Joint Operating Concept (JOC) - GlobalSecurity.org

aligning with the Americans and the insurrection effectively came to a close.
Perhaps better than other historical references, the Philippine counterinsurgency
clearly exemplifies an intervention force working multiple LOOs concurrently.
The “Banana Wars” (1915 - 1934). During the period between the Philippine
Insurrection and the Second World War, the US Marine Corps was engaged in
what are now referred to as the “banana wars.” Marines were extensively
involved in counterinsurgent operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and
Nicaragua, to name just a few. 30 With many of these operations akin to
constabulary duty, the Marine Corps learned how to work effectively with
indigenous paramilitary forces and among indigenous peoples. The Marines
were comfortable working in small units in extremely remote locations with
limited or vague guidance. That observation is not an indication that these
operations were executed in some disjointed, haphazard manner. On the
contrary, the Marine leaders involved held a clear vision of success and a
purpose, and worked according to that vision. In a true sense, the Marine Corps
at that time had a small wars ethos.
The Malaya “Emergency” (1948 - 1960). Following the Second World War,
Malaya was a British colony that experienced a communist-inspired insurgency.
The insurgents’ primary goal at the beginning of the conflict was to cause
maximum disruption of the country’s economy and administration. 31 In
response, the British counterinsurgent strategy in Malaya consisted of three
parts (or phases): (1) Defensive, when the adversary was prevented from taking
over and the insurgency was kept from escalating; (2) Offensive, during which
they broke the insurgent’s ability to win; and (3) Victory, in which they hunted
down and destroyed the communist insurgents and established an independent
Malaya. The British counterinsurgency effort was able to separate the
insurgents from the people and wear them down by chasing them into remote
jungle areas and occasionally killing them. Without the support of the people,
the guerrillas found that their struggle had been undermined. 32 The British,
following the defeat of the insurrection, worked with the fledgling Malay
government to help them build the capacity to govern. The process took some
time because it involved educating and training a generation of leaders and
developing the infrastructure on which to function. The military moved
seamlessly from the purely military tasks to these new challenges.
The Algerian Insurrection (1954 - 1962). The insurgents in Algeria forced
the French army to fight essentially two different wars. On one hand, due to the
physical security threat, they challenged the French military to maintain
stability, which forced the French military to bring in a large conventional force
and to garrison key populated areas. These forces were largely immobilized. The
30 Larry Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and
the Vietnam War, (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1986), p. 96.
31 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1976) p.
289.
32 Laqueur, p. 290.
Appendix G
G-2