Paris Peace Summit, 1971 - World Model United Nations

Paris Peace Summit, 1971 

World Model UN 2012 

Background Guide

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Letter from the Secretary General..............................................................1 

Letter from the Under-Secretary General.....................................................2 

Letter from the Chair...................................................................................3 

Introduction......................................................................................................4 

History and Structure of the Committee...................................................4 

History and Discussion of the Issue.........................................................5 

The Long Road to Revolution (1802-1945)..................................................5 

The First Indochina War (1946-1954).....................................................9 

An Uncertain Peace (1955-1963)..............................................................13 

The Vietnam War (1963-1971)..................................................................18 

Current Situation......................................................................................24 

Proposed Solutions...................................................................................24 

Key Actors.................................................................................................24 

Timeline..............................................................................25 

Suggestions for Further Research.............................................................27 

Position Papers..........................................................................................27 

Questions to Consider..............................................................................28 

Closing Remarks.......................................................................................28 

Works Cited..............................................................................................28 

Cover image courtesy of Vancouver Tourism Board.

KATHLEEN TANG 

Secretary-General 

SAMIR PATEL 

Director-General 

KEVIN LIU HUANG 

Under-Secretary-General for 

General Assemblies 

ANNA TROWBRIDGE 

Under-Secretary-General 

for Economic and Social 

Councils and Regional 

Bodies 

APARAJITA TRIPATHI 


Specialized Agencies 

RICHARD EBRIGHT 


Operations 

SAMUEL LEITER 


Administration 

SCOTT YU 


Business 

Letter from the Secretary-General 

Dear Delegates 

My name is Kathleen Tang and I am serving as the Secretary- 

General of the WorldMUN 2012 conference. After being a part 

of WorldMUN for the past few years it is a bittersweet experience 

to be running my last WorldMUN ever, but I could not be more 

excited to share this experience with all of you! 

Within the pages of this guide you will find the topics that the 

WorldMUN staff has been hard at work on over the past few 

months. Each chair worked hard to find a topic that they are truly 

passionate about and provide the best guides possible through 

extensive research. However, the background guide should 

only be the first step in your substantive learning process. Read 

through the guide thoroughly and note what areas of debate are 

particularly interesting for your chair and use this as a starting 

point for your own research on the topic. Remember that you 

will be representing a country, a people, and a culture outside of 

your own during your week of debate. What viewpoints does your 

country have on this topic? What would they say to the issues the 

chair brings up in the guide? In what ways would your country 

most like to see these issues ‘resolved’? There are always more 

sources to look at and more news to be up to date with so the 

learning never stops! 

Of course, if you ever need help along the way there are many 

resources up online for you - WorldMUN 101 and the Rules of 

Procedure are both up on our website (www.worldmun.org) and 

will help you better understand how to write a study guide and 

how debate will run March 11-15th, 2012. Feel free to also reach 

out to your chair or USG via email. They are here to help you feel 

comfortable and prepared for the conference. 

I hope you enjoy the research presented here and also the learning 

process that comes with doing your own research on the topic. 

I look forward to meeting you in March! 

Sincerely, 

Kathleen Tang 


World Model United Nations 2012 

secretarygeneral@worldmun.org

KATHLEEN TANG 


SAMIR PATEL 









Bodies 






Operations 

SAMUEL LEITER 



SCOTT YU 


Business 

Letter from the Under-Secretary-General 

Dear Delegates 

It is with tremendous excitement that I welcome you to the Specialized 

Agencies of WorldMUN Vancouver! My name is Aparajita Tripathi, 

and I am honoured to be serving as your Under-Secretary-General 

for the 21st session of World Model United Nations. I am a junior 

at Harvard, pursuing interdisciplinary coursework in philosophy, 

government, history, economics, and anthropology. This is my 

second time serving as a member of the Secretariat, having been 

the USG of Business last year in Singapore. I cannot wait to begin 

yet another memorable round of the unforgettable WorldMUN 

experience with you all! 

I also had the privilege of chairing a WorldMUN SA committee 

in 2011 (the Indian Cabinet), so the Specialized Agencies are 

especially dear to me. As our name reveals, we are a truly special 

community of people who are incredibly dedicated to the cause of 

fruitful deliberation and diplomacy—from the fantastic chairs you 

will soon meet, to the diligent Assistant Chairs on the host team, 

and to you, the delegates. We may have the smallest committees 

at WorldMUN, but the level and intensity of debate in the SA can 

easily rival that of any General Assembly session. Moreover, I hope 

that you will take advantage of the SA’s small size to engage with 

each of your fellow delegates, both inside and outside of committee. 

These comprehensive study guides are the products of months 

of research and careful writing on the part of your chairs. Read 

them thoroughly with the knowledge that they are only a starting 

point meant to expose you to a particular debate. Where you 

situate yourself within that debate and the direction in which you 

take it will depend largely on your own research – be sure to do 

your homework prior to arriving in Vancouver! If you have any 

questions whatsoever about the guides, rules of procedure, or the 

conference in general, please do no hesitate to reach out to either 

me or your chairs. We would be more than happy to hear from you 

even before the conference starts. 

Looking forward to meeting you all in March! 

Warmest regards, 

Aparajita Tripathi 

Under-Secretary-General of the 


atripathi@college.harvard.edu

KATHLEEN TANG 


SAMIR PATEL 









Bodies 






Operations 

SAMUEL LEITER 



SCOTT YU 


Business 

Letter from the Chair 

Dear Delegates, 

Welcome to WorldMUN and to the Paris Peace Summit of 1971! My 

name is Charlene Wong, and I am a third-year at Harvard studying 

Government and Economics. I was born in Singapore and grew up in 

New Jersey, although I return almost every year—including last year, 

for WorldMUN 2011! I have participated in Model UN since middle 

school, and at Harvard, I run the Specialized Agencies at our high 

school conference (HMUN), and continue to travel on the college 

circuit. Apart from classes and extracurriculars, I enjoy playing 

electric guitar, pursuing my interest in graphic design, and reading 

foreign newspapers. 

Some of you may remember me as the Under-Secretary-General for 

Administration from WorldMUN 2011—if there’s something I love 

as much as answering emails, it’s definitely the Specialized Agencies! 

I am so excited to chair the Paris Peace Summit—the conference that 

brought an end to the Vietnam War. Over the course of the week, 

delegates will represent diplomats from North Vietnam, the United 

States, South Vietnam, and other parties in attempting to craft the 

conditions of a ceasefire and long-term peace. Beginning in 1955, 

the Cold War-era military conflict pitted communist North Vietnam, 

supported by China and the Soviet Union, against South Vietnam 

and the United States. In real life, the Paris Peace Accords fell apart 

months after the last signature was inked—resulting in the forced 

unification of Vietnam under communist leadership. At WorldMUN, 

we’ll have the opportunity to craft out an agreement that will promote 

lasting peace in one of the most war-ravaged regions of Southeast 

Asia. 

What excites me most about this topic is its unconventional take on 

the Cold War in the Asian arena. Despite two million casualties, the 

Vietnam War has been an uncommon topic on the Model UN circuit. 

This committee seeks to remedy that disparity. If you’re interested in 

Cold War politics, Southeast Asia, or the dynamics of peace treaty 

negotiation, I hope you will join me in the Paris Peace Summit at 

WorldMUN XXI! Till then, if you have any questions or just want to 

introduce yourself, please feel free to drop me an email at charlene. 

wong@college.harvard.edu. I look forward meeting you. 

Sincerely, 

Charlene Wong 

Chair, Paris Peace Summit, 1971 

WorldMUN 2012

I N T R O D U C T I ON 

It is a conict known to Americans and Westerners as 

the “Vietnam War.” But the ghting that occurred in 

Vietnam between 1961 and 1975 goes by dierent names to 

the varied belligerents. To the Vietnamese, who have seen 

foreign intervention time and again it is the “American War;” 

Vietnamese communists call it the “Resistance War Against 

America.” To scholars seeking detached terminology, it is 

the “Second Indochina War”—marking the continuation 

of a previous, unnished battle that aected not only 

Vietnam, but neighboring Cambodia and Laos—or the 

“Vietnam Conict”—acknowledging that the United States 

Congress never actually declared war on the Southeast Asian 

nation. Such varied terminology is perhaps evidence of the 

contrasting points of view and the controversy surrounding 

the Cold War-era conict. 

e Paris Peace Summit meets in 1971 amid weariness and 

popular discontent on all sides for the repercussions of the 

lengthy war. e central question of this committee is, if the 

belligerents of the Vietnam War had made dierent choices 

at the negotiating table, could a long-term peace in South 

Vietnam be achieved? To answer this question, this committee 

will gather the parties involved in the Vietnam War to debate 

the conditions for peace—and if peace is possible, to cra 

the principles that will ensure lasting national and regional 

prosperity. 

is committee’s focus is not only on the short-term technical 

or military aspects of an end to conict—discussion of 

regional issues and, indeed, the international backdrop of a 

bipolar world will be critical to coming to an agreement. e 

e American delegation participated in a series of talks to 

formulate a treaty to end the war in Vietnam. 

purpose of this study guide is to help delegates gain a full 

understanding of the factors behind the conict in Vietnam, 

as well as the motivations and interests of each party to the 

war. However, please keep in mind the need for additional 

research, and please feel free to contact me if you have any 

questions. 

Over half of the guide comprises the History and Discussion 

of the Issue, which explains the development of a fractured 

Vietnam, from the rst foreign domination under the 

Chinese onwards. e rest of the guide provides additional 

helpful information and advice, including the substantively 

oriented Proposed Solutions, and Suggestions for Further 

Research. 

In the spirit of the crisis committee, all actions of the Paris 

Peace Summit will be up to you and your fellow delegates 

to decide. In a year when tensions are higher than ever 

before, disagreement could bring yet more escalation—and 

cooperation could usher in a new era of national peace. Best 

of luck, and I hope that this study guide will be useful in your 

preparations. 

HISTORY & STRUCTURE OF THE COMMITTEE 

The Paris Peace Summit comes together on January 1, 

1971, with the common hope that the new year will push 

forward the end to the conict in Vietnam. Present in Paris 

are delegates from the United States of America, the Republic 

of Vietnam (South Vietnam), the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North 

Vietnam), and the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong). 

While the Soviet Union did not attend the Paris Peace Talks in 

the real timeline of history, their presence at this simulation 

of the Paris Peace Summit reects the instrumental part they 

played in materially and ideologically supporting the North 

Vietnamese cause. A team of three individual delegates will 

represent each nation. Each team, comprising delegates from 

dierent universities, will work in tandem to push forward 

their respective nation or group’s objectives. Delegates 

representing nations will include the ministries of defense 

and foreign aairs, and advisors or negotiators. 

Following a lengthy period of debate and political 

maneuvering to bring every side to the negotiating table, the 

rst meeting in Paris took place on May 10, 1968. 

Powers of the Committee 

The committee’s mission is to dra an accord that will 

end the war and restore peace in Vietnam. erefore, 

Harvard WorldMUN 2012 PARIS PEACE SUMMIT 1971 4

its delegates have at their disposal every necessary power 

to negotiate a peace (such as declaring a ceasere, deciding 

upon a timeline for troop withdrawal, and calling a 

referendum). Delegates who are cabinet members also have 

their portfolio powers at their disposal. All delegates may 

privately communicate with military ocials and the head of 

their respective state. 

H I S T O R Y AND DISCUSSI ON OF T H E ISSUE 

The Long Road to Revolution (1802-1945) 

Early Foreign Domination 

Even before the rst American boots hit the ground in 

Southeast Asia, powerful foreign forces had shaped 

Vietnamese history for centuries. e narrative of foreign 

domination began with China, which conquered the Viet 

ethnic group in 111 BC and ruled the nation as a de facto 

province for the next millennia. A complicated relationship 

developed between the Vietnamese people and their Chinese 

rulers—one in which Vietnam embraced and adapted 

Chinese culture, religion, technology, language, art and 

architecture. In particular, the Vietnamese adopted the 

basic economy of China, based on wet rice farming. e 

cultivation of rice required cooperative labor, and became the 

foundation of the strong collective spirit within and among 

Vietnamese communities, which, though autonomous, 

could be mobilized as a unied chain to ght against foreign 

invasion. 1 e hierarchical government structure of China, 

based on Confucian ethics and bureaucratic administration, 

quickly took hold over its southern neighbor. 2 At the same 

time, however, Chinese domination sparked a series of 

bloody insurrections led by the Vietnamese elite. 

e most celebrated of these rebellions was led by the Trung 

sisters—Trung Trac and Trung Nhi—who vanquished the 

superior Chinese military in 39 AD. eir independent 

Viet kingdom lasted for three years before Chinese forces 

put down the insurrection, but the Trung sisters committed 

suicide, lasting in perpetuity in the memory of the Viet 

nationalists who followed them. 3 By the tenth century, a 

crumbling Tang dynasty in China could no longer aord the 

resources to maintain control over its colonial limbs. In 939, 

a Vietnamese army ambushed and defeated a much larger 

Chinese army at what is today Haiphong. Despite periodic 

attempts by the Chinese to regain control, the state of Dai 

Viet (“Great Viet”) maintained its independence through 

diplomacy, tribute payments to the Chinese capital, and 

successful military campaigns against invaders. 

e Trung sisters, TrungTrac and TrungNhi, are celebrated 

for leading a rebellion in 39 AD to defeat Chinese occupation 

and establish an independent Viet kingdom. 

Dai Viet 

Once established, the Viet kingdom saw its own imperial, 

expansionist desires. Population growth and economic 

factors spurred the Vietnamese to push southward, toward 

the fertile plains and the Mekong delta. In doing so, they 

vanquished their Cham and Khmer neighbors. Finally 

completing their expansion in 1700, Dai Viet controlled 800 

miles of coast. 4 

But expansion brought its own concerns, and the Vietnamese 

began to experience the internal dissension and strife that 

had long plagued its northern neighbor. From Hanoi, rulers 

found it dicult to exert control over Southern farmers. 

In the South, fertile lands and high crop yields shaped the 

development of an individualistic culture, which contrasted 

with the tradition-bound ethos of the North. In 1613, 

tensions came to a head with the explosion of civil war that 

split Vietnam into rival territories ruled by two warrior 

families, the Nguyen in the South and the Trinh in the North. 

Aer two hundred years of periodic strife, the Nguyen family 

managed a tentative unication of the two halves of Vietnam. 

e Nguyen Dynasty named their new empire “Nam Viet” 

(“Southern Viet”), and turned towards Confucian principles 

to assist in the consolidation of their domain. Within a few 

decades, however, the Nguyen faced yet another threat: 

French imperialists who sought to colonize Vietnam, 

Cambodia, and Laos. 

French Encounters 

Vietnam’s earliest encounters with Europeans date 

back to 16th century merchants and missionaries, but 


French imperial ambitions only became clear in the latter 

half of the 19 th century. Nguyen Anh, the founding head 

of the Nguyen Dynasty, foresaw that the European powers 

would eventually attempt to dominate Asia. 5 us, while he 

tolerated Christianity, welcomed Western imports, and even 

allowed some Europeans to remain at his court, he refused 

to give the French any advantage. Instead, he withdrew his 

court into the same isolation as the Qing Dynasty in China 

had adopted in defense against the West—turning his capital 

at Hue into a Beijing-style walled “Forbidden City.” 6 

At the end of his reign, Nguyen Anh chose an heir whom 

he knew to be xenophobic—the scholarly Minh Mang. Minh 

Mang selected a route even more isolationist than that of 

his father—rebung proposed pacts, rejecting the rst 

American to set foot in Vietnam, and enforcing the Confucian 

principles upon which his bureaucratic administration 

was based. His government had no department of foreign 

aairs—for in his mind, the Western “barbarians” were 

unworthy of institutional study. 7 As rebellions against his 

Nguyen Anh seized power in 1802 and established the 

Nguyen Dynasty, the last feudal dynasty in Vietnamese 

history. 

reign began to spread throughout the South, Minh Mang 

became increasingly suspicious of foreign and native 

Catholic priests’ involvement. In 1833, aer the son of the 

nominal Emperor Le rebelled against Minh Mang with 

apparent Catholic urging, Minh Mang ordered the arrest 

of all French and Vietnamese priests. 8 ose who did not 

escape were brutally executed. Minh Mang’s actions were 

met with renewed zeal by missionaries in France, who were 

determined to expand their crusade in Vietnam, where so 

many martyrs had already died for the cross. 

England’s success in the Opium War of 1841, where it 

forcefully opened Qing China to trade, placed greater 

pressure on France to expand its presence in Southeast Asia. 

French leaders sought to keep pace with Great Britain, which 

had already established control over India, Burma, and 

Malaya, and seemed ready to take Vietnam if the French did 

not rst lay claim. 9 Emperor Napoleon III sought the glory of 

empire in Southeast Asia. But more signicant than political 

aims were the economic calculations that drove France 

toward Vietnam. 

As the Industrial Revolution took hold in France, business 

elites looked toward the East for new resources and markets. 

Colonizing Indochina would not only generate prots from 

Southeast Asia, but would open up a new gateway into 

the vast markets of China. Accompanying these material 

motives was the age-old disguise of moral imperative: to 

civilize, and Christianize pagans. And renewed eorts by 

the Nguyen Dynasty to repress Christian missionaries would 

only provoke French intervention. In 1843, French foreign 

minister Francois Guizot deployed a permanent eet in 

Asian waters “to protect, and if necessary to defend, our 

political and commercial interests”—with the authorization 

to rescue threatened French missionaries. 10 

e French bid for colonial power began in 1858 with a 

gunship raid on the port of Danang, and attained success four 

years later. With no hope of resisting against superior French 

military technology, the Vietnamese court ceded Saigon and 

three other provinces to French rule. 11 As France expanded 

their control over the whole of Southern Vietnam, including 

the Mekong Delta, by 1867, they established a colony they 

called Cochin China. 

According to a treaty signed in 1883—under the coercion of 

gunships not far from the capital of Hue—the French would 

install ocials and garrisons to exercise authority over the 

Vietnamese government, including the emperor. Vietnam 

would be open to commerce, and the French would be 

responsible for regulating its trade, collecting customs duties, 

ensuring its defense, and managing its foreign aairs. 12 And 

“Vietnam” would be no more: the proud kingdom would be 

divided into the protectorates of Tonkin in the north, Annam 

along the central coast, and the existing colony of Cochin 

China. Chinese protests against the forced pact culminated 

in the Sino-French War (1884-1885)—a defeat for the Asian 

empire, and an opportunity for France to consolidate its 

control over its new colony. Ultimately, Vietnam had become 

a French possession. 


Although France had taken over the Vietnamese royal court, 

and replaced its throne with a docile puppet, it had not won 

over the Vietnamese people. e Vietnamese struggle of 

resistance continued well past the end of the century. As a 

prominent French ocial noted at the time, “We have no 

friends. Not even the courtiers surrounding the emperor, 

our creature, favor us.” 13 Even as the French expanded 

their colonial holdings to Cambodia and Laos (which, 

along with Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin, comprised 

the Indochinese Union), and placed civilian agents and 

soldiers everywhere, the task of “pacication” was an uphill 

battle—one that would leave scars of intense brutality and 

humiliation. 

Vietnam Under France 

Where the British governed India through a policy 

of “association”—indirectly ruling through native 

institutions—and other French scholars proposed forcing 

Vietnam into a Western mold through assimilation, the 

French rulers of Vietnam chose neither route. ey instead 

opted for direct rule, which lasted even until the 1950s, when 

they attempted to counter nationalist demands by installing 

Emperor Bao Dai as sovereign, only to continue ruling on his 

behalf. French admirals who rst took the reins over Cochin 

China in the 1860s assigned French ocers to run the 

administration, virtually none of whom were familiar with 

Vietnamese culture, language, or values. e local mandarins 

who served as bureaucrats in the Nguyen Dynasty resigned 

upon the French takeover, and the new government had to 

recruit local collaborators as intermediaries. However, they 

relegated Vietnamese employees to lowly positions with 

subpar salaries; the highest-ranking Vietnamese ocial 

earned less than the lowliest French colonial. 14 Where 

Vietnamese collaborators had some measure of autonomy— 

as the village chiefs who were responsible for collecting taxes 

and mustering labor did—they oen abused their powers 

to extort funds and oppress peasants. 15 e Vietnamese 

who climbed the ranks of the colonial system were mostly 

Catholic, and were too remote from the average Vietnamese 

citizen to serve eectively. 

French ocials sought to reform the Vietnamese education 

system, which for centuries had been based upon Confucian 

principles, to t the model of Western education. e 

French prohibited the teaching of the Chinese ideographs 

used for written Vietnamese, and ordered in its stead a 

curriculum of either French or quoc ngu, the Romanized 

alphabet. 16 Young Vietnamese rejected what they saw as 

colonial indoctrination—at the cost of national literacy rates. French Indochina in 1913. 

Wealthy Vietnamese youths who studied Western ideas of 

enlightenment in Paris returned home to the harsh reality of 

subjugation. eir newspapers and books were banned due 

to suspicions of subversive content, and they were met with 

unemployment or low wages. 

e ultimate subjugation of Vietnam was not only cultural 

or political, but rather economic. e Governor of Vietnam, 

Paul Doumer, sought to transform Indochina into a protgenerating 

enterprise for France. By 1902, he could claim that 

“Indochina began to serve France in Asia on the day that it 

was no longer a poverty-stricken colony, reduced to begging 

for alms from the motherland. Its strong organization, its 

nancial and economic structures and its great power are 

being used for the benet of French prestige.” 17 Doumer 

began by centralizing control over the nances of the French 

bankers, merchants and landowners who ran the lucrative 


Cochin China for their own gain. He increased revenues by 

creating ocial monopolies over the production and sale 

of alcohol, salt, and opium. Of the three, opium production 

had the greatest repercussions on the Vietnamese people. 

Although only the Chinese living in Vietnam had smoked 

opium prior to the arrival of the French, a new opium renery 

in Saigon encouraged local Vietnamese consumption of 

the narcotic. Vietnamese addiction accelerated—and soon 

revenue from opium production and sale accounted for one 

third of the colonial administration’s income. 18 Opium trac 

would have grave inuences on the Vietnamese people even 

aer the departure of the French. 

Rice cultivation in paddies was critical to the economic 

survival of peasants. 

Doumer pursued a land reform that accelerated the 

dispossession of rural peasants from the land. While the 

emperors had prohibited rice exports to insure against 

leaner times, rice was a valuable commodity to Doumer 

and the French. French speculators and wealthy landowners 

grabbed any fertile land to ride the wave of lucrative rice 

cultivation, at the expense of peasants, who lost their land 

and became tenants or worked small plots, in subsistence 

farming. Doumer found use for these landless peasants— 

as cheap labor in mining, rubber, construction, and other 

industries. Conditions in these sectors were abysmal, with 

many workers serving as little more than indentured labor, 

and oen working until they died of disease. 

While Doumer achieved his objective of turning the 

impoverished colony of Vietnam into a humming gear in the 

machine of the global French economy, the plundering of 

French capitalists set into motion the ideology of the extreme 

nationalists. Led by Ho Chi Minh, the Communists, the 

most ferocious adversaries of colonialism, would capture the 

popular discontent against French injustice, and eventually 

bring down the foreign regime. 

“Patriots of All Ages and All Types” 

Isolated from the all-but-obsolete Confucian philosophy 

that bound the older generation of mandarins, the young 

Vietnamese intelligentsia looked westward for a way to come 

to terms with French domination. Following the October 

Revolution in Russia in 1917, a number of young Vietnamese 

found themselves drawn towards the socialism that spurred 

the Bolshevik revolutionaries. 19 Among these Vietnamese 

was a young Ho Chi Minh, who was at the time living in 

Paris, writing articles and impassioned pamphlets for labor 

journals and participating in lively debate circles. For Ho, 

the decision to join the Communists, who had broken away 

from the gentler ideologies of the socialists, was that “their 

Soviet patrons had the potential power to spark the global 

revolution that would liberate Vietnam.” 20 What Ho found 

most compelling about Lenin’s thesis was his unrelenting 

critique of world imperialism. 

When Ho visited Moscow in 1924, however, he found that 

Soviet leaders were too busy squabbling among themselves 

for the succession of power to Lenin, to have sucient 

interest in Vietnam. 21 Nonetheless, Ho used his time in 

the Soviet Union to specialize in peasant aairs for the 

Communist International (Comintern) and before long was 

assigned to propagandize and recruit in China. In 1930, he 

founded the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), which, 

escaping the French suppression that undid rival groups, 

would become the most eective of the Vietnamese anticolonial 

organizations. 22 e ICP was thus better prepared 

than their rivals to seize the opportunity presented by the 

outbreak of World War II—and the Japanese occupation. 

e Japanese wave swept over Southeast Asia in 1940, as the 

Japanese Imperial Army poured down from China, crushing 

the French in Vietnam, the British in Malaya, the Dutch 

in Indonesia, and the United States in the Philippines. e 

Western colonial powers had fallen to an Asian nation— 

and native nationalists throughout Southeast Asia ocked 

to Japan. 23 Ho Chi Minh, however, was not convinced that 

the Japanese would be much kinder masters than the French 

they replaced. Instead, he expected the Allies to win—and 

to oust the French (who were now operating in Vietnam 

on behalf of the Japanese). In 1941, he formed a broad 

movement of “patriots of all ages and all types, peasants, 

workers, merchants and soldiers” to ght the Japanese and 

their French collaborators. 24 Led by the Communists, they 

called the nationalist organization the Viet Nam Doc Lap 

Dong Minh, the Vietnam Independence League—or the 

Vietminh, for short. 


e August Revolution 

By the end of 1944, the last days of Japanese domination 

were in sight. US troops under General Douglas 

MacArthur were ghting their way up through the Pacic and 

taking back the Philippines—word of mouth quickly spread 

that their rst destination on the Asian continent would be 

Vietnam. Fearing that the Americans would oust the Japanese 

only to transfer power to the Vietnamese nationalists, 

General Charles de Gaulle sent in French forces and arms 

into the area to participate as soon as the Americans made 

landfall. 25 e Japanese stiened their defense, and in March 

1945, they took over direct control, eliminating any resisting 

French soldiers, and granting Vietnam its “independence” as 

part of Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. 

Ho Chi Minh, seen here in 1945, led Vietnamese nationalists 

to independence. 

Meanwhile, massive famines in rural areas of Vietnam— 

almost entirely the result of Japanese agricultural 

policies—would prove to be a needed and fortuitous boost 

for the Vietminh cause. Early in 1945, facing shortages of 

raw materials from Southeast Asian sources reconquered by 

the Allied forces, the Japanese forced Vietnamese peasants 

to plant industrial crops like peanuts and jute, instead of 

rice. 26 At the same time, they appropriated rice, storing it for 

their troops in the case of an Allied invasion. Flooding in the 

summer of 1945 caused the shoddy and neglected Red River 

dikes to burst in several spots, further aggravating an already 

serious food shortage. 27 North and north-central Vietnam 

were hardest hit: two million out of a total population of ten 

million died. 28 

Starving peasants fought back—attacking French garrisons 

and storming Japanese silos. In August, news of Japan’s 

surrender to the Allies spread and sparked uprisings across 

the nation. e Vietminh rode to power on the wave of the 

popular insurrections—known aerward as the August 

Revolution. Vietminh agents mobilized villages, put Japanese 

and colonial collaborators on trial, and clashed with the Cao 

Dai and Hoa Hao, eclectic religious factions nurtured by 

the Japanese authorities. Vietminh numbers swelled from 

ve thousand before August to seventy thousand by the end 

of the year. 29 Days aer the Japanese surrender, uniformed 

Vietminh stormed government buildings and demanded the 

resignation of Bao Dai; the Emperor readily compiled, and 

in Vietnamese eyes, passed the ultimate legitimacy of the 

“mandate of heaven” onto Ho’s regime. 30 On September 2, 

before a crowd of 400,000, the aged Ho Chi Minh mounted a 

podium in Hanoi’s central Ba Dinh Square, and proclaimed 

the freedom and independence of the Democratic Republic 

of Vietnam 31 . But forces oceans away had already determined 

the course of Vietnamese history, a path that would send the 

Allies, once seen as Vietnam’s heroes, on a collision course 

with the Vietnamese nationalists. 

The First Indochina War (1946-1954) 

Roots of War 

In July of 1945, the Allied leaders had gathered in the sleepy 

Berlin suburb of Potsdam to plan the course of the postwar 

future. ere, hardly a blip in their greater scheme, they 

decided to disarm the Japanese administration in Vietnam by 

dividing the country at the sixteenth parallel. Great Britain 

would take the south, and the Chinese Nationalists would take 

the north. 32 Despite Ho’s proud assertion of independence 

at Hanoi in September, the Vietminh’s consolidation of 

freedom was far more tenuous. Over the next year, Ho and 

his burgeoning patriotic movement would have to contend 

with French ambitions of reconquest, domestic rivalries 

with other organizations, and Chinese suspicions. At the 

same time, his provisional government was confronted by an 

under-developed, war-ravaged economy, and the looming 

possibility of a return of the deadly famine. 

In the north, Chinese Nationalists formed close alliances 

with Vietnamese nationalist groups, namely the Vietnamese 

Nationalist Party (Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang), which 

competed with the Vietminh for control. To allay Chinese 

fears, Ho downplayed the role of communism in his party; 

he further prohibited local militias from attacking Chinese 

regiments and agreed to share power in the National 

Assembly with groups unaliated with the Vietminh. 33 In 

November 1945, he ocially disbanded the Indo-Chinese 

Communist Party (though the organization continued to act 

covertly, and eventually reconstituted itself at the height of 


the war with France). Satised with his actions, the Chinese 

Nationalists allowed the Vietminh to continue to function, 

and refused French requests to bring troops into the North. 34 

In the south, however, Ho faced a pair of confounding 

variables—French ambitions to retake Vietnam, and 

American and British sympathies that lay with the French 

cause. By 1944, as Allied victory became all but certain, 

Charles de Gaulle’s anxiety over the fate of Indochina became 

increasingly evident. e reconquest of its global territories 

did not rank lower in priority than the reestablishment of 

the French state—it was critical to the rehabilitation of the 

French image and economy. Francois de Langlade, one of 

de Gaulle’s delegates to Indochina, wrote in early 1945 that 

“Without Indochina, France is no longer a world power.” 35 

Aer the wartime devastation and humiliation at the hands 

of Nazi Germany, rebuilding its empire was the key step 

towards restoring its Great Power status. Further, French 

technocrats surmised, Vietnamese rice and rubber exports 

could help to piece together the parts of the shattered postwar 

French economy. 36 us, even as the Vietminh expanded 

its numbers and popularity, Jean Cédile, whom de Gaulle 

had sent to Indochina, refused to consider the Vietminh’s 

demands for sovereignty—and the Vietnamese nationalists 

would accept nothing less. 

General Leclerc arrived in Indochina with 35,000 troops to 

reclaim Indochina for the French. 

e Americans, meanwhile, had been following a more 

meandering foreign policy. President Franklin Roosevelt had 

initially been opposed to any continuation of French rule, 

which he saw as exploitative and the worst of all the colonial 

powers in Southeast Asia, and instead proposed a postwar 

United Nations trusteeship over Vietnam. By the time he 

died, however, American strategic interests that required 

French cooperation, rst in North Africa against the Axis 

powers, and later in the post-war recovery of Western 

Europe, took greater precedence over his hostility to French 

colonialism. 37 At the same time, the United States wished 

to retain control over the Pacic Islands that the American 

military had wrested from Japanese hands—and thus to 

simultaneously demand that France relinquish Indochina to 

international trusteeship would be unseemly. 38 e issue of 

Vietnam’s independence would be placed on the backburner 

during President Harry Truman’s administration as well. 

Two other strategic imperatives would emerge that would 

force the American government’s hand: the immediate 

need to secure French cooperation at the San Francisco 

Conference, where the United Nations was being established, 

and the fear in Washington that opposition to French claims 

in Indochina would spark an adverse nationalistic reaction 

to the advantage of the Communist Party in France. 39 In the 

long-term, American desire that France play a critical role in 

organizing Western Europe’s economy and defense against 

rising Soviet power outweighed its anti-colonial sentiments. 

Even as Great Britain was contemplating independence for 

India, it sent to Indochina a commander who reiterated his 

desire for the French to return. Fresh from command in 

India, General Gracey had been sent to Indochina to take 

the Japanese surrender, but he overstepped his instructions, 

holding the paternalistic view that the “natives” should not 

defy Europeans. 40 On September 21, he declared martial law, 

banning public meetings, imposing a curfew, and barring 

the publication of Vietnamese newspapers (although the 

French press was still allowed to operate). Lacking sucient 

troop numbers to enforce his decree, he released and armed 

fourteen hundred French army troops. Just a day aer their 

release, the paratroopers and Foreign Legionnaires went on a 

rampage, ousting Ho’s Provisional Executive Committee from 

their seats in Saigon’s city hall and other public buildings, 

raiding Vietnamese homes and shops, and indiscriminately 

brutalizing Vietnamese civilians. 41 It was too late for Gracey 

and Cédile to call back their dogs of war; the Vietminh 

leaders abandoned their belief that moderation would win 

them the Allied backing, and declared a general strike on 

September 24. Saigon closed its shutters as electricity, shops, 

and all civilian life came to a halt, and Vietminh squads 

stormed the city, airport, market, and prison—but the worst 

atrocities were to take place in the suburb of the Cité Hérault, 

where mercenaries led by Vietminh soldiers massacred one 

hundred and y French and European civilians and took 

a hundred more as hostages. 42 e events of September 

24 would mark the beginning of a conict that, despite 

numerous attempts at reconciliation, would come crashing 

down on the French and the Vietnamese. 


Failures of Diplomacy 

In October, de Gaulle dispatched to Indochina General 

Jacques Philippe Leclerc, accompanied by 35,000 troops. 

ey broke through a Vietminh blockade around Saigon, 

forged through the Mekong delta and coursed through the 

highlands. 43 Despite constant harassment from guerilla 

attacks by retreating Vietminh, within ve months, Leclerc 

declared victory in the South. But his claim was tenuous: 

as American troops would discover later, the French could 

conquer Vietnamese territory, but they could not hold it; the 

Vietminh would return on their heels. 44 

General Vo Nguyen Giap commanded the Viet Minh forces 

to victory during the French-Indochina War. 

With the threat in the north that the Chinese Nationalists 

would capitulate to the French in return for concessions 

in China, Ho believed that the only alternative would be a 

negotiated settlement in which the French could return, on 

the condition that they recognized Vietnam’s independence. 

As Ho wrangled over the terms with de Gaulle’s delegate, Jean 

Sainteny, they disagreed chiey over the fate of Cochin China. 

Under pressure from French interests in Saigon, Sainteny 

demanded that Cochin China become a state separate from 

that of Vietnam. Committed to national unity, Ho refused. 

Finally, on March 6, 1946, they agreed to let the fate of 

Cochin China be decided by public referendum; Vietnam 

would be recognized as a free state within the French Union, 

and Ho would permit twenty-ve thousand French troops to 

remain in Vietnam for ve years. 45 He departed for Paris for 

further talks. 

Unbeknownst to Ho, however, the French high commissioner 

for Indochina declared a Republic of Cochin China in the 

name of France. e conference in France turned out little 

more than a dra accord that failed to resolve the Cochin 

China issue. On September 19, Ho took what he saw as 

the last resort—signing an interim understanding with the 

Minister of Overseas France, deferring to the French on the 

sovereignty of Cochin China. Even the peace brokered by 

this concession was not to last. 

On the morning of November 20, a skirmish erupted between 

French and Vietminh troops at the port of Haiphong. 

Disputing with the Vietminh over the jurisdiction to collect 

customs duties, a French patrol boat seized a group of 

Chinese smugglers; the Vietminh responded by intercepting 

the French ship and arresting its crew of three men. 46 e 

French commander attacked—and the ghting spilled over 

into the town, where French tanks rolled in and Vietminh 

mortars whistled through the air. A cease-re lasted just 

one day, before the French Prime Minister Bidault, fearing 

for the survival of his administration, ordered the shelling 

of the Vietminh. As the French General stationed in Saigon 

telegraphed the command at Haiphong, “It appears that we 

are confronted by premeditated aggression [ . . . ] Employ 

all means at your disposal to master Haiphong completely, 

and thereby bring the Vietnamese military leaders to a better 

understanding of the situation.” 47 

On November 23, the French authorities demanded the 

evacuation of Vietminh troops from Haiphong. Despite 

the latter’s protests that they were observing the cease-re, 

French infantry and armored units cruised through the city, 

taking it house by house while aircra bombed Vietminh 

positions. Within days, the French had captured the city. e 

chairman of the municipal committee would later number 

the deaths at between ve hundred and one thousand. 48 

By December, incidents of violence against French soldiers 

had spread to Hanoi. And on the evening of December 

19, the Vietminh struck, sabotaging the municipal power 

plant and breaking into French homes to abduct residents. 49 

e French counter-attacked, and Ho Chi Minh’s military 

commander, Vo Nguyen Giap, issued a declaration of 

war against the French army. e ghting in Hanoi would 

continue through the end of the month as blood spilled into 

the streets. e course of the war was set. But where the 

war began as a colonial war between a newly independent 

Vietnam and its former French masters, with American and 

Chinese intervention in 1950, it would become a piece of the 

emerging global Cold War. 

e War With the French 

Charging against the French in battle, the Vietminh raised 

the banner of the revolutionary “people’s war”—in so 

doing, invoking the Maoist mottos then being employed 

by the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Civil 


War. As they did with Chinese governance and culture two 

thousand years before, the Vietnamese adopted Mao’s threestage 

people’s war to local conditions. First was a defensive 

period, during which insurgents would temporarily withdraw 

from cities to the liberated countryside bases, followed by an 

equilibrium stage, when revolutionary forces would attack 

French positions; last was the counter-oensive in cities 

and rural areas that would bring the unied Vietnam under 

Vietminh control. 50 

For the Vietminh, however, the rst stage would not be 

a controlled strategic withdrawal so much as a “collapsing 

front,” as General Vo Nguyen Giap would term the haphazard 

and disorganized retreat in the early years. Following Hanoi, 

the Vietminh quickly lost control of major cities, and in mid- 

February 1947, faced a major French oensive in the northern 

countryside that scattered Vietnamese rural defenses. 51 

Although Ho’s government held minimal control over the 

rural north, communication between units was sparse, 

and governmental decisions were delayed. Still, the French 

were unable to take full advantage of Vietnamese weakness, 

since the French military was already spread thin between 

post-war occupation in Germany and quelling uprisings 

in Algeria and Madagascar. 52 e French government was 

further split between hardliners who desired to see the return 

of the ancient colonial empire, and le-leaning Socialists 

and French Communist Party members who advocated 

negotiation and liberalization. 

Unable to unify their nation against the Vietnamese 

nationalists’ cause, French hawks increasingly looked across 

the Atlantic for support. e French sought American 

assistance to put into place what they called the “Bao Dai 

solution”—to install the former Vietnamese emperor, 

French units parachuted into Dien Bien Phu, the site of the 

nal, fateful battle of the French-Indochina War. 

widely perceived by his own people as a puppet, to lend 

legitimacy to a Vietnamese state that would remain under 

French inuence. Events in Europe in the late 1940s would 

turn American favor towards France. American foreign 

policymakers watched anxiously as eastern Europe folded 

to Soviet power, communist parties made strides toward 

majorities in western European elections, and the Soviet 

Union intervened in the Greek civil war and launched the 

Berlin blockade. 53 Mao Zedong’s victory in China over the 

American-backed Nationalists in 1949 brought the focus 

of the US on events unfolding in Asia, as a militant anticommunist 

wave swept over the US. 

In January 1950, both the Soviet Union and the People’s 

Republic of China formally recognized Ho’s Democratic 

Republic of Vietnam. Extensions of diplomatic recognition 

quickly followed from Soviet allies in Eastern Europe—Poland, 

Romania, Czechoslovakia, and others. More signicantly 

for the Vietnamese army, the Chinese Communist Party 

supplied material aid in the form of military equipment 

and supplies and large numbers of military advisors. 54 e 

US could no longer sit on the sidelines; through its anti- 

Communist lenses, it perceived Moscow’s manipulation 

and puppeteering of the Vietminh nationalists. Just a month 

aer the Soviet and Chinese recognition of Ho’s government, 

the US announced its recognition of the French-backed 

Associated States of Vietnam, led by Bao Dai. In May, 

the Truman administration appropriated $15 million of 

immediate military and economic assistance for the French 

cause, to be expanded to $100 million by the end of the year. 55 

e outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula in June 1950, 

where the US saw itself directly confronting China, further 

heightened the strategic signicance of the Vietnam conict 

in American eyes. 

Meanwhile, despite fresh American support, the French 

faced a stark reversal of fortune in the South. eir success 

in the initial years of the war was contingent on support from 

militant Cao Dai and Hoa Hao forces, who were themselves 

hostile to the Vietminh cause. When the French sought to 

build up Bao Dai’s National Army by integrating Cao Dai 

and Hoa Hao forces, however, the two groups protested the 

loss of their autonomy, and alliances with the French broke 

down. 56 Increasing brutality in French and sectarian militia 

campaigns, including burning villages, raping women, and 

killing men suspected of Vietminh ties, coupled with French 

policies to reverse the Vietminh’s redistribution of land in 

favor of exploitative landlords, turned popular favor in the 

South toward the DRV. 


In the latter stages of the war, much of the battles would be 

held in the North, where the Vietminh held the advantage. 

Despite some tensions between the Vietminh military forces 

and their Chinese strategic advisors, Communist presence at 

the Sino-Vietnamese border was a boon to the Vietminh— 

it secured their supply channels, and made possible attacks 

on the French in the border area. Aer 1951, the Vietminh 

turned towards a gradual strategy that would force French 

forces into defensive positions and wear them down over 

time. Domestically, as the war raged on, the DRV gained even 

more followers—and became more radical. Membership 

in the Vietnamese Communist Party, then underground, 

swelled from 5,000 in 1945, to 110,000 in 1947, and over 

776,000 in 1951. 57 When it reconstituted itself as the Vietnam 

Worker’s Party (Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam) in February 1951, 

it publicly committed itself to socialist revolution, shaped by 

a movement to purify the party, demote middle-class leaders, 

and promote radical land reform. 

As the Vietminh consolidated their claims in the northern 

military zone, the French at home grew weary of the war. 

Even with US aid, the war accounted for half of the country’s 

defense expenses by 1953—and it claimed 150,000 French 

casualties. 58 Detractors of the war began to call it la guerre 

sale—the “dirty war”—and advocated a negotiated settlement 

with the DRV. On the Vietnamese side, the close of the 

Korean War led the Chinese to anxiously hint at a settlement 

to cool international tension. Both sides therefore indicated 

their willingness to come to the negotiating table at Geneva. 

e French military therefore readied itself for a yet more 

aggressive strategy to improve its bargaining position. To 

stop a coming Vietnamese operation into French-controlled 

Laos, the French planned a massive landing of airborne units 

at Dien Bien Phu, a valley near the Lao border. 59 Certain 

that the hilly terrain would give the homegrown forces 

the advantage, the Vietminh decided to ght. In March 

1954, the battle began; the Vietminh dug into trenches and 

tunnels, barraging the French forces and making the aireld 

unusable. 60 As the French became trapped, they appealed to 

American President Dwight Eisenhower for direct military 

assistance—including mass bombing raids and potential 

use of tactical nuclear weapons. But close on the heels of the 

Korean conict, Congress and Great Britain expressed their 

opposition to another full-scale military intervention—and 

so on May 7, French troops surrendered. All eyes were now 

on Geneva. 

e Geneva Convention 

In 1954, France sought only to withdraw their embattled 

forces by a face-saving compromise. Fortunately for the 

French, the Soviet Union and China were both anxious 

to avoid deepening intervention from the US, and so 

encouraged the Vietminh to make concessions. 61 Despite 

their victories on the battleeld, therefore, the Vietminh 

agreed to a military truce. e Geneva Agreements 

stipulated that the DRV would maintain territory above the 

17th parallel, while an independent State of Vietnam would 

occupy territory below the line; Hanoi and Saigon would be 

the “representative authorities of the Northern and Southern 

zones,” respectively. An International Control Commission 

would oversee the ceasere and withdrawals. e partition 

would be temporary; in two years, a referendum would be 

held to resolve the thorny issue of reunication. e same 

conference led to Vietnam’s agreement to neutralize Laos and 

Cambodia—the latter two would not join military alliances, 

request foreign military aid, or allow the establishment of 

bases on their territory. 62 

But when the Final Declaration was signed, the Dirty War 

would not end so cleanly. Of the nine countries that attended, 

only four—France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and 

China—gave their unequivocal approval. To the Soviet Union 

and China, partition was a satisfactory solution because 

it stabilized a front line in the Cold War—similar to the 

divisions in Korea and Germany. 63 e Chinese, too, desired 

to see an end to Vietnamese expansion into Indochina, where 

it sought regional hegemony. 64 But the Saigon government 

denounced the agreement—particularly the provision for 

a partition, “nal or provisional.” Indeed, both Saigon and 

Hanoi proclaimed their support for maintaining Vietnam’s 

territorial integrity. 65 It was with bitterness, therefore, that 

the Vietnamese Communists accepted the Agreement; they 

were convinced, however, that they would win elections on 

reunication. e French at last withdrew from Vietnam— 

but they would be replaced in just a few short decades by the 

coming of American intervention. 

An Uncertain Peace (1955-1963) 

e Rise of Ngo Dinh Diem 

If the Vietminh seemed condent in 1954 of their victory in 

the promised elections, they owed much of their exuberance 

to the crumbling state of government in the South. e 

“generals” of the new incompetent armed forces were but 

recently elevated members of the French auxiliary forces. 66 

In Saigon, a rabble of cliques and ocials vied for power, 

throwing o any hope of consensus decision-making—many 


Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of 

South Vietnam from 1955 to 1963. 

of the rivalries egged on by the French. e bureaucracy 

administered little outside the capitals, and the maa-like 

Binh Xuyen dominated the vice halls and economic trac 

of Saigon. Led by the indulgent playboy and former emperor 

Bao Dai, the Southern regime seemed a lost cause. 

Amid these shambles stepped forth Ngo Dinh Diem. Born 

to a Catholic family with a deep Confucian sense of duty to 

emperor and country, Diem had rst desired to enter the 

priesthood, and eventually joined the civil service with the 

same sense of duty and discipline. 67 Aer graduating at the 

top of his class from the French School of Administration, he 

became province chief at 28, and in 1933, became Minister of 

the Interior to Bao Dai. As the French exerted their control 

and puppetry over the regime, however, Diem’s integrity led 

him to resign—an action that would give him nationalist 

and patriotic credentials. But when Ho oered him a seat 

in the government of the DRV aer the fall of the Japanese 

occupation, he refused, blaming the deaths of his brother 

and nephew on the Vietminh. In a Confucian gesture, he 

secluded himself for four years before departing Vietnam to 

travel around the world, before settling in a seminary in the 

US. 

While in the US, Diem seized upon American fears of the 

rising specter of global Communism, which coincided with 

the waning whip of colonialism. Selling himself aggressively 

through speeches, meetings, and letters, Diem emphasized 

development and modernization as nation-building 

instruments. 68 As the French withdrew their military and 

gaining American support became increasingly more 

signicant, Bao Dai had no choice but to select Diem as his 

prime minister in June 1954. Still, Diem would be viewed 

by American policymakers and observers as the man of last 

resort—despite the steady ow of American praise, he gained 

their support because “Diem’s the only boy we got out there,” 

as then Vice-President Lyndon Johnson said. 69 Bao Dai, too, 

would write in his memoirs, “I knew that Diem had a dicult 

character [ . . . ] but in that moment there was no better choice 

... Washington would not spare him its support.” 70 

Returning to Vietnam, Diem faced multiple obstacles in his 

path to rebuilding an independent South. e bureaucracy 

and government institutions were in disarray, and much 

of the countryside remained under the control of the Cao 

Dai and Hoa Hao sectarian militias, or communist forces 

loyal to the DRV. 71 e Geneva Agreements had given both 

North and South 300 days to reconstitute their forces on 

their respective sides of the 17 th parallel; with them came 

an exodus of hundreds of thousands of Catholic refugees 

from the North who needed to be resettled. Further, Diem’s 

preference for keeping top positions in the government for 

his family and close friends would trouble many political 

elites in Saigon. By far the greatest challenge to Diem’s 

consolidation of power came from opposition from the 

Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen to what they saw as the 

“Diem dictatorship.” 72 Accustomed to the free reign that 

Bao Dai had given them, they were unwilling to surrender 

their power to Diem without gaining a prominent voice 

in his government. United by their grievances, they issued 

Diem an ultimatum in March 1955. When Diem rejected 

their demands, his domestic adversaries declared war in the 

streets of Saigon. e French, who openly favored the Binh 

Xuyen, fed its ocers with information, put up road barriers 

against Diem’s troops, and denounced Diem in Paris. 73 As the 

ghting worsened in April, Diem seemed nished. 

In late April 1955, just as Washington privately wavered on 

its support for Diem, the prime minister ordered his army to 

attack Binh Xuyen bases in Saigon. e battle raged on for a 

week as heavy artillery, mortars, and gunre rang through the 

air; soldiers fought from house to house, resulting in more 

than 500 civilian deaths and turning 20,000 more homeless. 74 

By the end of May, the Binh Xuyen was defeated; the gang’s 

leader ed to Paris. Diem had meanwhile paid o the Cao 

Dai and Hoa Hao leaders with some $8.6 million courtesy of 

the CIA. 75 While many sectarian militiamen and Binh Xuyen 

soldiers rallied to Diem’s side, two thousand more would join 

the underground Communist guerrillas in the Mekong delta. 

Diem followed up his victory over his domestic rivals with 

an election to assure his position as head of state. With Bao 

Dai far away in his French chateau, on October 23, 1955, 

Diem held an election—not for the question of reunication, 


as promised at Geneva, but in order to push aside the 

former emperor. e ballot was strategically designed with 

American assistance: on the le side of the ballot, framed in 

green, the color of misfortune, was a portrait of a bloated 

and imperial Bao Dai; on the right, in auspicious red, a 

photo of a smiling Ngo Dinh Diem walking among the 

Vietnamese people. 76 Media censorship, Bao Dai’s absence, 

and Diem’s agents, stationed at the polling sites to supervise 

voting, virtually guaranteed Diem’s odds of victory. When 

the election results were announced, 

Diem had won 98 percent of the 

vote—spurning American advice for 

a more plausible 60 or 70 percent. In 

some areas, his vote tally exceeded 

the number of registered voters. 77 

Aer this nod to democracy, Diem 

would announce that the elections 

for reunication could not take place 

because conditions in the North were 

not “free.” 

Vietnam Under Diem 

With the test of authority passed, 

American ocials warmly 

embraced Diem, whom they called 

the “Winston Churchill of Asia.” e 

Eisenhower administration quickly 

sought to turn South Vietnam into a 

bastion of anti-communism in Asia 

despite the Geneva Agreements. Under 

US inuence, the South East Asian 

Treaty Organization was established 

in September 1954, which extended 

to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia the 

right to request protection in the event 

of an attack. 78 In October 1954, the 

US began sending direct military aid 

to Saigon’s army, including training 

and development through personnel 

on “temporary duty” or “loan.” 79 

Fresh from their experience on the 

Korean peninsula, American military 

advisors urged the development of 

a large conventional army, with heavily armed divisions to 

protect against invasion from the north. 80 e Ho Chi Minh Trail, built on the border 

with Laos and Cambodia, was the lifeblood 

of support and supplies for South Vietnamese 

cadres during the war. 

Instead of taking 

the advice of his own generals, who advocated a leaner 

ghting force capable of anti-guerrilla and civic operations, 

Diem bowed to American pressure. At the same time, the 

United States channeled military assistance in Laos through 

the French, who were authorized to maintain a military 

training mission. As its commitment to military assistance 

gradually grew, the United States began providing larger 

amounts of economic, technical, and administrative aid to 

South Vietnam; by 1956, South Vietnam was receiving $270 

million per year, the recipient of the most US aid per capita 

besides Korea and Laos. 81 Coupled with a constant stream 

of praise from Washington, these funds encouraged Diem to 

rule as he saw t. 

While Diem might have claimed the 

support of 98% of his country, his 

regime desperately needed a base 

of support broader than elite land 

interests and fellow Catholics. While 

a stream of arrivals from the North 

enlarged the Southern Catholic 

population, in the majority Buddhist 

nation, they represented no more 

than 10% of the total population. 

Nonetheless, Diem followed his 

nepotistic tendencies; one brother, 

Can, ran a secretive network of 

cadres, while another, Nhu, served 

as Diem’s closest advisor and chief 

of the security police, and a third, 

uc, was the archbishop of Hue. 82 

Nhu’s wife, the unocial First Lady 

to the unmarried Diem, virtually 

dictated legislation to the National 

Assembly. 83 Madame Nhu would 

later gain notoriety for her reference 

to the 1963 Buddhist protest 

immolations as “barbeques”—as 

she told one interviewer, “Let them 

burn, and we shall clap our hands.” 84 

With his domestic adversaries 

vanquished, and the referendum 

passed, Diem set his eyes on 

what remained of the Southern 

communists and their supporters. 

In 1955, he launched the Denounce 

the Communists (To Cong) campaign to root out subversives 

in the southern countryside. 85 Instead of “reeducating” former 

Vietminh, the campaign was a pretext for suppressing dissent 

from all corners; those arrested were sent to detention camps, 

tortured, and executed. According to Vietnamese reports, as 

many as 25,000 suspected communists were arrested, and 

1,000 were killed during the initial year of the campaign. 


While the campaign achieved its goal of weakening the 

communist bases and network in the countryside, the 

brutality and corruption surrounding the anti-communist 

eorts increased rural and urban opposition to Diem and his 

family. 

Diem augmented his repression of his political opponents by 

issuing Public Law 10/59 in May 1959. e draconian law 

expanded the category of political crimes to mean any form 

of political opposition. Tribunals roamed the countryside, 

setting up kangaroo courts to try, convict, and execute 

subversives. Local ocials, their powers greatly widened 

by the Public Law, could now imprison for life or execute 

anyone they designated as a communist—and they used 

these powers to extend the practices of bribery already 

common under the Denounce the Communists campaign. 86 

By the end of 1959, the Southern Communists counted as 

few as 5,000 members in their party. 

To further neutralize the threat of the DRV’s southern 

supporters, whom Diem’s forces pejoratively called Viet 

Cong—short for Viet Nam Cong San, or Vietnamese 

Communists—Diem organized “agrovilles” (khu tru mat) 

in the countryside to protect villages from communist 

inltration. While development and urban life were 

touted as the benets of life in the agrovilles, the political 

motivation behind their establishment was rural security 

and population control. 87 Peasants were relocated to new 

settlements of 2 square km, and forced to provide labor for 

construction, which meant that villagers had to dismantle 

their current homes near their rice elds and build new 

ones at some distance from the source of their livelihood. 88 

While the agrovilles were easier than traditional villages for 

the national army to defend, the brutal experience for the 

peasantry led many to join the southern communist cause. 

e Road to the South 

Through the late 1950s, Communists in the South and 

the leadership of the DRV watched in alarm as Diem 

consolidated his power over Saigon and the countryside. 

When they nally decided to endorse armed struggle in the 

South at the end of 1960, it was aer a long period discord, 

between Northern and Southern cadres and their allies in 

Moscow and Beijing. 

As the Geneva Agreements wrapped up, Ho and his top 

leadership were certain of their victory in the promised 

reunication elections. But even when Diem rejected the 

Geneva-mandated election processes, many in the DRV 

leadership continued to advocate a peaceful, gradual 

campaign for national reunication. 89 Part of this reluctance 

to ght came from Soviet and Chinese urgings at Geneva. 

Pushing the Vietnamese towards acceptance of a truce, the 

Soviet Union and China stated that if war broke out again, 

the DRV might have to ght alone. 90 At the same time, 

the DRV needed to consolidate their regime in the North. 

eir problem was not one of illegitimacy, but rather one of 

infrastructure and economy; as they withdrew, the French 

had devastated basic services and dismantled industries. 

Professionals had ed, and the cadres, though capable 

guerrillas, found their skills lacking when it came to 

administration. 91 Cut o from the rice elds of the Mekong 

Delta, the Northerners turned to the Chinese for aid when 

food shortage struck. 

e DRV faced greater challenges to their authority. Ethnic 

minorities who fought alongside the French held out against 

the Vietminh in their hillside bases. Catholics in one district 

rebelled, forcing Hanoi to send a division of the People’s 

Army to suppress the insurrection. Land reform and local 

administrative reorganization in late 1956 was so excessive 

that DRV leadership felt compelled to make a public 

apology. 92 Prominent writers and intellectuals who had 

previously stood stalwart by the revolution ridiculed these 

policies. 

As a result of the food shortage and political turbulence, in 

June 1956, the DRV issued a memorandum to its Southern 

colleagues titled “e Path of Revolution in the South.” 

Southern cadres were not to attempt to stage a coup; they 

were instead to concentrate on building up their movement, 

“because a weak movement would be unable to take advantage 

of favorable trends”—growing popular dissatisfaction with 

Protesting the Diem regime’s oppressive tactics, Buddhist 

monk ichQuangDuc immolated himself in the street. 


the Diem regime and the increasing inuence of the socialist 

bloc. 93 e only permissible form of violence was armed selfdefense 

when cadres’ lives or the survival of the organization 

was at stake. 

anks to Diem’s repressive tactics, Southern Communist 

agitation appeared eective for a time. Diem’s policies in the 

mid- to late 1950s embittered moderates who had hoped 

to nd a place in Diem’s government and were spurned by 

his nepotistic and authoritarian regime. Southern peasants 

who were supportive of the DRV during the war with the 

French and continued to be sympathetic to the Southern 

communists grew increasingly disillusioned by Diem’s 

rural policies. 94 But aer a period of recovery between 

1957 and 1958, the Southern cadres were routed. With the 

sects suppressed and US assistance growing, Diem had the 

military, police, and intelligence resources to turn against 

the threat of communism. 95 Law 10/59 banned virtually all 

involvement with the revolutionary movement; sweeping 

arrests intimidated the population into avoiding contact with 

political dissidents. Total party membership fell to 5,000 in 

1959. 96 

Even as leadership in Hanoi wavered on calling for armed 

struggle, Saigon’s repression, corruption, and authoritarianism 

intensied popular antagonism toward Diem’s regime. e 

countryside became a tinderbox of popular discontent as 

the lower ranks of the Southern cadres called for weapons 

and argued for revolution. At the Fieenth Plenum of the 

Vietnamese Communist Party in January 1959, the decision 

to allow the use of force in the Southern struggle was nally 

made. 97 As the nal resolution stated: “e fundamental path 

of development for the revolution in South Vietnam is that 

of violent struggle.” 98 In May 1959, the Communists began 

constructing a route to transport weapons, supplies, and 

later, troops, to the South along the hilly border with Laos— 

later known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. By the end of 1959, 

several thousand soldiers crossed into the South with 31 

tons of weapons and supplies. 99 e preconditions for armed 

struggle were set. 

e signicance of the Fieenth Plenum resolution was not 

lost on the Southern branch, who quickly set to work on 

disrupting the Diem regime. Beginning in the summer of 

1959 and accelerating through the winter, local communist 

groups began to spark “concerted uprisings” in central and 

southern Vietnam. In Ben Tre province, the sound of gongs 

and wooden bells rang out on the night of January 17, 1960, 

signaling to the local people to rise up against local ocials 

and landlords. e Ben Tre uprising was followed by others 

in the region. While the government was able to quell the 

insurrections in some areas, in other provinces, the uprisings 

allowed local communist groups to take control of portions 

of the highlands and the Mekong delta. 

e nal step in the North Vietnamese authority’s gradual 

movement to support revolution came at a landmark meeting 

in September 1960. For the rst time, Communist leaders 

called for the establishment of a political organization to 

challenge Diem’s regime for control over the South. 100 On 

December 20, 1960, drawing on the all-class nationalism 

and ideas of moderate social and economic transformation 

of the August Revolution of 1945, y representatives of 

various political, ethnic, and religious groups gathered near 

the Cambodian border to found the National Liberation 

Front. Support for the NLF grew quickly, and within a year it 

counted as many as 200,000 supporters in the South. 101 

e popularity of the NLF stemmed from its actions 

to support the physical and economic well-being of 

rural people. Whereas Diem’s land reform advanced the 

interests of its landlord base of support, the NLF followed 

the DRV’s moderate policy of land reform in the 1940s, 

setting maximum rents, limiting total landholdings, and 

redistributing land at nominal cost. 102 But while the actions 

of the Front beneted the peasantry, corrupt local ocials 

came under a reign of terror: the Front targeted and killed 

6,000 ocials in the early 1960s, as well as almost 25,000 

civilians. 103 Beginning in 1962, Diem set out to build more 

than 8,000 strategic hamlets, which, much like the preceding 

agroville project, forced peasants to relocate to new villages 

with fortications to keep the NLF out. 104 Despite the barbed 

wire and bamboo stakes that outlined the hamlets, the 

Front was able to inltrate as many as 80% of the strategic 

hamlets. Spurred on by nationalist rhetoric that exploited 

Diem’s relationship with US imperialism, by 1963, the NLF 

was estimated to control as much as half of the population in 

Southern Vietnam. 105 

Greater success in military confrontations accompanied the 

NLF’s growing public support. e Battle of Ap Bac in early 

1963 revealed the emerging strength of the Front’s military 

capabilities. Despite being outnumbered by four to one and 

outanked by substantial American helicopter support, 

the NLF’s armed forces defeated Diem’s army, killing and 

wounding more than 450 of Diem’s troops. 106 Aer the 

Battle of Ap Bac, armed wing of the NLF went on to mount 

successful attacks throughout the Mekong delta, and came to 

control as much as three-quarters of Southern territory by 

the end of 1963. 107 


e Buddhist Crisis and the Fall of Diem 

The NLF was not the only face of public discontent 

against the Diem government in the early 1960s. Initially 

centered on calls for religious freedom, the Buddhist protest 

movement of 1963 was the culmination of resentment against 

the authoritarian and dictatorial nature of Diem’s regime— 

and it would be the catalyst to the regime’s end. 

e protests began in May 1963, when Buddhists in Hue 

hung ags on homes and temples in violation of Diem’s 

decree that the South Vietnamese ag should be larger and 

y higher than other ags. 108 at the law was rarely enforced, 

and that the Vatican ag had previously been allowed to 

y as big and high as the South Vietnamese ag infuriated 

the predominantly Buddhist population of Hue. e police 

forcefully repressed protests by monks and laymen on 

May 8. e nine deaths that resulted further sparked street 

protestors, who demanded legal equality between Catholics 

and Buddhists, compensation to the families of the victims, 

and an end to arbitrary arrests. 109 When thousands of 

Buddhist protestors took to the streets in late May and June, 

the government used tear gas and dogs to scatter them; 

Diem placed Hue under martial law and a night curfew. 

Still, protests continued to emerge, and swelled following 

ich Quang Duc’s dramatic self-immolation in June 1963— 

the rst of six self-immolations by Buddhist monks in the 

coming weeks and months. 110 

While Diem insisted that the Buddhist protests were the work 

of the NLF, Buddhist leaders had actually been singled out in 

the 1950s by the Vietminh as damaging to the goals of the 

Communist Party. Instead, the protests were part of a greater 

revitalization of Buddhist heritage as critical to Vietnam’s 

future. As they continued, they expanded from a religiously 

based movement to a broader show of resistance against 

Diem, led by disillusioned members of Saigon’s middle class 

and students. 

In late August 1963, Diem’s troops, armed with ries, machine 

guns, grenades, and tear gas, raided the center of the protests, 

Xa Loi temple, and arrested monks, nuns, and laypersons. 111 

Further raids of major temples le 1,400 dead. Diem banned 

public gatherings and expanded martial law across the entire 

South Vietnam. When university and high school students 

continued to protest in Saigon and Hue, Diem arrested them 

and shut down most universities and high schools. 112 

e protests and Diem’s response to the crisis troubled the 

regime’s backers in Washington. Coming into oce in 1961, 

President John F. Kennedy deepened American involvement 

in Indochina. e popular credo of “domino theory” predicted 

that if the United States did nothing and South Vietnam “fell” 

to the Communists, neighboring states would then succumb 

to their domestic insurgencies or switch allegiances from the 

West to the socialist bloc. 113 e emerging corollary would 

be coupled with a shi in military strategy that emphasized 

counterinsurgency and waging wars below the nuclear level. 

Privately doubtful about NLF militarism and Diem’s lack of 

success in countering the guerrillas, Kennedy rejected his 

advisors’ guidance to commit American ground troops, but 

signicantly increased the number of US military advisors in 

Vietnam from 3,200 in 1961 to more than 23,000 in 1963. 114 As 

the Buddhist protests intensied through the late summer of 

1963, and as grisly images of the monks’ self-immolations 

appeared on the pages of the American and global press, 

Kennedy tried to pressure Diem to moderate his response to 

the crisis. But installments of aid only served to strengthen 

Diem’s resolve. 

Following the August attacks on temples in Saigon and Hue, 

a growing sentiment emerged in Washington that Diem 

presented an obstacle to the American anti-communist 

eorts. President Kennedy, frustrated by Diem’s inexibility 

in coming to peace with dissidents in the face of the larger 

Communist threat, conceded that the war would not be 

won under Diem. 115 He deferred to Henry Cabot Lodge, the 

newly appointed US ambassador in Saigon and a man with 

little patience for Diem. Aer failed attempts on Diem’s life 

committed by his own ocers, Lodge and CIA operatives 

contacted dissident senior ocers in the army, who were 

planning to stage a coup d’etat. 116 Reluctantly, the President 

agreed to the plans. Following a failed countercoup by Diem’s 

brother Nhu, on November 1, 1963, generals in the army 

seized power. ough they had promised Diem and Nhu 

safety in return for unconditional surrender, both brothers 

were shot dead in an assassination. A stunned Kennedy 

would hear the news just three weeks before his own death. 

The Vietnam War (1963-1971) 

e Gulf of Tonkin Incident 

Americans expected that Diem’s removal would mark a 

shi to a shorter war—a hope that turned to illusion. 

Indeed, the fall of Diem made the situation in the South 

even direr. At least Diem’s nationalist credentials had never 

come under debate, but between 1963 and 1965, twelve 

dierent governments came into power in the South as 

coups overthrew yet other coups. Morale in the Army of 

the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) dropped, and desertion 

rates reached almost 50% in mid-1965. 117 Even as the 


NLF sought to take full advantage of the political turmoil, 

the succession of President Lyndon B. Johnson in the US 

following Kennedy’s death created uncertainty regarding the 

future of American military commitment in Vietnam. is 

unease accompanied ris in the Sino-Soviet relationship that 

emerged in the late 1950s, as Mao Zedong objected to Nikita 

Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization project. By 1963, the split 

between the two Communist neighbors became an open 

conict, as the Soviets and Chinese publicly criticized each 

other’s governments; this too, marked a departure in their 

policies regarding Vietnam. Whereas the Soviets supported 

peace to the point of advocating the admission of both the 

DRV and Diem’s government to the United Nations, Chinese 

ocials told Ho in 1963, “We are standing by your side, and 

if war breaks out, you can regard China as your rear.” 118 

Taking advantage of the illegitimacy of the new Saigon 

government, the DRV issued a new aggressive military 

strategy, resulting in the NLF gaining ground throughout 

the South in 1964. ough the Sino-Soviet split disabused 

the Johnson administration of Cold War assumptions about 

a monolithic Communist force, he still considered Vietnam 

to be a focal point of US foreign policy. 119 Johnson aimed to 

curtail the inltration of Northern cadres and supplies into 

the South, and approved covert joint operations between 

South Vietnamese forces and American advisers to raid 

coastal commands. 

e direction of American policy and the level of its 

commitment to Vietnam, would drastically change with the 

Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964. On August 2, the 

US destroyer Maddox exchanged re with North Vietnamese 

torpedo boats while on a reconnaissance mission of the 

coast of the DRV. en on a stormy night on August 4, 

commanders aboard the Maddox and the destroyer C. 

Turner Joy believed they were coming under re from 

radar objects, and responded by shelling back. 120 While the 

captain of the Maddox developed doubts that the objects 

were attack cra—a suspicion that was later conrmed by 

an extensive study, President Johnson seized on evidence 

of the attack to justify retaliation against the North. 121 e 

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution subsequently authorized Johnson 

to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks 

against the forces of the United States and to prevent further 

aggression”—in eect allowing the President to wage an 

undeclared war. 122 

Hanoi was undeterred by Johnson’s response. In September 

1964, the rst units of the People’s Army of Vietnam rolled 

down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to begin directly engaging 

South Vietnamese forces. NLF resistance began attacking 

US bases and personnel, while the overall strategy of the war 

shied from a gradual and politically oriented strategy to 

one of high-level confrontation under the newly appointed 

General Nguyen Chi anh. 123 At the same time, support for 

Hanoi from the Soviet Union and China grew in the wake of 

policy shis. e fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, and the 

succession of Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin incepted 

a move away from Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence 

policies. 124 ough wary of a wider war, both Moscow and 

Beijing signaled their willingness to increase their military 

assistance to the DRV. 

Aware of political instability in Saigon and NLF advances 

throughout the Southern countryside, the Johnson 

administration increased its involvement. Reprisal airstrikes 

that took place early in 1965 were upgraded to a program 

of sustained air warfare, known as Operation Rolling 

under. 125 At the same time, the rst US combat troops 

arrived on the ground—increasing the American forces to 

27,000 in March 1965, 46,000 in May, and 74,000 in June. 126 

Johnson’s strategy for war in Vietnam was incremental 

increases in American bombing and troop levels to eventually 

push the DRV to abandon the NLF insurgency. is strategy 

was the product of political concerns over the cost of the war, 

and fears of Chinese intervention if the Americans pushed 

too quickly, as they did in North Korea. 127 US intervention 

saved the ARVN from near certain collapse—but it also 

transformed the terminal stages of a revolutionary and civil 

conict (if one held, as both Hanoi and Saigon did, that 

the 17 th parallel was a temporary division between a single 

country) into a complex international war. 128 And while 

almost every American was convinced in 1965 of the virtual 

omnipotence of the US, a country that had never lost a war, 

American troops fought alongside few allies. Britain and 

France shared skepticism about a military solution, while 

Japan was constitutionally prohibited from sending troops; 

only Australia and New Zealand responded voluntarily. 

Aer Johnson oered in December 1964 to “pay all the 

costs of any combat unit a country would dispatch to the 

war,” South Korea, the Philippines, and ailand eventually 

sent troops. 129 In any case, the modest contributions of other 

countries did little to change perceptions on the ground that 

this was primarily an American war. 

Escalation 

Appointed in June 1964 to lead the American eort in 

Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland outlined 

a two-stage plan to win the war. In the rst phase, which 


would last through 1965, he proposed building a logistical 

base for a large force. 130 In the second phase, American forces 

would search out and destroy the Communists’ main units 

in the remote sanctuaries where superior repower and 

mobility could be used to the US’ advantage. At the same 

time, an enhanced ARVN would focus on pacication in the 

more densely populated lowlands. Westmoreland’s goal was 

attrition in the PAVN to the point where it would be forced 

to retreat to avoid defeat, isolating Southern revolutionary 

forces that would be beaten by the ARVN. Under the 

Westmoreland strategy, US forces in South Vietnam would 

rise from 80,000 men in 1965 to its peak of 543,000 in 1969. 131 

American “search and destroy” techniques using 

sophisticated technology to pinpoint the exact location of 

Communist forces were designed to work in thinly inhabited 

border regions. Fiy thousand tons of herbicide were 

dropped on millions of hectares in the South, clearing away 

half of the territory’s jungle cover. 132 In the densely populated 

Mekong, where Communists combatants hid amid civilians, 

American tactics were sure to leave civilian casualties, and 

forced an estimated 4 million Vietnamese in the South to 

become refugees. 133 Westmoreland’s strategy aimed to reduce 

domestic political ramications of the war, by minimizing 

American casualties and sending soldiers for short, yearlong 

tours of duty, instead of the open-ended duration of the war, 

as was the case for Communist troops. e immediate eect 

of the strategy was a reversal of American reliance on ARVN 

troops; as one ARVN general recalled, “Americans in late 

1965 abruptly took over the war, shoved aside the Vietnamese 

counterparts, and executed the war unilaterally.” 134 

e escalation of American commitment brought further 

instability to the South Vietnamese state. In 1966, the 

renewal of the Buddhist-led protests plunged South 

Vietnam into urban chaos and grew to include other 

political dissidents, including students, labor unions, and 

some members of the armed forces. 135 Demonstrations for 

a civilian government and against continued American 

involvement in the war emerged in Hue, Saigon, Danang, 

and other major cities. Under pressure from the American 

government, which inaccurately believed that the protests 

were driven by the NLF, the government under Nguyen Cao 

Ky deployed two ARVN battalions to successfully put down 

protests in Danang. Despite severe repressive measures, 

street protests and strikes continued to blaze throughout the 

South, including a new series of self-immolations, and the 

burning of the American consulate. By June 1966, however, 

the South Vietnamese government regained control over 

Hue. Elections in 1967 brought some semblance of stability 

to the highest levels of South Vietnamese government, with 

General Nguyen Van ieu at its helm—but these elections 

were not far freer than those that brought Diem to power 

years earlier. Even given the constraints on campaigning 

for his civilian opponents, ieu only managed to capture 

a plurality of 35% of the popular vote, primarily in outlying 

districts where ARVN commanders guided the electoral 

process on his behalf. 136 ieu began his presidency with Ky 

as his deputy, but later sidelined the former head of state, and 

continues to maintain power. 

Economically, South Vietnam oundered through a 

combination of wider forms of corruption and higher levels 

of ination. rough the American economic aid program, 

a staggering amount of dollars were pumped into the 

Vietnamese economy, distorting ination levels and creating 

more opportunities for elites to take advantage of the system. 

Local importers took advantage of the US-nanced import 

initiative, the Commercial Import Program, to obtain 

licenses to sell goods at a high prot. 137 Meanwhile, as 

peasants ed from their elds amid battles, Vietnam became 

a service economy. Prices increased by more than 100% 

in 1965, and again in 1966, rising even further as the war 

carried on. 138 Bribery was rampant, and required for virtually 

every dimension of everyday life, including work permits, 

driver’s licenses, visas, and even jobs. 

Despite the weakening situation in the South, the DRV had 

been unable to deal a decisive blow to the regime; Hanoi 

now sought to take advantage of the political and economic 

chaos in Saigon. General anh’s strategy was to accelerate 

the formation of main forces in the lowlands and continue 

inltration of regular North Vietnamese units into the 

South. 139 e jungles of the highland would oer the needed 

cover for Communist bases and supply depots. 

On December 4, 1964, the NLF launched into its trial by re. 

Two NLF regiments attacked targets in Phuoc Tuy province 

southeast of Saigon, centering on Binh Gia, a strategic 

hamlet built by Catholic refugees from the North. 140 e 

ARVN’s strong response was routed into ambushes as the 

NLF held their ground. When the fog of war subsided on 

January 3, 1965, a Communist force of 1,500 had killed 200 

of the 2,000-man ARVN force, shot down three helicopters, 

and wounded six American crewmen while losing around 

140 of its own troops. 141 

Convinced that only American troops would be able to 

take the Communist forces head on, the US kicked o 

their oensive campaign in August 1965 at the Batangan 


peninsula, where villages had supported the Viet Minh 

during the resistance. 142 ree of the villages were guerrilla 

communities and supply bases for the NLF—defended by 

a network of tunnels, mineelds, and a 2,000-strong NLF 

regiment. Operation Starlite commenced on August 18, 

and in a display of overwhelming American repower, 

6,000 marines swarmed the shore as jets, two destroyers, 

and ground artillery showered the peninsula with napalm, 

rockets, and bombs. 143 e Americans counted 599 Viet Cong 

bodies and 122 prisoners—but at the cost of 45 dead and 203 

wounded friendly forces. 

e ground war continued until it reached a strategic 

stalemate in mid-1967. With almost half a million troops 

on the ground and a long logistical tail, US forces were too 

powerful for the Communists to evict; they had indeed 

succeeded in pushing some Southern regiments to seek 

sanctuary in Laos and Cambodia. 144 With an end to the 

coups in Saigon, and a better-equipped and trained army, 

South Vietnam no longer seemed on the edge of collapse. 

Yet, revolutionary forces still wreaked possessed oensive 

repower. e Ho Chi Minh Trail continued to serve as an 

artery connecting Southern cadres to Northern supplies. 

Guerrilla forces in the South, supported by artillery across 

the demilitarized zone, harassed US bases almost every day. 

While the revolutionaries had lost control of territory and 

population to American and Southern Vietnamese forces, its 

capacity to outlast American patience was unending. 145 

Meanwhile, American opinions toward the war were changing 

as well. While Westmoreland returned to Washington to 

report on the “tremendous progress” of the US and its allies, 

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara concluded that the 

US was simply unable to kill or capture enemy forces at a 

Protesting the Diem regime’s oppressive tactics, Buddhist 

monk ichQuangDuc immolated himself in the street. 

rate exceeding their replacement. 146 e crossover point of 

Westmoreland’s attrition strategy was beyond reach—the 

North Vietnamese had both the will and the capability to ght 

indenitely. At the same time, American eorts to win the 

hearts and minds of the Vietnamese population by attempting 

to reform administrative corruption and stimulating 

economic revival proved ineective—administered from the 

outside, the system paled in comparison to that which the 

revolutionaries could oer. Finally, within the United States 

itself, dissent, once limited to pacist and civil rights groups, 

broke out on university campuses in 1965. As the demands 

of the dra grew steeper, the willingness of ordinary citizens 

to support their government in time of war eroded, with 

popular support dipping below 50% in mid-1967. 147 

e Tet Oensive 

The North Vietnamese noted the American quagmire 

with satisfaction, but it also prompted debates about the 

future of a general oensive in the South. Party leadership in 

Hanoi was aware of setbacks in the South since the arrival of 

American troops on the ground, and admitted the persisting 

imbalance in repower and number of regular ground 

troops. 148e US could still bring in more troops and bombs. 

Nonetheless, Hanoi believed that the ineectiveness of the 

American search-and-destroy techniques and bombing 

campaigns, coupled with growing war weariness at home 

and on the ground, oered a promising opportunity for the 

Communists to turn the tide. e time had come “to prepare 

quickly on all fronts to seize the opportunity to achieve a 

large victory and force America to accept a military defeat” 

through a major military oensive and a popular uprising 

throughout Southern Vietnam. 149 

Internal and external divisions posed notable challenges to the 

planning of the General Oensive. General anh advocated 

high-level, aggressive confrontations with American and 

South Vietnamese troops. But these tactics had resulted in 

high casualties without decisively shiing the balance of the 

war. Defense minister Vo Nguyen Giap instead proposed 

a protracted war, focused on guerrilla warfare alongside 

regular units and conventional battles. At the same time, as 

the Sino-Soviet split intensied, the DRV was torn between 

competing pressures from the Soviet Union and China. e 

Soviets, who provided key anti-aircra artillery and heavy 

weapons, favored a conventional war. e Chinese, who 

controlled the transportation logistics for Soviet weaponry, 

and provided 320,000 troops to man engineering and antiaircra 

units in the North, urged the Vietnamese to follow 

the path of Maoist-style insurgency. 150 e sudden death 


of anh in early July led to a scaling back of plans for the 

military oensive, while the plans for popular uprising 

continued. 

Despite its military failure, the Tet Oensive of 1968 served 

as a turning point of the protracted war in Vietnam. 

To make the Tet Oensive a surprise, the North Vietnamese 

undertook a series of diversionary military maneuvers in the 

fall of 1967. ey attacked along the Cambodian border, the 

central highlands, and the DMZ between North and South 

Vietnam, hoping to convince the American government that 

the NLF was intent on seizing the northern region of South 

Vietnam. 151 e North moved troops near Khe Sanh, in the 

north-west near the Lao border, to draw American attention 

out from the urban centers in the South. 152 e US forces fell 

for the ploy; fearing that Khe Sanh would be the American 

Dien Bien Phu, the Americans redeployed 50,000 troops 

from Southern cities to Khe Sanh and the northern border 

regions. 

As the troops fell into place, the North Vietnamese continued 

to plan for the timing of the Tet Oensive. Drawing on 

a military tactic used by Vietnamese ghting against the 

Chinese in the late eighteenth century, Hanoi selected Tet, 

the Vietnamese lunar New Year and the most important 

holiday in Vietnam, when all work ground to a halt and many 

travelled back to their home villages. roughout the war, 

both sides had honored a ceasere during Tet. e ARVN 

was at half strength, since many soldiers returned home 

to their families; meanwhile, recrackers and reworks 

would provide useful cover for the gunre that opened the 

oensive. 153 

Nine days aer Northern troops hit Khe Sanh and several 

other highland targets as a diversion, 84,000 Communist 

troops rushed towards their targets in ve municipalities, 

36 province capitals, and 64 district seats. 154 Kicked o by 

a symbolically devastating assault on the US embassy in 

Saigon, which resulted in the deaths of ve US Marines and 

all of the attackers, the wave of attacks hit January 31, 1968. 

Just as the Tet strategy had caught the Chinese o guard two 

centuries before, the willingness of the Communist forces 

to ght on the Lunar New Year stunned the Americans 

and South Vietnamese. In the large majority of cases, the 

attacks were beaten back in a matter of days; the promise 

of a general uprising faded quickly. e Communists were 

able to hold Hue until late February, when it was liberated by 

artillery re, heavy bombing, and house-to-house ghting. 

In the aermath, the bodies of 2,800 Vietnamese who had 

been executed by NLF and North Vietnamese forces were 

found in mass graves, suggesting the deadly implications of 

Communist victory for some Southern Vietnamese. 155 

For the NLF and North Vietnamese, the oensive was a 

major military defeat. e NLF lost 80% of its ghting force, 

counting as many as 50,000 casualties. 156 Urban cadres who 

had come out from their covers to lead the general uprising 

were arrested. When promises of the uprising failed to 

materialize, the local population in the South became even 

more dispirited, making it harder for the NLF to recruit rural 

youths. Even though the higher levels in Hanoi had limited 

objectives for the oensive, General Tran Van Tra, commander 

of NLF forces north of Saigon during Tet, noted “we suered 

large sacrices and losses with regard to manpower and 

materiel, did not correctly evaluate the specic balance of 

forces between ourselves and the enemy, [and] did not fully 

realize that the enemy still had considerable capabilities and 

that our capabilities were limited. . . . [We] set requirements 

that were beyond our strength.” 157 Since many Northern 

Vietnamese troops had been held in reserve during the 

oensive, NLF cadres bore the brunt of the casualties. 

But if the Tet Oensive failed to achieve the military 

objectives of its commanders, then it changed the direction 

and strategy of the entire war. Coming less than three 

months aer General Westmoreland had said the end of 

the war was in sight, the Tet Oensive only conrmed the 

futility of American eorts. When Westmoreland requested 

additional troops to seize on NLF weakness, the Johnson 

administration balked. Moreover, the leakage of the request 

in the New York Times led to public uproar; suddenly, ocial 

optimism in years past seemed no more than incompetence 

or deception. 158 Congressional support for the war ebbed away 

as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings 

disputing the events of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Facing 

impending political defeat, on March 31, 1968, Johnson 

declared a bombing half over the North except for a narrow 


strip above the DMZ and called on Hanoi to agree to peace 

talks. Under the condition that a complete bombing halt be 

rst on the agenda, the peace talks opened in Paris in May. 159 

Vietnamization 

In 1969, President Richard Nixon came to the White House 

with the objectives of a shiing war in mind. Marked by 

war-weariness in America, Nixon’s election would bring a 

policy of Vietnamization, turning the war eort in South 

Vietnam over to the Vietnamese and an intensied eort to 

win the hearts and minds of the local population. But not 

all of Nixon’s eorts were concentrated on Vietnam: the 

administration launched attacks into Cambodia and Laos in 

an eort to break the NLF cause. 

In June 1969, Nixon announced the withdrawal of 25,000 US 

ground troops, American troops fell to 475,000 at the end of 

1969 and 140,000 by the end of 1971. 160 Meanwhile, the level 

of ARVN forces increased from 850,000 to over 1 million. 

To boost the eectiveness of the ARVN, the US increased 

military and economic assistance to the Saigon government. 

Huge quantities of weapons, including M16 ries and 

machine guns, grenade launchers, and heavy artillery and 

mortars were turned over to the South Vietnamese; ships, 

jets, helicopters, and military vehicles made the ARVN one 

of the best-equipped in the world. Eorts were made to boost 

ARVN morale by increasing pay across the board, enhancing 

veterans’ benets, and improving camp conditions. Still, some 

of the fundamental weaknesses persisted; corruption was 

still rampant, desertion was chronic, and a severe shortage of 

qualied, honest ocers persisted. ARVN troops still lacked 

the drive to counter the highly motivated NLF and North 

Vietnamese troops. American troop morale, meanwhile, 

was steadily decreasing, with unit discipline breaking down, 

a marked increase in assassination attempts of ocers, and 

heightened racial tensions. 161 

Pacication eorts—or the battle for the “hearts and 

minds” of the countryside—expanded under the Johnson 

administration aer the Tet Oensive, and accelerated even 

further under Nixon. Critics of the repower that formed 

the center of US military policy in Vietnam argued that 

what was really needed was a political solution to break 

the NLF hold in the countryside. ARVN forces defending 

villages were expanded to half a million men. 162 Under the 

pacication eorts, projects to clear roads and build schools 

and hospitals were launched. New programs expanded 

agricultural program through higher-yield rice crops and 

technology for more ecient planting, harvesting, and 

irrigating. Broader political reforms came when President 

ieu, realizing that his survival depended on enlarging 

his political base before the US withdrew, agreed to village 

elections and administrative decentralization in 1969. 163 He 

also agreed to pursue a limited land reform program, which 

legally sanctioned the redistributions the Communists had 

already made, removing an incentive for peasants to support 

the revolution. 

Accompanying this velvet touch was a wider war in 

Cambodia and Laos. As a precondition for peace talks, 

Johnson believed that he had Hanoi’s promise to cease 

attacks on major cities and across the DMZ. Nonetheless, 

soon aer Nixon arrived in the White House, he received 

evidence that Hanoi had begun to inltrate more troops 

in preparation for a new oensive. 164 Instead of resuming 

bombing of the North, Nixon turned his attention to 

Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. ese supply dumps, 

staging areas, and headquarters, all located just inside or 

on the border with Cambodia, were used with the reluctant 

consent of Cambodia’s Prince Norodom Sihanouk. In return, 

Hanoi had agreed to limit their support for the Cambodian 

Communists—the Khmer Rouge. In a break with past US 

strategy in Vietnam, Nixon wanted to preempt Communist 

oensives and signal to Hanoi his willingness to take 

unprecedented measures. On March 18, Operation Breakfast 

commenced—a secret bombing of Cambodian territory, 

carefully contrived to conceal its targets. 165 It was followed by 

Operations Lunch, Snack, and Dinner—collectively known 

as Operation Menu, which would damage the sanctuaries, 

disrupt the Ho Chi Minh trail, and leave a legacy of lasting 

political instability in Phnom Penh. e Khmer Rouge used 

President Richard Nixon advocated the withdrawal of 

American troops from Vietnam, to be replaced by the 

“Vietnamization” of the ghting force. 


the bombings as the centerpiece of its propaganda campaign, 

and with their supply lines threatened, the DRV found an 

alliance with the Khmer Rouge to be more promising than 

its previous truce with Prince Sihanouk. 

Unable to target COSVN despite the massive bombing 

campaign, Nixon ordered the invasion of Cambodia in April 

1970. 90,000 US ground troops and 40,000 ARVN forces 

hit Cambodia, expanding the borders of the war. 166 e 

major operation set o controversy in the US, where antiwar 

fervor and opposition to Nixon’s policies reached new 

heights. At the same time, the attacks proved largely fruitless; 

even when US intelligence was able to pinpoint the location 

of COSVN’s encampment, Soviet intelligence was oen able 

to warn Hanoi and the NLF before the strike. 167 Nonetheless, 

the Communists felt the pressure. By 1970, even military 

brass in Hanoi would admit that the Southern revolution was 

“temporarily” in a defensive posture. 168 With both sides at a 

continuing standstill, and both Vietnamese and American 

populations weary of war, the time is ripe for compromise. 

C URRENT SITU AT I ON 

As early as June 1964, Hanoi and Washington had made 

covert contact through representatives of the Canadian, 

French, British, Italian, Polish, Romanian, Norwegian, Soviet, 

and Chinese governments at various times. 169Ocial direct 

contact between the US and the DRV took place in Rangoon, 

Myanmar in December 1965, and again in Moscow in 

January 1967. roughout Nixon’s administration, Kissinger 

has sought secret meetings with DRV spokesman Xuan uy. 

Nonetheless, these secret meetings have come to naught. 

When negotiations rst began, the gap between North 

Vietnamese and US negotiating positions seemed nearly 

insurmountable. Hanoi wanted the US to withdraw fully from 

South Vietnam, and to have the ieu government replaced 

by a coalition including the NLF. 170 Washington sought a 

face-saving mutual withdrawal of US and North Vietnamese 

forces, and refused to negotiate over the replacement of 

the South Vietnamese government. However, the growing 

détente between the US and the Soviet Union, and the 

warming of Sino-American relations has placed pressure on 

Hanoi to drop its condition of ieu’s replacement. 

Proposed Solutions 

It is up to this committee whether and how peace should 

be achieved in Vietnam. e purpose of this section is not 

to direct delegates to a single path—this committee is yours 

to take as you see t—but rather to describe a few possible, 

non-mutually exclusive approaches. e priority of this 

committee is to achieve an end to the war—to do so, it must 

address the interrelated domestic and regional questions. My 

suggested priorities are as follows: to rst address the shortterm 

issue of a cease-re, then work to answer questions 

about reunication or permanent division of Vietnam, and to 

resolve military engagements in Laos and Cambodia. When 

thinking about the terms of an armistice, it may be useful 

to consider the Geneva Accords of 1954 and the Korean 

Armistice Agreement of 1953 as precedents. Again, how you 

pursue and resolve each aspect of the problem, and even the 

agenda of the committee itself, is entirely up to you. 

On the question of a ceasere, an important consideration is 

enforcement. Since many operations during the Vietnam War 

were covert, enforcing the ceasere on all sides is critical to the 

terms of the truce. A demilitarized zone could be established 

at the 17 th parallel, allowing both North Vietnamese and 

South Vietnamese to regroup their forces. e DMZ could be 

monitored by an international commission, as was the case 

following the Korean War. e repatriation of Vietnamese 

civilians, the release of Vietnamese and foreign prisoners of 

war, and the exchange of the remains of the dead should be 

arranged at the same time. Following the ceasere, foreign 

troops should begin to withdraw. e timeline and pace 

of the withdrawal are factors to be considered. A phased 

withdrawal of American and foreign troops, perhaps with 

the replacement of international peacekeepers, would enable 

a gradual and stable transition. A referendum in the South 

could be held under free and fair terms to determine whether 

the South Vietnamese themselves wish to live under a 

coalition government comprising ocials from the National 

Liberation Front and the current Saigon government, or 

desire reunication with North Vietnam. 

Key Actors 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam 

Although initially reluctant to sanction armed struggle 

in the South, the DRV has since supported its Southern 

cadres, the National Liberation Front. e Ho Chi Minh 

trail, which runs along the Cambodian border, has provided 

Southern forces with a lifeblood of supplies, weapons, 

and troops from the North. e death of Ho Chi Minh in 

September 1969 galvanized his successors, who regarded the 

defeat of the United States and its South Vietnamese allies to 

be a sacred duty, not a matter for compromise or capitulation 

to Nixon’s carrot-and-stick tactics. 171Nonetheless, they have 

been forced by rising Soviet pressure to back o their initial 

refusal to negotiate. While the Chinese have encouraged 


them to continue ghting, age-old tensions between Hanoi 

and Beijing have ared. 

Soviet Union 

Following a period of relative unconcern for Vietnam, 

the Soviet Union has equipped the North Vietnamese 

with much needed heavy artillery and weapons. Further, the 

Soviet Union has supplied NLF and North Vietnamese troops 

with intelligence and early warnings about potential US 

operations, including those of the secret bombing campaign 

over Cambodia. Still, as Nixon has made overtures towards 

a warming of relations, the Soviet Union has come to see the 

Vietnam War as an impediment to a desired relaxation of 

tensions with the United States. As such, the Soviets have 

increasingly encouraged Hanoi to come to the negotiating 

table. 

National Liberation Front 

Founded on December 20, 1960, the National Liberation 

Front represents the resistance in the South. e NLF 

was founded on the principles of all-class nationalism and 

moderate social and economic transformation that drove 

the August Revolution of 1945. e structure of the NLF is 

analogous to a series of concentric circles, unifying a variety 

of Southern forces hostile to Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime. 

At the center is the Central Oce for South Vietnam, or 

COSVN, which makes political and military policy decisions 

in coordination with the leadership in Hanoi. e next 

ring—later formalized as the Provisional Revolutionary 

Government—oversees the political activities of the Front. 

is ring comprises both leaders from the urban middle classes 

who grew disillusioned with Diem’s regime, and radicals 

who supported the DRV during the French War. 172 Further 

outward were rank-and-le NLF cadres. Mass organizations 

that supported the NLF comprised the outermost ring. ese 

organizations, including associations of peasants, workers, 

writers, youth, students, women, Buddhists, Catholics, and 

ethnic minorities became the public face of the NLF and 

training grounds to identify potential party members. 173 

While party leaders assigned to COSVN and the NLF did 

sometimes disagree with the central leadership in Hanoi, 

party discipline and procedures required members to settle 

conicts through party channels. 174 is ensured that the 

NLF would be able to follow Hanoi’s policies throughout the 

war. Going into the negotiations, the NLF seeks the creation 

of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, a coalition 

authority that would govern South Vietnam. 

United States 

American involvement in the Vietnam War dates back to 

its intervention to aid the French in the First Indochina 

War. Policymakers following domino theory and later 

theories of containment concluded that Vietnam had to be 

the frontline, the ground where the specter of communism 

could be held o from inltrating into the rest of Southeast 

Asia. Under the Nixon Administration, American troop 

numbers in Vietnam have fallen as the burden of the war has 

been shied to the ARVN. For the US, a satisfactory solution 

would see a Vietnam permanently divided—as another 

Germany or Korea. While propping up ieu’s government 

in South Vietnam, the US has privately conceded that the 

chain of regimes in Saigon has not been far from eective. 

Republic of Vietnam 

Led rst by Diem, then a slew of military juntas, and nally 

ieu, the government in Saigon has relied on American 

economic and military support over the past decade. At the 

same time, however, it has demanded to be recognized as the 

legitimate authority over South Vietnam, and has at times 

(particularly under Diem) contradicted American policy. 

While the regime has had a repressive past, land reform and 

other administrative reform measures recently undertaken 

by ieu have appeared to atone for previous sins in the 

eyes of the peasantry. Still, the regime has not inspired much 

support beyond the elites and ocials who stand to benet 

from rampant corruption and bribery. 

Timeline 

September 2, 1945: Following the surrender of Japan to 

Allied Forces, Ho Chi Minh declares the independent 

state of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) 

December 19, 1946: First Indochina War begins aer 

negotiations between French and Viet Minh break down. 

1949: Emperor Bao Dai and French President Vincent 

Auriol sign the Élysée Accords, in which France pledged 

material support for the anti-Communist emperor’s 

army. 

January 1950: e Viet Minh receive military advisors 

and weapons from China. 

July 1950: e United States pledges $15 million of 

military aid to support the French in Vietnam. 

May 7, 1954: French surrender at Dien Bien Phu 

July 21, 1954: Geneva Conference ends with signing of 

ceasere agreements. A provisional demarcation line 

at the 17 th parallel, dividing Vietnam until nationwide 

elections in 1956, is not accepted by the United States or 

the government of Bao Dai 


September 8, 1954: South East Asian Treaty Organization 

formed, with the United States, France, the United 

Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, ailand, and 

Pakistan as the members of the collective defense treaty, 

which oers protection to Cambodia, Laos and “the free 

territory of the state of Vietnam” 

January 1, 1955: United States aid begins owing to 

Diem’s government directly; American advisors replace 

French in training the Southern army 

August 9, 1955: Supported by the United States, Diem 

refuses to negotiate with the DRVN on elections for 

reunication 

October 23, 1955: Fraudulent referendum on whether to 

establish a republic results in the end of Emperor Bao 

Dai’s reign and the declaration of Diem as head of state 

October 26, 1955: Republic of Vietnam (RVN) declared, 

with Diem as its rst head of state 

April 6, 1956: RVN turns down Hanoi’s oer to negotiate, 

and declares that it is not subject to the conditions of the 

Geneva Agreements, as it was not a signatory. 

October 1957: Communist cadres in the South assemble 

rst battalion-sized armed force 

November 1957: Royal Lao government and Pathet Lao 

form a coalition government and agree to integrate their 

armed forces. e National Assembly chooses Souvanna 

Phouma to head the rst coalition government. 

July 23, 1958: American-supported rightist elements 

depose Souvanna Phouma 

August 18, 1958: Pro-US forces in Vientaine form a new 

government without Pathet Lao and arrest Pathet Lao 

leaders 

January 1959: Central Committee in Hanoi approves 

limited armed struggle in the South, followed in March 

by the establishment of a revolutionary base in the 

Southern highlands 

May 6, 1959: Diem issues Law 10/59, which establishes 

military tribunes to mete out harsh punishments for 

revolutionary involvement. 

August 1959: e People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) 

delivers rst load of arms to Southern cadres. 

January 17, 1960: Concerted uprisings in Ben Tre 

province spread across the Mekong delta 

August 9, 1960: Neutralist military coup restores 

Souvanna Phouma to power in Laos, but US-backed 

rightists counterattack, and Laos slides into civil war 

November 8, 1960: John F. Kennedy elected President of 

the United States 

December 20, 1960: National Liberation Front (NLF) 

unveiled at a session of the People’s Congress in the South 

May 13, 1961: Following the eviction of Royal Lao armed 

forces by the Pathet Lao and the PAVN, a ceasere is 

established in Laos. A conference opens in Geneva to 

restore neutral coalition government 

May 1962: Pathet Lao and PAVN extend control over 

Laos; Kennedy dispatches American troops to ailand 

July 23, 1962: Geneva conference ends with the signing 

of treaty to restore neutral coalition government 

May 8, 1963: Diem’s government res on marchers in 

Hue protesting the ban on public celebration of Buddha’s 

birthday, killing nine 

August 21, 1963: Special forces under the control of 

Diem’s brother Ngo Dinh Nhu raid pagodas and arrest 

1,400; martial law declared. 

November 1-2, 1963: With US Central Intelligence 

Agency approval, a military coup ousts Diem; Diem and 

his brother Ngo are killed. 

January 30, 1964: A second military coup deposes Diem’s 

replacement. 

May 27, 1964: Second Lao coalition government 

collapses. 

August 7, 1964: US Congress almost unanimously passes 

the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, allowing the President to 

use “all necessary steps to prevent further aggression” 

December 8-20, 1964: Student and Buddhist 

demonstrations threaten military’s grip over the 

government. 

February 18, 1965: ird military coup in Saigon 

February 28, 1965: US unveils Operation Rolling 

under – reprisal airstrikes on the North in order to 

force Hanoi into a negotiated settlement 

March 9, 1965: First US ground troops land at Danang 

March 1966: Demonstrations by Buddhist monks 

demanding return to civilian rule spread to Saigon; 

general strikes occur in Hue and Danang with local 

police approval 

April 1967: Wave of antiwar protests hits the US 

January 21, 1968: Siege of Khe Sanh begins 

January 30-31, 1968: Communists attack the South’s 

major cities in a coordinated movement known as the 

Tet Oensive and penetrate the US embassy in Saigon 

May 3, 1968: Hanoi and Washington agree to hold peace 

talks aer Johnson suspends bombing of the North 

except over the demilitarized zone 

November 1968: President Johnson halts all bombing of 

Northern Vietnam to comply with DRVN conditions for 

peace talks; Richard Nixon elected President of the US 

March 1969: US begins bombing campaign of 

Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia, which continues 

for fourteen months 

May 14, 1969: Nixon calls for “Vietnamization” of the 


war and withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces 

June 10, 1969: NLF and its allies form the Provisional 

Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam 

September 3, 1969: Ho Chi Minh dies 

March 18, 1970: Cambodian National Assembly deposes 

Prince Sihanouk, and installs General Lon Nol as chief 

of state 

March 27-28, 1970: US-supported ARVN forces attack 

Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia 

June 24, 1970: US Senate repeals the Gulf of Tonkin 

Resolution by a vote of 81-0 

June 29, 1970: US ground combat troops pull out of 

Cambodia, leaving ARVN troops to continue ghting 

S UGGESTI ONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 

Although this guide covers the challenges that the parties 

to the Vietnam War will face at the negotiating table, it is 

intended to be a summary, and is not exhaustive. erefore, 

I expect delegates to go beyond this guide in researching the 

issues, solutions, and their own positions. Fortunately, there 

is a wealth of resources available to delegates on this period 

of history, and many formerly condential documents have 

since been declassied. As a result, I hope that researching 

will be an enjoyable and enriching experience for delegates. 

In your research, you should endeavor to understand the 

following issues: 

A full understanding of the events and context of Vietnam 

War-era Indochina, especially in the later period of the 1960s 

(and into the 1970s, which are not extensively covered in this 

guide but oer a look into possible directions to take—or 

avoid). 

An understanding of Vietnamese political geography in the 

later years of the 1960s, as well as background knowledge of 

the Cold War, which for reasons of scope has largely been le 

out of this guide. 

Knowledge about your party’s position—and your specic 

character’s position. Detailed portfolios will be provided to 

you later, but knowing your party’s position in the deeply 

complex and explosive world of the Vietnam War will be 

necessary. 

Works on Development and History of the Vietnam War 

The international nature of the Vietnam War, which took 

place in the middle of the Cold War, means that this 

is a subject extensively covered in books and publications. 

To the benet of delegates researching the topic, American 

involvement means that there is a plethora of English- 

language media as well. Vietnam: A History, by Stanley 

Karnow is a colorful go-to resource, which covers Vietnam 

from the pre-colonial era forwards. at being said, 

Karnow’s book was published in 1983—and since then, many 

government documents have been declassied by American 

and other states involved. For an update, delegates may wish 

to refer to William S. Turley’s e Second Indochina War or 

John Prados’ Vietnam: e History of an Unwinnable War, 

1945-1975. 

Finally, I have always believed in the power of a great lm to 

convey the gritty details of culture and attitude that might 

not be fully captured in a scholarly work. For classics that 

crystallize the raw experience of the Vietnam War (at least, on 

the American end), see Francis Ford Coppola’s “Apocalypse 

Now” and Stanley Kubrick’s “Full Metal Jacket.” 

Position Papers 

In all committees, position papers oer an opportunity to 

thresh out ideas that one has gathered through research. For 

crisis committees in particular, they are helpful in examining 

the standpoint of one’s character and party on the topic. 

However, as a delegate in high school and college, my biggest 

frustration with position papers was that committee staers 

seem to rarely read them. Needless to say, this will not be 

the case with the Paris Peace Summit. Crisis sta will read 

and note your opinions and proposals for long-term peace in 

Vietnam. You will not be expected to always hold fast to the 

ideas in your position papers, but during committee session, 

I will bring up innovative proposals and may comment on 

drastic position shis. 

To that end, please include in your position paper: 

e views of your character on the current state of the 

Vietnam War, from the perspective of your nation. 

e objectives and interests of your nation at the negotiating 

table (On which conditions are you willing to compromise? 

What are your hard limits for negotiation?) 

e best methods to come to a short-term and long-term 

peace, while taking into account the interests of your nation. 

Although research on your character and ministry or position 

will be crucial to accurately participating in debate, I do not 

expect a character biography—these will be provided to you 

at conference. 

You may write your position paper from the perspective of 

a minister writing to your respective head of state as you 

prepare for the Peace Summit. Position papers should be one 


page single-spaced (do not worry if you run slightly over). 

Please do not use bullet points, although subheadings are 

ne. Deadlines for position papers will be announced later 

in the fall. 

Questions to Consider 

As this is committee is a Specialized Agency, no resolutions 

will be issued. Delegates should instead work towards 

draing an Accord. To assist delegates in preparing for 

committee, the following questions may be considered: 

What are the sources of leverage that your party has 

to gain the agreement of the other sides of the peace 

negotiation? 

How can cooperation and agreement be induced? 

How can all parties be held accountable to the terms of 

the peace accord, if one is draed? 

Should Vietnam reunify as one nation, or should it 

remain two sovereign states? If it is the former, through 

what processes and guarantees will reunication occur? 

How and when should foreign troops withdraw? What 

level of foreign intervention or aid should be acceptable 

for the future? 

C L O S I NG REMARKS 

Writing this study guide has been a highly rewarding 

experience. I hope it will prove to be a useful tool to 

you as you begin your research on Vietnam. Please keep in 

mind that this study guide is intended to provide you with an 

initial background into Vietnamese history up until 1971— 

further preparation is necessary to understand both your 

character’s role in a deeply complicated war, and Vietnam’s 

choices for the future. When researching, try to nd a balance 

between the domestic and the regional sides of Vietnam’s 

quandaries, as they are highly interlinked. 

I have always considered Model UN to be a valuable 

experience because it allows participants to see rst-hand 

the mistakes of the past, and make dierent choices, without 

repercussions outside of the committee room. It is my 

hope that during the ve days of committee, delegates will 

be able to step out of their lives as university students, and 

realistically act as the leaders of nations, and the participants 

of the Paris Peace Summit. In the meantime, please feel free 

to contact me at any point with questions about the guide, 

committee, or just to introduce yourself. 

e Paris Peace Summit ended in 1973 with the signing of 

the Paris Peace Accords. Just two years later, the People’s 

Army of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front invaded 

and captured Saigon, ending the Vietnam War once and for 

all and forcefully reuniting Vietnam under communist rule. 

Whether Vietnam will avoid this violent end, and whether 

peace will survive, are the questions that delegates will 

answer in the Paris Peace Summit of 1971. 

Best wishes, 

Charlene Wong 

W ORKS CITED 

Bradley, Mark. Vietnam at War. Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 2009. 

Kahin, George M. Intervention: How America Became 

Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986. 

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking 

Press, 1983. 

Lawrence, Mark Atwood. Assuming the Burden: Europe and 

the American commitment to war in Vietnam. Berkeley: 

University of California Press, 2005. 

—. e Vietnam War: A Concise International History. 

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 

Turley, William S. e Second Indochina War: A Concise 

Political and Military History. Lanham: Rowman & Littleeld 

Publishers, 2009. 

E N D N O T E S 

1 Karnow 98 

2 Lawrence, e Vietnam War 8 



5 Karnow 66 

6 Karnow 66 

7 Karnow 66 

8 Karnow 67 



10 Karnow 68 


12 Karnow 85-6 

13 Karnow 88 

14 Karnow 114 

15 Karnow 114 

16 Karnow 115 

17 Karnow 116 

18 Karnow 117 

19 Turley 11 

20 Karnow 122 

21 Karnow 123 

22 Turley 12 

23 Karnow 126 

24 Karnow 126 

25 Karnow 143 

26 Karnow 144 

27 Karnow 144 

28 Karnow 144 

29 Turley 12 

30 Karnow 146 

31 Bradley 9 

32 Karnow 147 

33 Bradley 43 

34 Bradley 44 

35 Lawrence, Assuming the Burden 19 

36 Bradley 43 

37 Kahin 4 

38 Turley 13 

39 Kahin 4 

40 Karnow 147 

41 Karnow 149 

42 Karnow 149 

43 Karnow 150 

44 Karnow 151 

45 Karnow 153 

46 Karnow 155 

47 Karnow 156 

48 Karnow 157 

49 Karnow 157 

50 Bradley 48 

51 Bradley 48 

52 Bradley 50 

53 Bradley 54 

54 Bradley 56 

55 Bradley 56 

56 Bradley 58 

57 Bradley 61 

58 Bradley 64 

59 Bradley 65 


60 Bradley 66 

61 Turley 16 

62 Turley 18 

63 Turley 17 

64 Bradley 61 

65 Turley 17 

66 Turley 26 

67 Turley 26 

68 Turley 28 

69 Karnow 214 

70 Bradley 81 

71 Bradley 82 

72 Bradley 82 

73 Karnow 222 

74 Karnow 223 

75 Turley 29 

76 Bradley 83 

77 Bradley 83 

78 Turley 31-2 

79 Turley 32 

80 Bradley 88 

81 Turley 32 

82 Turley 32 

83 Turley 33 

84 Bradley 85 

85 Bradley 86 

86 Bradley 88 

87 Bradley 87 

88 Bradley 87 

89 Bradley 90 

90 Bradley 90 

91 Turley 33 

92 Turley 33 

93 Turley 36 

94 Bradley 91 

95 Turley 38 

96 Turley 38 

97 Bradley 93 

98 Bradley 93 



101 Bradley 95 













113 Turley 58 


115 Karnow 277 





120 Turley 84 

121 Turley 84 

122 Turley 84 



125 Turley 85 

126 Turley 85 


128 Turley 94 

129 Turley 95 

130 Turley 98 

131 Turley 98 

132 Turley 99 


134 Turley 100 






































171 Karnow 597 



174 Turley 48

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