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X - Technische Universität Dresden

X - Technische Universität Dresden

X - Technische Universität

Security in Computer Networks Multilateral Security in Distributed and by Distributed Systems Transparencies for the Lecture: Security and Cryptography I (and the beginning of Security and Cryptography II) Andreas Pfitzmann Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Computer Science, D-01062 Dresden Nöthnitzer Str. 46, Room 3071 Phone: +49 351 463-38277, e-mail: pfitza@inf.tu-dresden.de, http://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de/ 1

  • Page 2 and 3: Field of Specialization: Security a
  • Page 4 and 5: Aims of Teaching at Universities Sc
  • Page 6 and 7: General Aims of Education in IT-sec
  • Page 8 and 9: General Aims of Education in IT-sec
  • Page 10 and 11: General Aims of Education in IT-sec
  • Page 12 and 13: Aims of Education: Offers by other
  • Page 14 and 15: 3 Cryptographic basics Table of Con
  • Page 16 and 17: History of Communication Networks (
  • Page 18 and 19: Important Terms computers interconn
  • Page 20 and 21: threats: Threats and corresponding
  • Page 22 and 23: Transitive propagation of errors an
  • Page 24 and 25: Protection against whom ? Laws and
  • Page 26 and 27: protection concerning protection ag
  • Page 28 and 29: area of physical control of the att
  • Page 30 and 31: • place • time confidentiality
  • Page 32 and 33: Multilateral security (2nd version)
  • Page 34 and 35: Protection Goals: Sorting 34
  • Page 36 and 37: Correlations between protection goa
  • Page 38 and 39: Correlations between protection goa
  • Page 40 and 41: Interference: detect judge Tamper-r
  • Page 42 and 43: Interference: detect judge Attack:
  • Page 44 and 45: Identification of human beings by I
  • Page 46 and 47: Identification of IT-systems by IT-
  • Page 48 and 49: Computer virus vs. transitive Troja
  • Page 50 and 51: Further problems 1. Specify exactly
  • Page 52 and 53:

    Aspects of distribution Distributed

  • Page 54 and 55:

    Availability Infrastructure with th

  • Page 56 and 57:

    more detailed notation Symmetric en

  • Page 58 and 59:

    Key exchange using symmetric encryp

  • Page 60 and 61:

    more detailed notation Domain of tr

  • Page 62 and 63:

    more detailed notation Symmetric au

  • Page 64 and 65:

    Key distribution using digital sign

  • Page 66 and 67:

    Whom are keys assigned to? Comments

  • Page 68 and 69:

    severity a) passive a1) ciphertext-

  • Page 70 and 71:

    Basic facts about “cryptographica

  • Page 72 and 73:

    security information theoretic acti

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    Hybrid cryptosystems (2) Even more

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    Information-theoretically secure en

  • Page 78 and 79:

    ciphertext S 00 01 10 11 equally di

  • Page 80 and 81:

    80 Keys have to be very long for in

  • Page 82 and 83:

    Definition for information-theoreti

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    Another definition for information-

  • Page 86 and 87:

    Symmetric authentication systems (2

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    About cryptographically strong syst

  • Page 90 and 91:

    clear: in NP ⇒ but difficulty can

  • Page 92 and 93:

    Search of prime numbers (1) 1. Are

  • Page 94 and 95:

    Z n : ring of residue classes mod n

  • Page 96 and 97:

    Calculating with and without p,q (3

  • Page 98 and 99:

    Compose ? Calculating with and with

  • Page 100 and 101:

    Calculating with and without p,q (7

  • Page 102 and 103:

    Calculating with and without p,q (9

  • Page 104 and 105:

    Calculating with and without p,q (1

  • Page 106 and 107:

    Calculating with and without p,q (1

  • Page 108 and 109:

    Calculating with and without p,q (1

  • Page 110 and 111:

    110 The s 2 -mod-n-Pseudo-random Bi

  • Page 112 and 113:

    s 2 -mod-n-generator as symmetric e

  • Page 114 and 115:

    s 2 -mod-n-generator as asymmetric

  • Page 116 and 117:

    Security of the s 2 -mod-n-generato

  • Page 118 and 119:

    Security of PBGs more precisely (1)

  • Page 120 and 121:

    Security of PBGs more precisely (3)

  • Page 122 and 123:

    constructive proof often Scheme of

  • Page 124 and 125:

    Why fallacy ? attacker attacked per

  • Page 126 and 127:

    GMR - signature system (2) Construc

  • Page 128 and 129:

    To factor is difficult (1) Theorem:

  • Page 130 and 131:

    Solution of problem 1 (1) Tree of r

  • Page 132 and 133:

    Note In the proof you dispose the

  • Page 134 and 135:

    Key generation 1) Choose two prime

  • Page 136 and 137:

    Proof (2) Holds, of course, for m

  • Page 138 and 139:

    secret area plaintext x random numb

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    secret area text with signature and

  • Page 142 and 143:

    ( x s ) Attack on digital signature

  • Page 144 and 145:

    m 2 Transition to Davida’s attack

  • Page 146 and 147:

    Defense against Davida’s attacks

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    secret area text with signature and

  • Page 150 and 151:

    c th roots are unique Shown : each

  • Page 152 and 153:

    L i-1 L i = R i-1 One round Feistel

  • Page 154 and 155:

    Expansion Use key S 1 Mixing S 2 S

  • Page 156 and 157:

    The complementation property of DES

  • Page 158 and 159:

    S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 Encryption function

  • Page 160 and 161:

    Stream cipher synchronous self sync

  • Page 162 and 163:

    plaintext block n Electronic Codebo

  • Page 164 and 165:

    Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) (2) All

  • Page 166 and 167:

    x 1 x 2 x 3 . . . x b-1 0 S 1 S 2 S

  • Page 168 and 169:

    Block length a Length of the output

  • Page 170 and 171:

    Block length a Length of the output

  • Page 172 and 173:

    Block length a Length of the output

  • Page 174 and 175:

    174 Collision-resistant hash functi

  • Page 176 and 177:

    Discrete logarithm assumption ∀ P

  • Page 178 and 179:

    Diffie-Hellman (DH) assumption: Dif

  • Page 180 and 181:

    Security is asymmetric, too Digital

  • Page 182 and 183:

    text with signature and test result

  • Page 184 and 185:

    Threshold scheme (1) Threshold sche

  • Page 186 and 187:

    Threshold scheme (3) Polynomial int

  • Page 188 and 189:

    adio" television" videophone" phone

  • Page 190 and 191:

    adio" television" videophone" phone

  • Page 192 and 193:

    Excerpt from: 1984 With the develop

  • Page 194 and 195:

    Mechanisms to protect traffic data

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