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Appendix G - A Historical Look at Irregular Warfare
History reveals that violent clashes of interests often include irregular forces or
armed groups that exist outside the authority of established states, with the
United States and other Western nations possessing a rich history of
involvement in operations fighting against irregular threats and fighting
irregularly against their adversaries. From the Indian Wars during the
seventeenth century to Somalia and Bosnia in the 1990s, this long US history of
IW provides a basis for understanding how to confront irregular threats and to
operate more irregularly in the future. Using our long historical experience with
IW combined with an appreciation of the evolving security challenges we face, we
can effectively wage IW against adversaries and counter the irregular threats
that they present.
The chief lesson to be drawn from the study or irregular wars centers around
the importance of operations on an expanded operational continuum. In case
after case, to be successful, the military intervention force worked in LOOs
(though they may not have called it that) beyond purely kinetic combat
operations. The participants seemed deliberately to blur the lines between types
of operations. That is, the military became comfortable working with other
agencies and even performed tasks that would not be associated with a
traditional military mission. These historical examples will show both some
similarities and very notable differences. Irregular wars are different from each
other; at least to the extent that no solutions can be “templated.” IW doctrine
therefore must be written with great flexibility in mind. History can help
understand the character of a conflict by providing context and can help prepare
for future challenges by showing what worked (or failed to work) in the past.
Examples of Countering Irregular Threats:
The Philippine Insurrection (1899 - 1913). Following the 1898 US
acquisition of the Philippines in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the
US military was dispatched to that area to seize control of the islands. In
response to the imminent US seizure, the Filipinos led an insurrection against
US occupation. President William McKinley decided that a policy of assimilation
should be adopted in the Philippines and carried out by the US military. This
shift forced the US military (the Army in particular) to devote at least as much
attention to civic projects—public works, government-building, and education—
as to more traditional military operations. While military operations were never
independently decisive during the Philippine Insurrection, the US military wove
them effectively into the fabric of counterinsurgency and what we would now call
“nation-building” activities. The insurgents were worn down, their re-supply cut
off, and ultimately were chased into the most remote, rural parts of the islands,
separating them from the populace. Meanwhile, the US military built
infrastructure, formed and trained Filipino police and military forces, and
established schools and rule of law. While the leader of the insurgency was
eventually captured, the population had already begun to see the advantages of
Appendix G G-1