Meier, Robinson, & C.. - Gettysburg College

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BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 30:46–55, 2008 

Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 

ISSN: 0197-3533 print=1532-4834 online 

DOI: 10.1080/01973530701866516 

Why a Big Mac Is a Good Mac: Associations 

Between Affect and Size 

Brian P. Meier 

Gettysburg College 

Michael D. Robinson 

North Dakota State University 

Andrew J. Caven 

Washington State University 

Evaluation is a core topic of interest in both social psychology and linguistic theory, but 

there are relatively few social-cognitive studies examining the ‘‘online’’ consequences of 

affective metaphor. The experiments presented here sought to investigate such online 

consequences in relation to an understudied class of metaphors linking evaluation to 

size (i.e., ‘‘bigger is better’’). Consistent with such metaphors, we found that positive 

(vs. negative) words were evaluated more quickly (Experiment 1) and accurately 

(Experiment 2) when presented in a larger (vs. smaller) font size. Parallel and opposite 

effects were found for negative words. A third experiment demonstrated that words 

presented in a larger font size were evaluated more favorably, thus extending size effects 

to evaluative judgments. Together, the studies converge on the importance of size metaphors 

for understanding evaluation from a social-cognitive perspective. 

Placing an order at a typical fast-food restaurant is often 

accompanied by a request to ‘‘up-size’’ or ‘‘biggie-size’’ 

the meal. Agreeing to this request gives the patron a 

larger drink and a side item in exchange for an extra 

cost. In addition to large meals, American consumers 

are frequently enticed to purchase large vehicles (e.g., 

the Hummer) and large houses, perhaps in excess of 

rational expenditures. The tendency to increase both 

the size and cost of some consumer items is likely 

an effective sales strategy because it capitalizes on the 

‘‘bigger-is-better’’ class of metaphors, which associates 

positive with big (e.g., ‘‘larger than life’’) and negative 

with small (e.g., ‘‘small mind’’). Indeed, one strongly 

positive adjective—great—refers not only to positive 

evaluations but also to objects that are ‘‘very large.’’ 

Although good things may sometimes come in small 

Correspondence should be sent to Brian P. Meier, Department of 

Psychology, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA 17325. E-mail: 

bmeier@gettysburg.edu 

packages (e.g., one’s body weight when dieting), such 

pairings appear to be atypical (Tolaas, 1991). 

Indeed, there are multiple, diverse sources of data 

suggesting that people exhibit preferences for larger over 

smaller objects, even under conditions in which it is difficult 

to discern a rational basis. For example, American 

voters typically elect the taller of two presidential candidates 

(Persico, Postlewaite, & Silverman, 2001). Within 

the domain of abstract objects (e.g., geometric shapes), 

both adults and children tend to prefer a larger object 

to a smaller one when forced to choose (Silvera, Josephs, 

& Giesler, 2002). We could cite many other findings 

here, but the general point is that people seem to favor 

larger stimuli in a wide variety of contexts, and we 

suggest that such findings implicate affective metaphor. 

AFFECTIVE METAPHOR 

Metaphors have been viewed as imprecise ways for 

conveying one’s experiences to others (for a review, see


Gibbs, 1994). According to this view, metaphors are 

useful for communication but not involved in more 

‘‘online’’ processes related to perception and judgment. 

A second view has challenged such ideas by claiming that 

metaphoric-representation processes are used in encoding 

new stimuli and therefore central to online representational 

processes (e.g., Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 

1999). Much of this debate has been framed in terms of 

philosophical–linguistic arguments, but the ultimate 

arbiter of such debates should be empirical data targeting 

online encoding and judgment processes (Gibbs, 1994). 

Metaphor-representation processes seem to be particularly 

important in the domain of affect and evaluation, 

presumably because affect is a fairly abstract 

concept that is nevertheless very important to daily life 

(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In support of this point, 

people have many affective metaphors, including those 

related to verticality, lightness–darkness, and physical 

proximity to an object (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Meier 

& Robinson, 2005). Moreover, we have shown in several 

studies that task-irrelevant physical attributes, such as 

those related to the lightness–darkness (e.g., Meier, 

Robinson, & Clore, 2004) or vertical location (e.g., 

Meier & Robinson, 2004) of stimuli, bias evaluations 

in a metaphor-consistent direction. For example, we 

have shown that positive words are evaluated faster 

when presented in a lighter font color, whereas negative 

words are evaluated faster when presented in a darker 

font color (Meier et al., 2004). Such data appear to 

support the point that evaluative judgments are faster 

when consistent with affective metaphor (see Meier & 

Robinson, 2005, for a review). 

Our prior studies, however, are limited in a few 

respects. Metaphors linking affect to verticality (e.g., 

‘‘two thumbs-up’’ ) and stimulus color (e.g., ‘‘I’m in a 

dark place’’) are relatively strong and ubiquitous (e.g., 

Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Metaphors linking affect to 

stimulus size are less pronounced in nature. Along these 

lines, ‘‘good things can come in small packages’’ and 

body weight is typically evaluated more favorably 

when it is lower. Accordingly, our focus on stimulus 

size manipulations is both entirely novel and important 

to extending the empirical case for the metaphorrepresentation 

perspective (Gibbs, 1994). 

Indeed, it is useful to contrast two different views of 

affective metaphor. One view links it to the specific 

phrases typical of a language (for a review, see Gibbs, 

1994). A second view links affective metaphor to ‘‘deeper’’ 

mappings that motivate and guide specific linguistic 

metaphors (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 

Our focus on stimulus size is useful because it allows 

us to dissociate these levels of analysis to a greater extent 

than in our previous studies (e.g., Meier & Robinson, 

2004; Meier et al., 2004). Specifically, linguistic associations 

linking higher positions and lighter stimuli to 

ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN AFFECT AND SIZE 47 

positive evaluations are especially prevalent in the 

English language (Meier & Robinson, 2005), whereas 

this appears to be less true in relation to stimulus size 

(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Accordingly, demonstrating 

evaluative biases related to stimulus size might provide 

better evidence for the idea that such effects pertain to 

‘‘deeper,’’ prelinguistic associations of the sort discussed 

by Lakoff (1987). 

In addition to examining the novel issue of whether 

stimulus size biases evaluations, we also examined a 

number of other issues important to the social-cognition 

literature on evaluation. Evaluations can be more or less 

automatic in nature (Tesser & Martin, 1996), and it is 

important to use procedures suited to examining automatic 

evaluations in work of this type (Fazio & Olson, 

2003). Accordingly, we conducted an experiment in 

which evaluations had to be made particularly quickly, 

specifically through the use of a ‘‘response-deadline’’ 

procedure, which is typically used to establish the automatic 

basis of an effect (Draine & Greenwald, 1998). If 

stimulus size biases evaluations in this paradigm, we can 

be more certain that the effects are automatic according 

to conventional social-cognition criteria. 

THE CURRENT EXPERIMENTS 

In Experiments 1 and 2, we examined the effect an irrelevant 

manipulation of physicality—here, related to font 

size—on the speed (Experiment 1) and accuracy (Experiment 

2) with which participants could evaluate positive 

and negative words. In both studies, we predicted an 

interaction such that positive evaluations would be 

facilitated by a larger font size, whereas negative evaluations 

would be facilitated by a smaller font size. However, 

findings along these lines might have uncertain 

relevance to evaluative judgments, which are arguably 

more important from a social-cognitive standpoint 

(Tesser & Martin, 1996). Accordingly, Experiment 3 

sought to significantly extend our prior work by examining 

effects of a task-irrelevant manipulation of font size 

on evaluative judgments. On the basis of the metaphorrepresentation 

perspective, we predicted that larger (neutral) 

words would be evaluated more favorably than 

smaller (neutral) words. Findings along these lines would 

bridge the gap between cognitive and social-cognitive 

studies of affective metaphor, and would additionally 

make the important point that affective metaphor has 

significant implications for evaluative judgments. 

EXPERIMENT 1 

In Experiment 1, we presented positive and negative 

words in either larger or smaller font sizes, and


48 MEIER, ROBINSON, CAVEN 

participants were asked to evaluate these words. Because 

the font size manipulation was independent of the 

manipulation of stimulus valence, participants should 

not be influenced by it, according to rational considerations. 

However, if people make evaluations in a manner 

consistent with the metaphor-representation perspective, 

then positive evaluations should be faster for larger 

words and negative evaluations should be faster for 

smaller words. 

Method 

Participants 

Participants were 32 undergraduate volunteers (4 male) 

with an average age of 24.28 (SD ¼ 8.20) years. Thirty 

participants were White (93.8%) and 2 participants were 

Asian (6.3%). 

Materials 

Positive and negative words. We used 100 words, 

50 of which had a positive meaning (e.g., kiss) and 50 

of which had a negative meaning (e.g., dead). The 

average number of letters per word was similar for each 

valence, F < 1. A pilot test also confirmed that the 

positive words (M ¼ 7.46, SD ¼ .86) were rated (from 

1[very negative] to9[very positive]) more positively than 

the negative words (M ¼ 2.42, SD ¼ .70), F(1, 98) ¼ 

1040.44, p < .001, g2 p ¼ :91 but that they were equally 

extreme, defined in terms of the absolute difference from 

the midpoint of the evaluation scale, F < 1. However, as 

is typical (e.g., Dixon, 1981), our positive words were 

a bit more frequent in the English language than our 

negative words, F(1, 98) ¼ 3.83, p ¼ .053, g2 p ¼.04. We 

were not concerned with this difference because it could 

not compromise our interactive predictions. 1 

Procedure 

The 100 words were presented in the center of a computer 

screen one at a time. The words randomly 

appeared in 20.5-point or 15.5-point Times New Roman 

font (in white color on a black background). Word type 

and font size were chosen at random by a computer 

program, which resulted in each participant receiving 

approximately half of the words in the larger font size 

and the other half in the smaller font size (each participant 

received a different set of words in each font size). 

Participants were told that the task was concerned 

with their ability to evaluate words regardless of 

possible changes in appearance. To make evaluations, 

participants were asked to press the Q key on the 

1 

Stimuli for Experiments 1 and 2 were identical to those reported 

in Meier and Robinson (2004). 

keyboard for positive words and to press the P key on 

the keyboard for negative words. To help participants 

remember this mapping, the labels ‘‘Q ¼ POSITIVE’’ 

and ‘‘P ¼ NEGATIVE’’ were placed on the bottom of 

the screen in 18-point Times New Roman font. The 

word remained on the screen until participants made a 

response. Participants were told to be quick and 

accurate. If participants were inaccurate, the word 

INCORRECT appeared in red font for 1.5 sec. Correct 

responses were followed by a 300-msec blank screen. 

Results 

We dropped inaccurate categorizations (4.4% of trials), 

log-transformed latencies to reduce skew, and replaced 

2.5 SD RT-outliers with these cutoff values (see 

Robinson, 2007, for a methodological discussion). 

Log-transformed latencies were examined, but effects 

are reported in milliseconds. Descriptive statistics for 

all variables in all experiments are reported in Table 1. 

We performed a 2 (valence: positive or negative) 2 

(size: big or small) repeated measures analysis of variance 

on evaluation latencies. The main effect of valence 

was significant, F(1, 31) ¼ 4.56, p ¼ .041, g2 p ¼.13, 

which indicated that participants were faster to evaluate 

positive (M ¼ 962 msec, SD ¼ 170 msec) relative to 

negative (M ¼ 1,000 msec, SD ¼ 205 msec) words. The 

main effect of size was not significant, F < 1. Of most 

importance, the Valence Size interaction was significant, 

F(1, 31) ¼ 5.54, p ¼ .025, g2 p ¼.15, and the means 

for this interaction are shown in Figure 1. 

Given the main effect for valence, which was 

expected, it was not legitimate to compare valence 

effects for a given font size. However, given the lack 

of a main effect for font size, it is more informative to 

compare font size effects for each word valence considered 

separately. In the latter simple comparisons, it 

was found that participants were faster to evaluate positive 

words if they were presented in the larger (vs. smaller) 

font size, F(1, 31) ¼ 5.28, p ¼ .029, g2 p ¼.15, whereas 

there was an opposite trend in evaluation times for negative 

words, F(1, 31) ¼ 2.56, p ¼ .120, g2 p ¼.08. Although 

the latter simple effect was not significant at the traditional 

level, the crossover interaction clearly highlights 

the divergent effects of font size for positive versus 

negative evaluations. 

Discussion 

Experiment 1 manipulated font size and found that positive 

words were evaluated more quickly when presented 

in a large font size, whereas negative words were evaluated 

more quickly when presented in a small font size. 

This interactive pattern is entirely novel and supports 

the idea that stimulus size is used as a heuristic to


TABLE 1 

Means, Standard Deviations, and Internal Consistencies for the Variables Assessed in all Experiments 

stimulus valence at encoding. Because this interactive 

pattern is consistent with affective metaphor, we suggest 

that Experiment 1 offers initial evidence for the idea 

that size is used as an online heuristic when making 

evaluations. 

However, we also point out that affective metaphors 

related to stimulus size may be less pervasive than those 

related to other factors such as stimulus brightness 

(Kövecses, 2000). We regard this as an important context 

for our findings in the sense that, although linguistic 

associations linking size and affect may be less robust 

relative to other linguistic associations, the ‘‘deeper’’ 

mappings linking size and affect may nevertheless be 

quite robust (Lakoff, 1987). In other words, affective 

links between size and evaluation may precede and 

motivate linguistic associations (Lakoff, 1987). 

In support of this prelinguistic theory, Tolaas (1991) 

suggested that links between evaluation and size develop 

in prelinguistic children. Furthermore, nonverbal animal 

species (e.g., Baerends & Drent, 1982; Menzel, 1961) 

also show preferences for larger objects (e.g., food, their 

Statistic 

Experiment Variable M SD a 

1 a 

RT for big–positive 945 msec 164 msec .71 

RT for small–positive 979 msec 204 msec .81 

RT for big–negative 1022 msec 217 msec .80 

RT for small–negative 978 msec 215 msec .79 

2 b 

Accuracy for big–positive 75% 15% .73 

Accuracy for small–positive 72% 17% .81 

Accuracy for big–negative 69% 14% .68 

Accuracy for small–negative 71% 16% .79 

3 c 

Valence rating for big words 3.99 .42 .81 

Valence rating for small words 3.67 .46 .84 

Valence rating time for big words 2,808 msec 902 msec .94 

Valence rating time for small words 2,823 msec 890 msec .93 

a N ¼ 32, b N ¼ 36, c N ¼ 46. 

FIGURE 1 Mean evaluation speed as a function of valence and font 

size, Experiment 1. 


offspring). Our results support such frameworks 

because, in fact, we did not manipulate linguistic associations 

but rather manipulated physical characteristics 

of words in a perceptual, nonlinguistic fashion. Therefore, 

the fact that font size interacted with word valence 

supports prelinguistic theories of associations between 

evaluation and stimulus size. 

EXPERIMENT 2 

Aside from conceptually replicating Experiment 1, the 

purpose of Experiment 2 was to better support the 

automatic nature of relations between evaluation and 

stimulus size. The stimuli, font size manipulation, and 

evaluation task were practically identical to Experiment 

1, but the response procedures were different. In Experiment 

2, we used a response deadline procedure in which 

responses had to be made more rapidly than is typically 

executed by the individual. Such procedures have been 

used in recent studies to demonstrate the automaticity 

of the relevant processes (e.g., Draine & Greenwald, 

1998; Payne, 2001). In addition, response-deadline 

procedures are perhaps particularly well suited to showing 

that affective metaphor influences the earliest, most 

automatic stages of stimulus encoding, as has been 

suggested but rarely demonstrated in support of the 

metaphor-representation perspective (for a review, see 

Gibbs, 1994). 

Method 

Participants 

Participants were 36 undergraduate volunteers (11 

male) with an average age of 19.67 (SD ¼ 2.17) years. 

Thirty participants were White (83.3%), 4 participants



were Asian (11.1%), 1 participant was American 

Indian=Alaskan Native (2.8%), and 1 participant was 

Hispanic (2.8%). 

Materials 

Positive and negative words. We used the same 

words from Experiment 1. 

Procedure 

Participants were told that we were interested in their 

ability to evaluate words quickly and accurately despite 

possible variations in appearance. Each trial involved a 

randomly selected word, which was randomly assigned 

to a larger (20.5 point) or smaller (15.5 point) Times 

New Roman font. Participants were told to press the 

Q key on the keyboard for positive words and to press 

the P key on the keyboard for negative words. To help 

participants remember the response mapping, the labels 

‘‘Q ¼ POSITIVE’’ and ‘‘P ¼ NEGATIVE’’ were placed 

on the bottom of the screen in 18-point Times New 

Roman font. 

We chose a 700-msec response-window procedure, 

similar to other research that we have conducted (e.g., 

Robinson, Meier, & Vargas, 2005). In the present context, 

this response window was 1.5 SDs faster (averaged 

across conditions and then across participants) than the 

average response time in Experiment 1, which used the 

same words and size manipulations. Thus, participants 

were necessarily pressed for time. Because this response 

window was so short, our instructions emphasized speed 

rather than accuracy, in this connection penalizing slow 

responses (‘‘Too Slow!’’ presented for 2 sec) rather than 

inaccurate responses. If the response was faster than 

700 msec, there was a 500-msec blank-screen delay to 

allow the participant time to prepare for the next trial. 

Participants evaluated each word twice, for a total of 

200 trials. 

Results 

Only 7.7% of the trials were associated with nonresponses. 

We deemed this rate quite low given the 

speeded nature of responses. Accuracy rates within the 

response window averaged 71.5% (chance ¼ 50%) and 

are reported in Table 1. For purposes of analysis, accuracy 

rates were arcsine transformed to reduce skewness 

(Bartlett, 1947). Analyses used these transformed scores, 

but results are reported in terms of untransformed 

accuracy rates for ease of interpretation. 

We conducted a 2 (valence: positive or negative) 2 

(size: big or small) repeated measures analysis of variance 

on the accuracy rates. Neither of the main effects 

were significant: valence, F(1, 35) ¼ 2.37, p ¼ .133, 

g 2 p 

¼.06; size, F < 1, although the valence main effect 

was marginal. Of most theoretical importance, the 

Valence æ Size interaction was significant, F(1, 35) ¼ 

7.94, p ¼ .008, g2 p ¼.19. 

To interpret the significant interaction, we examined 

the effect of size for each level of valence. As shown in 

Figure 2, participants were marginally more accurate in 

evaluating positive words if they were presented in the 

larger (vs. smaller) font size, F(1, 35) ¼ 2.92, p ¼ .096, 

g2 p ¼.08, whereas participants were marginally more 

accurate in evaluating negative words if they were 

presented in the smaller (vs. larger) font size, F(1, 

35) ¼ 4.03, p ¼ .052, g2 p ¼.10. Although neither of these 

simple effects was significant at the traditional level, 

both were marginal, in opposite directions, and moderate 

in size. Thus, the interactive pattern replicates 

Experiment 1 within a context in which there was less 

time for strategic responding. 

Discussion 

Response deadline procedures are often used to show 

that particular encoding phenomena are automatic 

(e.g., Draine & Greenwald, 1998). Accordingly, we conclude 

that stimulus size leads to relatively automatic 

inferences concerning stimulus valence. However, we 

also point out that the construct of automaticity has 

developed over the years since it was first proposed 

(e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Although automaticity 

initially referred to operations that were quickly 

activated, unconscious, unintended, and ballistic in nature, 

subsequent research has indicated that these qualities 

of automaticity are often somewhat independent 

of each other, so much so that few processes may be 

automatic according to all four criteria (e.g., Bargh, 

1994). Experiment 2 suggests that bigger-is-better mappings 

are automatic in that they (a) operate quickly 

and (b) are unintended in relation to the task goals. 

By contrast, we have not shown that such processes 

are unconscious or ballistic in nature, but these criteria 

of automaticity have always been more controversial 

and difficult to establish (de Jong, Coles, & Logan, 

1990; Hollender, 1986). Regardless, Experiment 2 

extends Experiment 1 in pointing to the automatic 

nature of bigger ¼ better mappings. 

As in Experiment 1, there was a tendency toward a 

main effect for valence but no such tendency toward 

a main effect for font size. Given the tendency toward 

a main effect for valence, follow-up comparisons 

focused on font size effects for each word valence. In 

Experiment 2, positive words were evaluated more accurately 

in a larger font size, whereas negative words were 

evaluated more accurately in a smaller font size, but 

both of these follow-up comparisons were marginally 

significant (although the effect sizes were moderate;


FIGURE 2 Mean accuracy rate as a function of valence and font 

size, Experiment 2. 

Cohen, 1987). Nevertheless, the interaction was clearly 

cross-over in nature (see Figure 2) and this fact suggests 

that bigger ¼ better mappings go hand in hand with 

smaller ¼ worse mappings. 

EXPERIMENT 3 

The prior experiments examined cognitive measures 

related to speed and accuracy rather than evaluative 

judgments. Therefore, it is uncertain whether bigger ¼ 

better mappings have implications for evaluative judgments, 

which are more typically of interest in the social 

psychology literature (Tesser & Martin, 1996). Therefore, 

we deemed it important to attempt to extend our 

theoretical framework to evaluative judgments. 

Within the context of strongly valenced stimuli, 

pre-existing associations may generally be more consequential 

(Fazio, 1995). However, within the context of 

neutral stimuli, priming influences might be more influential 

(Higgins, 1996). To best examine font size effects 

on evaluative judgments, therefore, we used neutral 

target words in Experiment 3. We predicted that our 

manipulation of font size would affect evaluative judgments, 

too, such that evaluations would be more favorable 

in the case of larger stimulus objects. Results along 

these lines would begin to make a stronger case for 

the idea that bigger ¼ better mappings affect socialjudgment 

processes related to evaluation. 

Method 

Participants 

Participants were 46 undergraduate volunteers (13 

male) with an average age of 19.13 (SD ¼ 1.85) years. 

Forty-three participants were White (93.48%), 2 participants 

were African American (4.4%), and 1 was 

American Indian=Alaskan Native (2.2%). 


Materials 

Neutral words. We selected 100 words (e.g., area) 

from the Handbook of Semantic Word Norms (Toglia 

& Battig, 1978). This handbook lists the ratings of more 

than 2,500 words on several dimensions, one of which is 

pleasantness. We selected words that were rated near 

the midpoint (M ¼ 4.03, SD ¼ .11) of the pleasantness 

dimension (1 ¼ low, 7 ¼ high). 2 

Procedure 

The 100 words were presented on the center of a 

computer screen one at a time in a 20.5-point or a 

15.5-point Times New Roman font (in white color on 

a black background). The computer program randomly 

chose font size, which resulted in each participant receiving 

approximately half of the words in the smaller font 

size and half of the words in the larger font size. We told 

participants that they should rate the words as to how 

positive or negative they are in meaning, regardless of 

possible variations in appearance. Each trial started 

with the rating scale presented on the bottom of the 

screen (from 1 [very negative] to6[very positive]) in 18point 

Times New Roman font. After the rating scale 

was shown for 1 sec, a randomly selected word, randomly 

varying in font size, was presented on the screen 

until participants made an evaluation rating. Participants 

rated each word by selecting a number from 

the 1-to-6 rating scale. Following each rating, there 

was a 1-sec delay until the appearance of the next 

word. Ratings were of primary interest, but we also 

collected reaction times to rule out a fluency-based 

confound (see next section for elaboration and evaluation 

of this hypothesis). 

Results 

We computed the average rating for each font size and 

then compared these means using a paired-samples 

t test. Participants evaluated large-font words (M ¼ 

3.99, SD ¼ .42) more positively than small-font words 

(M ¼ 3.67, SD ¼ .46), t(45) ¼ 3.92, p < .001, d ¼ .58, 

supporting the extension of bigger ¼ better mappings 

to evaluative judgments. 

A secondary analysis sought to rule out a potential 

confound. Prior results have shown that more quickly 

perceived stimuli are often judged more positively, an 

effect ascribed to perceptual fluency (Winkielman, 

Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). From this perspective, 

it could be that larger stimuli are more fluent, 

thus accounting for the relation between stimulus size 

2 

Please contact the first author for the list of neutral words used in 

Experiment 3.



and evaluative judgments in Experiment 3. To examine 

this potential confound, we analyzed latency-ofjudgment 

data, using identical transformation and trimming 

procedures as used in Experiment 1. Font size did 

not affect rating times, t < 1. 

Next, we subtracted the rating time for each word 

when it was presented in the small font size from the rating 

time for each word when it was presented in the large 

font size. We conducted an analysis of covariance with 

word as the unit of analysis. Size was a within-word factor 

and the rating-time difference score was added as a 

covariate. In this analysis, the effect of size remained 

significant, F(1, 98) ¼ 80.57, p < .001, g2 p ¼.45. Thus, 

font-size effects on latencies cannot explain why larger 

words, relative to smaller ones, were evaluated more 

favorably. 

Discussion 

Experiment 3 revealed that the bigger-is-better mapping 

has implications for judgments in addition to the 

efficiency of evaluative processing. Participants rated 

neutral words presented in a larger font size as more 

positive than neutral words presented in a smaller font 

size. A secondary analysis revealed that the effect did 

not appear to be due to perceptual ease in making the 

ratings. Furthermore, we did not find a main effect of 

font size in Experiments 1 or 2, again suggesting that 

none of the present results are due to differential fluency 

of processing for large- and small-font stimuli. This of 

course does not mean that perceptual fluency is irrelevant 

to evaluations, because clearly perceptual fluency 

is relevant to evaluative inferences (Winkielman et al., 

2003). Rather, the lack of main effects for font size here 

means that our results cannot be explained in terms of 

perceptual fluency confounds, thus better supporting a 

metaphor-related interpretation our findings. 

GENERAL DISCUSSION 

Lakoff and Johnson (1999; also see Gibbs, 2006) have 

contended that abstract concepts like affect are represented 

in terms of perceptual experiences that are consistent 

with metaphor. Although some prior results 

had supported this view within the context of stimulus 

brightness (Meier et al., 2004) and vertical position 

(Meier & Robinson, 2004, 2006), no prior work has 

examined affective inferences based on size. In addition, 

there were three unique goals of our studies. One, we 

sought to provide the first support for bigger ¼ better 

mappings at stimulus encoding (Experiment 1). Two, 

we sought to extend the metaphor-representation perspective 

by using a paradigm sensitive to automatic 

influences (Experiment 2). Finally, we sought to provide 

evidence that evaluative judgments are amenable to our 

viewpoint (Experiment 3). 

All experiments supported the hypotheses. A taskirrelevant 

manipulation of font size interacted with word 

valence to predict the speed (Experiment 1) and accuracy 

(Experiment 2) of evaluations. In Experiment 3, 

we were able to extend the case for affective metaphor 

to evaluative judgments in that words were evaluated 

more positively when presented in a large font size, 

despite their equivalence with respect to meaning. The 

results presented here therefore make a general case 

for bigger ¼ better mappings at stimulus encoding and 

possess important implications for social judgment 

processes. 

Implications for ‘‘Real–World’’ Evaluations 

Our results, most particularly those of Experiment 3, 

begin to make the case that bigger ¼ better mappings 

affect social judgments related to evaluation. In turn, 

we suggest that the findings have some important implications 

for evaluative judgments in daily life. First, our 

findings may shed some light on prior results, such as 

those revealing that taller presidential candidates are 

more likely to be elected (Persico et al., 2001). Second, 

our findings may partially explain why consumers routinely 

fall prey to ‘‘biggie-sized’’ restaurant items or to 

purchasing relative large vehicles and houses. In short, 

the American tendency to prefer ‘‘large’’ consumer items 

seems a likely consequence of relatively automatic 

tendencies to view bigger as better (e.g., a ‘‘Big Mac’’ 

is intuitively more positive than a ‘‘Small Mac’’). 

Somewhat cynically, our results also suggest that 

manufacturers might be well served by placing their 

products in ‘‘big’’ packages (e.g., potato chips bags 

filled primarily with vacuum-packed air). Such large 

packages, even when they provide no additional quantity 

or quality, seem more likely to sell according to 

our analysis. In addition, our results can help explain 

why advertisers routinely seem to favor large ads for 

their products. Although larger ads are perhaps more 

likely to be noticed than smaller ads, it also seems likely 

that a large ad may connote a better product than a 

small ad based on the bigger-is-better heuristic (e.g., 

Hanssens & Weitz, 1980). In sum, what we have done 

is to provide basic experimental evidence for what 

manufacturers and advertisers already appear to be 

capitalizing on, namely, the bigger ¼ better heuristic. 

Awareness of such influences may allow the consumer 

to resist them to a certain extent. 

There are many other potential applications as well, 

but we limit ourselves to two such applications here. 

First, it has been shown that people are often persuaded 

by ‘‘more’’ arguments (Harkins & Petty, 1981). We


suggest this peripheral route to persuasion may capitalize 

on bigger ¼ better mappings. If so, simply presenting 

persuasion-related material in a larger font size may render 

it more persuasive. A second potential application 

relates to self-report processes. Schwarz (1999) suggested 

that self-reports of attitude and personality are 

inherently malleable, influenced by several contextual 

manipulations. Because of the prelinguistic nature of 

our associations, it may be that manipulations of font 

size would be useful in examining the contextual nature 

of self-report. For example, it seems likely to us that 

participants would be more likely to endorse positive 

statements concerning the self (e.g., ‘‘I am a good person’’) 

if such statements are presented in a larger font 

size. In sum, font-size manipulations may be useful in 

understanding contextual influences on attitude and 

self-concept judgments in a more general manner than 

examined here. 

Theoretical Considerations 

Embodied Cognition 

We have highlighted affective metaphor in our 

interpretation of the results. Although this theoretical 

perspective appears to be especially generative (Lakoff 

& Johnson, 1999; Meier & Robinson, 2005), there are 

other theoretical perspectives that could, in principle, 

help explain our data. Along these lines, there has been 

a recent interest in ‘‘embodied’’ forms of social cognition 

(e.g., Niedenthal, Barsalou, & Winkielman, 

2005). The general contention is that cognitive processes 

seem to operate in a much more bodily fashion than 

typically appreciated within traditional views of 

cognition (e.g., Barsalou, 1999). For example, mental 

representations of a hammer seem to rely, to a certain 

extent, on neural brain regions actually used to perform 

the relevant action (e.g., pounding a nail). In short, the 

brain seems to ‘‘recruit’’ sensory, perceptual, and motor 

regions when representing stimuli. 

At the present time, it is difficult to sharply distinguish 

metaphoric and embodied views of cognition, 

in particular because they seem to make overlapping 

predictions (Wilson, 2002). Moreover, we recognize, as 

others have, that the metaphor-representation perspective 

must ultimately rely on brain functioning, as must 

any cognitive process. Thus, we do not necessarily distinguish 

metaphoric-representation processes from those 

involving perceptual and motor areas of the brain 

(Barsalou, 1999). However, in the future, it seems 

likely that the embodied perspective may help to explain 

why people seem to be so influenced by metaphorrepresentation 

processes. For example, our results 

suggest that it may be useful to examine perceptual areas 

of the brain, such as those related to size or spatial 


perception, while asking individuals to evaluate stimuli. 

Such data could complement our data in uncovering the 

neural basis of metaphor-representation processes. 

Metaphor Representation or Simple Associations? 

Cross-cultural evidence suggests that linguistic 

mappings are not arbitrary but rather are strongly constrained 

by our physical bodies (Gibbs, 1994; Kövecses, 

2000). For example, it is not surprising that cultures 

throughout the world associate good with brightness 

because human beings are diurnal creatures who have 

better capabilities to identify motive-relevant objects 

and survive the elements under daytime conditions 

(Meier & Robinson, 2005). Therefore, it is not surprising 

that we have so many phrases linking goodness to 

brightness. Similar developmental processes are also 

likely involved in the seemingly universal associations 

linking affect and size (e.g., Tolaas, 1991). The point 

here is that metaphor-representation frameworks can 

provide a principled theoretical basis for the ubiquity 

of particular linguistic mappings both within and 

across cultures (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff, 1987; Meier & 

Robinson, 2005). 

Could one arrive at the present predictions without 

reference to the ‘‘deep’’ theory of metaphor representation 

(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999)? Possibly, in a superficial 

manner, one could make these predictions on the 

basis of frequent valence-size pairings in the English language 

and through accumulated experiences. However, 

such purely associative accounts would be limited in at 

least two ways. First, purely associative accounts can 

provide no principled understanding of why particular 

metaphor mappings (e.g., black is bad) appear to be 

universal across cultures (Kövecses, 2000). Second, 

purely associative accounts cannot explain why stimulus 

manipulations such as word color, verticality, or font 

size influence evaluations at all, precisely because these 

manipulations involve physical characteristics of stimuli 

rather than linguistic associations. In sum, effects of the 

present type support the prelinguistic mappings thought 

to be characteristic of metaphor-representation processes 

rather than those pertaining to linguistic associations 

that might be particular to a given language 

(Gibbs, 1994; Meier & Robinson, 2005). 

Context Effects 

Good things sometimes do come in small packages 

(e.g., an engagement ring). Furthermore, individuals 

are typically averse to largeness when it pertains to their 

own body (Fallon & Rozin, 1985). The American preference 

for largeness, at least in meals, may not be shared 

by all cultures. Japanese individuals, intuitively at least, 

seem to favor smaller meals, and this preference for a



smaller meal size has been empirically established 

among French individuals (Rozin, Kabnik, Pete, 

Fischler, & Shields, 2003). These are merely a subset 

of findings that could suggest that effects of the present 

type might be somewhat limited to a particular evaluative 

context. 

Although we are in sympathy with such contextspecific 

frameworks (e.g., Tamir, Robinson, Clore, 

Martin, & Whitaker, 2004), it is important to recognize 

that the exclusive focus on context effects may mask 

more universal tendencies, such as those particular to 

affective metaphor (Meier & Robinson, 2005). In point 

of fact, demonstrating contextual effects requires careful 

design and procedures (e.g., Tamir et al., 2004), but the 

relevant findings may be the exception rather than the 

rule. Hence, we do suggest that the present sorts of 

effects might be contextual to a certain extent, and we 

encourage research along these lines. At the same time, 

however, we view contextual influences on automatic 

affect as a somewhat misleading model of the typical 

nature of automatic affect (for relevant reviews, see 

Klauer & Musch, 2003; Neumann, Forster, & Strack, 

2003; Winkielman et al., 2003). 

Accordingly, we suggest that careful manipulations 

of stimulus context can sometimes reverse typical affective 

associations (e.g., Tamir et al., 2004). However, we 

also suggest that there are broader tendencies that 

reinforce typical affective associations such as those 

linking larger stimuli to positive evaluations. In sum, 

we do not regard the present effects as inconsistent with 

the possibility of context effects, but we do regard the 

present effects as indicative of ‘‘default’’ associations 

linking evaluations to stimulus size. 

CONCLUSION 

When people use phrases like ‘‘big day’’ and ‘‘small 

mind,’’ they are using size in a metaphoric fashion. In 

our experiments, we pursued the premise that these 

metaphoric mappings are not merely linguistic in nature 

but rather reflect nonlinguistic, automatic tendencies to 

equate bigger stimuli with more positive evaluations. 

The current experiments supported the idea that such 

bigger ¼ better mappings operate at encoding (Experiment 

1), are automatic to a certain extent (Experiment 

2), and influence evaluative judgments (Experiment 3). 

These results are entirely novel to the social-cognition 

literature, but they are consistent with the metaphorrepresentation 

perspective (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 

1999). Accordingly, we suggest that automatic associations 

between evaluation and stimulus size may be 

important to future studies in the social psychology 

literature, both basic and applied. 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

Research in this article was supported by a grant from 

the National Institutes of Mental Health (MH 068241). 

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