FREE LAW JOURNAL Volume 1, Number 2 (October 18, 2005)

FREE LAW JOURNAL 

IN THIS ISSUE : 

Volume 1, Number 2 (October 18, 2005) 

ISSN 1712-9877 

EDITORIAL - LOUIS-PHILIPPE ROUILLARD (CANADA) 

HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF NECESSARY DEFENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW OF SERBIA AND 

MONTENEGRO - DR. DRAGAN JOVAŠEVIĆ (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) 

APPEARANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE – DR. DRAGAN JOVAŠEVIĆ (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) 

THE INTRA-NATIONALIZED INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT BY DR. ANWAR FRANGI (LEBANON) 

INTRODUCTION A LA ‘CRÉOLOGIE CRIMINELLE’ - DR. ANWAR FRANGI (LEBANON) 

A FRANCIA BÜNTETŐJOGSZABÁLYOK FIATALKORÚAKKAL SZEMBEN HATÁLYOSAN 

FOGANATOSÍTHATÓ INTÉZKEDÉSEI, KÜLÖNÖS TEKINTETTEL A NEMZETKÖZI 

EGYEZMÉNYEKRE - ORSOLYA BOGDÁN (HUNGARY) 

A MAGYAR ÉS A SVÁJCI BÜNTETŐTÖRVÉNYKÖNYVIATALKORÚAKKAL SZEMBEN HATÁLYOSAN 

FOGANATOSÍTHATÓ INTÉZKEDÉSEINEK ÁLTALÁNOS ÖSSZEHASONLÍTÁSA, KÜLÖNÖS 

TEKINTETTEL A NEMZETKÖZI EGYEZMÉNYEKRE - ORSOLYA BOGDÁN (HUNGARY) 

EXCEPTIONS TO RES JUDICATA AND THE PROHIBITION OF NE BIS IN IDEM IN CRIMINAL 

LAW - DR MACIEJ ROGALSKI (POLAND) 

NE BIS IN IDEM IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM - DR MACIEJ 

ROGALSKI (POLAND) 

DIE MATERIELLEN VORAUSSETZUNGEN DER FÜRSORGERISCHEN FREIHEITSENTZIEHUNG 

NACH ART. 432 DES TÜRKISCHEN ZIVILGESETZBUCHES - DOZENT DR. MEHMET DEMIR (TURKEY) 

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL 

HUMANITARIAN LAW IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT - ALEXANDRU MOCANU (MOLDOVA) 

THE LEGAL STATUS OF HOMOSEXUAL PEOPLE IN POLISH LAW WITH REGARD TO THE 

LAWS OF OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. FROM 

DEPENALIZATION THROUGH TOLERANCE UNTIL FULL EMANCIPATION - AGNIESZKA SZPAK 

(POLAND) 

THE INSTITUTE OF PARLIAMENTARY ADVOCATES (OBBUDSMAN) IN THE REPUBLIC OF 

MOLDOVA: PART OF THE NATIONAL MECHANISM FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY 

ALEXANDR SVETLICINII (MOLDOVA) 

FREE WORLD PUBLISHING Inc. @ http://www.FWPublishing.net 

4 

7 

21 

43 

61 

85 

105 

127 

157 

163 

181 

193 

211

FREE LAW JOURNAL - VOLUME 1, NUMBER 2 (18 OCTOBER 2005) 

The Free Law Journal results of a merger with the Eastern European Law Journals. It builds 

upon this previous success and aims at providing the freedom of publishing juridical research 

from everywhere and on all subjects of law. Its goal is to promote respect of the rule of law and 

the fair application of justice by sharing juridical research in its pages. 

Academics, post-graduate students and practitioners of law are welcome to submit in the 

academic section their articles, notes, book reviews or comments on any legal subject, while 

undergraduate students are welcome to publish in our student section. The list of fields of law 

addressed in these pages is ever-expanding and non-restrictive, as needs and interests arise. If a 

field is not listed, the author simply needs to propose the article and the field believed of law 

applicable; we will insure to create and list it. 

We accept articles in English, French, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Finnish, German, 

Greek, Hungarian, Icelandic, Innuktikut, Italian, Latin, Polish, Portugese (both Brazilian and 

European), Romanian, Russian, Serb (both Latin and Cyrillic), Slovenian,Spanish and Turkish. 

Articles not in English are provided with a synopsis to explain their content. Articles of 

exceptional quality, or requested to be, can be translated into English and/or French. All of this 

is the measure of freedom we provide. 

The material submitted for publication remains copyrighted to the author. If the author has 

interest in publishing elsewhere after having published in our pages, no permission to do so will 

be necessary. The author remains in full control of his or her writings. Articles of superior value 

will be considered for incorporation in collective works for publishing. 

We always accept submissions. To submit, please read the submission guidelines or ask us any 

question at : FLJ@FWPublishing.net . 

List of subject addressed (as it currently stands - subject to modifications as need arise) 

Administrative Law 

Admiralty law 

Antitrust law 

Alternative dispute resolution 

Anti-Terrorism 

Bankruptcy 

Business Law 

Canon Law 

Civil Law 

Common Law 

Comparative Law 

Constitutional Law 

Contract Law 

(Consuetudinary law) 

Obligations 

Quasi-contract 

Corporations law 

Criminal Law 

Organised Crime 

Criminal Procedure 

Cyber Crime Law 

Penal law 

Cyber law 

Election law 

Environmental law 

European Law 

Evidence Law 

Family law 

History of Law 

Human Rights Law 

Immigration Law 

Intellectual Property Law 

International trade law 

Patent 

Trademark Law 

International Humanitarian 

Rights Law 

Laws of Armed Conflicts 

Laws of war 

War Crimes Law (Belgium) 

International Law (Public) 

Diplomatic Relations 

Jus Gentium 

Treaties Law 

Labor law 

Law and economics 

Law and literature 

Medical Law 

Public Health Law 

Public Law 

Malpractice 

Mental health law 

Military law 

National Legal Systems - 

(Laws of any national legal 

system that is not of a 

precise category) 

Nationality and naturalisation 

Laws 

Natural law 

Philosophy of Law 

2 

Private International Law 

Private law 

Procedural law 

Property law (Public) 

International Law (See 

International Law (Public)) 

Refugee Law 

Religious law 

Islamic Law (Sharia) 

Qur'an 

Sharia 

Jewish law (Halakha) 

Hebrew law (Mishpat Ivri) 

Talmud 

Taqlid 

Christian (other than Canon 

Law) 

Twelve Tables 

Roman Law 

Sacred text 

State of Emergencies Laws 

Space law 

Tax law 

Technology law 

Torts Law 

Quasi-delict 

Trusts and estates Law 

Liens 

Water law 

Zoning


Free World Publishing is a partner of the Free European Collegium, provider of web-based, elearning 

education in matters related to the European Union. 

All material published are available for free on Free World Publishing Inc. web site at 

http://www.FWPublishing.net and can be used freely for research purposes, as long as the 

authors’ sources are acknowledged in keeping with national standards and laws regarding 

copyrights. 

All mail correspondence can be made with the editorial board at Karikas Frigyes u.11, 2/1, XIII 

kerulet, 1138 Budapest, Republic of Hungary, while electronic correspondence can be made 

through FLJ@FWPublishing.net . 

The views and opinions expressed in these pages are solely those of the authors and not 

necessarily those of the editors, Free World Publishing Inc. or that of the Free European 

Collegium Inc. 

Cited as (2005) 1(2) Free L. J. 

ISSN 1712-9877 

3


Free Law Journal Submission Guidelines 

Important. The following is not meant to discourage from submitting; only to ensure quality. If 

your article conforms to your own national standard of writings, we accept all and any format as 

long as arguments are justified by footnotes or endnotes. Never hesitate to submit an article : if 

there is a need for improvement, we will inform you and we will always remain open for resubmissions. 

1. Academics, Post-Graduate Students and Practitioners of law are all welcomed to publish their 

book reviews, comments, notes and articles. 

2. All legal subjects are considered for publication, regardless of the legal tradition, national or 

international field of expertise. The only limit to the extend of our publishing would be content 

that is illegal in national legislation (i.e. enticement to hatred) or against international norms (i.e. 

promoting genocide). 

3. Articles are welcomed in English, French, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Finnish, 

German, Greek, Hungarian, Icelandic, Innuktikut, Italian, Latin, Polish, Portugese (both 

Brazilian and European), Romanian, Russian, Serb (both Latin and Cyrillic), Slovenian as well 

as Spanish. Note that our staff is limited and therefore we use "Word Recognition 

Processors" to communicate in some languages. Nonetheless, this does not prevent 

understanding articles submitted in these language and we are not interested in measuring every 

word of your article : simply in publishing your writings. Therefore, we will review the general 

content, but leave with you the precise sense and meaning that you want to convey in your own 

language. If translation is desired by the author, we then submit it for translation to a translator. 

4. Their is no defined system of reference (footnotes or endnotes) demanded. As long as you 

justify your argument through references (author and work), we accept all writings respecting 

your own national standards. Exceptions : For Canadians, the Canadian Legal Guide to Citation 

is recommended but not mandatory. For Americans, referencing is expected to be in accordance 

with Harvard University's The Bluebook, A Uniform System of Citation. Any breach of 

copyrights is the sole responsibility of the author. 

5. The author retains the copyrights to his or her writings. As articles are unpaid for, ownership 

remains within your hands. We act as publishers and caretaker. Nothing prevents you from 

publishing elsewhere. You may even decide to have the article taken off this site if another 

publisher desires to buy the rights to your article. 

6. We reserve ourselves the right to edit the content or length of the article, if at all necessary. 

7. We do not discriminate in any way. Our aim is to bring under one roof perspectives from 

everywhere and everyone. Never hesitate to submit. 

8. If you desire information or desire to submit, do not hesitate to contact us at : 

FLJ@FWPublishing.net. 

4


EDITORIAL 

Welcome to the second issue of the Free Law Journal, a print and electronic journal aiming at 

promoting respect of the rule of law and the fair application of justice everywhere through the sharing 

of juridical research. 

The Free Law Journal’s first issue was a definitive success in terms of scope and reach, registering a 

very high volume of consultation on the web and orders of paper copies. This signals a definitive 

interest in getting to know the legal research produced everywhere and to share this knowledge. 

As such, this permits us to reach our first and foremost objective to promote the rule of law. 

Knowledge is definitely part of the application of this objective and we see a clear desire from people 

all over the world to gain access to this knowledge in order to foster the fair application of justice for 

all. 

Therefore, welcome to our second issue and we hope that our contributions to legal research and 

knowledge will expand through your witten contributions. 

Sincerely, 

Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard 

Editor-in-Chief, Free World Publishing Inc. 

5


6


HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF NECESSARY 

DEFENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW OF 

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 

BY DRAGAN JOVAŠEVIĆ* 

Introductory remarks 

All men in the world have the use of many natural, universal rights who 

names are human rights. These rights have general law protection. The 

attack to these rights many criminal codes has prescribed as criminal 

acts. Lack of any of general, basic elements of the definition of the 

criminal act in criminal code, of objective or subjective character, 

exempts that act (that is, the act committed by a person, with resulting 

consequences) from the character of criminal act 1 . It is regarded to the 

circumstances which an act of a man exempts from either social danger 

or illegality, or of both elements 2 . 

Namely, the exclusion of these elements exists when the act, which is 

otherwise regulated by law as a criminal act, is considered as excusable, 

according to some special provision. Provisions which allow this 

otherwise “forbidden” act in a specific case exclude illegality, so that 

there is no criminal act in that case. 

There are two bases for the exclusion of the criminal act in the criminal 

law of Serbia and Montenegro. They are: 

1) general bases (which are specifically provided by law and may be 

found in any criminal act or for any perpetrator) and 

* Dragan Jovašević PhD, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law in Nis, Serbia 

and Montenegro. 

1 

Ljubiša Jovanović, Dragan Jovašević, Krivično pravo, Opšti deo, Nomos, 

Beograd, 2002.p.72 

2 

Borislav Petrović- Dragan Jovašević, Kazneno pravo Bosne i Hercegovine, 

Opći dio, Pravni fakultet, Sarajevo, 2005. godine, p. 34-41 

7 

DRAGAN JOVAŠEVIĆ - HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF NECESSARY DEFENCE IN 

CRIMINAL LAW OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO


2) special bases ( which are not specifically provided by law and could 

not be found in any criminal act or for any perpetrator) 3 . 

General bases 4 in the criminal law of the Republic of Serbia (according 

to the provisions of the General criminal law) are: 1) insignificant social 

danger (article 8. paragraph 2. Basic Criminal Code former Criminal 

code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 5 from July 1976.), 2) 

necessary defence (article 9. paragraph 2. Basic Criminal Code) and 3) 

extreme necessity (article 10. paragraph 2. Basic Criminal Code). 

In the Criminal code of the Republic of Montenegro 6 from December 

2003. there is also a number of bases for the exclusion of the criminal 

act. They are: 1) an act of little significance (article 9. ), 2) necessary 

defence (article 10. ), 3) extreme necessity (article 11. ) and 4) force and 

threat (article 12. ). 

Special bases for the exclusion of the criminal act are not specifically 

provided by law. They present a creation of the law theory and court 

practice (but some of them are seen in the foreign legislations in specific 

cases). Specific bases usually include: 1) assent of the inflicted, 2) selfinfliction, 

3) performing the official duty, 4) superior’s order, 5) the 

right for disciplinary or corrective punishment and 6) allowed risk. 

According to the fact that these special bases are not specifically 

provided by law, their effect and applicability are of controversial 

matter 7 . 

3 Dragan Jovašević, Leksikon krivičnog prava, Službeni list , Beograd, 2002.p. 

376 

4 Bogdan Zlatarić- Mirjan Damaška ,Rječnik krivičnog prava i postupka, 

Informator, Zagreb,1960.p.193 

5 Dragan Jovašević, Komentar Krivičnog zakona SR Jugoslavije, Službeni 

glasnik, Beograd, 2002.p.26-29 

6 Službeni list Republike Crne Gore, Podgorica, No. 70/2003 ; Ljubiša Lazarević- 

Branko Vučković- Vesna Vučković, Komentar Krivičnog zakonika Republike 

Crne Gore, Obod, Cetinje, 2004.p.142 

7 

Zoran Stojanović, Krivično pravo, Opšti deo, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 

2000.p.148 

8 




The notion of necessary defence 

According to provision article 9. paragraph 2. Basic Criminal Code 

(with aplication in Republic of Serbia) , and article 10. paragraph 2. 

Criminal code of the Republic of Montenegro , necessary defence is 

defence which is necessary for a perpetrator in order to protect himself 

or other person from an imminent illegal attack 8 . An act committed in 

necessary defence is excusable because the legislator himself considers 

that the perpetrator of such act is authorised for commission of that act 9 . 

From this definition 10 , it results that necessary defence, in the sense of 

institute of criminal law, has to fulfil two conditions-the existence of 

attack and protection from such attack. But not every attack gives the 

right for necessary defence, nor every protection from attack is 

necessary defence. Attack, as well as protection from attack, has to fulfil 

conditions cumulatively provided by law. 

Conditions for the existence of attack 

Attack is every act aimed towards violating or endangering legal 

property or legal interest of a person 11 . It is most often undertaken by 

action, and sometimes by inaction. In order for an act to be relevant 

with the view to institute of necessary defence, it has to fulfil certain 

conditions, which are: attack has to be undertaken by man; attack has to 

be aimed against any legal property or legal interest of a person; attack 

has to be illegal; and attack has to be real. 

This solution are providing many modern criminal codes as : article 19. 

of Criminal code of the Republic of Albania 12 , article 3 of the Criminal 

8 H.H. Jescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafrecht, Allgemeiner teil, Berlin,1972.p.251 

9 Vojislav Đurđić- Dragan Jovašević - Ljubiša Zdravković, Nužna odbrana u 

krivičnom pravu, Niš, 2004.p. 42-53 

10 Dragan Jovašević, Tarik Hašimbegović, Osnovi isključenja krivičnog dela, 

Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja, Beograd, 2001. p. 78-93 

11 Josip Šilović, Nužna odbrana, Zagreb, 1910.p.97 

12 

The Criminal code of the Republic of Albania, Offialia text, Tirana, 2000. 

9 




code of the Republic of Osterrei 13 , article 13. of the Criminal code of 

the Republic of Belarus 14 , article 12. of the Criminal code of 

theRepublic of Bulgaria 15 , article 6. of the Criminal code of the 

Republic of Finland 16 , article 122-5 of Criminal code of the Republic of 

France 17 , article 22. of the Greek criminal law 18 , article 11. of Criminal 

code of the Republic of Slovenia 19 , article 9. of the Criminal code of the 

Republic of Macedonia 20 , article 29. of the Criminal code of the 

Republic of Croatia 21 , article 52. of the Criminal code of the Republic of 

Italy 22 , article 22. of the Criminal code of the Republic of Israel 23 , article 

20. of the Criminal code of the Peoples Republic of China 24 , articles 32. 

and 33. of the Criminal cdoe of the Federal Republic of Germany 25 , 

article 37. of the Criminal code of the Russian federation 26 , article 33. of 

the Criminal code of the Swiss federation 27 , article 15. of the Republic 

of Ukraine 28 etc. 

1) Attack can only be undertaken by man.-If an act is not undertaken by 

13 

Otto Trifterer, Osterreischesches Strafrecht, Allgemeiner teil, Wien, New 

York, 1994. 

14 

The Suprime Soviet of the BSSR, Criminal code of the Republic of Belarus, 

Official text, Minsk, 2001. 

15 

I. Nenov, Nakazatelno pravo, Obša čast, Sofia, 1993. 

16 

Finnish Penal code, Finnish Ministry of Justice, Helsinky, 1996. 

17 

G. Stefani, G. Levasseur, B. Bulock, Droit penal general, Paris, 1994. 

18 

N.B.Lolis, G. Mangakis, The Greek penal code, London, 1973. 

19 

B.Penko, K. Strog, Kazenski zakonik z uvodnimi pojasnili, Ljubljana, 1999. 

20 

Gorgi Marjanovik, Krivično pravo, Opšt del, Skoplje, 1998. 

21 

Željko Horvatić, Miroslav Šeparović, Novo hrvatsko kazneno pravo, Zagreb, 

1997. ; Željko Horvatić, Petar Novoselec, Kazneno pravo, Opći dio, zagreb, 

2001. 

22 

Compendio di diritto penale, Parte generale e speciale, Simone, Napoli, 2004. 

23 

Laws of the State of the Israel, Special volume, Penal law, Jerusalem, 1977. 

24 

C.D. Pagle, Criminal law of the People’s Republic of China, Peking, 1997. 

25 

W.Gropp, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner teil, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1998. ; 

U: Ebert, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner teil, Heidelberg, 1993. 

26 

J.I. Skuratov, V.M.Lebedov, Kommentarii k Ugolovnomu kodeksu v 

Rossijskoj federacii, Norma, Moskva, 1996. 

27 

Schweiserisches Strafgesetzbuch, Stand Am 1. April 1996., Bern, 1997. 

28 

M.I.Koržanskij, Popularnij kommentar Kriminolnogu kodeksu Ukrajini, 

NAUkova dumka, Kiev, 1997. 

10 




man but by an animal or by a force of nature, then there is the existence 

of danger as an element of extreme necessity, but not as well necessary 

defence. However, if a person directed a force of nature (torrent, 

rockslide) in order to endanger other person or his legal property, or if 

an animal (a dangerous dog or a horse) is used as means for 

endangering protected property, than these cases are also considered as 

necessary defence. Attack could be undertaken by any person, no matter 

of the age, accountability or guilt. It could be undertaken by any action 

or inaction, as well as using any means which is suitable for violation or 

endangering some legal property 29 . 

Therefore, necessary defence is excusable in case of an actual attack 

(instantaneous or present), as well as in case of imminent attack. 

Whether the attack is imminent, is a question which is determined by 

court in each particular case, judging all the circumstances of the 

committed act and the perpetrator. The attack is imminent when there is 

a possibility (in time and place) of the close carrying out an attack 30 . 

But, it does not mean that necessary defence is excusable against future, 

undetermined in place and time, but indicated attacks. Measures of 

precaution and preventive protection against indicated or expected 

attacks are excusable only if they do not go over the limits of necessary 

measures for that specific moment. 

2) Attack has to be aimed against a person, his legal property or legal 

interest.-Attacked or endangered properties, in the sense of necessary 

defence, could be different. Most often, life and physical integrity is 

being attacked, but sometimes it can be property, honour, reputation, 

dignity, moral. The object of attack could be any legal property or legal 

interest. Law does not explicitly state which are those goods that can be 

the objects of attack in the sense of necessary defence. Attack can be 

aimed against any legal property of the attacked person, but also against 

any legal property of some other physical or legal person. In that way, 

29 

Petar Novoselec, Krivično pravo, Krivično delo i njegovi elementi, Osijek, 

1990.p.35-36 

30 

Toma Živanović, Krivično pravo Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Opšti deo, Beograd, 

1935.p.231 

11 




attack can be aimed at violating the property of a corporation, facility or 

some other organization, but also against state security and its 

constitution. 

Therefore, necessary defence exists not only in case of protecting from 

the attack on a legal property, but also in case of protecting from the 

attack on any property of other person (physical or legal) if that person 

is not capable of protecting himself from such attack. There are theories 

in criminal law 31 , according to which some cases of protecting from the 

attack are not considered to be necessary defence, but called “necessary 

help”. In any case, the scope and necessity of defence depend in the first 

place on the nature of legal property which is attacked or endangered. 

3) Attack has to be illegal.-Attack is illegal when it is not based on some 

legal regulation and when it is not undertaken on the bases of some 

legal authorisation. Therefore, attack which is undertaken during 

exercising duty according to some legal authorisation, is not illegal and 

necessary defence in that case is not excusable. However, if an 

authorised person oversteps the limits of legal authorisation, then such 

situation is changed into illegal attack against which necessary defence 

is allowed. On the other hand, violation of necessary defence also 

changes into illegal attack, in which case the attacker has the right for 

defence (because in this case he is in the state of necessary defence). 

The right for necessary defence exists no matter if the attacker is 

conscious of illegality of his attack or not. Namely, it is enough that the 

attacked person objectively realises the attack. It is of no significance 

whether the attacker is guilty or not, as well as whether his act is 

punishable. Illegal attack could be undertaken by a child or by a 

mentally incompetent person. That means that necessary defence on 

necessary defence is not excusable. But, different situations in life can 

happen, when the attacked person anticipates the possibility of being 

attacked in certain place and time because of his relationship with some 

person. If in such situations anticipated attack is undertaken, it is 

31 

Vojislav Đurđić - Dragan Jovašević, Praktikum za krivično pravo, Knjiga 

prva, Opšti deo, Službeni glasnik, Beograd,2003.p.26-32 

12 




considered as illegal. 

Even more controversial situation is when a person provokes attack. 

There is no dilemma if the attacked person had previously endangered 

someone’s integrity or property. The problem arises if such attack is 

manifested verbally or only with concluding acts which irritate, provoke 

or underestimate the attacker. Social component of the institute of 

necessary defence should be considered in such situations. Namely, 

necessary defence stands for protecting the rights from illegality, and 

because of that abuse of this institute is not excusable. If the attacked 

person had deliberately provoked the attack, so as to use it and violate 

the attacker or his property, than the attacked person has no right on 

necessary defence. Such cases are known as feign necessary defence 32 . 

4) Attack has to be real.-Namely, it has to exist really in the outside 

world. It means that it is necessary that the attack has already started or 

it is imminent. Whether an attack exists or not, is a factual question 

which is being solved by court in each specific case. Typical example of 

real attack is endangering life or making physical injuries to a person. If 

there is no real attack, but the attacked person had a wrong or 

incomplete impression or illusion of its existence, there is no basis for 

necessary defence. In such case there is putative, imaginable or 

ostensible necessary defence. This defence does not exclude the 

existence of a criminal act, but it could be a ground for exclusion of the 

guilt 33 . 

Therefore, putative necessary defence represents, in fact, the lack of 

conscience of the attacked person about some real circumstance of the 

attack. That is, in fact, wrong impression and conviction that the attack 

aimed at violation of some property is real. This mistake could be 

related to the conscience about the illegality of the attack (when there is 

legal mistake). In other words, putative necessary defence is reduced to 

32 

Ljubo Bavcon, Alenka Šelih, Kazensko pravo, Splošni del, 

Ljubljana,1987.p.151 

33 

Zoran Stojanović, Komentar Krivičnog zakona SR Jugoslavije, Službeni list, 

Beograd, 1999.p.22-24 

13 




unavoidable mistake, in broader or narrower sense that the attacked 

person is in a condition of real and objectively needed necessary 

defence. When judging the existence of necessary defence or its 

violation, an act has to be seen on the whole, which means that it cannot 

be reduced and limited to only what had happened between the 

defendant and late (that is, the one who has suffered loss) immediately 

before the gun shot 34 . 

Conditions for the existence of defence 

Defence or protection from the attack is every action of the attacked 

person aimed at eliminating, preventing or protecting from the attack. 

By protection from the attack, the attacked person himself violates or 

endangers some legal property of the attacker. This violation or 

endangerment represents, in essence, formal characteristics of some 

criminal act from the federal or republic law (most often it is about a 

criminal act against life or physical integrity). 

Only in case when the attacked person, during the protection from 

attack, violates some property of the attacker, the existence of the 

institute of necessary defence is possible 35 . Necessary defence is not 

only the defence from the attack which endangers security of life of the 

attacked person, but every defence from present and illegal attack, if 

such defence was necessary for protection from the attack 36 . 

For the definition of needed defence, in the sense of penal law, it is 

absolutely necessary that the illegal attack is protected from by a 

punishable act towards the attacker. If such protection would not be 

considered as a punishable act, then it would be a situation beyond the 

area of penal law 37 . 

34 presuda Vrhovnog suda Srbije Kž. 474/91 

35 Gorgi Marjanovik, Krivično pravo, Opšt del, Prosvetno 

delo,Skopje,1998.p.183 

36 presuda Vrhovnog suda Srbije Kž. 260/70 

37 

Đorđe Avakumović, Teorija kaznenog prava, Beograd, 1887-1889,p.279 

14 




Defence, as an element of necessary defence, as well, has to fulfil 

certain conditions in order to be of criminal legal relevance. These 

conditions are: defence consists of protection from the attack; defence 

has to be aimed against the property of the attacker; defence has to be 

simultaneous with the attack, and defence has to be necessary for the 

protection from attack. 

1) Defence has to be consisted of protection from the attack.-If defence 

is not aimed at protection or prevention of attack, than it is not an 

element of necessary defence. Defence, in fact, depends on the existence 

of attack. The kind of defence has to be according to the attack. 

Attacked person is not obliged to retreat before the attacker. On the 

contrary, he is authorised to frustrate and disable the real illegal attack, 

in the aim of defence of legal property, by simultaneous legal attack on 

the attacker’s legal property 38 . 

2) Defence has to be aimed against the attacker and against any of his 

legal property or legal interest.-These properties could be various, like: 

life, body, estate, honour, reputation, human dignity, though most often 

situation is when life of the attacker is violated. But, there are situations 

in life, when it is about the violation or endangering legal property and 

the attacker, as well as some other person. 

Then, in relation to the property of the attacker, the attacked person acts 

in necessary defence, and in relation to the violation of property of some 

other person, he acts in extreme necessity (if all the conditions provided 

by law are fulfilled). That means that the attacked person, in order to 

protect his property, cannot put to extreme risk legal properties of other 

people. But, if the attacker had used properties of other person while 

committing an illegal attack as means of that attack, then, in case of 

violation those properties, there is necessary defence 39 . 

3) Defence has to be simultaneous with attack.-Defence is simultaneous 

38 

presuda Vrhovnog suda Srbije Kž. 1355/94 

39 

Draan Jovašević, Tarik Hašimbegović, Osnovi isključenja krivičnog dela, 

Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja, Beograd, 2001.p.50 

15 




if it was undertaken at time when attack has been imminent or when it 

began, but only up to the moment when it ceased. Attack is imminent 

when, from all the circumstances, it could be concluded that it was 

about to start, and when there was such danger that violation of legal 

property would occur in the next moment. The beginning of an act 

which could have direct consequences (death, physical injury, taking 

away, destroying or damaging property) is not crucial for beginning of 

the attack. Undertaken action which objectively represents imminent 

source of danger is essential. 

Whether an attack is imminent or not is a factual question which is 

being solved by court in each particular case. Only threat of imminent 

attack, without undertaking previous actions from which it can be 

concluded that the attack was imminent, could not be the reason for 

undertaking the act of defence. Defence of future attack is not excusable 

either, but still undertaking of some measures of precaution and some 

protective measures which start to work automatically in the moment 

when the attack starts (like various alarm systems connected with 

electrical circuit) is allowed. 

When the attack has started, defence could begin in the same moment. 

But, it often happens that the attacked person is not in position to react 

at the same time when the attack starts. In that case defence could be 

undertaken at any time during the attack. Continuity of defence has to 

coincide with the continuity of attack. When the attack has stopped, the 

right of the attacked on necessary defence stops, too. An attack was 

ended if legal property of the attacked person has been violated and 

when danger has been caused (as a kind of consequence in cases of 

criminal acts of endangering), and when the attacker has committed the 

action of attack, but due to accidental circumstances there was no 

violation of property of the attacked person. 

The right for necessary defence stops if the attack has finally and 

definitely ceased, but not in case when the attack was only temporarily 

ceased. Whether an attack has ceased or only temporarily ceased is a 

factual question which is being solved by court in each particular case. 

Attack has temporarily ceased if there is a possibility that it could be 

16 




continued any moment. 

4) Defence has to be necessary for protection from attack.-It is the 

defence which exists in case when attack cannot be prevented from in 

any other way except for violating the attacker’s property. This means 

that violation of attacker’s property has to be necessary, unavoidable in 

order to protect from the attack, so the intensity of defence is 

correspondent to the intensity of the attack and the manner and means 

which were used by attacker. When judging this necessity of defence, 

the equivalence between intensity of attack and intensity of defence in 

each particular case should be taken into consideration. On the other 

hand, this proportion means that violation of the attacker’s property is 

proportional with value of the property of the attacked person which 

was saved in this way. 

Violation of necessary defence 

If an attacked person, during the protection from attack on his or 

someone else’s legal property, oversteps the limits of defence which is 

necessary for protection from that attack, there is violation or excerpt of 

necessary defence has prescribed in article 9. paragraph 3. Basic 

Criminal Code and article 10. paragraph 3. Criminal code of the 

Republic of Montenegro. 

This violation, according to intensity, exists when violated property of 

the attacker is of greater value then the property saved in this way. 

Another kind of violation of necessary defence, according to broadness, 

exists in case when the attacked person returns an attack which hasn’t 

even started or hasn’t been imminent, or if he/she continues violating 

the attacked property after the attack has finally and definitely stopped. 

In these cases court is authorised to mitigate the sentence for a 

perpetrator of criminal act in violation of necessary defence. In case 

when violation of necessary defence was due to strong irritation or 

freight of the attacked person, court is authorised to release a perpetrator 

of such criminal act from the legal sentence. 

17 




BASIC LITERATURE 

Avakumović Djordje, Teorija kaznenog prava, Beograd, 1887-1889. 

Babić Miloš, Krivični zakonik Republike Srpske, Banja Luka, 2001. 

Babić Miloš, Komentari krivičnih zakona u Bosni i Hercegovini, 

Sarajevo, 2005. 

Bačić Franjo, Komentar Kaznenog zakonika Republike Hrvatske, 

Zagreb, 2005. 

Bavcon Ljubo – Šelih Alenka, Kazensko pravo, Splošnij del, Ljubljana, 

1987. 

Compendio di diritto penale, Parte generale e speciale, Milano, 2004. 

Đurđić Vojislav – Jovašević Dragan, Međunarodno krivično pravo, 

Nomos, Beograd, 2003. 

Đurđić Vojislav – Jovašević Dragan, Praktikum za krivično pravo, Prva 

knjiga, Opšti deo, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2003. 

Đurđić Vojislav – Jovašević Dragan – Zdravković Ljubiša, Nužna 

odbrana u krivičnom pravu, Niš, 2004. 

Ebert Udo, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner teil, Heidelberg, 1993. 

Foregger Eugen- Serini Egmont, Strafecht, Gesetzbuch, Wien, 1989. 

Gropp Walter, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner teil, Berlin, Heidelberg, New 

York, 1998. 

Horvatić Željko- Šeparović Miroslav, Novo hrvatsko kazneno pravo, 

Informator, Zagreb, 1997. 

Horvatić Željko – Novoselac Petar, Kazneno pravo, Opći dio, Zagreb, 

2001. 

Jescheck H.H., Lehrbuch des Strafrecht, Allgemeiner teil, Berlin, 1972. 

Jovanović Ljubiša – Jovašević Dragan, Krivično pravo, Opšti deo, 

Nomos, Beograd, 2002. 

Jovašević Dragan , Leksikon krivičnog prava, Službeni list, Beograd, 

2002. 

Jovašević Dragan, Komentar Krivičnog zakona SR Jugoslavije, 

Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2002. 

Jovašević Dragan – Hašimbegović Tarik, Osnovi isključenja krivičnog 

dela, Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja, Beograd, 2001. 

Kambovski Vlado, Krivičen zakonik so kratok objasnuvanja i registar 

na poini, Skoplje, 1996. 

Kambovski Vlado, Krivično pravo, Opšt del, Skoplje, 2005. 





Koržanskij M.I., Popularnij komentar Kriminolnogu kodeksu, Naukova 

dumka, Kiev, 1997. 

Lazarević Ljubiša, Krivično pravo, Opšti deo, Savremena 

administracija, Beograd, 2003. 

Lazarević Ljubiša- Vučković Branko- Vučković Vesna, Komentar 

Krivič nogzakonika Republike Crne Gore, Cetinje, 2004. 

Lolis Nicholas – Mangakis Georgis, The Greek penal code, London, 

1973. 

Marjanovik Gorgi, Krivično pravo, opšt del, Skoplje, 1998. 

Nenov Ivan, Nakazateljno pravo, Obša čast, Paralaks, Norma, Sofija, 

1993. 

Novoselec Petar, Krivično pravo, Krivično djelo i njegovi elementi, 

Osijek, 1990. 

Pagle C.D., Criminal lae of the People's Republic of China, Peking, 

1997. 

Pavišić Berislav, Komentar Kaznenog zakonika Republike Hrvatske , 

Rijeka, 2003. 

Petrović Borislav – Jovašević Dragan, Krivično (kazneno) pravo Bosne 

i Hercegovine, Opći dio, Sarajevo, 2005. 

Roxin Claus, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner teil, Band 1, Munchen, 1997. 

Schweiserisches Strafgesetzbuch, Stand Am 1. April 1996., Bern, 1997. 

Skuratov J.I.- Lebedov V.M., Kommentarii k Ugolovnomu kodeksu v 

Rossijskoj federacii, Norma, Moskva, 1996. 

Stefani G., Levasseur G., Bouloc B., Droit penal general, Pars, 1994. 

Stojanović Zoran, Krivično pravo, Opšti deo, Službeni glasnik, 

Beograd, 2000. 

Stojanović Zoran , Komentar Krivičnog zakona SR Jugoslavije, 

Beograd, 1999. 

Šilović Josip, Nužna odbrana, Zagreb, 1910. 

Trifterer Otto, Ostereischisches Strafrecht, Allgemeiner teil, Wien, 

Berlin, New York, 1994. 

Zlatarić Bogdan, Krivični zakonik u praktičnoj primjeni, Opći dio, Prvi 

svezak, Zagreb, 1958. 

Zlatarić Bogdan – Damaška Mirjan, Rječnik krivičnog prava i postupka, 

Zagreb, 1960. 

Živanović Toma, Krivično pravo Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Beograd, 

1935. 

19 




20 




APPEARANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND 

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 

BY DRAGAN JOVAŠEVIĆ* 

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 

When the Roman Statute of permanent International Criminal Court 

came into force in the middle of 2002, international criminal law and 

international criminal justice – have finally been constituted. It is in the 

beginning on XXI century. It is a system of legal regulations contained 

within the documents of the international community and national 

criminal legislations which determine the concept and characteristics of 

international criminal offences, the system of criminal responsibility 

and punishments , as well as the bodies and procedures to pronounce 

penalties to perpetrators of the most serious crimes against humanity, 

peace and international security. This finally brings into life centuries 

long idea of establishing universal criminal justice, or justice superior to 

national ones, which would pronounce penalties for breaches of 

international rules of conduct of states and individuals. 

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 

CRIMINAL LAW AND JUSTICE 

The appearance and development of international criminal law and 

international criminal justice in the recent history can be devided into 

three periods : 1) up to the First World War, 2) between the two World 

Wars and 3) after the Second World War to today 1 . 

* Dragan Jovašević PhD, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law in Nis, 

Serbia and Montenegro. 

1 

Đurđić V., Jovašević D., Medjunarodno krivično pravo,Nomos, Beograd, 

2003.p.25-35 

21 

DRAGAN JOVAŠEVIĆ - APPEARANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND BASIC 

CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE


In the first period, the appearance and the development of the 

international criminal law was tightly connected with international laws 

of war – a special branch of the law that regulates relations between 

states, separately belligerents and establishes concrete legal rules of how 

a war is started and ended and procedure against civil people, war 

prisoners and wounded 2 . 

The sources of international criminal law of that time can be found in 

the significant codification documents of international laws of war such 

as : 1) the Paris Declaration of 1856. (which provides the principles 

according to which goods of neutral countries can’t be seized in 

maritime conflicts and piracy is prohibited), 2) the Geneva Convention 

of 1864.(which regulates the position and prohibition of the wounded in 

land conflicts), 3) the Petrograd Convention of 1868. (which prohibits 

the usage of explosive grains that weigh less than 400 gr) and 4) the 

Hague Conventions of 1899. and 1907. (which regulate the position and 

prohibition of the wounded and civilian in war). It is beginning of new 

branch of penal law in XIX century 3 . 

In the second period, the period between the two World Wars, following 

up the above mentioned legal sources, a number of important 

international legal documents were adopted : 1) the Geneva 

Conventions of 1919. (which regulate the position and prohibition of the 

wounded, sick men and war prisoner), 2) the Geneva Protocol of 1925. 

(which prohibits the usage of poison gas and bacteriological means), 3) 

the Paris or Briand-Kellog Pact of 1928. (which prohibition a war as 

instrument of international politics) and 4) the London Protocol of 1936. 

(which regulate the rules of submarine war) 4 . 

Besides these normative activities, that under the strong impression of 

the previous war, the issue of concrete individual criminal responsibility 

was raised for the first time in the international legal system. Pursuant to 

2 

Radojković M., Rat i medjunarodno pravo,Beograd, 1947.p.12-31 

3 

Schwarzenberger G. , The Law of the Armed Conflict,London, 1968. 

4 

More : Lopičić J., Ratni zločin protiv ratnih zarobljenika, Naša knjiga, Beograd, 

2005.p.13-42 

22 




articles 227. and 230. of the Versailles Peace Treaty from 1919., the 

question of the criminal responsibility of German Emperor William II 

Hohenzollern, for ‘’a supreme offence against international morality and 

the sanctity of treaties has been raised’’. These articles also have 

stipulated the constitution of a special ad hoc tribunal to try the accused 

highest german state officials upon very serious charges for committing 

an act in violation of the laws and customs of war and high principles of 

humanity 5 . However, the justice was not served because the former 

german emperor was given asylum in the Netherlands which rejected 

the request for fih extradiction 6 . 

The third period of historical development of international criminal law 

is the period after Second World War. This period is marked by the 

most virgorous activity and development of this the most joungest 

branches of the modern penal law – international criminal law in 

therecent history. This is understandable keeping in mind that the world 

was faced with more informations about many millions of innocent 

victims and invaluable material damage. The knowlwdgw of 

individuals, organizations and countries that led to such tragical 

consequences had a significant impact on the final decision to raise the 

question of criminal responsibility in a proper manner 7 . 

Starting from principles of the protection of universal human values and 

general interests and then the principle that violations of international 

public law have to be sanctioned and that responsibility is not only 

historical, morarly and political question or a question of civil law, the 

international responsibility of states and the individual (and command) 

criminal responsibility have come to the forefront. The changed 

approach to the issue of responsibility was founded on the theory to 

application the principle of territory, universal values and protection 8 . 

In this period , the most important codification of international criminal 

5 

Lopičić J., Ratni zločin protiv civilnog stanovništva,Beograd, 1999.p.19-27 

6 

Perazić G., Medjunarodno ratno pravo, Beograd, 1986.p.16-19 

7 

Avramov S., Kreća M., Medjunarodno javno pravo,Beograd, 1981.p.14-23 

8 

Leon F., The Law of War, New York, 1972.p.56 

23 




law included the famous Nuremberg Principles ( which were contain in 

the Nuremberg judgment from 1948.). Also, this judgment has definited 

of new international criminal offences. Pursuant to the United Nations 

Security Council Resolution from 1946. the Commission for the 

Codification of International law was founded with the purpose of 

establishing new principles of international criminal law and of drafting 

a new International criminal code. 

The draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind was 

published in 1954. and it was composed of thirteen articles with 

concrete international criminal offences 9 . The work was followed up by 

the United Nations International Law Commission which among other 

things, was the first to discuss the foundation of a special international 

criminal court. Such an approach was supported by the United Nations 

Security Council Resolution from 1968. by which the UN Convention 

on Unexpirability of International criminal offences ( genocide, was 

crimes , crimes against peace and crimes against humanity) was 

adapted. In the period from 1980. till July 1998.(Roma Statute), that 

Commission has kept on working, specially on the draft Statute of the 

permanent International criminal court 10 . 

ESTABLISMENT OF AD HOC MILITARY TRIBUNALS 

After the victory ver fascism, the question of individual criminal 

responsibility for committed crimes war raised again. The legal bases 

were the Declaration Concering Atrocities and conclusions of the 

Moscow Conference of the Allies from October 1943. and the London 

Agreement from August 1945. on the established of the International ad 

hoc Military Tribunal and on the punishment of war criminals. the 

constituent part of this legal document were the Agreement of the Allies 

to Try and Punish Major War Criminals of the European Axis and the 

Statute of the Military tribunal. 

9 

V. Vasilijević, Medjunarodni krivični sud, Beograd, 1961.p.34-52 

10 

Brownlie J., Basic Documents in International Law,Oxford, 2002 

24 




Military tribunal in Nuremberg tried the highest military and political 

officials of the Third Reich who were accused of initiating the 

aggressive war, suffering, atrocities, destructions, crimes against 

humanity and war crimes. The criminal trial has started on November 

20,1945. and lasted more than two hundred days and the Prosecution 

entered indictments against twenty one major war criminals. The 

verdicts were announced on October 1, 1946 : eleven sentences to death 

hanging , three sentences to life imprisonment, four sentences to longer 

terms and three acquittals. The verdicts of guilty were handed down on 

the leadership and the organizations of the SS, NSDAP, SD and the 

Gestapo and these organizations were declared criminal. This is s first 

judgment which the legal entities has proclaimed criminal responsibility 

because committing war crimes. 

The real jurisdiction of this international military tribunal was 

determined by article 6. of the Statute (in London Agreement) pursuant 

to which international criminal offences were classified into three 

categories : 1) crimes against peace, 2) war crimes and 3) crimes 

against humanity. The territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal included 

implicitly the prosecution of the Second World War war criminals 

‘’whose criminal offences do not have some specific geographical 

commitment, regardless the fact whether they will be accused 

individually or as members of an organization or a group or in both 

capacities’’. 

Second military ad hoc tribunal 11 was established in Tokyo pursuant to 

the Declaration of the military commander, american general Daghlas 

Macarthur of allies January 16. 1946. with the purpose of trying 

japanese war criminals for war crimes committed in the Far East. The 

process in Tokyo has started on April 29. 1946. and lasted till 

November 12. 1948. with the result that twenty eight persons were 

pronounced guilty for committing war crimes (specialy war crimes 

against war prisoners). During the proccedings four perons died, one 

was pronounced insane and the criminal proccedings against him was 

stayed. The Tokyo military tribunal passed the following sentences : 

11 

Josipović I., Haško implenetacijsko kazneno pravo,Zagreb, 2000. p.45-62 

25 




seven dealth penalties, fourteen life imprisonment sentences and two 

persons were sentenced to prison with various terms 12 . 

In short, legal proccedings before ad hoc tribunals in Nuremberg and 

Tokyo contrinuted significantly to the afirmation of principles of 

individual criminal responsibility, command responsibility (in Tokyo 

judgement), system international criminal offences, and to the 

development of international criminal law and especially to the 

institutionalization of the idea of international criminal justice 13 . The 

end XX century give first permanent international (Roma) criminal 

court in Hague 14 . 

HAGUE TRIBUNAL (ICTY) FOR FORMER 

SFR YUGOSLAVIA 

The international tribunal for criminal procesution of persons 

responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 

committed in the teritory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. 

(International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia – ICTY) is one 

of ad hoc tribunals established after strong indications of war crimes or 

crimes against humanity committed in war conflicts in the territory of 

the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). This 

tribunal was established by the United Nations Security Council 

Resolution No. 827/93 from May 25,1993. and accordance with the 

previous acts issued by the same body – Resolution No. 780/92 from 

October 6. 1992 and Resolution No. 808/93 from February 22. 1993. In 

the material legal sense of meaning, this international ad hoc tribunal is 

authorized to investigate alleged war crimes belonging to the group of 

legal principles of the Nuremberg (1946.) and Tokyo (1948.) 

Tribunales Judgements and Code of the crimes against peace and safety 

of Mankind and to establish cempetenlty the individual responsibility 

12 

Perazić G., Međunarodno ratno pravo,Beograd, 1986. p.14-31 

13 

C.Van den Wyngaert, International criminal law, Kluwer, Hague, London, 

Boston, 2001.p.12-34 

14 

UN. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9, International Legal Materials, 1999. 

26 




for concrete international criminal acts 15 . 

Similar ad hoc tribunales with similar jurisdiction, system international 

criminal offences and rules about criminal responsibility and 

punishments have established United Nations Security Council as : 1) 

International criminal tribunal for Rwanda which established of Security 

Council Resolution No.955/94 from November 8. 1994 16 , 2) Special 

court for Sierra Leone which established of Security Council 

Resolution No 1315/2000 from August 14, 2000 and 3) Iraqi special 

tribunal which established of the Statute of the Iraqi special tribunal 

from December 10. 2003 17 . 

The establishment of the Hague tribunal attracted large attention of the 

whole world, especially of expert circles in Serbia and Montenegro and 

abroad. The first remark is deal with statutory questions. Legal 

representatives and the accused raised most often the question of the 

legality of the establishment, existence and functioning of ad hoc 

tribunals 18 . 

The second remark is deal with the defense of the accused. Some legal 

representatives of the Defense have pointed out that they do not have 

the same effective abilities as the Prosecution, especially in the very 

important phase of evidence collection and finding witnesses 19 . Defense 

are significantly of the protected witness because the identity of the 

witness is not revealed till the trial and it is not possible to contact that 

group of persons till the very moment of having the main hearings 20 . 

Third remark is deal with the tribulal procedure and the trial in absentia. 

15 

Vasilijević V., Međunarodni krivični sud,Beograd, 1961.p. 64-68 

16 

Blakesley Ch., Definition and Triggering Mechanism, The International 

criminal court, AIDP,1997. 

17 

www. cpa-iraq.org/human _rights/statute.htm 


Josipović I., Haško implementacijsko kazneno pravo, Zagreb, 2000.p. 124-141 

19 

Đurđić V., Jovašević D., Međunarodno krivično pravo, Beograd, 2003. p. 33- 

34 

20 

More about remarks against Hague Tribunal in theory criminal law in Serbia 

and Montenegro : Stojanović Z., Međunarodno krivično pravo, Beograd, 2002. 

27 




Pursuant article 61. of the Statuet of Hague Criminal Tribunale (ICTY) 

there is a possibility to initiate proceedings against a person who 

currently can’t be accessed by the Tribunal in Hague under the 

condition that the indictment against the person has already been raised 

and the procedure of brining evidence has been initiated. Here again, the 

Hague Tribunal has wide authorities and a possibility to initiate the 

proceedings to rewiev and reconfirm the indictment, to declare 

internationally a wanted person and to make all countries collaboration. 

The participation of the Defense attorneys at this stage is not permitted 

and it is conditioned by the first appearance of the accused before the 

Tribual 21 . Up to that moment, the Defense attorneys may participate in 

the process only as spectators. 

REWIEV ON COLLABORATION BETWEEN SERBIA AND 

MONTENEGRO AND HAGUE TRIBUNAL 

The Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement that was signed in the end of 1995. 

(which finnished civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina) established a 

whole range of obligations assigned to all signatories.Among other 

things, by singing the agreement the signatories undoubtedly 

acknowledged and accepted the existence and activity of the Hague 

Tribunal (ICTY) and have undertaken upon themselves the international 

legal obligation to collaboration with this Tribunale in Hague. As a 

signatory, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (today Serbia and 

Montenegro from February 4. 2003 22 .) similarly has undertaken this 

and other international obligations, keeping in mind that the same issue 

was regulated directly or indirectly by the internal legislation and 

numerous previously enacted international documents (as United 

Nations Security Council resolutions, conventions, agreements etc). 

The collaboration between a government in Belgrade and the Hague 

Tribunal evolved in several periods between from 1995. to 2005. In the 

21 

Đurđić V., Jovašević D., Međunarodno krivično pravo, Beograd, 2003. p. 117- 

118 

22 

Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro No. 1/2003 

28 




first period (1995.-2000), the relationship between the FR Yugoslavia 

and the Hague Tribunal was hampered with political antagonism, 

general lack of trust, politics of the international community that was 

expressed by making conditions and putting pressure. The official 

bodies of government in Belgrad ( competent organs of the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia or competent organs of the Republic of Serbia) 

at the time did not manage to harmonize their relations with other 

relevant key players of the international relations (in international 

community) above all the United States or their European allies. 

After the change power in FR Yugoslavia (after presidental elections in 

Octobar 2000.) aarived the second period in relationship and 

collaboration between FR Yugoslavia and Hague tribunal. This 

collaboration has have a many remarks and stoppages. From the point of 

view of internal law system, the legal situation was somewhat unclear 

and that led to delay in concrete forms of collaboration with the Hague 

Tribunal . First of all, this may be applied to the requests made by the 

Hague Tribunal to the FR Yugoslavia to extradite its citizens suspected 

of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity who are in the 

territory of our country. The dilemma about the collaboration with the 

Hague Tribunal appeared because of constitutional, political, legal and 

other reasons. 

Legal dilemmas appeared above all because of normative solutions of 

the Yugoslav Constitution (from 1992.) and Constitution of Republic of 

Serbia (from 1990.) and Code about Criminal Proceedings 23 (from 1976. 

with more novels) and especially because of the provision dealing with 

the extradition of Yugoslav citizens to foreign courts. In the legal 

vacuum, the Federal Government have tried to find legal form that 

would enable the protection of our national interest and to avoid the 

introduction of new sanctions of international community and fulfil the 

requests made by the Hague Tribunal. Till the federal law was enacted, 

the Federal Government as a temporary solution has adopted the 

Provision on the Collaboration Procedures with the International 

23 

Jekić Z., Krivično procesno pravo,Beograd, 1992.p.347-351 ; Đurđić V., 

Krivično procesno pravo, Niš, 1998.p. 269-272 

29 




Criminal Tribunal 24 (2001.). According to this legal act, the rules 

dealing with the jurisdiction of the Hague Tribunal to undertake 

investigations in the FR Yugoslavia, the yielding of criminal 

proceedings led before Yugoslav courts, the appropriate application of 

the Code about Criminal Proceedings provisions, the issue of leagl 

assistance, the execution of the verdicts in the territory of the FR 

Yugoslavia etc. were established. 

The Federal Government of FR Yugoslavia has given priority to 

international law and direct application of the Statute of the Hague 

Tribunal, starting from the view that the Tribunal is as international 

institution and that the FR Yugoslavia has to respect all internationally 

undertaken obligations and norms of international public law and 

international criminal law. But, the Federal Constitution Court has 

passed the decision that this Provision does not comply with the 

Yugoslav Constitution and Code about Criminal Proceedings 25 . In its 

legal explanation, the Federal Constitution Court started from the 

opposite opinion in comparision to the Federal Government’s opinion, 

giving priority to the internal legal order. 

Starting from these facts, the government of the Republic of Serbia 

adopted a similar by law a special Provision on the Collaboration with 

the International Criminal Tribunal 26 (2002.). The enactment of the 

Republic act ‘’solved’’ the problem of collaboration with the Hague 

Tribunal for a very short period of time because internally there were 

still political disputes and no consensus in that respect. The adoption of 

the legal acts of a higher hierarchy was an imperative and more serious 

considerations started especially because of the international factor. 

Finally, the Federal Assembly of FR Yugoslavia adopted in 2002.the 

Code on the Collaboration of the FR Yugoslavia with the International 

Tribunal for criminal procesution of persons responsible for serious 

violations of international humanitarian law in territory of former 

24 Official Gazette of the FR Yugoslavia, No. 30/2001 

25 Official Gazette of FR Yugoslavia, No. 70/2001 

26 

Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 14/2002 

30 




Yugoslavia from 1991 27 . This Code is short legal act and it has 41 

articles in total, classified in seven chapters that cover : 1) general 

provisions, 2) the authorities of the Tribunal to conduct investigation in 

the territory of the FR Yugoslavia, 3) the yielding of cases led before 

local courts, 4) the extradition of the accused, 5) legal help to the 

Tribunal, 6) the execution of the verdicts made by the Tribunal in the 

territory of the FR Yugoslavia and 7) other provosions 28 . 

In material-legal sense f meaning, the nature of this Code iz lex 

specialis in this matter. In the general provisions, special emphasis has 

been given to the principle of priority of international obligations 

accepted by the FR Yugoslavia pursuant to international law, especially 

the provisons of the Statute of the Hague Tribunal (article 2. of this 

Code). On the other hand, the principle of the sovereignty of the FR 

Yugoslavia is also stressed in cases of potential collisions with the 

Hague Tribunal requests (article 4. of this Code) and the establishment 

of the Special National Council for Collaboration with the Hague 

Tribunal has been envisaged (article 7. of this Code). Other legal 

solutions under this Code in initial chapters are mainly well-known to 

experts and general public from the previous practice of the Hague 

Tribunal. 

In procedural-legal sense of meaning, the Code has regulated to a great 

extent and very precisely , the collaboration procedures of domestic 

citizens with the Hague Tribunal. The second chapter provisions 

(articles 9-11. of this Code) envisage concrete powers of the Hague 

Tribunal to undertake investigative activities in the FR Yugoslavia such 

as : the collection of informations, interviews with the suspects, 

accused, witnesses, sworn-in court experts, the performance of 

autopsies and exhumation of corpses, the collection of material 

evidence, review and coping of records etc. One limitation deals with 

an obligation to respect national sovereignty, security and legal order of 

the FR Yugoslavia (article 10. paragraph 3. of this Code). The next 

27 

Official Gazette of FR Yugoslavia, No.18/2002 

28 

More: Jovašević D., Medjunarodno krivično pravo – teorija, 

zakonodavstvo,praksa, Službeni list, Beograd, 2005. 

31 




chapter (articles 12-17. of this Code) regulates the yielding of criminal 

cases conducted before a local court which is in keeping with already 

known forms of international criminal court collaboration (legal 

assistance). 

The central place of the Code from 2002. has been given to the 

extradition procedure of the accused that is envisaged under the fourth 

chapter (articles 18-31. of this Code). In compliance with article 18. the 

extradition procedure is relevant, first of all, for the accused and there 

are no exceptions on that basis as for their privilegs and immunity, not 

even for the Heads of States. The decision on the extradition of the 

accused is passed by bodies of Republic of Serbia. The body that is 

really authorized to pass a decision on the extradition of a person is the 

court that receives from the Ministry of Justice of Republic of Serbia 

(former Federal Ministry of Justice , before February 4. 2003.), the case, 

that is the request for extradition, confirmed indictment and an orrder to 

perform the arrest. Pursuant to that, the authorized investigative judge 

determines obligatory detention for the person asked for in the 

extradition request and the accused always has to have a lawyer. The 

detention term may be also defined before the request is submitted and 

expecially in urgent and justifiable cases (the person is on the run or 

hiding etc). The Code offers other guarantees as well in relation to the 

perpetrator and the criminal offence, especially that the accused shall be 

released within 48 hours if the domestic competent court does not 

receive theextradition reguest with the confirmed indictment. 

The bodies of the Interior Ministry of Republic of Serbia have a 

significant role in this phase of the extradition procedure because they 

are authorized to arrest the accused (article 23. of this Code). This also 

applies to persons for whom formally-legally there is no order issued by 

an investigative judge. It is sufficient to be put on the wanted list a local 

body or the Hague Tribunal. The obligation of the police is to give the 

arrested person to further jurisdiction of the court, so that provosion is 

the same as in Code about Criminal Proceedings 29 . Other provisions in 

29 

More : Jovašević D., Zakonik o krivičnom postupku, Službeni list, Beograd, 

2004. In the Republic of Serbia in application is Code about od Criminal 

32 




this chapter deal with the imprisonment appeal procedures and passing 

the final decision. 

Closing chapters (chapter five and chapter six) contain standard forms 

of international criminal legal assistance (articles 32-35). The last , seve 

chapter of this Code on the Collaboration of the FR Yugoslavia with the 

Hague Tribunal from 2002. includes other provisons and the most 

important is the one dealing with the voluntary surrender of persons 

(Article 36. of this Code) and guarantees given by domestic local 

bodies in relation to a request to be out on pre-trial release. 

THE THEORY NOTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 

LAW 

There is not a unanimous understanding of the notion and content of the 

international criminal law in theory. According to the oldest 19 th century 

view this notion includes a set of rules on special validity of national 

criminal legislation or the set of rules on application of national criminal 

law depending on where a crime was committed or depending on the 

nationality of its perpetrator. 30 A slightly broader view of this branch of 

law is the one, which in addition to the above said content includes also 

the rules regarding international legal aid in criminal matters (lodging 

information on perpetrators, validity of international courts decisions 

and other). Since they lack the international rules certain countries 

determine on their own the validity of their criminal laws referring to 

the acts committed abroad or to foreign citizens as crime perpetrators; in 

this way the international criminal law adequately to international 

private law used to be limited to the settlement of conflicts of criminal 

laws of various countries. 

Proceedings from 2001. Official Gazette of FR Yugoslavia, No. 70/2001 and 

68/2002 and Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia, No. 58/2004. In the Republic 

of Montenegro in application is Code about Criminal Proceedings from 2003. 

Official Gazette of Republic of Montenegro, No. 70/2003 

30 

Jescheck, H. H., Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, 2. Auflage, 

Berlin, 1972, p. 127 

33 




There is also a specific view of international criminal law, which 

defines this branch of law as a set of rules that determine the conditions 

and assumptions according to which the states must help each other in 

legal cases in order to insure the performance of their penal authority 

within the international community. 31 There are also some views in 

theory according to which the international criminal law is a discipline 

that determines the jurisdiction of criminal courts of a country in 

relation to the jurisdiction of foreign courts, then the application of 

material and criminal proceedings laws in relation to the place and 

perpetrators as well as the execution of foreign court decisions, 

especially criminal court decisions, and legal aid in criminal matters and 

extradition. 32 

There are also various interpretations of this notion in our domestic 

criminal law theory. For instance, the international criminal law is 

determined as a set of rules of international community of states or 

contracts between certain states by which the international criminal acts 

and penalties for their perpetrators are established in order to protect 

international relations (international peace and security of mankind). 33 

There is a similar opinion according to which the international criminal 

law is a set of rules and regulations contained in the documents of the 

international community and contracts concluded between certain 

countries by which the international criminal acts and penalties are 

established in order to preserve the international peace and security of 

mankind, as well as a set of rules which provide for the conditions for 

international legal aid referring to the application of penalties to the 

crime perpetrators. 34 In theory we can also find a definition of 

international criminal law as an entirety of criminal law norms referring 

to international relations. 35 There is also an interesting definition 

31 

Martens, Traite de droit international penal, Paris, 1887, p.5 

32 

Zlatarić, B., Medjunarodno krivično pravo, Prvi deo, Rasprostranjenost 

represivne vlasti države, Zagreb, 1979, p. 15-18 

33 

Čejović, B., Krivično pravo, Opšti deo, Beograd, 2002, p. 51-52; Radovanović, 

M., Krivično pravo, Opšti deo, Beograd, 1975. p. 10 

34 

Jovanović, Lj., Jovašević, D., Krivično pravo, Opšti deo, Beograd, 2002, p. 24- 

25 

35 

B. Zlatarić, op. cit., p. 24 

34 




according to which the international criminal law includes both the 

international legal aspects of criminal law and criminal law aspects of 

public international law. 36 

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 

LAW 

According to such definitions of the notion of the international criminal 

law, it follows that it has the below mentioned characteristics: 

1) It consists of two set of rules. The first set is made of rules, which 

establish the international criminal offences. Here we can distinguish 

two kinds of criminal offences. The first kind covers the conduct 

breaching the international contracts, agreements or guarantees and in 

this way disturbing or endangering peace between nations and the 

security of mankind or breaching war rules and practices and 

maltreatment of war prisoners, the wounded, the sick, shipwrecked 

persons and civilians, or the conduct destroying biological, economic, 

cultural and other conditions necessary for the existence of a nation or 

national, racial, religious or ethnic group. The second kind includes all 

remaining international crimes breaching or endangering values 

protected by the international criminal law (offences related to 

narcotics, prostitution, pornography, piracy, hijacking, terrorism, 

hostage taking, and other) 37 . 

The second set consists of the rules by which the conflicts regarding 

spatial validity of criminal laws of various countries are settled and the 

rules regarding the international legal aid related to the extradition of 

crime perpetrators to countries on whose territories they committed 

crimes for pronouncing or execution of penalties. 

2) The source of these rules is in the international legal documents. Here 

36 

Stojanović, Z., Medjunarodno krivično pravo, Beograd, 2002, p. 3 

37 

Đurđić V., Jovašević D., Međunarodno krivično pravo, Beograd, 2003. godine, 

str.46 

35 




we distinguish the universal documents of the international community 

which are therefore yielded within or under the wing of the UN, and 

then the documents of regional organizations (such as the Council of 

Europe) or the contracts concluded between two or more countries. 

3) These are the legal rules, which do not have statutory character, so 

unlike the national criminal law that is the statutory law, here we do not 

have a statutory law although one of the basic principles of the 

international criminal law is the principle of legality. 

4) The rules refer both to material and proceedings law. There are 

certain rules, which only partially determine certain issues or institutes 

of international criminal law, but there are also rules (Roman Statute of 

the permanent International Criminal Court –1998.) which completely 

establish the field of this branch of law. 

5) Some of the rules which have the international character are applied 

directly to concrete cases where crimes were committed and to their 

perpetrators through the practices of the International Court of Justice of 

the Hague for former SFR Yugoslavia (1993.)or the Court for Rwanda 

(1994.) or Sijerra Leone (2000.) or Iraqi Special tribunal (2003.) and 

some only in case and when certain countries incorporate them in their 

national criminal legislation after ratification (for instance, the 

Convention on the laundry, search, seizure or confiscation of illegally 

gained income or UN Convention against transnational organized 

crime). 

The notion of the international criminal law very often means a set of 

international documents, which is binding for the states, which accepted 

them to incorporate certain conducts qualified as crimes in their 

respective criminal legislations. According to such opinions, there are 

two kinds of international crimes – in narrow or broad sense. In narrow 

sense, these are the crimes contained in the sentences of Nuremberg 

(1946) and Tokyo (1948) courts: crimes against peace, crimes against 

humankind and war crimes. In a broader sense, it is any conduct, which 

the international community would like to suppress on the national 

level: crimes related to narcotics, trafficking in white slaves, weapons, 

36 




nuclear substances, pornography and prostitution, hijacking, and 

similar. 38 

Therefore, the international criminal law, which referred to settling of 

conflicts of spatial validity of criminal laws and international legal aid, 

becomes the international criminal law, which refers to establishing of 

international crimes and penalties for their perpetrators. Considering the 

tendencies expressed during recent years in the field of international law 

in general, it can be assumed that the content of such an understood 

international criminal law will be extended further. After the Roman 

Statute of the permanent International Criminal Court came into force it 

can be said that the international criminal law is a system of legal rules 

determined by this Statute establishing international crimes, basic penal 

responsibility and penal system for the perpetrators as well as the 

proceedings before the international criminal court and the rules 

contained in the national criminal legislation determining basics and 

conditions for international criminal legal aid. 39 

But taking into account that in the majority of countries today there is a 

large number of the same or very similar crimes with the same type and 

range of prescribed penalties, that a great number of the institutes of 

criminal law in general refers to crimes, complicity, the system of 

criminal liability, and that the penal system which is unified to a great 

extent, the theory raised a question of unification of criminal legislation 

which would lead to the creation of such a criminal law which would be 

binding for all or at least the majority of countries and their citizens. 

This would in a specific manner bring about the idea of the international 

criminal law, which would be uniform and generally applied for the 

whole human and social community. 

This concept, however, could not be brought to life at this level of 

mankind development, first of all due to the differences in socioeconomic 

and political systems and legal system of certain countries 

(although there are certain shifts, for instance regarding the construction 

38 

Stojanović, Z., Krivično pravo, Opšti deo, Beograd, 2001, p. 33 

39 

Jovašević, D., Leksikon krivičnog prava, Beograd, 2002, p. 275-276 

37 




of criminal law of European union or European criminal law), and in 

addition to this due to the differences in opinions, degree of 

development, tradition, culture, criminal policy and other. This is why 

we talk less about a complex and thorough international criminal law 

and insist more that certain socially dangerous acts of the international 

character be established as punishable in all countries. 

Therefore, the unification of criminal legislation under present 

conditions of development of international community is not realistic. 

This however does not mean that the cooperation among countries 

cannot and should not be established which would include building of 

certain general principles and rules of criminal law. It should also take 

into account that the legislations of some countries (such as Germany, 

France or Great Britain) have considerable influence on the 

development of criminal legislations of other countries (there is a great 

influence of Anglo-Saxon precedent criminal law in the countries of 

former Commonwealth). 

THE SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 

Regardless of what term we use to name this branch of law, it is 

obviously the branch of law, which aims to determine international 

criminal offences, the penal system for their perpetrators, the bases and 

conditions of penal responsibility and culpability, as well as the 

procedures to establish liability and pronounce and execute penalties by 

the competent judicial authorities. The subject of the international 

criminal law therefore includes two notions and institutes – the notions 

of material and procedural character. The notion of general and the 

notion of special part of criminal law are distinguished within the 

material notion and institutes. 

The subject of the general part of criminal law includes establishing of 

the notion and elements of international criminal offences, stages in 

their commitment, grounds excluding the existence of crime, 

commitment of crime by one person or types of complicity, grounds for 

criminal liability (state of mind and guilt) as well as the system of 

38 




penalties and bases of excluding from criminal liability and right to 

punishment. 

The special part of criminal law determines the notion, features and 

characteristics of basic, qualified and privileged forms of international 

crimes and penalties for their perpetrators. 

The procedural part of international criminal law determines the system 

and organization of international criminal justice, architecture and 

course of proceedings (first instance proceedings and proceedings on 

appeal), place, role and status of certain proceedings subjects (parties 

and other participants) in conducting proceedings activities aimed at 

clearing and resolving criminal matter in whole in a legal and equitable 

manner. 

However, when we speak about the international criminal law (as a 

branch of positive law) it should be said that this term in addition to the 

above said includes also the science of international criminal law as a 

law of legal science which studies all above mentioned terms and 

institutes which actually represent the subject of regulation and 

establishing of the international criminal law as a set of legal rules of 

the international community. On one hand this study aims at providing 

as good an understanding and as regular application on concrete 

practical cases as possible, and on the other hand at providing for its 

further development and improvement in order to increase the efficiency 

of action. 

CONCLUSION 

Following two and a half century long historical development a new 

branch of penal law – the international criminal law – has finally grew 

up at the beginning of 21 st century. This branch of law has formally 

acquired ‘civil rights’ when the Roman Statute of the permanent 

International Criminal Court in the Hague came into force in the middle 

of 2003. It is namely the law which analogue to other branches of 

positive penal law determines the notion and elements of international 

39 




criminal offences (aggression, crimes against humanity, genocide and 

war crimes), stages of their commitment, forms of complicity, notion 

and characteristics of penal responsibility, as well as a system of 

penalties (material law) and the notion and features of proceedings 

subjects: prosecution and courts, the course and architecture of criminal 

proceedings (procedural part). 

By pronouncing sentences and execution of penalties to perpetrators of 

international crimes within Nuremberg and Tokyo courts, as well as by 

ad hoc tribunals, the norms of the international criminal law came into 

life in court practice. This has created not only theoretical and legal but 

also practical bases for establishing and further implementation of the 

international criminal law and this paper presents its basic notions, 

features and characteristics. Further development of national criminal 

laws and unification of many general and basic institutes of criminal 

law create bases for final establishment of transnational criminal law, 

which would include all, or at least the majority of contemporary 

civilization by its implementation. 

BASIC LITERATURE: 

Avramov, S. Kreća, M., Medjunarodno javno pravo, Beograd, 1981. 

Babić M., Komentari krivičnih zakona u Bosni i Hercegovini, Sarajevo, 

2005. 

Bačić F., Komentar Kaznenog zakonika Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb, 

2005. 

Basic Documents , United Nations, ICTY, 1995. 

Bassiouni, M.C., Crimes against Humanity in International criminal 

Law, Dordecht, 1992. 

Brownlie J., Basic Documents in International Law, Oxford, 2002. 

Compendio di Diritto penale, Parte generale e speciale, Napoli, 2004. 

Čejović B., Krivično pravo, Opšti deo, Beograd, 2002. 

Gattegno, P, Droit penal special, Paris, 2003. 

Geninet, B., L indispensable du droit penal, Paris, 2002. 

Djurdjić V., Krivično procesno pravo,Niš, 1998. 

Djurdjić, V. – Jovašević, D., Medjunarodno krivično pravo, Beograd, 

40 




2003. 

Janković, B., Medjunarodno javno pravo, Sarajevo, 1960. 

Janković, B.,- Radivojević, Z., Medjunarodno javno pravo, Niš, 2002. 

Jekić Simić Z., Krivično procesno pravo, Beograd, 1992. 

Jescheck H.H., Lehrbuch des Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, Berlin, 1972. 

Josipović I., Haško implementacijsko kazneno pravo, Zagreb, 2000. 

Jovanović, Lj. – Jovašević, D., Krivično pravo, Opšti deo, Beograd, 

2002. 

Jovašević D., Leksikon krivičnog prava, Beograd, 2002. 

Jovašević D., Komentar Krivičnog zakona SR Jugoslavije, Beograd, 

2002. 

Jovašević D., Zakonik o krivičnom postupku, Beograd, 2004. 

Jovašević D., Medjunarodno krivično pravo – teorija, zakonodavstvo, 

praksa, Beograd, 2005. 

Klotter, J.-Edwards, T., Criminal Law, Cinsinnati, 1998. 

Kambovski V., Megunarodno krivično pravo, Skoplje, 2003 

Koržanskij M.I., Popularnij komenar Kriminolnogu kodeksu, Kiev, 

1997. 

Lazarević Lj., Vučković B., Vučković V., Komentar Krivičnog zakonika 

Republike Crne Gore, Cetinje, 2004. 

Leon, F.,The Law of the War, New York, 1972. 

Lopičić J., Ratni zločin protiv civilnog stanovništva,Beograd, 1999. 

Lopičić J., Ratni zločin protiv ratnih zarobljenika, Beograd, 2005. 

Martens, Traite de droit international penal, Paris, 1887. 

Molan M., Criminal law, Textbook, Charlton, London,2003. 

Marjanović G., Krivično pravo, Opšt del, Skoplje, 1998. 

Nenov I., Nakazatelno pravo na Republika Blgaria, Obša čast, Knjiga 

vtora, Sofija, 1992. 

Perazić G., Medjunarodno ratno pravo, Beograd, 1986. 

Petrović B., Jovašević D., Krivično (kazneno) pravo Bosne i 

Hercegovine, Opći dio, Sarajevo, 2005. 

Petrović B:, Jovašević D., Krivično (kazneno) pravo Bosne i 

Hercegovine, Posebni dio, Sarajevo, 2005. 

Radojković M., Rat i medjunarodno pravo, Beograd, 1947. 

Radulović D., Medjunarodno krivično pravo, Podgorica, 1999. 

Schwarzenberger G., The Law of the Armed Conflict, London, 1968. 

Skuratov J.., Lebedov V.M., Kommentari k Ugolonomu kodeksu v 

41 




Rossijskoj federacii, Moskva, 1996. 

Spinelis D.D., Essays on criminal sciences, Atina Komotini,2001. 

Stojanović Z., Komentar Krivičnog zakona SR Jugoslavije, Beograd, 

1999. 

Stojanović Z., Medjunarodno krivično pravo, Beograd, 2002. 

Vasilijević V., Medjunarodni krivični sud, Beograd, 1961. 

Vučinić Z., Medjunarodno ratno i humanitarno pravo, Beograd, 1996. 

Zlatarić B.,Medjunarodno krivično pravo, Rasprostranjenost represivne 

vlasti države, Zagreb, 1979. 

Wyngaert C.V., International criminal law, Hague, London, Boston, 

2001. 

42 




THE INTRA-NATIONALIZED 

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 

BY DR. ANWAR FRANGI* 

There are three general types of conflict under positive international 

humanitarian law: (1) tension 1 , (2) disturbance 2 , and (3) armed conflict 3 . 

* LL.M. 1995, Harvard University Law School (Massachusetts, USA); LL.M. 

1992, American University Washington College of Law (Washington, D.C.); 

Doctorat en droit 1986, University of Poitiers Law School (France); D.E.A. 

1983, University of Poitiers Law School (France); LL.B. 1982, Lebanese 

University Law School (Lebanon). Dr. Frangi is full-time Senior Lecturer 

and Researcher at the Holy Spirit University of Kaslik (Lebanon), and 

professor of international law and philosophy of law at La Sagesse 

University Faculty of Law (Lebanon). 

1 

‘Internal tensions’ involve situations “which are not marked by acts of violence.” 

(See Commentaire des Protocoles additionnels du 8 juin 1977 aux 

Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949, Comité international de la Croix- 

Rouge, Genève, 1986, p. 89). Under ‘internal tensions’ may be included massive 

arrests; a large number of ‘political’ detainees; probable existence of 

maltreatment or inhumane conditions of detention; suspension of fundamental 

judicial guarantees, because of either the proclamation of a state of exception, or 

a de facto situation; allegations of disappearances (See id. at 1379). Civil 

disobedience is deemed to be “tension” when it does not manifest acts of 

violence. Under ‘civil disobedience’ may be included, e.g., sit-in, draft card 

burning, peaceful strike. The origin of acts of violence may not change the 

characterization of the act, acts of violence being characterized as conflicts 

independently of the actor. 

2 

‘Internal disturbances’ involve situations in which there exists not a noninternational 

armed conflict as such, but a confrontation within the country, 

characterized by a certain seriousness or duration and which involves acts of 

violence. (See International Committee of the Red Cross, Conference of 

Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 

Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 24 May-12 June 

1971, Vol. V, “Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,” p. 

79). Under ‘internal disturbances’ all acts of violence short of armed conflicts 

may be included, such as riots, violent strikes and protests, etc. 

3 

An ‘armed conflict’ is a collective act of violence indicating the existence of 

open hostilities between organized armed forces. There are two types of armed 

43 

DR. ANWAR FRANGI - THE INTRA-NATIONALIZED INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT


There is also a fourth general type of conflict not foreseen by positive 

international humanitarian law, namely, the intra-nationalized 

international conflict. 4 

1. Definition. The intra-nationalized international conflict involves a 

situation of international tension or disturbance or armed conflict which 

has degenerated into a non-international tension or disturbance or armed 

conflict. 

‘International tension’ involves situations of unfriendly acts short of 

violence; legal or illegal unfriendly acts short of violence, and which may 

be deemed as threat of peace. May be included under ‘international 

tension: (i) reprisals, such as refusing to fulfill treaty obligations; war-like 

operations without the intention of making war or massing troops along 

conflict according to positive international humanitarian law, an international, 

and a non-international, armed conflict. The ‘international armed conflict’ breaks 

down into two: (i) an armed conflict within the meaning of Common Article 2 to 

the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, such as cases of declared war 

or of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, and 

(ii) an armed conflict within the meaning of article 1(4) of Protocol I of 1977, 

such as cases of people fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 

and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination. 

The ‘non-international armed conflict’ breaks down also into two: (i) that 

which is within the meaning of Common Article 3 to the Four Geneva 

Conventions of 1949, and (ii) that which is within the meaning of Article 1 of 

Protocol II of 1977. Thus, under the latter the non-international armed conflict 

covers situations in which an armed faction is opposed to another armed faction, 

and in which the government is not necessarily a party to the conflict; and under 

(i) the non-international armed conflict involves situations in which the 

government is opposed to national dissident armed forces, which are commonly 

known as “classical civil war.” These situations cover group’s acts of violence 

which tend either (a) to change the policy of the established government, (b) or to 

force a concession, or (c) to secede from the established government. 

4 

For a brief analysis of the Intra-Nationalized International Conflict, see A.T. 

Frangi, The Internationalized Non-International Armed Conflict in Lebanon, 

1975-1990: Introduction to Confligology, 22 CAP.U.L. REV. 965, 1037-1040 

(1993). See also L.-Ph. Rouillard, Les conflits armés à caractère noninternationaux‘internationalisés’, 

FLJ (1)(1) (Special Issue, August 2005) at 104 

et s. 

44 



international borders; putting pressure on the offending state by seizing or 

destroying property, holding territory or capturing of vessels; nuclear arms 

race; (ii) embargo; (iii) pacific blockade, such temporary suspension of the 

commerce of the offending state; (iv) retorsion, such as imposing similar 

restrictions upon the subjects of the offending state in retaliation of its 

wrongful acts, recalling ambassadors, termination of diplomatic relations, 

withdrawal of fiscal and tariff concessions; (v) competition for 

international political influence, and propaganda campaigns. 

‘International disturbance’ involves situations of acts of violence short of 

armed conflict, which are committed by individuals or subjects of 

international law or groups not subjects of international law, and which 

bear seriousness in terms of high number of victims or in terms of threat to 

international peace. May be included under ‘international disturbance, (i) 

political assassinations; (2) acts of terrorism; (3) sporadic international 

attacks. 

2. Characteristics. Five features characterize the intra-nationalized 

international conflict: 

a. It is a conflict of international character in origin. 

b. It is an international conflict degenerating into a noninternational 

conflict. 

c. It is a multidimensional conflict, it being concerned with 

various conflicts at the same time and not with one type of 

conflict at a time. 

d. It is a relational conflict, which means that it is concerned 

with the relation between the types of conflict. If 

humanitarian laws may be applicable to some conflicts, 

such as disturbances and armed conflicts, and may not be 

applicable to some conflicts, such as internal and 

international tensions, the generation of one conflict into 

another can, however, within a continuum of humanitarian 

and human rights norms. It is this relation between the 

types of conflict that justifies breaking the frontiers 

delineating conflicts. 

Not only is the intra-nationalized international conflict: 

45 



- an international conflict in origin; 

- an international conflict degenerating into a noninternational 

conflict; 

- a multidimensional conflict, and 

- a relational conflict. It is also, and most 

importantly, 

e. A multi-legal and non-legal conflict, 5 since it can be 

extended to non-legal conflicts, meaning conflicts that do 

not fall formally within the provisions of Geneva Law, 

such as internal and international tensions, to which 

minimum humanitarian rules do not usually apply. 

3. Classification. In combining all types of conflict foreseen by 

positive international humanitarian laws, namely, tensions, disturbances, 

and armed conflicts, 9 possible conflicts covered by the intranationalized 

international conflict may be distinguished: 

1. International tension degenerating into non-international 

tension, such as the Cold War degenerating into (a) the Soviet’s 

Blockade of the Western-held sectors of West Berlin in 1948- 

1949; (b) the Berlin Crisis of 1961; (c) the Western powers’ 

rearmament of West Germany, which became a member of 

NATO, and the Soviets’ establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 

May 1955; (d) the Martial Law in Poland 6 . 

5 On the Multi-Legal and Nonlegal Approach see A. T. Frangi, The 

Internationalized Noninternational Armed Conflict, 22 CAP.U.L. REV. 965, 

965-966 (1993); see also A.T. Frangi, Democracy of History: A Theory of 

Minority Group Law, a paper submitted to Harvard Law School on May 5, 1995, 

p. 37. Two activities divide the law, legal and illegal activities. Every activity 

that is not foreseen by the law is ‘non-legal.’ On the Multi-Legal and Non-legal 

Approach see A. T. Frangi, The Internationalized Non-International Armed 

Conflict, 22 CAP.U.L. REV. 965, 965-966 (1993); see also A.T. Frangi, 

Democracy of History: A Theory of Minority Group Law, a paper submitted to 

Harvard Law School on May 5, 1995, p. 37, of which only part was published in 

FLJ (1) (1) (July 2005) at 7. 

6 

In 1981, under pressure from Moscow, the Polish government imposed 

martial law in an attempt to destroy the challenge to its authority presented by 

Solidarity, an independent labor union. In protest, the United States imposed 

economic sanctions on Poland. 

46 




disturbance, such as the Cold War degenerating into: (a) the 

Cuban missile crisis of 1962 7 ; (b) the Korean plane incident 8 . 


armed conflict, such as the Cold War degenerating into the 

Korea War in the early 1950s. 

4. International disturbance degenerating into non-international 

tension, such as the September 11 th attacks 9 occurred in the 

territory of the United States, generating limitation of personal 

freedoms for security purposes in the United States. 


disturbance, such as the attacks launched by the Palestinians 

against Israel from the territory of Lebanon, and which resulted 

into disturbances in Lebanon 10 . 


armed conflict, such as the acts of terrorism launched by the 

Palestinians against the Israelis, which degenerated into noninternational 

armed conflicts between the Palestinians and the 

Phalangists in Lebanon between 1975-1990. 

7. International armed conflict degenerating into non- 

7 This crisis would be considered as a situation of disturbance and not a 

situation of tension, although it had not developed into a US-Soviet armed 

conflict, because there was an actual soviet’s secret installation of missiles in 

Cuba in 1062 that could be used to launch nuclear attacks on U.S. cities. This had 

sparked a confrontation that might have generated into an armed conflict between 

the two superpowers in the territory of Cuba. 

8 A Soviet fighter shot down a Korean Airlines 747 that had strayed over 

Soviet territory on a flight from Alaska to Seoul, South Korea. All persons aboard 

the plane died. The Soviets insisted that the plane had been engaged in espionage. 

9 An act of tension of high intensity may be characterized as a ‘disturbance,’ it 

being not only a threat to, but also a breach of, international peace. 

10 

After 1967, the Palestinians started to launch attacks from the Territory of 

Lebanon against Israel. This international disturbance divided Lebanon into two 

camps: one camp, mostly Christians, opposed the Palestinians’ freedom of 

actions against Israel from the Lebanese territory, and another camp, mostly 

Moslems, encouraged that freedom. In December-January 1968, this crisis 

developed into interior armed clashes between the Palestinians and the Lebanese 

army and security forces. 

47 



international tension, such as the Arab-Israeli armed conflict 

degenerating into the troublesome issue of the Palestinians 

refugees in many Arab countries. 

8. International armed conflict degenerating into noninternational 

disturbance, such as the US-led coalition v. Iraq 

armed conflict which resulted into serious armed clashes 

between the Shiites and the Sunnites in Iraq, bringing the Iraqi 

factions to the brink of civil war in July 2005. 

9. International armed conflict degenerating into noninternational 

armed conflict, such as Arab-Israel armed 

conflict degenerating into non-international armed conflicts in 

Lebanon or Jordan 11 . 

4. Modes. All the above 9 possible conflicts covered by the intranationalized 

international conflict may arise between two or more states, 

and may occur in the territory of the parties to the conflict or of a third 

state not a party to the conflict. Accordingly, 36 possible conflicts covered 

by the intra-nationalized international conflict may be distinguished. But 

since the application of international law and humanitarian laws would not 

be much different whether the conflict is international or multinational, 

these modes can be reduced to 18 as follows: 

1. Intra-nationalized International Conflict in the Territory of 

One of the Parties To the Conflict: 

1.1. International tension degenerating into non-international 

tension, such as the East-West antagonism degenerating into 

the U-2 incident of 1960 12 . 


disturbance: US v. fundamentalists tension resulting into the 

September 11 th attacks occurred on the land of the United 

11 

In September 1970, King Hussein of Jordan fell on the Palestinians in his 

kingdom, killing thousands. 

12 

Since 1955, American high-altitude U-2 spy planes had been carrying out 

surveillance operations over Soviet territory. On May 1, 1960, the Soviets 

succeeded in downing a U-2 and capturing its pilot. Khrushchev used this U-2 

incident to break up the Paris summit meeting as it was about to convene in June. 

48 



States. 


armed conflict: US v. fundamentalists tension resulting 

ultimately into armed conflicts in Afghanistan after 2001. 

1.4. International disturbance degenerating into noninternational 

tension, such as the September 11 th attacks 

occurred in the territory of the United States, which generated 

dozens of retaliatory incidents throughout the United States, 

where Arab American communities have been “in a state of 

siege” since the time of the attacks 13 . 


disturbance, such as the September 11 th attacks 

occurred in the territory of the United States, which generated 

into violent attacks in the United States on Arab Americans 14 . 


armed conflict, such as the acts of terrorism 

launched by the Palestinians from the territory of Lebanon 

against the Israelis, which degenerated into non-international 

armed conflicts between the Palestinians and the Phalangists 

in Lebanon. 

1.7. International armed conflict degenerating into noninternational 

tension, such as US-Iraq armed conflict 

generating, inter alia, into anti-war demonstrations in the 

United States 15 . 

13 

See Stuart Millar, Violent Attacks on Arab Americans. Special Report: 

Terrorism in the US, The Guardian, September 14, 2001: “300 marchers – some 

waving American flags and chanting ‘USA!USA!’ – tried to march on a mosque 

in Briedgeview, a suburb to the south-west of the city. Three demonstrators were 

arrested as police sealed off the blocks around the closed mosque and turned the 

march away. One of the marchers, Colin Zaremba, 19, said: ‘I’m proud to be 

American and I hate Arabs and I always have.’ ” 

14 

See id: “In Chicago, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at an Arab American 

community center.” “Gunshots were fired at an Islamic center in a Dallas suburb 

yesterday” 

15 

See Matthew Engel, Anti-War Message Blunted: Globalization 

Demonstration Replaced by Peace Rally, The Guardian, October 1, 2001: “As 

the main body of protesters, about 8,000 of them, marched down Pennsylvania 

Avenue towards Capitol Hill on Saturday afternoon, they passed a hundred or so 

49 




disturbance: US-Afghanistan armed conflict 

degenerating into anti-American attacks launched by the 

Mujahedeens Front which groups Talibanis, and loyals to Ex- 

Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and members of Al- 

Qaida in Afghanistan, against American soldiers on August 

21. 


armed conflict, such as the Arab Israeli armed 

conflict which was at the origin of many Arab governments- 

Palestinians non-international armed conflicts, such in 

Jordan 16 . Also, the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from 

Lebanon in the 1980s generated into various armed conflicts 

between Lebanese factions in Lebanon. 

2. Intra-Nationalized International Conflict in the Territory of a 

Third State: 


tension, such as the Cold War generating into (a) the Martial 

Law imposed in Poland in 1981; (b) the Western Alliance 

(NATO) and Eastern Alliance (Warsaw Pact); (c) the Berlin 

Blockade in 1949. 


disturbance, such as the Cold War resulting into (a) the Bay 

of Pigs conflict on Cuba’s Southern coast; (b) the East 

German Revolt in 1953. 


armed conflict, such as the Cold War generating into (a) the 

overthrow of the government of Fulgencio Balista, the 

American-supported Cuban dictator, by the communism 

inspired Fidel Castro; (b) the American invasion of the 

counter-demonstrators carrying US flags and banners like “Welcome traitors,” 

“Seek Therapy,” and “Is It Halloween already?” 

16 During its 1948 War of Independence, Israel drove hundreds of thousands of 

Palestinians from their homes into neighboring countries. 

50 



Dominican Republic in 1965; (c) the American invasion of 

Grenada in 1983; (d) the long and unsuccessful military effort 

to prevent communist North Vietnam from bringing South 

Vietnam under its rule. 


tension, such as the September 11 th attacks 

generating rising tide of anti-Muslim anger in Australia 17 . 


disturbance, such as the September 11 th attacks 

generating violent attacks amid a rising tide of anti-Muslim 

anger across North America 18 . 


armed conflict, such as the troublesome issue 

of the Palestinians refugees which generated armed conflicts 

between Palestinians and various Lebanese factions between 

1975-1990 in Lebanon. 


tension, such as the bombing campaign against 

Afghanistan in 2001, which generated protests in Pakistan, 

and Indonesia 19 . 

17 

See Stuart Millar, Violent Attacks on Arab Americans. Special Report: 

Terrorism in the US, The Guardian, September 14, 2001: “In Brisbane, Australia, 

a school bus packed with Muslim children was stoned.” 


See id: “In Montreal, Canada, a firebomb was thrown at a mosque.” 

19 

See Anti-US Protests Continue in Muslim Countries, The Guardian, October 

15, 2001: “Muslim leaders called for a general strike to coincide with a visit by 

the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, who is seeking to build support for 

Operation Enduring Freedom. In response, thousands of shopkeepers across the 

country closed their stores today to protest against their government’s support for 

the US-led military strikes against Afghanistan…Nearly every store was reported 

closed in the border city of Quetta, and the entire business district was shuttered 

in the southern town of Jacobabad, the site of yesterday’s large anti-American 

demonstrations near Shahbaz air base, currently being used by US military 

personnel…In Jacobabad, about 500 people who had been detained over the 

weekend were released this morning after police said they had promised to 

‘peaceful’.” 

51 




disturbance, such as the bombing campaign 

against Afghanistan in 2001, which generated bombs attacks 

in Yemen 20 . 


armed conflict, such as the bombing campaign 

against Afghanistan in 2001, which generated fighting 

between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria 21 . 

5. Applicability of the Law. 

5.1. Applicability of the Law to the Intra-Nationalization 

Approach. 

If intra-nationalization is stigmatized as legal it may need moral approval. 

No law may approve of intra-nationalizing international tensions or 

disturbances or armed conflicts. For it would be in violation of human 

rights norms: Intra-nationalization is intimately related to the wider 

“After a quiet weekend in the world’s most populous Muslim country, about 700 

anti-American protesters gathered outside the Indonesian parliament building in 

Jakarta (Indonesia) today. Police fired tear gas and water cannon into the crowd.” 

20 See id: “A bomb exploded today in a garbage container near Aden’s central 

post office, causing damage, witnesses said. Following the blast, police arrested 

two people after a chase and confiscated the vehicle, the witnesses said. 

Yesterday, another bomb exploded in a garbage container, this time during 

celebrations marking the beginning of the city’s 1967 revolt against British rule, 

witnesses said, adding that police had arrested at least six people in relation to the 

blast. Aden was the site of last year’s bombing of the USS Cole destroyer, which 

killed 17 sailors and injured 39. Osama bin Laden, whose family was originally 

from Yemen, is also accused of orchestrating the Cole attack.” 

21 See id: “A fourth day of fighting between Muslims and Christians erupted in 

the western Nigerian city of Kano today, after community leaders said 200 

protesters were killed over the weekend. The violence broke out on Friday in the 

wake of anti-America protests, and police have been ordered to shoot rioters on 

sight. The Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, today defended the use of 

police force against anyone found rioting in the town and said he was not 

concerned by reports that up to 200 people had been killed in the clashes.” 

52 



problem not only of the effective limitation of the liberty of States, but also 

and particularly of jeopardizing their national security. 

If intra-nationalization is deemed illegal it is hard to say at what point 

along the continuum of all the situations listed above it becomes as such. 

Intra-nationalization is closely linked to the problem of interference, and 

both intra-nationalization and interference amount to violations of states’ 

independence. However, where intra-nationalization is but illegal, 

interference may be either legal or illegal: A mere friendly advice to 

another state is legal interference, whereas a forcible interference or one 

that is backed by the threat of force is illegal. Tension and armed conflict 

are at opposite ends of the intra-nationalization spectrum. The intranationalized 

tension is necessarily less than forcible or backed by the threat 

of force, but more than mere friendly advice to the State in which the 

international tension is being intra-nationalized. Thus, intranationalization 

is not ‘legal interference’ on its face. It is not ‘illegal 

interference’ either. For international tension or disturbance or armed 

conflict lies at the root of intra-nationalization; this, however, does not 

hold true for interference. Also, intra-nationalization and interference are 

diametrically opposed; for interference may be deemed a method short of 

war for the settlement of disputes, which is not the case of intranationalization. 

5.2. Applicability of the Law to the Intra-nationalized 

International Conflict. 

The intra-nationalized international conflict could prove useful in 

applying (a) a continuum of legal system of protection in all situations 

of intra-nationalized international conflict, and (b) either a multi-legal 

system of protection, or one legal system of protection, in every 

situation thereof. 

a. Applicability of a continuum of legal system of protection in 

all situations of intra-nationalized international conflict. 

The intra-nationalized international conflict allows the application of a 

continuum of legal norms in all the situations of intra-nationalized 

conflict, from situations of international tension degenerating into non- 

53 



international tensions at one end of the spectrum all the way through to 

situations of international armed conflict degenerating into a noninternational 

armed conflict. 

Two principles govern the intra-nationalized international conflicts: 

i. The principle of non intra-nationalization: 

Every nation, as subject of international law, 

has a right to the respect of integrity, both 

territorial and juridical, and of the attributes inseparable 

from its national personality. 

Thus, intra-nationalizing legal and/or non-legal international unfriendly 

acts short of violence that may pose risk to intra-nationalizing situations 

of national tensions or disturbances or armed conflicts, are forbidden; 

intra-nationalizing international state torture, be it territorial such as acts 

of terrorism or sporadic attacks or moral such as propaganda campaigns, 

and degrading or inhuman international treatment are forbidden; intranationalizing 

international pressure by seizing or destroying property, 

holding territory or capturing of vessels is forbidden. 

ii. The principle of national security: 

Every nation, as a subject of international law, 

has the right to national security. 

Thus, conducting war-like operations even without the intention of 

making war or massing troops along international borders, which may 

intra-nationalize a sense of national insecurity are forbidden; intranationalizing 

legal and/or non-legal international unfriendly acts short 

of violence that may pose risk to intra-nationalizing reprisals and 

hostage-takings are forbidden. 

These principles protect the existence of a continuum of legal norms 

that may justify the extension of basic humanitarian rules to non-legal 

activities such as international and internal tensions. In every situation 

of intra-nationalized of international conflict, however, there should be a 

specific legal system of protection that should apply to every aspect of 

the intra-nationalized international conflict in question. 

54 



b. Applicability of a multi-legal system of protection, or one 

legal system of protection, in every situation involving an 

intra-nationalized international conflict. 

A multi-legal system of protection or one legal system of protection may 

clearly apply to every situation involving an intra-nationalized 

international conflict. The first situation of the intra-nationalized 

international conflict, namely, the international tension degenerating into 

non-international tension, may be subject to the application of the 

following laws: (i) international law may be applicable to the intranationalization 

per se, it being a violation of the sovereignty and security 

of the state; (ii) international law may be applicable to the international 

aspect of ‘the international tension degenerating into a non-international 

tension,’ i.e., the international tension, since it may be deemed, if of high 

intensity, as threat to peace within the provisions of Chapter VII of UN 

Charter, and (iii) basic international human rights provisions may be 

applicable to the non-international aspect of ‘the international tension 

degenerating into a non-international tension,’ i.e., the non-international 

tension, and which regulate issues of, inter alia, probable existence of 

maltreatment or inhumane conditions of detention; suspension of 

fundamental judicial guarantees, because of either the proclamation of a 

state of exception, or a de facto situation; allegations of disappearances. 

The second situation of the intra-nationalized international conflict, 

namely, the international tension degenerating into non-international 

disturbance, may be subject to the application of the following laws: (i) 

international law may be applicable to the intra-nationalization per se, it 

being a violation of the sovereignty and security of the state; (ii) 

international law may be applicable to the international aspect of ‘the 

international tension degenerating into a non-international disturbance’, 

since it may be deemed as threat to peace within the provisions of Chapter 

VII of UN Charter, and (iii) basic international human rights provisions 

may be applicable to the non-international aspect of ‘the international 

tension degenerating into a non-international disturbance,’ i.e., the noninternational 

disturbance, and which regulate issues of, inter alia, internal 

terrorist disturbance. 

55 



The third situation of the intra-nationalized international conflict, namely, 

the international tension degenerating into non-international armed 

conflict, may be subject to the application of the following laws: (i) 




international tension degenerating into a non-international disturbance,’ 

i.e., the international tension, since it may be deemed as threat to peace 

within the provisions of Chapter VII of UN Charter, and (iii) Common 

Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions may be applicable to the noninternational 

aspect of the ‘international tension degenerating into noninternational 

armed conflict, i.e., the non-international armed conflict. 

The fourth situation of the intra-nationalized international conflict, namely, 

the international disturbance degenerating into non-international tension, 

may be subject to the application of the following laws: (i) international 

law may be applicable to the intra-nationalization per se, it being a 

violation of the sovereignty and security of the state; (ii) international law 

may be applicable to the international aspect of ‘the international 

disturbance degenerating into non-international tension,’ i.e., the 

international disturbance, since it may be deemed as threat to peace within 

the provisions of Chapter VII of UN Charter, and (iii) basic international 

human rights provisions may be applicable to the non-international aspect 

of ‘the international disturbance degenerating into a non-international 

tension,’ i.e., the non-international tension, and which regulate issues of, 

inter alia, probable existence of maltreatment or inhumane conditions of 

detention; suspension of fundamental judicial guarantees, because of 

either the proclamation of a state of exception, or a de facto situation, 

and allegations of disappearances. 

The fifth situation of the intra-nationalized international conflict, namely, 

the international disturbance degenerating into non-international 

disturbance, may be subject to the application of the following laws: (i) 




international disturbance degenerating into non-international disturbance,’ 

i.e., the international disturbance, since it may be deemed as threat to 

56 



peace within the provisions of Chapter VII of UN Charter, and (iii) basic 

international human rights provisions may be applicable to the noninternational 

aspect of ‘the international disturbance degenerating into a 

non-international disturbance,’ i.e., the non-international disturbance, and 

which regulate issues of, inter alia, internal terrorist disturbance. 

The sixth situation of the intra-nationalized international conflict, namely, 

the international disturbance degenerating into non-international armed 





international disturbance degenerating into a non-international armed 

conflict’, since it may be deemed as threat to peace within the provisions 

of Chapter VII of UN Charter, and (iii) Common Article 3 to the 1949 

Geneva Conventions may be applicable to the non-international aspect of 

the ‘international tension degenerating into non-international armed 

conflict, i.e., the non-international armed conflict. 

The seventh situation of the intra-nationalized international conflict, 

namely, the international armed conflict degenerating into noninternational 

tension, may be subject to the application of the following 

laws: (i) international law may be applicable to the intra-nationalization 

per se, it being a violation the sovereignty and security of the state; (ii) 

with regard to the international aspect of the ‘international armed conflict 

degenerating into non-international tension,’ i.e., the international armed 

conflict, international humanitarian law may be applicable, within the 

meaning of Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions in cases 

of declared war or of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 

Contracting Party, and within the meaning of article 1(4) of Protocol I of 

1977, in cases of people fighting against colonial domination and alien 

occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of 

self-determination, and (iii) basic international human rights provisions 

may be applicable to the non-international aspect of ‘the international 

armed conflict degenerating into a non-international tension,’ i.e., the noninternational 

tension, and which regulate issues of, inter alia, probable 

existence of maltreatment or inhumane conditions of detention; 

suspension of fundamental judicial guarantees, because of either the 

57 



proclamation of a state of exception, or a de facto situation, and 

allegations of disappearances. 

The eighth situation of the intra-nationalized international conflict, 

namely, the international armed conflict degenerating into noninternational 

disturbance, may be subject to the application of the 

following laws: (i) international law may be applicable to the intranationalization 

per se, it being a violation the sovereignty and security of 

the state; (ii) with regard to the international aspect of the ‘international 

armed conflict degenerating into non-international disturbance,’ i.e., the 

international armed conflict, international humanitarian law may be 

applicable, within the meaning of Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva 

Conventions in cases of declared war or of partial or total occupation of 

the territory of a High Contracting Party, and within the meaning of article 

1(4) of Protocol I of 1977, in cases of people fighting against colonial 

domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the 

exercise of their right of self-determination, and (iii) basic international 

human rights provisions may be applicable to the non-international aspect 

of ‘the international armed conflict degenerating into a non-international 

disturbance,’ i.e., the non-international disturbance, and which regulate 

issues of, inter alia, internal terrorist disturbance. 

The ninth situation of the intra-nationalized international conflict, namely, 

the international armed conflict degenerating into non-international armed 



being a violation the sovereignty and security of the state; (ii) with regard 

to the international aspect of the ‘international armed conflict degenerating 

into non-international armed conflict,’ i.e., the international armed conflict, 

international humanitarian law may be applicable, within the meaning of 

Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions in cases of declared 

war or of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting 

Party, and within the meaning of article 1(4) of Protocol I of 1977, in cases 

of people fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 

against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, 

and (iii) Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions may be 

applicable to the non-international aspect of the ‘international tension 

58 



degenerating into non-international armed conflict, i.e., the noninternational 

armed conflict. 

Conclusion: 

The intra-nationalized international conflict is an umbrella term for a 

variety of different legal and non-legal conflicts, thus brightening up 

shady activities, and shadowy political dimensions. The fact that nonlegal 

activities, such as international tension which does not fall 

formally within the provisions of humanitarian norms, degenerate into 

legal or illegal activities, makes it imperative to contain non-legal 

activities by applying to them humanitarian norms even though they do 

no fall formally within the circumstances of application set out therein, 

such as extending to internal tension the provisions of Common Article 

3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Because international non-legal 

activities may degenerate easily into non-international illegal activities 

and thus adversely degenerate further into non-international 

disturbances and armed conflicts. 

This is why it is difficult to understand that what is being labeled as 

internationalization of non-international conflicts is actually the effect 

of intra-nationalization of international conflicts. For example, 

throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union 

avoided direct confrontation in the world, and engaged in foreign 

policies or combat operations only to expand communism rule or to 

contain expansion of communism rule, i.e., to keep allies from defecting 

to the other side or to overthrow them after they had done so. Thus the 

Soviet Union sent troops to preserve communist rule in East Germany 

(1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan 

(1979). For its part, the United States helped overthrow a left-wing 

government in Guatemala (1954), supported an unsuccessful invasion of 

Cuba (1961), invaded the Dominican Republic (1965) and Grenada 

(1983), and undertook a long (1964-1975) and unsuccessful effort to 

prevent communist North Vietnam from bringing South Vietnam under 

its rule. 

It is out of context to understand these conflicts as essentially noninternational 

conflicts then internationalized by the intervention of the 

United States and the Soviet Union. For they were intra-nationalization 

59 



of the East-West mounting tensions. Thus, what has being stigmatized 

as internationalization has actually been a further development of intranationalizing 

international conflicts. Considering them as 

internationalized can indeed throw out of the law non-legal activities 

which influence the generation of non-international conflicts. 

60 



INTRODUCTION A LA ‘CRÉOLOGIE 

CRIMINELLE’ 

BY DR. ANWAR FRANGI* 

Maître de Conférences-Chercheur (Usek) 

TABLE DES MATIERES 

I. L’OBJET DE LA CRÉOLOGIE CRIMINELLE 

A. LES THÉORIES « NON-STRUCTURELLES » DU 

CRIME 

1. Formulation des théories « non-structurelles » du crime 

a) La théorie du crime selon « ce qu’il est » 

b) La théorie du crime selon « ce qu’il exprime » 

2. Problèmes posés par les théories « non-structurelles » du 

crime 

a) Le problème de l’antériorité 

b) Le problème de la détermination 

B. LA THÉORIE «STRUCTURELLE » OU 

« CRÉOLOGIQUE» DU CRIME 

1. La théorie créologique du crime prise en soi 

2. La théorie créologique du crime prise en relation avec les 

autres théories criminologiques précédentes 

II. LA NÉCESSITÉ DE LA CRÉOLOGIE CRIMINELLE 

A. LA NÉCESSITÉ INTER SE DE LA CRÉOLOGIE 

CRIMINELLE 

1. La nécessité Inter Se de la créologie criminelle dans l’ordre 

historique 

2. La nécessité Inter Se de la créologie criminelle dans l’ordre 

logique 

B. LA NÉCESSITÉ IN SE DE LA CRÉOLOGIE 

CRIMINELLE 

1. La nécessité In Se essentielle de la créologie criminelle 

2. La nécessité In Se formelle de la créologie criminelle 

61 

DR. ANWAR FRANGI – INTRODUCTION À LA CRÉOLOGIE CRIMINELLE


Toute science humaine ou exacte suppose un objet spécifique qui 

justifie sa création. Elle suppose aussi être nécessaire par rapport aux 

autres sciences, prête à affronter et résoudre les problèmes qu’elle pose 

ou ceux que les autres sciences soulèvent. L’on ne saurait ainsi évoquer 

la créologie criminelle comme science criminologique nouvelle sans 

que ces deux conditions soient remplies. Nous étudions donc dans ce 

qui suit, tout d’abord l’objet de la créologie criminelle (section I) et 

ensuite, sa nécessité (section II). 

I. L’OBJET DE LA CREOLOGIE CRIMINELLE 

Il existe deux théories générales relatives à l’étude criminologique du 

crime : une première théorie qui étudie le crime en tant que phénomène 

juridique, le considérant ou bien ‘dans’ ou bien ‘hors’ de son contexte 

humain et social ; et une seconde théorie qui étudie le crime en tant que 

phénomène ‘conventionnel’ ou ‘naturel’, par référence aux sentiments 

provoqués dans la société par l’acte ainsi qualifié. Ce sont les théories 

dites ‘non-structurelles’, qui étudient le crime en dehors de sa 

constitution. 

Il existe une troisième théorie générale relative à l’étude criminologique 

du crime. C’est la théorie ‘créologique’, qui étudie le crime dans sa 

constitution même. 

* LL.M. 1995, Faculté de Droit de l’Université Harvard (Massachusetts, 

USA); LL.M. 1992, Faculté de Droit de l’Université Américaine 

(Washington, D.C.); Doctorat en droit (nouveau régime) 1986, Faculté de 

Droit de l’Université de Poitiers (France); D.E.A. 1983, Faculté de Droit de 

l’Université de Poitiers (France); Licence de droit 1982, Faculté de Droit de 

l’Université libanaise (Liban). Dr Frangi est Maître de Conférences- 

Chercheur à l’Université Saint-Esprit de Kaslik (Liban), et professeur de 

droit international et de philosophie de droit à l’Institut supérieur pour 

l’étude du droit de l’Université La Sagesse (Liban). Le présent article forme, 

en substance, l’introduction de sa thèse de doctorat intitulée La création 

comme facteur criminogène : introduction à la ‘créologie criminelle’, soutenue 

le 2 juillet 1986 à la Faculté de Droit de l’Université de Poitiers. Il avait 

originairement formé le sujet-matière de son mémoire intitulé Introduction à 

la créologie criminelle, soutenu au mois d’octobre 1983, à la Faculté de Droit 

de l’Université de Poitiers, en vue de l’obtention du Diplôme d’Etudes 

Approfondies en Droit pénal. 

62 



A. LES THEORIES NON-STRUTURELLES DU CRIME 

1. LA FORMULATION DES THEORIES NON- 

STRUCTURELLES DU CRIME 

Selon les théories non-structurelles, le crime est appréhendé dans deux 

sens : il est ou bien ‘ce qu’il est’ ou bien ‘ce qu’il exprime’ ; l’une et 

l’autre acception dépendant respectivement de la manière dont il est 

considéré ou expliqué. 

a) LA THEORIE DU CRIME SELON ‘CE QU’IL EST’ 

En tant « qu’il est », le crime est conçu ou bien comme une 

‘entité légale’, ou bien comme une ‘entité réelle’. 

i. LE CRIME SELON ‘CE QU’IL EST 

JURIDIQUEMENT’ 

Juridiquement, le crime est une entité purement formelle, ce qu’il 

recouvre étant uniquement soumis à une description juridique 

spécifique. Ainsi, l’homicide est un acte dont l’existence est attribué 

non pas à l’homme lui-même, cette existence n’étant en rien d’ailleurs 

différente de celle d’autres actes, mais à l’acte juridique, qui lui a 

permis d’être différente de l’existence d’autres actes. (v. Carrara cité par 

J. Pinatel, La définition criminologique du crime, le caractère 

scientifique de la criminologie, RSC, 1957, p. 194 ; D. Szabo, 

Criminologie, p. 34-35 ; E. Yamarellos et G. Kellens, Crime et 

criminologie, p. 129). 

Au départ, c’est avec l’acte juridique qu’une distinction de fait 

commence, et par conséquent, qu’une étiquette d’anormalité ou de 

normalité s’attache sur l’existence de tel ou tel acte commis. Mais en 

distinguant les faits, l’acte juridique crée désormais une nouvelle façon 

d’aborder la réalité humaine ; car après la promulgation de la loi, l’acte 

humain devenant crime, acquiert une réalité nouvelle, étant attribué 

chaque fois qu’il est commis à ce qu’il est devenu, et non pas à ce qu’il 

était avant la promulgation de la loi. 

63 



Le crime donc, selon la théorie juridique, est conçu comme une entité 

absolument relative, tout d’abord, à l’acte juridique, et par suite, à la 

réalité. Juridiquement, il l’est car d’une part, le crime est défini par 

l’acte juridique en ce qu’il ne peut y avoir de crime sans une législation 

(au sens large du terme); et car d’autre part, il est pris invariablement 

pour ses conséquences envisagées à l’avance par l’acte juridique. C’est 

ce à quoi amène effectivement l’acte qui détermine la nature de celui-ci, 

et non pas celui qui l’a amené à exister (l’homme). Et c’est 

l’accomplissement du crime qui qualifie juridiquement l’offenseur, 

celui-ci étant envisagé comme un être abstrait, pris uniquement selon 

son acte perpétré. 

Ensuite, réellement, il l’est car l’acte juridique imprime une telle 

influence dans la société qu’un tel acte humain qualifié 

crime juridiquement le sera tout de même réellement. L’acte juridique 

change l’ordre des actes humains ; on ne dira plus, par exemple, que 

l’homicide en tant qu’acte juridique, ressemble à l’homicide en tant 

qu’acte humain, mais que, tout au contraire, l’homicide en tant qu’acte 

humain, ressemble à l’homicide en tant qu’acte juridique. 

Mais, s’il en est ainsi, la notion de crime selon la théorie juridique 

résisterait à toute connaissance scientifique. Tout d’abord, la notion du 

« crime juridique » est variable à l’intérieur d’une législation donnée et 

à une époque donnée, tel fait étant ou non incriminé selon les 

circonstances. Ensuite, la notion de « crime juridique » est variable dans 

le temps et dans l’espace. Ainsi, des faits incriminés jadis ne le sont 

plus aujourd’hui, et des faits incriminés par une législation dans tel État 

ne le sont pas par une autre législation dans d’autres États. La variabilité 

de la réaction sociale face à l’avortement, par exemple, prouve que 

celui-ci possède une entité indépendante de celle que l’acte juridique lui 

a fournie. Car si l’avortement est qualifié de « crime » en fonction de 

l’évolution de la réaction sociale, cela prouve justement que 

l’avortement ne couvre pas une réalité « mystique », mais plutôt une 

réalité sociale, détachée de toute loi formelle. 

C’est ainsi qu’il paraît intéressant pour d’autres chercheurs 

criminologues d’envisager la réalité humaine et sociale que l’acte 

juridique couvre. 

64 



ii. LE CRIME SELON « CE QU’ IL EST 

REELLEMENT » 

Selon la « théorie réelle » du crime, l’acte juridique apparaît comme un 

aspect du phénomène criminel. La nature de l’homme et les conditions 

sociales déterminent la perpétration du crime, non pas l’acte juridique. 

Si, en effet, le crime est une notion juridique, il n’en reste pas moins que 

le concept légal recouvre une réalité humaine et sociale qui, en tant que 

phénomène, est antérieure à l’acte juridique et le motive. Et une bonne 

connaissance du « droit » exige une connaissance bien poussée du 

« fait ». Il n’est pas rationnel, par exemple, de réprimer le proxénétisme 

sans avoir connaissance du monde de la prostitution. Et le suicide, 

l’avortement, sont des matières sur lesquelles se base tout choix 

juridique. (v. J. Pinatel, op. cit., p. 194). 

D’un autre côté, le phénomène humain et social devient non plus une 

entité fondue dans celle de l’acte juridique, mais une entité qui 

intervient invariablement dans l’accomplissement du crime. Ainsi, 

l’homme peut présenter des anomalies biologiques qui déterminent son 

penchant au crime 1 ; et il ne peut être détaché de son milieu qui oriente 

la formation de sa « personnalité criminelle ». 2 

1 Cesare Lombroso (1836-1909), le « père » de la criminologie, est connu 

notamment pour sa notion du criminel atavique. Le « criminel-né », comme l’a 

nommé plus tard Enrico Ferri, serait une résurgence de l’homme primitif, une 

espèce de Néanderthal attardé, « un homme anormal avant sa naissance ». Dans 

son livre intitulé « l’Uomo Delinquente » (1876), Lombroso dit que ce criminel 

peut être reconnu d’après des anomalies anatomiques (une capacité réduite du 

crâne, arcades sourcilières proéminentes, front fuyant, oreilles écartées…), des 

anomalies physiologiques (daltonisme, insensibilité à la douleur…), et des 

anomalies caractériels (égoïsme, frivolité…). 

Voulant apaiser les critiques, surtout adressées par Ferri, Lombroso tempère sa 

théorie. A la notion du « criminel-né », il ajoute les notions de « criminel par 

passion », de « criminel fou », de « criminel occasionnel » et de « criminel par 

habitude ». Discutant ces notions, Lombroso reconnaît la part que le 

conditionnement social peut jouer dans l’accomplissement du crime. 

Lombroso a même considéré que le « criminel-né » peut toujours éviter la 

65 



courbure de sa destinée criminelle si le milieu social où il s’est développé n’est 

pas favorable au crime. 

Une variante de la recherche de Lombroso, entamée par Ernst Kretschmer 

(1921) et William Sheldon (1940), est l’investigation portant sur la relation 

entre la criminalité et la forme du corps. Cette recherche apparaît plus 

scientifique que celle menée par Lombroso. Alors que celui-ci n’avait 

considéré que les délinquants, Kretschmer et Sheldon ont comparé délinquants 

et non-délinquants. Ils ont, tout d’abord, classé les individus en fonction de leur 

forme anatomique, soit 4 catégories : (1) les pycniques (trapus, aux formes 

arrondies) ; (2) les dysplastiques (moins larges, bras mince, présentant un 

déséquilibre glandulaire) ; (3) les leptosomes (maigres, anguleux) ; et (4) les 

athlétomorphes (épaules larges, de type sportif). Ensuite, ils ont étudié ces 

individus en fonction de leur caractère. Ils ont montré, par exemple, que les 

pycniques sont des cyclothymiques, alternant l’excitation et la dépression, ou 

que les leptosomes sont des schizoïdes ou introvertis, etc. Enfin, en appliquant 

ces investigations aux délinquants, ils ont trouvé que (i) les pycniques, souvent 

sans récidive, commettent habituellement des attentats contre les biens ; (ii) les 

dysplastiques commettent souvent des infractions sexuelles ; (iii) les 

leptosomes sont souvent des voleurs agressifs, escrocs et récidivistes ; et (iv) 

les athlétomorphes commettent souvent des meurtres et des incendies. 

Autres recherches se sont alignées dans l’étude positiviste de Lombroso. 

Celle portant sur les anomalies chromosomiques retient le plus d’attention. 

Cette théorie essaie d’établir une corrélation entre le supplément Y dans le 

gonosome et la criminalité. Normalement, chaque cellule contient 46 

chromosomes, dont 2 gonosomes ou chromosomes sexuels (XY chez l’homme, 

XX chez la femme). Cependant, dans des rares cas, un chromosome peut être 

absent, ou il pourrait y avoir des chromosomes suppléments. Par exemple, la 

combinaison XXY se produit 1.3 par mille chez des bébés masculins, et celle 

XYY 1.0 par mille. Autres combinaisons, plus rares, se produisent encore 

comme par exemple, XYYY, XXYY et XXXYY. 

Dans une investigation menée par le groupe Price et al. en Ecosse, on a 

observé que les patients portant un supplément Y avaient une tendance (1) 

d’être des psychopathes ; (2) d’être condamnés à un âge plus tendre que 

d’autres psychopathes, et (3) de commettre plus de crime contre les biens que 

de crime contre la personne. 

La théorie des « aberrations chromosomiques » est intéressante, en ce sens 

qu’elle prétend pouvoir fonder la base génétique pour une disposition 

criminelle particulière. Cette théorie apparaît cependant insuffisante. Tout 

d’abord, elle n’essaie pas d’aborder une explication pouvant indiquer 

« comment » la différence génétique peut être traduite en une différence de 

66 



C’est ainsi que la « théorie réelle » du crime croit résoudre le problème 

de la variation de la notion du crime dans le temps et dans l’espace, en 

insistant sur le « déterminisme ». Chaque homme qui présente des 

anomalies biologiques particulières (le criminel-né de Lombroso, les 

types de délinquants de Kretchmer et de Sheldon), ou qui vit dans un 

milieu criminogène, est voué à commettre un crime ; et ce, par rapport à 

n’importe quelle législation et à n’importe quelle époque donnée. 

Mais s’il en est ainsi, le crime en tant qu’un phénomène humain et 

social résisterait à toute connaissance scientifique. 

Il est sûr que la « nature » peut prédisposer à devenir délinquant 

l’homme qui présente une personnalité asociale; mais il est certain 

qu’elle ne peut déterminer son passage à l’acte délictueux. Les 

recherches scientifiques contemporaines affirment que les aberrations 

chromosomiques ne peuvent déterminer qu’une orientation seulement 

« possible », favorable à la genèse du crime. Un supplément de 

chromosome dans le gonosome (XYY) ne détermine pas la formation 

d’une « personnalité criminelle », mais au plus l’agressivité qui peut 

contribuer, au côté d’autres composantes, à influencer le passage à 

l’acte délictueux. (v. J. Léauté, Criminologie et pénologie, Les Cours 

de Droit (1981), pp. 282-293 ; Criminologie et science pénitentiaire, pp. 

453-457). 

Ensuite, il est reconnu aujourd’hui qu’il ne faut plus rechercher la 

connaissance du crime dans l’homme « pathologique ». Car 

comportement. Ensuite, la théorie est très étroite en ce sens que son explication 

porte sur une proportion minuscule de la population générale et délinquante. 

2 

Depuis Enrico Ferri (1856-1929), l’importance du milieu social dans la 

genèse du crime ne peut être ignorée. A la fin du 19 

67 

e siècle, Ferri disait que « le 

niveau de la criminalité est déterminé, chaque année, par les différentes 

conditions du milieu physique et social combinées avec les tendances 

héréditaires et les impulsions occasionnelles des individus ». Plusieurs enquêtes 

menées aux Etats-Unis ont confirmé les corrélations entre criminalité et milieu. 

Ainsi, une comparaison de 500 délinquants et de 500 non-délinquants a montré 

que 35% des délinquants contre 5% des non-délinquants avaient manqué 

d’affection maternelle (V. J. Pradel, Droit pénal général, éditions Cujas : Paris, 

1986, p. 47-48) . 



l’accomplissement du crime, dans ce cas, est certainement une 

expression, parmi d’autres, de la personnalité pathologique de l’homme 

offenseur. La connaissance du crime doit être recherchée plutôt dans les 

perturbations psychiques qui sont considérées comme moins 

pathologiques qu’acquises ou « normales ». 3 C’est seulement à l’aide de 

cette recherche que nous pouvons reconnaître l’intérieur de l’homme 

criminel qui, loin d’être une « variété de l’espèce humaine », est 

« pourvu des mêmes idées, des mêmes sentiments que tout autre 

3 

Parmi les criminels qui présentent des « troubles psychiques », ceux atteints 

d’une maladie mentale dite « grave » (comme la psychose) ne sont pas tenus 

normalement responsables de leurs actes. Ils bénéficient d’un non lieu ou d’un 

acquittement. En revanche, les criminels atteints d’une maladie « moins 

grave » (comme la névrose) sont normalement tenus responsables de leurs 

actes, mais bénéficient toutefois des circonstances atténuantes, donc de la 

réduction de la peine, ou d’un traitement tendant à l’amélioration de leur état 

mental, à leur rééducation morale et à leur réadaptation sociale. 

Les délinquants dits « pathologiques », dont la maladie entraîne souvent leur 

irresponsabilité pénale, présentent des troubles psychiques ou neuropsychiques 

ayant aboli le discernement ou le contrôle de leurs actes. Ces troubles peuvent 

consister en une « maladie de l’intelligence » (crétinisme, idiotie, imbécillité), 

ou en une psychose paranoïde ou une schizophrénie, ou encore en crises 

d’épilepsie. Pour entraîner l’irresponsabilité pénale, un lien doit exister entre 

l’aliénation mentale (consistant en un trouble psychique « grave ») et 

l’infraction commise (par ex., le cas de « l’homicide volontaire » provoqué par 

la manie de la persécution). 

Les délinquants dits « normaux », dont la maladie entraîne souvent leur 

responsabilité pénale, sont ceux qui présentent moins des maladies perturbant 

le développement de leur intelligence ou leurs facultés de raisonnement, que 

des maladies perturbant leur « volonté » ; comme, par exemple, la 

psychasténie, la neurasthénie, l’hystérie, la kleptomanie (manie du vol), la 

pyromanie (manie du feu). Normalement, les troubles de la volonté entraînent 

des « circonstances atténuantes », donc abaissant la peine, lorsqu’un lien causal 

est établi entre la maladie et l’infraction commise (par ex., le cas du « vol » 

commis par le kleptomane). 

Toutefois, la distinction entre les maladies de l’intelligence, et celles de la 

volonté, est difficile à faire. On a du mal, en effet, à considérer des impulsions 

irrésistibles pouvant entraîner le « malade » à commettre des infractions 

particulières, sans considérer parallèlement un mal entraînant un dérèglement 

de son être psychique perturbant ses facultés de raisonnement. 

68 



homme », toutefois en exagération par rapport à celui-ci. (v. E. Ferri, 

Sociologie criminelle, p.42 ; J. Pinatel, « La théorie de la personnalité 

criminelle », in Traité de Droit Pénal et de Droit Pénal, T.III, p.473 ; E. 

de Greeff, « La criminogenèse », rapport général au 1 er C.I.C., Actes, 

T.VI, p. 277). 

Aussi, l’explication du crime par le milieu social apparaît insuffisante. 

Deux individus qui présentent les mêmes aberrations chromosomiques, 

et qui vivent dans le même milieu criminogène, ne sont pas pour autant 

des criminels l’un et l’autre. 

Montrant que le crime selon « ce qu’il est », juridiquement ou 

réellement, contribue peu à connaître le crime, d’autres chercheurs 

criminologues proposent d’envisager plutôt un « crime absolu », qui 

résisterait au changement de l’espace-temps. (v. R. Garofalo, 

Criminologie, « Étude sur la nature du crime et la théorie de la 

pénalité », pp. 1-52). En effet, ces chercheurs prétendent que le 

problème posé par la théorie de « ce que le crime est », est mal posé. Il 

ne s’agit pas de rechercher si certains actes qualifiés « crimes » à une 

époque déterminée, ont toujours été comme tels dans le temps et dans 

l’espace. Il faut précisément analyser les sentiments provoqués dans la 

société par les actes ainsi qualifiés. Pour ce faire, ces chercheurs 

proposent de remplacer l’étude portant sur « ce que le crime est » par 

celle plus pratique portant sur « ce que le crime exprime ». 

a) LA THEORIE DU CRIME SELON « CE QU’ IL 

EXPRIME » 

En tant « qu’il exprime », le crime peut se prendre de deux acceptions : 

ou bien ce qu’il exprime est l’effet d’une « convention », ou bien l’effet 

de la « nature ». 

i. LE DELIT CONVENTIONNEL 

Selon Garofalo, le « délit conventionnel » est tout acte violant des 

sentiments évolutifs et contingents, tels que l’amour de la patrie, le 

69 



sentiment religieux, la chasteté. Le « délit conventionnel » exprime 

donc tout ce qu’une communauté a entrevu en tant que possibilité de 

répression ; et ce, par référence aux sentiments provoqués dans cette 

communauté par l’acte ainsi qualifié. 

La théorie du « délit conventionnel » se distingue de la théorie juridique 

du crime. Tout d’abord, contrairement à celle-ci qui prend le crime hors 

de son contexte humain et social, la théorie du « délit conventionnel » le 

prend dans son contexte social, le délit étant ainsi qualifié par référence 

aux sentiments évolutifs qu’il provoque dans la société. Ensuite, alors 

que la variation de la notion de crime dans le temps et dans l’espace 

n’est pas compréhensible par référence à la théorie juridique, elle 

devient compréhensible par référence à la théorie du « délit 

conventionnel ». Et la notion de crime change dans le temps et dans 

l’espace parce que les sentiments provoqués par l’acte ainsi qualifié sont 

eux-mêmes évolutifs et contingents. 

La théorie du « délit conventionnel » se distingue également de la 

théorie réelle du crime. Contrairement à celle-ci qui prend le crime 

juridique dans son contexte humain et social et qui cherche à prouver 

qu’une anomalie biologique ou un milieu criminogène peut déterminer 

l’accomplissement de l’acte ainsi qualifié, la théorie du « délit 

conventionnel » prend le crime dans son contexte social, cherchant à 

prouver que l’acte est ainsi qualifié parce qu’il provoque dans la société 

des sentiments évolutifs particuliers. 

ii. LE DELIT NATUREL 

En revanche, le « délit naturel » exprime toute violation des 

« sentiments altruistes fondamentaux, c’est-à-dire, la pitié et la 

probité », que l’on trouve dans tout groupe social. 

Il ne s’agit pas donc, de rechercher si un acte normalement pris pour un 

crime, l’est ou ne l’est pas effectivement, ni de rassembler les « faits 

universellement haïs ». Il s’agit plutôt de voir les « sentiments blessés » 

par cet acte, « non pas la partie supérieure et la plus délicate de ces 

sentiments, mais la mesure moyenne dans laquelle ils sont procédés par 

70 



une communauté et qui est indispensable pour l’adaptation de l’individu 

à la société ». (Garofalo, ibid., pp. 38-39). 

Ainsi, l’acte nuisible n’est plus considéré comme tel à cause de la loi 

mais à cause des « sentiments rudimentaires » blessés, ceux-ci seuls 

pouvant déterminer ce qui serait ou ne serait pas naturellement un 

crime. 

Cependant, il faut préciser la notion de « sentiment altruiste 

fondamental ». Il faut donc voir si Garofalo tout en proposant d’analyser 

les « sentiments altruistes fondamentaux » violés par le crime, n’établit 

pas par là, une « loi » qui prendrait une autre forme que la loi juridique. 

Et il faut voir d’ailleurs, si la définition des « sentiments altruistes 

fondamentaux » reviendrait exclusivement à la « pitié » et la « probité ». 

Car, il n’est pas évident que la pitié et la probité constituent à elles 

seules, les « sentiments altruistes fondamentaux ». D’autres sentiments 

relatifs à l’honneur, par exemple, ou à la pudeur, ou à la religion, 

peuvent aussi être attribués à la définition de ces « sentiments ». 

Ensuite, on peut se demander si les sentiments collectifs violés par le 

crime sont toujours les mêmes dans les différentes sociétés, et cela 

malgré la variation de la notion de l’acte ainsi qualifié. Car la question 

de l’avortement ou de la prostitution prouve qu’ils ne sont pas 

considérés par toute l’espèce humaine comme des « cruautés inutiles à 

la communauté », même s’ils l’étaient à une époque déterminée. 

Enfin, il faut se poser la question de savoir s’il est possible que d’autres 

délits, non attribués à la définition du « délit naturel », peuvent quand 

même exister par eux-mêmes. Car autres délits, relatifs à la politique, 

par exemple, ou à la presse, ne peuvent pas être constitués ni par la 

« pitié », ni par la « probité », ni par aucun autre sentiment, si tant est 

que Garofalo aurait accepté de ranger à côté de ceux-ci, l’honneur, la 

religion, ou la pudeur, etc. (v. J. Constant, Eléments de criminologie, pp. 

46-48). 

Ainsi, la théorie réelle du crime paraît insuffisante pour la connaissance 

du crime, et la théorie juridique de plus en plus irremplaçable. 

71 



1. PROBLEMES POSES PAR LES THEORIES 

« NON-STRUCTURELLES » DU CRIME 

Nous constatons de ce qui précède, que l’acte criminel a été pris en 

dehors de sa « constitution », en rapport avec « l’acte juridique », 

« l’homme », le « milieu social » ou les « sentiments violés ». 

Considérant le crime en dehors de sa « constitution », les chercheurs 

criminologues ont voulu montrer que le crime est « absolument relatif » 

ou bien à « l’acte juridique » (la théorie juridique du crime), ou bien à 

« l’homme » ou au « milieu social » (la théorie réelle du crime), ou bien 

aux « sentiments violés » (la théorie de Garofalo). Ainsi, selon la théorie 

juridique, un acte criminel qualifie juridiquement l’offenseur par le fait 

même qu’il est accompli. De même, selon la théorie réelle, des 

anomalies biologiques ou un milieu criminogène qualifient 

juridiquement l’offenseur, puisqu’ils déterminent l’accomplissement du 

crime. De plus, selon la théorie de Garofalo, un acte blessant les 

sentiments de pitié et de probité qualifie l’offenseur comme criminel par 

le fait même que cet acte est commis. (v. supra, « le délit naturel »). 

En voulant établir que le crime est un phénomène « déterminé », pour 

prouver que le crime peut être connu scientifiquement, les théories 

« non-structurelles » du crime sont prises dans un dilemme dont il faut 

sortir. Car l’expérience prouve, au contraire, que le crime est un 

phénomène « indéterminé ». L’homme qui commet un crime n’est plus 

« nécessairement » juridiquement qualifié « criminel » ; et l’homme qui 

présente des anomalies biologiques, ou qui évolue dans un milieu 

criminogène, n’est plus, non plus, nécessairement voué à 

l’accomplissement du crime. De même qu’un acte blessant les 

sentiments altruistes fondamentaux ne qualifie pas nécessairement son 

offenseur de « criminel ». (ibid.). 

Les théories « non-structurelles » du crime posent en général deux types 

de problèmes auxquels la « théorie créologique » apportera une 

solution : 

(1) le problème de l’antériorité et 

(2) le problème de la détermination. 

72 



a) LE PROBLEME DE L’ANTERIORITE 

Au commencement, c’est l’entité juridique du crime qui a été 

envisagée ; ainsi la réalité humaine et sociale du crime se posait comme 

« absolument relative » à l’acte juridique. Dans un second temps, c’est 

l’entité humaine et sociale du crime qui a été envisagée ; ainsi l’entité 

juridique du crime se posait comme « absolument relative » au 

phénomène humain et social. 

Le problème de l’antériorité pose des difficultés au chercheur 

criminologue car si le phénomène humain et social est pris comme 

« absolument relatif » à l’acte juridique, le crime apparaît alors comme 

une entité purement formelle, et le phénomène humain et social que 

couvre le crime, ne serait qu’une réalité purement définie, donc 

inexistante en soi (v. supra., « le crime selon ce qu’il est 

juridiquement ») ; et ce qui est considéré comme postérieur, apparaît en 

effet comme une entité antérieure à l’acte juridique, et le motive. 

Et si le phénomène humain et social que le crime couvre, est antérieur à 

l’acte juridique qui ne fait que le proclamer comme crime, nous 

retombons dans le même problème qu’a soulevé l’antériorité du crime 

juridique. Car il faudra alors définir les critères sur lesquels se base la 

qualification comme crime d’un phénomène social, plutôt qu’un autre. 

(voir également les problèmes engendrés par le « délit naturel »). 

Le problème de l’antériorité, ainsi souvent soulevé par les chercheurs 

criminologues, est en effet mal posé. 

Le concept « d’antériorité » évoque nécessairement celui du temps ; 

concevoir un objet dans le temps c’est l’envisager antérieurement ou 

postérieurement par référence à un autre objet. Concevoir le crime 

comme une entité juridique, implique nécessairement sa variabilité, et 

en conséquence, sa relation avec l’entité sociale qu’elle couvre, puisque 

le changement de la qualification du crime apparaît en fonction de 

l’évolution sociale. De même, concevoir le crime comme une entité 

humaine et sociale implique nécessairement sa variabilité et, en 

conséquence, sa relation avec l’entité juridique qui la couvre, puisque 

73 



c’est l’acte juridique qui qualifie cette entité, et qui change en fonction 

de l’Etat. 

C’est ainsi que d’autres chercheurs criminologues ont essayé de 

résoudre le « problème de l’antériorité » du crime d’une autre façon, en 

prouvant que l’entité juridique du crime est en « concordance » avec son 

entité humaine et sociale. En effet, la « théorie juridique » du crime 

« détermine » l’aspect criminel de l’acte dans ses « conséquences », car 

tout homme est « criminel » si son acte « concorde » avec la 

qualification juridique que lui impose la loi (ce raisonnement s’applique 

également, par analogie, à la théorie de Garofalo). Et la « théorie 

réelle » du crime « détermine » l’aspect criminel de l’acte dans l’homme 

ou le milieu social, car tout homme est « criminel » si son acte 

« concorde » avec la qualification psychologique, biologique, ou 

sociale, que lui impose son statut psychique, ou constitutionnel (v. la 

théorie du « criminel-né » ; la théorie des « aberrations 

chromosomiques »), ou social (v. la théorie des « lois de l’imitation » ; 

la théorie des « associations différentielles »). 

Le problème de la « concordance » évoque donc bien celui de la 

détermination. 

a) LE PROBLEME DE LA DETERMINATION 

La « détermination » du crime peut en effet être ramenée à deux théories 

criminologiques : la « théorie juridique » du crime et la « théorie du 

criminel-né ». 

Alors que la « théorie juridique » considère que l’aspect déterminé du 

crime se trouve dans son accomplissement, donc dans sa qualification 

juridique (puisque l’offenseur est qualifié de « criminel » par le fait 

même qu’il commet l’acte qualifié « crime »), la théorie du criminel-né 

considère que le crime est un phénomène déterminé dans l’offenseur 

(puisque ce sont les anomalies biologiques de l’offenseur qui le vouent 

nécessairement à la perpétration du crime). 

Les deux théories ont ceci en commun, qu’en dépit de la variation de la 

notion du crime dans le temps et dans l’espace, l’accomplissement de 

74 



l’acte qualifié de « crime » impliquerait invariablement l’offenseur 

comme criminel (la théorie juridique du crime), et la présence des 

anomalies biologiques dans l’homme qualifieraient invariablement 

l’accomplissement du crime ( la théorie du criminel-né). (v. supra., « le 

crime selon ce qu’il est réellement). 

La variation de la notion de crime, par nature indéterminée, ne peut 

changer ni la qualification juridique de l’offenseur, lorsque l’acte 

criminel est accompli, ni l’accomplissement du crime par l’homme 

présentant des anomalies biologiques. Ainsi, selon la théorie du 

criminel-né, la notion de crime, pris comme une entité humaine, ne 

pouvant être compris que dans la connaissance de la constitution de 

l’homme offenseur, est en « concordance » avec la notion du crime pris 

comme une entité juridique, puisque tel homme présentant des 

anomalies biologiques le vouant nécessairement au crime n’est qualifié 

« criminel » qu’en fonction de la qualification juridique de son acte 

accompli. 

Cette solution est, cependant, apparente. Car il est difficile aujourd’hui 

de voir en la théorie du criminel-né une contribution sérieuse à la 

connaissance du crime. En effet, un homme voué au crime par naissance 

étant inconcevable. De même, il est inconcevable de détacher l’homme 

offenseur de son milieu pour le qualifier comme tel selon son acte, 

comme le veut la théorie juridique du crime, alors que c’est l’homme 

qui subit la peine. 

Une raison majeure de l’échec de la théorie juridique et de la théorie du 

criminel-né dans la connaissance du crime, est le fait qu’elles ont étudié 

le crime hors de sa « constitution ». 

En effet, il est bien-sûr difficile de connaître le crime tout en détachant 

l’homme offenseur de sa constitution ou de son milieu. Mais, il est aussi 

difficile de connaître le crime dans « l’homme offenseur » ou dans son 

« milieu » sans toutefois risquer de l’envisager comme un « phénomène 

indéterminé », et donc échouer à l’étudier scientifiquement. Il est 

également difficile de contourner ces difficultés lorsque les chercheurs 

criminologues veulent toujours poursuivre une étude « nonstructurelle 

» du crime. 

75 



C’est pour éviter ces problèmes que la « théorie créologique » du crime 

propose de rechercher la connaissance du crime dans sa « constitution » 

même. 

B. LA THEORIE STRUCTURELLE OU CREOLOGIQUE 

DU CRIME 

1. LA THEORIE CREOLOGIQUE DU CRIME 

PRISE EN SOI 

La théorie créologique du crime propose d’étudier l’acte criminel dans 

sa structure, comme élément constitutif de « l’acte humain en soi ». Or 

admettre qu’il en est ainsi, c’est admettre en d’autres termes que l’acte 

humain en soi possède initialement le germe d’un acte criminel; et que 

le germe d’un acte criminel existe par nature dans l’acte humain en soi, 

en tant qu’acte criminogène. 

En effet, la caractéristique de l’homme est de pouvoir nommer les 

choses ; et toute la démarche de l’esprit humain dans l’histoire peut être 

réduite à l’effort de l’homme de former les choses, afin de pouvoir les 

comprendre. Cet effort, cependant, se manifeste moins dans certains 

actes humains, que dans d’autres. Or le pouvoir de nommer les choses 

est un pouvoir créateur. Ainsi, la caractéristique distinctive de l’homme 

est-elle de créer. Et puisque le pouvoir de nommer les choses se reflète 

dans tous les actes humains à des degrés variables, et puisque le pouvoir 

de nommer les choses est un pouvoir créateur, chaque acte humain est 

acte de créer à des degrés variables. En conséquence, chaque acte 

humain est constitué d’un élément créateur. Mais, l’acte de nommer les 

choses est cause de quelque chose, et toute cause est non seulement le 

germe de son effet comme Leibniz le disait, mais est aussi co-existante 

avec son effet comme Newton le disait. 

Ainsi, si l’acte législateur est un acte humain, nommant tel acte comme 

acte criminel, l’acte législateur et l’acte criminel devraient coexister, 

comme éléments constitutifs, dans le même acte humain ; l’acte 

législateur et l’acte criminel ne formant qu’un seul et même acte humain 

à double face. Et partant, la connaissance de l’acte criminel ne peut être 

76 



suffisamment accomplie, selon la créologie criminelle, sans celle de 

l’acte législateur ; ni la connaissance de l’état dangereux criminologique 

ne peut se faire sans celle de l’état dangereux législateur (V. A. Frangi, 

L’innovation et la législation, 6th Conference : Freedom & Creativity 

on Reality and Ambition (16-18 April 2001), Philadelphia University, 

Amma, Jordan). Un autre aspect de l’état dangereux créologique, doit 

être recherché dans la façon dont est poursuivie l’activité créatrice, qui 

peut se révéler criminogène, développant chez l’homme créateur qui 

s’en occupe les traits psychologiques de la personnalité criminelle. (V. 

infra, « la nécessité in se formelle de la créologie criminelle). 

Si la théorie créologique du crime affirme que les théories précédentes 

rencontrent des difficultés à cause de leur étude non-structurelle du 

crime, elle doit donc montrer comment elle-même, par l’approche 

structurelle du crime, peut se distinguer de ces théories tout d’abord, et 

ensuite, résoudre les difficultés rencontrées par celles-ci. 

1. LA THEORIE CREOLOGIQUE DU CRIME PRISE 

EN RELATION AVEC LES THEORIES 

CRIMINOLOGIQUES PRECEDENTES 

Ne voulant pas répéter les approches proposées par les autres théories 

criminologiques, la théorie de l’acte humain en soi veut « continuer » 

l’effort déjà entamé par ces théories, pour saisir avec confiance 

l’essence du phénomène criminel, en vue d’apporter des « solutions » 

aux problèmes rencontrés par celles-ci. 

a) LA THEORIE CREOLOGIQUE DU CRIME 

COMME « CONTINUATION » 

La façon dont l’effort de la créologie criminelle pour saisir l’essence du 

phénomène criminel peut être considéré comme une « continuation », 

réside effectivement dans l’apport de la créologie criminelle à la 

connaissance du crime. Or les sciences criminologiques précédentes se 

sont limitées à une étude non-structurelle de l’acte criminel, alors que la 

créologie criminelle définit une étude criminologique structurelle. Cet 

apport peut être dégagé clairement des solutions que la théorie 

77 



créologique du crime apporte aux problèmes confrontant les autres 

théories criminologiques. 

b) LA THEORIE CREOLOGIQUE DU CRIME 

COMME « SOLUTION » 

A la question comment connaître le crime alors que le crime est une 

notion variable dans l’espace et dans le temps, la créologie criminelle 

seule peut apporter une réponse satisfaisante. Car en considérant la 

« structure » intime de l’acte criminel, la notion espace-temps s’écarte 

d’office, la structure de l’acte criminel étant toujours la même, quelle 

que soit la législation en vigueur dans l’État et l’époque à laquelle il est 

commis. L’acte humain, pris en soi, n’est pas détaché au départ de l’acte 

criminel, l’acte humain envisagé étant lui-même l’acte criminel, pas 

nécessairement en accomplissement, mais nécessairement en 

constitution. 

Aussi, la théorie créologique du crime résout « le problème de la 

détermination ». En effet, le reproche qui peut être adressé aux théories 

criminologiques précédentes, à savoir que deux personnes sujettes aux 

mêmes conditions ne sont pas pour autant l’une et l’autre criminelles, ne 

peut s’adresser à la théorie créologique du crime. Car si nous 

considérons que l’acte criminel est un élément constitutif de « l’acte 

humain en soi », nous constatons, d’une part, qu’il ne peut être pris 

comme déterminé puisqu’il n’est pas nécessairement voué à entrer en 

conflit avec le droit pénal ; et d’autre part, il ne peut pas être pris 

comme indéterminé puisqu’il est comme tel un acte « criminogène » (v. 

sur ce point, infra.: « la nécessité in se essentielle de la créologie 

criminelle). 

Si l’étude de l’objet de la créologie criminelle forme bien une 

« continuation » des études criminologiques précédentes, et une 

« solution » aux problèmes qu’elles ont rencontrés, cette étude doit être 

donc « nécessaire ». Le besoin de la créologie criminelle apparaît dans 

la « nécessité » de son objet par rapport aux autres objets des sciences 

criminelles (« la nécessité inter se »), et dans la nécessité de sa notion 

(« la nécessité in se »). 

78 



II. LA NECESSITE DE LA CREOLOGIE CRIMINELLE 

A. LA NECESSITE INTER SE DE LA CREOLOGIE 

CRIMINELLE 

La nécessité inter se de la créologie criminelle peut être montrée, d’une 

part, en se référant à « l’ordre historique », et d’autre part, à « l’ordre 

logique », auxquels sont sujettes les sciences criminelles. 

1. LA NECESSITE INTER SE DE LA CREOLOGIE 

CRIMINELLE DANS L’ORDRE HISTORIQUE 

L’objet des sciences criminelles est pris jusqu’à présent selon trois 

acceptions : ou bien en relation avec la « nature », ou bien en relation 

avec la « société », ou bien en relation avec « l’homme ». La « physique 

criminelle » étudie le crime en rapport avec les phénomènes 

météorologiques. La « sociologie criminelle » envisage le crime en 

fonction du milieu hygiénique (alimentation, habitation, misère, etc.), 

ou du milieu éducatif (famille, école, etc.), ou du milieu culturel (la 

presse, la radio, la télévision, le cinéma, etc.). La « psychologie 

criminelle » analyse le crime en relation avec l’homme lui-même 

(l’influence des troubles de l’intelligence, de la volonté ou de 

l’affectivité sur la genèse du crime). 

Il en est autrement pour la créologie criminelle qui envisage la relation 

existante entre l’acte de créer et l’acte criminel comme éléments 

constitutifs de l’acte humain en soi. Certes, celui-ci est commis dans la 

société mais, alors qu’il est considéré par les sciences criminologiques 

précédentes, comme la résultante d’une condition géo-physique, sociale, 

ou humaine, il est considéré par la créologie criminelle dans sa structure 

elle-même, comme étant un acte humain posé en soi dans l’histoire de la 

pensée humaine. 

L’objet de la créologie criminelle apparaît comme une nécessité dans 

l’évolution de l’histoire des sciences criminologiques. En effet, l’esprit 

a commencé par étudier le crime dans son accomplissement (c’est 

l’étude purement matérielle du droit pénal) ; dans un second temps, il 

s’est élevé pour l’étudier dans l’homme ; dans un autre temps, il s’est 

79 



efforcé de l’étudier dans la société mais aussi dans l’environnement ou 

la nature. 

Il serait enfin temps, tout en suivant l’ordre de cette démarche 

ascendante, de considérer l’acte criminel dans « l’acte humain en soi » 

posé dans l’histoire de la pensée humaine, en vue de couronner le 

cheminement historique des sciences criminologiques. Ce 

couronnement apparaît aussi dans l’ordre logique auquel ces sciences 

sont sujettes. 

1. LA NECESSITE INTER SE DE LA CREOLOGIE 

CRIMINELLE DANS L’ORDRE LOGIQUE 

Si la créologie criminelle est une « abstraction » des autres sciences 

criminologiques, elle est aussi leur « précision ». Elle est leur 

« abstraction », car elle dégage l’acte criminel de sa nature légale, 

sociale, ou humaine, en vue de l’envisager en soi, dans sa constitution 

même. Et elle est leur « précision » car à l’étude de l’acte criminel selon 

les conditions météorologiques (la physique criminelle), ou selon la 

société (la sociologie criminelle), ou selon l’homme (la psychologie, la 

biologie et la psychanalyse criminelles), s’ajoute, par référence à l’ordre 

logique allant du général au particulier, l’étude de l’acte criminel selon 

« l’acte humain en soi » (la créologie criminelle). 

Jusqu’ici, nous avons montré que la créologie criminelle a un objet 

« spécifique » ; et que cet objet est « nécessaire » vis-à-vis des autres 

sciences criminologiques. Il nous reste à montrer comment cet objet 

reflète une « nécessité in se » ou « idéelle » propre à la créologie 

criminelle. 

B. LA NECESSITE IN SE DE LA CREOLOGIE 

CRIMINELLE 

La nécessité in se de la créologie criminelle peut être prise dans deux 

sens : elle est « essentielle » ou bien « formelle ». 

80 



1. LA NECESSITE IN SE « ESSENTIELLE » DE LA 

CREOLOGIE CRIMINELLE 

Essentiellement, la créologie criminelle propose de considérer l’acte 

humain en soi criminogène constituant l’acte criminel, celui-ci étant pris 

dans sa structure intime. Poser ainsi la connaissance qualitative de l’acte 

criminel, en dégageant son acte humain, et puis sa connaissance 

quantitative, en dénonçant la quantité du caractère criminogène de l’acte 

criminel en fonction de son acte humain, serait suffisant pour entériner 

les situations criminogènes spécifiques et ultimement, pour prévenir 

l’accomplissement du crime. 

Concernant la coexistence susmentionnée de l’acte criminel et l’acte 

législateur, la nécessité essentielle de la créologie criminelle réside donc 

dans le fait de rechercher la qualification de l’état dangereux 

criminologique non pas seulement dans l’acte criminel, mais aussi dans 

l’acte législateur. Sa nécessité essentielle réside également dans la 

quantification de cet état dangereux, en vue de pouvoir réduire la 

quantité criminogène des actes humains (V. A. Frangi, L’état dangereux 

criminologique : une étude qualitative et quantitative (en cours de 

publication). 

Le concept de cette nécessité, qui ne forme le principe d’aucune autre 

science criminologique, justifie, en effet, la création d’une nouvelle 

discipline, la créologie criminelle, pour l’étude du crime. La nécessité 

formelle de la créologie criminelle peut apporter aussi une telle 

justification. 

1. LA NECESSITE IN SE « FORMELLE » DE LA 

CREOLOGIE CRIMINELLE 

Formellement, le terme « créologie » vient du latin « creare, creo » 

(créer), et du grec « logos » (la connaissance de, ou la science de). Le 

latin identifie « creo » à « creare ». Ainsi, la créologie criminelle, ou la 

science de la création criminelle, englobe non seulement l’étude des 

corrélations entre acte de créer et acte criminel, en tant qu’actes 

constitutifs de l’acte humain, mais aussi l’étude de l’activité créatrice 

(« creo », je crée) et l’activité criminelle en relation. 

81 



Toute démarche ultérieure concernant l’étude de l’acte de créer et l’acte 

criminel en relation devrait donc commencer par une étude structurelle 

créologique-criminelle de l’acte humain en soi. 

BIBLIOGRAPHIE 

1. LE CRIME SELON «CE QU’IL EST» 

A. Selon «ce qu’il est» juridiquement 

ANCEL, M., La défense sociale nouvelle, Paris, Cujas, 3e Ed., 1981, 

pp. 24-29. 

MARQUISET, J., Le crime, P.U.F., Paris 1948, Que sais-je ? n˚ 297, p. 

7-17. 

NUVOLONE, «Droit pénal et criminologie», Revue Internationale de 

Droit Pénal., 1952, p. 157 et s. 

SZABO, D., Criminologie, 2e Ed., Montréal 3, Presses de l’Université 

de Montréal, 1967, p. 34-35. 

YAMARELLOS et KELLENS, Crime et criminologie, marabout 

université, 1970, V˚ Crime, p. 103 et s. (à la p. 119) 

B. Selon «ce qu’il est» réellement 

i. Le crime pris réellement du point de vue social 

FERRI, E., La sociologie criminelle, Alcan, Paris 1905, p. 14-21. 

LACASSAGNE, Archives de l’Anthropologie Criminelle, 1886, p. 182 

PINATEL, J., «De Lacassagne à la nouvelle école lyonnaise», Revue de 

Sciences Criminelles et de Droit Pénal Comparé, 1961, p. 151. 

82 



TARDE, G., Les lois de l’imitation, Paris, Alcan, 1890. 

TARDE, G., «Le crime, étude sociale», de H. Joly, Revue 

Philosophique, 1889, 1er semestre, p. 298-306. 

ii. Le crime pris réellement du point de vue individuel 

BACHET, M., «Les précurseurs de l’anthropologie criminelle», Revue 

Internationale de Criminologie et de Police Technique, 1956, p. 82. 

ESCOFFIER-LAMBIOTTE, «L’hérédité de la violence», Le Monde du 

16 octobre 1968, p. 8. 

FERRI, E., La sociologie criminelle, Alcan, Paris 1905, p. 152-156. 

GRAVEN, J., «Existe-t-il un chromosome du crime? Comment juger le 

délinquant porteur d’une anomalie génétique XYY?», Revue 

Internationale de Criminologie et de Police Technique, 1968, p. 277. 

GRAVEN, J., «Le problème de l’anomalie chromosomique XYY en 

criminologie», Revue Internationale de Criminologie et de Police 

Technique, 1969, p. 21. 

HEUYER, G., «Histoire des doctrines en criminologie», Revue 

Internationale de Criminologie et de Police Technique, 1950 (juilletsept), 

p. 171. 

HIVERT et BRETON, J., «Cytogénétique et criminologie», Revue 

Pénitentiaire, 1968, p. 493. 

LACASSAGNE, A., «Césare Lombroso», Archives de l’Anthropologie 

Criminelle, 1909, p. 881. 

LEAUTE, J., Criminologie et pénologie (les cours de droit), Paris 1981, 

p. 68-71. 

LEY, J., «Apports possibles de la cytogénétique à l’étude de la 

délinquance», Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie, 1967, p. 392. 

83 



LOMBROSO, C., L’homme criminel, T I, 2 ème Ed. Française, Alcan, 

1895, p. 92-108. 

LOMBROSO, G., «Comment mon père est arrivé à la conception de 

l’homme criminel», Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie, 1921, p. 

907. 

MENDLEWICK, J., WILMOTTE, J. et STOCQUART, R., «Les 

déterminants génétiques de la délinquance», Revue de Droit Pénal et de 

Criminologie, 1969-1970, p. 439 

MOORE, L., «Aberrations chromosomiques portant sur les 

chromosomes et comportement antisocial», Annales Internationales de 

Criminologie, 1967, p. 469. 

PINATEL, J., « Criminologie », in Traité de droit pénal et criminologie, 

de Bouzat, P. et Pinatel, J., T III, Paris, Dalloz, 3 ème Ed., p. 180 et s. 

PINATEL, J., «Aperçu de l’histoire des doctrines criminologiques», 

Revue de Sciences Criminelles et de Droit Pénal Comparé, 1953, p. 

336. 

PINATEL, J., «La doctrine lombrosienne devant la criminologie 

scientifique contemporaine», Revue de Sciences Criminelles et de Droit 

Pénal Comparé, 1960, p. 318. 

VERVAECK (Dr.), «La théorie lombrosienne et l’évolution de 

l’anthropologie criminelle», Archives de l’Anthropologie Criminelles, 

1910, p. 561. 

YAMARELLOS et KELLENS, Crime et criminologie, marabout 

université, 1970, V˚ Génétique criminelle, p. 198-199. 

2. LE CRIME SELON «CE QU’IL EXPRIME» 

GAROFALO, R., Criminologie, étude sur la nature du crime et la 

théorie de la pénalité, 5ème Ed., Alcan, Paris, 1905, p. 1-52. 

84 



A FRANCIA BÜNTETŐJOGSZABÁLYOK 

FIATALKORÚAKKAL SZEMBEN 

HATÁLYOSAN FOGANATOSÍTHATÓ 

INTÉZKEDÉSEI, KÜLÖNÖS TEKINTETTEL A 

NEMZETKÖZI EGYEZMÉNYEKRE 

BY ORSOLYA BOGDÁN * 

I. BEVEZETÉS 

1. NEMZETKÖZI TÖREKVÉSEK ÉS TENDENCIÁK A FIATALKORÚAK 

BÜNTETŐJOGÁBAN A XX. SZÁZADBAN 

„A XX. század elejétől a klasszikus büntetőjogi iskola merev 

dogmatizmusát feloldó pozitivista kriminálpolitika tettes – büntetőjogi 

szemléletének máig érvényesülő hatása a fiatalkorú bűnelkövetők 

megkülönböztetett, a felnőttekétől eltérő kezelése.” 1 

Államonként azonban eltérő szemlélettel találkozhatunk: valamely 

állam a fiatalkorúak szankciórendszerét inkább tekinti 

ifjúságvédelemnek ill. ifjúságnevelésnek, mint a hagyományos 

büntetések és intézkedések hálózatának fiatalkorúakra szabásának. Az 

előbbi modell előnyben részesíti az érintettek ügyeiben eljáró 

szakemberek – szociális munkások, pszichológusok stb. – szélesebb 

körű beavatkozását, míg az ún. igazságszolgáltatási modell a klasszikus 

tettfelelősség, proporcionalitás és a formális garanciák talaján áll és attól 

nem rugaszkodik el. 

* Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest. 

1 

Lőrincz József: Nemzetközi tendenciák a fiatalkorúak büntetés – 

végrehajtásában, Bv. Szakkönyvtár, IM Büntetés – végrehajtás Országos 

Parancsnokság, Budapest, 1992, 123. oldal 

85 

ORSOLYA BOGDÁN - A FRANCIA BÜNTETŐJOGSZABÁLYOK 

FIATALKORÚAKKAL SZEMBEN HATÁLYOSAN FOGANATOSÍTHATÓ 

INTÉZKEDÉSEI, KÜLÖNÖS TEKINTETTEL A NEMZETKÖZI EGYEZMÉNYEKRE


A II. világháború utáni „új társadalomvédelmi iskola” (pl. Gramatica) 

kiinduló pontja a tettes reszocializációja, mely gyógyító – nevelő 

intézkedések útján érhető el, de ez nem szoríthatja háttérbe a társadalom 

biztonságát (hasonlóan a XIX. században, ahol elsődleges cél a bűnözők 

izolációja és a társadalom védelme volt). 

Ezzel párhuzamosan fejlődik ki az ún. treatment ideológia (a skandináv 

államokban, az USA - ban) a főként pszichológusokat, pszichiátereket 

és szociológusokat tömörítő, a humán tudományokat felhasználó 

rehabilicionista mozgalom termékeként; módszere a deviancia okának 

feltárása és az elkövetői személyiség – torzulás megszűntetése 

humánus, speciálpreventív eszközökkel. 

Ezzel szemben a hazánkban többek között Szabó András – képviselte 

„neo – abszolút” elmélet a büntetés megtorló jellegét helyezte előtérbe, 

és álláspontja szerint a büntetésnek joghátrányi és nem szociálpolitikai 

intézkedési jellegét kell kidomborítania. 2 

Rendszertől és elmélettől függetlenül szinte valamennyi országnak a 

fiatalkori bűnözés növekedésével kellett szembesülnie a 70 – es évektől. 

A szabadságvesztéssel járó büntetések nem bizonyultak a 

legmegfelelőbb eszköznek a kriminalitás visszaszorításához (kvázi 

ultima ratio – ként emlegetik): a fiatalkorú erkölcsi – szociális – 

tanulmányi fejlődésében való visszavető hatása tagadhatatlan. E 

probléma mentén alakultak ki az olyan fogalmak, mint a „szabadságban 

való kezelés”, a „közösségi ellenőrzés”, a jóvátétel és a mediáció. A 

fiatalkorúak szabadságelvonásának hosszabb, illetve határozatlan 

tartalmát az államok szűkülő köre, elsősorban az ún. ifjúságvédelmi 

modellt követők tartották fenn. 3 

A nemzetközi szervezetek ajánlásaikban (pl. Pekingi Szabályok) a 

fiatalkorú bűnelkövetők emberi jogainak specifikus védelmére 

szólítanak fel, pozitív diszkriminációjukat, családjuk, a társadalom és az 

2 Lőrincz: uo., 124. oldal 


86 





állam velük szembeni felelősségét hangsúlyozva, így az emberi jogaikra 

és méltóságuk védelmére különös tekintettel kellene a 

büntetőtörvényeket kialakítani. 

A jóléti államok büntetőjogának profiljában már a 70 – es, 80 – as 

években középpontba kerülhettek az alap – és középfokú általános – 

illetve szakműveltséget biztosító iskolarendszerű intézmények, melyek 

a kreativitás és készségfejlesztés mellett kiegészültek praktikus, a 

szabadulás utáni életet megkönnyítő tanácsadó programokkal is. 

Újabban pedig világszerte szélesedett a társadalmi erőket az intézet 

életébe bekapcsoló együttműködést eredményező törekvés a fiatalkorú 

és szociális környezete közötti ellentmondás feloldása és a fiatalok 

szocializálása céljából. 4 

2. A FIATALKORÚAKRA VONATKOZÓ SZANKCIÓRENDSZER 

NEMZETKÖZI TENDENCIÁI NAPJAINKBAN – AZ ENSZ – 

KÖVETELMÉNYEK 

Az Egyesült Nemzetek Szervezete a 80 – as években meghirdetett 

bűnmegelőzési programjának középpontjába a fiatalkorúak 

igazságszolgáltatásának finomítását állította, figyelemmel az emberi 

jogokra és a társadalmi igazság szempontjaira. 5 

E szervezet égisze alatt kibontakozó reformmozgalom olyan 

irányelveket tett magáévá, mint a fiatalkorú életkori sajátosságain túl 

értelmi – erkölcsi fejlettségének a figyelembe vételét, a szankció 

elsődlegesen nevelő célját, az eljáró igazgatási szervek kötelességét a 

reszocializációban, továbbá külön büntetés – végrehajtási törvény 

kidolgozására hívja fel a tagállamokat. 


5 

ENSZ 40/33/1985. sz. határozata (Pekingi Szabályok), 23. pont 

87 





A változtatás igényét először az ENSZ 1980 – ban megrendezett VI. 

bűnmegelőzési kongresszusán fogalmazták meg, melyet az ún. Pekingi 

Szabályok (az 1955 – ös ENSZ Minimum Szabályokra épül), 1985 – 

ben, majd a Rijadi Irányelvek a megelőzésről 1988 – ban követett, 

melyeket a „Gyermekek jogairól” 6 szóló 1989 – es New York – i 

egyezmény összegzett. 

Kutatásom során a Pekingi Szabályok részletesebb bemutatása mellett 

döntöttem, mert fejezetei lefedik mindazon probléma – köröket, 

melyekkel a dolgozatom foglalkozik, és amelyekkel az egyes államok 

jogalkotóinak szembe kellett nézniük. 

2.1.A PEKINGI SZABÁLYOK 

A dokumentum preambulumában ajánlja, hogy „a 

tagállamok…törekedjenek a fiatalkorú és családja jólétének 

előmozdítására” és csökkentsék a jogi beavatkozás szükségességét, a 

„törvénnyel összeütközésbe került fiatalkorú eredményes és humánus 

kezelését” (25. pont). Az e szabályhoz fűzött kommentár kiemeli, hogy 

a fiatalkorúról való gondoskodás alapvető jogpolitikai követelménye 

megelőzni a bűnelkövetést, ennek pedig egyik útja a fiatal jólétének 

elősegítése, ami egyúttal minimalizálni fogja az igazságszolgáltatás 

beavatkozásának szükségességét, csökkentve az ezzel okozható ártalmat 

is (26. pont). 

Kiemelendő még a Szabályokból az arányosság követelménye, mely 

nem egyoldalúan a bűncselekmény tárgyi súlyához fűződik, hanem az 

elkövető személyes körülményeihez is (pl. családi körülmények – ám 

ez, ebben az általános megfogalmazásban, meglátásom szerint nehezen 

hozható összhangban az egyenlő elbánás elvével, azaz diszkriminatív). 

Így a törvényi reakció arányosságát az elkövető, a bűncselekmény és az 

áldozat körülményeinek kontextusában kell vizsgálni (28. pont). 

6 

A décret 90-917 8 Octobre 1990 tette a francia nemzeti jog részévé. Az 

Egyezmény a „gyermek” szó alatt a 18 éven aluliakat érti (1. cikk) 

88 





Az eljárási garanciák körében fontos megemlíteni a fiatalkorú 

anonimitáshoz való jogát és a szülő/gyám jelenlétéhez való jogot a 

tárgyalás során (31. pont). 

A dokumentum bátorítást ad az alternatív szankciók minél szélesebb 

körben való alkalmazására, így az intézeti elhelyezés helyett az alábbi 

intézkedéseket/büntetéseket javasolja: a fiatalkorú gondozása, 

felügyelete; próbára bocsátás; közérdekű munka; pénzügyi jellegű 

büntetések, kártalanítás; kezelés elrendelése, csoporttanácsadáson való 

részvétel, valamint nevelőszülői, lakóközösségi vagy más nevelő 

környezet általi gondozás elrendelése (32 – 33. pont). 

A fenti szankciók közös tulajdonsága, hogy közösségi bázisú korrekciós 

törekvéseket tartalmaznak. 7 Az alternativitás elve azt is jelenti, hogy a 

hatóságnak legyen lehetősége kiválasztani az elkövető számára 

legmegfelelőbbet és adott esetben azt módosítani (34. pont). 

Az 1955 – ös szabályozástól eltérően, a legvégső esetben alkalmazható 

szabadság – elvonó (intézeti) nevelés esetén sem tartja reálisnak az 

elítélt erkölcsi megváltozathatóságát, sokkal inkább a társadalomba való 

visszailleszkedésének feltételeit kívánja elősegíteni, például a személyes 

erőforrások fejlesztése útján. A Szabályok ezért előtérbe akarja hozni a 

fél – intézeti megoldásokat, mint a nevelőotthonokat és a nappali oktató 

központokat, melyek hozzájárulnak a fiatalkorú reintegrációjához (49. 

pont). 

3. A FIATALKORÚAKRA VONATKOZÓ HATÁLYOS SZABÁLYOZÁS 

HELYE A FRANCIA BÜNTETŐJOGBAN 

A fiatalkorúakra vonatkozó büntetés-szabályozás igen hamar elkülönült 

a nagykorúakétól; igaz, kezdetben ez nem szisztematikusan történt. Már 

7 




89 





a rómaiak is figyelemmel voltak az életkorra, de külön bíróságot még 

nem állítottak fel ezen ügyek kivizsgálására. A régi francia jog ezt 

adaptálta. Amennyiben a fiatalkorú súlyos bűncselekményt követett el, a 

különleges elbánás követelménye már nem védte tovább. 

A forradalmi törvényhozás a 16 éves életkorhoz kötötte az enyhébb 

eljárást. Az 1810-es Code Pénal megteremti a nevelő jellegű 

intézkedések alapját, elismerve a bebörtönzés kedvezőtlen hatásait és a 

gyógypedagógia szükségességét. 

Az 1800-as évek derekán született jogszabályok alapján a kevésbé 

súlyos bűncselekményt szabálysértési hatóság előtt bírálták el, valamint 

a fogházakban elkülönítették a fiatalkorúakat idősebb társaiktól. A 

századfordulón megszületik a külön bíróság, a felügyelet intézményei és 

a megelőzés gondolata. 8 

Az új francia büntetőtörvénykönyv visszafogottan rendelkezik a 

fiatalkorúakkal kapcsolatban: egyrészt külön törvény hatály alá utalja 

(ordonnance 9 2 février 1945). A CP art. 122-8 szerint: „a 

bűncselekmény elkövetésében bűnösnek talált fiatallal szemben 

védelmi, felügyeleti és nevelési intézkedés foganatosítható megfelelő 

körülmények fennállása esetén.” Emellett azonban a törvény 

megfogalmazza a fiatalkorúak általános büntetőjogi felelősségét. Az 

ordonnance indoklása rögzíti a korhatárt, valamint a Köztársaság azon 

akaratát, hogy „hatékonyan védje különösen a bűnöző fiatalkorút, mivel 

Franciaországban nem olyan magas a születésszám, hogy 

elhanyagolhasson egészséges lényeket.” 

Az évtizedekkel korábbi kriminálpolitika terméke még az 1958-as a 

veszélyeztetett fiatalkorúak helyzetét, az 1970-es a szülői felügyeletet 

szabályozó törvény. E három jogszabály fogja át azt a teljes körűnek 

8 

Jean-François Renucci – Christine Courtin: Le droit pénal des mineurs, PUF, 

Párizs, 2001, pp. 59-60. 

9 

kormányrendelet törvényi felhatalmazással 

90 





szánt megelőzési – nevelési – büntető programot a 90-es évekig, ami 

nem képezte integráns részét a francia Btk.-nak. 10 

A bűnözés szerkezetének megváltozásával, a fiatalkorú elkövetők 

számának növekedésével és a bűnözők „fiatalodásával” szükségessé vált 

az ordonnance felülvizsgálata. 1993-ban került be az art. 12-1-vel a 

jogszabály szövegébe a reparáció. 1998-ban a Miniszterelnök 

körlevélben fogalmazta meg a fiatalkorú bevonását szorgalmazva az új 

társadalmi cselekvési program kidolgozásába. A 2002. szeptember 9-i 

törvény megengedi a nevelő intézkedések és a büntetések együttes 

alkalmazását is. 

II. A FIATALKORÚAKRA VONATKOZÓ HATÁLYOS 

INTÉZKEDÉSEK 

1. A FRANCIA BTK. SAJÁTOSSÁGAI 

1.1.1. AZ ÉLETKOR JELENTŐSÉGE 

Az 1810-es Code Pénal szerkesztői 16 éves korban határozták meg a 

nagykorúság küszöbét. A szándékos bűncselekmény-elkövetőre 

büntetés, a nem szándékos elkövetőre javítóintézeti elhelyezés várt, 

amely maximálisan a 20. életévig tarthatott. 

Ezt a megoldást sok kritika érte egyrészt, mert a kiskorúakat nem 

különítették el nagykorú társaiktól, másrészt, mert a 16 év alacsonynak 

bizonyult. 

Ezt követően az 1906-os törvény kijelenti, hogy a 13. életév alatt a 

büntetőjogi felelősséggel nem számolhatunk, de a 13 és a 18 év 

közöttiekkel szemben a néhány évvel később felálló fiatalkorúak 

bírósága már érdemben eljárhat. 

10 

Lazrges, Christine: Introduction á la politique criminelle, l’Harmattan, 

Párizs, 2000, pp. 77-8. 

91 





Ez a korhatár a mai napig hatályos, a többször módisított ordonnance 

fenntartotta (ord. 45-174). A 13. életévét már betöltött elkövető esetén 

egyszerű, megdönthető vélelmet állít föl a bíró a beszámíthatóságát 

illetően, és a börtönbüntetésen kívül a legtöbb büntetés és intézkedés 

foganatosítható vele szemben (45-174, art. 2.). 

1.2 A FIATALKORÚAKKAL SZEMBEN FOGANATOSÍTHATÓ 


Az alkalmazható intézkedések köre széles, teret engedve ezzel a bírói 

mérlegelésnek, a hatékony és testreszabott szankcióknak. A francia 

törvényhozás megkülönbözteti a büntető és a nevelő jellegű 

intézkedéseket. Az utóbbi alkalmazásának elsőbbségét a jogszabály 

egyértelművé teszi (art. 2.). 11 A 13 évet be nem töltöttek esetén a 

beszámíthatóság megdönthetetlen vélelem, velük szemben csak nevelő 

jellegű intézkedés alkalmazható. A 13. életévét betöltöttek esetén az 

alábbiak foganatosíthatók az 1.1. pontban foglalt feltételek alapján: pl. 

szülőhöz, gyámhoz, szülői felügyeletet gyakorló vagy arra alkalmas 

személyhez való (vissza)helyezés, magán vagy állami oktatási, gyógy- 

vagy gyógyító-nevelő, illetve javító intézményben való elhelyezés, 

valamint az art. 2-nek megfelelően büntetés kiszabása (art. 15-6.). 

A nevelő jellegű intézkedések körébe tartozó büntetőjogi közvetítést 

(mediáció – médiation) külön fejezetben tárgyalom. 

A büntető jellegű intézkedések (mesures répressives ou peines) 

részletezésétől eltekintek az összehasonlíthatóság kedvéért, mert a 

magyar jogszabályok ezeket a büntetések közé sorolják (közérdekű 

munka – travail d’intéret, pénzbüntetés – amande és börtönbüntetés – 

emprisonnement). 

11 

„Le tribunal pour les enfants et la cour d’assises des mineurs prononceront, 

suivant les cas, les mineurs de protection, d’assistance, de surveillance et 

d’éducation qui sembleront appropriées (…).” 

92 





1.1.2 A nevelő jellegű intézkedések (mésures éducatives) 

1.2.1.1.Megrovás (admonestation, art. 8.) 

A legenyhébb válasz a bűncselekményre, hasonlóan a magyar 

szabályozáshoz. A bírósági szakban, a bűnösség kimondása után, 

kizárólag a bíró által hajtható végre. Ez az „ünnepélyes” figyelmeztetés 

a szülők és a sértett jelenlétében hatékony, amelyet adott esetben 

pártfogó felügyelet elrendelésével párosíthatnak. 12 

1.2.1.2.Fiatalkorú pártfogó felügyelete (liberté surveillée, art. 25-27.) 

Az 1912-es törvénnyel került bevezetésre, párhuzamosan alkalmazható 

egyéb intézkedésekkel, illetve ideiglenes megoldásként egyaránt. Az art. 

8. szerint elrendelésének köre igen széles: a fiatalkorúak bírósága 

minden esetben megteheti a nagykorúság eléréséig. Kiszabható az ítélet 

meghozataláig, de járulékosan is, az ítélkezés keretén belül is. 

Az ítélet nyomán a bíróság megbízottja folyamatosan gyűjti a fiatal 

körülményeinek alakulásával kapcsolatos információkat, így a családi és 

a beiskolázási helyzetére, az intézkedés végrehajtását nehezítő 

akadályokra és elhelyezésére vonatkozó adatokat továbbítja a bíróhoz. 

Az állandó megbízottat az Igazságügy miniszter, az önkéntest a 

fiatalkorú ügyével foglalkozó bíró nevezi ki. 

Az intézkedés szükségessége a foganatosítástól számított 1 éven belül 

felülvizsgálható akár a fiatal, akár szülei, gyámja kezdeményezésére. 

Amennyiben az eljáró hatóság a szülő/gyám részéről az együttműködési 

kötelezettségének megszegését tapasztalja, az intézkedés 

végrehajthatatlanná válik, 1,5-től 175 Euróig terjedő pénzbírságot 

szabhat ki. 

12 

Laurent Gebler – Ivan Guitz: Le traitement juduciaire de la délinquance des 

mineurs, Éditions ASH, Párizs, 2004, pp. 71. 

93 





1.2.1.3. Bírói védelem alá helyezés (mis sous protection judiciaire, art. 

16bis) 

Az 1975-ben kelt törvény alapján a 16. évét betöltött fiatalkorú a 

fiatalkorúak bíróságának vagy ülnökbíróságának döntése alapján 

maximálisan 5 évre bírói védelem alá helyezhető – 21 éves koráig. Az 

1996-os reform alapján a fiatalkorú bármely életkorában alkalmazható, 

valamint valakinél/valahol való elhelyezéssel kombinálható. 

1.2.1.4. Nevelő jellegű elhelyezés (placement éducatif, art. 8., 10., 15., 

16., 33.) 

Ez az intézkedés az eljárás bármely szakaszában elrendelhető. 

Megkülönböztetnek ún. nyitott közegben végrehajtandó intézkedést 

(milieu ouvert); a gyermek megmarad eredeti családi körében egy előre 

meghatározott időtől eltekintve, amikor a fiatalt egy harmadik 

személyre/intézményre bízzák. A pártfogó felügyelethez hasonlóan sor 

kerülhet átmeneti, ítélethozatalig tartó kiszabásra is. 

Az elhelyezés időtartalma alatt a szülők hivatalosan nem veszítik el 

felügyeleti jogukat, cserébe minden szükséges beleegyezést meg kell 

adniuk e jog más által történő gyakorlásához (pl. továbbtanulás iránya, 

veszélyes sport űzése, orvosi kezelés) és minden, a gyermek életében 

fontos eseményen meg kell jelenniük (pl. szülői értekezlet, tanár 

fogadóórája). 

Az elhelyezés történhet (a másik) szülőnél, gyámnál, szülői felügyeletet 

gyakorló vagy arra alkalmas személynél, illetve az 1.2. pontban felsorolt 

intézményekben. 

„Az arra alkalmas harmadik” többnyire „bizalomra méltó” (personne 

digne de confiance) természetes vagy jogi személy, aki a fiatalkorú 

közelebbi vagy távolabbi rokona, vagy az, aki az elkövető életében 

mindig fontos szerepet töltött be, esetleg egy speciális befogadó 

94 





család. 13 Napjainkban, az elhelyezésre ítélt fiatalok többsége valamely 

nevelési – oktatási intézetben kerül elhelyezésre, ahol 8-20 fős 

csoportokban foglalkoznak velük. 

Újraszabályozásukra 2002-ben került sor. Az intézmény típusától függ 

az elhelyezés időtartalma, a foglalkozások fajtája, a nevelő-gárda 

képzettsége: például a centre éducatif renforcé-ban a marginalizálódott, 

többszörös visszaeső elkövetőket fogadják be, 8 fős csoportokba 

sorolják őket 3-6 hónapos időtartamra. Ez idő eltelte után helyezik át 

őket más intézetbe vagy az ún. nyitott közegű intézkedést rendelik el. 

Léteznek olyan otthonok, amelyek azonnali befogadásra alkalmasak, 

sokszor a bebörtönzés alternatívájaként 1-3 hónapra. 

1.1.2 Nevelő jellegű büntetések (sanctions éducatives) 

A magyar Btk-hoz hasonlóan itt is lehetőség nyílik a fiatalkorú által 

birtokolt dolog elkobzására (confication), amely az elkövetés célját 

szolgálja; adott esetben egy motorbicikli is lehet a francia joggyakorlat 

alapján (art. 15-1). 

Az ordonnance-ban megtaláljuk a kiutasításhoz hasonlítható, a bűntett 

elkövetési helyétől maximálisan 1 évre eltiltó szankciót (interdiction de 

paraître), azzal a megkötéssel, hogy az eltiltás nem vonatkozhat a 

gyermek szokásos lakhelyére ill. iskolájának körzetére. 

A bíróság megtilthatja a sértettel vagy tettestársával való érintkezését 

(interdiction de rencontre) az elkövetőnek 1 éves időtartamra. 

2. KÖZVETÍTÉS – REPARÁCIÓ (MÉDIATION, ART. 12-1) – AZ 

ALTERNATÍVA 

„A médiáció a bűncselekmény elkövetője és sértettje között létrejövő 

önkéntes megállapodás arról, hogy a tettes az áldozatnak okozott kárt 

egy mindkettőjük által elfogadott módon és mértékben jóváteszi, és 

13 Gebler – Giutz: u.o. pp. 76. 

95 





részben vagy egészben mentesül az adott államban egyébként szokásos 

büntetőjogi felelősségre vonás és a büntetés alól.” 14 

2.1 A KÖZVETÍTÉS A NEMZETKÖZI SZERVEZETEK JOGALKOTÁSÁBAN 

„A bűncselekmények és a hatalommal való visszaélés áldozatainak 

nyújtandó igazságszolgáltatás alapelvei”-ről szóló 1985. évi ENSZ 

deklaráció részletesen foglalkozik azzal, hogy mit is értünk 

kártalanításon és jóvátételen. Szorgalmazza, hogy a nemzeti jogszabályalkotók 

vizsgálják meg a reparáció jogrendszerükbe való beillesztésének 

lehetőségét. 

Az ENSZ egy másik, két évvel korábbi konvenciója azt az esetkört 

tárgyalja, amikor a kompenzáció más forrásból nem teljesítendő, 

szükséges az állam fellépése: kártalanítást biztosít azoknak, akik 

szándékosan elkövetett erőszakos bűncselekmények áldozatává váltak 

és komoly testi sérülést szenvedtek (vagy elhunytak). Az összeg úgy 

kerül megállapításra, hogy az elegendő legyen legalább a keresetkiesés 

pótlására, az orvosi és temetési költségekre egyaránt. 

E témában ugyancsak megemlítendő az Európa Tanács 

büntetéskiszabással kapcsolatos ajánlása, amely a kompenzáció mind 

szélesebb körben való alkalmazását sürgeti, akár önállóan, a 

szabadságvesztés alternatívájaként, akár más szankcióval együttesen. 15 

A Tanács azonban figyelmeztet, hogy a jóvátétel különböző, 

igazságtalan helyzetbe hozhatja az elkövetőket – nem mindenki tudja 

„megváltani a szabadságát” (lásd az óvadék intézménye körüli vitákat). 

Ez alapján hívja föl a bírók figyelmét arra, hogy a reparáció nem csak 

pénzben kifejezve és teljesítve, hanem más, az elkövető által kifejtett 

jóvátétellel is megtörténhet. 

2.2 MEDIÁCIÓ A FRANCIA SZAKIRODALOMBAN ÉS A GYAKORLATBAN 

14 

dr. Barabás Andrea Tünde: Egyezség tettes és áldozata között – racionalitás 

vagy naivitás? in Kriminológiai Tanulmányok, 2002/39., pp. 114. 

15 

„Az áldozatnak a büntetőjogban és a büntetőeljárásban elfoglalt helyzeté”-ről 

szóló ajánlás 1985-ből 

96 





2.2.1 A közvetítés célja és tárgya 

A mediáció egy békéltetési, kiegyezési technika a bűncselekmény 

elkövetője és a sértett között, amely a kár jelképes helyrehozatalán 

alapul. 

Ezen alapjait az 1945-ös jogszabályban is megtalálhatjuk, amelyet a már 

említett 1993. január 4-i törvény teljesített ki. 

Jelenleg az eljárás bármely szakaszában rendelkezésre áll akár az 

ügyésznek, akár a bíróságnak vagy az ügyben eljáró más hatóságnak, 

figyelemmel a sértett beleegyezésére és a közösség érdekére. 

A mediáció – reparációt meg kell különböztetni a közérdekű munkától, 

amelyet csak 16 éven felüliekkel szemben szabhatnak ki, és feltétlenül 

minimálisan 40 óra munkaként teljesítendő, ellenkező esetben büntetésvégrehajtási 

intézetben kerül végrehajtásra. 16 

Előnyei az alábbiak mentén foglalhatók össze: egyrészt, nevelő 

karakterű büntetőjogi választ ad egy valós bűncselekményre, kikerülvén 

ezzel más szankciók lehetséges kedvezőtlen hatásait. Másrészt a fiatal 

elkövetőben jobban tudatosodik cselekménye, a reparáció kézzel 

foghatóvá válik az általa okozott kár. Végül, a sértett személye sem 

merül feledésbe; a jogalkotó célja a gyors, természetbeni kármentesítés 

elérése. 17 

A nevelő jellege vitathatatlan: a közvetítő tevékenysége során igen nagy 

hatást gyakorolhat az elkövető érzelmi-lelkiismereti fejlődésére – 

ráébreszti a fiatalt tettének az áldozatot és a társadalmat érintő 

következményeire. 

2.2.2 A közvetítés meneteű 

A legfiatalabb elkövetőkkel szemben is foganatosítható; a helyrehozatal 

történhet természetben vagy pénzben, részben vagy egészben, 

közvetlenül az áldozat részére teljesítve, vagy közösségi munkaként (pl. 

kórházban, közlekedési vállalatnak, ami azonban nem sértheti a fiatal 

vallási meggyőződését). Az előbbi esetben, természetesen, a kárt 

elszenvedő hozzájárulása szükséges. Amikor az elkövető szülője 

16 Lazarges: u.o., pp. 105-8. 

17 

Mbanzoulou, Paul: La médiation pénale, l’Harmattan, Párizs, 2002, pp. 60. 

97 





rendelkezik felelősségbiztosítással, gyakran a biztosító fedezi a fiatal 

által okozott kárt. 

Az art. 4-1 szerint az elkövető mellé saját ügyvéd híján hivatalból kell 

valakit kirendelni, aki képviselete ellátása mellett felvilágosítja jelenléte 

kötelező mivoltáról. Ezen kívül ő teremti meg a lehetőséget a bíró és a 

fiatalkorú közti dialógus létesülésére (ennek szükségképpen meg kell 

előznie a bírósági eljárást), amelynek során az elkövető előtt tisztázzák a 

bűncselekmény minősítését, a felelősség megállapítását, tettének 

következményeit és a sértett kártalanítását. 

A közvetítő megbízását a közszféra-beli Fiatalok Bírósági Védelme 

elnevezésű szervezettől kapja, feladata lényegében a fiatal és az eljáró 

hatóság közötti kommunikáció megkönnyítése. Munkája során valódi 

hajlandóságot ébreszt az elkövetőben tette materiális és morális 

helyreállítására, megértetvén védencével az eljárást és okait. 

2.3 A MEDIÁCIÓ MEGÍTÉLÉSE A MAGYAR SZAKIRODALOMBAN 

A magyar szakirodalom első jelentős restitúciós kompenzáció tana az 

Angliába elszármazott Schäfer István kriminológus nevéhez köthető, aki 

többek között „Jóvátétel a bűnözés áldozatainak” valamint „A 

kártalanítás és a jóvátétel a bűnözés áldozatainak” címmel publikálta 

műveit. Az azóta kikristályosodott fogalmak alapján a kártalanítás az 

állam általi, a jóvátétel pedig az elkövető általi teljesítést jelenti az 

áldozatok részére – igaz, más források gyakran szinonimaként 

használják. 

Az elkövető általi megtérítés többféle lehet; általában nincs mód a kár 

reális jóvátételére, például azért, mert az pénzben nem mérhető. 

Ilyenkor szimbolikus reparációra kerülhet sor, amely megnyilvánulhat 

bocsánatkérésben, karitatív célokért történő teljesítésben vagy 

munkavégzésben. 

98 





Azonban ez a megoldás sem maradhat kritika nélkül: az Európa Tanács 

ajánlásában már figyelmeztetett az elkövetők anyagi különbségeikből 

fakadó igazságtalanságra. Emellett komoly problémát jelent a kár 

megállapítása módszerének kiválasztása és alkalmazásának 

bizonytalanságai. 18 Továbbá rendszertanilag el kell tudni különíteni a 

pénzbüntetéstől is, ami adott esetben szintén a szabadság-vesztés 

alternatívájaként jelenik meg. 

Kerezsi Klára több munkáját szentelte ennek a témának; véleménye 

szerint a jóvátétel a sértett és az elkövető közötti harmónia 

helyreállítását szolgálja. Az utóbbit a felelősség vállalására késztette, 

szégyenérzetét erősítette, visszatartotta a további jogellenes 

magatartástól, de a kompenzációval mintegy az önbecsülését is 

visszanyerte. A legújabb kutatások alapján a közvetítés egy 

háromdimenziós értelmezést nyer: sértetti, elkövetői és társadalmi 

vetületet. Meglátása szerint a bűnözésre és a bűnöző kezelésére fordított 

költségek jó esetben nem magasabbak a bűnözéssel okozott károkkal – 

ezt segíthet kiegyenlíteni az elkövető által történő teljesítés. Kerezsi 

felhívja a figyelmet arra, hogy polgári jogi elemek szivárognak be a 

közjogi területre az elkövető-sértett-közvetítő egyezkedésével és a 

kártérítés-színezetű szankció megjelenésével (a mediáció egyébként 

hazánkban is működő intézmény a magánjogi vitás kérdések 

rendezésére). 

Kerezsi kidolgozta a közvetítés lehetséges hazai koncepcióját: az eljárás 

ügyészi vagy bírósági szakaszában az eljárás 3 hónapra feltételesen 

felfüggeszthető, ha lenne rá remény, hogy a sértettnek okozott kárt 

megtérítik, akár munkavégzéssel, akár pénzfizetéssel. A közvetítő a 

pártfogó szolgálat alkalmazottja. Feltételei, hogy az ügyész vagy a bíró 

ezt jóváhagyja, a sértett beleegyezik, a bűncselekmény csekély súlyú, 

valamint a közérdeket a jóvátétel nem sérti. 

Nagy Ferenc is a külföldi példák alapján elemzi a mediáció lehetőségeit: 

egyes országok közvetítését a büntetőeljárásban előrehozott informális 


Dr. Görgényi Ilona: A bűncselekménnyel okozott kár megtérítésének 

perspektívái in Kriminológiai Tanulmányok, 2002/39., pp. 96. 

99 





konfliktus-szabályozásként jellemzi, egyéb eljárási cselekmények 

elkerülése végett; máshol a büntetőeljárás lezáró aktusa, végül önállóan 

alkalmazható szankcióként is értelmezhető. 

III. A FRANCIA SZABÁLYOZÁS KIEMELT PONTJAI A 

NEMZETKÖZI KÖVETELMÉNYEK TÜKRÉBEN – 

MEGOLDÁSI JAVASLATOK A JÖVŐRE NÉZVE 

„Az Egyezményben részes államok gondoskodnak arról, hogy a 

gyermeket szüleitől, ezek akarata ellenére, ne válasszák el, kivéve, ha az 

illetékes hatóságok, bírói felülvizsgálat lehetőségének fenntartásával és 

az erre vonatkozó törvényeknek és eljárásoknak megfelelően úgy 

döntenek, hogy ez az elválasztás a gyermek mindenek felett álló 

érdekében szükséges. Ilyen értelmű döntés szükséges lehet bizonyos 

különleges esetekben, például akkor, ha a szülők durván kezelik, vagy 

elhanyagolják gyermeküket, illetőleg ha különválva élnek és dönteni 

kell a gyermek elhelyezéséről. „ 19 

Az Egyezmény is csak példálózóan tér ki azokra az esetekre, amikor a 

fiatalkorú családi környezetéből való kiemelése szükséges; ennek 

meghatározását egyrészről az aláíró ország törvényalkotójának 

kompetenciájába, másrészről a bíró mérlegelési körébe utalja. 

Az Egyezményben részes államok elismerik a gyermekeknek az 

oktatáshoz való jogát, és az esélyegyenlőség jegyében történő 

gyakorlása céljából az alapfokú oktatást kötelezővé és ingyenessé 

teszik, melyet lehetőség szerint középfokú vagy szakmai képzésnek kell 

követni, melyhez minden gyermeknek, így a büntetés vagy intézkedés 

hatálya alatt állónak is hozzáférhetőnek kell lennie. 20 Láthattuk az 1.2. 

pontban, hogy ez az ordonnance szövegében megtalálható és különleges 

fontossággal bír. 

19 

New York – i egyezmény, 9. cikk, 1. bekezdés 

20 

u.o. 28. cikk 

100 





A 29. cikkből – mely továbbra is az oktatás – nevelés szükségességével 

foglalkozik – kiemelnék egy számomra nagy jelentőséggel bíró 

gondolatot: a gyermekek tudatába kell vésni az emberi jogok és az 

alapvető szabadságjogokon kívül „…a szülei személyazonossága, 

nyelve és kulturális értékei iránti tiszteletet, valamint annak az 

országnak, amelyben él, továbbá esetleges származási országnak a 

nemzeti értékei iránti és a sajátjától különböző kultúrák iránti 

tiszteletet…” 

Franciaországban a büntetés – végrehajtási intézetek lakói igen nagy 

arányban külföldiek, illetve az egykori gyarmatbirodalom és a jelenlegi 

tengeren túli megyéik polgárai; az adminisztrációnak lépéseket kell 

tennie annak érdekékében, hogy az életkörülményeik és nemzeti - 

etnikai hovatartozásuk miatt marginalizálódott (e kettő többnyire 

halmozottan jelentkezik) fiatalokat valamiféle kapaszkodóhoz juttassa, 

éreztesse velük, hogy az adott társadalom megbecsült tagjai. Ennek 

módja pedig nem a kirekesztés, hanem az integráció lehet – de nem 

minden áron. Lehetőséget kell számukra adni a kisebbségi kulturális 

gyökereik megismerésére, és ezt véleményem szerint a normál 

tanintézetek keretén belül mind a kisebbségi, mind a többségben élő 

gyerekeknek is meg kell teremteni. A toleráns és hozzáértő 

megközelítés eme megnyilvánulása, az identitástudat, a mások iránti 

felelősségtudat hatalmas előrelépést jelenthetne az agresszió 

visszaszorításában s így megelőzés területén egyaránt. 21 

Elgondolkodtató – és talán a fentiekkel ellentétes - a 

„fátyoltörvényként” elhíresült jogszabály, ami a laicizmus alapelvét 

hivatott kiteljesíteni Franciaországban a vallási jelképek száműzésével a 

középiskolák falai közül. 22 

A 33. cikk említi az államok felelősségét arra nézve, hogy a 

gyermekeket megvédjék a kábító- és pszichotróp szerek tiltott 

21 

lásd bővebben: Ervin Staub: Az erőszak társadalmi – kulturális gyökerei in 

Történeti és politikai pszichológia (szerk. Hunyady György), Osiris, Budapest, 

1998, 90 – 115. oldal, továbbá a Code de l’Éducation art. 122-7-t 

22 

erről bővebben például Nicolas Sarkozy La république, les religions, 

l’espérance című könyvében olvashatunk (Cerf, 2004, Párizs, pp. 95-104) 

101 





fogyasztásától, szabályozása elszórtan található például az egészségügyi 

törvényben valamint a CP-ben is. 

Munkám során kialakult álláspontom szerint számos, eddig 

megválaszolatlan vagy részben rendezett kérdésre nem csak jogalkotói, 

hanem szélesebb körű szakmai – társadalmi választ kell keresni mind a 

franciaországi, mind hazánkat érintő tapasztalatokat figyelembe véve. 

Érdekes kezdeményezésnek tűnik a megelőzés jegyében az ún. szülői 

tréning kialakítása, mely hatékony beavatkozás lehet agresszív és 

antiszociális gyermekek esetében azáltal, ha például szüleik is részt 

vesznek a fiatalok számára biztosított pozitív oktatási és szocializációs 

tapasztalatszerzés folyamatában. Ezek a korai beavatkozó programok 

kialakíthatják az iskolai munkában való hatékonyságot és érdeklődést, 

erősíthetik a családi kapcsolatokat is, szilárd talajt nyújtva ezzel a 

gyerekeknek. 

Kétséget ébresztenek azonban azok a próbálkozások, amelyek az 

igazságos és költségkímélő büntetés ideológiájának felhasználásával 

kívánják feltámasztani a represszív testi és megalázó büntetések 

alkalmazását. 

Míg a napóleoni Code Civil 371. cikke szerint „az apai tekintélynek és 

hatalomnak kell kiegészíteni a törvényeket, kijavítani az erkölcsöt és az 

engedelmességet kialakítania a gyermekben”, addig ma már több 

nemzetközi szervezet, helyi kezdeményezés és iskolai szintű programok 

segítik a fiatalokat abban, hogy megtalálják a helyes utat, ehhez 

azonban az életkörülményeik javítása elengedhetetlen – az állam 

hathatós közreműködésével. 

102 





IV. FELHASZNÁLT IRODALOM 

Dr. Barabás Andrea Tünde: Egyezség tettes és áldozata között – 

racionalitás vagy naivitás? in Kriminológiai Tanulmányok, 2002/39. 

Gebler, Laurent –Guitz, Ivan: Le traitement juduciaire de la délinquance 

des mineurs, Éditions ASH, Párizs, 2004 

Dr. Görgényi Ilona: A bűncselekménnyel okozott kár megtérítésének 

perspektívái in Kriminológiai Tanulmányok, 2002/39. 

Lazrges, Christine: Introduction á la politique criminelle, l’Harmattan, 

Párizs, 2000 


végrehajtásában, Bv. Szakkönyvtár, IM Büntetés – végrehajtás 

Országos Parancsnokság, Budapest, 1992 

Martinetti, Françoise: Les Droits de l’enfants, edition Unicef, Librio, 

Párizs, 2002 

Mbanzoulou, Paul: La médiation pénale, l’Harmattan, Párizs, 2002 

Nagy József: A fiatalkorúakra vonatkozó büntetőjogi szabályok 

kialakulása és változásai in Rendvédelmi Füzetek, 2002/36. 

Renucci, Jean-François –Courtin, Christine: Le droit pénal des 

mineurs, PUF, Párizs, 2001 

Sarkozy, Nicolas: La république, les religions, l’espérance, Cerf, 2004, 

Párizs 

Staub, Ervin: Az erőszak társadalmi – kulturális gyökerei in Történeti és 

politikai pszichológia (szerk. Hunyady György), Osiris, Budapest, 1998 

103 




FREE WORLD PUBLISHING Inc. 

HTTP://WWW.FWPUBLISHING.NET 

CALL FOR ARTICLES 

Free World Publishing is calling for articles by 

Academics, Practitioners and Post-Graduate 

Students to be published in its new journals : 

FREE LAW JOURNAL - (ISSN 1712-9877) 

WAR & PEACE JOURNAL - (ISSN 1712-9885) 

WORLD HISTORY JOURNAL - (ISSN 1712-9893) 

Articles are welcomed in : English, French, Bosnian, 

Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Finnish, German, Greek, 

Hungarian, Icelandic, Innuktikut, Italian, Latin, 

Polish, Portugese, Romanian, Russian, Serb, 

Slovenian as well as Spanish. 

FREE LAW JOURNAL : pertains all legal subjects, 

whether from a national, comparative or 

international perspective and including Canon Law, 

International Law, Islamic Law or social and 

historical perspective of laws' impacts on societies. 

WAR & PEACE JOURNAL : pertains to all issues 

ranging from conflict prevention to nation-building; 

including political sciences and diplomacy, nationbuilding, 

defense policies, strategies, operations, 

tactics, logistics, intelligence, peacekeeping, 

peacemaking, leadership, psychology of combat, 

technological developments and counter-terrorism; 

and finally Military Historical studies, relating to the 

conduct of operations, their causes and effects, the 

avoidance of conflict, leadership and personalities. 

WORLD HISTORY JOURNAL : pertains to the whole 

spectrum of human development, whether from 

local, regional or global perspectives, including 

history from all periods, paleontology, anthropology, 

linguistics, letters and languages, arts as well as 

sociological perspectives. 

For details, please consult the respective page of 

each journal and its submissions guidelines from 

http://www.FWPublishing.net or contact the editorin-chief 

at FWP@FWPublishing.net . 

Sincerely, 



APPEL POUR ARTICLES 

Free World Publishing accepte les articles 

d’académiciens, praticiens et d’étudiants supérieurs 

à être publier dans ses nouveaux journeaux : 




Les articles sont bienvenus en : Français, Anglais, 

Allemand, Bosniaque, Bulgare, Croate, Espagnol, 

Finlandais, Grecque, Hongrois, Islandais, Innuktikut, 

Italien, Latin, Polonais, Portugais, Roumain, Russe, 

Serbe, Slovène et Tchèque. 

FREE LAW JOURNAL : porte sur tous les sujets 

juridiques de perspectives nationale, comparative ou 

internationale, incluant les droits canonique, 

international, islamique, et les perspectives sociales 

et historiques de l’impact des lois sur les sociétés. 

WAR & PEACE JOURNAL : porte sur le spectre de la 

prévention de conflit jusqu’à la reconstruction 

d’État, incluant : sciences politiques, diplomacie, 

politique de défense, stratégie, operation, tactiques, 

logistique, renseignement, maintien et imposition de 

la paix, art du commandement, psychologie du 

combat, avancées technologiques et contreterrorisme, 

l’histoire militaire étudiant la conduite 

des opérations, l’évitement des conflits, leurs 

causes et effets, les commandants et personalités. 

WORLD HISTORY JOURNAL : porte sur l’ensemble 

du spectre du développement humain, d’une 

perspective locale, régionale ou globale, incluant : 

histoire de toutes les périodes, paleontologie, 

anthropologie, linguistiques, lettres et langages, les 

arts de même que les perspectives sociologiques. 

Pour les détails, consulter la page respective de 

chaque journal et ses critères de soumissions de 

http://www.FWPublishing.net ou contactez l’éditeur- 

chef à FWP@FWPublishing.net . 

Sincèrement, 


Éditeur-chef, Free World Publishing Inc.


A MAGYAR ÉS A SVÁJCI 

BÜNTETŐTÖRVÉNYKÖNYVIATALKORÚAKKAL 

SZEMBEN HATÁLYOSAN FOGANATOSÍTHATÓ 

INTÉZKEDÉSEINEK ÁLTALÁNOS 

ÖSSZEHASONLÍTÁSA, KÜLÖNÖS TEKINTETTEL 

A NEMZETKÖZI EGYEZMÉNYEKRE 

BY ORSOLYA BOGDÁN 

I. BEVEZETÉS 

1. NEMZETKÖZI TÖREKVÉSEK ÉS TENDENCIÁK A FIATALKORÚAK 

BÜNTETŐJOGÁBAN A XX. SZÁZADBAN 

„A XX. század elejétől a klasszikus büntetőjogi iskola merev 

dogmatizmusát feloldó pozitivista kriminálpolitika tettes – büntetőjogi 

szemléletének máig érvényesülő hatása a fiatalkorú bűnelkövetők 

megkülönböztetett, a felnőttekétől eltérő kezelése.” 1 

Államonként azonban eltérő szemlélettel találkozhatunk: valamely 

állam a fiatalkorúak szankciórendszerét inkább tekinti 

ifjúságvédelemnek ill. ifjúságnevelésnek, mint a hagyományos 

büntetések és intézkedések hálózatának fiatalkorúakra szabásának. Az 

előbbi modell előnyben részesíti az érintettek ügyeiben eljáró 

szakemberek – szociális munkások, pszichológusok stb. – szélesebb 

körű beavatkozását, míg az ún. igazságszolgáltatási modell a klasszikus 

tettfelelősség, proporcionalitás és a formális garanciák talaján áll, és 

attól nem rugaszkodik el. 

1 




105 

ORSOLYA BOGDÁN - A MAGYAR ÉS A SVÁJCI 

BÜNTETŐTÖRVÉNYKÖNYVIATALKORÚAKKAL SZEMBEN HATÁLYOSAN 

FOGANATOSÍTHATÓ INTÉZKEDÉSEINEK ÁLTALÁNOS ÖSSZEHASONLÍTÁSA, 

KÜLÖNÖS TEKINTETTEL A NEMZETKÖZI EGYEZMÉNYEKRE


A II. világháború utáni „új társadalomvédelmi iskola” (pl. Gramatica) 

kiinduló pontja a tettes reszocializációja, amely gyógyító–nevelő 

intézkedések útján érhető el, de ez nem szoríthatja háttérbe a társadalom 

biztonságát (hasonlóan a XIX. században, ahol elsődleges cél a bűnözők 

izolációja, de emellett a társadalom védelme volt). 

Ezzel párhuzamosan fejlődik ki az ún. treatment ideológia (a skandináv 

államokban, az USA-ban) a főként pszichológusokat, pszichiátereket és 

szociológusokat tömörítő, a humán tudományokat felhasználó 

rehabilicionista mozgalom termékeként; módszere a deviancia okának 

feltárása és az elkövetői személyiség–torzulás megszüntetése humánus, 

speciálpreventív eszközökkel. 

Ezzel szemben a hazánkban többek között Szabó András – képviselte 

„neo–abszolút” elmélet a büntetés megtorló jellegét helyezte előtérbe, és 

álláspontja szerint a büntetésnek joghátrányi és nem szociálpolitikai 

intézkedési jellegét kell kidomborítania. 2 

Rendszertől és elmélettől függetlenül szinte valamennyi országnak a 

fiatalkori bűnözés növekedésével kellett szembesülnie a 70–es évektől. 

A szabadságvesztéssel járó büntetések nem bizonyultak a 

legmegfelelőbb eszköznek a kriminalitás visszaszorításához (kvázi 

ultima ratio–ként emlegetik): a fiatalkorú erkölcsi – szociális – 

tanulmányi fejlődésében való visszavető hatása tagadhatatlan. E 

probléma mentén alakultak ki az olyan fogalmak, mint a „szabadságban 

való kezelés”, a „közösségi ellenőrzés”, a jóvátétel és a mediáció. A 

fiatalkorúak szabadságelvonásának hosszabb illetve határozatlan 

tartalmát az államok szűkülő köre, elsősorban az ún. ifjúságvédelmi 

modellt követők tartották fenn. 3 

A nemzetközi szervezetek ajánlásaikban (pl. Pekingi Szabályok) a 

fiatalkorú bűnelkövetők emberi jogainak specifikus védelmére 

szólítanak fel, pozitív diszkriminációjukat, családjuk, a társadalom és az 



106 






állam velük szembeni felelősségét hangsúlyozva, így, az emberi 

jogaikra és méltóságuk védelmére különös tekintettel kellene a 

büntetőtörvényeket kialakítani. 

A jóléti államok büntetőjogának profiljában már a 70–es, 80–as években 

középpontba kerülhettek az alap– és középfokú, általános– illetve 

szakműveltséget biztosító iskolarendszerű intézmények, amelyek a 

kreativitás és készségfejlesztés mellett kiegészültek praktikus, a 

szabadulás utáni életet megkönnyítő tanácsadó programokkal is. 

Újabban pedig világszerte szélesedett a társadalmi erőket az intézet 

életébe bekapcsoló együttműködési törekvés a fiatalkorú és szociális 

környezete közötti ellentmondás feloldása és a fiatalok szocializálása 

céljából. 4 

2. A FIATALKORÚAKRA VONATKOZÓ HATÁLYOS SZABÁLYOZÁS 

HELYE A MAGYAR ÉS A SVÁJCI BÜNTETŐJOGBAN 

2.1. A MAGYAR SZABÁLYOZÁS 

Magyarországon eddig három büntető törvénykönyvet alkottak. Az elsőt 

az 1843. évi Büntető Törvényjavaslat előzte meg, ezen túl a reformkori 

irodalom valamint német és az osztrák büntetőkódexek is nagy hatással 

voltak rá. 

Csemegi Károly, nagy felkészültségű ügyvéd, a Deák–párt bizalmát 

élvezve kapott megbízást a Btk. szöveganyagának és indoklásának 

kidolgozására, amelyet másfél éves országgyűlési vita után az 1878. V. 

tc.– ként törvényerőre emeltek. 

A Csemegi – kódex még nem kezelte egységesen a fiatalkorúak 

büntetőjogát, de a felnőttekétől eltérő büntetési mértéket már külön, a 

VII. fejezetben tárgyalta. 


107 






A reformtörekvések eredményeként létrejött 1908. évi I. Büntető 

Novella intézkedési tárában már helyet kaphatott a házi felügyelet és az 

iskolai fenyítés mellett a javító nevelés, dorgálás és a javító nevelés is. 

Az 1951. évi 34. számú tvr. a fiatalkorúakra vonatkozó anyagi és 

eljárásjogi szabályokat egy jogszabályban határozta meg, és növelte a 

nevelő jellegű intézkedések súlyát. 

Az 1961. évi V. törvény a fenti szabályokat a Btk. általános részébe 

építette be VI. fejezetként. 

Az 1961–es törvény szakmai gyengesége miatt szükségessé vált egy új 

kódex megalkotása, amelyet az igazságügyi minisztérium előkészítése 

után, a tudományos elit bevonásával 1978. december 20–án az 

országgyűlés elfogadott. Az új és máig hatályos Btk. már határozottan 

állást foglalt a nevelő jellegű intézkedések elsőbbsége mellett, s a 108.§ban 

(korábban 87.§) arról rendelkezik, hogy büntetés kiszabására csak 

akkor van mód, ha az intézkedés nem célravezető. Az intézkedések 

alkalmazása azonban nem a felelősség „elmosására” irányul, hanem 

olyan szankciók preferálásra, amelyek jobban alkalmazkodnak az e 

korban lévők életkori sajátosságaihoz. 5 

A törvényhozó célja ily módon a fiatalkorú helyes irányba fejlődésének 

és a társadalom hasznos tagjává válásának elősegítése. 

2.2. A SVÁJCI SZABÁLYOZÁS 

1798–ban, az „egy és oszthatatlan helvét köztársaság” létrejötte után 

nem sokat késlekedett a liberalizmus eszméit magán viselő 

büntetőtörvénykönyv kidolgozásával. 6 

5 

Nagy József: A fiatalkorúakra vontatkozó büntetőjogi szabályok kialakulása és 

változásai in Rendvédelmi Füzetek, 2002/36., 8. oldal 

6 

Nagy Ferenc: A svájci büntetőjogi szankciórendszer, Acta Universitatis 

Szegediensis De Attila József Nominatae – Acta Juridica et Politica, tomus 

XXXVI., Szeged, 1986, 145. oldal 

108 






Svájc államszövetséggé alakulásával azonban rövidesen 15 kantonális 

Btk. született, hiszen néhány speciális törvényi tényállást kivéve, a 

szövetségi tagok szabad kezet kaptak az anyagi és alaki törvényhozás 

körében is 7 . 

Carl Stooss berni professzor 1889–ben kapott megbízást a Szövetségi 

Tanácstól az államszövetségi Btk. tervezetének kidolgozására. Az ő 

keze nyomán épült ki először a társadalmilag szükséges intézkedések 

rendszere a törvényhozási munkában. 

Végül 1937. december 21–én került sor a törvény kihirdetésére, amit kis 

többséggel megerősített a kiírt népszavazás is, majd 1942. január 1–én 

hatályba lépett. A fiatalkorúakra vonatkozóak a 4. cím alatt kerültek 

szabályozásra. 

A dualista elképzelés szerint a büntetések mellett az intézkedések 

katalógusa biztonsági és más jellegű intézkedéseket fog át. Különbség 

tehető továbbá a szabadságelvonással és az azzal nem járó, valamint a 

javító–izoláló, illetve személyi és tárgyi intézkedések között. 

A törvény hatályba lépése után már mintegy tíz évvel, 1950–ben, majd 

1974. január 1–i hatállyal szükségessé váltak jelentősebb módosítások; 

ez utóbbi helyezte be a szankciók közé a fiatal felnőttek munkára nevelő 

intézeti beutalását, illetve megváltoztatta a korcsoport – elhatárolásokat 

is. 

A svájci Btk. intézkedéseiről összefoglalóan elmondható Rahberg 

szavaival, hogy „jövőre irányuló, célorientált prevenciók”. 

2.3. A FIATALKORÚAKRA VONATKOZÓ SZANKCIÓRENDSZER 

NEMZETKÖZI TENDENCIÁI NAPJAINKBAN – AZ ENSZ–KÖVETELMÉNYEK 

Az Egyesült Nemzetek Szervezete a 80–as években meghirdetett 

7 svájci Btk. 369., 371. cikke 

109 






bűnmegelőzési programjának középpontjába a fiatalkorúak 

igazságszolgáltatásának finomítását állította, figyelemmel az emberi 

jogokra és a társadalmi igazság szempontjaira. 8 

E szervezet égisze alatt kibontakozó reformmozgalom olyan 

irányelveket tett magáévá, mint a fiatalkorú életkori sajátosságain túl 

értelmi–erkölcsi fejlettségének a figyelembe vételét, a szankció 

elsődlegesen nevelő célját, az eljáró igazgatási szervek kötelességét a 

reszocializációban, továbbá külön büntetés–végrehajtási törvény 

kidolgozására hívja fel a tagállamokat. 

A változtatás igényét először az ENSZ 1980–ban megrendezett VI. 

bűnmegelőzési kongresszusán fogalmazták meg, amelyet az ún. Pekingi 

Szabályok (az 1955–ös ENSZ Minimum Szabályokra épül), 1985–ben, 

majd a Rijadi Irányelvek a megelőzésről 1988–ban követett, amelyeket 

a „Gyermekek jogairól” 9 szóló 1989–es New York– i egyezmény 

összegzett. 

Kutatásom során a Pekingi Szabályok részletesebb bemutatása mellett 

döntöttem, mert fejezetei lefedik mindazon probléma–köröket, 

amelyekkel a dolgozatom foglalkozik, és amelyekkel az egyes államok 

jogalkotóinak szembe kellett nézniük. 

2.3.1. A Pekingi Szabályok 

A dokumentum preambulumában ajánlja, hogy „a tagállamok (…) 

törekedjenek a fiatalkorú és családja jólétének előmozdítására” és 

csökkentsék a jogi beavatkozás szükségességét, a „törvénnyel 

összeütközésbe került fiatalkorú eredményes és humánus kezelését” (25. 

pont). Az e szabályhoz fűzött kommentár kiemeli, hogy a fiatalkorúról 

való gondoskodás alapvető jogpolitikai követelménye megelőzni a 

8 

ENSZ 40/33/1985. sz. határozata (Pekingi Szabályok), 23. pont 

9 

Magyarországon az 1991 – től (LXIV. tv.), Svájcban 1997 – től hatályos. Az 

Egyezmény a „gyermek” szó alatt a 18 éven aluliakat érti (1. cikk) 

110 






bűnelkövetést, ennek pedig egyik útja a fiatal jólétének elősegítése, ami 

egyúttal minimalizálni fogja az igazságszolgáltatás beavatkozásának 

szükségességét, ez pedig csökkenti az ezzel okozható ártalmat is (26. 

pont). 

Kiemelendő még a Szabályokból az arányosság követelménye, amely 

nem egyoldalúan a bűncselekmény tárgyi súlyához fűződik, hanem az 

elkövető személyes körülményeihez is (pl. családi körülmények – ám 

ez, ebben az általános megfogalmazásban, meglátásom szerint nehezen 

hozható összhangban az egyenlő elbánás elvével, azaz a formális logika 

szerint diszkriminatív). Így a törvényi reakció arányosságát az elkövető, 

a bűncselekmény és az áldozat körülményeinek kontextusában kell 

vizsgálni (28. pont). 

Az eljárási garanciák körében fontos megemlíteni a fiatalkorú 

anonimitáshoz való jogát és a szülő/gyám jelenlétéhez való jogot a 

tárgyalás során (31. pont). 

A dokumentum bátorítást ad az alternatív szankciók minél szélesebb 

körben való alkalmazására, így az intézeti elhelyezés helyett az alábbi 

intézkedéseket/büntetéseket javasolja: a fiatalkorú gondozása, 

felügyelete; próbára bocsátás; közérdekű munka; pénzügyi jellegű 

büntetések, kártalanítás; kezelés elrendelése, csoporttanácsadáson való 

részvétel, valamint nevelőszülői, lakóközösségi vagy más nevelő 

környezet általi gondozás elrendelése (32 – 33. pont). 

A fenti szankciók közös tulajdonsága, hogy közösségi bázisú korrekciós 

törekvéseket tartalmaznak. 10 Az alternativitás elve azt is jelenti, hogy a 

hatóságnak legyen lehetősége kiválasztani az elkövető számára 

legmegfelelőbbet, és adott esetben azt módosítani (34. pont). 

Az 1955–ös szabályozástól eltérően, a legvégső esetben alkalmazható 

szabadság–elvonó (intézeti) nevelés esetén sem tartja reálisnak az elítélt 

erkölcsi megváltozathatóságát, sokkal inkább a társadalomba való 

10 Lőrincz József: uo. 24. oldal 

111 






visszailleszkedésének feltételeit kívánja elősegíteni, például a személyes 

erőforrások fejlesztése útján. A Szabályok ezért előtérbe akarja hozni a 

fél–intézeti megoldásokat, mint a nevelőotthonokat és a nappali oktató 

központokat, amelyek hozzájárulnak a fiatalkorú reintegrációjához (49. 

pont). 

II. A FIATALKORÚAKRA VONATKOZÓ HATÁLYOS 

INTÉZKEDÉSEK A MAGYAR ÉS A SVÁJCI 

BÜNTETŐJOGBAN 

1. A SVÁJCI BTK. SAJÁTOSSÁGAI 

1.1. AZ ÉLETKOR JELENTŐSÉGE 

A szövetségi Btk. 4. címe két differenciáló ismérvet említ a 

fiatalkorúkkal szembeni intézkedések elrendelésére tekintettel. Az egyik 

a kezelés – nevelésre szorultság, a másik az életkor 11 . Ez utóbbi a 

magyartól eltérően három tartományt határoz meg: a 7 év alattiak nem 

büntethetők, azt a polgári jog körébe utalja, míg a 7 és 15 év közöttiekre 

(„enfant”) vonatkozó szankciókat tételesen elkülöníti a 16 – 18 év 

(„adolescent”) közöttiektől, amelyek a jogszabály kidolgozói az 

iskolalátogatási kötelezettséggel, illetve a pedagógusoktól való függés 

idejével hoznak összefüggésbe. 

1.2. A FIATALKORÚAKKAL SZEMBEN FOGANATOSÍTHATÓ 


A svájci Btk. 83. cikkelyében a fiatal elkövetési magatartásának és 

fizikai, pszichikai állapotának előzetes felmérését követeli meg, 

amelynek során világossá válik, melyik szankció lenne a 

legalkalmasabb vele szemben. Ennek érdekében elrendelhető a 

11 svájci Btk. 82. és 89. cikkelye 

112 






fiatalkorú ún. megfigyelő intézetben 12 való elhelyezése. Az azonban, 

hogy e vizsgálatot melyik hatóság(ok) végezzék, az adott kanton 

szabályozásának függvénye 13 . Az intézkedéseken belül nevelő jellegűek 

és speciális kezelést nyújtók is megtalálhatók, ám a büntetések közé 

sorolt fegyelmi jellegű szankciókkal is szeretnék foglalkozni, hiszen 

ezek eszközükben inkább dolgozatom tárgyához állnak közelebb, 

alkalmazási körük a svájci gyakorlatban vitatott. 

1.2.1. A nevelő jellegű intézkedések (mesures éducatives) 

Ha a fiatalkorú nem igényel speciális kezelést, de nehezen kezelhető, 

elhanyagolt vagy veszélyeztetett, az illetékes hatóság elrendelheti 

nevelőotthonban, nevelőcsaládban való elhelyezését, illetve ún. nevelési 

segítség nyújtását mind a 7 – 14, mind a 15 – 18 évesek körében 14 . 

1.2.1.1. A nevelési segítség (assistance éducative) 

Az 1973–as módosítások óta ez utóbbi intézkedés képezi sarokkövét a 

fiatal elkövetők büntetőjogának, így például a „veszélyeztetettséget” 

ugyan tágan kell értelmezni (családi körülmények, pszichés fejlődése, 

zavartság stb.), de a családból való kiszakítását alapos érvekkel kell 

alátámasztani. A nevelési segítség megadja a fiatal számára azt a 

körültekintő segítséget, nevelést és útbaigazítást, amelyre életkori 

sajátosságaiból és körülményeiből kifolyólag szüksége van. A 15 éven 

felettieknél ez kiegészül szakmai képzésben való részvételük és 

munkájuk rendszeressé válásának támogatásával, szemmel tartásával. A 

nevelési segítség mellett megállapítható fogház- és pénzbüntetés is. 

12 

uo. 83., 90., 384. cikke 

13 

a szankciókat a fiatalkorúak bírósága szabja ki, pl. Vaud kantonban az 1973. 

november 26–i törvény 9. cikkelye tartalmazza az erre vonatkozó szabályokat 

14 

svájci Btk. 84. és 91. cikkelye. Az intézkedések megnevezéséhez Nagy Ferenc 

fordítását használtam fel. 

113 






1.2.1.2. Elhelyezés nevelőotthonban (placement dans une maison 

d’éducation) 

Ha a fiatalkorú családi környezete ártalmas a fejlődésére nézve, 

hátráltatja testi – lelki fejlődését vagy kizsákmányolják, továbbá olyan 

bűntettet vagy vétséget követ el, ami a fiatal különleges 

veszélyességére, nehezen kezelhetőségére utal, és a családnál való 

elhelyezése nem célszerű, a fiatalkorú nevelőotthonba való beutalását 

rendeli el a hatóság. Az 1.2. pont bevezetőjében említett előzetes 

megfigyelést is ezekben az intézményekben kell végrehajtani, de a 

szélsőségesen kezelhetetlen, a többiek számára elviselhetetlen 

magatartásúak terápia otthonokba 15 való átszállítása lehetséges. Ezen túl 

a fiatal felnőttek számára ún. munkára nevelő intézeteket is felállítottak 

(lásd később), illetve az utógondozás is megoldott. 

Svájci specialitások a Btk. 384. cikke alapján a privátintézetek, otthonok 

engedélyezése, amelyek megfelelő, többek között orvosi felügyeletéről 

a kantonok gondoskodnak. 

A svájci nevelőotthonok fokozatos végrehajtásúak és a fiatalkorúak 

hosszabb tartalmú nevelésére és kezelésére szolgálnak, amikor az 

ambuláns intézkedések nem elegendőek. A főszerepet az iskolázási és a 

képzési lehetőségek biztosítása játsza. 

Az ott-tartózkodás határozatlan idejű (kivéve, ha a fiatalkorú különösen 

romlott, vagy bűntettet vagy súlyos vétséget követ el; ilyenkor az 

maximum 2 év). Az elkövetőt 25. életéve betöltésekor az intézetből el 

kell bocsátani. 

1.2.2. A speciális kezelés 16 (traitement spécial) 

15 uo. 93 ter cikke 

16 uo. 85. és 92. cikkelye 

114 






Ha a fiatalkorú szellemi fogyatékos, gyengeelméjű, gyengén látó, 

súlyosan hallás- vagy beszédképességében károsult, epilepsziás, 

rendellenesen visszamaradott szellemi vagy erkölcsi fejlődésében, 

speciális kezelés elrendelésére kerül sor. A 14 – 18 év közötti 

korosztállyal szemben ezen kívül alkoholizmus és drogfüggőség esetén 

is alkalmazható. Végrehajtása a hatóság által kijelölt korházban vagy 

szanatóriumban, de lehetőség szerint ambulánsan történik. 

Ebben a szabályban erőteljesebben látjuk érvényesülni az elkövető 

speciális rászorultságát a megkülönböztetett bánásmódra, ám a 84. 

cikkben lévő intézkedések párhuzamosan kiszabhatók vele. 

Ha az intézkedés oka megszűnt, az elkövető elbocsátható; de ha ez még 

nem állapítható meg, próbára bocsátásnak van helye. 

1.2.3. A fegyelmi büntetés (punitions disciplinaires) 17 

A svájci Btk. - a magyartól eltérően - büntetésként határozza meg a 

fegyelmi jellegű szankciókat, amelyek kiszabását akkor tartja 

célszerűnek, ha a fiatalkorúnak nincs szüksége sem nevelő intézkedésre, 

sem speciális kezelésre, amelynek eldöntésére a híresen tág bírói 

mérlegelés körében kerül sor. 

A kérdés szabályozására többek között Neuchâtel és Bâle–Ville 

kantonok szolgáltatták a példát 18 ; ezek nyomán beszélhetünk 

megrovásról, a kár helyrehozásáról, munkáról vagy 6 napos iskolai 

felfüggesztésről. 

Ezek közül kiemelném egyrészt a megrovást, ami nyilván szóban, 

szemtől-szemben lehet igazán hatékony; igaz, erről a törvény nem 

rendelkezik. A hatóság közvetlenül a fiatalhoz címzi kellő tapintattal és 

a megfelelő komolysággal. 

17 uo. 87. cikke 


korábban lehetőség kínálkozott iskolai elzárás és szobafogság elrendelésére is 

115 






Az elkövető őszinte megbánása a kár helyreállításában is 

megnyilvánulhat. A megbánásnak nem kell feltétlenül tettekben is 

kifejeződnie a jelen szabályozás szerint, a lényeg a hajlandósága, 

továbbá a részleges, szimbolikus jóvátétel is bírhat kellő nevelő 

hatással. 

A bíróság ugyanakkor le is mondhat a szankcionálásról, ha például 

törvénysértés óta 3 hónap telt el (az indoklás szerint ebben a korban a 

fiatalok gyorsan fejlődnek és felejtenek, így valamely fegyelmi 

intézkedés elrendelésével nem érnék el nevelő céljukat), a kárt 

helyreállította vagy a tette igen kis súlyú bűncselekmény. 

2. A MAGYAR BTK. SAJÁTOSSÁGAI 

2.1. AZ ÉLETKOR JELENTŐSÉGE 

A hatályos szabályozás szerint nem büntethető, aki az elkövetéskor nem 

töltötte be 14. életévét, azaz kiskorú 19 . Az 1978. IV. törvény miniszteri 

indoklása azonban kimondja, hogy a 14 – 18 év közötti fiatal büntető 

törvénybe ütköző cselekményei elleni küzdelemben az általános 

gyermek- és ifjúságvédelem eszközei egymagukban elégtelenek, az 

ilyen elkövetők már büntetőjogi felelősséggel tartoznak, velük szemben 

büntetést és intézkedést lehet alkalmazni 20 . Ma büntetés akkor szabható 

ki, ha az intézkedés célszerűtlennek bizonyul, nincs korhoz kötve 

(korábban 16. életév), így szigorítást jelent az 1961–es szabályozáshoz 

képest. Érdekességképpen megemlíteném, hogy az 1951. évi 34. sz. 

rendelet a fiatalkorúakon belül – Svájchoz hasonlóan – két korcsoportot 

állapított meg (12 – 14 és 15 – 18 évesek). 

19 

magyar Btk. 22 – 23. § 

20 

uo. 107. § 

116 






2.2. A FIATALKORÚAKKAL SZEMBEN FOGANATOSÍTHATÓ 


A magyar Btk. 108.§-a egyértelműen állást foglal amellett, hogy a 

fiatalkorúval szemben kiszabott / elrendelt büntetés vagy intézkedés 

elsődleges célja az egyéni megelőzés, azaz az elkövetőt helyes irányba 

fejlesztő nevelés és társadalomba való beilleszkedésének elősegítése. 

Három fajtáját különíthetjük el az intézkedéseknek: a kifejezetten 

nevelő jellegűek (megrovás, próbára bocsátás, javítóintézeti elhelyezés), 

a gyógyító jellegű (kényszergyógykezelés), gyógyító és nevelő jellegű 

(kényszergyógyítás) és biztonsági célú (elkobzás). 

Munkámban csak a svájci Btk.–ban is megtalálható intézkedési 

fajtákkal foglalkozom, hogy lehetőségem legyen a bilaterális 

összehasonlításra. 

2.2.1. Megrovás 

A megrovás 71.§-beli szabályozása vonatkozik mind a felnőtt -, mind a 

fiatalkorúakra; a legenyhébb büntetőjogi jogkövetkezmény. 

A szakirodalomban vita folyt arról, hogy az ún. „bagatell– 

bűncselekményeknél” beszélhetünk–e társadalomra veszélyességről, 

mert a tényállás ugyan megvalósult, de hatása lényegében 

elhanyagolható. A 80–as években olyan javaslat is született, hogy 

kiveszik a törvény szövegből a társadalomra veszélyességre utaló 

fordulatot. 21 

Jelenleg megrovás akkor alkalmazandó, ha a társadalomra veszélyesség 

csekély foka, csekéllyé válása vagy megszűnése (nem kötelező) miatt a 

tett nem büntethető, illetve, ha a büntethetősége egyéb okból 

megszűnik. 

21 

Györgyi Kálmán: Büntetések és intézkedések, Közgazdasági és Jogi 

Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1984, 361. oldal 

117 






A megrovás elsősorban rosszallást fejez ki, amit a bíróságon kívül 

egyéb hatóság is végrehajthat (ügyész, nyomozó hatóság), amelyet 

szóban indokolt megtenni. 

2.2.2. A javítóintézeti nevelés 

A 118. § szerinti intézkedés szükségességéről a törvény igen 

szűkszavúan rendelkezik. A szakirodalomban például az alábbi 

indokokat olvashatjuk 22 : a fiatalkorú környezete káros befolyást 

gyakorol a fejlődésére, és környezeterősítésre van szüksége; környezete 

ugyan nem gyakorol rá káros befolyást, de erői elégtelennek 

mutatkoznak a kriminalitás elleni hatékony küzdelemre. Végül 

lehetséges, hogy a fiatal káros erkölcsi tulajdonságai és jellemének 

fogyatékosságai újabb büntettek megelőzése érdekében elszigetelést és 

szigorú közösségi fegyelemben való nevelést tesznek szükségessé. 

A javítóintézetek gyermekvédelmi rendszer részeként sajátos 

pedagógiai feladatokat ellátó nevelőintézetek. 

A magyar szabályozás az általános formán kívül további két típusát 

említi az intézményeknek. Az egyik zárt jellegű, ahova az intézmény 

igazgatója az elkövetőt áthelyezheti, ha az ismételten és súlyosan 

megsérti az intézet rendjét, míg a másik az utógondozó, ahogy ez a 

svájci törvényben is megtalálható. 

A nevelés időtartalma a 1.2.1.2. pontban tárgyaltaktól eltérően 

határozott időtartamú; egy évtől három évig terjedhet, de az intézet 

lakóját 19. életévének betöltésekor onnan el kell bocsátani. 

Svájchoz hasonlóan – nemzetközi kötelezettségekből eredően -, a 

nevelés célja a fiatal beilleszkedési zavarainak enyhítése, pszichés 

állapotának rendezése, oktatása, szakképzettségének fejlesztése, 

22 

Szabó András: A fiatalkorúak és a büntetőjog, Közgazdasági és Jogi 

Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1961, 310. oldal 







egészséges életmódra való felkészítése. Kiemelten kell foglalkozni az 

alkohol, a kábítószer veszélyeivel és a szexuális élet problémáival. 

2.2.3. Gyógyító jellegű intézkedések 

A magyar büntetőjog nem rendelkezik speciálisan a fiatalkorúak 

gyógykezeléséről szóló paragrafussal, igaz, a Büntetés - végrehajtási 

tvr. 23 107. §-ának (2) bekezdése szerint különös gondot kell fordítani a 

gyógypedagógiai nevelésre szoruló és a személyiségzavarban szenvedő 

fiatalkorúak gyógyítására, sajátos nevelésére és oktatására, de ez nem 

feltételez külön intézetet. 

A 74. és a 75. § rendelkezik a kényszergyógykezelésről és az 

alkoholisták kényszergyógyításáról. Itt nem találkozhatunk a fiatalkorú 

olyan különleges körülményeinek, tulajdonságainak leírásával, mint a 

svájci törvényben (pl. gyengén látó); az intézkedés elrendelendő, ha 

személy elleni erőszakos vagy közveszélyt okozó – 1 évi 

szabadságvesztésnél súlyosabban büntethető – cselekményt követ el, de 

nincs beszámítási képessége az elmeműködésének kóros állapota miatt. 

A kényszergyógykezelés elrendelhető akkor is, ha a bűnelkövetés 

kábítószer-élvező életmódjával függ össze. 

A kezelés elsődleges célja a szakszerű gyógyítás, állapota romlásának 

megakadályozása, valamint újabb bűncselekmény elkövetésének 

megelőzése (tekintettel a törvény (1) bekezdésének harmadik, 

konjunktív feltételére). Az ápolás mellett azonban fontos szerepet 

kapnak a munkaterápiás foglalkozások is. 

Végrehajtására arra kijelölt, zárt intézetben kerül sor (IMEI), 

határozatlan időtartamra, folytatásának szükségességét a bíróság 

hivatalból évente megvizsgálja. 

A kényszergyógyítás végrehajtása fiatalkorú esetében javítóintézetben 

történik. A 103/1981. büntetőkollégiumi állásfoglalás szerint az 

intézkedés eredményes végrehajtásához legalább 4 hónapi időtartam 

23 

1979. évi 11. tvr. többszörösen módosítva 

119 






szükséges, amelyet egy maximum 30 napos kivizsgálás előz meg. 

Ennek alapján készítik el az elítéltek sajátos nevelésének, oktatásának és 

kezelésének a programját, irányítják csoportokba. 

Időtartama legfeljebb 1 év, a svájci szabályozástól eltérően nem önálló 

szankció. 

3. A „FIATAL FELNŐTT” MINT ÖNÁLLÓ KORCSOPORT? 

3.1. KEZDEMÉNYEZÉSEK HAZÁNKBAN 

A fiatalkorúakkal kapcsolatos jogfejlődést végigtekintve egy rendkívül 

fontos, de sikertelen kezdeményezés tanúi lehettünk az 1970–es 

években, az új Btk. előkészítésével összefüggésében. Molnár József 24 , 

kiindulva a személyiségfejlődés 24 – 25 éves korra történő 

lezárulásának következményeiből, széles körű nemzetközi 

összehasonlítással is alátámasztott kriminológiai vizsgálatot végzett. 

Célja, hogy a fiatal felnőttek büntetőjogi felelősségét külön 

kategóriaként ismerjék el, átmenetet képezzen a fiatalkorúakra és a 

felnőtt korúakra vonatkozó szankciórendszer között, és az 

bekerülhessen az 1978 – as törvénybe. 

A kodifikáció során ezek a külföldön már bevált megoldások nem 

valósulhattak meg ugyan, de a szakma figyelmét sikerült e kérdéskörre 

irányítani. 

3.2. MEGVALÓSULÁSA SVÁJCBAN 

A svájci Btk. külön alpontjában tárgyalja a fiatal felnőttekre vonatkozó 

szabályozást – igaz, igen röviden. 

24 

Molnár József: A fiatalkori bűnözés helyzete és megelőzése Magyarországon, 

Kriminológiai és Kriminalisztikai Tanulmányok X. kötet, Budapest, 1973, 159. 

oldal 

120 






Főszabályként 25 ha az elkövető elkövetéskor 18. életévét már betöltötte, 

de még nem múlt el 25, az általános büntetési tételeket kell vele 

szemben is alkalmazni. Ez alóli kivételeket a 100 bis és a 100 ter 

tartalmazza. 

A törvény szerint a bíró tájékozódik az elkövető magaviseletéről, 

tanulmányairól és társadalmi helyzetéről, és ha szükséges, szakértői 

vizsgálatot rendel el fizikai és szellemi állapotáról, így tanulási– és 

munkaképességéről, és kérheti a fiatal munkára nevelő intézeti 

(„dologház”) beutalását. 

Ez az intézkedés kizárólag a 18 – 25 év közötti azon elkövetőkkel 

szemben alkalmazható, akik jellembeli fejlődésükben jelentősen 

zavartak vagy veszélyeztetettek, léhák vagy munkakerülők, tettük ezzel 

összefüggésben áll, és feltehető, hogy ezzel a jövőbeni bűncselekmény 

megelőzhető. 

A fiatalnak biztosítani kell az intézeten belüli szellemi és testi fejődést, 

szakmai ismereteinek bővítésének lehetőségét, kötelezni kell szakmai 

végzettség megszerzésére vagy intézeten kívüli munkavégzésre. 

Tartama minimálisan 1 év, 1 – 3 év próbaidőre feltételesen elbocsátható, 

de védőfelügyeletet biztosítanak számára. Ha az elkövető az intézet 

szabályait súlyosan megszegi, a hatóság elrendelheti a felnőttek számra 

fenntartott büntetés – végrehajtási intézetek egyikébe történő 

átszállítását. 

III. A MAGYAR ÉS SVÁJCI SZABÁLYOZÁS KIEMELT 

PONTJAI A NEMZETKÖZI KÖVETELMÉNYEK TÜKRÉBEN – 

MEGOLDÁSI JAVASLATOK A JÖVŐRE NÉZVE 

„Az Egyezményben részes államok gondoskodnak arról, hogy a 

25 svájci Btk. 100. cikke 

121 






gyermeket szüleitől, ezek akarata ellenére, ne válasszák el, kivéve, ha az 

illetékes hatóságok, bírói felülvizsgálat lehetőségének fenntartásával és 

az erre vonatkozó törvényeknek és eljárásoknak megfelelően úgy 

döntenek, hogy ez az elválasztás a gyermek mindenek felett álló 

érdekében szükséges. Ilyen értelmű döntés szükséges lehet bizonyos 

különleges esetekben, például akkor, ha a szülők durván kezelik, vagy 

elhanyagolják gyermeküket, illetőleg ha különválva élnek és dönteni 

kell a gyermek elhelyezéséről. „ 26 

Az Egyezmény is csak példálózóan tér ki azokra az esetekre, amikor a 

fiatalkorú családi környezetéből való kiemelése szükséges; ennek 

meghatározását egyrészről az aláíró ország törvényalkotójának 

kompetenciájába, másrészről a bíró mérlegelési körébe utalja. 

Dolgozatom körébe csak azok az esetek tartoznak, amikor a fiatalkorú 

bűnelkövető. A Szabó András – iránymutatásból a jelen szabályozásba 

csak az a fordulat került bele, hogy a javítóintézeti elhelyezés (mint 

egyetlen, eddigi környezetétől távoli elhelyezést biztosító alternatíva) az 

elkövető nevelése szempontjából szükséges. 

A svájci megoldás sokkal körültekintőbben dolgozza ki a fiatal 

körülmény–rendszerét, ezen túl pedig lehetővé teszi az ún. nevelési 

segítséget is. 

Az Egyezményben részes államok elismerik a gyermekeknek az 

oktatáshoz való jogát, és az esélyegyenlőség jegyében történő 

gyakorlása céljából az alapfokú oktatást kötelezővé és ingyenessé 

teszik, ami lehetőség szerint középfokú vagy szakmai képzésnek kell 

követnie 27 , amihez minden gyermeknek, így a büntetés vagy intézkedés 

hatálya alatt állónak is hozzáférhetőnek kell lennie. Láthattuk az 1.2.1.2 

és 2.2.2. pontokban, hogy ez mindkét Btk. szövegében megtalálható és 

különleges fontossággal bír. 

26 

New York– i egyezmény, 9. cikk, 1. bekezdés 

27 

u.o. 28. cikk 

122 






A 29. cikkből – ami továbbra is az oktatás–nevelés szükségességével 

foglalkozik – kiemelnék egy számomra nagy jelentőséggel bíró 

gondolatot: a gyermekek tudatába kell vésni az emberi jogok és az 

alapvető szabadságjogokon kívül „…a szülei személyazonossága, 

nyelve és kulturális értékei iránti tiszteletet, valamint annak az 

országnak, amelyben él, továbbá esetleges származási országnak a 

nemzeti értékei iránti és a sajátjától különböző kultúrák iránti 

tiszteletet…” 

Mind Svájcnak (a büntetés – végrehajtási intézetek lakói igen nagy 

arányban külföldiek), mind hazánknak (roma kisebbség) lépéseket kell 

tennie annak érdekékében, hogy az életkörülményei és nemzeti - etnikai 

hovatartozása miatt marginalizálódott (e kettő többnyire halmozottan 

jelentkezik) fiatalokat valamiféle kapaszkodóhoz juttassa, éreztesse 

velük, hogy az adott társadalom megbecsült tagjai. Ennek módja pedig 

nem a kirekesztés, hanem az integráció lehet – de nem minden áron. 

Lehetőséget kell számukra adni a kisebbségi kulturális gyökereik 

megismerésére, és ezt véleményem szerint a normál tanintézetek keretén 

belül mind a kisebbségi, mind a többségben élő gyerekeknek is meg kell 

teremteni. A toleráns és hozzáértő megközelítés eme megnyilvánulása, 

az egészséges identitástudat kialakulása, a mások iránti felelősségtudat 

hatalmas előrelépést jelenthetne az agresszió visszaszorításában s így a 

megelőzés területén egyaránt 28 . 

A 33. cikk említi az államok felelősségét arra nézve, hogy a 

gyermekeket megvédjék a kábító- és pszichotróp szerek tiltott 

fogyasztásától, amelyet mindkét törvénykönyv külön kiemel, és a 

használattal összefüggésben bűnözővé vált fiatalkorú speciális kezelését 

írják elő. 

Összehasonlító munkám során nem tapasztaltam lényegi eltéréseket a 

vizsgált két szankciórendszer elvi alapjaiban. Azonban álláspontom 

28 

lásd bővebben: Ervin Staub: Az erőszak társadalmi – kulturális gyökerei in 

Történeti és politikai pszichológia (szerk. Hunyady György), Osiris, Budapest, 

1998, 90 – 115. oldal 

123 






szerint számos, eddig megválaszolatlan vagy részben rendezett kérdésre 

nem csak jogalkotói, hanem szélesebb körű szakmai–társadalmi 

megoldást kell keresni. 

Érdemes lenne talán újragondolni hazánkban az egyes korbesorolásokat, 

nem csak azért, hogy a fiatalkorú fejlettségéhez mérten adekvált 

büntetés / intézkedés alkalmazására kerülhessen sor, hanem a bűnügyi 

mutatók arra a sajnálatos tényre is felhívják a figyelmünket, hogy az 

első elkövetések egyre fiatalabb korra tevődnek. 

Külön tanulmányt megérne a – 1.2.1. pontban csak megemlített – 

Svájcban ismert ún. nevelőszülői elhelyezés, amely társadalmi, nem 

pedig állami intézményi szinten kívánja a deviáns fiatalok helyzetét 

rendezni; itt azonban az országra olyan többlet felelősség és feladat is 

hárulna, mint például a családok kiválasztása, képzése, ellenőrzése. 

Kétséget kizáróan ez tűnik a leghumánusabb megoldásnak, ám az 

anyagi kérdéseken túl ott van egy személyi is: felkészültünk- e vajon 

arra, hogy egyenrangúként kezeljünk, befogadjunk egy olyan fiatalt, 

akit a büntetőjog történetének hosszú évszázadai alatt kirekeszteni 

törekedtünk... 

Érdeklődéssel olvastam, hogy Svájcban a nevelőotthonban való 

tartózkodás 25 éves korig is kitolódhat; a jogalkotó szándéka nyilván az 

lehetett, hogy a fiatalkorú (fiatal felnőtt) minél tovább legyen egy olyan 

közeg tagja, ahonnan megerősítést kaphat és erkölcsi nevelését, szakmai 

képzését is biztosítják. A magyar megoldás mellett fel lehet hozni 

érvként, hogy a fiatalok nagy része 16-19 évesen ösztönösen lázad 

mindenfajta kötöttséggel szemben (különösen, ha komoly intézeti 

házirendről van szó), ami hátráltathatja a többi ott-lakó nevelését, 

veszélyeztetheti a fegyelmet. A javítóintézetek feladataikban 

túlterheltek, gyakran diszfunkcionálisak, ezért szükségét látnám 

hazánkban a probléma megvizsgálását. 

Érdekes kezdeményezésnek tűnik a megelőzés jegyében az ún. szülői 

tréning kialakítása, amely hatékony beavatkozás lehet agresszív és 

antiszociális gyermekek esetében azáltal, ha például szüleik is részt 

124 






vesznek a fiatalok számára biztosított pozitív oktatási és szocializációs 

tapasztalatszerzés folyamatában. Ezek a korai beavatkozó programok 

kialakíthatják az iskolai munkában való hatékonyságot és érdeklődést, 

erősíthetik a családi kapcsolatokat is, szilárd talajt nyújtva ezzel a 

gyerekeknek. 

Kétséget ébresztenek azonban azok a próbálkozások, amelyek az 

igazságos és költségkímélő büntetés ideológiájának felhasználásával 

kívánják feltámasztani a represszív testi és megalázó büntetések 

alkalmazását. 

Nem utolsó sorban megemlítem a svájci Btk. 57. cikkében szereplő – 

felnőttekre vonatkozó - ún. békekezesség intézményét, amelynek 

lényege, hogy a bíró a bűncselekménnyel vagy annak ismétlésével 

fenyegető személy ígéretét veszi, hogy tettét mégsem viszi véghez. 

Sajnos azonban úgy tűnik, hogy ez nem jelent különösebb visszatartó 

erőt egy, a magyarnál régebbi jóléti demokráciában sem, hiszen 

alkalmazási köre igencsak leszűkült, ritkán alkalmazott, kevéssé 

hatékony. 

Míg a napóleoni Code Civil 371. cikke szerint „az apai tekintélynek és 

hatalomnak kell kiegészíteni a törvényeket, kijavítani az erkölcsöt és az 

engedelmességet kialakítania a gyermekben”, addig ma már több 

nemzetközi szervezet, helyi kezdeményezés és iskolai szintű programok 

segítik a fiatalokat abban, hogy megtalálják a helyes utat, ehhez 

azonban az életkörülményeik javítása elengedhetetlen – az állam 

hathatós közreműködésével. 

125 






IV. FELHASZNÁLT IRODALOM 

Belovics Ervin – Vokó György: A büntetés – végrehajtási jog 

magyarázata, HVG – ORAC, Budapest, 2001 

Büntetőjog – Általános rész (szerk. dr. Békés Imre), HVG – ORAC, 

Budapest, 2002 

Ervin Staub: Az erőszak társadalmi – kulturális gyökerei in Történeti és 

politikai pszichológia (szerk. Hunyady György), Osiris, Budapest 

Fraçoise Martinetti: Les Droit de l’enfant, edition Unicef, Librio, Paris, 

2002 

Györgyi Kálmán: Büntetések és intézkedések, Közgazdasági és Jogi 

Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1984 


végrehajtásában, Bv. Szakkönyvtár, IM Büntetés – végrehajtás 

Országos Parancsnokság, Budapest, 1992. 

Molnár József: A fiatalkori bűnözés helyzete és megelőzése 

Magyarországon, Kriminológiai és Kriminalisztikai Tanulmányok X. 

kötet, Budapest, 1973 

Nagy Ferenc: A svájci büntetőjogi szankciórendszer, Acta Universitatis 

Szegediensis De Attila József Nominatae – Acta Juridica et Politica, 

tomus XXXVI., Szeged, 1986 

Ausztria, NSZK, Svájc, Hollandia és Spanyolország büntetés – 

végrehajtási rendszerének áttekintése, Bv. Szakkönyvtár, Budapest, 

1990/1. 

Intézkedések a büntetőjog szankciórendszerében, Közgazdasági és Jogi 


Nagy József: A fiatalkorúakra vonatkozó büntetőjogi szabályok 

kialakulása és változásai in Rendvédelmi Füzetek, 2002/36. 

Paul Logoz: Commentaire du Code Pénal Suisse - Partie Générale, 

Delachaux&Niesté SA., Neuchâtel – Paris, 1976 

Szabó András: A fiatalkorúak és a büntetőjog, Közgazdasági és Jogi 


Vokó György: A magyar büntetés – végrehajtási jog, Dialóg Campus, 

Budapest – Pécs, 2001 

www.parlament.ch 

126 






EXCEPTIONS TO RES JUDICATA AND THE 

PROHIBITION OF NE BIS IN IDEM IN 

CRIMINAL LAW 

BY DR MACIEJ ROGALSKI 

1. The notion of legal validity appeared for the first time during the 

period of the Hammurabi State, which dates back to more than 1750 

BC. In the Hammurabi Code, and in numerous documents from court 

proceedings that have been preserved on clay tablets, it is recorded that 

a judge who altered a judgment recorded on a sealed tablet would be 

removed from judicial office, and face a fine of twelve times the value 

of the claim. 1 

Further on in history, the institution of legal validity was connected with 

the prohibition of ne bis in idem. In ancient Greece the principle of ne 

bis in eadem re was in force in Athens and Sparta – no one could be 

tried twice for the same offence. The purpose of this principle was to 

prevent the same person from facing repeated prosecution. 2 As early as 

the fourth century BC Demosthenes referred to this as one of the rights 

guaranteed to a defendant facing trial. 3 

In Roman times, Ulpian maintained that a final court judgment should 

not be changed (res judicata pro veritate accipitur). Roman lawyers 

believed that a judgment, if it was to serve the aim of the trial, had to 

constitute law in that specific case. 4 In this respect, both sentences and 

acquittals became valid in law. During the period of the Republic, once 

a case had been decided, there was no higher court or instance which 

had jurisdiction over the case, so each judgment carried immediate legal 

validity. 5 Once courts of instance were introduced, before a judgment 

1 

S. Waltoś: Proces karny. Zarys systemu, Warszawa 2002, p 75. 

2 

J. W. Jones: Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks, 1956, p 148. 

3 

M. L. Friedland: Double Jeopardy, Oxford 1969, pp 15-16. 

4 

Z. Resich: Res judicata, Warszawa 1978, p 7. 

5 

W. Kufel: Res judicata. Przegląd zapatrywań na istotę powagi rzeczy osądzonej 

127 

DR MACIEJ ROGALSKI - EXCEPTIONS TO RES JUDICATA AND 

THE PROHIBITION OF NE BIS IN IDEM IN CRIMINAL LAW


could become valid in law, all appeals first had to be exhausted. During 

the same period, the principle of non bis in idem was also observed 6 , 

and it was expressed in other Latin proverbs: nemo debet bis vexari pro 

una et eadem causa, nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto 7 , or the one 

formulated by Joannes Teutonius: ne bis in idem crimen iudicetur. 8 

The principle of the legal validity of judgments in criminal cases was 

considered as a principle of both canon law and older German 

legislation. This was mentioned by Gratian who, basing it on the Old 

Testament, used the formulation of non iudicabit Deus bis in id ipsum. 9 

The principle of ne bis in idem appeared in the Saxon Mirror. Emperor 

Charles V’s criminal legislation of 1532 (Constitutio Criminalis 

Carolina) contained no provisions covering the legal validity of 

sentences. In trials during the Inquisition, the principle of ne bis in idem 

was abolished. In 16 th -century continental Europe, the principle of ne 

bis in idem was replaced by the institution of “release from the court of 

first instance” (absolutio ab instantia) prepared by Milanese lawyers. 

This meant that where there was insufficient evidence to pass judgment, 

the proceedings were suspended, but could be reopened on new 

evidence. 10 In Germany, the institution of absolutio ab instantia was 

introduced in 1635, and by the end of the 18 th century, it became 

common court practice. In 1751, the validity of “release from the court 

of first instance” was confirmed in the Codex Juris Bavarici Criminalis. 

In line with the binding concept of absolutio ab instantia, undertaking 

of final proceedings was dependent on new circumstances coming to 

w procesie cywilnym, Ruch Prawniczy Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 1964, No. 

1, p 49. 

6 

See Jolowicz: Roman Foundations of Modern Law, 1957, pp 87, 94-100. 

7 

R. Kmiecik: Prawomocność postanowień prokuratora w świetle k.p.k. z 1997 r. 

(in:) Nowy Kodeks postępowania karnego. Zagadnienia węzłowe, Kraków 1998, 

p 193. 

8 

M. Lipczyńska: Polski proces karny. Zagadnienia ogólne, t. I, Warszawa 1986, 

p 53; S. Waltoś: op. cit. p 63. 

9 

F.C. Schroeder: Die Rechtsnatur des Grundsatzes „ne bis in idem“, Juristische 

Schulung 1997, No.3, p 228. 

10 

G. Schwarplies: Die rechtsgeschichtliche Entwicklung des Grundsatzes “ne bis 

in idem” im Strafprozess, Zürich 1970, p 27. 

128 




light. 11 

By the end of the 18 th Century, the French Revolution once again 

restored the principle of ne bis in idem. 12 The first regulations in French 

law (The Constitution of September 1791, Chapter V and Art. 9 of the 

Criminal Procedure Code of 1808) limited the principle to prohibiting 

punishment and prosecution once a person had been acquitted. 13 

In Germany during the Enlightenment, the individual was granted new 

rights in criminal proceedings. 14 The framework for the modern criminal 

trial was established by the Frankfurt Constitution of 1849, which 

among other things significantly limited the possibility for a retrial of 

the same criminal case and against the same person, thereby increasing 

the importance of the institution of legal validity. However, no 

provisions of the German Reich’s Criminal Procedure of 1 February 

1877 referred directly to the institution of legal validity. Nevertheless, it 

did accept the principle of ne bis in idem which from that moment on 

has been generally accepted in Reich Court judgments. 15 

In Anglo-Saxon legal theory, the ne bis in idem prohibition is described 

as a “rule against double jeopardy”. This prohibition is as old as the 

common law itself. In 12 th Century England, during the controversy 

between Henry II and Archbishop Thomas Becket over Church 

independence, this principle was exploited in the defence of the 

independence of ecclesiastical courts. An official accused of murder 

was tried by an ecclesiastical court. In order to exclude the jurisdiction 

of the Royal court, the principle of ne bis in idipsum, then in force in 

ecclesiastical courts, was invoked: “no one may be punished twice for 

the same offence”. 16 During a later period, a principle was observed in 

11 

U. Dithmar: Der Gundsatz “ne bis in idem” und das fortgesetzte Delikt, Berlin 

1993, p 6. 

12 

Barbey: La Rẻgle Non Bis in Idem, 1930, p 23. 

13 

F. C. Schroeder: op. cit., p 228. 

14 

T. Maciejewski: Historia powszechna ustroju i prawa, Warszawa 2000, pp 

838-840. 

15 

U. Dithmar: op. cit., p 7. 

16 

M. L. Friedland: op. cit., p 5. 

129 




practice according to which it was impermissible to conduct several 

proceedings in the same case. In 1660, the Court of the King’s Bench in 

England forbade the conduct of two proceedings in the same case. 17 

In Ireland the double jeopardy concept is often recognisable in the 

language of anglicised Norman French (i. e. autrefois acquit and 

convict) whereas in most of the Code nations is it expressed in the Latin 

maxim of non bis in idem. 18 

The principle of double jeopardy is to be found in the Fifth Amendment 

of the United States Constitution and provides that no person shall “be 

subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”. 

The Fifth Amendment has been held to consist of three separate 

guarantees, namely: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and protection 

against multiple punishment for the same offence. In addition to the 

United States, the German, Canadian, Indian and South African 

constitutions also embody this principle. Article 35(3)(m) of the 

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides that a person is 

“not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which 

that person has previously been either acquitted or convicted”. 19 

The principle of ne bis in idem is contained in the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966. 

According to Art. 14 par. 7, “No one shall be liable to be tried or 

punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally 

convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and criminal 

procedure of each country”. This provision concerns only criminal 

proceedings in a given state. 20 

This principle can also be found in the 1984 Protocol No. 7 to the 

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 

17 

P. A. McDermott: Res Judicata and Double Jeopardy, Butterworths 1999, p 

200. 


P. A. McDermott: op. cit., p 201. 

19 

P. A. McDermott: op. cit., pp 198, 201. 

20 

Dziennik Ustaw, 1977 , No. 38, item 167. See J. Tylman: Postępowanie karne. 

Zbiór przepisów, orzecznictwo i literatura, Bydgoszcz-Łódź 2002, p 30. 

130 




Fundamental Freedoms, which provides that, ”No one shall be liable to 

be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction 

of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally 

acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and criminal 

procedure of the State.” 21 Thus formulated, the prohibition of ne bis in 

idem does not prevent the reopening of proceedings in accordance with 

the law and procedure of a state concerned where new facts have been 

discovered or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous 

proceedings that could affect the outcome of the case (Art. 4 par. 2). In 

the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 

Fundamental Freedom, the principle of ne bis in idem is a principle 

which is not subject to derogation, which means that states cannot 

temporarily suspend its binding force even in extraordinary 

circumstances (“In time of war or other public emergency threatening 

the life of the nation”) within the meaning of Art. 15 of the European 

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 

Freedom. 22 This prohibition protects citizens against a feeling of 

uncertainty and the legal order from the instability of court decisions. 23 

2. Res judicata is a legal institution preventing situations arising where 

further proceedings would be instigated against the same person, in the 

same case, once a final valid judgement had been passed terminating the 

proceedings. If a given case is examined ex officio to determine 

whether res judicata applies, even before criminal proceedings 

commence , this ensures that people are not involved without due cause 

in a process with all the negative consequences this can entail. 24 On the 

21 Dziennik Ustaw 2003, No. 42, item 364. 

22 See B. Gronowska: Wyrok Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka w 

sprawach: Gradinger przeciwko Austrii, 23 October 1995, ref.. 33/1994/480/562 

and Oliveira przeciwko Szwajcarii, 30 June 1998, ref. 84/1997/868/1080, Prok. i 

Pr. 1999, Nos. 11-12, p 150; F. C. Schroeder: op. cit., p 230. 

23 R. Kmiecik, E. Skrętowicz: Proces karny. Część ogólna, Kraków-Lublin 1999, 

pp205-206; R. Kmiecik: Prawomocność postanowień prokuratora w świetle 

k.p.k. z 1997 (in:) Nowy Kodeks postępowania karnego. Zagadnienia węzłowe, 

Kraków 1998, p 193. 

24 S. Waltoś: op. cit., p 440. 

131 




other hand, obviously, this cannot be allowed to lead to the perpetrator 

of an offence avoiding responsibility. 25 

The principle of ne bis in idem guarantees the accused that he will not 

be held criminally responsible for an act which has already been 

adjudged. This is a right of the perpetrator of a punishable act, who can 

then demand that proceedings not be instituted against him, or where 

proceedings have already commenced, that they be discontinued, if 

criminal proceedings against him in the same case have already 

terminated with a valid judgement. 

The prohibition against reopening proceedings in the same case thus 

takes priority over the principle of justice. This may sometimes be 

difficult to accept due to “society’s notion of justice”. It is worth noting 

that the Parliamentary Council in Germany, as a result of “past 

experience”, i.e. endemic infringement of the law by institutions and 

offices of National Socialism, has added Art. 103 par. 3 to the current 

Constitution, which prohibits multiple punishment, . However, this did 

not relate to the prohibition against multiple punishment, but rather with 

the fact that sentences were set aside as too lenient and replaced with 

more severe ones on the basis of an extraordinary appeal and petition 

for annulment. Therefore, these were in fact ordinary multiple 

prosecutions, rather than cases of multiple punishment 26 

German doctrine established the concepts of substantive justice and 

legal certainty (the reliability of a legally established order) that are the 

fundamental elements of a nation of laws. Substantive justice is the 

authorisation, and duty of, the state to punish the perpetrator of an act 

commensurately with his degree of guilt and type of offence. However, 

the notion of legal certainty is based on the fact that where the 

perpetrator has been judged by the state apparatus, he cannot be retried 

for the same act in the same case. The state, in instituting and 

conducting proceedings against a specific person, in effect exhausts its 

25 A. Kaftal: O niektórych zagadnieniach tożsamości przedmiotowej czynu przy 

przestępstwie ciągłym, Palestra 1964, No.8, p 33. 

26 F. C. Schroeder: op. cit., p 228. 

132 




right to judge the offender. German doctrine accepts the precedence of 

legal certainty over the principle of substantive justice. 27 

Both the individual and society as a whole should be able to rely on 

legal certainty. A society should have confidence in the legal order of its 

state. This confidence is strengthened among other things by the fact 

that court judgments are irreversible. The principle of legal certainty 

also has a disciplinary significance for state organs conducting 

proceedings, who must exercise particular care as it will not be possible 

to re-open proceedings or rectify errors later : they will be restricted by 

the principle of ne bis in idem. The principle of legal certainty is 

exceptionally important for citizens. No citizen need fear that 

proceedings will be reopened in a given case once the court has made a 

legally valid judgment.. This reflects the dignity and freedom of the 

individual and in this way he is protected against any possible abuse of 

authority by the state. 28 

It is generally accepted that the principle of ne bis in idem serves 

foremost to protect those who have been judged, whether convicted or 

acquitted. This principle also means that proceedings may not be 

conducted with the aim of acquittal or mitigating the penalty for a 

person who has received a legally valid sentence. 29 However, it should 

27 E. Schmidt: Strafprozeß und Rechtsstaat, Strafprozeßrechtliche Aufsätze und 

Vorträge (1952 bis 1969), Göttingen 1970, p 273; H. J. Behrendt: Der Tatbegriff 

im materiellen und formellen Steuerrecht, Zeitschrift für die gesamte 

Strafrechtswisseschaft 1982, No. 94, p 888; U. Dithmar: Der Grundsatz..., pp 11- 

12. 

28 E. Beling: Deutsches Reichsstrafprozessrecht, Berlin-Lepzig 1928; M. Faber: 

Strafklageverbrauch und fortgesetzte Handlung, München 1966, p 29; W. Stree: 

Teilrechtskraft und fortgesetzte Tat (in:) Festschrift für Karl Engisch zum 70 

Geburstag, Frankfurt am Main 1969, p 676; R. Neuhaus: Der 

strafverfahrensrechtliche Tatbegriff – „ne bis in idem“, Bochum 1985, p 165; U. 

Dithmar: op.cit. pp 12-14. 

29 

G. Grünwald: Die materielle Rechtskraft im Strafverfahren der Bundesrepublik 

Deutschland (in:) H. H. Jescheck (red.): Deutsche strafrechtliche Landesreferate 

zum IX Internationallen Kongreβ für Rechtsvergleichung, Teheran 1974, Berlin- 

New York 1974, p 97. 

133 




be noted that the ne bis in idem prohibition may in certain circumstances 

prevent the accused from demonstrating his innocence. 30 Therefore, 

one should note that under modern criminal procedures the binding 

principle of presumption of innocence stands until the court pronounces 

the accused guilty in a legally valid judgment. The accused is presumed 

innocent until his guilt is determined in a legally valid verdict, which 

puts into effect the ne bis in idem prohibition. Errors committed by the 

court that lead to the sentencing of an innocent person should not be 

rectified by infringing this principle. Furthermore, legal systems have 

measures allowing even those verdicts which are legally valid to be 

overturned. 

3. The principle of ne bis in idem is not one that is binding without any 

qualification. Provisions of the Code on Penal Proceedings and 

provisions of other laws provide exceptions to the prohibition against 

conducting criminal proceedings for the same matter. In Polish criminal 

procedure, the foremost exceptions include: cassation and reopening 

proceedings; changes to the judgment as a result of an amendment to the 

law; judicial decisions on carrying out the sentence and other criminal 

sanctions; changes to judicial decisions on probation; criminal 

proceedings in a matter where a foreign court has already passed 

judgment; verdicts changing a previous decision as a result of 

extradition conditions; correction of evident typographical errors and 

mistakes in accounting or in the calculation of time periods; restoration 

of final time limits; proceedings supplementing resolutions contained in 

the verdict; pardons; amnesties, and proceedings on the basis of the Law 

of 23 February 1991 on the Invalidity of Judicial Decisions in Respect 

of Persons Repressed for Activities in Favour of the Independence of 

the Polish Nation. 31 

According to Art. 17 par. 1 sub. 7 of the Polish Criminal Procedure 

30 

M. L. Friedland: op. cit., p 4. 

31 

M. Rogalski: Res judicata jako przesłanka procesu karnego, Rzeszów 2004, p 

142; M. Cieślak: Polska procedura karna. Podstawowe założenia teoretyczne, 

Warszawa 1984, p 375; T. Grzegorczyk, J. Tylman: Polskie postępowanie karne, 

Warszawa 2001, p 192. 

134 




Code , the substantive legal validity of a court judgment constitutes a ne 

bis in idem prohibition (precluding a trial) in respect of a trial where the 

accused is to be tried again for the same act. The possibility of 

continuing proceedings that have been validly concluded under the law 

should be seen as an exception to the ne bis in idem prohibition. 

According to the principle of ne bis in idem, there should be no 

proceedings if the same accused stands trial for an act in a case that has 

already been resolved by a legally valid judgement. Hence, the law 

provides cassation and reopening of proceedings as exceptions to the ne 

bis in idem prohibition. 32 

In Polish literature the view predominates that cassation or reopening of 

proceedings are continuations of the previous proceedings, not the 

beginning of new ones (bis). 33 A legally valid judicial decision settling 

proceedings is set aside as part of the same, not in new, proceedings. 34 

A contrary view is presented by G. Grünwald, according to whom, the 

reopening of such proceedings constitutes new proceedings, 

independent of the first, in which general legal norms are binding and in 

particular in dubio pro reo. In Grünwald’s view, if proceedings are 

reopened in accordance with the requirements of substantive legal 

validity and are to the benefit of the accused, they cannot be recognized 

as an infringement of substantive legal validity. 35 Grünwald also notes 

that there are no criteria justifying the acceptance of the argument that 

during a re-examination of the same case based on the same factual 

state, the second court would apply the provisions of law better than the 

previous one. However, the legislator, in establishing the binding legal 

order, assumes that is not based on an empirically justified normative 

rule, but rather a normative designation that the legal position of appeals 

courts has priority before courts of first instance. An exception is where 

new facts or evidence become available, in which case the trial will lead 

32 

R. Kmiecik, E. Skrętowicz: Proces karny. Część ogólna, Kraków-Lublin 1999, 

p 208. 

33 

P. Hofmański, E. Sadzik, K. Zgryzek: Kodeks postępowania karnego. 

Komentarz, t. I, Warszawa 1999, pp 131-132. See also W. Grzeszczyk: Kasacja 

w polskim procesie karnym, Kraków 2000, p 35. 

34 

W. Daszkiewicz: Proces karny. Część ogólna, Poznań 1995, p 140. 

35 

G. Grünwald: op. cit., pp 94-95. 

135 




to a better discovery of historical truth. 36 

In accordance with the Polish Criminal Procedure Code, cassation may 

also be instituted to the disadvantage of the accused where 

circumstances excluding prosecution arise, particularly where there is a 

legally valid judgment. According to Art. 519 of the Polish Criminal 

Procedure Code cassation may be initiated from each legally valid 

appeal court judgment which terminates the proceedings. Cassation in 

this form allows the setting aside of a legally valid substantive judgment 

of an appeals court and judgement to be passed again on the accused. 37 

In connection with these provisions, doubts appear as to the very 

institution of legal validity, if a party can, within a set time period, 

appeal a legally valid judgment by cassation, which is essentially an 

ordinary means of appeal. 38 S. Waltoś pointed out, for instance, that 

cassation as a means of appeal against a legally valid judicial decision 

may present problems for Poland’s ratification of Protocol No. 7 to the 

European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 

Fundamental Freedoms, which has already been signed, as according to 

the Convention no one can again be judged or penalised in proceedings 

before a court of the same state where previously he was sentenced with 

a legally valid sentence or acquitted in accordance with the law and the 

principles of criminal procedure of that state. Proceedings may be 

reopened in accordance with the law and criminal procedure of a given 

state if newly discovered facts are disclosed or if an error that may have 

had a bearing on the outcome of the case was committed in previous 

proceedings. The Convention’s provisions allow an exception to the 

prohibition against infringing the ne bis in idem rule to the detriment of 

the accused only in the form of reopening proceedings. 39 It should be 

36 

G. Grünwald: op.cit., pp 104-105. 

37 

R. Kmiecik, E. Skrętowicz: op. cit., p 208. 

38 

R. Kmiecik: Trójinstancyjny system apelacyjno-kasacyjny czy dwuinstancyjna 

hybryda rewizyjno-kasacyjna? (w związku z nowelizacją k.p.k. w zakresie 

postępowania odwoławczego) (in:) Kierunki i stan reformy prawa karnego, 

Lublin 1995, p 71. See also R. Kmiecik: Kodeks postępowania karnego w ocenie 

doktryny i publicystyki (in:) Racjonalna reforma prawa karnego, Warszawa 

2001, p 64. 

39 

S. Waltoś: Nowa kasacja w procesie karnym, Palestra 1996, Nos. 1-2, pp 21- 

136 




noted that Protocol No. 7 of the European Convention on the Protection 

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms refers to the ”the law and 

penal procedure of a given State”. This results from the order to take 

into account the specific criminal procedure law of each signatory to 

Protocol No. 7. Therefore it would be difficult to acknowledge that the 

use of the institution of cassation for correcting blatantly defective 

legally valid judicial decisions is an infringement of the principle of ne 

bis in idem, since cassation does not mean new proceedings should be 

opened despite previous proceedings being concluded with a legally 

valid judicial decision. Instead, it is a decision as to whether the judicial 

decision that ended the proceedings is flawed by a blatant infringement 

of the law, hence exceptionally allowing proceedings to be continued. 40 

Doubts also arise in German doctrine as to the permissibility of 

reopening proceedings terminated with legal validity to the detriment of 

the sentenced offender (Art. 362 Strafprozeβordnung together with the 

provisions of Art. 103 par. 3 of the German Constitution which provides 

for the ne bis in idem prohibition). This situation is justified by principle 

of justice taking the priority over the principle of legal certainty. One 

should also note that in German law proceedings may not be reopened 

where their only the aim is to impose a different penalty on the basis of 

the same penal law (Art. 363 Strafprozeβordnung). 41 

4. According to Art. 540 par. 1 of the Polish Criminal Procedure Code, 

proceedings concluded with a legally valid judicial decision can be 

reopened if: 

1) an offence has been committed in connection with the 

proceedings and there exists a reasonable basis for belief that 

22. 

40 

Z. Doda, A. Gaberle: Kontrola odwoławcza w procesie karnym, Warszawa 

1997, pp 45-46. See also Z. Doda, J. Grajewski, A. Murzynowski: Kasacja w 

postępowaniu karnym – Komentarz, Warszawa 1996, p 7. Protocol No. 7 of the 

European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 

Freedoms has already been announced in Dziennik Ustaw 2003, No. 42, item 

364. 

41 

F. C. Schroeder: op. cit., pp 229-230. 

137 




this could have influenced the contents of the judicial 

decision; 

2) after the judgment was pronounced, new facts or evidence 

came to light that were previously unknown to the court and 

which indicate that: 

a) the sentenced person did not commit the act or his act 

did not constitute an offence or was not subject to a 

penalty, 

b) he was sentenced for an offence that is subject to a more 

rigorous penalty, or if circumstances that required an 

extraordinary mitigation of penalty were not taken into 

account, or if the court erroneously accepted 

circumstances that caused an extraordinary aggravation 

of penalty, 

c) the court discontinued or conditionally discontinued 

criminal proceedings, erroneously accepting that the 

accused committed the act of which he is accused. 

Proceedings are reopened to the benefit of the accused if the need arises 

as a consequence of a decision by an international authority by virtue of 

an international agreement ratified by the Republic of Poland (Art. 540 

par. 3 of the Polish Criminal Procedure Code). On the basis of 

international agreements ratified by Poland these authorities are: the 

European Commission of Human Rights, which is concerned with 

individual petitions raised against Poland, and the European Tribunal of 

Human Rights. 

According to Art. 540a of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, court 

proceedings which ended in a legally valid judgment may also be 

reopened if: 

1) a convicted person to whom provisions of Art. 60 par. 3 or 4 of 

the Polish Criminal Code were applied did not confirm 

138 




previously disclosed information during criminal proceedings, 

2) circumstances specified in Art. 11 par. 3 of the Polish Criminal 

Procedure Code arise. 

Pursuant to Art. 60 par. 3 of the Polish Criminal Code, a court applies 

extraordinary mitigation of penalty and perhaps even conditional 

suspension of the sentence in respect of a perpetrator participating with 

other persons in the commission of an offence, if he reveals the offence 

and its material circumstances to the prosecuting authority. Under Art. 

60 par. 4 of the Polish Criminal Code, upon a motion from the 

prosecution, a court may apply extraordinary mitigation of penalty and 

even conditional suspension of the penalty in respect of a perpetrator 

who, irrespective of clarifications submitted in his case, revealed to the 

prosecution a hitherto unknown offence and presented its material 

circumstances, if the offence is subject to a penalty of deprivation of 

liberty for a period of more than five years. 

However, under Art. 11 par. 1 of the Polish Code of Criminal 

Procedure, proceedings concerning an offence carrying a penalty of up 

to five years’ deprivation of liberty may be set aside if, due to the type 

and level of the penalty imposed in a legally valid judgement for 

another offence, the sentence would clearly be inappropriate and if this 

does not conflict with the interests of the injured party. Under Art. 11 

par. 3 of the Polish Criminal Procedure Code criminal proceedings that 

have been annulled under Art. 11 par. 1 may be reopened in the event 

that the legally valid verdict causing them to be annulled is set aside or 

an essential change is made to it. 

Hence, the provisions of Art. 540a of the Polish Criminal Procedure 

Code permit the reopening of proceedings, but only where it would be 

to the disadvantage of the accused. 42 In the grounds for the draft 

changes to the Polish Criminal Procedure Code it was provided that 

42 

T. Grzegorczyk: Wybrane zagadnienia najnowszej procedury karnej, Państwo i 

Prawo 2003, No. 8, p 15. 

139 




"In proceedings to reopen proceedings there are two bases for the 

infringement of a legally valid judgment, unknown in legislation until 

now. Thus, it will be possible to reopen proceedings where the text of a 

legally valid judgment has been set aside or its essence has been 

changed, because of which proceedings were annulled pursuant to Art. 

11 par. 1 (see Art. 540a point 2) and where, after the judgment had been 

handed down, new facts or evidence not previously known to the court 

are revealed indicating that a convicted person to whom provisions of 

Art. 60 par. 3 or par. 4 of the Criminal Code were applied had 

substantially changed his testimony or explanations (see Art. 540a point 

1). The draft amendment aims to prevent accused persons from 

deceitfully “obtaining under false pretences” benefits provided under 

Art. 11 par. 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code and under Art. 60 par. 3 

and 4 of the Criminal Code. It continues to conform with the text of Art. 

4 par. 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection 

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and does not conflict with 

the international standard of prohibition against repeated judgments or 

penalties.” 43 

In German criminal procedure, the reasons for reopening proceedings 

fall into two categories, those that are to the benefit of the convict and 

those to his disadvantage. Proceedings are reopened to the benefit of the 

convict in the following cases: 

1) Disclosure of new facts and evidence that justify a resolution to 

the case other than the previous one. Facts and evidence that 

were not presented during the main hearing are recognised as 

new facts and evidence. These are not only facts of which the 

accused was unaware during the proceedings, but also those 

which have their source in court files but which were not 

exploited during the main hearing. 

2) Documents presented to the disadvantage of the accused were 

43 

Projekt ustawy o zmianie ustawy – Kodeks postępowania karnego – Przepisy 

wprowadzające Kodeks karny oraz niektórych innych ustaw, Druk Sejmowy No. 

182, 20 December 2001, pp 70-71. 

140 




either not genuine or were falsified, a witness or expert 

intentionally or negligently provided false testimony under 

oath. Reopening is possible if on the basis of evidence in its 

possession the court finds that the falsified documents or 

testimony were not genuine. 

3) A civil court judgement, on the basis of which the criminal 

court issued its verdict, had been set aside. The difference 

between the new judgement of a civil court and the previous 

one may occur if new facts or evidence have appeared or the 

material evidence before the civil court was wrongly assessed. 

After the civil court verdict is set aside, the decision of the 

criminal court must be verified; 

4) The judge accepted material benefit in return for granting a 

specific resolution; 

5) A defect has been found in the law which has been applied. In 

accordance with Art. 79 of the German Constitution, reopening 

is possible if the Constitutional Court determines that the 

provisions of the Constitution have been infringed. 44 

In German law the substantive legal validity of a verdict may also be set 

aside as a consequence of extraordinary means of accusation being 

introduced by one of the co-defendants due to infringement of the 

provisions of substantive law. However, the verdict is set aside only in 

respect of the co-defendant in regard to whom the law was infringed. 45 

Proceedings may, however, be reopened to the disadvantage of the 

accused in the event that falsification of a document used as evidence to 

his benefit is disclosed, false testimony is given, or an offence ex officio 

is committed by the judge. There are however are limitations to the 

range of possibilities for conducting a new criminal proceedings to the 

disadvantage of the convict. A person acquitted or convicted by a 

44 

G. Grünwald: op. cit., pp 98-101. 

45 

Ibid., p 101. 

141 




legally valid verdict is protected against new penal proceedings to his 

disadvantage , even where new facts or evidence come to light. 46 

In French procedure proceedings concluded with a legally valid judicial 

decision are reopened in the following circumstances: 

- the alleged victim of a murder is in fact alive; 

- there are two judicial decisions in the same case; 

- a witness has been sentenced for false testimony; 

- new facts come to light indicating the innocence of the 

convicted person. 47 

In French procedure, infringement of the prohibition of ne bis in idem 

(”two judicial decisions in the same case”) constitutes a basis for 

reopening proceedings. 

There is a provision in the Polish Criminal Procedure Code (Art. 549 

par. 2) that may constitute a basis for reopening proceedings to the 

benefit of the accused if, as a result of Constitutional Tribunal decision, 

the legal provision that was the basis for the sentencing or conditional 

annulment has lost its force of law or been changed. The decision of the 

Constitutional Tribunal may follow a constitutional petition. A 

constitutional petition is most often described as a specific, 

extraordinary legal measure on the basis of which a citizen or another 

legal entity may turn to the Constitutional Tribunal to grant it protection 

from the infringement of its constitutional rights by a state organ or 

other public authority. 48 

With the assistance of such legal measures, a party dissatisfied with the 

resolution of the criminal proceedings may initiate proceedings before 

the Constitutional Tribunal aimed at instigating a constitutional 

46 Ibid., pp 98-101. 

47 H. H. Kühne: Ne bis in idem in den Schengen Vertragsstaaten, Juristenzeitung 

1998, No. 18, p 878. 

48 

B. Nita: Skarga konstytucyjna jako środek prawny umożliwiający korektę 

prawomocnego orzeczenia wydanego w postępowaniu karnym (in:) Środki 

zaskarżenia w procesie karnym. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci prof. Zbigniewa 

Dody, Kraków 2000, p427; B. Nita: Trybunał Konstytucyjny a proces karny, 

Kraków 1999, p 229. 

142 




examination of the legal provision it is questioning that became the 

basis for the resolution issued in his case. 49 

In Polish criminal procedure, such a petition may only be granted where 

there is a conflict between the Constitution and the law that was the 

basis for the judgment issued in a specific case. Hence, one cannot have 

a constitutional petition on the grounds that the judgment infringes 

constitutional rights, through failure to apply, or erroneous application 

of, the law. The decision of the Constitutional Tribunal determining 

whether a provision that has been examined is unconstitutional does not 

automatically invalidate judicial decisions that were made as a result of 

such a provision being applied. However, it is possible to reopen 

proceedings to the benefit of the accused. 50 The exception to the 

principle of ne bis in idem in the form of reopening proceedings as a 

result of a Constitutional Tribunal judgement applies only in 

circumstances where there is a change in the law to the benefit of the 

perpetrator, in that the act of which he was accused has ceased to be a 

criminal offence or its classification as a criminal offence has changed. 51 

5. In Polish criminal procedure, a change in verdict as a result of a 

change in law may be regarded as an exception to the ne bis in idem 

principle. According to art. 4 § 2 of the Polish Criminal Code the 

(“PCC”), if, under a new law, an offence carries a maximum sentence 

that is lower than the maximum sentence that was previously imposed, 

the maximum sentence will be reduced to the level provided for in the 

new law. If, under the new law, the punishable offence no longer carries 

a prison sentence, the prison sentence that was previously imposed must 

be commuted to a fine or imprisonment, on the basis that one month’s 

imprisonment is the equivalent of a fine equal to 60 daily rates 52 or 2 

49 

B. Nita: Skarga konstytucyjna..., p 428. 

50 

B. Nita: Skarga konstytucyjna..., p 437, p 444. 

51 

See J. Rybak: Trybunał Konstytucyjny a proces karny, Przegląd Sądowy 1992, 

No.10, p 30; J. Oniszczuk: Powszechnie obowiązująca wykładnia ustaw ustalana 

przez Trybunał Konstytucyjny, Studia i Materiały, Vol. III, Warszawa 1995, p 

188; B. Nita: Trybunał Konstytucyjny..., p 226. 

52 

Daily rates are calculated on the basis of the accused’s economic situation, i.e, 

143 




months of detention (art. 4 § 3 PCC). If, under the new law, the offence 

is no longer punishable, the punishment will be cancelled ex lege 

(art. 4 § 4 PCC). 

The change in law results in a change in the verdict handed down in the 

same case and against the same person. The change in verdict under this 

procedure should be considered permissible because it is the result of a 

change in legislation and works to the advantage of the convicted 

person. 

6. Further exceptions to the ne bis in idem principle in Polish criminal 

proceedings can be found in relation to judgments on the carrying out of 

sentences and other penal measures, and changes to probationary 

judgments. 

Judgments issued in connection with the carrying out of sentences and 

other penal measures apply to one offence committed by one and the 

same person. They are a continuation of the previous proceedings, and 

are an exception to the ne bis in idem principle. They include, in 

particular, judgments on the following matters: changes to the duties 

imposed in connection with suspended prison sentences (art. 74 § 2 

PCC), release on parole (art. 77 et seq. PCC), payment of a fine in 

instalments (art. 49 of the Polish Executive Criminal Code) and a 

moratorium on imprisonment (art. 150 et seq. of the Polish Executive 

Criminal Code). 

An exception to the ne bis in idem principle can be found where there 

has been a change in a conditional (“probationary”) judgment as a result 

of an unsuccessful attempt at probation, i.e., the resumption of 

proceedings that were suspended conditionally (art. 68 PCC), an order 

to carry out a suspended sentence (art. 75 PCC), and the revocation of 

parole (art. 81 PCC). 

The resumption of proceedings that were suspended conditionally 

salary etc. 

144 




(chapter 57 of the Polish Criminal Procedure Code - ‘PCPC’), an order 

to carry out a suspended sentence, or the revocation of parole, leads to 

the imposition of the prison sentence. The fact that these issues are 

being considered does not mean that the previous verdicts are being 

questioned. These judgments merely confirm that the conditions 

imposed on the convicted person have not been fulfilled, and that, 

therefore, the consideration of criminal liability must be resumed, 

involving either an order to carry out a sentence or the revocation of 

parole. 

With regard to judgments that involve the application of penal sanctions 

of a conditional nature (conditional suspension of sentence, parole, 

quashing of proceedings), the PCPC and PCC deal with the principle of 

ne bis in idem in a relative way. This is evident by the fact that if certain 

new circumstances come to light, it is possible to alter the sentence 

resulting from this type of judgment. If new circumstances envisaged in 

the act come to light during the period of probation, it is permissible to 

impose a suspended sentence, and revoke parole and resume the 

proceedings that were suspended conditionally. This does not affect the 

legally binding nature of this type of verdict and stems directly from the 

provisions of law. For instance, art. 70 § 1 PCC states that the period of 

probation commences as of the moment the verdict assumes the force of 

law. 53 

7. Another exception to the ne bis in idem principle in Polish criminal 

proceedings occurs when a verdict is issued abroad. Art. 109 PCC 

provides that Polish criminal legislation applies to Polish citizens who 

have committed offences abroad. According, however, to art. 110 § 1 

PCC, Polish criminal legislation applies to foreigners who, while 

abroad, have committed offences directed against the interests of the 

Republic of Poland, Polish citizens, Polish natural persons or legal 

entities, as well as to foreigners who have committed acts of terrorism. 

In turn, art. 110 § 2 PCC provides that Polish criminal legislation 

53 

See Z. Doda: Rewizja nadzwyczajna w polskim procesie karnym, Warszawa 

1972, p. 103. 

145 




applies to offences committed by foreigners abroad, other than those 

referred to in art. 110 § 1 PCC, if under Polish criminal legislation the 

offence carried a sentence of greater than 2 years’ imprisonment and the 

perpetrator were on the territory of the Republic of Poland and no 

extradition order were issued. 

Until recently, the principle of prosecuting Polish citizens for all 

offences they committed while abroad has been approved by the Polish 

courts and by Polish legal commentators. But nowadays, many 

arguments are being raised against the idea of prosecuting and 

punishing Polish citizens twice for offences they committed abroad. In 

particular, it is claimed that such double prosecution is a violation of the 

ne bis in idem principle. The following arguments are also cited: the 

high costs of such proceedings are not commensurate with their results; 

the fact that an offence committed abroad does not harm the legal 

interests of the Polish state and its citizens; and the general world trend 

of abandoning the principle of legalism in favour of the principle of 

opportunism. 

The ne bis in idem crimen iudicetur principle, universally accepted in 

developed legal systems, applies to offences committed on the territory 

of Poland. In relation to offences committed by Polish citizens outside 

the territory of Poland, this principle is not absolutely binding. Polish 

law permits dual proceedings for the same offence vis-à-vis the same 

person (art. 111 and 114 PCC). 54 

Such a principle of liability raises serious concerns. It is stressed that 

each offence committed by a Polish citizen should be the subject of only 

one lawfully concluded court hearing. The principle of legalism, 

however, imposes on the prosecutor a duty to re-open investigative 

proceedings; and on the court, the duty to hold a second trial in a 

situation where an offence committed by a Polish citizen abroad had 

already been tried abroad. There are doubts as to the rationality of such 

54 

W. Groszyk: Czy demokratyczne państwo stać na zasadę legalizmu, 

Rzeczpospolita of 12 September 2001. See also P. Sucholiński, Jeśli ukarać 

Polaka za granicą – to jak ?, text available on the website: Praca i nauka za 

granicą, www.pracainauka.pl/szuk2.php?types. 

146 




a principle of dual criminal liability. The only explanation for such a 

regulation is the desire of the state to exercise control over offences 

committed by its own citizens whilst abroad. It has no justification in 

the generally accepted sense of justice. After all, an offence committed 

abroad breaches neither the interests of the Polish state as such, nor the 

interests of that state’s individual citizens. Instead, it harms the legal 

order of the country in which it was committed and the interests of its 

citizens. If a foreign state decides that its legal order has been seriously 

damaged, it will certainly decide to punish the offender. Whether or not 

to punish a Polish citizen (application of the principle of opportunism) 

is a decision best left to the appropriate authorities of the foreign state. 55 

People have also correctly observed that now that Poland is a member 

of the European Union, there is no reason for the state to continue to 

enjoy the “right” to try its own citizens. M. Płachta has demanded the 

practical realisation of the principle of aut dedere, aut poenam, i.e., 

either issue a sentence, or carry it out. The realisation of this principle 

means the need to respect foreign court verdicts and observe the 

principle of ne bis in idem. 56 

According to art. 111 § 1 PCC, one of the conditions for liability for an 

offence committed abroad is that the deed also be considered an offence 

under the legislation of the place where it was committed. If there are 

differences between Polish legislation and the local legislation, the 

Polish court, when applying the Polish legislation, may take these 

differences into account, to the benefit of the perpetrator (art. 111 § 2 

PCC). The condition envisaged in art. 111 § 1 PCC does not apply to a 

Polish public official who, while serving abroad, has committed an 

offence during the course of his service, or to a person who has 

committed an offence in a place that is not subject to any state authority 

(art. 111 § 3 PCC). 

According, however, to art. 114 PCC, a verdict issued abroad is no 

55 

W. Groszyk: op. cit.. 

56 

M. Płachta: Zasada aut dedere aut judicare w dziedzinie międzynarodowej 

wspólpracy w sprawach karnych, Palestra 2000, no. 7-8, p. 34-43. 

147 




obstacle to the initiation or continuation of criminal proceedings for the 

same offence before a Polish court. (art. 114 § 1 PCC). With regard, 

therefore, to sentences issued by foreign courts, res judicata does not 

apply. When imposing a sentence, however, a Polish court will consider 

any actual periods of detention spent abroad and the punishment handed 

down there, taking into account the differences between these 

punishments (art. 114 § 2 PCC). The provision contained art. 114 § 2 

PCC, prevents the perpetrator from being punished twice. This rule not 

only permits, but also obliges, Polish courts to take into account during 

sentencing any sentence that has already been served abroad and any 

period of detention already spent there. 

Art. 114 § 3 PCC provides the following three exceptions to the rule 

whereby the verdict of a foreign court does not make a deed, to which 

Polish criminal legislation applies, a case of res judicata: 57 

1) where the sentence that was passed abroad has been 

accepted for implementation in the territory of the 

Republic of Poland 58 , and also where the sentence that 

was passed abroad concerns an offence in relation to 

which the case was transferred 59 abroad, or the 

57 

M. Kalitowski, Z. Sienkiewicz, J. Szumski, L. Tyszkiewicz, A. Wąsek: Kodeks 

karny. Komentarz, vol. II, Gdańsk 2001, p. 357. 

58 

See Konwencja o przekazywaniu osób skazanych na karę pozbawienia 

wolności w celu odbycia kary w państwie, którego są obywatelami, sprządzona w 

Berlinie dnia 19 maja 1978 r., Dziennik Ustaw 1980 no. 8, item 21; Konwencja o 

przekazywaniu osób skazanych, sprządzona w Strasburgu dnia 21 marca 1983 r., 

Dziennik Ustaw 1995 no. 51, item 279; Protokół dodatkowy do konwencji o 

przekazywaniu osób skazanych, sprządzony w Strasburgu dnia 18 grudnia 1997 

r., Dziennik Ustaw 2000 no. 43, item 490; M. Płachta: Przekazywanie skazanych 

pomiędzy państwami w celu wykonania kary, Prokuratura i Prawo 1997 no.3, p. 

21-33. 

59 

See F. Rafałowski: Ekstradycja a przejęcie ścigania, Problemy 

Praworządności 1973, no. 10, p. 12; L. Gardocki: Przejęcie (przekazanie) 

ścigania, Studia Prawnicze 1977, no. 53, p. 185 et seq.; J. Zientek: Przekazanie i 

przejęcie ścigania a stadium procesu, Prokuratura i Prawo 1997, no. 3, p. 34; E. 

Janczur: Przejęcie i przekazanie ścigania karnego, Prokuratura i Prawo 1999, 

148 




perpetrator was extradited from the territory of the 

Republic of Poland, 60 

2) to judgments of international criminal tribunals acting on 

the basis of international law binding the Republic of 

Poland, 

3) to foreign court judgments, where this has been provided 

for under an international agreement to which the 

Republic of Poland is party. 

8. According to art. 597 PCPC, if, when extraditing an offender to 

Poland, the foreign country stipulates that the sentences imposed on him 

must be carried out only for the offences for which extradition was 

granted, the adjudicating court may, if necessary, revise the verdict in 

such a way that sentence will be carried out only for those offences for 

which the perpetrator was extradited. Thus, art. 597 PCPC is yet another 

exception to the substantive force of law. 

9. Art. 17 § 1 sub. 7 PCPC, which prohibits the initiation of fresh 

criminal proceedings if criminal proceedings vis-à-vis the same deed by 

the same person have already been concluded, is not an obstacle to the 

initiation of supplementary proceedings, provided that this is legally 

permissible. 

Supplementary proceedings occur when, after the end of a trial, separate 

no. 5, p. 61. 

60 

See: Europejska konwencja o ekstradycji sporządzona w Paryżu dnia 13 

grudnia 1957 r., Protokół dodatkowy do powyższej konwencji sporządzony w 

Strasburgu dnia 15 października 1975 r., i Drugi protokół dodatkowy do 

powyższej konwencji sporządzony s Strasburgu dnia 17 marca 1978 r., Dziennik 

Ustaw 1994, no. 70, item 307; M. Lipczyńska, A. Kordzik, Z. Kegel, Z. Świda- 

Łagiewska: Polski proces karny, Warszawa - Wrocław 1975, p. 69; L. Gradocki: 

Podwójna przestępczość czynu zabronionego w prawie ekstradycyjnym [w:] 

Problemy nauk penalnych. Prace ofiarowane Profesor Oktawii Górniok, L. 

Tyszkiewicz ed., Katowice 1996, p. 69-70. 

149 




proceedings are held in order to resolve an issue that was not resolved 

during the original proceedings, whether through oversight or through 

the emergence of certain circumstances after the sentence has been 

passed. It is never the intention of supplementary proceedings to 

invalidate the binding force of the original verdict. Some supplementary 

proceedings can only be held after the lawful conclusion of the previous 

proceedings. 

Supplementary proceedings can cover the following matters: forfeiture 

of property; the counting of custody or detention towards a prison 

sentence; preventative measures involving the suspension of an accused 

person from his official duties or from exercising his profession, a ban 

on specific activity or on driving certain types of vehicle; and matters 

involving additional material evidence (art. 420 § 1 PCPC). 61 In other 

cases, supplementary proceedings or changes made to the verdicts of 

lawfully concluded proceedings are permissible only through cassation 

or through reopening proceedings. A supplementary verdict is issued in 

a case involving the same deed, committed by the same person vis-à-vis 

whom the original proceedings have already been concluded. In the 

narrow sense of idem, i.e., that it applies only to questions regarding the 

legal liability of the accused, the issuing of such supplementary verdicts 

is not an exception to the ne bis in idem principle. 62 The ne bis in idem 

prohibition concerns not only an accused person’s responsibility for the 

deed he has committed, but also other decisions connected with his 

criminal responsibility, e.g., the counting of custody towards a sentence. 

In this sense, supplementary proceedings are an exception to the ne bis 

in idem prohibition. 

10. The next exception is connected with art. 126 PCPC, which states 

that if a final deadline has not been met for reasons beyond a party’s 

control, the party may, within 7 days of the date on which it has notice 

of the above reasons, apply for a new deadline, at the same time 

performing the action that should have been performed by the original 

deadline. The decision to set the new deadline is taken by the authority 

for whom the action was to have been performed. Any refusal to fix the 

61 

See: M. Cieślak: op. cit., p. 72; W. Daszkiewicz: op. cit., p. 141. 

62 

P. Hofmański, E. Sadzik, K. Zgryzek: op. cit., p. 131. 

150 




new deadline may be appealed. Thus, the status of the res iudicata is no 

obstacle to the extension of the deadline. 

11. According to art. 105 § 1 PCPC, evident typographical errors and 

mistakes in accounting or in the calculation of time periods in a verdict 

or order may be corrected at any time. 63 The correction is made by the 

authority that made the mistake. If proceedings are taking place before 

an appeal body, that body may correct the verdict of the first instance 

body ex officio (art. 105 § 2 PCPC). The correction of a verdict or of a 

statement of reasons thereto is made by way of a decision, and a 

correction to decrees is made by way of a decree. Though often a mere 

formality, such action constitutes interference with a verdict that marks 

the conclusion of proceedings, and is an exception to the ne bis in idem 

prohibition. 

12. A decision on the granting of amnesty should also be regarded an 

exception to the ne bis in idem prohibition because it involves the 

reopening of proceedings in the same case and against the same person 

(art. 560 et seq. PCPC). There are, however, serious doubts as to 

whether idem exists fully in such a case, because circumstances that 

change with the passing of time, and especially the actual carrying out 

of a sentence, create new factors that may be considered as affecting the 

substantive basis of an indictment, and the subject of the proceedings. 64 

The substantive basis for a pardon is set forth in art. 139 of the Polish 

Constitution, which states that the President of the Republic of Poland 

has the power to grant pardons. For a pardon to be granted there must 

have been a verdict that has the force of law. A pardon is granted by a 

body of executive authority, whose decision changes the verdict of the 

judicial body, which was reached on the basis of binding principles of 

law, despite, the absence of a statutory basis on which to question the 

63 M. Cieślak: op. cit., p. 371-372. 

64 Ibidem, p. 375. 

151 




correctness of that verdict 65 

Neither the Constitution nor any other legal instrument regulates the 

actions of the President when considering motions or settling issues ex 

officio. The President is not bound by any formal restrictions. 66 The 

scope of a pardon remains at his discretion. A sentence may be repealed 

in full, or it may be commuted. The carrying out of a sentence already 

handed down, or remaining to be carried out may also be suspended. 67 

A pardon may not be identified with legal remedies, for it does not alter 

the convicted person’s guilt or the legal qualification of his offence. The 

main purpose of a pardon is to correct a lawful verdict in that part of it 

that concerns the sentence and the remedies at law. 68 

13. The purpose of an amnesty is to alleviate or eliminate the effects of 

a lawful sentence, by altering it. Thus, an amnesty is another exception 

to the ne bis in idem prohibition. 

Ne bis in idem applies when a verdict is issued after a case has been 

considered on the basis of the regulations governing an amnesty. In such 

a case, apart from extraordinary remedies at law, the reopening of 

proceedings is prohibited, even if the court mistakenly failed to apply 

the regulations that govern an amnesty. 

14. The Act of 23 February 1991, on the Invalidity of Judicial Decisions 

in Respect of Persons Repressed for Activities Aiding the Independence 

65 

J. Grajewski: Przebieg procesu karnego, Warszawa 2001, p. 346. 

66 

E. Samborski: Zarys metodyki pracy sędziego w sprawach karnych, Warszawa 

2002, p.. 460-461. 

67 

J. Grajewski: op. cit., p. 346, 349. See also A. Murzynowski: Ułaskawienie w 

Polsce Ludowej, Warszawa 1965, p. 163; T. Grzegorczyk: Kodeks postępowania 

karnego. Komentarz, Zakamycze 1998, p. 1303; A. Bulsiewicz, M. Jeż- 

Ludwichowska, D. Kala, D. Osowska: Przebieg postępowania karnego, Toruń 

1999, p. 279. 

68 

A. Bulsiewicz, M. Jeż-Ludwichowska, D. Kala, D. Osowska: op. cit., p.. 280. 

152 




of the Polish Nation, is in force in Poland. 69 It contains regulations on 

proceedings to annul verdicts and to award eligible persons with 

compensation for the harm they suffered as a result of a sentence that 

has been declared null and void. In the matters covered by this Act, the 

legislator has restored the institution of the invalidity of penal verdicts 

ex lege, something that was absent from the 1969 Polish Code of 

Criminal procedure. Verdicts are void ex tunc, and the role of the 

criminal court is merely to state that they are void. 70 All verdicts issued 

by Polish law enforcement bodies and judicial authorities, or by nonjudicial 

bodies, during the period between the commencement of their 

activities on the Polish territory as of 1 January 1944 to 31 December 

1956, have been rendered void, if the deed for which they were issued 

was connected with activity furthering the existence of an independent 

Polish State, or if the verdict was issued on account of such activity or 

on account of resistance to the collectivisation of farms, and also if the 

deed was committed in order to save oneself and others from repression 

for conducting such activity (art. 1 sub. 1 and 2 of this law). Also 

considered void are verdicts issued after 31 December 1956, if they 

pertained to deeds or actions that occurred during the period 1 January 

1944 to 31 December 1956 (art. 1 sub. 4 of the act). The same applies to 

verdicts issued by the Polish Armed Forces in the USSR, which were 

not under the authority of the Government of Poland, regardless of the 

date and place of their issue (art. 14 of the act). 71 

69 

Dziennik Ustaw 1991 no. 34, item 149, as amended. 

70 

A. Bulsiewicz, M. Jeż-Ludwichowska, D. Kala, D. Osowska: op. cit., p. 303- 

304. See also A. Czarnota, P. Hofmański: Prawo, historia i sprawiedliwość (in:) 

Aktualne problemy prawa karnego i kryminologii, Białystok 1998, p. 142, 147. 

71 

See also the Supreme Court resolution of 22 September 1994, I KZP 22/94, 

OSNKW 1994, no. 9-10, item 59; B. Bladowski: Glosa do uchwały Sądu 

Najwyższego z dnia 22 września 1994 r., I KZP 22/94, Orzecznictwo Sądów 

Polskich 1995, no. 7-8, item 169; S. Zabłocki: Przegląd orzecznictwa Sądu 

Najwyższego i Sądów Apelacyjnych do ustawy z 23 lutego 1991 r. o uznaniu za 

nieważne orzeczeń wydanych wobec osób represjonowanych za działalność na 

recz niepodległego bytu Państwa Polskiego (Dz. U. Nr 34, poz. 149 z późn. zm.), 

Palestra 1995, no. 11-12, p. 197; T. Grzegorczyk, J. Tylman: Polskie 

postępowanie karne, Warszawa 2005, p. 869. 

153 




According to art. 4 of this Act, determination that a verdict was invalid 

is not prevented by the carrying out of the sentence, the granting of 

amnesty, removal of the sentence from the records, a pardon, limitation, 

compensation, the death of the oppressed person to whom the verdict 

applied, a suspension or quashing of proceedings for reasons other than 

the fact that the deed was not committed, or if the deed does not bear the 

hallmarks of a crime, or if according to law it is held that the perpetrator 

did not commit the crime. In these last three cases, the court will not 

consider a motion to determine the invalidity of the verdict if the 

convicted person was acquitted for these reasons or if the proceedings 

were discontinued (art. 7 sub. 1 of the law). Thus, the seriousness of the 

res iudicata is no obstacle to the issuing of a decision in proceedings to 

declare a verdict void. The institution of the invalidity of verdicts, 

envisaged in the Act on the Invalidity of Judicial Decisions in Respect 

of Persons Repressed for Activities Aiding the Independence of the 

Polish Nation, constitutes an exception to the ne bis in idem principle. 

This raises no doubts where the verdict was issued by a court, but 

certain doubts may arise where the verdict was issued by a non-judicial 

authority. One should, however, realise that although these state 

authorities were neither law-enforcement bodies nor judicial authorities, 

they were nevertheless empowered under the regulations then in force to 

pass judgment on matters that were considered to be offences. If you 

accept that the ne bis in idem principle is meant to protect a particular 

person from the re-opening of proceedings in the same case against him, 

then the re-opening of proceedings that were not considered by a court 

of law but by another, non-judicial body, must therefore, be considered 

a departure from this principle. In this respect, the type of body that 

issued judgments in matters that were considered to be offences, is of 

secondary importance. The most important thing is that proceedings will 

be re-opened in the same case and against the same person. 

A court determines that a verdict is void if it determines the existence of 

the prerequisites set forth in art. 1 and 14 of the 1991 act. The 

determination of the invalidity of a verdict is deemed to be synonymous 

with the acquittal of the convicted person (art. 2 sub. 1 sentence two of 

154 




the act). 72 Although the proceedings to determine the invalidity of a 

verdict is a departure from the ne bis in idem prohibition, this departure 

is, therefore, in the interests of the person who was convicted earlier. 

The ne bis in idem prohibition is meant to protect a person whose case 

has already been lawfully judged, from the re-opening of proceedings. 

This ban applies to cases where the accused was found innocent, as well 

as cases where he was found guilty. In the case of proceedings taking 

place on the basis of the provisions of the Act on the Invalidity of 

Judicial Decisions in Respect of Persons Repressed for Activities 

Aiding the Independence of the Polish Nation, such proceedings are 

initiated at the request of the person concerned, in other words, he alone 

decides whether proceedings in his case are to re-opened, the purpose of 

which is to verify judgments he considers unfair. Although proceedings 

to determine the invalidity of a judgment is a departure from the ne bis 

in idem prohibition, this exception can, therefore, hardly be considered a 

breach of the rights of the person whose case has already been judged. 

The opposite is true. 

Once a judgment regarding the invalidity of a verdict under the terms of 

the Act of 1991 has assumed the force of law, it is not possible to take 

any action to acquit the convicted person or annul the proceedings, 

whatever the justification for doing so, because the verdict that could be 

subjected to court control by way of extraordinary measures at law, will 

have ceased to exist. 73 

72 

Ibidem, p. 871-872. 

73 

Ibidem, p. 872. See also Supreme Court verdict of 29 March 1994, WO 37/94, 

OSNKW 1994, no. 7-8, item 51. 

155 



FREE WORLD PUBLISHING Inc. 

HTTP://WWW.FWPUBLISHING.NET 

CALL FOR ARTICLES 

Free World Publishing is calling for articles by 

Academics, Practitioners and Post-Graduate 

Students to be published in its new journals : 




Articles are welcomed in : English, French, Bosnian, 

Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Finnish, German, Greek, 

Hungarian, Icelandic, Innuktikut, Italian, Latin, 

Polish, Portugese, Romanian, Russian, Serb, 

Slovenian as well as Spanish. 

FREE LAW JOURNAL : pertains all legal subjects, 

whether from a national, comparative or 

international perspective and including Canon Law, 

International Law, Islamic Law or social and 

historical perspective of laws' impacts on societies. 

WAR & PEACE JOURNAL : pertains to all issues 

ranging from conflict prevention to nation-building; 

including political sciences and diplomacy, nationbuilding, 

defense policies, strategies, operations, 

tactics, logistics, intelligence, peacekeeping, 

peacemaking, leadership, psychology of combat, 

technological developments and counter-terrorism; 

and finally Military Historical studies, relating to the 

conduct of operations, their causes and effects, the 

avoidance of conflict, leadership and personalities. 

WORLD HISTORY JOURNAL : pertains to the whole 

spectrum of human development, whether from 

local, regional or global perspectives, including 

history from all periods, paleontology, anthropology, 

linguistics, letters and languages, arts as well as 

sociological perspectives. 

For details, please consult the respective page of 

each journal and its submissions guidelines from 

http://www.FWPublishing.net or contact the editorin-chief 

at FWP@FWPublishing.net . 

Sincerely, 



APPEL POUR ARTICLES 

Free World Publishing accepte les articles 

d’académiciens, praticiens et d’étudiants supérieurs 

à être publier dans ses nouveaux journeaux : 




Les articles sont bienvenus en : Français, Anglais, 

Allemand, Bosniaque, Bulgare, Croate, Espagnol, 

Finlandais, Grecque, Hongrois, Islandais, Innuktikut, 

Italien, Latin, Polonais, Portugais, Roumain, Russe, 

Serbe, Slovène et Tchèque. 

FREE LAW JOURNAL : porte sur tous les sujets 

juridiques de perspectives nationale, comparative ou 

internationale, incluant les droits canonique, 

international, islamique, et les perspectives sociales 

et historiques de l’impact des lois sur les sociétés. 

WAR & PEACE JOURNAL : porte sur le spectre de la 

prévention de conflit jusqu’à la reconstruction 

d’État, incluant : sciences politiques, diplomacie, 

politique de défense, stratégie, operation, tactiques, 

logistique, renseignement, maintien et imposition de 

la paix, art du commandement, psychologie du 

combat, avancées technologiques et contreterrorisme, 

l’histoire militaire étudiant la conduite 

des opérations, l’évitement des conflits, leurs 

causes et effets, les commandants et personalités. 

WORLD HISTORY JOURNAL : porte sur l’ensemble 

du spectre du développement humain, d’une 

perspective locale, régionale ou globale, incluant : 

histoire de toutes les périodes, paleontologie, 

anthropologie, linguistiques, lettres et langages, les 

arts de même que les perspectives sociologiques. 

Pour les détails, consulter la page respective de 

chaque journal et ses critères de soumissions de 

http://www.FWPublishing.net ou contactez l’éditeur- 

chef à FWP@FWPublishing.net . 

Sincèrement, 


Éditeur-chef, Free World Publishing Inc.


NE BIS IN IDEM IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 

ACT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 

BY DR MACIEJ ROGALSKI 

1. In Anglo-Saxon legal theory, the ne bis in idem prohibition is 

described as a “rule against double jeopardy”. This prohibition is as old 

as the common law itself. In 12 th Century England, during the 

controversy between Henry II and Archbishop Thomas Becket over 

Church independence, this principle was exploited in the defence of the 

independence of ecclesiastical courts. An official accused of murder 

was tried by an ecclesiastical court. In order to exclude the jurisdiction 

of the Royal court, the principle of ne bis in idipsum, then in force in 

ecclesiastical courts, was invoked: “no one may be punished twice for 

the same offence”. 1 During a later period, a principle was observed in 

practice according to which it was impermissible to conduct several 

proceedings in the same case. In 1660, the Court of the King’s Bench in 

England forbade the conduct of two proceedings in the same case. 2 

In Ireland the double jeopardy concept is often recognisable in the 

language of anglicised Norman French (i. e. autrefois acquit and 

convict) whereas in most of the Code nations is it expressed in the Latin 

maxim of non bis in idem. 3 

The principle of double jeopardy is to be found in the Fifth Amendment 

of the United States Constitution and provides that no person shall “be 

subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”. 

The Fifth Amendment has been held to consist of three separate 

guarantees, namely: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and protection 

against multiple punishment for the same offence. In addition to the 

United States, the German, Canadian, Indian and South African 

1 

M. L. Friedland: Double Jeopardy, Oxford 1969, p 5. 

2 

P. A. McDermott: Res Judicata and Double Jeopardy, Butterworths 1999, p 

200. 

3 

P. A. McDermott: op. cit., p 201. 

157 

DR MACIEJ ROGALSKI - NE BIS IN IDEM IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 

IN THE UNITED KINGDOM


constitutions also embody this principle. Article 35(3)(m) of the 

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides that a person is 

“not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which 

that person has previously been either acquitted or convicted”. 4 

2. The principle of ne bis in idem guarantees the accused that he will not 

be held criminally responsible for an act which has already been 

adjudged. This is a right of the perpetrator of a punishable act, who can 

then demand that proceedings not be instituted against him, or where 

proceedings have already commenced, that they be discontinued, if 

criminal proceedings against him in the same case have already 

terminated with a valid judgement. 

It is generally accepted that the principle of ne bis in idem serves 

foremost to protect those who have been judged, whether convicted or 

acquitted. This principle also means that proceedings may not be 

conducted with the aim of acquittal or mitigating the penalty for a 

person who has received a legally valid sentence. 5 However, it should 

be noted that the ne bis in idem prohibition may in certain circumstances 

prevent the accused from demonstrating his innocence. 6 Therefore, one 

should note that under modern criminal procedures the binding principle 

of presumption of innocence stands until the court pronounces the 

accused guilty in a legally valid judgment. The accused is presumed 

innocent until his guilt is determined in a legally valid verdict, which 

puts into effect the ne bis in idem prohibition. Errors committed by the 

court that lead to the sentencing of an innocent person should not be 

rectified by infringing this principle. Furthermore, legal systems have 

measures allowing even those verdicts which are legally valid to be 

overturned. 

4 P. A. McDermott: op. cit., pp 198, 201. 

5 G. Grünwald: Die materielle Rechtskraft im Strafverfahren der Bundesrepublik 

Deutschland (in:) H. H. Jescheck (red.): Deutsche strafrechtliche Landesreferate 

zum IX Internationallen Kongreβ für Rechtsvergleichung, Teheran 1974, Berlin- 

New York 1974, p 97. 

6 M. L. Friedland: op. cit., p 4. 

158 




3. In the United Kingdom, as a consequence of criticism of the 

prevailing solutions in the area of double jeopardy, the relevant 

provisions of the Criminal Justice Act were fundamentally amended. 

The critics of the previous provisions indicated that it was necessary to 

ensure greater rights for the victims of crime and to provide the 

possibility for the prosecutor to reopen proceedings, under specific 

conditions, in case of serious offences. A specific circumstance that 

would allow the reopening of proceedings is the disclosure of new, 

important evidence after the accused has been acquitted of a serious 

offence. 7 

The new Criminal Justice Act came into force on 20 November 2003. 

Of significance from the point of view of double jeopardy are the 

provisions of Part 10 of the Criminal Justice Act (the “CJA”) entitled 

Retrial for Serious Offences. Art. 75 of the CJA specifies cases that can 

be the subject to reopened proceedings. According to Art. 75 (1) CJA: 

“This Part applies where a person has been acquitted of a qualifying 

offence in proceedings- 

(a) on indictment in England and Wales, 

(b) on appeal against a conviction, verdict or finding in proceedings 

on indictment in England and Wales, or 

(c) on appeal from a decision on such an appeal.” 

According to Art. 75 (2) CJA, “A person acquitted of an offence in 

proceedings mentioned in Subsection (1) is treated for the purposes of 

that Subsection as also acquitted of any qualifying offence of which he 

could have been convicted in the proceedings because of the firstmentioned 

offence being charged in the indictment, except an offence- 

(a) of which he has been convicted, 

(b) of which he has been found not guilty by reason of insanity, or 

(c) in respect of which, in proceedings where he has been found 

to be under a disability (as defined by Section 4 of the Criminal 

Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (c. 84)), a finding has been 

7 

The Criminal Justice Bill: Double jeopardy and prosecution appeals. Bill 8 of 

2002-3, Home Affair Section, House of Commons Library, Research Paper 

02/74, p6, pp 19-42. 

159 




made that he committed the act or made the omission charged 

against him.” 

According to Art. 75 (4) CJA, “This Part also applies where a person 

has been acquitted, in proceedings elsewhere than in the United 

Kingdom, of an offence under the law of the place where the 

proceedings were held, if the commission of the offence as alleged 

would have amounted to or included the commission (in the United 

Kingdom or elsewhere) of a qualifying offence”. “Conduct punishable 

under the law in force elsewhere than in the United Kingdom is an 

offence under that law for the purposes of Subsection (4), however it is 

described in that law” (Art. 75 (5) CJA). 

Part 10 CJA applies whether the acquittal happened before or after the 

passing of this Act (Art. 75 (6) CJA). In Part 10 CJA, a "qualifying 

offence" means an offence listed in Part 1 of Schedule 5 (Art. 75 (8) 

CJA). Schedule 5 lists 29 offences: murder, attempted murder, soliciting 

murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, attempted rape, intercourse 

with a girl under thirteen, incest by a man with a girl under thirteen, 

assault by penetration, rape of a child under thirteen, attempted rape of a 

child under thirteen, assault of a child under thirteen by penetration, 

causing a child under thirteen to engage in sexual activity, sexual 

activity with a person with a mental disorder impeding choice, causing a 

person with a mental disorder impeding choice to engage in sexual 

activity, unlawful importation of Class A drug, unlawful exportation of 

Class A drug, fraudulent evasion in respect of Class A drug, producing 

or being concerned in production of Class A drug, arson endangering 

life, causing explosion likely to endanger life or property, intent or 

conspiracy to cause explosion likely to endanger life or property, 

genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, grave breaches of 

the Geneva Conventions, directing terrorist organization, hostagetaking, 

conspiracy. 

(a) To reopen proceedings, an application must be filed with the 

Court of Appeal. ”A prosecutor may apply to the Court of 

Appeal for an order- quashing a person's acquittal in 

proceedings within Section 75(1), and 

160 




(b) ordering him to be retried for the qualifying offence” (Art. 76 

(1) CJA). 

“A prosecutor may apply to the Court of Appeal, in the case of a person 

acquitted elsewhere than in the United Kingdom, for- 

(a) a determination whether the acquittal is a bar to the person 

being tried in England and Wales for the qualifying offence, 

and 

(b) if it is, an order that the acquittal is not to be a bar” (Art. 76 (2) 

CJA). 

“A prosecutor may make an application under Subsection (1) or (2) only 

with the written consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions” (Art. 76 

(3) CJA). 

“The Director of Public Prosecutions may give his consent only if 

satisfied that- 

(a) there is evidence as respects which the requirements of Section 

78 appear to be met, 

(b) it is in the public interest for the application to proceed, and 

(c) any trial pursuant to an order on the application would not be 

inconsistent with obligations of the United Kingdom under 

Article 31 or 34 of the Treaty on European Union relating to the 

principle of ne bis in idem” (Art. 76 (4) CJA). 

“On an application under Section 76(1), the Court of Appeal- 

(a) if satisfied that the requirements of Sections 78 and 79 are met, 

must make the order applied for; 

(b) otherwise, must dismiss the application” (Art. 77 (1) CJA). 

“Where the Court of Appeal determines that the acquittal is a bar to the 

person being tried for the qualifying offence, the court- 

(a) if satisfied that the requirements of Sections 78 and 79 are met, 

must make the order applied for; 

(b) otherwise, must make a declaration to the effect that the 

acquittal is a bar to the person being tried for the offence” (Art. 

77 (3) CJA). 

161 




Provisions of Sections 78 and 79 CJA concern new and compelling 

evidence and interests of justice. Evidence is new if it was not adduced 

in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted (nor, if those were 

appeal proceedings, in earlier proceedings to which the appeal related) 

(Art. 78 (2) CJA). 

“Evidence is compelling if- 

(a) it is reliable, 

(b) it is substantial, and 

(c) in the context of the outstanding issues, it appears highly 

probative of the case against the acquitted person” (Art. 78 (3) 

CJA). 

The requirements of interests of justice are met if in all the 

circumstances it is in the interests of justice for the court to make the 

order under Section 77 (Art. 79 (1) CJA). 

“That question is to be determined having regard in particular to- 

(a) whether existing circumstances make a fair trial unlikely; 

(b) for the purposes of that question and otherwise, the length of 

time since the qualifying offence was allegedly committed; 

(c) whether it is likely that the new evidence would have been 

adduced in the earlier proceedings against the acquitted person 

but for a failure by an officer or by a prosecutor to act with due 

diligence or expedition; 

(d) whether, since those proceedings or, if later, since the 

commencement of this Part, any officer or prosecutor has failed 

to act with due diligence or expedition” (Art. 79 (2) CJA). 

162 




DIE MATERIELLEN VORAUSSETZUNGEN DER 

FÜRSORGERISCHEN FREIHEITSENTZIEHUNG 

NACH ART. 432 DES TÜRKISCHEN 

ZIVILGESETZBUCHES 

DOZENT DR. MEHMET DEMIR ٭ 

I. Allgemeines 

Das geltende türkische Vormundschaftsrecht sieht wie schweizerisches 

Zivilgesetzbuch (ZGB) und Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) vier Arten 

vormundschaftlicher Institutionen vor: Vormund-, Beistand-, 

Beiratschaft und fürsorgerische Freiheitsentziehung (FFE) 1 . 

In der Türkei sind die neuen Bestimmungen über die fürsorgerische 

Freiheitsentziehung (in Art. 432 ff. als neuer, im sechster Abschnitt, 

zehnter Titel, dritter Abteilung, zweiter Teil des tZGB) schon am 1. 

Januar 2002 in Kraft getreten. 

Mit dem neuen türkischen Zivilgesetzbuch (Art. 432–437 tZGB) wurde 

die vormundschaftliche fürsorgerische Freiheitsentziehung (FFE) in 

aller Ausführlichkeit geregelt. Diese Bestimmungen enthalten die 

Voraussetzungen bezüglich der betroffenen Person (der persönliche 

Geltungsbereich) und den Einweisungsvoraussetzungen eingeteilt. Die 

Einweisungsvoraussetzungen i.e.w. umfassen die einzelnen 

Schwächezustände, die Fürsorgebedürftigkeit, die Belastung für die 

Umgebung sowie die geeignete Anstalt. 

٭ 

Dozent am Lehrstuhl des Zivilrechts, Juristische Fakultät und Rechtspflege- 

Hochschule der Universität Ankara. 

1 

Spirig, E.: Die allgemeine Ordnung der Vormundschaft, Die fürsorgerische 

Freiheitsentziehung Art. 397a– 397f (in: Peter Gauch/Jörg Schmid, Das 

Familienrecht, Teilband II 3a), Zürich 1995, Vorbem. N. 25, 10 ff.; Riemer, Hans 

M., Grundriss des Vormundschaftsrechts, Zweite, überarbeitete Auflage, Bern 

1997, Rdn. 12, 38 ff. und gesondert siehe für Spezialliteraturverzeichnis: 

Riemer,15 ff.; Spirig, S. XIII ff. 

163 

DOZENT DR. MEHMET DEMIR - DIE MATERIELLEN VORAUSSETZUNGEN DER 

FÜRSORGERISCHEN FREIHEITSENTZIEHUNG NACH ART. 432 DES TÜRKISCHEN 

ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


Im türkischen Zivilgesetzbuch werden zivilrechtliche und 

zivilprozessuale spezifische Regeln über die FFE vorgesehen 2 . Art. 432 

des türkischen Zivilgesetzbuches regelt die materiellen 

Voraussetzungen einer Anstaltseinweisung aus fürsorgerischen Gründen 

bei Mündigen und Entmündigten. Das neue türkische Zivilgesetzbuch 

enthält aber auch ausführliche Regeln über die FFE für Kinder (Art. 446 

tZGB) 3 . Demnach kann ein Kind, der unter Vormundschaft steht, selbst 

gerichtliche Beurteilung verlangen (Art. 446 Abs. 3 tZGB). Für die 

Kinder, die unter elterlicher Gewalt stehen sind, eine solche 

Bestimmung im Gesetz nicht vorgesehen. Man kann aber Art. 446 Abs. 

3 auch für die unter elterliche Gewalt stehende Kinder anolog 

anwenden. Allerdings muss dieses Kind mindestens 16 Jahre alt sein 

(Art. 446 Abs. 3 tZGB), um selbst gerichtliche Beurteilung verlangen zu 

können. Auch hier muss für die Einweisung eine Gefährdung des 

Kindes vorliegen (vgl. Art. 347 Abs. 1; Art. 432 tZGB). Ferner gelten 

sowohl für die Entziehungsgründe und Einweisungsoraussetzungen als 

auch verfahrensrechtlichen Sicherheiten gleiche Regelungen wie für 

2 

für die Ausführliche zu diesen Bestimmungen siehe: Dural, M. / Öğüz, T./ 

Gümüş, A., Türk Özel Hukuku, C.III, Aile Hukuku, (Das türkische Privatrecht, 

Bd. III, Das Familienrecht), İstanbul 2005, 679 ff. ; Öztan, B., Aile Hukuku, 5. 

Bası (Das Familienrecht, fünfte Aufl.), Ankara 2004, 805 ff.; Kılıçoğlu, A.. M., 

Medeni Kanun’umuzun Aile-Miras-Eşya Hukukuna Getirdiği Yenilikler, 

Genişletilmiş 2. Bası (Die Neuerungen des neuen türkischen Zivilgesetzbuches 

bezüglich Familien-, Erb- und Sachrecht, Zweite, erweiterte Aufl.) Ankara 2004, 

160 ff. ; Gümüş, M. A., Kısıtlı ve Kısıtlı Olmayan Ergin Kişilerin Koruma Amaçlı 

Özgürlüğünün Kısıtlanması, Yeditepe Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi I/2, 

Cilt:1, Sayı:2 Yıl: 2005, 189–228 (Die fürsorgerische Freiheitsentziehung der 

entmündigten- und nichtentmündigten Mündige Personen trZGB 432-437, in: 

Zeitschrift der Juristische Fakultät der Yeditepe Universität, I/2, 2005, S. 189- 

228); Gençcan, Ömer U., Koruma Amacıyla Kısıtlama Davaları, Adalet Dergisi 

Y. 93, Temmuz 2002, 41 vd. (Die Rechtsstreite der fürsorgerischen 

Freiheitsentziehung, Zeitschrift der Justiz, J. 93, Juli 2002,. 41–42); Gençcan, 

Ömer U., 4721 Sayılı Türk Medeni Kanunu, Bilimsel Açıklama- İçtihatlar-İlgili 

Mevzuat, 2. Cilt: Madde 352–1030 (mit der Nummer 4721 des türkischen 

Zivilgesetzbuches, Die wissenschaftliche Ausführung- Jurisprudenz- betreffende 

Gesetzgebung, Bd. 2, Art. 352-1030), Ankara 2004, 1841 ff. 

3 

mit schweizerischem Zivilgesetzbuch vgl.: Art. 405a ZGB 

164 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


Mündige und Entmündigte 4 . 

In den Bestimmungen zur FFE handelt es sich um einen schweren 

Eingriff in die persönliche Freiheit und von diesem Standpunkt aus 

gesehen gilt die FFE als eine umfassende vormundschaftliche 

Maßnahme. 

Im türkischen Recht steht FFE auch mit dem Verfassungsrecht in 

Verbindung. In dieser Hinsicht impliziert das türkische Grundgesetz 

einen wichtigen Artikel (Art. 19 tGG) über die FFE. Nach Art. 19 Abs. 

3 kann man sich der individuellen Freiheit entziehen. Der türkische 

Grundgesetzesgeber bestimmt in Art.19 Abs. 3 des tGG 5 , dass in 

gesetzlichen Ausnahmesituationen die Freiheitsentziehung beschränkt 

werden kann. Ohne weiteres gehört FFE zu diesen Ausnahmefällen 

auch. Dennoch ist FFE kein Ordnungsinstrument, sondern ein 

persönliches fürsorgliches Instrument. Also wird die 

4 für ausführliche Erläuterungen zu diesem Thema siehe: Lustenberger, Markus, 

Die Fürsorgerische Freiheitsentziehung bei Unmündigen unter elterlicher Gewalt 

(Art. 310/314a ZGB), Freiburg 1987. 

5 

Die türkische Verfassung (Art. 19 Abs. 3 t GG) heißt ganz genau: ‘‘ 

Niemandem darf seiner Freiheit entzogen werden, es sei denn in den nach Art 

und Voraussetzungen durch Gesetz bestimmten Fällen: 

Vollstreckung von durch die Gerichte verhängten Freiheitsstrafen und 

Sicherungsmaßnahmen, Festnahme oder Verhaftung des Betroffenen aufgrund 

einer Gerichtsentscheidung oder einer im Gesetz bestimmten Verpflichtung, 

Vollstreckung einer Entscheidung zur Besserung unter Aufsicht oder Vorführung 

eines Minderjährigen vor die zuständige Behörde, Vollstreckung einer im 

Einklang mit den im Gesetz bestimmten Grundsätzen getroffenen Maßnahme zur 

Behandlung, Erziehung oder Besserung eines gemeingefährlichen 

Geisteskranken, Rauschgift- oder Alkoholsüchtigen, eines Landstreichers oder 

einer Person, welche die Ausbreitung einer Krankheit herbeizuführen geeignet 

ist, in einer Anstalt, Festnahme oder Verhaftung einer Person, welche illegal in 

das Land einzureisen versucht oder einreist oder gegen die eine Ausweisungsoder 

Auslieferungsentscheidung ergangen ist. ’’. Das parallele Bedürfnis zu 

diesem Artikel wird mit 4721 N. türkisches Zivilgesetzbuch Art. 432–437 

gedeckt. Ebenso für Erläuterungen und Auslegungen siehe : Gençcan, 1842; 

Gümüş, 200f. und 201 Fn. 44 

165 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


vormundschaftliche fürsorgliche Freiheitsentziehung gegenüber anderen 

grundgesetzlichen freiheitsentziehenden Maßnahmen abgegrenzt 6 . 

Besonders schützt man sich die Interessen der betroffenen Personen 

dadurch, dass das Gesetz für solche Personen grundsätzlich die 

verfahrensrechtlichen Sicherheiten wie umfassende gerichtliche 

Beurteilung sicherstellt (zum Beispiel: Art. 434 tZGB 

Mitteilungspflichten; Art. 435 tZGB Eine gerichtliche Beurteilung der 

Einweisungsentscheidung; Art. 436 tZGB Gewisse verfahrensrechtliche 

Minimalanforderungen). 

In diesem Aufsatz wird die FFE im Rahmen des Art. 432 des tZGB 

behandelt, der die materiellen Voraussetzungen der fürsorgerischen 

Freiheitsentziehung regelt. 

II. Grundprinzipien über die FFE 

A. Das Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzip 

FFE beruht im Allgemeinen auf dem Grundsatz der 

Verhältnismässigkeit oder Proportionalität. Dieses Prinzip wird von den 

sichernden Maßnahmen des Strafrechts abgegrenzt 7 . Es handelt sich bei 

einer fürsorgerischen Freiheitsentziehung nicht um eine Strafe. Deshalb 

gibt es zwischen den Voraussetzungen beider Arten von Maßnahmen 

Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede 8 . 

6 

gesondert siehe: Schnyder, Bernhard, Vormundschaft und Menschenrechte, in: 

ZVW 27/1972, 41 ff. (in: ZVW 28/1973, 3 ff.); Spirig, Rdn. 29 f., 10-11. 

7 

hierzu ausführlich: Schultz, H., Persönlichkeitsschutz und Freiheitsrechte im 

Vormundschaftswesen: Strafrechtliche Aspekte, in: ZVW 43 (1988), 121 ff.; 

Bigger, E., Fürsorgliche Freiheitsentziehung (FFE) und Strafrechtliche 

Massnahme bei Suchtkranken aus rechtlicher Sicht (Art. 397a ZGB/44 StGB), in: 

ZVW 47 (1992), 41 ff. ; Gümüş, 203–204 

8 

zu diesem Vergleich und Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzip im Vormundschaftsrecht 

siehe: Caviezel-Jost, Barbara, Die materiellen Voraussetzungen der 

fürsorgerischen Freiheitsentziehung (Art. 397a Abs. 1 und 2 ZGB), 1988, 241 ff. 

166 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


Im Vormundschaftsrecht ist der Grundsatz der Verhältnismässigkeit 

eine wichtige Maßgabe. Dieses Prinzip besteht aus den drei Unterteilen: 

Geeignetheit, Erforderlichkeit und Verhältnismässigkeit i.e.S., die 

einzeln auf eine konkrete Maßnahme angewendet werden sollen. 

Nach diesem Grundsatz muss das Mittel und die Maßnahme zur FFE 

dem angestrebten Ziel angepasst sein. Bei Anwendung dieses 

Grundsatzes muss man sehr vorsichtig und behutsam sein. Daher muss 

ein Eingriff in die persönliche Freiheit weder stärker noch schwächer 

sein. 

Das Verhältnismässigkeitprinzip kommt bei den gesetzliche 

Modalitäten des Vollzugs einer FFE zur Anwendung. 

B. Typengebuntheit und Typenfixierung 

Im Vormundschaftsrecht wie im Sachenrecht, im ehelichen Güterrecht 

und bei den Formen der juristischen Personen besteht ein sog. Numerus 

Clausus, also ein beschränkter Zahl-Formen und Typen Grundsatz. In 

Anlehnung an den Grundsatz der Typengebundheit regelt man an 

Formen und Möglichkeiten vormundschaftliche Maßnahmen. Aber für 

Rechts– und Verkehrssicherheit bedarf es auch des Grundsatzes der 

Typenfixierung 9 . 

Nach diesem Grundprinzip werden im Gesetz FFE–Maßnahmen 

umschreiben. Die Maßnahme darf nicht beliebig ausgewählt werden. 

Sie ist richtig zu wählen und zu dosieren. 

In der Anwendung der Maβnahmen wird man nicht nur die Interessen 

der Hilfsbedürftigen, sondern auch diejenigen der Dritten, die mit ihm 

und 323 ff.; Schnyder, B., Die Stufenfolge der vormundschaftlichen Massnahmen 

und die Verhältnismässigkeit des Eingriffes, in: ZVW 26/1971, 41 ff. (ZBJV 

105/1969, 268 ff.); Riemer, s.35 f., N. 6-7 und 159, N. 17; Spirig, 68, Rdn. 257 

ff. ; Dural/Öğüz/Gümüş, 691f. 

9 Riemer, 36 f., N. 8. 

167 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


in Rechtsverkehr treten, berücksichtigen 10 . 

C. Der Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten 

Der Zweck des türkischen Vormundschaftsrecht besteht auch darin, die 

schwachen und hilfsbedürftigen Personen zu umsorgen und zu 

unterstützen. Die FFE als eine zivilrechtliche Möglichkeit und 

Massnahme verfolgt das Grundrecht der persönlichen Freiheit und 

Sicherheit bestmöglich zu schützen 11 . 

Die persönliche Freiheit wird als Grundrecht ausdrücklich durch das 

EMRK ( Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und 

Grundfreiheiten ) geschützt 12 . Am 18. Mai 1954 trat die Türkei dem 

EMRK bei 13 . Diese Konvention ist hinsichtlich der Gründe der FFE sehr 

bedeutsam auf dem Gebiet der Menschenrechte. 

Im Hinblick auf die Verfahrensgarantien der EMRK soll die türkische 

vormundschaftsrechtliche Gesetzgebung künftig als gegenwärtige 

Regeln vermehrt verbindliche Organisations- und 

Verfahrensvorschriften enthalten 14 . 

10 

Riemer, 37, N. 9-10. 

11 

Im türkischen Recht besonders für die Verbindung zwischen dem Prinzip des 

Schutzes des Persönlichkeitsrechtes und Vormundschaftrechtes siehe : Helvacı, 

S., Kişiliğin Korunması ve Vesayet Hukuku, Prof. Dr. Erdoğan Moroğlu’na 65. 

Yaş Günü Armağanı, 2. Baskı (Der Schutz der Persönlichkeit und 

Vormundschaftsrecht, in: FS 65. Geburtstag für Prof. Dr. Erdoğan MOROĞLU, 

zweite Aufl.), Ocak-2001, İstanbul 2001, 863 ff.; Güneş, S., Teori ve Uygulamada 

Kişi Özgürlüğü ve Güvencesi (In der Theorie und Anwendung die Freiheit und 

Sicherung der Individiuum), İstanbul 1988, 2 ff. ; Gümüş, 201-202. 

12 

Spirig, 12, Rdn.35; Riemer, 154–155, N. 6-7. 

13 

dafür siehe: Offizielle Anzeiger (türkische Gesetzblatt) v. 19.03.1954 / mit N. 

8662. 

14 

Gölcüklü, A. F/Gözübüyük, A.Ş., Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve 

Uygulaması, 3. Bası, (Europaeische Menschenrechtskonvention und ihre 

Anwendung, dritte Aufl.), Ankara 2002, 234 ff. 

168 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


Es gibt das Prinzip des Persönlichkeitsschutzes als Verbindlichkeit eines 

Rechtsstaats auf wichtige Wirkungen auf das türkische 

Vormundschaftsrecht. Auch FFE zählt zu diesen rechtliche Wirkungen. 

III. Neue Regelung bezüglich der FFE in Art. 432 tZGB 

Im türkischen Zivilrecht wird die materielle Voraussetzung für die FFE 

nach Art. 432 tZGB wie folgt bestimmt : 

‘‘Jede mündige Person, die wegen Geisteskrankheit, Geistesschwäche, 

Trunksucht oder anderen Suchterkrankungen, gefahrdarstellenden 

ansteckenden Krankheiten oder Vagabundismus der Gesellschaft eine 

Gefahr darstellt, darf in einer Anstalt, geeignet für ihre Heilung, 

Erziehung oder Vernünftigung untergebracht werden, wenn ihr die 

nötige persönliche Fürsorge nicht anders erwiesen werden kann. 

Staatsbeauftragte, die während ihres Dienstes einen dieser Gründe 

erfahren, haben unverzüglich die berechtigte Vormundschaftsstelle über 

diesen Zustand in Kenntnis zu setzen. 

Dabei ist auch die Belastung zu berücksichtigen, welche die Person für 

ihre Umgebung bedeutet. 

Die betroffene Person muss entlassen werden, sobald ihr Zustand es 

erlaubt." 

Wie oben ausgeführt wurde, bezieht sich dieser Artikel auf die 

materiellen (i.e.S und i.w.S) Voraussetzungen der FFE. Danach besteht 

dieser Artikel kurz im Vorliegen eines Schwächezustandes (die Existenz 

einer der Einweisungsgründe), einer daraus folgenden 

Fürsorgebedürftigkeit und Belastung für sich und die Umgebung, in der 

Verhältnismässigkeit der Massnahme und im Vorhandsein einer 

geeigneten Anstalt. 

Im Art. 432 tZGB werden die Freiheitsentziehunsgründe und die in 

diesem Zusammenhang stehenden materiellen Voraussetzungen der 

169 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


FFE verständlicherweise aufgezählt. Auch dieser Aufzählung im tZGB 

432 zu den Freiheitsentziehungsgründen ist ebenso EMRK (Art. 5 Ziff. 

1) und ZGB (Art. 397 a) abschliessend. Darin sind die 

Freiheitsentziehungsgründe wie folgt: 

A. Die Existenz einer der Freiheitsentziehunsgründe als eine 

materielle Voraussetzung : Geisteskrankheit oder Geistesschwäche / 

Alkoholismus oder Suchterkrankungen (Drogenabhängigkeit) / eine 

schwere gefahrdarstellende ansteckende Krankheit / 

Vagabundentum 

Dieser Absatz (Art. 432 Abs.1 tZGB) enthält an und für sich die 

Voraussetzungen für die betroffenen Person, d.h. den persönlichen 

Geltungsbereich. Die betroffenen Personen sind mündige oder 

entmündigte Personen. Der Gesetzgeber zieht ausdrücklich eine 

Freiheitsentziehung für die mündige Person in Erwägung in Art. 432. 

Die fürsorgliche Freiheitsentziehung für Kinder ist nach diesem Artikel 

nicht möglich (vgl. Art. 446 tZGB) 15 . 

Die persönlichen Schwächezustände 16 müssen die Ursache für die 

Fürsorgebedürftigkeit sein, d.h. ein Kausalzusammenhang muss 

zwischen dem Schwächezustand und der Fürsorgebedürftigkeit 

bestehen. 

Es muss für die fürsorgerische Freiheitsentziehung einer der möglichen 

Schwächezustände sowie die Fürsorgebedürftigkeit kumulativ 

vorhanden sein. 

Es werden vom Gesetzgeber die nachstehenden gewissen 

Schwächezustande 17 (Geisteskrankheit, Geistesschwäche, Trunksucht, 

andere Suchterkrankungen und schwere Verwahrlosung) aufgezählt. 

15 

Öztan, 805 f.; Kılıçoğlu, 162; Gümüş, 196-197. 

16 

Caviel-Jost, 117 ff. 

17 

für die Abgrenzung, Konkurrenz und Kumulation der Schwächezustände 

siehe: Caviel-Jost, 233 ff. 

170 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


Mit diesen Zuständen wird sich der untere Teil generell befassen. 

1. Geiteskrankheit oder Geistesschwäche 

Die Begriffe Geisteskrankheit und Geistesschwäche werden sowohl im 

medizinischen Sinn als auch im juristischen Sinn behandelt und kurz 

unter dem Oberbegriff der Psychischen Störungen zusammengefasst 18 . 

Diese sind als Rechtsbegriffe zu verstehen und bedürfen dieser 

Konkretisierung 19 . Bei der Geisteskrankheit oder Geistesschwäche 

handelt es sich um pyschische Störungen. Aber es gibt bei der 

Geisteskrankheit im Vergleich zur Geistesschwäche pyschische Störung 

schwererer Art. In der Literatur schreibt Schorn 20 ausdrücklich, dass 

auch der Geistesschwache unter den Begriff der Geisteskrankheit fällt. 

Zum Beispiel im juristischen Sinne: 

• Eine paranoide Psychose oder Schizophrenie, 

• Die chronische Epilepsi begleitet von einer Psychose, 

• Eine Psychopathie, wenn sie eine gewisse Schwere aufweist… 

usw. 

Bei der Geistesschwäche handelt es sich um Fälle, bei denen auffälliges 

Verhalten der persönlichen Situation und des Vorlebens noch einfühlbar 

sind. Für die Geistesschwäche wurden als Beispiele angenommen 21 : 

• Absonderung von der Familie und realer Suizidgefahr 

(Selbstmord), 

• Die Kurz- und Langzeitgedächtnisstörungen, 

• Die Verzweiflung, übersteigerte Niedergeschlagenheit, 

• Eine Psychopathie, die nicht eine gewisse Schwere erreicht… 

usw. 

18 zu diesen Begriffen siehe weiters: Caviezel-Jost: 118 ff.; Spirig, 28 ff. 

19 Dazu : BGE 62 II 264; 85 II 460; 117 II 233/234. 

20 Schorn, H., Die Europäische Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte 

und Grundfreiheiten und ihr Zusatzprotokoll in Einwirkung auf das deutsche 

Recht, Frankfurt 1965, 158. 

21 Spirig, s.28, Rdn. 25 ff. 

171 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


Die Geisteskrankheiten und Geistesschwächen sollen nicht im 

medizinischen Sinn zu verstehen. Die fürsorgebedürftigkeit des 

Betroffenen spielt im Grunde eine entscheidende Rolle. 

2. Alkoholismus oder Suchterkrankungen (Drogenabhängigkeit) 

Das Problem des Alkoholismus ist sowohl eine medizinische als auch 

juristischen Tatsache. Dadurch muss deren Verhältnis zueinander 

abgeklärt werden 22 . Es gibt als medizinischen Begriff je nach Grund und 

Phase verschiedene Formen des Alkoholismus. Die Einteilung nach 

Gründen: Alpha-, Beta-, Gamma-, Delta- und Epsilon-Alkoholismus. 

Die Einteilung nach Phasen: präalkoholische (vor der Trunksucht), die 

Phase der Trunksucht. Besonders beim dem Gamma-Alkoholismus ist 

die dritte Phase die wichtigste. Diese sind die prodromale-, kritische- 

und chronische Phase 23 . 

In der juristischen Literatur 24 und Rechtsprechung 25 gibt es 

verschiedenen Definitionen für den Begriff des Alkoholismus und der 

Trunksucht. Die Begriffbestimmungen über das Alkoholismus- und die 

Rauschgiftsüchtigkeit - sind relativ vage und unklar. Die Trunksucht 

wird als abnormaler Hang zum Trinken oder als Haltlosigkeit im 

Zusammenhang mit dem Hang zum Trinken beschreiben 26 . 

Die Drogenabhängigkeit kann als allgemeiner Begriff betrachtet 

werden, weil die Begriffe Alkoholismus und Suchterkrankung im Sinne 

von Drogenabhängigkeit verstanden werden 27 . 

22 

siehe hierzu ausführlich: Spühler, K., Die Voraussetzungen der fürsorgerischen 

Freiheitsentziehung bei Drogensüchtigen, in: ZBl. 1983, 49 ff. ; Caviezel-Jost, 

157 ff. 

23 

Caviel-Jost, 160–162. 

24 

Caviel-Jost, 157; Spirig, s. 35, Rdn. 49 ff.; Gümüş, 198 f. 

25 

Caviel-Jost, 164. 

26 

BGE 39 II 509; BGE 65 II 141; BGE 78 II 337 (Caviel-Jost, 155, Fn. 14) 

27 

Caviezel-Jost, 200 f. 

172 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


Wie beim Vormundsurteil gemäss Art. 409 tZGB muss der Richter vor 

dem Urteil zu FFE aufgrund von Alkohol- und Drogenabhängigkeit von 

dem Gesundheitsgremium ein ärztliches Attest beschaffen und die 

betreffende Person anhören 28 . 

3. Die schwere gefahrdarstellende ansteckende Krankheit 

Dieser Freiheitsentziehungsgrund betrifft besonders den Schutz der 

öffentlichen Gesundheit. Dabei sind schweren gefahrdarstellenden 

ansteckende Krankheiten sowohl in die persönlichen- als auch 

gemeingefährlichen Zustände einzuteilen. 

Die Bestimmung dieser verschiedenartigen Krankheiten ist eine 

medizinwissenschaftliche Arbeit 29 . Jedoch in der Begründung des oben 

erwähnter Artikels wird auf z.B. Aids (Acquired immune deficiency 

syndrome), Cholera, die fortgeschrittene Tuberkulose (Schwindsucht), 

Pest (Epidemi) und andere stärker ansteckende Krankheiten 

verwiesen 30 . 

4. Als ein spezifischer Zustand schwerer Verwahrlosung und 

Fürsorgebedürftigkeit: Vagabundheit / Vagabundismus 

Die schwere Verwahrlosung und Fürsorgebedüftigkeit zur FFE sind 

neue Begriffe im Vormundschaftsrecht. Der Inhalt dieser Begriffe wird 

in Literatur 31 und Rechtsprechung 32 in unterschiedlichem Sinne 

28 

dafür siehe die Urteile des 2. Senats des türkisches Kassationsgerichtshofs: Y 

2. HD. 06.03.2003, 1622/2977 (Gençcan, 1845); Y. 2. HD. v. 7.3.1996, 

1035/2203 (Öztan, 762, Fn. 64). 

29 

Dural/Öğüz/Gümüş, 686; Öztan, 806; Kılıçoğlu, 162-163; Gümüş, 198 und 

225f. 

30 

Kılıçoğlu, 163. 

31 

für Ansichten : Caviel-Jost, 209 ff.; Öztan, 806; Kılıçoğlu, 163; Gümüş, 198 f. 

und S. 199, Fn. 38. 

32 

für Rechtsprechungen: Caviel-Jost, 223–224. 

173 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


dargestellt und definiert. 

Besonders die Verwahrlosungzustände auf die gestützte FFE können 

vom Gesetzgeber auf bestimmte Fälle beschränkt werden 33 . 

Die Vagabundheit als materielle Voraussetzung für FFE ist ein 

spezifischer Grund des türkischen Vormundschaftsrechtes. Dieser 

Grund wird im schweizerischen (ZGB) nicht geregelt. Es wird 

Landstreicher als sinngemäßer Ausdruck in der EMRK 34 verwendet. 

Die Begriffe Vagabundheit, Vagabundismus oder das Vagabundentum 

bedeuten unzwecks umherzuwander, d.h. es heißt sog. vagabundierend 

sein. Andererseits ist das Vagabundenleben ein ungebundenes und 

unstetes Leben, mit häufigem Wechsel des Aufenthaltsortes und der 

Lebensumstände. Ein richtiger Vagabund 35 od. Landstreicher 36 liebt das 

unstete Leben, hält es nicht lange an einem Ort aus. 

Bei der Entziehung aufgrund von Vagabundheit muss noch mehr die 

Erziehung und Besserung der betroffene Person in Betracht gezogen 

werden 37 . 

B. Die Belastung für die Umgebung 

Der türkische Gesetzgeber sieht in dem zweiten Absatz des Artikels 

(Art. 432 Abs.2 tZGB) vor, dass zur FFE der betroffenen Person auch 

33 Iberg, Gottlieb, Die fürsorgerische Freiheitsentziehung, erste Erfahrungen mit 

einem neuen Gesetz, in: Brennpunkt 1982, S. 85 ff. und besonders 97. 

34 Art. 5 Ziff. 1 lit. e EMRK 

35 englisch: Vagrant / französische : Vagabond 

36 Unter einem Landstreicher ist im Sinne der EMRK (Art. 5) im Wesentlichen 

ein arbeitsfähiger, jedoch arbeitsscheuer Müssiggänger zu verstehen.; vgl. : 

Ulusan, İ., Die Neugestaltung des Familienrechts durch das neue türkische 

Notariatszeitung, 8/2002, 225 ff. und besonders 234 (GÜMÜŞ, zitiert auf der 

Seite 199, Fn. 38). 

37 Gümüş, 199–200. 

174 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


die Belastungen für ihrer Umgebung zu berücksichtigen sind 38 . Dieses 

Element ist eine feststehende Tatsache. Dadurch wird es sich auf einen 

Entschluss zur FFE auswirken. 

Die Belastung für die Umgebung kann sich für die nähere Umgebung 39 

und weitere Umgebung 40 ergeben. Zur näheren Umgebung sind 

diejenigen Personen zu zählen, wie Ehegatte, Familiengehörige und im 

gleichen Haushalt mit der betroffen Person lebende Personen sowie 

Nachbarn. Diese Personen haben die größte Belastung zu tragen. Für die 

nähere Umgebung weist die Belastung zwei Aspekte auf. Zum Beispiel 

für die nähere Umgebungen: Wohnungsgenossen, Konkubinatspartner, 

Hausangestellte. Die weitere Umgebung umfasst die 

Familiengemeinschaft und Nachbarschaft sowie Arzt, Fürsorger, 

Vormund und jedermann, der mit dem Hilfsbedürftigen in Berührung 

kommt. 

Auch auf solcher Belastungs-Situationen sind die Voraussetzung für 

Pflege und Behandlung zu betrachten, um die betroffene Person in eine 

Anstalt einweisen zu können. 

C. Die geignete Anstalt als Einweisungsvoraussetzung 

Wie in der schweizerischen Rechtsprechung 41 so ist auch im türkischen 

Vormundschaftsrecht der Begriff der geeignete Anstalt 42 in einem 

weiten Sinne zu verstehen. In diesem Sinn kann die FFE auch in einem 

Kinder-, Schul-, Therapie-, Pflegeheim, in einer psychiatrischen Klinik 

oder einer Strafanstalt vollzogen werden. 

38 

Öztan, 807; Kılıçoğlu, 163; Gümüş, 196-197. 

39 

Zur Belastung für die nähere Umhebung: Cavier-Jost, 295. 

40 

Zur Belastung für die nähere Umhebung: Cavier-Jost, 296. 

41 

‘‘… Nicht nur geschlossen Anstalten zählen dazu, sondern alle Institutionen, 

welche die Bewegungsfreiheit der betroffene Personen aufgrund der Betreuung 

und Überwachung spürbar einschranken …’’ (BGE 121 III 306). 

42 

für dieser Begriff: Breitenstein, F., Was ist im Sine von Art. 397a 

ZGB ?, in: ZVW 36 (1981), 98 ff. 

175 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


Unterbringung oder Zurückbehaltung der betroffene Person in einer 

Anstalt behindert grundsätzlich das Recht auf ihrer persönliche Freiheit. 

Die eingewiesene oder zurückbehaltete Person muss entlassen werden, 

sobald ihr Zustand es erlaubt 

In der Literatur 43 muss die Geeignetheit der Anstalt als 

Einweisungsvoraussetzung konkret definiert werden, weil es im 

Einzellfall oft wenig wirklich geeignete Anstalten gibt. 

IV. Zusammenfassende Ergebnisse 

Einer der wichtigen Revisionen, welches das neue Zivilgesetzbuch mit 

Nummer 4721 in das türkische Vormundschaftsrecht eingeführt hat, ist 

die fürsorgliche Freiheitsentziehung. Das Hauptziel dieser Maßnahme 

ist die Umgebung sowie die Freiheit und Sicherheit der volljährigen 

Person, dessen Freiheit eingeschränkt werden soll, von den Gefahren, 

die sie sich und ihrem Umfeld zufügen kann, zu schützen. 

Das türkische Verfassungsgesetz vom 1982 regelt das Recht auf Freiheit 

und Sicherheit der Person unter den Grundrechten (Art. 19 tGG). Das 

Grundgesetz erlaubt eine Freiheitsentziehung nur unter den im Gesetz 

vorgeschriebenen Grundsätzen und spezifischen Umständen. Somit 

können nur bestimmte Personen, die für die Gesellschaft eine Gefahr 

darstellen, zur Behandlung, Erziehung oder Besserung in eine geeignete 

Anstalt eingewiesen werden. Der Gesetzeszweck welcher im 

Verfassungsgesetz als ‚‚sachgemäß den im Gesetz vorgeschriebenen 

Grundsätzen’’ formuliert wurde, ist mit dem neuen türkischen 

Zivilgesetzbuch (Art. 432 ff. tZGB) verwirklicht worden. 

Die Regelungen der fürsorgerischen Freiheitsentziehung für Mündige 

sind im Gegensatz deren für Minderjährige ausgiebiger und in Artikel 

43 

Spirig, s.45, Rdn. 118 ff.; Caviel-Jost, 5. Kapitel: Geeignete Anstalt, 344 ff. 

und besonders 383 f.; Riemer, N. 18-19, 159; Dural/Öğüz/Gümüş, 694 f; Öztan, 

807; Kılıçoğlu, 163 f.; Gümüş, 206–208. 

176 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


432 ff. tZGB detailliert geregelt. In dieser Regelung hat der 

Gesetzesgeber, anders als in den ausgängigen schweizerischen 

Zivilgesetzbuchregeln (Art. 397a–f ZGB), nicht die Möglichkeit einer 

fürsorgerischen Freiheitsentziehung für eine Minderjährige Person 

vorgesehen. Zudem wird der Begriff „mündig“ erweiternd ausgelegt, so 

dass auch die Freiheitsentziehung für volljährige Personen unter 

elterlicher Gewalt und Volljährige, welchen rechtliche Berater oder 

Verwalter ernannt wurden, erlaubt wird 44 . 

Für fürsorgerische Freiheitsentziehungen für Volljährige haben gewisse 

rechtliche Gründe zu bestehen. Diese beschränkten Gründe sind 

materielle Voraussetzungen einer fürsorgerischen Freiheitsentziehung. 

Deshalb hat der Gesetzesgeber in dem entsprechenden Artikel, um das 

Anwendungsgebiet dieser Maßnahme einzuschränken, diese rechtlichen 

Gründe in dieser Art aufgezählt: Geisteskrankheit, Geistesschwäche, 

Trunk- und Drogensucht, Vagabundenleben und ansteckende 

Krankheiten, welche eine schwere Gefahr darstellen (Art. 432 tZGB). 

Besonders zu erwähnen ist, dass der letzte rechtliche Grund, also 

ansteckende Krankheiten die eine schwere Gefahr darstellen, welcher 

im ausgängigen schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch nicht geregelt ist, als 

ein gesonderter rechtlicher Grund für fürsorgliche Freiheitsentziehung 

für Volljährige genannt wird. 

Die Feststellung der Existenz dieser Gründe, außer dem 

Vagabundenleben, hängt von einem Bericht, welcher die Ansichten der 

Sachverständigen beinhaltet und von einer amtlichen 

Gesundheitskommission aufgesetzt wurde, ab. Der Bestand eines 

Vagabundenlebens ist mit jeglichen Nachweisen festzustellen 45 . 

Das Hauptzweck der Entziehungsgründe, ausschließlich ansteckende 

Krankheiten, die eine schwere Gefahr darstellen, ist die jeweilige 

volljährige Person wieder für die Gesellschaft zu gewinnen. Deshalb 

wird somit unter diesen Umständen die Personenfreiheit und -sicherheit 

44 

Dural/Öğüz/Gümüş,683; Öztan, 805 f. 

45 

Öztan, 806; Kılıçoğlu, 162 f.; Gümüş, 225 f. 

177 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


nicht verletzt und letztendlich das Persönlichkeitsschutzprinzip aufrecht 

erhalten. 

In Artikel 432 des tZGB werden schwere ansteckende Krankheiten wie 

AIDS, Cholera, fortgeschrittene Tuberkulose und Pest als Beispiele 

genannt. Eigentlich steht im Falle des Auftretens dieser Krankheiten 

nicht der Schutz der Personenfreiheit sondern die Gesundheit der 

Umwelt und somit das Interesse der Gesellschaft im Vordergrund. Um 

das Interesse der Gesellschaft zu beurteilen, werden die Lasten, die die 

volljährige Person, wessen Freiheit entzogen werden soll, der 

Gesellschaft bringt, vor Augen gehalten. Lasten, die diese Person der 

Gesellschaft bringt, bedeuten schwerwiegende Belastungen, die die 

normale Grenzen, welche seine Familie und sein nahes Umfeld auf sich 

zu nehmen haben, überschreiten. 

Um eine fürsorgerische Freiheitsentziehung für eine volljährige Person 

anzuordnen, ist allein der Bestand einer oder einiger der im Gesetz 

beschränkten Gründe nicht ausreichend. Neben dem Geschehen des 

rechtlichen Vorsatzes benötigt es den Personenschutz durch eine 

Freiheitsentziehung. Angemessene Maßnahmen die in diesem Falle 

genommen werden zu haben, werden als Grundsatz des Prinzips der 

Verhältnismäßigkeit, welches in der Lehre anerkannt wird, angesehen. 

Nachdem ist eine Einweisung in eine geeignete Anstalt oder nach einer 

Einweisung das dortige Aufbewahren nur für die Heilung, Erziehung 

oder Besserung der volljährigen Person, wessen Freiheit entzogen 

werden soll, zu begünstigen. Während eine Unterbringung oder eine 

Einweisung der Person in eine geeignete Anstalt, die zwangsweise 

erfolgt, bedeutet: eine Aufbewahrung / die Aufnahme der Person auf 

eigenen Wunsch oder den dortigen Halt dieser. Unter den geeigneten 

Maßnahmen ist die Heilungsmethode bei psychischen und schweren 

physischen Krankheiten, der Weg der Erziehung und Besserung eher bei 

Entziehung wie im Falle von Vagabundenleben zu nennen. Um es zu 

wiederholen; sollte trotz Heilungs- Erziehungs- und Besserungsversuch 

die psychische oder schwere physische Krankheit der jeweiligen Person 

eine Gefahr für die Gesellschaft darstellen, kann eine fürsorgerische 

Freiheitsentziehung für diese Person angeordnet werden. 

178 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


Sollte der persönliche Schutz durch eine andere Maßnahme anstatt einer 

Freiheitsentziehung, trotz dessen das die psychische oder schwere 

physische Krankheit der volljährigen Person eine Gefahr für die 

Gesellschaft darstellt, gewährleistet werden können, ist in solchen 

Fällen keine Freiheitsentziehung anzuordnen. 

Bezüglich dieses kann eine Einweisung in eine geeignete Anstalt oder 

die dortige Aufbewahrung nur dann angeordnet werden, wenn der 

persönliche Schutz nicht auf anderem Wege gewährleistet werden kann. 

Grundsätzlich ist die zuständige Behörde, die diesen Entscheid erlassen 

kann, die Vormundschaftsbehörde, also das Amtsgericht am Wohnsitz 

des Betroffenen. Doch ist im Gesetz dieser Zuständigkeit eine 

Ausnahme gestellt. Dieser Ausnahme nach ist, wenn Gefahr im Verzug 

ist, die Vormundschaftsbehörde am Aufenthaltsort der betroffenen 

Person zuständig (Art. 433 tZGB). 

Nach Artikel 434 hat die Ausnahme darstellende zuständige 

Vormundschaftsbehörde die Einweisung oder Aufbewahrung der 

mündigen (volljährigen) Person in eine geeignete Anstalt oder der unter 

manchen besonderen Umständen vorgesehene Zuständige, falls er 

bezüglich der Vormundschaft Maßnahmen durchsetzt, diesen Zustand 

der Vormundschaftsbehörde am Wohnsitz der betroffenen Person 

mitzuteilen 46 . 

Die zuständige Behörde setzt den Betroffenen oder dessen 

Nahestehende über den Einweisungsentscheid in Kenntnis. Innerhalb 

zehn Tagen nach Mitteilung des Einweisungsentscheids sowie der 

Abweisung eines Entlassungsgesuches ist es möglich, dagegen innert 

zehn nach der Mitteilung an der Aufsichtsbehörde, also am Gericht 

erster Instanz, Einwand zu erheben (Art. tZGB 435). 

Spezifisch für den Prozess in der fürsorglichen Freiheitsentziehung sind 

einige besondere Verfahrungsrechtsregelungen vorgesehen (Art. tZGB 

436). Außer diesen einzigartigen Verfahrensregeln sind die in der 

46 Dural/Öğüz/Gümüş, 700 f. 

179 



ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


türkische Zivilprozessordnung (trZPO) 47 vorgesehenen allgemeinen 

Regeln anzuwenden 48 . 

Letztendlich ist zu sagen, dass der Entscheid über eine fürsorgliche 

Freiheitsentziehung nach vereinfachtem Verfahren zu erlassen ist. 

Gemäss diesem Verfahren muss der zuständige Richter vor dem 

Erlassen des Freiheitsentziehungsentscheides den Betroffen mündlich 

einvernehmen. Alleine das Postulat des Bevollmächtigten oder des 

Vertreters ist nicht ausreichend. Auf Grund dessen hat der Richter 

folgend unmittelbarer Anhörung des Betroffenen nach innerer 

Überzeugung von der Notwendigkeit einer Entziehung zu entscheiden 

(Art. t ZGB 437) 49 . 

47 auf türkisch: Hukuk Usulü Muhakemeleri Kanunu (HUMK). 

48 für Ausführungen über diese Prozessuale Regeln siehe: Dural/Öğüz/Gümüş, 

705 ff.; Öztan, 808 f.; Kılıçoğlu, 167 f.; Gençcan, Art. 436 trZGB, 1849 ff; 

Gümüş, 220 ff. und besonders 226-228. 

49 Dural/Öğüz/Gümüş, 711-713. 




ZIVILGESETZBUCHES


THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS 

LAW PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL 

HUMANITARIAN LAW IN SITUATIONS OF 

ARMED CONFLICT 

BY ALEXANDRU MOCANU 

Introduction 

After almost half a century from the International Conference on 

Human Rights held at Teheran, where the Resolution on Human Rights 

in Armed Conflicts 1 was adopted, some authors talk about a confusion 

that continues to exist, pointing out that many people still think that 

human rights law only applies in times of peace, while international 

humanitarian law in time of war. 2 Although contemporary international 

humanitarian law is focused only on jus in bello and its laws concerning 

the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict, apparently, have 

nothing to do with human rights protection, the final purpose of 

humanitarian law is protection of victims of armed conflicts, what 

makes it closer to the kind of protection provided by human rights law, 

applicable both in times of peace and war, with certain restrictions. This 

article attempts to thrash out the historical and conceptual differences 

and similarities of these two branches of law, in order to clarify their 

scope of application and the way they interplay in the context of armed 

conflict. 

1 Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, Resolution XXIII adopted by the 

International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 12 May 1968, 

http://www.icrc.org/ihl. 

2 

FREEMAN Mark, International Law and Internal Armed Conflicts: Clarifying 

the Interplay between Human Rights and Humanitarian Protection, The Journal 

of Humanitarian Assistance, 17 October 2000, 

http://www.jha.ac/articles/a059.htm. 


ALEXANDRU MOCANU - THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 

PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 

IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT


Historical Overview 

The classic public international law recognized distinction between the 

law of peace and the law of war. Depending on the state of international 

relations, was applied either the corpus juris of the law of peace or that 

of the law of war. 3 That is why only the jus in bello was recognized 

during wars. This situation prevailed until 1945, when the UN Charter 

and subsequent international instruments in the field of human rights 

protection diminished the rigidity of this division. Since then there are 

norms, witch are applicable during both the peace and the wartimes. 

However, since the international human rights law and the international 

humanitarian law have completely different historical origins and 

philosophical concepts, these innovations were not immediately 

accepted. 4 

The law of war began to develop when the use of force as an instrument 

of national politics was considered legal. As a result, a common interest 

aroused to develop some norms of “civilized” conduct on the battlefield. 

Consequently, the law of war had an international input, which is not 

the case of human rights law. The first concepts relating to human rights 

emerged in the national legal orders, mainly in Europe and North 

America, due to writings of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau on 

“natural law” and, respectively, “social contract”, which dramatically 

influenced the constitutional development of the domestic political 

institutions. Nevertheless, the human rights concepts latter were 

internationalized, while the law of armed conflicts extended its area of 

application on internal affairs. Thus, the states were concerned about the 

faith of their nationals abroad and were trying to ensure, by means of 

bilateral agreements “minimum standards of civilization”, meaning 

respect for certain rights in all circumstances. Later, a new concern 

3 HEINTZE Hans-Joachim, On the Relationship between Human Rights Law 

Protection and International Humanitarian Law, International Review of the Red 

Cross, December, 2004, Vol. 86, No. 856, p. 789. 

4 

DOSWALD-BECK Louise, VITÉ Sylvian, International Humanitarian Law 

and Human Rights Law, Offprint from International Review of the Red Cross, 

March-April 1993, p. 94. 






regarding national minorities was asserted. Therefore, at a given 

historical point, a states’ common interest emerged in the field of human 

rights. Consequently, the national concepts relating to human rights had 

been acquired by international law. The most firm step in the 

internationalization of the human rights law has been made by adopting 

the Universal Declaration in 1948 5 . Further, this was followed by the 

adoption of a series of international conventions in the field of human 

rights, some of them under the United Nations’ auspices, while others in 

the framework of the regional organizations. 

The law of armed conflicts followed, as mentioned above, a very 

different course, starting as a branch of international law. However, the 

most important thing in the evolution of this branch is that, by the 

adoption of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949, it penetrated the 

national sovereignty, extending over internal armed conflicts and 

ceasing to be only a branch of international law, aimed exclusively on 

regulating interstate relations. The common article 3 of the four Geneva 

Conventions from 1949 marked the first step in nearing the international 

humanitarian law and international human rights law. In the same 

context, the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of 

civilian persons in time of war and applicable to situations of 

occupation, even if it meets with no armed resistance, makes these two 

branches to get even closer. 6 

Distinctions 

Nevertheless, there are a series of obvious distinctions between 

international humanitarian law and international human rights law, what 

5 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Adopted and proclaimed by General 

Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948, 

http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 

6 

EIDE Asbjørn, The Laws of War and Human Rights – Differences and 

Convergences, Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red 

Cross Principles in Honour of Jean PICTET (ed. Christophe SWINARSKI), 

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva-Hague, 1984, p. 678. 






makes it difficult to perceive these two branches as applicable to the 

same range of relationships. These differences are due to different 

philosophies. 

The international humanitarian law has been conceived as a code of 

conduct during armed conflicts aimed on protecting persons and 

property that are, or may be, affected by the conflict, and to limit 

parties’ rights of using methods and means of warfare of their choice. 7 

The human rights law is based on the principle that individuals and 

groups can expect and/or claim certain behaviors or benefits from their 

governments. 8 The above formulations reveal that the first branch 

focuses on the way a party in a conflict is to behave in relations to 

people at its mercy, whereas human rights law concentrates on the rights 

of the recipient of a certain treatment. 9 To sum up, the main goal of the 

law of war is to prevent, as far as possible, unnecessary suffering during 

an armed conflict by prescribing certain behaviors. The major concern 

of human rights is to ensure good governance (by imposing some 

standards), which consists in respect and protection of the individual in 

all circumstances. 10 

Besides, from the human rights standpoint, there are two situations: the 

“normal one” and the state of emergency, which endanger the life of the 

nation. The last one allows, by virtue of most international instruments 

in the field, for a relaxation of the states’ obligations to respect human 

rights. Unlike human rights law, the international humanitarian law does 

not recognize any kind of derogations. By exceptional nature of armed 

conflicts, the rules of international humanitarian law have an imperative 

character and are created for each particular situation. Moreover, it 

considers the principle of military necessity so that to keep feasible the 

7 

Frequently Asked Questions on International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights 

and Refugee Law in the context of armed conflict, Inter-Agency Standing 

Committee Task Force on Humanitarian Action and Human Rights, UN, 2004, p. 

4. 

8 

Ibidem, p. 10. 

9 

DOSWALD-BECK Louise, VITÉ Sylvian, op. cit., p. 101. 

10 

EIDE Asbjørn, op. cit., p. 676. 






parties’ capacity to win. 

Nevertheless, there are a series of rights which cannot be derogated 

from and should be respected in any circumstances, as well as a set of 

rules according to which a state is allowed to derogate. 11 Moreover, 

even those rights that allow for derogations must be respected as far as 

possible. Finally, the human rights law may question the purpose and 

legitimacy of the governmental actions. The international humanitarian 

law is different to this regard by placing the issue of the state’ purpose 

in using the force outside its scope of application, regulating only the 

means and methods of warfare. 

The concomitant application 

Generally, international humanitarian law is today less and less 

perceived as a code of honour for combatants, but as a mean of sparing 

non-combatants as much as possible from the horrors of war. 12 In its 

discussion on relations between law of armed conflicts and human 

rights law, Jean Pictet was talking about merging these two branches of 

law under a generic heading: humanitarian law. Pictet goes even further, 

by suggesting to include some other elements of international law, like 

refugee law, or aspects of international law regarding social relations, 

particularly those developed by the International Labor Organization. 13 

It is interesting to see at least how these two branches of law interact 

and apply to the same social relations. The International Court of Justice 

upheld this fact through its Advisory Opinions on Nuclear Weapons 14 

and Legal Consequences 15 clearly denying that International Covenant 

11 

See: HEINTZE Hans-Joachim, op. cit., p. 799. 

12 

DOSWALD-BECK Louise, VITÉ Sylvian, op. cit., p. 105. 

13 

Quoted by EIDE Asbjørn, op. cit., p. 675. 

14 

Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ, July 8, 

1996, paragraph 26. http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunanframe.htm. 

15 

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 

Territory, ICJ, Advisory Oppinion, July 9, 2004, paragraph 102-106, 






on Civil and Political Rights is applicable only during peacetime. 

The most relevant treaties in the field of Human rights contain clear 

stipulations regarding the obligation of the states to respect human 

rights during armed conflicts. Let us take, for instance, article 15 of the 

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 

Fundamental Freedoms from 1950, which makes reference to the faith 

of human rights in situations when the life of the nation is endangered 

by a war or another public emergency. In such circumstances, the state 

may take measures derogating from its obligations arising from the 

Convention. The human rights stipulated in the Convention may be 

limited strictly according to the dictates of the specific circumstances of 

a particular situation. However, some expressly mentioned rights (inter 

alia right to life and prohibition of torture) cannot be limited in any 

circumstances. These rights are called inalienable, witch means that no 

derogations are admitted and they are to be considered in all 

circumstances without exceptions. Thus, the “traditional impermeable 

border” between international humanitarian law, which is applied 

during armed conflicts, and the law of peace is thereby crossed. 16 

Further, this “crossing of the border” is supported by the common 

article 3 of the Geneva Conventions from 1949, which contains a list of 

rights to be protected in all circumstances. These rights practically 

coincide with the inalienable human rights. This determined the 

academics to adopt the Turku Declaration 17 aimed on filling out the 

gaps from the border area between the law of peace and the law of war 

and to ensure a minimum humanitarian standard by cumulating the 

application of both humanitarian and human rights law. 

The European Convention is not the single instrument that refers to 

human rights law application during wars. Another regional instrument, 

the American Convention on Human Rights 18 from 1969, also lists in 

http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm. 

16 

HEINTZE Hans-Joachim, op. cit., p. 791. 

17 

Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, Turku (Finland), 2 

December 1990, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1990b.htm. 


American Convention on Human Rights, signed at the Inter-American 






article 27 the rights from which no derogation is allowed during the 

wartime. Other international treaties in the field of human rights also 

refer to the so-called "inalienable" rights. For example, article 4 of the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains an 

emergence clause with a similar wording to those from the regional 

instruments. 

The Child Convention 19 from 1989 combines those two branches of law 

in an obvious manner. Article 38 (1) of the Convention obliges the 

Contracting Parties to respect and ensure respect for the rules of 

international humanitarian law in the field of children protection. 

Therefore, a human rights treaty, normally applicable during peacetime, 

contains also provisions of humanitarian law. Actually, article 38 (2,3,4) 

simply reiterates the provisions of article 77 of the Additional Protocol I 

to the Geneva Conventions, which limits recruitment and participation 

in hostilities of children younger than 15 years old during an armed 

conflict. In 2000 was adopted the Optional Protocol 20 to this 

Convention, which raised the age threshold to 18 years, imposing to 

member states a higher standard of protection than that set by 

humanitarian law. 

All these international instruments prove that human rights law is an 

essential part of the legal provisions that govern the war and other 

situations of emergency. Particularly, the example of the Child 

Convention shows how the norms of law of peace overlap with those 

that regulate warfare, as well as the fact that during wars states must 

look for their international obligations in other branches of law, as well. 

Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San Josi, Costa Rica, 22 November 

1969, http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr.html. 

19 

Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 

http://www.icrc.org/ihl. 

20 

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 

involvement of children in armed conflict, 25 May 2000, http://www.icrc.org/ihl. 






The mutual influence 

Despite different historical origins and philosophy of the human rights 

law and the international humanitarian law, nowadays the jurists from 

one or another branch resort more and more to a combined use of their 

concepts. This is either because a branch assists another in the correct 

interpretation of its provisions, or because the application of one of the 

branches automatically ensures application of another one. For example, 

in order to determine the content of torture, as prohibited method of 

warfare must necessarily be consulted the UN Convention against 

Torture. 21 

An interesting example is the right to life. Many human rights defenders 

would still avoid any reference to humanitarian law, which a priori 

accepts the possibility for persons directly involved in hostilities to be 

deprived of their life. However, it must be noted that international 

documents in the field of human rights 22 expressly mention that 

deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention to 

this right, when it results from the use of force, which is no more than 

necessary in legally taken actions for quelling a riot or insurrection. 

Important is to keep in mind that “arbitrary” deprivation of life is 

prohibited, the term having a particular meaning during an armed 

conflict. Actually, humanitarian law ensures the right to life by means 

of a series of provisions, such as sparing of civilians as far as possible, 

limitation of attacks exclusively on military objects, prohibition of 

starvation of population, creating of demilitarized zones, collecting sick 

and wounded and offering them medical assistance or facilitating 

human life conditions for keeping the prisoners of war and internees. 

Some examples would rather frame into the category of "economic and 

cultural" rights according to human rights law. This shows that 

21 

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 

or Punishment, New York, 10 December 1984, 

http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html. 

22 

Ex.: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 

Freedoms (article 2), Rome, 4 November 1950; The International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights has not such a provision - a gap identified by doctrine. 






international humanitarian law protects the right to life in a manner that 

outruns the traditional concept of protection of this right. Finally, 

relevant for the respect of the right to life are the restrictions imposed by 

international humanitarian law in connection with death penalty 

application to persons under 18 years old or pregnant women and with 

little children, or in occupied territories where it was abolished. 

The list of these examples of convergence of human rights law and 

international humanitarian law can be continued. However, it should be 

mentioned that there are a series of rights (right to association and other 

political rights) which are not provided for by the international 

humanitarian law because of their irrelevance for the protection of 

persons against dangers that an armed conflict implies. 

International Humanitarian Law as lex specialis 

The cumulative application of the international humanitarian law and 

human rights law inevitably brings on discussion concerning the 

relationship between those two branches of law. The jurisdiction of the 

International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinions regarding 

Nuclear Weapons 23 and the Legal Consequences recognized the primacy 

of humanitarian law during armed conflicts and its character of lex 

specialis. This means that during an armed conflict the provisions of 

human rights law and, respectively, the content of some rights 

(especially right to life) are to be interpreted according to international 

humanitarian law. Thus, in some circumstances of war the international 

human rights law cannot be taken into consideration. For instance, a 

combatant who kills an enemy will be not, according to jus in bello, 

criminally responsible for the act of murder committed on the battlefield 

during an armed conflict. That is why the term “arbitrary deprivation of 

life” from human rights law must be considered from the humanitarian 

23 

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ, 

July 8, 1996, paragraph 36 http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunanframe.htm. 






law perspective. Namely, the regional human rights instruments give 

such an interpretation. Article 15 of the European Convention clearly 

stipulates that the cases of death resulting from acts of war must not be 

regarded as violation of right to life. 

Conclusion 

The interplay between international human rights law and international 

humanitarian law consists in mutual influence during the processes of 

formation, implementation and application, experiencing a significant 

convergence in recent years. Although historically and conceptually are 

still distinct categories of international law, these two branches of law 

are not mutually exclusive, but complement each other, shaping in such 

way their future development. This is how the protective provisions of 

human rights and humanitarian law have equivalents under each other’s 

instruments and already make extensive use of each other’s 

implementation and supervision mechanisms. The recent study on 

customary international humanitarian law 24 confirms the overlapping 

nature of a series of fundamental guaranties provided for in both 

humanitarian and human rights law. 25 Establishment of the category of 

crimes against humanity which does not require nexus to armed conflict 

is an obvious example of "cooperation" between these two fields having 

a common major goal: the protection of the life, health and dignity of 

the human beings. 

Bibliography: 

24 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted the study at 

the specific request of States who sought the ICRC's assistance in trying to 

identify the unwritten rules of customary humanitarian law. 

25 

KELLENBERGER Jakob, International Humanitarian Law and Other Legal 

Regimes: Interplay in Situations of Violence, Address at the 27 

190 

th Annual Round 

Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law, 4 September 

2003, International Review of the Red Cross, September 2003, vol. 85, No. 851, 

p. 649. 





1. DOSWALD-BECK Louise, VITÉ Sylvian, International 

Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, Offprint from 

International Review of the Red Cross, March-April 1993. 

2. EIDE Asbjørn, The Laws of War and Human Rights – 

Differences and Convergences, Studies and Essays on 

International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in 

Honour of Jean PICTET (ed. Christophe SWINARSKI), 

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva-Hague, 1984. 

3. FREEMAN Mark, International Law and Internal Armed 

Conflicts: Clarifying the Interplay between Human Rights and 

Humanitarian Protection, The Journal of Humanitarian 

Assistance, 17 October 2000, 

http://www.jha.ac/articles/a059.htm. 

4. Frequently Asked Questions on International Humanitarian 

Law, Human Rights and Refugee Law in the context of armed 

conflict, Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on 

Humanitarian Action and Human Rights, UN, 2004. 

5. HEINTZE Hans-Joachim, On the Relationship between Human 

Rights Law Protection and International Humanitarian Law, 

International Review of the Red Cross, December, 2004, Vol. 

86, No. 856. 

6. KELLENBERGER Jakob, International Humanitarian Law and 

Other Legal Regimes: Interplay in Situations of Violence, 

Address at the 27th Annual Round Table on Current Problems 

of International Humanitarian Law, 4 September 2003, 

International Review of the Red Cross, September 2003, vol. 

85, No. 851. 

Documents 

7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Adopted and 

proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 

December 1948, http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 

8. Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of Armed 

Conflicts, 12 August, 1949 and their Additional Protocols, 8 

June 1977, http://www.icrc.org/ihl. 

191 





9. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 

Degrading Treatment or Punishment, New York, 10 December 

1984, http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html. 

10. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 

Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950, 

http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z17euroco.html 

11. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New 

York, 16 December 1966, http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html. 

12. Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, Resolution XXIII adopted 

by the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 12 

May 1968, http://www.icrc.org/ihl. 

13. American Convention on Human Rights, signed at the Inter- 

American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San Josi, 

Costa Rica, 22 November 1969, 

http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr.html. 

14. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, and 

its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed 

conflict, 25 May 2000, http://www.icrc.org/ihl. 

15. Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, Turku 

(Finland), 2 December 1990, 

http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1990b.htm. 

Case Law 

16. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 

Oppinion, ICJ, July 8, 1996, http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunanframe.htm. 

17. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 

Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ, Advisory Oppinion, July 9, 

2004, http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm. 

192 





THE LEGAL STATUS OF HOMOSEXUAL 

PEOPLE IN POLISH LAW WITH REGARD TO 

THE LAWS OF OTHER EUROPEAN 

COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. 

FROM DEPENALIZATION THROUGH 

TOLERANCE UNTIL FULL EMANCIPATION 

BY AGNIESZKA SZPAK* 

SUMMARY 

Although homosexuality has never been dominant sexual orientation, it 

has existed in every society and every culture. In the law of ancient 

Mediterranean Sea States it was repressed (among others in 

Mesopotamia and Egypt). However, in the ancient Greece and Rome 

homosexuality was accepted; especially in Greece where it was 

regarded as a natural form of sexual life. 

In the XIX century European States began abolishing penalization of 

homosexuality; France was the first State that did so, Holland was the 

next one. But in most European States homosexuality was penalized 

until the beginnings of the XX century. In 1973 the American 

Psychiatric Association deleted homosexuality from its official 

nomenclature of mental disorders, and in 1991 the World Health 

Organization deleted it of its list of diseases. 

In Polish legislation the first Penal Code of 1932 abolished the 

penalization of homosexuality yet it envisaged a penalty of up to 3 years 

in prison for male homosexual prostitution. The next Penal Code of 

1969 apart from abolishing the penalization of homosexuality abolished 

the penalization of homosexual prostitution as well. 

* Public International Law Faculty, Nicolas Copernicus University in 

Toruń, Poland. 

193 

AGNIESZKA SZPAK - THE LEGAL STATUS OF HOMOSEXUAL PEOPLE IN POLISH 

LAW WITH REGARD TO THE LAWS OF OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND 

INTERNATIONAL LAW. FROM DEPENALIZATION THROUGH TOLERANCE UNTIL 

FULL EMANCIPATION


The Penal Code of 1997 now in force includes the same provisions. 

Outside the criminal law Polish law contains only a very small number 

of provisions regulating the legal status of homosexuals. Most of them 

are antidiscriminatory provisions that can be found in the Constitution 

of 1997 (Arts. 32 and 47 – protection of private life), the Labour Code 

(Chapter IIa – Equal treatment in employment) and in the Act on 

Promotion of Employment and on Institutions of the Labour Market of 

2004. Polish legal system guarantees to homosexual people a minimum 

of minimum by way of antidiscriminatory provisions but that does not 

equal lack of discrimination. 

In this context it should be mentioned that Art. 18 of the Polish 

Constitution defines marriage as a relationship between a man and a 

woman. In Polish law now in force homosexual couples have no right to 

marry, not even to contract registered partnerships; they are not allowed 

to adopt children. In 2003 Professor M. Szyszkowska (a senator) 

submitted a draft act on registered partnerships. It envisaged the 

possibility of contracting a registered partnership and many rights 

connected with it, mainly of economic character. The amendments of 

the Senate considerably reduced the extent of rights accorded to 

homosexual couples. 

Polish draft act follows an example of other countries, mainly European 

such as among others Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, 

Norway, France, Belgium, Germany, Croatia or Spain recently which 

passed similar acts. The most recent events are the approval of the 

same sex partnership laws by New Zealand and Switzerland 

Significant changes relating to the attitude towards people of 

homosexual orientation have been taking place in the legal systems of 

those States; generally they are aimed at the equality of rights for 

heterosexual and homosexual persons. Many times have also the 

European Tribunal of Human Rights passed judgments in favour of 

homosexuals in cases of their discrimination and protection of their 

private life. 

194 




FULL EMANCIPATION


On the basis of the presented stages of regulation of the legal status of 

homosexuality it may be noticed that they have evolved from 

depenalization through tolerance into full emancipation. Particular 

European States are in different stages – some of them on lower and 

some on higher levels – but significant changes in relation to 

homosexuality and people of homosexual orientation in the direction of 

introducing different forms of legalized homosexual relationships or 

marriages and their equality with heterosexual marriages are evident. It 

is to be hoped that Poland will follow the example of other European 

States and changes contributing to the struggle against discrimination 

will take place, the changes that will guarantee the equality of rights and 

chances for homosexuals. There is no reason to treat homosexuality as 

something unnatural; it is natural sexual orientation as same as 

heterosexuality. 

195 




FULL EMANCIPATION


ARTICLE 

It is truism to say that all societies are diversified – socially, nationally, 

culturally and religiously. People as well are different in terms of their 

origins, age, colour, wealth, opinions or finally sexual orientation. These 

features can not be judged – they are neither good nor bad in 

themselves. They are simply some objective factors. “All human beings 

are born free and equal in dignity and rights” - states the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (Art.1). In the Preamble we read 

that “[…] recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 

inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation 

of freedom, justice and peace in the world“ 1 . And this is what really 

matters, what is significant and should constitute a signpost also for 

creating national laws. 

Although homosexuality has never been a dominant sexual orientation it 

has existed in every society and every culture. The space does not allow 

for detailed presentation of the evolution of legal regulations concerning 

homosexuality from historic perspective; therefore I will confine myself 

to just a few remarks. In the law of ancient Asian Mediterranean 

countries homosexuality was repressed (inter alia old Hebrew law 

envisaged a death penalty for male homosexual relations; the legal 

situation was similar in Mesopotamia and Egypt) 2 . But in the ancient 

Greece and Rome homosexuality was accepted 3 . It was especially so in 

Greece where we could have encountered unprecedented sexual 

freedom. For the Greeks aesthetic values and experience were more 

important than rigid gender division. Therefore homosexuality was 

regarded as a natural form of sexual life and there were no attempts to 

1 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at: 

http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html 

2 

M. Filar, Status prawny homoseksualizmu w prawie polskim na tle prawa 

porównawczego i międzynarodowego, in: Księga Jubileuszowa Profesora 

Tadeusza Jasudowicza, Toruń 2004, p. 114 (translation by the author). 

3 

K. Boczkowski, Homoseksualizm, Warsaw 1992, pp. 63-64 (translation by 

the author). 

196 




FULL EMANCIPATION


legally repress it. 

Moving forward in time to modern times it should be noted that in 1810 

France was a first country that abolished the criminality of 

homosexuality; the Netherlands was next to have done so in 1811 4 . 

However, in most European countries homosexuality was penalized 

until the beginning of the XX century. It should not be forgotten that in 

1935-1945 in the Nazi Germany 50 000 homosexuals were executed 

and 25 000 were sent to concentration camps on the basis of new harsh 

law of 1935 5 . For example in Denmark the penalization of homosexual 

relations was abolished in 1933, in Sweden in 1944, in Norway and 

Finland only at the beginning of 70’s of the XX century (in 1972 and 

1971 respectively) 6 . In 1973 the American Psychiatric Society deleted 

homosexuality from its official nomenclature of mental disorders, which 

meant recognizing homosexuality as natural variant of our sexuality. In 

1991 also the World Health Organization deleted it of its list of 

diseases. 

Despite abolishing criminalization of homosexuality in many countries 

homosexual relations were still subject to restrictions that were not 

imposed on heterosexual relations. I mean most of all the different ages 

of consent for heterosexual and homosexual relations. For homosexual 

relations they were higher, for example in Finland they were 

respectively: 15 years of age for heterosexual relations and 18 for 

4 K. Waaldijk, Civil Developments: Patterns of Reform In the Legal Position of 

Same-Sex Partners in Europe, “Canadian Journal of Family Law” 17(1), 2000, 

p. 68; available at: 

http://www.meijers.leidenuniv.nl/content_docs/Publications%20Kees%20Waal 

dijk/17_canadian_journal_of_family_law_2000__p._62-88.doc 

5 An earlier provision (1873) stated that a man who commits obscene relations 

with another men or that participates in such relations will be punished with 

imprisonment. Quote from R. Biedroń, Piętno różowego trójkąta, “Polityka”, 

no. 34(2415), 2003, pp.62-63 (translation by the author). 

6 

J.M. Krawczyk, Homoseksualiści w systemach prawnych i społecznych 

państw skandynawskich, Grodzisk Mazowiecki, 2002, pp.5-6 (translation by 

the author). 

197 




FULL EMANCIPATION


homosexual ones. Nowadays in all the Scandinavian countries the age 

of consent is the same for heterosexual and homosexual relations. As for 

other countries, especially not European ones, there is still much left to 

be done; for example in Afghanistan, Morocco, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi 

Arabia, Iran, Sudan and Yemen homosexual relations are punished and 

in the last four even with death penalty, and in Pakistan with flogging 

or stoning! 7 

With regard to Polish legislation the first penal code of 1932 abolished 

penalization of homosexuality, yet it envisaged a penalty of up to 3 

years imprisonment for the crime of male homosexual prostitution (Art. 

207). Apart from repeating the provisions of its predecessor pertaining 

to abolishing criminalization of homosexuality, next penal code of 1969 

also abolished penalization of homosexual prostitution. Penal code of 

1997 – currently in force - also stands on the ground of depenalization 

of homosexuality 8 . It means that homosexual relations between two 

adult partners that consent to that can not be punished and such acts 

belong to the sphere of one’s private life, in which sphere the law must 

not interfere (the possibilities of such interference have been formulated 

in very restrictive manner) 9 . The penal code does not criminalize 

prostitution – every prostitution heterosexual as well as homosexual but 

forms of its organizing and benefiting from it. In these terms Polish law 

namely criminal law may be regarded as “showing liberal tendencies” 10 

but in other branches just like family law, inheritance law or tax law it is 

very conservative. 

7 

See: http://www.mojeprawa.info/lista_krajow.rtf 

8 

Penal Code, Dz.U. 1997 No. 88, item 553 amended. 

9 

Art. 31 (3) of the Polish Constitution states: „ Any limitation upon the 

exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed only by statute, 

and only when necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its security 

or public order, or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, 

or the freedoms and rights of other persons. Such limitations shall not violate 

the essence of freedoms and rights”. The exceptions are thus formulated very 

narrowly. 

10 

M.Filar, op.cit., p. 117. 

198 




FULL EMANCIPATION


Polish law currently in force contains a small number of provisions 

regulating the legal situation of homosexual people. They are mainly 

provisions of antidiscriminatory character. Most fundamental of them is 

Art. 32 of the Constitution of 2 April 1997, which states: “(1) All 

persons shall be equal before the law. All persons shall have the right to 

equal treatment by public authorities. (2) No one shall be discriminated 

against in political, social or economic life for any reason 

whatsoever” 11 . Although the formula “any reason whatsoever” includes 

sexual orientation it would be a better solution to adopt another formula 

– of explicit, non-exhaustive listing of the criteria, on the basis of which 

any discrimination would be prohibited and among them sexual 

orientation should be enumerated. That was the initial idea; in the 1995 

draft Art. 32 (2) listed criteria on the basis of which no body could be 

discriminated against and there was an explicit mention of sexual 

orientation. The draft had been rejected because of the protests of the 

catholic church, right-wing parties and the then President Lech 

Wałęsa 12 . As we read in a report issued by Lambda Association and 

Campaign Against Homophobia 13 on discrimination and intolerance for 

reason of sexual orientation in Poland of 2002 (page 36) “Art. 32 of the 

Constitution does not fulfill its role in regards to homosexual minorities 

– it does not translate into passing of legal bills and decrees that would 

regulate the legal situation of Polish gays and lesbians in more details” 

11 

Dz.U. 1997, No. 78 item 483. 

12 

P. Leszkowicz, Przełamując hetero-matrix. Wojna seksualna w Polsce i 

kryzys praw człowieka, in: Z. Sypniewski, B. Warkocki (ed.), Homofobia po 

polsku, Warsaw 2004, p. 104 (translation by the autor). 

13 

The Report is available at: 

http://warszawa.lambda.org.pl/dokumenty/Raport_dyskryminacja_2002_pl.pdf 

(in Polish). Lambda Association is a Polish law association with the aim to 

create a positive identity of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transexuals as well as 

shaping the social acceptance of them; check the website: 

http://www.lambda.org.pl; Campaign Against Homophobia was founded in 

2001 and is a non-governmental organization operating throughout Poland. 

Only volunteers work for the Campaign and they focus their efforts on a 

broadly understood fight against homophobia; check the website: 

http://www.kampania.org.pl/homofobia/angwer.php 

199 




FULL EMANCIPATION


(translation by the author). 

Equally important is Art. 47 of Polish Constitution according to which: 

“Everyone shall have the right to legal protection of his private and 

family life, of his honour and good reputation and to make decisions 

about his personal life”. 

With no doubts these provisions ensure protection of private life 

including its such important part as sexual life; this protection exists as 

long as acts of sexual activity do not comprise a crime and as has been 

written above homosexual relations between consenting partners 

definitely are not a crime. 

First Polish legal act which contained the antidiscriminatory provisions 

with regard to sexual orientation was the Act on Employment and 

Counteracting Unemployment (as amended in December 2002, in force 

since 6 February 2003) 14 . This Act was then replaced by a new Act on 

Promotion of Employment and on Institutions of the Labour Market of 

20 April 2004 15 . Earlier on 1 January 2004 amendments to the Labour 

code came into force – a new chapter II a entitled “Equal treatment in 

employment” (Art. 18 3a – Art. 18 3e ) was added. According to Art. 18 3a 

“employees shall be treated equally as regards the establishment and 

termination of employment relationships, the conditions of employment, 

promotion and access to training in order to raise occupational 

qualifications, particularly regardless of sex, age, disability, race, 

religion, nationality, political views, trade union membership, ethnic 

origin, religious convictions, sexual orientation […]”. This amendment 

resulted from the obligation to harmonize Polish law with the European 

Community law and more specifically with the EU Council directive 

2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 

employment and occupation of 27 November 2000 16 . The indemnity can 

be awarded for infringement of the equal treatment principle; it must not 

14 Dz. U. 2003 No. 58, item 514. 

15 Dz.U. 2004 No. 99, item 1001. 

16 

Official Journal L 303, 02/12/2000 P. 0016 - 0022 

200 




FULL EMANCIPATION


be lower than the minimum remuneration for work determined under 

separate provisions (Art. 18 3d of the Labour code). Equally important is 

the provision of the next Article (18 3e ) according to which “ employee’s 

exercise of the rights resulting from infringement of the principle of 

equal treatment in employment may not constitute the grounds for the 

employer’s submitting of a notice of termination of the employment 

relationship or terminating such relationship without notice 17 “. 

The above mentioned Act on Promotion of Employment and on 

Institutions of the Labour Market of 2004 in a few articles (36, 38 and 

123) enumerates among grounds of prohibited discrimination sexual 

orientation. Art. 36(4) stipulates that employment agency should be 

based on the principle of equality meaning an obligation to give 

assistance to all seeking job in its finding regardless of the sexual 

orientation. At the same time the employers may not formulate their 

employment requirements in such a way that they be discriminatory for 

the candidates because of their sexual orientation, among others. The 

provision concerning employment counseling was construed in an 

analogous way (Art. 38(2)). Every person who refuses to employ a 

candidate for reason of his/her sexual orientation will be punished with 

a fine not lower than 3 000 zł (Art. 123). 

Polish legal system ensures for people of homosexual orientation 

minimum of minimum of rights through the antidiscriminatory 

provisions but does this mean lack of discrimination? 18 

17 

Labour code Dz. U. 1998, No. 21, item 94, amended. 


In its concluding observations of 2 December 2004 concerning Poland’s 

respect for her international legal obligations resulting from the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 Human Rights Committee 

expressed its concern about the legal situation of sexual minorities. It stated 

that the prohibition of discrimination principle is not respected and that the 

discriminatory acts are not adequately investigated and punished; see the 

observations at: 

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/66db176cabc27b16c1256f43005ba 

2e7?Opendocument 

201 




FULL EMANCIPATION


In this context it should be mentioned that Art. 18 of the Polish 

Constitution defines marriage as a relationship between a man and a 

women (in the same way Art. 1 of the Family code of 25 February 

1964) 19 . In conformity with currently binding Polish law homosexual 

couples are not allowed to marry or even to contract any registered 

partnerships; they are also not allowed to adopt children. However, 

there is a draft act on registered same-sex relationships in the Sejm (the 

lower chamber of Polish parliament) but it is unfortunately practically 

impossible that the act be passed in this term of the parliament (and in 

the next as well). The initial draft prepared by professor Maria 

Szyszkowska, SLD-UP senator (left-wing parties), entitled the act on 

the registered partnerships was forwarded to the Senate (the upper 

chamber of Polish parliament) on 21 November 2003 20 . The purpose of 

this draft act was to regulate the legal situation of homosexual people in 

Poland. It envisaged the possibility of contracting a registered 

partnership and many rights connected with it mainly of economic 

character. The most important of these rights were the right to inherit 

after the dead partner, the right to health insurance for family members, 

the right to joint taxation or to working benefits such as pension The 

original draft did not include the right to children adoption but it did not 

exclude a possibility of raising one partner’s child by the two partners as 

well as representing the child by the partner without the parental 

authority. It is worth mentioning that the draft contained a provision 

pertaining to the internal relations between the partners – they were to 

be based on mutual assistance, support, maintaining and deepening of 

spiritual agreement, as well as on the cooperation and mutual planning 

of the future. 

On 3 December 2004 the Senate decided that a redrafted act will be 

forwarded to the Sejm. The name of the draft was amended into the Act 

on the registered same-sex relationships because the term partnership 

was thought to be reserved only for a relationship between a man and a 

19 

Dz.U. 1964 No. 9, item 59, amended. 

20 

The draft bill (in Polish) is available at: 

http://www.prawo.lex.pl/czasopisma/sp/1_04.html 

202 




FULL EMANCIPATION


woman 21 . According to the redrafted act, registration of the relationship 

in the registry office implicates the acquirement of rights mainly of 

economic character, inter alia: the right to inherit after the dead partner, 

the right to alimony for the partner in a state of scarcity that resulted 

from the termination of the relationship. Joint property of partners will 

not begin ipso iure (like in the initial draft) but the partners will be 

allowed to enact it by way of contract (notarial act); partners will not 

have the right to joint taxation. Another difference between the initial 

and current draft act is the impossibility of taking by partners the same 

name and representing one partner’s child by a second partner without 

the parental authority rights. In the new draft the provision on the 

internal relations between the partners was crossed out which should be 

grieved as law should also reflect values and mutual assistance, support 

or deepening of emotional ties between partners are with no doubt such 

values. Polish Senators – when adapting the amendments – decided that 

a person in a partnership will be allowed to receive information and visit 

his or her partner being in a hospital as well as make decisions 

concerning the manner of treatment of the other partner. Partners were 

also granted a right to collect correspondence of the other partner as 

well as a right to refuse to testify in a legal suit as a witness according to 

the same rules as for the marital spouses. The act does not allow for 

adoption. 

Polish draft act draws patterns from other countries. In many European 

states similar acts were adopted, among others in Denmark, the 

Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, France, Belgium, Germany, Croatia or 

recently in Spain. Spain became the third European country after 

Belgium and the Netherlands to legalize the same sex marriages and 

adoptions. The most recent events are the approval of the same sex 

partnership laws by New Zealand and Switzerland. On June 5th 2005, 

the Swiss people finally approved the same-sex partnership law with a 

21 

In this way the resolution of the Sejm of 3 December 2004 on the issue of 

introducing in the Sejm the draft act on the registered same-sex relationships 

(the justification); available at (in Polish): 

http://www.senat.gov.pl/K5/DOK/UCH/073/548uch.htm 

203 




FULL EMANCIPATION


clear 58% vote in favour, thus becoming the first people in the world to 

directly approve same sex partnerships. Also Great Britain passed Civil 

Partnership Act (2004) and first registrations start in December 2005, 

open to same-sex partners only with all the same rights and 

responsilibities as marriage. In the legal systems of these states 

significant changes relating to the attitude towards homosexual people 

can be noticed. These changes can be generally characterized as 

heading for equalization of homosexual people with heterosexuals. For 

instance in Denmark, which was the first country to grant to 

homosexual people a right to legalize their relationships and made their 

status equal with the status of heterosexual marriages, the Danish 

Registered Partnership Act was adopted (1989). The legislative 

technique consisted in making most of the provisions on marriages 

applicable to registered partnerships; there is no possibility of adoption 

for homosexual couples, however. The next state that passed analogous 

law was Norway; in April 1993 Norwegian parliament adopted a Bill on 

Registered Partnerships. Finland passed an act with the same title in 

2001 22 . In all the Scandinavian countries partnerships have not been 

accorded a right to adoption except for Sweden where partnerships and 

marriages (heterosexual) have been equalized also in this regard 23 . In 

other Scandinavian states a person being in a legalized relationship has 

a right to adoption of partner’s children. In the Netherlands there are 

two legal acts in force – the Act on the Opening Up of Marriage and the 

Act on Adoption by persons of the same sex, both of 2000. They 

enabled contracting marriages between homosexual people and granted 

them a right to adoption (except for foriegn adoption). In this moment it 

is worth indicating motives that constituted guidelines for Scandinavian 

countries when passing the above mentioned acts taking as an example 

Norway. The most important among the motives were: a need to 

regulate rights and duties between same-sex partners and between them 

22 

Texts of the relevant acts are available at: 

http://www.mojeprawa.info/aktyprawa-kraje.htm 

23 

J.M.Krawczyk, op.cit., p.18. Text of the Act on Registered Partnerships was 

adopted in Sweden in 1994; originally it did not envisage a right to adoption, it 

was introduced by the Act of 2002. 

204 




FULL EMANCIPATION


and the society; a need for changes in the people’s attitude towards 

homosexual people; a need for stabilization of homosexual relationships 

and a need to strengthen the paradigm of family and marriage 24 . 

Rationality and necessity for forging these motives into legal acts 

should not give rise to doubts. It is interesting to note that changes in 

social attitude were achieved through changes in law. 

The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 

Freedoms (ECHRF) of 4 November 1950 and the judgments of the 

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) deserve a few remarks. 

Poland as a state-party to the Convention is obliged to respect its 

provisions; it is advisable to give a few exemplary ECHR’s judgments 

significant to the legal situation of homosexual people. In this context, 

Art. 8 of the Convention is relevant; it stipulates that: 

“(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 

home and his correspondence. 

(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 

exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 

necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 

public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 

prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 

or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” 25 . 

The ECHR’s judgments which have been passed on the basis of this 

provision are numerous and there is no possibility to analyze them all in 

this article; all that can be done is to draw some attention to the most 

important judgments. In the Dudgeon case (Dudgeon v. Great Britain) 

of 22 October 1981 the Court stated that the legislation that prohibits 

homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males 

constitutes unjustified interference with a right to respect for private life 

24 

Ibidem, p.17. 

25 

Text of the Convention is available at: 

http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/005.doc 

205 




FULL EMANCIPATION


and as a consequence such prohibition violates Art. 8 of the 

Convention 26 . The Strasburg Court took an analogous position in its 

following judgments – Norris v. Ireland case of 26 October 1988, 

Modinos v. Cyprus of 22 April 1993 and A.D.T. v. Great Britain of 31 

July 2000 27 . In da Silva Mouta v. Portugal of 21 December 1999 

European Court of Human Rights stated that limitation of parental 

responsibility of a father of a minor daughter only on the ground of his 

homosexual orientation violates Art. 8 of the Convention in connection 

with Art. 14 (which will be explored next). 

In this group of judgments the Court tried to examine whether there was 

a breach of Art. 14 of the Convention or not. Article 14 reads as follows 

(prohibition of discrimination): 

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 

shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 

colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 

origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 

status” 28 . 

In its judgments in cases of L. and V. v. Austria of 9 January 2003, B. 

B. v. Great Britain of 10 February 2004 and Woditschka and Wilfling v. 

Austria of 21 October 2004, the Court took the position that setting 

26 

Jeffrey Dudgeon complained about the British law which regarded some 

homosexual acts between consenting adults as a crime. British government 

indicated that the law is actually a dead letter and had not been applied for 

years but the European Court stated that mere existence of such provisions 

makes them possible to be applied in the future; thus the Court considered it as 

an unjustified interference with private life and violence of Art. 8 of the 

Convention. The judgment is available at: 

http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html 

&highlight=dudgeon&sessionid=3374870&skin=hudoc-en 

27 

Judgments are available at: 

http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en 

28 

Text of the Convention is available at: 

http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/005.doc 

206 




FULL EMANCIPATION


different ages of consent for heterosexual and homosexual relations 

between adults and adolescents has no justification and constitutes 

discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, thus violates the 

prohibition of discrimination and the right to respect for private life 

(Art. 14 in connection with Art. 8 of the Convention). 

In another group of judgments concerning gays in military especially 

two cases are important: Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. The United 

Kingdom and Smith and Grady v. The United Kingdom both of 27 

September 1999. All four applicants in two cases were members of the 

armed forces of the U.K. After investigations by the military police into 

their sexual orientations and their admitting that he or she was 

homosexual they were administralively discharged. They complained 

that the investigations into their sexual orientations and their subsequent 

discharges constituted violation of Art. 8 (the right to respect for private 

life) as well as of Art. 14 (prohibition of discrimination). The Court 

found that the U.K. violated Art. 8 of the Convention, however it 

decided that the complaint under Art. 14 provided no separate issue 

from that already addressed under the Art. 8 complaint 29 . 

On the basis of the above presented phases which can be discern in the 

legal regulation of homosexuality we can notice some kind of regularity 

– from depenalization through tolerance to full emancipation. Particular 

European countries are at different levels but significant changes in 

attitudes towards homosexuality and homosexual people are visible – in 

some countries more and in some less visible but still they are there. 

These changes are heading for introducing various forms of legalized 

homosexual relationships or marriages. A good example in this sphere 

is given by Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands where 

homosexual persons are guaranteed equal rights; and where 

homosexuals constitute quite large part of their societies. In Poland as 

well live about 20 million homosexual people (about 5 % of the 

society). This is a huge number of citizens deprived of many rights only 

because of their sexual orientation. Such a legal and factual situation 

29 

Judgments are available at: http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en . 

207 




FULL EMANCIPATION


cannot be sustained any longer; we cannot ignore such a numerous 

group of Polish citizens since “the Republic of Poland shall be the 

common good of all its citizens“ (Art. 1 of the Polish Constitution). 

How can we talk about justice and equality when a part of the society is 

being denied rights because of sexual orientation? It is to be hoped that 

following example of other European states also in Poland changes will 

come, changes that will contribute to the struggle against discrimination 

and will ensure equality of rights and chances for homosexual people. 

There is no reason to regard homosexuality as something unnatural; it is 

a natural sexual orientation to the same extent as heterosexual one. It is 

usually emphasized that when making new law relating to the legal 

status of homosexuality the social awareness should not be ignored but 

it must also be borne in mind that the majority opinion is not always 

righteous. Professor Szyszkowska righteously said that “very rarely the 

right belongs to the majority. The number of voices in favour of an 

opinion cannot be the measure of its legitimacy” 30 . Statistics cannot 

justify discrimination and prohibition thereof is recognized as standard 

of Polish law and the European Community law as well as the 

international law. As the example of Scandinavian states demonstrates – 

it is possible to create changes in social attitude through changes in law. 

In this place we could ask ourselves whether the protection accorded in 

Polish law is sufficient or whether maybe we still deal with 

discrimination. How should ‘tolerance’ be understood – in negative 

terms only as enduring something unpleasant mere lack of 

discrimination? And is it enough? Despite all the positive changes in 

Polish legal system, the protection is – in my opinion – not sufficient. It 

is not sufficient to depenalize homosexuality and pass a few 

antidiscriminatory provisions. The mere non-existence in internal law of 

provisions “institutionalizing” 31 homosexuality equals discrimination; 

provisions that accord to gays and lesbians full, equal rights as 

compared to those accorded to heterosexuals. At the end it is worth 

30 

Quote from: Z.Sypniewski, B.Warkocki (ed.), op.cit., p.288 (translation by 

the author). 

31 

Adjective taken from M. Filar, op.cit., p.122. 

208 




FULL EMANCIPATION


invoking the UNESCO Declaration of the Principles on Tolerance of 16 

November 1995 where we can find a meaning of tolerance (Art. 1): 

“1.1 Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich 

diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of 

being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication 

and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in 

difference. It is not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal 

requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, 

contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of 

peace. 

1.2 Tolerance is not concession, condescension or indulgence. 

Tolerance is, above all, an active attitude prompted by recognition of 

the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of others. In no 

circumstance can it be used to justify infringements of these 

fundamental values. Tolerance is to be exercised by individuals, groups 

and States. 

1.3 Tolerance is the responsibility that upholds human rights, pluralism 

(including cultural pluralism), democracy and the rule of law. It 

involves the rejection of dogmatism and absolutism and affirms the 

standards set out in international human rights instruments. 

1.4 Consistent with respect for human rights, the practice of tolerance 

does not mean toleration of social injustice or the abandonment or 

weakening of one's convictions. It means that one is free to adhere to 

one's own convictions and accepts that others adhere to theirs. It means 

accepting the fact that human beings, naturally diverse in their 

appearance, situation, speech, behaviour and values, have the right to 

live in peace and to be as they are. It also means that one’s views are not 

to be imposed on others” 32 . 

32 

Text of the Declaration in: J.Symonides (ed.), The struggle against 

discrimination. A collection of international instruments adopted by the United 

Nations System, UNESCO, Paris, 1996, p.186. 

209 




FULL EMANCIPATION


In such an understanding of tolerance it means acceptance and 

appreciation of values and benefits resulting from pluralism and 

diversity; it does not mean just a mere lack of discrimination. There is 

no such tolerance in Poland. 

210 




FULL EMANCIPATION


THE INSTITUTE OF PARLIAMENTARY 

ADVOCATES (OBBUDSMAN) IN THE REPUBLIC 

OF MOLDOVA: PART OF THE NATIONAL 

MECHANISM FOR PROTECTION OF 

HUMAN RIGHTS 

BY ALEXANDR SVETLICINII * 

Present situation with human rights in Moldova is very typical for many 

developing countries, where government has officially proclaimed 

protection of human rights and freedoms as a priority in the public 

affairs. However, due to the difficult social-economic conditions and 

authoritarian legacy of the past these declarations often remain on paper. 

One would hardly argue that Moldova didn’t move since the 

proclamation of its independence to the better protection of human 

rights. National Constitution adopted in 1994 contains the majority of 

the civil, political and economic rights and liberties guaranteed by the 

state in the majority of democratic nations. Moldovan legislation has 

been continuously reformed in order to correspond to the international 

standards in this area. Moldova has joined several international and 

regional treaties that provide certain mechanisms for monitoring the 

situation of human rights in the country, addressing the causes of 

violations and encouraging the government to undertake proper steps in 

combating the identified violations. 

Thus, Moldova is a part in both International Covenants on political, 

economic, social and cultural rights; it has ratified Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights and several international documents 

* 

Alexandr Svetlicinii holds LL.B International Law degree from Free 

International University of Moldova, Chisinau and is currently enrolled in LL.M 

International Business Law program at Central European University, Budapest. 

Present article is a product of the author’s internship at the Center for Human 

Rights of Moldova in spring of 2005. 

211 

ALEXANDR SVETLICINII - THE INSTITUTE OF PARLIAMENTARY ADVOCATES 

(OBBUDSMAN) IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: PART OF THE NATIONAL 

MECHANISM FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS


addressing particular categories of individuals and their rights such as 

Convention of the Rights of the Child and other. Within the Community 

of Independent States Republic of Moldova is part to the Convention of 

the Community of Independent States on Human Rights of May 26, 

1995 and Law of the Community of Independent States regarding 

Human Rights Committee of September 24, 1993. However, these two 

documents remain merely declarations; they are amorphous legal 

instruments that lack basic enforcement mechanisms. 1 

Among regional treaties the most important is European Convention of 

Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties, which Moldova ratified in 

order to become a member in Council of Europe. This regional treaty 

creates an effective mechanism that is aimed to protect human rights 

under the Convention even in case when Member-state allows or fails to 

prosecute the violation. It is the European Court of Human Rights that 

accepts individual complaints against the governments of Memberstates 

when all domestic remedies were exhausted. Unfortunately, 

citizens of Moldova, due to certain objective factors, cannot fully take 

advantage of this method when deprived of their rights and liberties. 

However, there were several decisions of the ECHR against Moldovan 

government that had a great impact on the situation with human rights 

in certain areas. 2 

National judiciary is aimed to be the key institution, which should 

provide effective reestablishment of citizens in their rights in case of 

violations committed by the government officials or private parties. 

There were several judicial reforms that shaped the structure and 

internal hierarchy of the judicial system, trying to provide maximum 

level of accessibility to justice for the ordinary citizen. New Code of 

Criminal Procedure provides more guarantees for the suspects, accused, 

victims, and witnesses in protection of their constitutional rights during 

1 

Parliamentary Advocate, Newsletter of the CHRM, Oct-Dec 2000, Number 5, 

Volume 1, p. 2 

2 

Alexandr Svetlicinii, Republic of Moldova as a Respondent State in the 

European Court of Human Rights, Eastern European Human Rights Law Journal, 

Volume 2, Number 2 (April 18,2005) p. 8 

212 





the course of investigation, interrogation, trial, appeal and other stages 

during the process of criminal justice. Thus, with the introduction of the 

position of special judge for criminal investigation, every action taken 

by the investigator and prosecutor, that cause limitation or intrusion 

with constitutional rights of the citizens, now require the prior approval 

of that judge. 

Another important and active player in the field of human rights 

protection that is continuously increasing its capabilities is civil society 

represented by numerous non-governmental organizations, grass root 

groups, representatives of local administration and responsible citizens. 

They have been very active in fighting against violations filing law 

suits, writing petitions and legislative proposals and assisting individual 

citizens in their cases. Majority of the complaints filed with the 

European Court of Human Rights against Moldovan authorities where 

filed by lawyers and legal experts, members of the non-governmental 

human rights organizations. 3 

But this panorama of national, regional and international mechanisms 

for protection of human rights applicable to the Republic of Moldova 

wouldn’t be comprehensive without mentioning another important 

element in the national protection system. It is the institute of the 

Parliamentary Advocates (ombudsman) that are appointed by the 

Parliament in order to guarantee the observance of constitutional rights 

and freedoms by central and local public administration, institutions, 

organizations and enterprises regardless of their type of ownership, by 

public associations, as well as by officials at all levels. 

At present ombudsman institutions are in operation in over ninety 

countries world-wide. They complement and expand the traditional 

parliamentary control over the executive authorities, and yet do not take 

over the functions of other institutions, such as courts. In 1995-1996 

3 

Two most active nonprofit organization in this matter were Lawyers for Human 

Rights and Moldova Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, both Chisinau-based 

NGOs 

213 





special expert missions, on an assignment of the United Nations 

Development Programme, made a rigorous assessment of the exercise 

of fundamental human rights in Moldova and found it expedient that a 

national institution for protection of human rights be established in the 

republic. In its report experts have also found that there must be actions, 

conditions and mechanisms by which to ensure the protection of the life 

of individuals, their honor, their dignity and their property. These 

mechanisms were still ineffective in Moldova. 4 

In 1996 United Nations Development Programme and the United 

Nations Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights have initiated 

a project “Support to Democratic Initiatives in the Field of Human 

Rights in the Republic of Moldova”. One of the goals was the creation 

and capacity building of the independent national institution for 

promotion and protection of human rights. This project has been also 

supported financially by the Governments of Sweden and the 

Netherlands. The Second International Conference on Ombudsman and 

Human Rights Institutions that was held in spring of 1996 in Chisinau 

arrived at similar conclusion, this time in the context of international 

experience, though. All these experiences were later embodied into the 

Law on Parliamentary Advocates enacted in October 1997 by Moldovan 

Parliament. Administering the above Law, in February 1998 the 

Parliament appointed three Parliamentary Advocates and assigned equal 

rights and responsibilities to each of them. 5 

To incorporate this newly established institution into a separate agency, 

Moldovan Government has adopted a statute of the Center for Human 

Rights of Moldova (CHRM) – office of Parliamentary Advocates that 

should provide them with necessary logistical and technical support and 

4 

Republic of Moldova Human Development Report 1996, Chapter 2 Political 

Reforms – Conditions for Building a State and Integration of Society, United 

Nations Development Programme (UNDP), available at 

http://www.undp.org/rbec/nhdr/1996/moldova/ 

5 http://www.iatp.md/cpdom/en/ombudsmen.htm 

214 





assistance. 6 When analyzing the legal status of the CHRM, we can 

easily identify the provisions that since the beginning undermine the 

efficiency of the Center in achieving its objectives. According to the 

provisions that regulate the internal structure of the Center, its staff is 

composed of only 22 employees including Parliamentary Advocates. 

Leaving auxiliary personnel outside discussion we have 17 persons of 

whom 12 are lawyers and 5 are of supporting personnel. 7 Several 

employees work on behalf of UNDP program in supporting the Center, 

as, for instance, the project manager and legal specialist responsible for 

hot line established to consult the citizens on legal matters. CHRM has 

also three branch offices in Balti, Cahul and Comrat that were 

established to ensure the access of the citizens in these areas (North, 

Center and South of the Republic) to the Parliamentary Advocates. 8 

Currently, only two Parliamentary Advocates work at the CHRM: Ms. 

Raisa Apolschii (Director) and Mr. Iurie Perevoznic. Third 

Parliamentary Advocate Ms. Alina Ianucenco has been recently 

appointed, as a judge in the Constitutional Court and her position is 

vacant waiting for another person to be appointed by the newly elected 

Parliament. The three Parliamentary Advocates concentrations area is 

drawn on the mechanical criteria of division of laws in Moldova: Civil 

Law-Labor Law-Land Law; Criminal 

Law-Administrative Law-Penitentiary Law; Social Security Law- 

Family Law. 

It is obvious that if the Center is aimed to be a key organization in the 

human rights area, if it has to research each petition and effectively react 

6 

Hotarirea Parlamentului Republicii Moldova cu privire la aprobarea 

Regulamentului privind Centrul pentru Drepturile Omului, a structurii, statului de 

functii si modului de finantare a acestuia Nr.1484 din 05.02.98, Monitorul 

Oficial al R. Moldova nr.22-23 din 12.03.1998 

7 

For detailed table of the internal structure of the CHRM see Anexa nr.2 la 

Hotarirea Parlamentului nr.1484-XIII din 5 februarie 1998 Structura si statul de 

functii ale Centrului pentru Drepturile Omului 

8 

Anexa nr. 3 la Hotarirea Parlamentului nr. 1484-XIII din 5 februarie 1998 

structura si statul de functii ale filialelor Centrului pentru Drepturile Omului din 

judetele Balti, Cahul si U.T.A. Gagauzia 

215 





on the identified violations, it has to be provided with sufficient amount 

of human resources, i.e. competent personnel of legal specialists, 

attorneys, program managers, administrative and technical assistance 

staff. The structure of the regional branches of the Center was 

developed in the same way: each branch employs only five people 

including specialists and administrative staff. Throughout the years of 

Center’s existence the situation hasn’t changed: the structure and the 

budget remain strictly limited and doesn’t include the resources 

necessary for providing qualified public service. 

In 2001 Chamber of State Auditors has conducted an inspection aimed 

at assuring that the Center is properly managing the financial resources 

allocated for its activity as a part of the state budget. In this report 

Chamber of State Auditors has revealed that Center failed to follow 

several regulations that are related to the accounting and financial 

transactions. Specifically, the Chamber notes that Center had no right to 

increase certain categories of expenses such as salary for its staff. 

Regarding these violations, state auditors recommend the Government 

to decrease next year Center’s budget proportionally to the amount that 

was overspent. 9 These failures and violations can be viewed from 

different perspectives, first of all they show the lack of competence of 

the Center’s employees responsible for accountancy matters. But at the 

same time it is an obvious factor of the deficiency of the Center’s 

budget that does not allow this institution to function properly. Article 

37 of the Law on Parliamentary Advocates stipulates that Center has its 

own budget that with preliminary evaluation of the Ministry of Finances 

shall be approved by the Parliament along with the state budget. In 

reality, Ministry of Finances sets the annual volume of CHRM 

financing at its own competence. As a result, it is difficult to carry out 

surveys, attract experts, run projects, and invite foreign experts. CHRM 

9 

Curtea de Conturi, Hotarire privind rezultatele controlului asupra utilizarii 

mijloacelor bugetare alocate pentru intretinerea Centrului pentru Drepturile 

Omului in anul 2000 Nr.25 din 14.03.2001 Monitorul Oficial al R.Moldova 

nr.35-38 din 29.03.2001 

216 





simply works on examining petitions, which is more affordable in 

present funding conditions. 10 

Thus, in 2000 Parliamentary Advocates had to increase the salaries and 

authorize some other payments related to reparations and supplies that 

were necessary for the Center’s efficient work and were not reflected in 

the budget. 

It would be logical to start the analysis of the activity of Parliamentary 

Advocates with the commentary on the annual reports – the official 

documents produced by the CHRM on the yearly basis that supposed to 

reflect the situation with respect for human rights in Moldova. 

Throughout the year CHRM collects and processes the information that 

later on will be put in the basis of its annual report that should be 

presented to the Parliament. This report also regards the activity of 

Parliamentary Advocates according to their mandate. 

Although established in 1997, CHRM did not release publicly any 

reports until 1999. The Annual Report of 1999 states that its purpose is 

to present to the legislative authority, in accordance with the Law on 

Parliamentary Advocates, an ample information regarding “the 

observance of human rights in the Republic of Moldova during the 

previous year”, based on received complaints, highlighting the areas in 

which the most gross violations of human rights and freedoms took 

place, the causes of such violations as well as the measures taken by the 

Parliamentary Advocates in accordance with their mandate in order to 

reinstate citizens in their rights, the perfection of the national legislation 

and its adjustment to the international instruments, the education of the 

community in human rights. 11 

Starting with its first report, CHRM has demonstrated obvious 

inconsistency and subjective approach to the assessment of the situation 

10 

Parliamentary Advocate, Newsletter of the CHRM, Jan-Dec 2005, Number 1, 

from the interview with Parliamentary Advocate Mr. Iurie Perevoznic 

11 

1999 Annual Report, Center for Human Rights of Moldova, Chisinau, p. 5 

217 





with human rights in Moldova. First of all, Parliamentary Advocates 

have divided human rights not by the “right” criteria itself, but 

according to the social categories, such as rights of the elderly people, 

rights of the disabled people, rights of the children, etc. This approach 

suggests that Parliamentary Advocates assume the authority to judge 

what rights are more important to the particular category of the citizens. 

For instance, all above mentioned chapters of the Annual Report of 

1999 focus exclusively on the social and economic rights describing 

difficult economic situation of these categories of the citizens and 

criticizing governmental decisions to cut certain social benefits or 

privileges. Secondly, quantitative data provided by the center is based 

on the content of the petitions and on the statistical information that is 

publicly available from the government agencies. Many conclusions 

produced in the report rely on the information from the Department of 

Statistics and Sociology and written complaints submitted to the CHRM 

by the applicants who claim that their rights were violated. All these 

facts show that CHRM in its official reports cannot provide credible and 

comprehensive data regarding the true situation with human rights. 

Adding some more statistical data approved by the CHRM to be used in 

its annual reports will help to support this statement. From 1999 to 2003 

only about 30%-40% of the petitions fell under the authority of the 

Center to launch its own investigation in order to verify the facts 

provided by the complaining parties. This means that the rest (up to 

60%) of the complaints were simply redirected for consideration to the 

competent authorities. Moreover, continuously, every year about 60% 

of the complaints come from the Chisinau municipality alone, which 

means extreme “under-representation” of other regions of the country 

where human rights violations is much harder to track. This again 

shows, that CHRM when describing human rights situation in Moldova 

either paraphrases publicly available information from governmental 

sources, or depicts very subjective, one-sided and often unrealistic 

image based on the incoming complaints. 

Annual Report of 2000 reflects very similar pattern. Human rights 

situation is again linked to the difficult social and economic conditions 






in the country. Chapters about the right to assistance and social 

protection, right to education, right to labor and right to property are 

dominated by the numerous examples of different claims, material in 

nature, made to the government on the behalf of the applicants. Other 

important issues such as trafficking in persons and inhuman treatment of 

detainees are addressed only slightly, despite the increased attention of 

international organizations and governments to these problems. 12 

CHRM admitted that despite numerous complaints about degrading 

treatment, physical violence and tortures that detainees experience from 

penitentiary officers, during 1998-2000 there was only one registered 

case of inhuman, humiliating behavior towards the convicts on the part 

of penitentiary officer. 13 

In Annual Report of 2001 again, all human rights’ violations noted by 

the CHRM are limited to the inadequate funding and social assistance 

from the Government: right to private property and social assistance, 

right to social protection and assistance, right to labor, right to health. 

The overall analysis by CHRM concludes that government should 

provide more social assistance, create more jobs, pay higher salaries, 

provide free medical treatment, etc. For the first time CHRM has 

mentioned a very important political right, crucial to the stable 

democratic governance – right to elect and to be elected. Remarkably, 

CHRM confirmed that it had received no complaints concerning 

violation of this right, thus explaining why this right is not addressed in 

the official reports. This once again proves that the assessment of 

human rights situation in Moldova provided by the CHRM is 

incomplete and subjective. 

In Annual report of 2002 CHRM for the first time has addresses civil 

rights in a separate, although very short and incomprehensive chapter. 

Parliamentary Advocates have addressed the situation discussing 

increasing crime rates in Moldova and expressing concerns about 

12 

Supporting human rights and democracy: the U.S. record 2004-2005, 

Department of State Publication 11237, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights 

and Labor, Bureau of Public Affairs, Released March 2005, p. 139-143 

13 


219 





inhuman treatment of detainees. Under subtitle Justice no factual 

information was provided. All problems of detainees were linked to the 

poor financing of the penitentiary system. The rest of the Report 

dedicated to the human rights situation assessment presents a simple 

listing of statistical data from governmental sources that depicts difficult 

economic situation, poverty, low salary and benefit rates and 

insufficient spending on the health care system. 

Annual Report of 2003 draws more comprehensive situation with 

respect to the political and civil rights in Moldova. Issues of 

discrimination, access to public records and right to defense are 

evaluated separately. Chapter II Social and Economic Rights present 

traditional for the CHRM evaluation and attitude. 

Summarizing the analysis of the annual reports released by the CHRM 

and presented to the Parliament, we can conclude that they do not create 

a clear and objective picture of the human rights situation in the 

country. The cause for this failure is two-folded. First is the insufficient 

information that CHRM uses in preparing its reports, as it was proved in 

the above passages. Governmentally produced statistical data and 

information derived from the written complaints cannot provide for a 

comprehensive and objective analysis. As a result, such issues as 

governmental control over media, human trafficking, violations during 

local elections of 2003 and other problems of this sort noted by other 

observers, are almost completely absent from the CHRM reports. 

Second is subjective attitude of Parliamentary Advocates and their 

personal judgment about the priorities in the field of human rights. 

Obviously, throughout its history, CHRM has emphasized the 

importance of social and economic and called the government to 

increase spending on social programs. This subjective attitude has 

marginalized political and civil rights that constitute the foundation of 

the democratic society. Ignoring the fact that political rights should be 

first secured in order for democratically elected governance to perform 

its functions being accountable for the people, Parliamentary Advocates 

continue to push for the social assistance as a remedy for the majority of 

problems with human rights in the country. 

220 





As a result, CHRM’s annual reports create a misguiding assessment of 

the observance of human rights. An uninformed reader can form an 

impression that difficult economic situation is the cause of all problems. 

Talking about Members of Parliament and ordinary citizens, the reports 

do not present any original conclusions or suggestions that cannot be 

derived from the media, public sources, or human rights watchdogs’ 

reports. At the same time political and civil rights should draw special 

attention of independent observers. Their observance is the indicator of 

democratic development in Moldova, which is on its way to join the 

family of European democracies. 

On July 28, 2005 Parliament of the Republic of Moldova has adopted a 

decision regarding the Report presented by the CHRM about the 

situation with human rights and activity of the Center in 2004. After 

analysis of the statistics concerning the complaints received and 

investigated by the Center, Members of Parliament have assessed that 

human rights situation in Moldova hasn’t changed significantly 

comparing with the indications of the previous year. 14 Their decision 

also emphasizes that Parliamentary Advocates haven’t demonstrated 

sufficient initiative when existing information confirmed massive 

violation of constitutional freedoms and liberties of the citizens. 

Parliament has also estimated that CHRM hasn’t succeeded in reaching 

the objectives of the National Actions Plan in the Field of Human 

Rights for 2004-2008. National legislature has adopted several 

suggestions for the perfection of the situation with human rights and 

efficiency of the CHRM activities. This area became one of major 

concern taking into account political course towards European 

integration and fulfillment of the provisions of the Actions Plan 

European Union - Republic of Moldova, agreed in 2004. 

In their Annual Report of 1999 Parliamentary Advocates proudly 

acclaimed that as a result of the action taken in 1999 by the CHRM in 

accordance with art. 31 of the Law on Parliamentary Advocates, 

14 

http://www.parliament.md/news/plenaryday/28.07-29.07.2005/ 

221 





800,000 people have been reinstated in their constitutional rights. 15 

Indeed, art. 31 of the above mentioned law gives Parliamentary 

Advocates a very powerful tool to use in their fighting for better human 

rights protection. This is the authority to petition Constitutional Court 

asking to examine the constitutionality of the complete laws or their 

parts that according to the Parliamentary Advocates violate certain 

rights of the citizens guaranteed by the national Constitution. Due to the 

fact that the right to petition Constitutional Court directly has been 

attributed only to the limited number of state agencies, Parliamentary 

Advocates have a unique opportunity to get unconstitutional laws that 

violate constitutional rights cancelled or amended. The analysis of this 

important element in the activity of the Parliamentary Advocates can 

add to the overall assessment of their effectiveness. 

In 1999 Parliamentary Advocates have succeeded in several 

applications to the Constitutional Court. Among these cases: petition 

regarding constitutional control of the Decision #338 26/05/95 of the 

Government on “Returning of property, reimbursement of its value and 

payment of compensation to the victims of political repression” which 

violated the right of this category of the citizens for fair compensation. 

Parliamentary Advocates have also petitioned the Constitutional Court 

on the suspension of the art. 32 of the Law regarding the status of 

judges as unconstitutional stipulating the social rights of judges for 

pension upon retirement. Analyzing the content of Parliamentary 

Advocates petitions one can clearly see the tendency for “overrepresenting” 

the professional interests of strong interest groups of the 

Moldovan society: prosecutors, lawyers, judges, investigators, state 

employees, notaries, etc. The majority of the hearings in 1999 in the 

Constitutional Court initiated by the Parliamentary Advocates were 

regarding the right for social assistance and benefits of the above 

mentioned categories of citizens. 16 

15 


16 

Moldova: Two years under the communist rule in the new millennium / 

Moldova Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, editor Serghei Ostaf, Colograf- 

Com, 2003, 632 p Observations on the Center for Human Rights Ombudsman 

Office in Moldova p 7-17 

222 





In 2000 Parliamentary Advocates were preoccupied with defending 

professional rights of the Moldovan legal community. New Law of the 

Bar has obliged all practicing lawyers who have obtained a license from 

the Department of Justice to join Lawyers’ Union. This was considered 

as a limit of the access to the legal profession and declared 

unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. The Parliamentary 

Advocates also submitted another petition, addressing the exclusion of 

social and material guarantees for the prosecutors and judges. 

In 2001 CHRM was not very active in petitioning the Constitutional 

Court. Archives of the Center show that the Court rejected numerous 

petitions this year. They included several problematic issues of the 

military organization, judiciary structure, citizenship by naturalization 

and few other questions of minor importance, that do not address 

massive human rights violations. 

In 2002 CHRM has defended political rights of the citizens to elect their 

local representatives in city councils when Parliament first adopted a 

law regarding the administrative reform and assigned a date for the new 

local election. This has terminated the authority of the elected officials 

to continue serving their terms and ignored the choice of the population 

made during the previous elections. Although supported by the 

Constitutional Court, petition of the Parliamentary Advocates wasn’t the 

only one – both opposition and coalition parties have submitted their 

petitions claiming the law to be unconstitutional. 

Several petitions were again rejected. For example, on January 28, 2002 

Parliamentary Advocate considered that Code of Administrative 

Violations contains unconstitutional provisions because appointment 

decisions by the Parliament, President and Government cannot be 

argued before the court. Constitutional Court has rejected this petition 

as unmotivated, containing mistakes and not following the Code of 

Constitutional Procedure. 

223 





On March 21, 2002 Parliamentary Advocate sent a petition to the 

Constitutional Court arguing that provision of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure that requires that decision about the termination of 

investigation should first be attacked before the prosecutor, and then 

before the court, as limiting free access to justice. Constitutional Court 

has rejected to hear the matter of this case because other law has already 

corrected this deficiency. These two examples can indicate the level of 

professional competence of the office of Parliamentary Advocates. 

Annual Report 2003 contains no examples when Parliamentary 

Advocates have petitioned the Constitutional Court. Indeed, CHRM 

archives show that Parliamentary Advocates were not very active in this 

regard. One of the few cases filed with Constitutional Court this year 

was the case about right for defense, when Parliamentary Advocates 

argued that the requirement to have a lawyer when taking the case to the 

Supreme Court of Justice violates the right of the citizens to defend 

themselves in the court using various means, including direct 

representation of one’s own interests. 

Analyzing the history of petitioning the Constitutional Court by the 

Parliamentary Advocates, there can be found several tendencies that 

shift the activity of CHRM in this direction and explain the only average 

performance if judging by the number of petitions supported by the 

Court. 

First of all, Parliamentary Advocates have been continuously 

prioritizing social and economic rights over civil and political rights. 

Only few petitions address right to elect and to be elected and freedom 

of association. The majority of the petitions pursue the reinstatement of 

social or material benefits revoked by the legislature. 

Secondly, CHRM has served as another channel used by the 

professional interest groups such as lawyers, judges, prosecutors, 

notaries and others to protect their professional interests and privileges. 

Note, that these groups also have powerful voices in Parliament, 

224 





Supreme Court of Justice and other institutions that have the authority 

to petition Constitutional Court. 

Significant number of petitions that have been rejected as unmotivated 

and beyond the authority of Parliamentary Advocates can be used as a 

proof of lack of professional competence of the CHRM staff. 

Clearly, the authority to petition Constitutional Court is may be the only 

truly efficient tool that is granted to the CHRM by the legislature that, if 

wisely utilized, could produce a significant impact on human rights 

situation in the country and reinstatement of particular groups of 

citizens in their rights. However, because the limited capability of the 

Center, Parliamentary Advocates were unable to filter every legislative 

act and its impact on the observance of human rights. Majority of the 

petitions resulted from the previous written complaints submitted to the 

CHRM by the interested parties. As a result, poor, marginalized and 

uninformed majority of the population can seldom call for justice using 

this initiative. This also helps to understand why some well organized 

professional communities are “over-represented” in Parliamentary 

Advocates petitions to the Constitutional Courts. 

Another important element in the activity of the Parliamentary 

Advocates consists in the research and investigation of the possible 

causes of human rights violation and collecting necessary data for their 

annual reports, publications and legislative proposals. Being constantly 

involved in investigating the alleged human rights violations claimed by 

the applicants in their petitions addressed to the CHRM, Parliamentary 

Advocates lack resources and power to find the truth. First and 

foremost, current budget of the Center does not allow its employees to 

make on-site visits and investigations. The only method of investigation 

commonly used by the CHRM – written requests to the competent 

authorities – often proves to be inefficient because responsible officials 

are reluctant in investigating violations committed under their own 

jurisdiction. 

225 





Audience of the citizens is another component of CHRM daily activity. 

Legal counselors are on duty every day to interview the visitors and 

offer them free of charge legal advise. Audience of the citizens follows 

the same pattern as analysis of written complaints. Current activity has 

demonstrated that the population does not yet know the rights stipulated 

in different legal instruments and how they can enjoy them. Many 

citizens address continuously to the CHRM with legal issues that are 

beyond the mandate of Parliamentary Advocates. 17 Often happens that 

individuals use audience service for their own advantage to receive free 

legal advice from counselors, that otherwise would require significant 

attorney’s fees. We believe that this activity proved to be very 

unproductive and should be replaced by the scheduled appointments 

that would follow after the written complaint has been accepted for the 

examination. This will increase the usefulness of these appointments 

and give CHRM counselors more time to work on the accepted 

complaints. Following chart, compiled from the annual reports of the 

CHRM illustrate the quantitative features of the Center’s activity 

including audience of the citizens: 

Year Written 

Complaints 

Signatories Audience 

1999 1368 4654 2049 

2000 1005 3264 4036 

2001 902 2651 2668 

2002 1214 3349 3107 

2003 1217 1907 1422 

2004 1102 1517 ???? 

Finally, the most successful, but unfortunately not the most powerful 

component of the CHRM’s activity consists in educational and 

informational campaigns that are aimed to increase the awareness of the 

general population and particular groups of citizens such as civil society 

17 

Parliamentary Advocate, Newsletter of the CHRM, Aug-Oct 2000, Number 4, 

Volume 1, p. 2 

226 





activists, lawyers, and teachers about human rights and legal ways to 

protect them. So far, Center has managing this part of its activity well 

enough, actively cooperating with various human rights organizations, 

local administrations and government agencies. In its annual reports, 

Parliamentary Advocates allocate almost one third of its content for the 

description of their publications and educational events they have 

conducted. 

International experts assessing the efficiency of the activity of the 

CHRM has noted educational and informational components are the 

strongest elements. Thus, senior consultant at the United Nations Office 

of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Mr. Peter Hosking has 

stated in an interview evaluating the activity of the Center that 

educational and training activities are perhaps most effective, while 

complaints team needs more skills in investigation techniques, 

legislative analysis and human rights policy advise. An example of this 

deficiency will be the situations of the penitentiary system, where 

policies and legislative amendments should be proposed and 

investigation in prisons should be carried out. 18 

Finalizing the analysis of the activity of the Center for Human 

Rights in Moldova, we can admit that the institution of 

Parliamentary Advocates constitutes a part of the national 

mechanism for protection of human rights and fundamental 

freedoms, which could be extremely potential and efficient, since by 

the law regulating the activity of the present institution, the national 

ombudsmen have been attributed great functions and significant 

possibilities. 19 However, there are certain objective and subjective 

obstacles that do not allow Parliamentary Advocates to perform 

their functions efficiently and to make a difference improving 

overall respect for human rights in the country. 


Parliamentary Advocate, Newsletter of the CHRM, Oct-Dec 2000, Number 5, 

Volume 1, p. 3-4 

19 

This opinion has been supported by Petru Ciuchitu, Chief of the Petitions and 

Audience section of the CHRM, for details see Parliamentary Advocate, 

Newsletter of the CHRM, Aug-Oct 2000, Number 4, Volume 1 

227 





These objective obstacles include insufficient funding and overall 

disregarding attitude of the Parliament and central authorities to the 

work of the Parliamentary Advocates. Basically, because of this lack of 

attention from the part of the country’s authorities Center for Human 

Rights looks more like a non-governmental organization, which, 

however being financed from the public budget, does not exercise any 

significant authority or influence attributed to other state agencies. At 

the same time, Parliamentary Advocates do not enjoy any special 

respect or authority among nonprofit sector either. Human rights NGOs 

have been continuously criticizing CHRM for the lack of strategic 

policies and initiative. 20 

Among the subjective weaknesses in the activity of the CHRM are lack 

of leadership and result-oriented management. All of current 

Parliamentary Advocates have been holding public service offices of 

judges, prosecutors, and investigators previously to their appointment. 

Their professional backgrounds might constrain them from taking 

radical initiative, criticizing current policies and demanding change in 

the respect for human rights in the country. 

All the above mentioned reasons make us to conclude that the 

institution of Parliamentary Advocates in Moldova requires significant 

reforms, external and internal, in order to improve its efficiency. 

Moldova does not yet have sufficient experience in human rights 

protection. Unfortunately, this institution fails to provide an effective 

redress in rights of the applicants and does not have any significant 

influence on the general state policies regarding human rights, which is 

much more influenced by the recommendations of the Council of 

Europe, European Union and other regional and international 

organizations. 

20 

Moldova: Two years under the communist rule in the new millennium / 

Moldova Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, editor Serghei Ostaf, Colograf- 

Com, 2003, 632 p Observations on the Center for Human Rights Ombudsman 

Office in Moldova p 7-17 

228 





The key directions in the reforming the Center’s ability to effectively 

fulfill its mission could be following: concentration on the legislative 

proposals and analysis of the proposed legislative acts that have 

negative impact on the human rights situation. This could be achieved 

through an increased level of cooperation with parliamentary 

commission on human rights. CHRM must revise its attitude towards 

cooperation with the non-governmental human rights organizations and 

other civic society groups. Its policy should be shifted from the pure 

informational and educational activity towards policy building and 

advocacy. It could serve as a link between government and civic society 

in matters concerning human rights and their protection. 

Parliament and central authorities in their turn should realize that 

without sufficient funding, internal reform and revision of the strategic 

directions of the Center’s activity, national mechanism for protection of 

human rights will remain incomplete, lacking an independent, selfsufficient, 

lucrative and objective state agency that will be able to 

produce clear and unbiased picture of the human rights situation and 

assist legislative body in drafting national legislation for the better 

human rights protection. 

229

FREE LAW JOURNAL Volume 1, Number 2 (October 18, 2005)

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?