp. 157-159; Fc~recast International, DMS Market
Intelligence Report, Kuwait, Jmr?, 1994; James Bmce, "Kuwait: Castle in the
Sand," "fnne3 Dqense Wekfy, October 29,1994, g. 21, July 2% 1995, pp, 37-36.
142. I lSS, MiEifafy Bnlnncc, 199S1996, pp. 438-439; Jnnefs Deferrse Weekly,
December 14, 1991, p. 1174; hndon Finafzeial Tirr~es, N~~vember 18, 1991, g. 4;
Armed Forces jourrlal In tenzalicl~tnl, April, 1994, p. 14.
143. Definse Nezus, April 25, 194; fane's Defense Weekly, July 29, 1 995, pp. 1 7-36.
144, Dcfirzse News, January 11,1993, p. 3, Ferbruary 217, p. 8; Itr~e's Defense Weekly,
April 16, 1993, p- 8, Aupst 20, 2994, p, 21, July 8, 1995, p. 15, July 29, 1995, pp.
17-36; Kzlrrvnit i~z BrieJ November, 1995, p. 6.

145.JnncS Defettse Weekly, March 28,1992, p. 531, May 23,1992, p. 878# May 30,
1992, p. 911, August 15,1992, p. 5, Sptember 5,1992, p. 5, July 29,1995, pp. 17-36;
Londt.1~2 Firzarlcial Ti~r~es., July 8,1994, p, 3; Dgetzse Week, August 24,4992, p. 1; Dcfense
News, Sptember 28,2992, p. 48; Anrted Forces four~ckl, Novernbeu; 1992, p. 25.
146, The Wrriors are being provided under a $794 millictrt cmtract signed in
August, 2993 with GKN Uefense' a divisian of Telford, Xnc. They will be specially
mc>dified to imprcjved their performance in desert warfare, raising the cost to
$918 million. Dcfense Nezos, F&ruary 27, 2995, p. 8; July 8, 1995, p. 2 5, fane's
D~efzse Weekly, July 29,1995, pp. 37-36.
147. Jntze's D~fe~rstr We&ly, July 213,1995, pp. 17-36.,
148. Kuwaiti Xaw- requires that contracts over one milfio>n dinars result in onethird
of the value being reinvested in the Arab world, preferably in Kuwait. Executive
News %mice, Jut y 25,2995,0941; August 30,1995,0809,
149. Defcnse News, January 41,1993, p. 3, February 27, p. 8; lane's Defcnse Weekly,
April 16,1993, p. 8, August 20,1994, p. 21, July 8,1995, p. 15, July 22,1995, p. 17,
July 29,1995, pp. 17-36.
150. jalze's Defense Weekly, February 8, 1992, p. 187, February 2% 2 992, p. 274,
Juty 29,1995, pp. 17-36; D~efzse News, Nc>vember 18,1991, g. 37 London Financial
Times, February 16,1992, p. 4.
151. J~ne's Dqense Weekly, March 28,1992, pp. 530-531.
152, Defense Nm, May 6, 4996, p. 1.
253, j127.zeJs Defease Wcekly, July 22,1995, p. 2 7.
154, The 12 round 300 mm Smel-ch was available at only $1.8 million per
launcher and $140,000 per rocket and had twice the range of the MLR$. It did,
hc>wevex; have twice the reload time and required 25% more manpower, and only
had one warhead with 72 conventional HE submunitions versus a choice of a
warhead with 644 armor piercing submunitions or 28 anti-tank mines for the
MLR$, Reuters European Business Repc~rt, January 6,11i393; Defettse Mews, January
31,1993, p. 3; Jnrzers Defetzse Weekly, April 16,1993, p. 8, August 20,1994, p. 21, July
29,4995, pp. 17-36,
155, lane% Deferzse Weekly, July 1, 1995, p. 27, July 29, 1995, pp. 17-36; Arlrwd
Forces In terjrnliotzal, August, 1995, p. 22.
156, Defense Nezus, January 11,1993, p. 3, February 27, p. 8; j127.zeJs Defense Weekly,
April 16, 1993, p. 8, August 28, 1994, p. 21, July 8, 1995, g. 15, July 29, 1995, pp.
17-36,
157. Dejense Nem, No~vernber 18,1991, p. 37, November 25,1991, p. 22.
158. Associated Press, January 23,1993; New Uol-k Ti~~tes~ October 11,1994, Octnber
30,1994, p. 12; Financial E~res, OctcYber 11,1994, p. 5; Anrzy Times, February 15,
4993, p. 24; ln~e's Defettse We&ly, March 28, 4992, p. 531,
Chapter 10
2 59, Major sources include Anthony H. Cordesman, Affer trlte Stonrz: The Clza~gin8
Militarp B~ul~~ce in Gtw Middle East, Boulder, Wesb~iew, 1993; The llSS Military
Balnnce, 4995-1996, London, IISS, 2995; Ern XGpley, "Rebuilding the Kuwaiti Military;"
h~nl-ernational Defcnse Reviecu, 2/1993, pp. 157-359; Forecast International,

DMS Market Intelligence Repc~rt, Kuwaik June, 11994; James Bruee, "Kuwait: Castle
in the Sand," "no3 Defense Weekly, October 29, 1994, p. 21.
1I;CI. lane's D@e?tse Weekly, July 29,1995, pp. 17-36..
161. JaneS Defense Weekly, February 22, 1992, p. 274; Dejense Nezos, November
48, 4991, p. 37; November 25, 1991, p, 22; Ia~zeS Fighting Slzips, 1994, London,
Jane's, pp. 399-400.
162. J~ne's Fighting Sltips, 1994, London, Janefss, pp. 399400.
163. IXSS, Xblilifajy Balalzce, 2995-1996, pp- 13&239; Xntematim.zal Befi~se Revr'ei-u,
10/1991, g. 1152; Arvrled Forces Jozirnnl, April, 1994, p. 21; lane's Defense Weeklyf July
25, 4992; Dqfcnse Ner~rs, August 24,1994, pp. 3/36.
1-64. J~ne's Dqense Weekly, July 29, 1995, p. 30.
165. ZISS, MiliIny Batlance, 1995-1 996, pp. 13&139; Inle~~rzatiorzal Lfefettse Rezriezo,
1011992, p. 1152, Spternber 9, 1992, p. 802; Ar~rzed Forces fournaf, April, 1994, p.
21; Defetirse NPZUS, April 4&24,1994, p. 1, May 9,11994, February 2K 1995, p. 6; )atzcS
Dejense Weekly, January 1 5,1994, p. 20, October 29, 1 994, p. 21.
166. ji;tners Dgense Weekly, July 29,1995, p. 30.
Chapter I1
16'7. Majctr sources include Anthony FT. Cordesman, Affer fhe Storm: Tke 61.acl;rzging
Military Balance in ttw MWle East, Boulder, Wesh~iew, 1993; The llSS Milifary
B~lnnce, 4995-1996, London, IISS, 1995; Tim XGpley, "Rebuilding the Kuwaiti Militayt""nkcrr-zatioior?alt
Definsc Reztiew, 2/1993, pp. 457-1553; Frrrecast Znternatiortal,
BMS Market Intelligence Report, Kuwait, June, 1994; Jarnes Bruce, "Kuwait: Gastle
in the Sand," @no% Defetzse Weekly, October 29, 1994, p. 21.
168, Full repairs were largely comgXc3ted by the end of 1994. Defense News,
November 18,1991, p. 37.
169. Kuwait retains a stock of Matra 530 and 550 missiles, Jnl.refs Defer?se Weekly,
December 14,1991, p. 1174; Defel-rse Nezus, November 18,1991, p. 37; Avi~tion Week,
November 44,11994, p. 20.
1 70, Avl'ation We&, November 1 4,1994, p. 20; Befi~se News, August 22,1994, p.
8; lnr~eS Exercise c?? Eainitzg Mo~~it~r~ Ilanzm y-March 4 996, pp. 8-10, Ja.zzeS Defcnse
Weekly, April 24,1996, pp. 18-23.
171. The F/A-18s are the first delivered with the new F-404-GE-402 17,754
lb. thrust engines, giving it a 10-20% boost in power, IISS, Military Bnlnnce,
1995-2996, pp. 138-139; St. Louis-Post Displafetf, October 9, 1991, p. B-1; Avh-
Iion Week, February 3, 4992, p, 63, November 14, 1994, p., 20; Jar$efs D~.f-etzse
Weckly, October 26, 1991, p. 753, February 22, '11992, p. 274, March 28, 1992, p.
534, May 23, 1992, p, 879, April 24, 1996, pp. 18-22; Washingtuu Times, March
29, 1993, p. A-2.
172, Auia"afiun Wek, November 14, 1994, p. 20; Iat~e's Exercise c?? Raining Monitor?
Ja~ranry-Marc-2 2996, pp, 8-10, Jnne's Defelzse Weekly, April 24, 1996, pp.
1 8-23.
173. j127.zeJs Defe~se Wekly, July 29,1995, pp. 17-36, April 24, 1996, pp. 1 8-22.
1%. The FiA-28s are the first delivered with the new F-404CE-402 1'1",'754 lb.
thrust engines. IISS, Military Balanci~~ 2995-1996, pp. 13&139; );St. Lozais-Post Dispatch,
Octc3ber 9,1991, g. B-l ; Azl;iation Week, Fdruary 3,1992, g. 63, November 1 4,

4994, p, 20; lane% Dqelase Weekly, October 26, 1991, p. 753, February 22, 1992, p.
274, March 28,15392, p. 531, May 23,1992, p. 879, July 29,1995, pp, 17-36, April 24,
4996, pp. 18-22; Waslrit?gforz Ernes, March 29, 4993, p. A-2; lar1e3 Exercise 6 Tr~itzi~~g
Illnnitor; fatzua~y-Marcfz 1996, pp, 8-10.
175. St. Louis-Post Dispntch, October 9,1991, p, 13-1; Ruiafiotz Week, February
3, 1992, p, 63, November 14, 1994, p. 20; Jnne's Dqense Weekly, October 26,
1991, p. 753, April 24, 1996, pp. 18-22, February 22, 1992, g. 274, March 28,
1992, p. 531, May 23, 1992, p. 879, July 29, 1995, pp. 17-36; WQS~~E'IZ~~OU Times,
March 29, 1993, p. A-2; Jg~ane" Exercise & Training MoniCe;tr, jarzuary-Marcfz 1996,
pp. 8-10.
376, lane's D~efzse Weekly, March 28, 1992, p. 530, July 29, pp. 17-36; Reuters,
July 14,1995,1623.
1 77, Defclzse News, November 27-December 3, 1995, p. 4; JaneS Defi~se Weeklyt
July 29, pp. 4, and 17-36; Reuters, July 14, 1995, 1623; Executive News Service,
July 14,1995,1623.
2 78. Defel-tse Ncm, Nc~vernber 27-December 3,1995, g. 4.
179. Aviation Week, November 14, 1994, p. 20.
180. Jane'ss, Nafional and Itztemational Air Defeszse, 1994, London, Jane", p. 14.
181. FIig/zt. Infel-nniionnl, January 26, 1993, p. 5; Wall Street jarat-rznl, January 43,
1993, p. A-6; lnlernlrfional Defefzse Rrvieruf 211993, p. 98; 3;nne's Dqensp Weekly, April
29,1995, July 29,1995, pp. 47-36.
182. Kuzuait 2.r~ Rrieh March, 1996, p. 3.
183. FIiglzt. Infe~*rzntiorznl, January 26, 1993, p. 5; Wal1 Street jarat-rznl, January 43,
1993, p, A-6; 11p.r terrzafio?tnl Defense Reviewt 21 1993, p. 98; lane2 Defense Weekly, April
29,1995, July 29,1995, pp. 17-36.
1 84, Fligkl ltzter~ntional, January 26, 1993, p. 5; Wall Street jclumnl, January 13,
1993, p. A-6; llnletnlrfional Dcfefzse Revkruf 211993, p. 98; Jnne's Dqense Weekly, April
29,1995, July 29,1995, pp. 47-36.
1 85. IIISS, Mr'lita~y Bnli;r~jce, 1995-1 996, pp. 1 38-1 39; lane$ Defense Weekly, January
45, lli394, p. 20, October 29, 4994, p. 24, July 4, 1995, p. 27; Defense Nezvs, April
18-24, 1 994, p. 1, May 9,1994; Reuters, july 14,1995,1623,
1 86. The follwing Bscription of human rights is based on the Internet version
of the US State Department report on Human Rights far 1994, Kuwait
country chapter, and additional material from Middle East Watch and Amnesty
International.
187, Based on the Internet version of the US State Department repc~rt on
Human Rights for 1994 and 1995, Kuwait country chapter, as accessed July 15,
4995 and March 9,1996.
188, Based on the Internet version of the US Skate Department report on
Human Rights for 1994 and 1995, Kuwait count^ chaptex; as accessed July 15,
1995 and Ma~h 9,1996,
189. Based on the internet version of the US State Department repc~l"c on
Human Rights for 4994 and 1995, Kuwait counti-y chapter, as accessed July 45,
1995 and March 9,1996

1%. Based on the Internet version of the US Stake Department repc~rt on
Human Rights for 1994 and 1995, Kuwait cuunt~ chaptez; as accessed July 15,
4995 and March 9,1996,
291, Based on the Xnternek version of the US Skate Department report on
Human Rights for 4994 and 1995, Kuwait countiy chapter; as accessed July 45,
1995 and March 9,2996.
192. Based on the internet version of the US State Department repc~l"c on
Human Rights for 1994 and 1"35t Kuwait county chapter, as accessed July 15,
1995 and March 9,1996.
193. Based on the Internet version of the US Stake Department repc~rt on
Human Rights for 1994 and 1995, Kuwait cuunt~ chaptez; as accessed July 15,
4995 and March 9,1996,
294. Based on the Xnternek version of the US Skate Department report on
Human Rights for 4994 and 1995, Kuwait countiy chapter; as accessed July 45,
1995 and March 9,2996.
195. Based on the internet version of the US State Department repc~l"c on
Human Rights for 1994 and 1"35t Kuwait county chapter, as accessed July 15,
1995 and March 9,1996.
196. Based on the Internet version of the US Stake Department repc~rt on
Human Rights for 1994 and 1995, Kuwait cuunt~ chaptez; as accessed July 15,
4995 and March 9,1996,
297. Based on the Xnternek version of the US Skate Department report on
Human Rights for 4994 and 1995, Kuwait countiy chapter; as accessed July 45,
1995 and March 9,2996.
198. Based on the internet version of the US State Department repc~l"c on
Human Rights for 1994 and 1"35t Kuwait county chapter, as accessed July 15,
1995 and March 9,1996.
199, Based on the Internet version of the US Stake Department repc~rt on
Human Rights for 1994 and 1995, Kuwait cuunt~ chaptez; as accessed July 15,
4995 and March 9,1996,
200. Based on the Xnternek version of the US Skate Department report on
Human Rights for 4994 and 1995, Kuwait countiy chapter; as accessed July 45,
1995 and March 9,2996.
Chapter 23
203. New Yol'kr Tintes, October 28,1994, p. A-3.
202, Beutsche 13ress-Agentur, November 21, 1994; November 30, 1994; faneS
D~efzse Wc~ekly, July 9, 19%; J~ne's Exercise 6. Trail~ing Mon itsr, Janua ~y-Ma rch
4996, pp. 8-9.
203. Jane's Defense Weekly, February 22, 1992, g. 274, March '7, 1992, p. 375,
August 1, 4992, p, A-40, August 4, 1992, p. A-14, August 8, 4992, p. 6, August
15,1992, p, A-2 5; Befense News, September 9,Z 991, p. 1, November 18, 1991, p.
3, February 47, 1992, p. 3, June 15, 1992, p. 26; Stnrs aarzd Stripes, March 3, 1942,
p. 8; tondorz Fit-zn~cinl Times, July 8,1991, p. 3; Washington Posf, August 28,1991,
g. A-'7, September 6, 1993, p. A-24, August 15, 1992, p. A-35; Wnshif?gl"on Ti~nes,

December 6, 1991, p. A-2, August 5, 1992, p, A-4; Ruinfiun Week, September 9,
1991, p. 21.
204. Chalupa-BC R's SQRG S Brief; Nero York Ernes, October 44, 1994, p. A-l;
Washington Past, October 14, 1994, p. A-33; Department of Defense backpound
briefing, Octctber 20,1994 (Federal News Srvice); Department of Defense handouts
of (Ilctober 11,1994 and (nctober 12,1994; J;-ErreS Dtfense Weekly, October 22,
1994, g. 4, December 17, 1994, g. 7; US Army briefing sheet (undated) Octc~ber;
1994; Conpessionial Research Service, Iraq Crisis, October, 1994, A Chmnology, 94-
80&F, October 24, 1994; JQ~P's Deftnse Weekly, July 29, 1995, pp. 22-24.
205. Wgshingtun Titr~cs, Augwt 29, 1995; JnrzeS Defi~zse Weekly, August 26, 4995,
g. 3.
206, Executive News Seivice, August 253,1995,0329, Spternber 19,1995,4044,
September 27, 1995,0324; Washington Post, Augutit 19,1995, p. A-17;
207. Nt3ro York Tinres, January 30,19f)G, p. A-6.
2013, Beutsche 13ress-Agentur, November 21, 1994; November 30, 1994; faneS
D~efzse Weekly, July 9,1992
269. New York Elrres, October 14,1994, p. A-l; Washington Post, Octcriber 14,1994,
g. A-33; Department of Defense background briefing, Octcjber 20, 1994 (Federal
News Service); Congressional Research Seivice, Imq Crisis, October, 299df A
Clluonofogy, 94-8Q8Ff October 124, 1994; lane2 Dcfense Weekly, July 29, 1995, pp,
22-24; jnrzeS Exercise ir;. Bainitzg Morzitul; January-March 1996, pp. 8-9.
210. New York Ernes, October 14, 1994, p. A-2; Washirzgton Post, October 14,
423911, p, A-33; Congressional Resarch Service, Imq Crisis, Octobec 1994, A
Clzronology, 94-808F, October 24, 1994; fatzek Befi~se Weekly, Juf y 29, 1 925, pp.
22-24; &neS Exe-feise 6 Trainl'zfg Monitor, January-March, 1996, pp. 8-9.

Sources and Methods
This volume is part of a series of volumes on each of the Gulf states which has
been developed by the Cater for Strategic and Internatianal Studies as part of a
dpamic net assessment cjf the Middle East. This prctject has had the sponsorship
of each of the Southern Gulf states as well as US sponsors of the CSXS, and each
text has been widely distributed for comment to expe~s and officials in each
Southern Gulf country, to US experts and officials, and to several international
agencies and institutions, and t~arious private experts.
Sources
The author has drawn heavily on the inputs of outside reviewers throughout the
text. It was agreed with each reviewer, however; that no individual or agency
sht)uid be attributed at any point in the text except by specific request, and that
all data used be attributed to sources that are openly available to the public. The
reader should be aware of this in reviewing the footnotes. Only open sources are
normally referred to in the text, although the data contained in the analysis has
often been extensively modified to reflect expert comment.
There are other aspects of the sources used of which the reader should be
aware, It was possible to visit each Suuthern Gulf states at variom tims during
the preparation of this book and to talk to local officials and experts. %>me provided
detailed comments on the text. Interviews also took place with experts in
the United States, United Kingdom, France, Switzerland. and Germany brtions
of the manuscript tzrer-e circulated for informal review by European officials and
diplomats in same cases. Once again, no details regarding such visits or cornments
are referenced in the text.
Data fmm open sources are deliberately drawn fram a wide range of sources.
Virtually all of these sources are at least in partial ccmflict. There is no consensus
over demographic data, budget data, military expenditures and arms transfers,
force numbers, unit designations, or weapons types.
While the use of computer data ba~s allowed same cross-correlatic~n and
checking of such source, the reporting on factors like force strengths, unit types
and identities, tactics often could not be reconciled and citing multiple sources for
each case was not possible became it involved many detailed ju%rnents by the
author in recmcilirzg different reports and data.
"The Internet and several on-line services were also used extensively, Since such
the data bases are dynamic, and change or are deleted over time, there is no clear

Sources nlzd Meflzods 151
way to fc3otnate much of this material. Recent press sources are generally cited,
but are often only part of the material cmsulted-.
Methods
A brc~ad effort has been rnade to standardize the analysis of each cormti"yI but it
became clear early in the project that adopting a standard format did not suit the
differences that emerged between countries. The emphasis thrc>ughc>ut this phase
of the CSIS net assessment has been on analyzing the detailed trends within iindividuat
states and this aspects of the analysis has been given priority over country-to-country
consistency.
Tn many cases, the author adjusted the figures and data use in the analysis on
a "best guess" basis drawing on some thirty years of experience in the field, In
some other cases, the original data prcjvided by a given source were used without
adjustment to emure camparability even though this leads to =me cmflicts
in dates, place names, force strength, etc. within the material p~sented-particularly
between summary tables surveying a number of countries and the best
estimates for a specific country in the text. In such cases, it seemed best to provide
contradictory estimates to give the reader some idea of the range of uncertainty
involved.
Extensive use is rnade of graphics to allow the reader to easily interpret cornplex
statistical tables and see long-term trends. The graphic progam used was
deliberately standardized, and kept refatlively simple, to allow the material portrayed
to be as comparable as passible. Such graphics have the drawback, however,
that they often disguise differences in scale and exaggerate or minimize key
trends. The reader should carefully examine the scale used in the left-hand axis of
each gaphs.
Most of the value judgments regarding military effectiveness are rnade on the
basis of America military experience and standards. Although the author has
lived in the Middle East, and. worked as a US advisor to several Middle Eastern
governments, he believes that any attempt tcr create some Middle Eastern standard
of reference is likely to be far more arbitrary than basing such judgments on
his own military background.
Mapping and location names presented a major problem. The author used US
Army and US Air Frrrce detailed maps, commercial maps, and in same cases commercial
satelliite photos. In many cases, howeveu; the place names and terrain
dewriptions used in the combat reporting by bcyth slides, and by independent
obsemers, presented major contradictions that could not be resolved from available
maps. No standardization emerged as to the spelling of place names. Sharp
difkrences emerged in the geographic data published by variom governments,
and in the conflicting methods of: transliterating Arabic and Farsi place names
into English.
The same problem applied in reconciling the names of organizations and individuals-particularly
those being transliterated from Arabic and Farsi. It again
became painfully obvious that no progress is being made in reconciling the con.flicting
methcds of transliterating such names into Engiiisl~, A limited efhrt has

een made to standardize the spellings used in this text, but many diffewnt
spellings are tied to the refationat data bases used in preparing the analysis and
the prexrvation of the cjriginal spelling is necessary to identify the source md tie
it to the transcript of related intesviews,

About the Book and Author
With the thoroughness that this recently spotlighted nation requires, this volume
examines Kuwait" internal and external ~curity situation after the turbulent
days of the Gulf War and investigates continued Western involvemnt in its
safekeeping. It also examines Kuw-sit" changing role as an energy exporter.
Arrthany H. Cardesrnan has served in senior positions in the office for the
secretary of defense, NATO, and the U.S. Senate. He is currently a senior fet-
low and Go-Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, an adjunct professor of national security studies at
Georgetcswn University and a special consultant on military affairs for ABC
News, He lives in Washington, D,C,