Erfahrung und Analyse Experience and Analysis - Austrian Ludwig ...

BRENTANO UND ARISTOTELES
ÜBER DIE ONTOLOGIE DER
INTENTIONALEN BEZIEHUNG
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski,
Zielona Góra, Polen – Salzburg, Österreich
Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos war in mehrfacher
Hinsicht von Aristoteles abhängig. Auch an den Stellen, wo
er seine Intentionalitätstheorie bespricht, beruft er sich auf
Aristoteles, und zwar oft in der Form, als ob beinahe alles,
was man heute als Verdienste der Brentano’schen Intentionalitätstheorie
betrachtet, im Grunde schon bei Aristoteles
latent vorhanden wäre. Ich will indessen zeigen,
dass es zwischen der Aristotelischen und Brentano’schen
Ontologie der Intentionalität doch beträchtliche Unterschiede
gibt. Die Aristotelische Ontologie der intentionalen Beziehung
sieht auf den ersten Blick viel einfacher und
eleganter aus. Es zeigt sich allerdings, dass die größere
Komplexität, die Brentano in Kauf nimmt, durch gewisse
theoretische Vorteile aufgewogen wird.
WITTGENSTEIN’S CRITICISM OF
HUSSERL’S SYNTHETIC A PRIORI
PROPOSITIONS
Roberto Ciuni, Genoa, Italy
The aim of this paper is to show the inadequacy of
Wittgenstein’s criticism of the definition of a synthetic a
priori proposition provided by Husserl. I shall attempt to
demonstrate that such a criticism is valid only on condition
that exactly the Tractarian conception of a synthetic
proposition is shared. Unfortunately, Husserl does not
include these assumptions in his theories. After exposing
the Tractarian equivalence analytic a priori necessary,
my paper will focus on the Tractarian conception of
“synthetic”, since the equivalence synthetic depictive
constitutes the main (although implicit) assumption in the
criticism Wittgenstein addresses to Husserl.
IS A NATURALISTIC THEORY OF
REFERENCE DEFENSIBLE?
Andrea Clausen, Konstanz, Germany
In this paper, I argue that even the most promising version
of a naturalistic theory of reference, Millikan’s evolutionary
approach, does not always avoid indeterminacy of
reference. In consequence, an evolutionary approach must
at least be amended by non-naturalistic elements such as
elements that build upon Brandom’s social-inferential
approach. Furthermore, I argue that his version of a social
conception of reference, just like an evolutionary one, does
not imply that a linguistic community is at liberty to fix
reference. In consequence, a completely social-inferential
position is as convincing as the combination of an
evolutionary and a social-inferential approach. But even if
one opts for the former position, naturalistic aspects –
more precisely, causal-counterfactual relations between
stimuli and observation reports – are important in order to
guarantee that these reports serve as preliminary regressstoppers
in the social-inferential process that determines
reference.
Abstracts
IS PERCEPTION INFERENTIAL?
William Cornwell, West Point, New York
Applying Kent Bach’s “take-for-granted principle” to Jerry
Fodor’s faculty psychology, I argue that perception usually
is non-inferential, but I also indicate how and under what
circumstances perceptual processes are and ought to be
inferential. The epistemological consequence is that some
perceptual knowledge is basic or foundational (hence,
coherentism and confirmation holism are false) but some
perceptual knowledge has inferential justification.
GENERIC ESSENCE
Fabrice Correia, Tarragona, Spain
I distinguish two kinds of essentialist statements, the
generic and the objectual, reject a number of accounts of
generic essence, and (tentatively) suggest that the notion
(i) is primitive, and (ii) can be used to define objectual
essence, metaphysical necessity and analyticity.
THE TRACTATUS AND THE NEED OF
NON-TRUTH-FUNCTIONAL OPERATIONS
João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter, São Paulo, Brazil
The Tractatus is bound to recognize that not every
operation is a truth-functional one. Non-truth-functional
operations are essential in applied arithmetic, although
arithmetical series can be defined in independence of
them.
WHAT WE CANNOT SAY,
WE CAN AND MUST SPEAK ABOUT
Darlei Dall´Agnol, Florianópolis, Brazil
This paper seeks to show that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus can
be interpreted as a criticism of two views, namely that
ethics can be a science and that philosophy can establish
the foundations of morality, but not as a defense of
quietism. In the first section, the limits of what can be said
(science) are reconstructed. In the second, the relationship
between to say and to show is clarified and a new
distinction between to say and to speak is introduced. The
following section makes another distinction between ‘be
silent’ in a trivial way and in a logical-philosophical one.
This subsequently is used to show that Wittgenstein is
prohibiting any kind of foundationalism. The last section
shows how morality, free from philosophical confusions,
can be expressed. A final distinction between moral and
immoral silence is drawn in order to show that what we
cannot say, we can and must speak about.
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