Joint Operating Concept (JOC) - GlobalSecurity.org

Appendix H –Expanding Role of the MILGRP in IW 35
While the following article was written to describe the potential role of the
MILGRP activities to support the GWOT, it provides sufficient illustration of the
vital role that US missions may play in coordinating and executing future IW
operations. As such it is included in this JOC as an appendix to guide future
experimentation and CONOPS development.
“As warfare moves into the shadows, it will become a deadly game of cat and
mouse — something more akin to tough investigative and police work than
traditional warfare. In this type of environment, command and control concepts
tailored for the Cold War do not apply. Large joint task forces with multiple
components, designed for divisional fire and movement against similarly
equipped adversary forces are not appropriate for fighting irregular, small-scale
conflicts where surrogate forces carry much of the burden.
For IW fought in the netherworld between real peace and all-out war, one
command and control model has proven to be appropriate, effective and
efficient over time. This is the US ambassador’s interagency country team and
its tailored US military component working as an interagency team nearest the
problem and closest to the principal actors in the host nation. The Defense
Department contribution to the country team is a military organization ranging
from a small Office of Defense Cooperation to a full US Military Group tailored
to meet the ambassador’s needs for military coordination and support. This is
a time-proven design that helps the host nation solve its own problems, designs
information activities to best complement the overarching campaign, and
guarantees cross-cultural understanding and overall success.
US Military Groups, when assisting a country with an active insurgency or as
part of a wider IW effort, are designed to manage the provision of materiel and
training packages, US military advisers and trainers, and intelligence assets
within the context of political constraints. Despite the proven effectiveness of
this formula, the need to fight IW simultaneously in many locations around the
world over an extended time should prompt an overhaul of Military Group
staffing and structure. Of particular importance is commander selection and
preparation, with an eye toward his coordination chain outside an embassy.
Intelligence linkages must also gain greater scope and definition, and make use
of the latest technology. Release authorities and parameters for host nation
partners, as well as the degree of interagency sharing, must also be clearly
defined. Depth among staff members is critical, with emphasis on experience
with counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, psychological operations,
civil-military operations, security assistance, and logistics. Country-specific
experience is vital as well.
35 Extract taken from a pending article “Group Dynamics -- How U.S. Military Groups support the
War on Terrorism” by MG (Ret.) Geoffrey C. Lambert
Appendix H H-1