Views
5 years ago

X - Technische Universität Dresden

X - Technische Universität Dresden

Aims of Teaching at

Aims of Teaching at Universities Science shall clarify How something is. But additionally, and even more important Why it is such or How could it be (and sometimes, how should it be). “Eternal truths” (i.e., knowledge of long-lasting relevance) should make up more than 90% of the teaching and learning effort at universities. 4

5 General Aims of Education in IT-security (sorted by priorities) 1. Education to honesty and a realistic self-assessment 2. Encouraging realistic assessment of others, e.g., other persons, companies, organizations 3. Ability to gather security and data protection requirements • Realistic protection goals • Realistic attacker models / trust models 4. Validation and verification, including their practical and theoretical limits 5. Security and data protection mechanisms • Know and understand as well as • Being able to develop In short: Honest IT security experts with their own opinion and personal strength.

  • Page 1 and 2: Security in Computer Networks Multi
  • Page 3: Areas of Teaching and Research •
  • Page 7 and 8: General Aims of Education in IT-sec
  • Page 9 and 10: General Aims of Education in IT-sec
  • Page 11 and 12: Offers by the Chair of Privacy and
  • Page 13 and 14: 1 Introduction Table of Contents (1
  • Page 15 and 16: adio" television" videophone" phone
  • Page 17 and 18: History of Communication Networks (
  • Page 19 and 20: Development of the fixed communicat
  • Page 21 and 22: confidentiality integrity availabil
  • Page 23 and 24: commands universal universal Trojan
  • Page 25 and 26: Which protection measures against w
  • Page 27 and 28: money! time! Considered maximal str
  • Page 29 and 30: Stronger means: Strength of the att
  • Page 31 and 32: Multilateral security • Each part
  • Page 33 and 34: Multilateral security (3rd version)
  • Page 35 and 36: Protection Goals: Definitions Confi
  • Page 37 and 38: Correlations between protection goa
  • Page 39 and 40: Physical security assumptions Each
  • Page 41 and 42: Shell-shaped arrangement of the fiv
  • Page 43 and 44: Golden rule Correspondence between
  • Page 45 and 46: Identification of IT-systems by hum
  • Page 47 and 48: Admission and access control Admiss
  • Page 49 and 50: Basic facts about Computer viruses
  • Page 51 and 52: Golden Rule Design and realize IT s
  • Page 53 and 54: Trustworthy terminals Trustworthy o
  • Page 55 and 56:

    Basics of Cryptology Achievable pro

  • Page 57 and 58:

    0 0 1 1 plaintext x Example: Vernam

  • Page 59 and 60:

    Sym. encryption system: Domain of t

  • Page 61 and 62:

    Key distribution using asymmetric e

  • Page 63 and 64:

    more detailed notation Domain of tr

  • Page 65 and 66:

    gfjjbz r 1 " ⊕ r 2" ⊕ r 3" …

  • Page 67 and 68:

    a) key (total break) Goal/success o

  • Page 69 and 70:

    Basic facts about “cryptographica

  • Page 71 and 72:

    security Security classes of crypto

  • Page 73 and 74:

    Combine: Hybrid cryptosystems (1)

  • Page 75 and 76:

    Information-theoretically secure en

  • Page 77 and 78:

    ciphertext S 00 01 10 11 equally di

  • Page 79 and 80:

    Vernam cipher (one-time pad) All ch

  • Page 81 and 82:

    Preparation: Definition for informa

  • Page 83 and 84:

    (3)⇒(4) is clear with const':= W(

  • Page 85 and 86:

    Key distribution: Symmetric authent

  • Page 87 and 88:

    Limits: Symmetric authentication sy

  • Page 89 and 90:

    About cryptographically strong syst

  • Page 91 and 92:

    Factoring assumption ∀ PPA F (pro

  • Page 93 and 94:

    3. Primality tests: Search of prime

  • Page 95 and 96:

    Calculating with and without p,q (2

  • Page 97 and 98:

    Calculating with and without p,q (4

  • Page 99 and 100:

    squares and roots Calculating with

  • Page 101 and 102:

    Calculating with and without p,q (8

  • Page 103 and 104:

    Calculating with and without p,q (1

  • Page 105 and 106:

    Calculating with and without p,q (1

  • Page 107 and 108:

    Calculating with and without p,q (1

  • Page 109 and 110:

    to b) F : input n repeat forever ch

  • Page 111 and 112:

    Method s 2 -mod-n-generator • key

  • Page 113 and 114:

    s 2 -mod-n-generator as sym. encryp

  • Page 115 and 116:

    n s PBG Security of the s 2 -mod-n-

  • Page 117 and 118:

    Security of the s 2 -mod-n-generato

  • Page 119 and 120:

    Security of PBGs more precisely (2)

  • Page 121 and 122:

    Reminder: Summary of PBG and motiva

  • Page 123 and 124:

    Scheme of security proofs (2) (adap

  • Page 125 and 126:

    GMR - signature system (1) Conseque

  • Page 127 and 128:

    GMR - signature system (3) Problem:

  • Page 129 and 130:

    to show : 1) Permutation -1 ∉ QR

  • Page 131 and 132:

    Solution of problem 1 (2) Propositi

  • Page 133 and 134:

    secret area plaintext with signatur

  • Page 135 and 136:

    c • d ≡ 1 (mod Φ(n)) ⇔ Proof

  • Page 137 and 138:

    Naive insecure use of RSA RSA as as

  • Page 139 and 140:

    secret area plaintext RSA as asymme

  • Page 141 and 142:

    ( x c ) Attack on encryption with R

  • Page 143 and 144:

    143 Attack on digital signature wit

  • Page 145 and 146:

    Active Attack of Davida against RSA

  • Page 147 and 148:

    secret area plaintext x random numb

  • Page 149 and 150:

    Faster calculation of the secret op

  • Page 151 and 152:

    64-bit block plaintext L 0 IP round

  • Page 153 and 154:

    L i-1 L i = R i-1 Decryption Why do

  • Page 155 and 156:

    Generation of a key for each of the

  • Page 157 and 158:

    L i-1 One round complement compleme

  • Page 159 and 160:

    Generalization of DES 1.) 56 ⇒ 16

  • Page 161 and 162:

    e.g. 64 bits with DES ECB Main prob

  • Page 163 and 164:

    Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) All lin

  • Page 165 and 166:

    • plaintext block n memory for ci

  • Page 167 and 168:

    Block length a Length of the output

  • Page 169 and 170:

    shift register 1 b CFB for authenti

  • Page 171 and 172:

    Plain Cipher Block Chaining (PCBC)

  • Page 173 and 174:

    Utilization of indeterministic bloc

  • Page 175 and 176:

    Diffie-Hellman key agreement (1) pr

  • Page 177 and 178:

    andom number 1 Domain of trust secr

  • Page 179 and 180:

    Find a generator in cyclic group Z

  • Page 181 and 182:

    x, s(x), “pass” or “fail” r

  • Page 183 and 184:

    Signature system for blindly provid

  • Page 185 and 186:

    Reconstruction of the secret: Thres

  • Page 187 and 188:

    adio" television" videophone" phone

  • Page 189 and 190:

    adio" television" videophone" phone

  • Page 191 and 192:

    Since about 1990 reality Video-8 ta

  • Page 193 and 194:

    Problems with exchanges Unsolved pr

  • Page 195:

    Questions: Attacker (-model) • Ho

Statistics beyond Physics - Technische Universität Dresden
OCL By Example Lecture - Technische Universität Dresden
Graphs - Www-st.inf.tu-dresden.de - Technische Universität Dresden
Optimierung und Frustration: - Technische Universität Dresden
02 - Technische Universität Dresden
Content Sharing - Technische Universität Dresden
Statistics beyond Physics - Technische Universität Dresden
Christie FHD551-X - Matec GmbH Dresden
Wiki Event Navigation - Computer Networks - Technische Universität ...
x - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische Universität Dresden
Fakultät Informatik - Technische Universität Dresden
Paper (PDF) - Technische Universität Dresden
Paper PDF - Technische Universität Dresden
Abstract - Technische Universität Dresden
Abstracts - Technische Universität Dresden
View - Technische Universität Dresden
report [pdf] - Technische Universität Dresden
get paper - Technische Universität Dresden
slides (pdf) - Technische Universität Dresden