A minimalist analysis of English and Norwegian psych-verbs

A minimalist analysis of
English and Norwegian
psych-verbs
Rurik Thomas Greenall
A thesis presented to the
Department of Modern Foreign Languages
at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Spring, 2004

Acknowledgements
I would like to extend my thanks to Mila Dimitrova-Vulchanova for her efforts in supervision of
this thesis.
I would also like to thank Annjo K. Greenall in a very general sense.
All errors remain, of course, my own.
Rurik Thomas Greenall,
12 May 2004

Contents
1.0 Introduction 1
1.1 Theoretical assumptions and background 4
1.1.1 The link between meaning and syntactic form 4
1.1.2 Adequacy and efficiency 5
1.2 A minimalist programme for linguistics 5
1.2.1 Minimalism and the present approach 7
1.3 The proposed framework 7
1.3.1 Situational semantics 8
1.4 Content and structure 9
2.0 Introduction 11
2.1 Psych-verbs: initial observations 12
2.2 English and Norwegian psych-verbs:
constructions and alternations 13
2.2.1 Basic patterns 14
2.2.2 Fear and frighten-type verbs 15
2.2.2.1 Causative/inchoative construction 16
2.2.2.2 Middle construction 17
2.2.2.3 PRO-arb object construction 20
2.2.2.4 Possessor (and) attribute (factoring)
constructions 21

2.2.2.5 Interaction with sentential complements 23
2.2.2.6 Passive construction 26
2.2.2.7 Binding properties 27
2.2.2.8 Compatibility with intentional adverbs 29
2.2.2.9 Frighten-type multiword constructions 31
2.2.2.10 Multiword psych-constructions in Norwegian 32
2.2.2.11 Appeal-type verbs 34
2.2.2.12 Wonder-type verbs 35
2.3 Conclusions 37
3.0 Previous research on psych-verbs 39
3.1 Research overview 39
3.1.1 Belletti & Rizzi 41
3.1.2 Grimshaw (1990) 44
3.1.3 Pesetsky (1995) 48
3.2 Problems with these analyses 51
3.2.1 Problems with the analysis of Italian data 52
3.2.2 Frighten-type verbs as unaccusatives 52
3.2.3 Problems with the unaccusative analysis 55
3.2.3.1 Anaphoric (reflexive) cliticization 55
3.2.3.2 Frighten-type passives 57
3.2.3.3 Extraction out of complements 65
3.2.3.4 Arbitrary interpretation of pro 67
3.2.3.5 Causative constructions 70

3.2.3.6 Grimshaw's evidence for the adjectival analysis
of frighten-type passives 73
3.2.3.7 A note on the passive and the progressive 76
3.2.4 Problems with Pesetsky's (1995) analysis 79
3.3 Conclusions 80
4.0 Introduction 81
4.1 Bouchard, syntax and semantics 81
4.1.1 Semantics and syntax 82
4.1.2 Mapping problems 89
4.1.3 Problems with the semantic-role analyses —
heteromorphy 91
4.1.4 Summary: the irrelevance of semantic roles
to grammar 94
4.1.5 Problems associated with peri-theoretical
grammatical relations 94
4.1.6 Bouchard's conception arguments regarding
psych-verbs 99
4.2 The arguments and aspects
of psych-verbs 103
4.2.1 Causativity 103
4.2.2 An argument against the causative analysis
of psych-verbs 107
4.2.3 Affectedness of experiencing arguments 110
4.2.4 Aspects of aspect 112
4.2.5 Frighten-type psych-verbs compared with other
causatives 118

4.3 The analysis 119
4.3.1 Internal arguments and external arguments 119
4.3.2 vP, VP, internality and externality 120
5.0 Introduction 131
5.1 Accounting for the basic data 131
5.1.1 Prepositional alternations 131
5.1.2 PRO-arb Object alternation 132
5.1.3 Possessor Subject Possessor-Attribute
Factoring alternation 133
5.1.4 Passives 134
5.1.5 Compatibility with intentional adverbs 136
5.1.6 Psych constructions 138
5.1.7 Possessor-attribute-object alternation 139
5.1.8 Possessor-and-attribute alternation 140
5.1.9 Appeal-type verbs 140
5.1.10 Marvel-type verbs 141
5.1.11 Wonder-type verbs 141
5.2 Accounting for the complex data 142
5.2.1 Backward binding 142
5.2.2 Extraposition of sentential arguments of
psych-verbs 148
5.2.3 Middles 153
5.2.4 Productivity 167

5.2.5 Constructions 168
5.2.5.1 Gjøre/Make constructions 168
5.2.6 Bouchard's psy-chose argument 170
5.2.7 Bech Lutnæs & Åfarli (2000) 170
5.3 Conclusions 173
6.0 Conclusions 175
Appendix A — Norwegian Verbs 177
Bibliography 179

1.0 Introduction
This work treats "verbs of psychological state" (cf. Levin (1993: 188)), more commonly
known as psych-verbs. These verbs are of interest because they have been and remain a contentious
issue in syntactic theory. Since the earliest transformational accounts of their behaviour (Lakoff
(1970), Postal (1971)) to the present day no single approach has achieved a broad base of
acceptance. Indeed, the most widely known approach — Belletti & Rizzi (1988) — is also the
most criticized.
The aim of this thesis is to present an approach that can account for observed phenomena
while avoiding the pitfalls that have beleaguered previous analyses. A second aim is to provide an
analysis which accounts for both English and Norwegian; the latter language being relatively little
studied in this respect (cf. Bech Lutnæs & Åfarli (2000) and references therein).
The examples in (1) and (2) represent the major classes of psych-verbs, these are referred to
as fear-type and frighten-type verbs, respectively.
(1b)
(1b)
(2a)
(2b)
Kim fears Sandy.
Kim fears storms.
Sandy frightens Kim
Storms frighten Sandy.
Note the apparent crossover of arguments, where the verbs in (1) map the experiencing participant
to subject position and the stimulating participant to object position; whereas the verbs in (2) map
the experiencing participant as object and the stimulating participant as subject. This is an unusual
feature, as it is generally assumed that verbs with similar meanings map their arguments in similar
ways.
Note that these constructions are also found cross-linguistically; I have chosen to contrast
the English examples with Norwegian data.
(3a)
(3b)
Kim frykter Sandy.
Kim fears Sandy
Kim frykter stormer.
Kim fears storms
1

(4a)
(4b)
Sandy skremmer Kim.
Sandy scares Kim
Stormer skremmer Kim.
Storms scare Kim
The Norwegian data shows the same crossover phenomena as English; indeed, the verbs pattern in a
similar way in these two languages. This is not, however, to say that these verbs behave in exactly
the same way in English and Norwegian; as will be seen later, there are some quite striking
differences.
One reason why it is interesting to look at psych-verbs is that previous analyses have
involved what can be termed "quirky syntax"; that is to say, chunks of theory developed to account
for these verbs alone. Belletti & Rizzi (1988), for example, claim that frighten-type verbs have an
internal structure like that typically associated with unaccusative verbs. An unaccusative analysis
of frighten-type verbs can be described as "quirky" because unaccusatives are typically oneargument
verbs, whereas frighten-type verbs have two arguments. Claiming that frighten-type verbs
are unaccusative also involves developing distinctly quirky syntactic configurations, associated
with this and only this group of verbs. This kind of approach is contrary to modern syntactic
theory, as will be shown.
This thesis aims to present a "non-quirky" analysis, one which analyses the observed
phenomena, minimizing recourse to peri- and extra-theoretical notions. This is an attempt to avoid
the pitfalls of the "quirky" approaches by utilizing accepted tools from the core "grammatical
toolkit" of later grammatical theory. It will be seen that recent developments within syntactic
theory make this possible.
This thesis follows a strict formalism, with its fundament in the Chomskian tradition; the
formalism is developed from Bouchard (1995) and Chomsky (1993, 1995a, 2000). The next
chapters introduce concepts minted by these authors presenting a view of syntax and semantics
reflecting recent developments in linguistic theory. This thesis refers to a conception of minimality,
based, in part, on developments within Chomsky's minimalist programme, and in part, on a
common-sense conception of minimalism, namely a cluster of what can be termed "economy
2

principles" for the syntax-semantics interface and syntax itself. Such a footing in the logicalempirical
tradition common to neo-positivist, structuralist Cartesian linguistics potentially ignores
the paradoxical nature of 'linguistics as science'. Itkonen (1978) points out that it is important to
address the problems of assuming empirical methodological monism — among which the paradox
mentioned above is numbered.
Positivism is concerned with positive, observable and measurable phenomena; linguistics,
by contrast, abandons observability for a prioris. This is necessitated by the immeasurability of
and impossibility of providing exhaustive proof for certain assumptions; cf. Itkonen (1978:23).
Language is, nevertheless, described in positivist terms: Dowty et al. (1981: 5) state that '…the
proper business of semantics is to specify how language connects to the world….' [my emphasis].
Because language is viewed as an entity in its own right, it can be viewed positivistically with an
ontogeny independent of its surroundings and context (which form the lions share of the
problematic a prioris). This notion that language is observable as an independent thing is
fundamental to theories of linguistic knowledge (Chomsky (1965)); redefining, and breaking, the
link between structural elements and the "real" world things they denote.
Thus, in sum, the present analysis is grounded in positivism, however, certain things which
are presented as facts exist, in truth, only at the level of assumption. The basic rule is that the
usefulness of these assumptions should be attestable. Of course, a binding principle is Occam's
razor — the simplest solution always wins out. It will become obvious that this principle of
economy fits well into the present framework.
The remainder of this chapter considers the motivation behind the framework developed in
this thesis, presenting fundamentals and assumptions which form the backbone of the analysis
presented in the final chapters.
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1.1 Theoretical assumptions and background
1.1.1 The link between meaning and syntactic form
The notion that there is a link between meaning and syntactic form is an important one in
the context of this thesis: the structural representation of meaning is central to the syntax presented
here. This is not to say that general "semantics" should be assumed to control syntactic form, but
rather, the subtle clues that are given in the form of similar structure shared across verbs with
similar meanings should be taken as a cue that there are semantic properties that motivate and
facilitate the wider sharing of syntactic form.
One must be careful when assuming that meaning is shared across structures: in lexicalsemantic
approaches, a problem is encountered where fine-grained semantics leads to massive
overgeneration of, for example, homonyms (cf. Pustejovsky (1995:5-60) for an overview of this and
other problems). Additional problems arise because much lexical-semantic description is normative:
the definitions are based on what is expected, rather than what is observed. Much of this is due to
the inherent ontological problem of the thing under observation being part of the observer.
As it turns out, the fine-grained semantic definition of a word has no effect on the syntactic
context of that word; meaning in this sense does not affect form. For example, the fact that the
word dog denotes "an animal with fur" has no effect on the word's position in a sentence. This is
demonstrated by the fact that the dog in Kim stroked the dog can be replaced with the table even
though most tables lack fur (the properties of the surface of the stroked object, e.g., smoothness or
furriness, testify to the motivation for the act described by the sentence, but this is also irrelevant
to syntactic realization).
In order to avoid such problems, Bouchard (1995) abandons fine-grained semantic
descriptions in favour of a system involving a simple one-to-one relationship between the levels of
syntax and semantics; this system is adopted in this thesis. This particular topic is covered in detail
in section 1.3.
4

1.1.2 Adequacy and efficiency
Descriptive adequacy is the major aim of any generative grammar: to capture all and only
the grammatical sentences of a language; a second aim is to do this in an economical manner.
Language seems, by contrast, to show little regard for efficiency, presenting a relatively high level of
redundancy. Why should efficiency be of concern for written grammars, when language itself does
not seem to be concerned with it? In this thesis, efficiency is required in order to to produce a
working grammar for the context of psych-verbs in English and Norwegian. One major limitation
that is addressed by producing an efficient grammar is the processing ability of the individuals
looking at the grammar; reading a written grammar is not the same as "applying" (as one does when
using and creating language). Therefore, the present work attempts to present a well-formed
grammar that accounts for the data in a clear and concise way.
The special purpose of this particular project, then, is to present a grammar which is
applicable in the context of English and Norwegian; what this entails is a grammar that can be
encoded such that it functions in the context of two differing selections of parameters (the
parameters that account for the differences between the two languages). The conception of these
parameters is the topic of the next section.
1.2 A minimalist programme for linguistics
The Chomskian mainstream is presently dominated by theories stemming from the
minimalist programme, cf. Chomsky (1993, 1995b, 2000); the minimalist programme is, in one
sense, a directed effort to restructure and prune theories stemming from later Government &
Binding (GB) (Chomsky (1981, 1982)) and Principles & Parameters (P&P) (Chomsky (1991),
Chomsky & Lasnik (1995)) approaches. Since the specifics of the minimalist programme are as yet
only sketched, what counts as "minimalist" is a matter of debate. Chomsky (1995, 2000, 2001)
presents a view of language which can be characterized in the following way:
5

• Language is made up of two parts: the computational system and the lexicon. Of
these, only the lexicon is subject to variation in its non-substantive parts and in the
properties of the lexical items it contains.
• Universal Grammar (UG) is thought to consist of "a fixed system of principles and a
finite array of finitely valued parameters" (Chomsky (1995: 170)); thus "The notion
of grammatical construction is eliminated, and with it, construction-particular rules.
Constructions such as verb phrase, relative clause , and passive remain only as
taxonomic artefacts, collections of phenomena explained through the interaction of
the principles of UG, with the values of parameters fixed." (ibid. 170)
• The computational system of UG, S 0
, is made up of the principles discussed in the
previous point. A set of principles, S, selected from S 0
, determines a language.
• A language (as defined by S) defines an infinite set of structural descriptions (SDs),
each of which contains a matching pair (Chomsky's l and p) taken from Logical
Form (LF) and Phonetic Form (PF) respectively (if LF and PF are to be taken to be
a part of the system). Chomsky notes that aside from learning lexical items and the
properties of PF, child language acquisition is the process of fixing S.
• A parsing system maps the set of principles that define a language and the phonetic
content of the language (S and p respectively) into a "structured precept, in some
cases associated with an SD" (ibid. 170).
• "Conditions on representations — those of binding theory, Case theory, q-theory,
and so on — hold only at the interface, and are motivated by properties of the
interface, perhaps properly understood as modes of interpretation by performance
systems. The linguistic expressions are the optimal realizations of the interface
conditions, where "optimality" is determined by the economy conditions of UG."
(ibid. 170–171) Here, Chomsky intends economy to be understood as optimal
satisfaction of interface conditions.
6

1.2.1 Minimalism and the present approach
How do the relationships between and outcome of these points affect this thesis? In the
spirit of minimalism, the present system is one of interfaces. Mapping between syntax and
semantics is a matter of interface correspondence-rules between Conceptual Structure (CS) and
syntax; Chomsky's recent conceptualization of the minimalist programme defines an organization
roughly similar to (5):
(5) Computational system
A–P (PF)
C–I (LF)
Here, the computational system mediates between the Articulatory–Perceptual interface (A–P),
(roughly aligned with PF), and the Conceptual– Intentional interface (roughly aligned with LF).
According to the overview of minimalism given above, the computational system is therefore the
interface between the two interfaces A–P and C–I, and it is here that syntactic processes (MOVE
and MERGE, etc.) and conditions on representations (Case theory, Theta theory, etc.) apply.
Under this view, the levels of Deep Structure (DS) and Surface Structure (SS) are subsumed into
one. The relevance of the diagram to the present work is in the correspondence between C–I and the
computational system; the mapping of elements of C–I to syntactic structures (SDs). In this
respect, I follow Bouchard (1995) in postulating a simple one-to-one relationship. This relationship
is, however, governed by a set of principles that restrict what parts of the C–I interface are relevant
to grammar.
1.3 The proposed framework
The influence of Bouchard (1995) is strongly evident in the present work. He assumes the
Conceptual–Intentional level to be divided into two: situational semantics — which can be aligned
with background, "global", knowledge — and linguistic semantics — semantics relevant to linguistic
7

knowledge; a subset of this latter grouping affects syntactic form. As justification for this
approach, Bouchard presents some arguments for the autonomy of syntax and the role and
influence of semantics in and on syntactic form. Opting to use Chomsky's bipartite conception of
linguistic interface levels as seen in (5) above, already removes certain possibilities, such as the
multiple interface levels postulated by, among others, Jackendoff (1997). Using the minimalist
platform, Bouchard presents an economy principle where syntactic form is based on binary
relations, such that:
(6) AÆ B, C
Where A is a binary relation of two elements B and C, which can be either atoms, or groupings of
atoms recursively expressing the structure defined in (6). These atoms/the heads of these groupings
are selected from the following set {noun, verb, adjective, preposition}. The structure of semantics
follows the same pattern: a set of semantic primitives standing in a binary relation either as
individuals or groups recursively structured according to the binary relation. These binary relations
echo those of syntactic structure; thus, it is assumed that the mapping relationship between syntax
and semantics is one-to-one, as in (7):
(7) Semantics a b
Syntax A B
These assumptions are adopted in this thesis. Reanalysing what semantic content is relevant
to grammar proves productive, allowing insight into the problems of previous approaches and
opening up new avenues for research. The following section briefly discusses the different kinds of
semantics outlined above, and the relevance of these to this thesis.
1.3.1 Situational semantics
Since Bouchard's approach insists that much of the semantics of a word is irrelevant to
grammar, it is interesting to ask just what is disregarded? The answer to this question is "global
knowledge"; things that are associated with the verb, but which do not affect its physical syntax.
8

Bouchard terms this "situational" and "(wider-) linguistic" semantics. Generally, however, it seems
that situational semantics is easier to recognise than linguistic semantics. It will be shown in
Chapter 4, exactly what counts as situational semantics, sufficing to say for the moment that it
includes semantic roles.
In sum then, the framework postulated by Bouchard, and adopted here, omits situational
notions such as semantic roles in favour of uncovering the properties of participants that pertain at
the level of "trivial necessity"; the exact nature of participants is discussed in Chapter 4, and the
distinct properties associated with the arguments of the different psych-verbs will be made clear.
1.4 Content and structure
Summing up, this thesis presents a syntactic analysis of English and Norwegian psychverbs
using minimalist principles. This involves a specific view of language as an object of study,
where sentences are constructed according to the principles and parameters of the language to which
they belong. The aim of the thesis, therefore, is to map and describe the principles and parameters
of English and Norwegian that affect psych-verbs.
The syntactic toolkit is drawn from GB and P&P approaches; while this is the case,
economy is taken is an overarching rule: the simplest route is chosen. "Economy", however, must
be qualified: in this thesis, it is assumed that overt structure is preferred to covert structure, hence
"quick fixes" involving postulating otherwise unmotivated structures with no phonetic content are
avoided in favour of structures that appeal to core elements in the GB and P&P approaches. Other
economy features relate to the specific view of the relationship between syntax and semantics taken
here: only certain parts of semantic understanding are assumed to be relevant to grammar. The
thesis is also concerned with discovering what semantic properties differentiate psych-verbs from
other verbs and each other.
The thesis assumes that the reader has prior knowledge of the GB and P&P frameworks, as
well as an insight into common theories of semantics/aspect.
In Chapter 2, data methodology and the data itself is presented, including the problems and
9

phenomena that any possible analysis needs to explain. Chapter 3 presents previous analyses, and
counter-arguments to them, showing that a new analysis is needed. Chapter 4 presents a new way
of analysing the data in accordance with the principles of semantic mapping adopted from
Bouchard's (I995) analysis, demonstrating that many of the problems associated with analyses of
psych-verbs stem from a misinterpretation of the data. A new analysis, which appeals to a VPshell,
is presented. Chapter 5 presents the final analysis of the English and Norwegian data,
showing the applicability of the analysis presented at the end of Chapter 4 to the data from
Chapter 2. Chapter 6 presents conclusions.
10

2.0 Introduction
The data for this thesis is made up of sentences of English and Norwegian that are
acceptable to native speakers in either written or spoken form. The English data presented is
British English, the Norwegian is Bokmål. All examples and translations are my own unless
otherwise stated. Explanatory/attributary notes are provided in the text or as footnotes.
The data is presented in the form of numbered sentences, with numbering beginning at (1)
from the beginning of each new chapter:
schema:
(1) This is an example.
The sentences are marked according to their acceptability/grammaticality using the following
(2a) Kim eats fish. Acceptable/grammatical
(2b) *Kim fish eats. Unacceptable/ungrammatical
(2c) ?Kim was performed before. Borderline acceptability
Combinations of the symbols "?" and "*" appear; "??" and "?*" are scalar points between "?" and
"*" (or in fact "Ø" and "*"), such that "??" is less acceptable than "?", but more acceptable than
"?*", which in turn is more acceptable than "*".
Data collection for this work began with a perusal of Levin's (1993) seminal work on verbclassification.
After producing a simple database of these verbs, a search for Norwegian
counterparts was begun. The Norwegian verbs were gleaned with the assistance of translating
dictionaries, Norwegian thesauri and the kind assistance of speakers of Norwegian. A number of
searches in corpora were performed to verify the usage of these verbs.
The majority of the English data is taken from personal introspection, the opinions of native
speakers and literature on psych-verbs. Norwegian data has mainly been gathered from interviews
with native speakers, although some is gathered from the literature. Data has also been collected
from corpora, but this has proven to be a less effective approach because the data gathered from the
most wide-scale, free corpus of Norwegian 1 provided many examples, but not much variety (this is
1
The Oslo Corpus of Tagged Norwegian Texts (http://www.tekstlab.uio.no/norsk/bokmaal/english.html)
11

most likely because the corpus is more-or-less uniformly comprised of newspaper texts). In the
cases where data is extracted from other sources, be they from the literature or literary, this is noted
as either a footnote or in the text.
The remainder of this chapter has the following structure: initial observations regarding
psych-verbs; English and Norwegian frighten and fear-type verbs in constructions and alternations;
English and Norwegian multiword psych-constructions; English and Norwegian appeal and wondertype
verbs; and conclusions.
2.1 Psych-verbs: initial observations
There is an expectation that verbs with similar meanings share similar syntax; this is the
fundamental notion on which most verb categorization is based; it seems to be a sound assumption,
given the variety of different verb groups identified in, for example, Levin (1993) 2 . While psychverbs
have more-or-less the same meaning — they are typically defined as denoting a change in
psychological state — they have surprisingly different syntactic realizations. (3–6) present a
simple semantic analysis of the arguments of the verbs:
(3) Dogs frighten Kim.
Stimulating Affected 3
(4) Kim fears dogs.
Affected Stimulating
(5) Hunder skremmer Kim.
'Dogs frighten Kim'
Stimulating Affected
(6) Kim frykter hunder.
'Kim fears dogs'
Affected Stimulating
Note that the English and Norwegian verbs repeat the same pattern. Frighten and fear are seemingly
2
Noe that Levin's (1993) approach is far from precise. Group membership and grouping properties are seemingly
haphazard in many cases. The group of psych-verbs was, however, identified long before Levin's work was published.
3
It should be noted that a reasonable amount of care must be exercized when choosing nomenclature for the two
arguments. The terms "stimulating (argument)" and "affected (argument)" are used for the present to avoid association
with titles derived from semantic roles (cf. Gruber (1965)).
12

coherent in semantics, but not in syntax. This pattern is repeated across the group: some verbs
express an argument structure similar to that of frighten, and some a pattern similar to that of fear.
Thus, two kinds of psych-verb can be distinguished — the first of which is characterized here as
frighten-type, the second, fear-type. The same titles are used for the Norwegian verb groups to
avoid confusion.
One important thing to note is how these verbs compare with canonical transitive verbs 4 , as
both fear and frighten-type psych-verbs seem to be canonical transitives. It can, however, been
argued, as will be seen in Chapter 4, that the assumption that both kinds of verb are transitive
depends very much on how the notions "subject" and "object" are understood. There are also socalled
intransitive psych-verbs:
(7) Fairground attractions appeal to Kim.
(8) Kim wonders about fairground attractions.
The first of these verbs is referred to as "appeal-type", the second as "wonder-type". The present
work, in common with almost every other work on psych-verbs, perhaps unfairly concentrates on
the transitive psych-verbs. This is because the appeal-type verbs are extremely limited in number
in English and Norwegian, and the wonder-type verbs are quite often intransitive variants of
transitive verbs, for example: Kim worries about Sandy. It is debatable whether wonder-type verbs
form a coherent group, because some verbs display intransitive behaviour, whereas others display
behaviour associated with prepositional verbs (such as compatibility with the passive). This topic
is covered in section 2.2.2.12
2.2 English and Norwegian psych-verbs:
constructions and alternations
Levin (1993: 189-191) uses compatibility with different constructions to determine verb
classes and group membership, in addition to grouping verbs based on more superficial semantic
similarities. In this way, a group may contain several verbs that have similar meanings, but which
are not all compatible with the same grammatical constructions. One such example is that some
4
Verbs which take two arguments, a subject and a direct object.
13

members of the group of fear-type verbs are compatible with sentential complements, whereas
others are not:
(9a)
(9b)
Kim fears that Sandy will tell Les.
*Kim idolized that Sandy will tell Les.
It is therefore the case that these verb groupings do not offer one-hundred percent coherence; rather,
the groups are built loosely around semantic and syntactic similarities, more especially in simple, or
"basic" — to use Keenan's (1976: 307-308) definition — constructions. Levin's illustrations,
nevertheless, provide good insight into many of the properties of these verbs, even if these
properties do not extend to every member in a group. One of Levin's important insights is that the
constructions that verbs are compatible with reflect properties of the meaning of the verbs and their
arguments; this insight provides background material for the analysis in this thesis.
2.2.1 Basic patterns
Of the different verb groups, fear-type, frighten-type, appeal-type and wonder-type, only
the frighten-type group is widespread; Levin (1993) lists 222 frighten-type verbs, 45 fear-type
verbs, 79 wonder-type verbs (although many are listed twice or more because of combinations with
different prepositions), and 5 appeal-type verbs.
Norwegian presents roughly the same verb classes as English, namely fear-type, frightentype,
appeal-type and wonder-type. Of these, again, only the frighten-type group is widespread;
the list of Norwegian psych-verbs that appears in Appendix A forms the basis for the data used
here (the list is by no means all-inclusive, but it indicates the distribution of verbs across the
classes).
Frighten-type verbs:
bekymre
irritere
overraske
skremme
'worry'
'irritate'
'surprise'
'scare/frighten'
Fear-type verbs:
beundre
forakte
frykte
like
'admire'
'despise'
'fear'
'like'
14

Appeal-type verbs:
appellere til
gnage på
jage opp
skurre i
'appeal to'
'eat at/annoy'
'chase up/agitate'
'grate on'
Wonder-type verbs
lure på
kjæle for
sørge over
stole på
'wonder (about)'
'cherish'
'grieve (about)'
'trust (in)'
Note that the group divisions already discussed in relation to English are repeated in Norwegian;
this fact combined with similarity in meaning internally in the groups, and between the groups
across the languages is striking evidence that meaning and structure are interrelated. Note, for
example, that frykte and its cognate form, fear, both appear in the group of fear-type verbs in
Norwegian and English respectively; this fact shows that the structural relationship of a verb and
its arguments is an important one. It is not, however, the case that this generalization holds for each
and every verb: Norwegian stole på does not have a cognate form trust on in English; trust is a
simple transitive in English; note, however, that the ordering of arguments with these two verbs is,
nevertheless similar: an affected argument is mapped as subject, the stimulating argument is mapped
as object.
The following examples display the basic patterns observed in English and Norwegian:
(10a) The noises worry Sandy. (11a) Lydene bekymrer Sandy.
Sounds-the worry Sandy
'The noises worry Sandy'
(10b) Sandy despises Kim. (11b) Sandy forakter Kim.
'Sandy despises Kim'
(10c) The book appeals to Sandy. (11c) Boka appellerer til Sandy.
Book-the appeals to Sandy
'The book appeals to Sandy'
(10d) Kim wonders about Sandy. (11d) Kim stoler på Sandy.
Kim trusts on Sandy
'Kim trusts Sandy'
2.2.2 Fear and frighten-type verbs
The basic properties of fear-type verbs can be summed up in the following way:
• transitive verbs;
• affected argument mapped as subject;
• stimulating argument mapped as object.
15

The basic properties of frighten-type verbs as discussed so far can be summed up in the following
way:
• transitive verbs;
• affected argument mapped as object;
• stimulating argument mapped as subject.
Grimshaw (1990) argues that the group can be further subdivided on the basis of verbs that have an
agentive interpretation (amuse) and those that do not (concern). This matter is treated further in
section 2.2.2.8 and in Chapter 5.
2.2.2.1 Causative/inchoative construction
The first construction to be looked at here is the causative/inchoative construction; this
construction is a "transitivity alternation" where what is normally realized as a transitive verb (12a,
12c) is used in an intransitive construction (12b, 12d):
(12a)
(12b)
(12c)
(12d)
Kim amused Sandy.
*Sandy amused at Kim.
Kim delighted Sandy.
Sandy delighted in Kim.
This construction is incompatible with fear-type verbs:
(13a)
(13b)
*Kim fears at Sandy.
*Kim likes in Sandy.
This alternation is typically associated with verbs of change of state or position. With psych-verbs
that alternate in this way, the affected participant is realized as subject and the stimulating
participant is realized as the object of a PP. This alternation is restricted to a small group of psychverbs
including delight. It should also be noted that the head of the PP differs from verb to verb. In
this thesis, this alternation is taken to indicate properties of the arguments of frighten-type verbs,
including the requirements regarding the affectedness of the object. It is also taken to indicate
properties of the verbs themselves regarding change of state. For more in-depth details regarding
16

this construction, see Guerssel et al. (1985) and Ikegami (1985). Note that this alternation is not
associated with Norwegian verbs.
2.2.2.2 Middle construction
Many English transitive frighten-type verbs take part in the middle construction. This is a
transitivity alternation where the argument normally realized as the object of a transitive
construction is realized as subject with a (generally obligatory) adverbial.
(14a)
(14b)
(14c)
Kim frightens easily.
Small children amuse easily.
*Kim concerns easily.
These constructions are often said to be restricted to verbs with agentive/intentional subject
arguments, because they are often analysed as having an unexpressed "agentive" argument. They are
also often said only to be compatible with verbs that have affected objects. Many frighten-type
verbs take part in the middle construction; this is perhaps unsurprising as the post-verbal argument
is affected and is thus a candidate for raising in this construction. Additionally, the subjects of
many frighten-type psych-verbs, such as frighten and irritere 'irritate', can be aligned with the
semantic role Agent — a prerequisite for compatibility with this construction if they do involve a
suppressed Agent — which may explain the incompatibility of certain verbs, such as concern and
bekymre 'worry', with this construction, since they do not select an intentional or agentive argument
as subject.
Contrasting with frighten-type verbs, fear-type verbs do not take part in the middle
construction.
(15a)
(15b)
(15c)
?*Bears fear easily.
*Chocolates like easily.
*Pine furniture hates easily.
This is perhaps unsurprising given that this construction, as was pointed out above, depends on the
presence of an affected object and the suppression of an "agentive" argument. This fact is important
in regard to the analysis of fear-type verbs and their arguments; the contrast with frighten-type
17

verbs is also important as it identifies the properties that distinguish the two groups.
Some Norwegian verbs (16a) —including frighten-type psych-verbs (16c–e) — participate
in the middle alternation; consider the following data:
(16a)
(16b)
(16c)
(16d)
(16e)
Suppen i
koker (*seg i
) lett.
Soup-the i
boils (*REFL i5
) easily
'The soup boils easily'
*Kim bekymrer lett.
Kim worries easily
Kim i
bekymrer seg i
lett.
Kim i
worries REFL i
easily
'Kim worries easily'
*Kim bekymrer over slike ting.
Kim worries over such things
Kim i
bekymrer seg i
over slike ting.
Kim i
worries REFL i
over such things
'Kim worries about such things'
This shows that certain Norwegian verbs (16a) allow the middle construction as seen in English (a
verb with an adverb), whereas others (16c, e) allow only a reflexive middle. Note that this is not the
case across-the-board, because many verbs do not allow the middle at all:
(17) *Kim i
skremmer (*seg i
) lett.
Kim i
scares REFL i
easy
A third class appears in those that allow a reflexive transitivity construction that is not a
middle, see the discussion of middles below. Note that (16d, e) represent what can be seen as the
Norwegian equivalent of the transitivity alternation in (12) above.
Norwegian features a number of psych-verbs which only ever appear with an accompanying
reflexive (18); some other verbs have a reflexive use in addition to their usual non-reflexive use.
Note that of the latter group, only one is a fear-type verb (19), while the rest are frighten-type
verbs (20).
(18a)
Kim i
gruer seg i
(til prøven).
Kim i
looks-not-forward REFL i
(to test-the)
'Kim is not looking forward (to the test)'
5
REFL marks a reflexive element.
18

(18b) Kim i
vemmer seg i
.
Kim i
disgusts REFL i
'Kim is disgusted'
(19) Kim i
liker seg i
(i Spania).
Kim i
likes REFL i
(in Spain)
'Kim likes/enjoys being in Spain'
(20a)
(20b)
Kim i
bekymrer seg i
over slike ting.
Kim i
worries REFL i
over such things
'Kim worries about such things'
Kim i
irriterer seg i
over slike ting.
Kim i
irritates REFL i
over such things
'Kim gets irritated about such things'
In this thesis, these constructions are aligned with middles because the middle is often realized in
other languages (cf. Bulgarian) as a reflexive, and therefore remarks on and references for middles are
relevant for this class of reflexive constructions.
Norwegian fear-type verbs — in common with their English counterparts — are
incompatible with the middle construction, although there is a single fear-type verb in Norwegian
(like) that is compatible with the reflexive construction, but this is used as an idiom and is not
compatible with the (perhaps obligatory) adverb that is observed with middles.
(21a)
(21b)
*Bjørner frykter lett.
Bears fear easily
Kim i
liker seg i
(*lett).
Kim i
likes REFL i
(*easy)
'Kim enjoys himself'
In this thesis, middle constructions are taken to be indicative of properties of the arguments
of the verbs; additionally, these constructions prove to be an important factor in distinguishing the
syntax of frighten and fear-type verbs, and are discussed extensively in Chapter 5. For commentary
on middles, see Condoravdi (1989), Dimitrova-Vulchanova (1999), Hale & Keyser (1986, 1987,
1988) and Keyser & Roeper (1984, 1992).
19

2.2.2.3 PRO-arb object construction
The PRO-arb(itrary) object construction is an alternation which is observed with many
frighten-type verbs; it involves the suppression of an object argument such that the event denoted
by the verb is read as generic, i.e. it the event concerns everyone.
(22a)
(22b)
The story about the Scotsman never fails to annoy Scottish people.
The story about the Scotsman never fails to annoy.
The PRO-arb Object alternation is not seen with Norwegian psych-verbs.
(23a)
(23b)
Historien om skotten slutter aldri å irritere skotter.
Story-the about Scot-the stops never to irritate scots
'The story never stops/fails to irritate Scotsmen'
*Historien om skotten slutter aldri å irritere.
Story-the about Scot-the stops never to irritate
The construction is not observed with fear type verbs in either English or Norwegian. Levin points
out that this construction is restricted to verbs with affected objects (explaining why fear-type
verbs do not participate in this construction: the subject is affected, not the object). It seems
therefore strange that only a limited group of frighten-type verbs is actually compatible with this
alternation, as objects of frighten-type verbs are typically affected arguments. The fact that
Norwegian does not allow this construction is important in this thesis because is indicates the
parametric variation between English and Norwegian; the alternation, in English, is assumed to
indicate properties of the arguments of frighten-type psych-verbs; these matters are treated in
Chapter 5. . For more information on this alternation, see Rizzi (1986).
20

2.2.2.4 Possessor (and) attribute (factoring) constructions
The transitive possessor subject possessor-attribute factoring construction is an alternation
that involves the group of frighten-type verbs. It is observed in both English and Norwegian, and is
formed by expressing the stimulating argument either as the possessor of a property (which is
realized as a PP object), or as an attribute realized as a genitive.
(24a)
(24b)
(25a)
(25b)
Kim irritated Sandy with his silly jokes.
Kim's silly jokes irritated Sandy.
Jon i
irriterte Tor med de dumme vitsene sine i
Jon i
irritated Tor with silly jokes-the REFL i
'Jon irritated Tor with his silly jokes'
De dumme vitsene til Jon irriterte Tor.
silly jokes-the to Jon irritated Tor
'Jon's silly jokes irritated Tor'
Here, the stimulating argument is rendered either as an individual with certain properties expressed
in a PP, or as properties attributed to an individual. Levin (1993: 77) points out that factoring in
this alternation sets up a relationship between the subject of the construction and the object of the
PP, which is unlike other factoring alternations which set up relationships between the object of the
construction and the object of the PP. This is demonstrated in the following example (a possessorattribute
factoring alternation involving fear-type psych-verbs):
(26a)
(26b)
Kim admired Les' optimism.
Kim admired the optimism in Les.
Norwegian speakers find fear-type verbs are somewhat strange when the object is an
attribute in the possessor-attribute-object alternation (27). They take part in the possessor-andattribute
alternation given a suitable "possessor" (Karis øyne in (28b), Kari alone would have been
unacceptable). This distinguishes Norwegian from English, where both of these alternations are
acceptable; why this difference should be present is discussed in Chapter 5.
(27a)
Kim liker Karis holdning.
Kim likes Kari's attitude
21

(27b)
(28a)
(28b)
?Kim liker Kari for holdningen hennes.
Kim likes Kari for attitude-the hers
'Kim likes Kari for her attitude'
Kim hatet Karis forakt.
Kim hated Kari's contempt
Kim hatet forakten i Karis øyne.
Kim hated the contempt-the in Kari's eyes.
'Kim hated the contempt in Kari's eyes'
Note that there is a clear semantic link between the direct object and the object of the PP in (28b),
mirroring the link between the subject and the object of the PP of the frighten-type construction in
(24a). This may be taken to be evidential that the subject of frighten-type psych-verbs has some
object-like properties. The construction in (24b) does, however, can also be taken to indicate
special properties of the arguments of frighten-type psych-verbs, as it shows that "properties of an
individual"/a non-intentional aseity can be expressed as subject for these verbs. This opens up
questions regarding properties of the arguments of frighten-type psych-verbs. In this thesis, the
analysis of these properties proves to be an essential part of defining what frighten-type psychverbs
are; topics arising from the discussion of these properties appear in Chapters 3–5. For more
information on this alternation, see Van Oosten (1980).
Fear-type verbs contrast with frighten-type verbs in that they take part in the possessorattribute-object
alternation. Participation in this alternation involves a verb that takes an object that
is a genitive phrase such as "his croquet skills" or a phrase based on the formula "possessor" "for
attribute". Levin cites Deane & Wheeler (1984) as arguing that the verbs involved in this alternation
"denote the direction of attention toward some entity."
(29a)
(29b)
Kim admires Sandy's optimism.
Kim admires Sandy for her optimism.
Note that this alternation is differentiated from other similar alternations by the specific use of the
preposition for in the NP PP variant.
A similar alternation that fear-type verbs take part in is the possessor-and-attribute
alternation. In this case, the genitive is again present, but the attribute is inserted as the direct
object, and the possessor as the object of a PP:
22

(30a)
(30b)
Kim hated Sandy's jealousy.
Kim hated the jealousy in Sandy.
As fear-type verbs are the only verbs that take part in this alternation, this particular alternation
helps to develop the analysis of the arguments of fear-type verbs. The facts of these constructions
are relevant to the present work because they illustrate selectional restrictions associated with feartype
verbs; this matter is treated in Chapter 5. For more information on these constructions see
Deane & Wheeler (1984).
2.2.2.5 Interaction with sentential complements
English and Norwegian allow the extraposition of sentential complements with frightentype
verbs 6 ; this is reflected by the insertion of an argument, "it", which refers to the extraposed
complement.
(31a)
(31b)
(31c)
(31d)
(32a)
(32b)
(32c)
(32d)
That the stock market had crashed irritated Sandy.
It irritated Sandy that the stock market had crashed.
To have to serve such people irritated the shop assistant.
It irritated the shop assistant to have to serve such people.
At børsen kræsjet irriterte Tor.
That stock-market-the crashed irritated Tor
'That the stock market crashed irritated Tor'
Det irriterte Tor at børsen kræsjet.
It irritated Tor that stock-market-the crashed
'It irritated Tor that the stock market crashed'
Å måtte ekspedere slike folk irriterer ekspeditøren.
To must serve such people irritated shop assistant-the
'To have to serve such people irritated the shop assistant'
Det irriterer ekspeditøren å måtte ekspedere slike folk.
It irritated shop assistant-the to must serve such people
'It irritated the shop assistant to have to serve such people'
The fact that this construction is observed with both frighten-type and, as will be seen, fear-type
verbs. The relevance of this construction to this thesis is the indication it gives as to what can
qualify as a subject/object argument of a psych-verb. The fact that frighten-type verbs take a clause
in subject position is in itself indicative of the special properties of these verbs; it has been claimed
that it is indicative of the fact that the subjects of these verbs have object-like properties, this will
6
Mila Vulchanova (p.c.) points out that frighten-type psych-verbs are the casebook examples of extraposition.
23

e shown to be an incorrect analysis.
The realization of a clause in subject position is not limited to frighten-type psych-verbs,
numerous verbs, including but not limited to raising verbs, present similar syntax:
(33a)
(33b)
(34a)
(34b)
(35a)
(35b)
(36a)
(36b)
(37a)
(37b)
(38a)
(38b)
That Kim plays chess opens many doors for him.
It opens many doors for Kim that he plays chess.
That Kim has an extra arm helps his piano technique.
It helps his piano technique that Kim has an extra arm.
That Sandy eats anchovies seems to put people off her.
It seems to put people off her that Sandy eats anchovies.
At Kim spiller sjakk åpner opp mange muligheter for ham.
That Kim plays chess opens up many possibilities for him
'That Kim plays chess opens up many doors for him'
Det åpner opp mange muligheter for Kim at han 7 spiller sjakk.
It opens up many possibilities for Kim that he plays chess
'It opens up many possibilities for Kim that he plays chess'
At Kim har en arm for mange forbedrer klavier-teknikken sin.
That Kim i
has one arm too many improves piano technique REFL i
'That Kim has one arm too many improves his piano technique'
Det forbedrer Kims klavier-teknikk at han har en arm for mange.
'It improves Kim's piano technique that he has one arm too many'
At Sandy spiser ansjos gjør folk skeptisk til henne.
That Sandy eats anchovies does people skeptical to her
'That Sandy eats anchovies makes people feel she is a bit strange'
Det gjør folk skeptisk til henne at Sandy spiser ansjos.
It does people skeptical to her that Sandy eats anchovies
'?It makes people feel that she is a little strange that Sandy eats anchovies'
The fact that there are numerous verbs that realize similar sentential extraposition to that observed
with frighten-type psych-verbs indicates that they are not "quirky" or unusual. This fact is a
central theme in Chapters 4 and 5.
Levin's (1993) categorization reveals that fear-type verbs vary as to whether they allow
sentential complements (39a, b); whether they allow dummy "it" with sentential complements
(39c, d); or infinitival complements (39e, f).
7
Note that the ordering antecedent–anaphor is required for grammaticality in most cases in Norwegian. See Hellan
(1988) for analysis.
24

(39a)
(39b)
(39c)
(39d)
(39e)
(39f)
Kim feared that the world was coming to an end.
*Kim idolised that Shirley Crabtree had said hello to him.
Kim hated it that the world was coming to an end.
?*Kim feared it that the world was coming to an end.
Kim liked to walk home.
*Kim idolized to walk home.
This pattern is repeated in Norwegian, with the exception that (40d) is acceptable.
(40a) Kim fryktet at vi nærmer oss verdens ende.
Kim feared that we near us world's end
'Kim feared that the world is coming to an end'
(40b) *Kim tilba at vi nærmer oss verdens ende. 8
Kim worried that we near us world's end
(40c) Kim hatet det at vi nærmer oss verdens ende.
Kim hated it that we near us world's end
'Kim hated it that the world is coming to an end'
(40d) Kim fryktet det at vi nærmer oss verdens ende.
Kim worried it that we near us world's end
(40e) Kim likte å gå hjem.
Kim liked to walk home
(40f) *Kim tilba å gå hjem.
Kim adored to walk home
The properties of the individual verbs dictate whether or not they are compatible or incompatible
with the different sentential complements. It is not difficult to imagine that the meaning of
idolize/tilba is only compatible with a small set of "idolizable" things; these things are restricted
things denoted by NPs. There are, however, further restrictions on idolize, in that it is also only
compatible with things that are idolizable. Note that Kim idolizes the stars is only felicitous when
referring to stars in the sense of famous individuals (such as Greta Garbo), not stellar bodies. These
kinds of property are important in the context of this thesis, because they give insight into the
overarching selectional restrictions that are defined in the core concept of psych-verbs.
Additionally, the selectional restriction indicate different things about the events denoted by the
individual verbs, which is also highly relevant to the present study.
From this, the hypothesis is advanced that both fear and frighten-type psych-verbs behave
8
The example in (a) below, however, is perfectly grammatical.
(a)
Kim i bekymret seg i over at vi kanskje nærmet oss verdens ende.
Kim i worried REFL i over that we perhaps approached us worlds end
'Kim worried that we were perhaps approaching the end of the world'
25

syntactically in a similar way to other verb groups, but that their selectional restrictions distinguish
them from these other verb groups. The identification of which properties govern suitable
candidates for arguments for these verbs is covered in Chapters 3–5. For more information regarding
clauses as arguments in English see Quirk et al. (1985); for Norwegian, see Faarlund et al. (1997);
for more information regarding psych-verbs and sentential complements see Bouchard (1995).
2.2.2.6 Passive construction
English frighten-type psych-verbs passivize; the choice of preposition used with the
passive form of frighten-type verbs varies with the verb, although they can all use by, which is
taken by some (cf. Pesetsky (1995)) to be indicative of the verbal passive; other prepositions are
associated with adjectival passives. (41c) presents a purely adjectival passive.
(41a)
(41b)
(41c)
Sandy was irritated by/with Kim.
Kim was concerned by/about/with Sandy.
You can consider me irritated by that suggestion.
Assuming that it is the case that by represents the verbal passive, and other prepositions the
adjectival passive, it can be assumed that frighten-type verbs allow both kinds of passive.
In Norwegian, it seems to be the case that the preposition does not vary, but one can — at a
push — use av rather than the usual over, in the instances below. Note that the passives in (42a, b)
are true verbal passives as the passive morphology ble and -s only occurs with verbal passives;
(42c) represents the Norwegian adjectival passive.
(42a)
(42b)
(42c)
Kim ble irritert (?av)/over Sandy.
Kim PASS irritated of/over Sandy
'Kim is irritated by Sandy'
Kim irriteres (?av)/over Sandy.
Kim irritate+PASS of/over Sandy
'Kim is irritated by Sandy'
Kim er irritert (*av)/over Sandy.
Kim is irritated over Sandy
'Kim gets irritated with Sandy'
Norwegian and English fear-type verbs allow all types of passive, be they verbal or
26

adjectival:
(43a)
(43b)
(44a)
(44b)
(44c)
Sandy is hated by Kim.
Sandy can consider herself hated.
Sandy hates av Kim.
Sandy hate+PASS of Kim
'Sandy is hated by Kim'
Sandy ble hatet av Kim.
Sandy PASS hated of Kim
'Sandy is hated by Kim'
??Sandy er hatet av Kim.
Sandy is hated of Kim
'Sandy gets hated by Kim' (had this been grammatical)
Because they are assumed to passivize both adjectivally and verbally, fear-type verbs are not
generally considered to be unusual in most approaches.
Belletti & Rizzi (1988) and Grimshaw (1990) both claim that frighten-type verbs do not
passivize verbally, claiming that the passives observed with these verbs are adjectival passives/past
participles. The disproval of this claim is one of the major themes in this thesis. More evidence will
be presented regarding the status of the passive with respect to frighten-type verbs in Chapters 3
and 4.
For more on the passive in relation to psych-verbs see Belletti & Rizzi (1988), Bouchard
(1995), Grimshaw (1990) and Pesetsky (1995); for more information on the passive in English see
Quirk et al. (1985); and Norwegian: Åfarli (1989/1992); for more on the syntax of the passive, see
Perlmutter & Postal (1983) and Williams (1982).
2.2.2.7 Binding properties
The binding properties of psych-verbs are widely discussed, because frighten-type verbs
allow so-called backward binding. Backwards binding is a situation where an anaphor precedes its
antecedent.
(45a) The variety of rumours about themselves i
impressed Kim and Sandy i
.
(45b) Reflected images of themselves i
frightened Kim and Sandy i
.
27

Backwards binding is not generally observed in Norwegian: Bech Lutnæs & Åfarli (2000) use the
following example to demonstrate this (their (9b)):
(46) *Hunden sin i
har ofte skadet Jon i
.
Dog-the REFL i
has often hurt Jon i
Some sentences seem, however, to be more acceptable than others, the following examples are
borderline acceptable to some Norwegian speakers.
(47a) ?Mengden (av) rykter om dem selv i
imponerte [Kim og Sandy] i
.
Amount-the (of) rumours about them REFL i
impressed Kim and Sandy i
'The amount of rumours about themselves impressed Kim and Sandy.
(47b) ?Speilbilder av dem selv i
skremte [Kim og Sandy] i
.
Reflected images av them REFL i
scared Kim and Sandy i
'Reflected images of themselves frightened Kim and Sandy'
Binding theory as expressed in Chomsky (1986) has problems accounting for backward
binding — it is essentially the reverse of the pattern otherwise observed. This seems, again, to
suggest that frighten-type psych-verbs are unusual; this is, in fact, a misrepresentation, as there are
a wide number of other non-psych-verbs that also allow backward binding:
(48a) Pictures of each other i
would make nice presents for Kim and Sandy i
.
(48b) Hearing such things about themselves i
gives Kim and Sandy i
headaches.
(48c) Reports about his i
own deeds characterize Les' i
books.
Backwards binding has been used by certain authors (cf. Belletti & Rizzi (1988)) to
promote the idea that frighten-type psych-verbs are in some way unusual; that backward binding is
observed in other, non-psych, constructions goes some way to refuting this claim. As was stated
above, this thesis is concerned with showing that psych-verbs are not "unusual" or "quirky". They
will be shown to display similar patterns to other constructions; and psych-verbs generally will be
shown to be distinguished by properties of their meaning and selectional restrictions. Therefore, the
topic of backward binding is an important issue in Chapter 5, helping to show that psych-verbs
abide by the common principles and parameters of the language in which they are observed.
For more information on binding related to psych-verbs see Bech Lutnæs & Åfarli (2000),
28

Belletti & Rizzi (1988), Grimshaw (1990), Pesetsky (1995), and Bouchard (1995); for information
on binding in Norwegian, see Hellan (1988); for more information on the theory of binding, see
Chomsky (1986), Jackendoff (1997: 67–78), Pollard & Sag (1994: 238–281).
2.2.2.8 Compatibility with intentional adverbs
It was noted above that Grimshaw (1990) claimed that the frighten-type group could be
divided into those that have agentive interpretations and those that do not. An agentive
interpretation is a reading where a participant, typically the subject, is assumed to carry out the
action denoted by the verb intentionally, or — under a thematic analysis — as an Agent; a nonagentive
reading is one where there is no such intentional participant. (49a), (50a), (51a) and (52a)
give examples of agentive interpretations (although (50a) and (52a) are ungrammatical); (49b), (50b),
(51b) and (52b) give examples of non-agentive interpretations. Note that the agentive interpretation
is marked by interaction with a suitable adverb, such as deliberately.
(49a)
(49b)
(50a)
(50b)
(51a)
(51b)
(52a)
(52b)
Kim (deliberately) scared Sandy (by banging doors and making ghost noises)
Something about Kim (*deliberately) scared Sandy.
Kim (*deliberately) concerned Sandy (?*by changing tone of voice).
Something about Kim (*deliberately) concerned Sandy.
Kim skremte Sandy med vilje.
Kim scared Sandy with will
'Kim scared sandy on purpose'
Noe ved Kim skremte Sandy (*med vilje).
Something with Kim scared Sandy (*with will)
'Something about Kim scared Sandy (*on purpose)'
Kim bekymret Sandy (*med vilje).
Kim worried Sandy (*with will)
'Kim worried Sandy (*on purpose)'
Noe ved Kim bekymret Sandy (*med vilje).
Something with Kim worried Sandy (*with will)
'Something about Kim worried Sandy (*on purpose)'
These sentences show that scare/skremme is compatible with both intentional and non-intentional
subjects, whereas concern/bekymre is only compatible with non-intentional subjects 9 . In relation to
compatibility with adverbs, Postal (1971) points out the following pattern:
9
Note that intentionality is presumed to be a property of sentient individuals, thus it cannot be applied to parts or
properties of individuals (unless they are some form of synecdoche, such as Les' elbow deliberately came into contact
with the button, where Les' elbow is taken to stand for the whole of Les, who presumably is an intentional being).
29

(53a)
(53b)
(53c)
(53d)
Personally, I fear Kim.
*Personally, Kim fears me.
*Personally, I frighten Kim.
Personally, Kim frightens me.
The pattern is also observed in Norwegian, although the use of 'personally' is considered to be
somewhat unusual with skremme:
(54a)
(54b)
(54c)
(54d)
Personlig frykter jeg Kim.
*Personlig frykter Kim meg.
*Personlig skremmer jeg Kim.
?Personlig skremmer Kim meg.
Postal (1971) claims that this kind of adverb can only be used to refer to a DS subject. This claim
is, of course, easily disproved because these adverbs can refer to objects and raised (non-DS)
subjects:
(55a)
(55b)
(55c)
Personally, the idea kick-started my creative process
Personally, I was put in the cage by the magician.
Personally, I was expelled.
A related issue can be found in the fact that number of frighten-type verbs are also plainly
incompatible with certain adverbs such as "voluntarily" and "personally". This is very similar to
the data presented regarding Grimshaw's (1990) proposal that frighten-type verbs be divided into
those that have an agentive interpretation and those that do not; it can be seen that certain
constructions are incompatible with adverbs that imply intentionality.
(56a)
(56b)
(56c)
(56d)
(57a)
(57b)
*Personally, I concern people.
*Kim voluntarily concerns people.
Personally, I frighten people.
Kim voluntarily frightens people.
*Personlig, bekymrer jeg folk.
Personally worry I people
*Kim bekymrer folk med egen vilje.
Kim worries people with own will
30

(57c)
(57d)
Personlig skremmer jeg folk.
Personally, frighten I people
'Personally, I frighten people'
Kim skremmer folk med egen vilje.
Kim frightens people with own will
'Kim deliberately scares people'
The fact that personally can only refer to certain arguments in certain positions points to properties
of the arguments and argument structure of these verbs; the fact that some verbs are plainly
incompatible with such adverbs seems to point to whether or not it is possible to associate an
agentive/intentional interpretation with the event denoted by the verb. In this thesis, these issues
help to identify properties of the arguments of psych-verbs and their event types. This matter is
discussed in Chapter 5.
Further discussion of this topic can be found in Bouchard (1995), Postal (1971) and Ruwet
(1972).
2.2.2.9 Frighten-type multiword constructions
Frighten-type verbs are not restricted to the kinds listed by Levin (1993), many authors
also include multiword verbs of the kind in (58); these are termed "psych-constructions" by
Bouchard (1995). They are often made up of non-psych-verbs juxtaposed with "psychcompatible"
arguments, such that a psych interpretation is derived; in this way, they are also
productive, allowing non-psych-verbs to take on new meanings.
(58a)
(58b)
(58c)
(58d)
Kim gives Sandy the heebie-jeebies/the heebie-jeebies to Sandy.
Kim makes Sandy angry.
Kim put the fear of God into Sandy.
Kim struck Sandy with his intelligence.
In this context, psych-compatible arguments are typically those that express some notion
associated with emotion, such as "heebie-jeebies', but may include a wide array of other argument
types that gain a psych-interpretation in these particular constructions. This fact makes these
constructions useful in identifying properties of the arguments of psych-verbs.
Psych-constructions are not strictly speaking psych-verbs as they also appear in non-
31

psych-constructions. Psych-constructions, however, have special properties that they do not share
with their non-psych uses. Among these are properties such as compatibility 10 with "backwardbinding"
constructions.
(59a)
(59b)
Pictures of themselves/?Each other's spouse gave Kim and Sandy the heebie-jeebies.
*Each other's spouse gave Kim and Sandy a kiss.
These constructions do not, however, share all of the properties of frighten-type psych-verbs: they
do not, for example, participate in the middle construction.
(60a)
(60b)
*Sandy gives the heebie-jeebies easily.
*Sandy makes angry easily.
These constructions are productive and allow the formation of new, novel psych-constructions in a
way that is not seen with "proper" psych-verbs. This fact shows that psych-verbs build upon
identifiable processes and share structural properties.
2.2.2.10 Multiword psych-constructions in Norwegian
In common with English, Norwegian allows a number of multiword psych-constructions.
As has been seen, these are constructions with psych interpretations, but which centre around a
verb which is not necessarily a psych-verb; again this is a productive construction. Norwegian,
however, also features a number of sometimes idiosyncratic constructions, among which are
reflexive psych-verbs.
A construction which is observed extensively in Norwegian, and is tied in with the reflexives
mentioned above, is a construction where a reflexive is combined with a modal and a bare psychinfinitive
such that a psych-construction is formed.
(61a)
(61b)
Kim i
lar seg i
irritere.
Kim i
lets REFL i
irritate
'Kim lets himself get annoyed'
Kim i
lar seg i
bekymre.
Kim i
lets REFL i
worry
'Kim lets himself worry'
10
This does not, however, hold for all constructions.
32

This construction also has a possible analogue in English (62), although note that the construction
does not share the exact syntax of the Norwegian construction.
(62) Kim i
lets himself i
get annoyed/het up.
This is an important construction for two reasons; firstly, in that it is widespread in the Oslo
Corpus of Tagged Norwegian Texts (often seen in situations where more direct forms such as an
active construction would presumably have been deemed offensive). And, secondly, because they
demonstrate certain properties of psych-verbs associated with reflexivity and argument types.
Many constructions in English and Norwegian are based around causative auxiliaries such as
make in English and får 'get' and gjøre 'do' in Norwegian. These verbs are combined with an
adjective, creating a psych-construction.
(63a)
(63b)
(63c)
(63d)
Han gjør meg redd.
He does me scared
'He makes me scared'
Han gjør meg trist.
He does me sad
'He makes me sad'
Han gjør meg blid.
He does me happy
'He makes me happy'
Han får meg til å grøsse
He gets me to to shudder
'He makes me shudder'
Note that gjøre also forms a number of compound verbs:
(64) Han blidgjorde folkemengden.
He happy-did people-mass-the
'He calmed the crowd'
The non-combinatory constructions are borderline/unacceptable when used in the passive,
compounded constructions are fine in the passive.
(65a)
(65b)
??Jeg gjøres redd (av han).
I make+PASS scared (of him)
??Jeg gjøres trist (av han).
I make+PASS sad (of him)
33

(65c)
(65d)
??Jeg gjøres blid (av han).
I make+PASS happy (of him)
*Jeg fåes til å grøsse (av han).
I get+PASS to to shudder (of him)
(66) Jeg blidgjøres (av han)
I happy-make+PASS (of him)
'I am made happy by him' (?)
These constructions are important because they demonstrate that Norwegian allows the kind of
causative constructions observed in many other languages, and that these Norwegian constructions
can have a psych interpretation. In addition, they display a compound form not observed in
English, namely blidgjøre.
The issues that arise from the discussion of multiword psych-constructions are important
to this thesis because they show not only that psych-verbs have distinct properties that mark them
out as a group, but also that they are part of a wider syntactic domain. The phenomenon of psychconstructions
also points to limitations on productivity in this class. The properties and underlying
principles for these phenomena are treated in Chapters 4 and 5.
Further information on psych-constructions can be found in Bech Lutnæs & Åfarli (2000),
Bouchard (1995) and Ruwet (1972).
2.2.2.11 Appeal-type verbs
These verbs are characterized by their lack of compatibility with the passive; this is
unsurprising given the fact that they do not subcategorize a direct object. Levin also points out that
this group displays a pattern which is more common in other languages, for example French. Both
English and Norwegian appeal-type verbs fail to passivize.
(67) *Kim was appealed to (by the statue).
(68a) *Kim appelleres til av statuen.
Kim appeal+PASS to of statue-the
(68b) *Kim ble appellert til av statuen.
Kim PASS appealed to of statue-the
(68c) *Kim er appellert til av statuen.
Kim is appealed to of statue-the
34

These verbs form a very limited class in both English and Norwegian; this, in addition to their
otherwise restricted behaviour means that they are analysed in this thesis as simple unergative
intransitives. This analysis is only slightly embellished, to account for certain properties associated
with the subject arguments of these verbs and frighten-type verbs. More information on
intransitives in English can be found in Quirk et al. (1985); for Norwegian, see Faarlund et al.
(1997).
2.2.2.12 Wonder-type verbs
Levin notes that some verbs in this group passivize; this may be because, as stated above,
the group is not coherent. The verbs that passivize may be prepositional verbs, rather than true
intransitives.
(69a)
(69b)
(69c)
(69d)
(70a)
(70b)
(70c)
The statue was marvelled at by Kim.
The statue was approved of by Sandy.
*The statue was angered over by Kim.
*The statue was bewared of by Sandy.
?Kim stoles på/ble stolt på av alle..
Kim trust+PASS on/PASS trusted on of all
'Kim is trusted by everyone'
Dødsfallene sørges over/ble sørget over av alle.
Deaths-the mourn+PASS over/PASS mourned over of all
'The deaths were mourned by everyone'
*Mysteriet lures på/ble lurt på av alle.
Mystery-the wonder+PASS on/PASS wondered on of all
A true intransitive verb should not passivize because the verb does not have a direct object, which
means that when the subject is suppressed, no argument remains to be promoted to subject. On the
basis of this, it can be assumed that the group is not coherent, and a fifth group is identified; this
group should perhaps be identified as a subgroup of the fear-type verbs as it otherwise displays
similar realization to those verbs, e.g. an affected argument is realized as subject, while the
stimulating argument is realized as object. This entails that the verbs in the new group be
compatible with the same alternations as other fear-type verbs. In the following, alternations with
which fear-type verbs are incompatible have an asterisk next to the alternation title.
35

Sentential complements
(71a) ??Kim marvelled at it that Sandy had passed the test/*to like fish.
(71b) *Kim approved of (it) that Sandy had passed the test./*to like fish.
(72a) Kim stoler på (det) at Sandy har bestått prøven/*å like fisk.
Kim trusts on (it) that Sandy has passed test-the/*to like fish
'Kim relies? on (it) that Sandy has passed the test'
(72b) Kim sørger over (det) at Sandy har bestått prøven/*å like fisk.
Kim mourns over (it) that Sandy has passed test-the/*to like fish
'Kim mourns over the fact that Sandy has passed the test'
*Middles
(70a) ??Statues marvel at easily.
(70b) *Statues approve of easily.
(70a) *Kim i
stoler på (seg i
) lett.
Kim i
trusts on (REFL i
) easy
(70b) *Slike dødsfall i
sørger over (seg i
) lett.
Such death-falls i
mourn over (REFL i
) easy
Possessor-attribute-object alternation
(71a) Kim marvelled at ?Sandy and Les for their optimism/Sandy and Les' optimism.
(71b) Kim approved of *Sandy and Les for their optimism/Sandy and Les' optimism.
(71a) *Kim stoler på Sandy og Les for deres optimisme/*Sandy og Les' optimisme.
Kim trusts on Sandy and Les for their optimism/*Sandy and Les' optimism
(71b) *Kim sørger over Sandy og Les for deres optimisme/*Sandy og Les' optimisme.
Kim mourns over Sandy and Les for their optimism/*Sandy and Les' optimism
Possessor-and-attribute alternation
(72a) Kim marvelled at Sandy's jealousy/the jealousy in Sandy.
(72b) Kim approved of Sandy's jealousy/?the jealousy in Sandy.
(72a) *Kim stoler på Sandys sjalusi/*sjalusien i Sandy.
Kim trusts on Sandy's jealousy/jealousy-the in Sandy
(72b) ?Kim sørger over Sandys sjalusi/*sjalusien i Sandy.
Kim mourns over Sandy's jealousy/jealousy-the in Sandy
It seems to be the case then that these verb are, in many respects, similar to the fear-type verbs,
excepting limited compatibility with sentential complements and the possessor-attribute-object
alternation. Henceforth, these verbs are referred to as "marvel-type" verbs. The marvel-type group,
in essence, share the analysis of fear-type verbs; the wonder-type verbs are analysed as simple
unergative intransitives. For more information on intransitives and prepositional verbs, see Quirk et
al. (1985) for English and Faarlund et al. (1997) for Norwegian.
36

2.3 Conclusions
The data as presented gives some insight into the behaviour of the verbs, defining the object
of study as well as describing it. The data can be summarized in the following way:
• English and Norwegian psych-verbs appear in two distinct forms: transitive and
intransitive;
• the transitive verbs in both languages can be subdivided into those that express the
affected participant as object (frighten-type) and those that express it as subject
(fear-type);
• the intransitives in both languages are divided into those that express the affected
participant as the object of a PP (appeal-type) and those that express it as subject
(wonder-type);
• of the groups, the frighten-type group is most extensive;
• there is some doubt as to whether the frighten-type groups in both languages should
be sub-divided into two groups on the basis of whether verbs have an agentive
interpretation or not;
• many of the basic properties of these verbs are common to both English and
Norwegian;
• the middle is expressed differently in the two languages; Norwegian allows an
extensive array of reflexive constructions, some of which play a role in middle
constructions;
• only the frighten-type group is productive — both languages form constructions
from this group in a similar way, which can loosely be described as involving
"causative" verbs and arguments that force a psych interpretation.;
• the wonder-type group as advanced by Levin is not a coherent group; it contains a
number of true intransitives, and a number of prepositional verbs, marvel-type
verbs, that appear to be a subtype of the fear-type verbs;
37

• the variation that exists between the way the two languages express psych-verbs
craves an explanation in terms of parametric variation between the two languages.
The data has drawn together a series of important questions regarding psych-verbs crosslinguistically,
these can be listed as the following:
• Are the verb groups pertinent and theoretically relevant?
• What properties are pertinent to the subjects and objects of psych-verbs?
• If so, what properties of frighten-type verbs result in the distinctive object
extraction associated with these verbs? (This is perhaps covered by the previous
point.)
• What properties cause the transitive frighten-type verbs to be so prolific in terms of
number and productivity in relation to the other verb groups?
While Norwegian and English are quite similar in many ways, a number of questions have
arisen from the discussion above; many of these indicate that Norwegian and English specify
objects differently, for example, in terms of the possessor-and-attribute alternation; while some
indicate that the languages have a differing parameters regarding fundamental syntactic processes
(such as the middle). These can be summarized as follows:
• What differences exist in the argument-selectional properties of English and
Norwegian psych-verbs?
• What parameters lie behind the differences observed between English and Norwegian
binding?
• What properties lie behind the differences between English and Norwegian in regard
to middles and reflexives?
38

3.0 Previous research on psych-verbs
In the present context, it would be impossible to do real justice to all of the research on
psych-verbs, so focus is placed on the most influential approaches. These approaches are those
which are most often cited in the literature, and form the basis for other approaches. This chapter is
divided in the following way: section 3.1 gives an overview of the field, and introduces Belletti &
Rizzi (1988), Grimshaw (1990) and Pesetsky (1995); section 3.2 forms a critique of these
approaches.
3.1 Research overview
Psych-verbs are treated extensively in the literature; these treatments are characterized by a
general lack of consensus regarding analysis. Much of the debate can be boiled down to
grammarians' expectation that verbs with similar meaning have similar syntax. An example of this is
the very fact that two verbs such as fear and frighten are clustered together in a group entitled
"verbs of psychological state". The fact that this group can be sub-divided into two groups (those
with affected "Experiencer" objects and those with affected "Experiencer" subjects) reflects the
weak glue that holds the group together. In this case, though, the general principle regarding the
relationship between form and meaning has overridden the cold facts of these verbs; their syntax is
different even though their semantics are perhaps notionally similar.
Lakoff (1970) and Postal (1971) presents work within early Transformational Grammar
(TG), with transformational rules such as (Postal's) PSYCH-MVT. PSYCH-MVT is a rule
whereby the surface structure of a frighten-type verb is derived from an underlying structure
identical to that of a fear-type verb. This can be seen in the following:
(1) DS:[ S
[ NP
Kim] [ VP
[ V
frighten] [ NP
Sandy]]] fi
SS: [ S
[ NP
Sandy] [ VP
[ V
frightens] [ NP
Kim]]]
These verbs are thus associated with what were termed "crossover" phenomena. Note that this
neatly explains the meaning-form conundrum: the underlying structures of the two verbs are the
39

same. This approach shows clear roots in the thinking of the then contemporary Generative
Semantics, where the DS of a construction was considered to be a representation of meaning
(perhaps equivalent to the way LF is viewed in Standard Theory). Note that the fear-type
construction is seen as the "basic", "underlying" construction; why should this be the case? Why
can frighten-type verbs not be the "underlying" form? The reason for this will be treated in a
moment, and proves to be a central point in the next two analyses.
The transformational-rule approach is incompatible with the programme of research
initiated by Chomsky (1981). Chomsky's Government and Binding (GB) approach does away with
the problems of massive overgeneration and theoretical creep, evidenced by the vast number of
(potential) verb-specific transformational rules such as PSYCH-MVT; all such rules were disposed
of in favour of an all encompassing rule for movement, move-a under the GB scheme. This
obviously means that the analysis of psych-verbs must be reappraised, not only because of the
verb-specific movement rule, but also because of the fact that "crossover" phenomena are
essentially ruled out by innovations of GB-theory such as the q-criterion and locality constraints.
The relevance of the q-criterion is that it is used to govern which NPs can be realized where;
and it is here that the choice of a fear-type structure proves not to be coincidental. The application
of the q-criterion has lead to the development of thematic hierarchies of the kind expressed in
Pesetsky's (1995) U(T)AH. Such hierarchies are generally accepted to have first appeared in
Fillmore (1968) and Jackendoff (1972); they are built on a conceptualization of mapping, where
arguments bearing given q-roles are always mapped into the same syntactic positions. Given a
hierarchy such as that in (2) (adapted from Davis & Koenig (2000)), an Agent role will always be
projected higher than a Patient or a Theme role.
(2) AGENT > BENEFICIARY > RECIPIENT/EXPERIENCER/GOAL >
PATIENT/ THEME > LOCATIVE
This explains the reasoning behind Postal's positing the structure of fear as the "default" psychverb:
the hierarchy dictates that arguments attributed Experiencer roles be projected higher in the
syntactic structure than stimulus arguments, which are typically assigned Theme roles. Note that
40

"higher" is generally assumed to mean comparatively more leftward. Because syntax is typically
thought to exhibit the structure of the canonical X'-structure of the kind in (3), an argument which is
said to be comparatively more leftwards than another is also assumed to be higher than one which
is, comparatively speaking, occupying a position which is more to the right.
(3) XP
YP
X'
X° ZP
Thus YP will be assigned a semantic role which is higher (more towards the left) in the hierarchy
and ZP will be assigned one which is lower (more to the right) in the hierarchy. This proves to be in
important issue in the approach of Belletti & Rizzi (1988), which is discussed in a moment.
Given that q-roles are an adaptation of precepts from the, perhaps naïvistic, philosophical
logic of the 1960s, stemming from Gruber (1965), it is not surprising that the application of q-roles
and -hierarchies within language study has been widely criticized. Among others, Bouchard (1995),
Coppieters (1982, 1990), Davis & Koenig (2000), Dowty (1991), Ladusaw & Dowty (1988) and
Schlesinger (1995) all criticize the use of thematic notions. Given the volume of references against
hierarchies specifically, and q-roles generally, one might assume that modern approaches would
avoid relying on these theoretical constructs; this is not, however, the case. In fact, semantic roles
appear in most, if not all, grammatical frameworks; this matter is revisited in Chapter 4, where it is
demonstrated not only that situational semantic notions of this kind are irrelevant to syntax, but
also that semantic roles lead to incorrect conclusions through the theoretical slant such tools place
on analyses.
3.1.1 Belletti & Rizzi
Belletti & Rizzi (1988) present a novel approach which deals with psych-verbs in Italian.
Because the two groups of verbs map arguments with the same semantic roles to seemingly
different positions, they are problematic in terms of thematic hierarchies. Belletti & Rizzi solve this
41

problem by applying the hierarchy in a very loose, but nonetheless structured, way. They insist
that the role Experiencer is always projected "higher" than a Theme role; higher, however, in the
sense that it is configurationally higher. This entails that the syntax of frighten-type verbs differs
radically from that of fear-type verbs (or indeed any other verb). Thus, Belletti & Rizzi propose
the structures in (4a) and (4b) for fear-type and frighten-type verbs respectively.
(4a) VP (4b) VP
NP 1
V' V' NP 1
V° NP 2
V° NP 2
Kim fears war frightens War Kim
They claim that fear-type verbs are canonical transitives and that frighten-type verbs are not. The
analysis is such that NP 2
in (4b) is not assigned accusative Case by the lexical verb and is thus a
candidate for movement. NP 2
thus moved, the surface word-order now resembles that which
observed in English. This approach also solves the problem of backward binding in a novel way:
backward binding is problematic because of the assumption that an antecedent must c-command its
anaphor; an XP c-commands YP if and only if the first branching node dominating XP also
dominates YP, thus NP 1
of (4a) c-commands NP 2
because the first branching node dominating NP 1
is VP, which also dominates NP 2
. If an anaphor is realized in some projection under NP 1
of (4a),
then it is not possible for an antecedent realized in a configurationally lower position (such as NP 2
in (4a)) to c-command the anaphor because the first branching node dominating the antecedent NP 2
is V', which does not dominate the anaphor in NP 1
. Note, however, that an antecedent realised in
NP 1
of (4b) does c-command NP 2
; this is the case because the argument realized in NP 1
is
immediately dominated by VP, which also dominates NP 2
.
The problem with this approach is that it requires an explanation of how the new syntactic
structure (4b) fits in with syntactic structures generally; where is its precedent? Belletti & Rizzi
(1988: 343) argue that the verb classes (they identify three in Italian) "...are identical except for one
42

parameter involving the selection of different inherent Cases." The core of their argument regarding
fear-type verbs, therefore, is that the argument bearing the Experiencer role is automatically marked
as an external role; their analysis of frighten-type verbs, as has already been mentioned, is
somewhat more complex:
• Belletti & Rizzi identify a Case grid and a q-grid for each verb. If a verb has an
argument marked as the external argument, then the Case grid will be empty; if,
however, there is no external argument, then inherent Case is assigned via the Case
grid.
• Frighten-type verbs are assumed to be deficient Case-assigners. (cf. Burzio's (1986)
"unaccusative hypothesis"). Because only one Case is assigned, Accusative, this is
assigned to the first argument in the Case grid; this will always be the argument
assigned the Experiencer role, because, in a theta grid containing an Experiencer and a
Theme, the Experiencer will always be projected higher than (in the sense that it
asymmetrically c-commands) the Theme.
• The Experiencer role of frighten-type verbs is not marked as an external role, and the
inherent Case it is assigned, Accusative, is incompatible with externalization, so it is
not a candidate for movement to a VP-external position. Thus, the argument bearing
the Theme role is externalized.
The result here is that the surface orders of fear-type and frighten-type verbs will be mirror images,
as was seen in (4). A major problem with this approach is that it requires proof of the derived
status of the subject of frighten-type verbs, for — if Belletti & Rizzi's analysis is correct — the
Theme argument — an internal argument — is a derived subject akin to the subjects of
unaccusatives and passives. It will be shown that this line of argumentation cannot be upheld on the
basis of the data presented by Belletti & Rizzi, nor in light of data from other languages (including
Norwegian).
43

3.1.2 Grimshaw (1990)
Grimshaw (1990) presents an analysis of psych-verbs stemming from a review of the
aspectual and syntactic properties of psych-verbs and de-verbal psych-nominals and -adjectives.
Grimshaw's account provides insight into the internal semantic structure of these verbs, as well as
an unusual way of accounting for the differences in argument realization observed between fear and
frighten-type verbs. When compared to Grimshaw's approach, that of Belletti & Rizzi seems
unprincipled in its identification of external arguments, and is revealed to have no real descriptive
power because of this. Grimshaw's analysis provides a simple mechanism for codifying the
thematic hierarchy at the same time as neatly accounting for the perceived crossover of arguments
in frighten-type psych-predicates, without resorting to crossing actual arguments over.
Grimshaw's analysis of psych-verbs differs to that of Belletti & Rizzi mostly because of its
innovative analysis of argument structure, but also because of its focus on aspectual, rather than
syntactic, explanations for observed phenomena. Grimshaw (1990: 3) approaches argument
structure as '…a structured representation over which relations of prominence are defined."
Grimshaw argues that a lexical item's argument structure is itself structured internally; this structure
is assumed to be governed by the lexical item's semantics. In this way, Grimshaw claims that
argument structure is directly dictated by semantics, linking meaning and form in a simple way.
Because semantics thus governs argument structure, the argument structure of a predicate can be
determined from certain '…key characteristics of its meaning' (ibid. 3). Argument properties are
related in an 'organic' way; the given example being the external argument, which '…has a natural
definition in a theory of structured argument structure, as the most prominent argument.' (ibid. 3).
A structured argument structure is annotated by Grimshaw thus:
(5) announce (Agent (Goal (Theme)))
Here, announce has an external Agent, an internal Goal and an internal Theme. Grimshaw points
out (ibid. 4) that in (5) the Agent is most prominent, while the Goal is relatively more prominent
than the Theme; a fact reflected in the way the argument structure embeds its contents. This
analysis seems to reach a common-sense conclusion, as argument selection is based on semantic
44

principles; Grimshaw's approach has not, however, been widely applied.
Grimshaw's argument structure differs from previous research in that '…the internal
organization of the a[rgument] structure results (in part) from the thematic hierarchy, so the
prominence relations reflect thematic information of a very limited kind, namely whether a given
argument is higher or lower on the thematic hierarchy than another' (ibid. 5).
Prominence of an argument is governed by its relative prominence in two dimensions
(thematic and aspectual), thus an argument is prominent in relation to the other arguments of the
predicate (with the most prominent typically representing the the external argument). The thematic
dimension (hierarchy) is represented thus:
(6) (Agent (Experiencer (Goal/Source/Location (Theme ))))
Grimshaw (1990: 8)
Thus, an argument structure for a fear-type verb like hate is predicted to have the structure
in (7), because of the relative prominence of the Experiencer argument:
(7) hate (x (y))
Experiencer Theme
The argument structure of frighten-type verbs should be identical to that of fear-type verbs;
this is problematic, because — as has already been stated — the most prominent argument is
generally aligned with the external argument, and this would be the Experiencer. Grimshaw (p20)
states that '…the a[rgument] structure prominence relations for the frighten class are not the same
as those for fear.' To save the analysis, Grimshaw turns to differences in the aspectual properties
of fear-type and frighten-type verbs.
The aspectual dimension is, in interaction with the thematic tier, identified as the decider of
external arguments (ibid. 19). In order to systematize how arguments relate to one-another,
Grimshaw develops a prominence hypothesis based on event-decompositional lexical semantics
(see Dowty (1979), Pustejovsky (1988, and more recently 1995), Vendler (1967), among others),
whereby the action denoted by a verb is decomposed into aspectual sub-events, thus:
45

(8) event
process
state
The event denoted by the verb – say hit – can be decomposed into two sub-events, the
process of hitting and the state of being/having hit. Grimshaw argues that a Cause argument will
always 'be associated' with the first sub-event '…which is causally related to the second sub-event.'
(ibid. 26). From this, Grimshaw draws the generalisation that '…an argument which participates in
the first sub-event in an event structure is more prominent than an argument which participates in
the second sub event…' (ibid. 26). This is tantamount to saying that an agentive argument is more
prominent than an affected argument, which, it will be shown in Chapter 4, is problematic in
relation to the argument realization of fear-type verbs.
Grimshaw, claims that prominence organises an aspectual hierarchy that runs side-by-side
with the thematic hierarchy. Thus, a verb of the fear-type and the frighten-type can be represented
by structures such as (9a) and (9b), respectively. (9c) represents the agentive/intentional use of
frighten:
(9a) Experiencer Theme Fear-type
State State
(9b) Experiencer Theme Frighten-type (psych reading 11 )
Cause State
(Bouchard (1995: 261-262))
(9c) Agent Experiencer Frighten-type (agentive reading 12 )
Cause State
Note that the aspectual description of fear relates the stativity of fear-type verbs, whereas the
11
A "psych reading" is one which involves a non-Agent stimulus for the psychological state.
12
An "agentive reading" is one involving an Agent stimulus for the psychological state.
46

aspectual hierarchy of frighten in (8b) reflects the causative use of these verbs. Psych-verbs are
often assumed to be stative, in that they are analysed as denoting a state of being, rather than an
activity or accomplishment/achievement of some kind. The agentive/intentional reading differs from
the stative reading in that it defines an activity which leads to a state, or change in state. The
mismatch in (9b) – where the Experiencer is higher on the thematic hierarchy, whereas the causer is
higher on the aspectual hierarchy — is what Grimshaw claims to be the cause of the unusual
argument discrepancy associated with frighten-type verbs in relation to fear-type verbs. Grimshaw
points out that there is no aspectual-thematic mismatch with the agentive use of these verbs; she
supposes that this is reflected by the impossibility of "backward binding" with clearly agentive
uses:
(10a) The pictures of themselves i
frightened Kim and Sandy i
.
(10b) *Themselves i
frightened Kim and Sandy i
.
The unacceptability of backward binding in these cases seems to point to the fact that the
arguments are not crossed over on the aspectual level; this will be shown to not necessarily be the
case in Chapter 5.
Grimshaw argues that Causes are always subjects, thus Belletti & Rizzi's analysis of
frighten-type verbs as having non-thematic derived subjects is impossible. Grimshaw (p32) points
to Zubizarreta's (1992) observation that, in French, the pronominal ça operates as a thematic
argument, while il operates an a non-thematic argument:
(11a) C'est possible (que Marie ait peur des mouches). Thematic subject
'It is possible (that Marie fears flies)'
(11b) Il semble que Marie a peur des mouches. Non-thematic subject
'It seems that Marie fears flies'
Frighten-type verbs, however, do not allow the non-thematic pronominal il:
Grimshaw (1990: 32)
47

(12a) Ça m'amuse (que Marie ait peur des mouches). Thematic subject
'It amuses me (that Marie fears flies)'
(12b) *Il m'amuse que Marie ait peur des mouches. Non-thematic subject
Grimshaw (1990: 32)
Because amuser takes a thematic argument in this position, Zubizarreta argues that the subject
position of frighten-type verbs is thematic. Ça refers to an underlying subject que Marie ait peur
des mouches. Grimshaw contrasts this with Belletti & Rizzi's claim, based on extraction evidence,
that the Experiencer argument of frighten-type verbs is non-thematic. Grimshaw's argumentation
here, is, in fact, in line with the argumentation presented in Chapter 5.
Grimshaw's argument then is based on an analysis and comparison of the prominence
features of arguments at the thematic and aspectual levels. If a conflict of prominence occurs — as
is the case with frighten-type verbs — then a verb displays contradictory properties: the argument
structure reflects aspectual properties, while the arguments of the verb itself echo properties
associated with the semantics of the verb, resulting in a number of unusual syntactic realizations.
3.1.3 Pesetsky (1995)
A third approach has been suggested by Pesetsky (1995); under this view, frighten-type
and fear-type verbs are seen as two distinctly different groups. Both fear and frighten-type verbs
are seen as canonical transitives that appeal to a modified thematic hierarchy of the kind in (13):
(13) AGENT/CAUSE > BENEFICIARY > RECIPIENT/EXPERIENCER/GOAL >
PATIENT/ THEME/TARGET OF EMOTION/SUBJECT OF EMOTION >
LOCATIVE
Note that Pesetsky adds three new semantic roles to the hierarchy, Cause, Target of emotion and
Subject of emotion; these new semantic roles are developed to account for a number of observations
regarding properties of different fear-type verbs (15, 16) and Pesetsky's claim that frighten-type
verbs are causative.
48

(14a) War frightens Kim.
Cause
Experiencer
(14b) Krig skremmer Kim.
War scares Kim
Cause
Experiencer
(15a) Kim loves war.
Experiencer Target of emotion
(15b) Kim elsker krig.
Kim loves war
Experiencer Target of emotion
(16a) Kim fears war.
Experiencer Subject of emotion
(16b) Kim elsker krig.
Kim loves war
Experiencer Subject of emotion
Although Pesetsky's claims echo to some extent those of Grimshaw (who claims that the subject
argument of frighten-type verbs is aspectually causative, but thematically a Theme), he argues that
both Belletti's & Rizzi and Grimshaw's analyses are incorrect in a number of respects; based on
this, he proposes that the data points rather to a purely "causative" analysis for frighten-type
verbs, rather than an unaccusative analysis (as is the case for Belletti & Rizzi) or one of
thematic–aspectual mismatch (as is Grimshaw's claim).
Pesetsky proposes that the following conditions on the realization of arguments bearing
certain semantic roles:
• A Cause argument is always the highest argument of its predicate
• An Experiencer argument is the highest argument of its predicate
As fear-type verbs are, under Pesetsky's scheme, devoid of a Cause argument, the
Experiencer role is automatically assigned to the highest available position in the predicate.
Obviously, this analysis presents a problem for frighten-type verbs, which contain both an
Experiencer and a Cause argument; Pesetsky suggests, therefore, that frighten-type verbs are biclausal.
Under his analysis, a frighten-type verb is derived from a fear-type base by the addition of
a zero morpheme CAUS, in a projection above the VP containing the fear-type base. Since the
49

analysis essentially projects two heads into two separate clauses, the Experiencer argument is now
the highest argument in the fear-type base and the Cause argument is the highest argument in the
CAUS clause, such that both of the conditions Pesetsky presents are satisfied. This analysis is
similar to the argumentation presented in this thesis, although they are distinguished by theoretical
points of departure: the present work incorporates the bi-clausal analysis into a minimalist
approach, and abandons the notions of semantic roles in favour of non-situational tools.
Returning for a moment to semantic roles: Pesetsky introduces two new roles to account for
the "stimulating arguments" of fear-type verbs, recognizing that there is a difference between the
objects in (17a) and (17b):
(17a)
(17b)
Kim loves the things Sandy wrote in the newspaper.
Kim fears the things Sandy wrote in the newspaper.
(17a) describes an event where an emotion is evoked by things written in the newspaper; however,
whatever is written there is not specified as either pleasant or unpleasant. The reason Kim loves the
article may be due to the fact that Sandy has written it, lying about and slandering Kim to the extent
that it appeases the guilt Kim feels about threatening Sandy). Pesetsky calls the thematic role
expressed here "Target of Emotion". "Subject Matter of Emotion" is the title given by Pesetsky to
the semantic role which is expressed as the second argument in (17b); here, the meaning is different
from (17a) in the sense that it is the appearance of the article in print that Kim fears. This latter
point is perhaps more explicit in the comparison of fear-type and frighten-type verbs:
(18a)
(18b)
Kim and Sandy fear ferris wheels.
Ferris wheels frighten Kim and Sandy.
In (18a), Kim and Sandy's emotive experience revolves around a conceptualization of ferris wheels;
the ferris wheels need not be present for the emotional response to occur. A conceptualization of
ferris wheels that elicits a fear response may, for example, contain associations with death and
injury. In (18b) by contrast, the ferris wheel must necessarily be present in some way for it to elicit
a response. The notion of ferris wheels may again act as stimulus, but it is difficult to imagine a
situation where a trigger for this conceptualization is not presented to the Experiencer (i.e., that the
50

conceptualization is internal to the Experiencer before the emotional state exists, but that it must be
caused to be retrieved); this can be exemplified by a situation where Kim and Sandy have ferris
wheels described to them in words or pictures: here, the trigger for the conceptualization is
presented to Kim and Sandy, it does not come from them — it is an external cause. If this is true, it
can also be argued that, in (18a), Kim and Sandy experience the emotion denoted by the word fear
whenever the thought of ferris wheels enters their heads; in (18b) on the other hand is only
felicitous if it is understood as denoting a situation where Kim and Sandy experience fright when in
the presence of ferris wheels or some presentation thereof. It will be shown in Chapter 4 that the
distinction made here is relevant to syntax, but only in a very broad sense, and not in the way
suggested by Pesetsky.
3.2 Problems with these analyses
'… the … analyses — Belletti and Rizzi's, Grimshaw's and Pesetsky's — are forced to use
unconstrained indexical linking because they rely on thematic notions. In addition,
Pesetsky's use of special theta role labels … is not very explanatory and raises further
problems…. Grimshaw's use of multiple tiers further weakens the possibility of
constraining the correspondence between arguments and syntactic positions. Raising
analyses like Belletti and Rizzi's in which [frighten-type] verbs are assumed to have a
derived subject, also face [various problems]….'
Bouchard (1995: 264)
This section covers the following topics:
• Problems for Belletti & Rizzi 's and Grimshaw's analyses arising from Italian data;
• problems with Belletti & Rizzi's and Grimshaw's analyses in terms of assumptions
regarding the nature of frighten-type verbs;
51

• problems with Belletti & Rizzi's and Grimshaw's analyses in terms of
heteromorphy;
• problems with Belletti & Rizzi's, Grimshaw's and Pesetsky's analyses in terms of
argument mapping;
• problems associated with conceptualization of peri-theoretical grammatical relations;
• problems accounting for psych-constructions.
3.2.1 Problems with the analysis of Italian data
A major problem with Belletti & Rizzi's analysis is that the tests they use to identify
derived subjects are generally not applicable to non-Romance languages such as English and
Norwegian. This means that much of the discussion of that work is not directly applicable to
Norwegian or English. For the sake of brevity and clarity, certain elements of Belletti & Rizzi's
analysis have been left out of this thesis, focussing rather on those topics that are directly related to
the analysis of English and Norwegian, or that are of special interest.
3.2.2 Frighten-type verbs as unaccusatives
In order to fully understand what is entailed by Belletti & Rizzi's assertion that frightentype
verbs are unaccusatives, it is necessary to understand what unaccusatives is and how they are
analysed. Following Burzio (1986), an unaccusative is one of two types of intransitive verb. In the
examples below, (19) is an unergative, whereas (20) is an unaccusative.
(19) Kim runs.
(20) Kim came.
Burzio claims that (19) has a different underlying structure to (20). It is claimed that the subject of
(20) is derived, because the certain properties of the argument closely match those of canonical
objects (Burzio analyses the argument of (20) as being realized in [comp, VP] in DS, from where it
is raised to fulfil the subject requirement instantiated by the extended projection principle (EPP);
this is possible because these verbs are assumed not to assign Case (hence, un-accusative)). In this
way, these verb are similar to passives (although they lack passive morphology). Burzio identifies
52

several types of derived subjects (unaccusatives and passives, among others) and a number of
phenomena that he associates with derived subjects, among these are:
• Compatibility with the ne-clitic in Italian;
• auxiliary selection;
• and extraction from complement NPs.
The examples in (21), (22) and (23) present the core data from unaccusative verbs, passives
and unergative verbs respectively.
Unaccusatives
(21a)
Giacomo passa tre settimane a Milano.
Giacomo passes three weeks in Milan
(21b) Tre settimane sono state passate a Milano. (NP-extraction)
Three weeks are been passed in Milan
(21c) Giacomo ne passa tre a Milano. (Ne compatibility)
Giacomo PRT passes three in Milan
(21d) Giacomo è passo tre settimane a Milano. (AUX selection)
Passives
(22a)
Molti studenti furono arrestati.
'Many students were arrested'
(22b) Furono arrestati molti studenti. (NP-extraction)
Were arrested many students
'Many students were arrested'
(22c) Ne furono arrestati molti. (Ne compatibility)
PRT were arrested many
'Many of them were arrested'
(22d) Molti studenti è furono arrestati. (AUX selection)
Unergatives
(23a)
Giacomo resta tre settimane a Milano.
'Giacomo stays three weeks in Milan'
(23b) *Tre settimane sono state rimaste a Milano. (NP-extraction)
Three weeks are been remained in Milan
(23c) *Giacomo ne resta tre a Milano. (Ne compatibility)
(23d) Giacomo ha resto tre settimane a Milano
(adapted from Haegeman (1994: 324-6))
The contrasts between (21, 22) and (23) show, according to Burzio, that derived subjects behave
53

differently to deep (canonical 13 ) subjects. Burzio's association of these phenomena with a particular
group of verbs (those analysed as lacking an external argument) gives rise to what is known as
Burzio's generalization:
• 'verbs that do not have an external argument do not assign accusative case and failure
to assign accusative case entails a failure to q-mark external arguments'. (Burzio
(1986: 178-184)).
The main outcome of this is that a one-argument verb that realizes its argument in [comp, VP] does
not assign Case and does not q-mark an external argument, leaving the argument free to be derived to
a subject position in order to receive Case. The configuration of the VP of unaccusative structures is
thus assumed to be that in (24):
(24) [IP Kim [VP [V' [V˚ came ] [NP t ]]]]
i
i
Of course, any sentence with the structure in (24) will be incompatible with the passive because
there is no external argument to suppress, or if the subject is already derived, there will be no object
to derive; English and Norwegian unaccusative verbs are indeed incompatible with the passive.
(25) *Kim is come.
(26) *Kim kommes.
Kim come+PASS
In practical terms (cf. Chomsky (1981), Burzio (1986) and Jaeggli (1986), among others),
passivization is generally assumed to involve a process where the external argument of the verb is
suppressed; passive morphology is generated in I°, and this absorbs the theta-role that would have
been assigned to the (now suppressed) external argument and also absorbs the accusative Case that
would have assigned by the verb to its internal argument. This leaves a verb which does not have an
external argument and does not assign Case to its internal argument; which is also a basic definition
of an unaccusative verb. The difference between passives and unaccusatives is that the passive has
passive morphology in I°, whereas the unaccusative does not. Obviously, a subject cannot be
13
What deep, canonical subjects actually consist in is covered in Chapter 4.
54

derived twice, and thus unaccusatives are incompatible with the passive.
3.2.3 Problems with the unaccusative analysis
Belletti & Rizzi's analysis takes its motivation for subject raising from Burzio's
unaccusative hypothesis; the argument in [comp, VP] is not assigned Case, and is thereby a
candidate for movement. Much of the data they present is designed to identify frighten-type
subjects as derived; they use the following tests:
• Anaphoric (reflexive) cliticization
• Passivization
• Arbitrary pro (switch between plural and third-person interpretations)
• Causative constructions with Italian fare
3.2.3.1 Anaphoric (reflexive) cliticization
The first test is based on the claim that only deep subjects can bind reflexive anaphoric
clitics; thus, Belletti & Rizzi claim that deep subjects of fear-type verbs and derived subjects of
frighten-type verbs are discriminated on the basis of compatibility with the reflexive clitic si:
(27a) Gianni si teme. (deep)
Gianni himself fears Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 297)
(27b) ??Gianni si spaventa. (derived)
Gianni self frightens Arad (1998: 7)
Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 298) and Arad (1998:7), however, both point out that (27b) is not
ungrammatical per se,; it is only ungrammatical on a reading where Gianni is the "latent" cause of
his own worries. This is demonstrated clearly in (28), where only an agentive interpretation is
available:
(28) Gli studenti si spaventano prima degli esami per indursi a studiare di più.
'The students frighten themselves before exams in order to urge themselves to study
harder'
(Arad (1998: 7))
Thus, it seems that si reflexives require an agentive subject (cf. Grimshaw (1990: 161)); they test
55

for semantic properties of the subject rather than syntactic properties and they are not therefore a
test of the deepness or otherwise of subjects14. Arad (1998) points out that this link between
Agents and reflexivity is made by Reinhart (1996).
The argument that reflexives require agentive subjects does not, however, seem to be the
whole story, as English allows stative frighten-type psych-verbs with reflexives as long as a
plausible context is created.
(29a)
(29b)
Sometimes, I even frighten myself. fi
Sometimes, the good ideas I have surprise (even) me.
I frighten myself. fi
The fact that I have no control over my actions frightens me.
In (29a), the speaker is being congratulated for having produced a well-regarded piece of work; being
modest, they try to play down the incident by stating that it is "almost" coincidental that it
happened to be their idea. In (29b), the speaker is subject to psychological episodes characterised
by loss of conscious control of motor function; they lament this fact by stating that they frighten
themselves. No agentive interpretation is possible here because the action is implicitly involuntary.
Thus, Belletti & Rizzi's claim that the subjects of frighten-type verbs cannot bind reflexives is
shown to be incorrect, and that the group of things that can bind a reflexive is rather wider than
generally assumed, including non-agentive subjects. Based on this, the initial argument for
derivedness of the subjects of frighten-type verbs must be rejected.
It will be shown, in Chapter 4, that agentivity is only coincidentally relevant to grammar,
and that reflexives in English and Norwegian can be accounted for without reference to such
situational notions. The nature of reflexives associated with psych-verbs is covered in detail in
Chapter 5.
14 It should be noted that the source of confusion here may lie in the fact that the cluster of properties associated with
subjects extensively overlaps the cluster of properties typically associated with Agents, a point made by Keenan
(1976).
56

3.2.3.2 Frighten-type passives
Belletti & Rizzi and Grimshaw claim that frighten-type verbs do not passivize verbally.
Recall that Belletti & Rizzi claim that these verbs are unaccusative, and the discussion of the
incompatibility of unaccusatives with the passive — passivization involves derivation of a subject
from a VP-internal argument; the subject of unaccusative verbs is already derived from an internal
argument of the verb. Grimshaw, on the other hand, claims that frighten-type verbs do not
passivize because of the aspectual–thematic mismatch that she claims typifies these verbs.
Unfortunately, both analyses are flawed because frighten-type verbs do passivize in Italian,
English and Norwegian; Belletti & Rizzi and Grimshaw, however, claim that these passives are not
verbal passives, but adjectival passives. They make this claim on the basis of an analysis of the
properties of adjectival passives; one such test is the binding of clitic pronouns with adjectival
passive participles in reduced relatives:
(30a)
(30b)
(31a)
(31b)
La notizia che gli è stata communicata.
the notice that was communicated to him
La notizia communicatagli
the notice communicated-to-him
La notizia che gli è ignota
the notice that was unknown to him
*La notizia ignotagli
the news unknown-to-him
Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 309-310)
In (30), a passive of a transitive verb allows binding of clitic pronouns, whereas the adjectival
passive of the unaccusative verb (31) does not. If frighten-type verbs are unaccusative, and
therefore have adjectival passives, they will also be ungrammatical with a bound clitic:
(32a) La sola persona che ne è affascinata.
the only person that is fascinated by it
(32b)
*La sola persona affascinatane
the only person fascinated by it
Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 310)
It seems to be the case that Belletti & Rizzi and Grimshaw are correct in their analysis because
57

(32b) is ungrammatical, but note that Belletti & Rizzi use ne-clitics for the frighten-type examples.
Pesetsky (1995) claims that the situation regarding the analysis of bound clitics in reduced
relatives is not quite so simple, because the clitic used in Belletti & Rizzi's examples for frightentype
verbs cannot bind with the passive participles of any verb of any class; thus disproving the
reliability of this test. In the examples below, it is shown that agentive transitives are incompatible
with ne-clitics in reduced relative clauses.
(33a)
(33b)
(34a)
(34b)
La sola persona che ne è stata uccisa
the only person that by it was killed
*La sola persona uccisane
La sola persona che ne è stata colpita
the only person that by it was struck
*La sola persona colpitane
(35a) La sola persona che ne è stata toccata
the only person that by it was touched
(35b) *La sola persona toccatane
(36a) La sola persona che ne è stata arrestata
the only person that by it was struck
(36b) *La sola persona arrestatane
Pesetsky (1995: 26)
It seems therefore to be the case that the clitic-binding argument cannot be used as an argument for
the derived status of the subject of frighten-type verbs.
Belletti & Rizzi's second argument revolves around the claim that adjectival passives select
the auxiliary verb essere "be", whereas verbal passives select venire "come". Belletti & Rizzi claim
that frighten-type verbs are incompatible with venire because they have a derived subject (and
therefore produce only adjectival passives). Thus, adjectival passives become associated with
derived subjects, while verbal passives are associated with deep subjects.
58

(37a)
(37b)
(37c)
Gianni viene apprezzato dai suoi concittadini.
Gianni comes appreciated by his fellow-citizens
*Gianni viene appassionato dalla politica.
Gianni comes excited by politics
*Gianni viene preoccupato da tutti.
Gianni comes worried by everybody
Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 311)
Note that, in (37a), the fear-type psych-verb apprezzato "appreciate" is compatible with venire
"come", marking this as a verbal passive. In (37b, c), the frighten type verbs appassionato "excite"
and preoccupato "worry" are incompatible with viene, marking these — following the reasoning of
Belletti & Rizzi — as adjectival passives, and their subjects as derived. But, Pesetsky points out
that the claims made by Belletti & Rizzi as regards passive auxiliary choice are incorrect in that the
examples of frighten-type verbs in (37b, c) are acceptable if they are made eventive (i.e. they denote
an action or perhaps a delimited, caused transition):
(38a)
(38b)
(?)Il publico venne affascinato dalla conclusione di quel concerto.
the public came fascinated by the conclusion of that concerto
Gianni venne spaventato da questa prospettiva alle cinque.
Gianni came frightened by this perspective at five
Pesetsky (1995: 27)
Pesetsky also points out that Grimshaw's (1990) analysis — based on that of Belletti & Rizzi —
argues that frighten-type passives are always stative and that stativity is a property typically
associated with adjectival passives. Pesetsky notes that adjectival passives are stative, and that this
can be demonstrated by very/much tests (the examples in (39) represent adjectival passives,
whereas those in (40) represent verbal passives):
(39a)
(39b)
(40a)
(40b)
The idea was much discussed in the '70s.
This edition is very abridged.
This idea was being (*much) talked about in the '70s.
The book was still being (*much) abridged when the order came through to publish it
in its entirety.
Pesetsky (1995: 29)
This shows that the examples of progressive aspect with stativity in (40) become ungrammatical if
59

much or very is inserted. If verbs have stative readings, they will generally be incompatible with
progressive aspect because states denote a persistent condition or state of affairs that will be
incompatible with the sense of the progressive. This is shown in (41):
(41a)
(41b)
*Kim is knowing the answer.
*The answer is being known by Kim.
These examples show that a stative verb is incompatible with both the active and passive
progressive. States are viewed as incompatible with progressive aspect, firstly, because the
progressive denotes a persistent state of affairs and secondly because there are certain delimitational
properties associated with the progressive state of affairs that cannot be applied to states: for more
information on stativity and the progressive, see Comrie (1976), Vendler (1957) and Verkuyl
(1993). As regards psych-verbs, certain members of the group of frighten-type verbs have purely
stative readings, such as care, depress and worry. These verbs allow the active progressive, but do
not allow passive progressive interpretations:
(42a) The situation was depressing Mary.
(42b) *Mary was being depressed by the situation.
a-b: Pesetsky (1995: 30)
Pesetsky argues, citing Baker (1988), that (42) presents "non-iterative" passives: passives that
denote events/states that do not occur in repeated stages. Pesetsky shows that the same pattern is
seen with stative fear-type verbs:
(43a)
(43b)
(43c)
Sue is truly hating the sea-urchin sushi.
*The sea-urchin sushi is truly being hated by Sue.
The sea-urchin sushi was truly hated by Sue.
Pesetsky (1995: 30-31)
The examples in (43) have a non-iterative interpretation. The passive progressive (43b), like (42b),
is not grammatical whereas the active progressive (42a, 43a) is grammatical. Pesetsky claims that
what Grimshaw (1990) assumes to be evidence of adjectival passives is, in fact, evidence of
60

stativity. Because of this limited participation in progressive constructions, and because neither
Belletti & Rizzi nor Grimshaw claim that fear-type passives are adjectival, this is counter-evidential
to an unaccusative analysis: frighten-type passives are clearly verbal. This is proven by a
much/very test, which forces the adjectival passive (44), and the restrictions on verbs that select
different prepositions for verbal and adjectival passives (45) (see below):
(44a)
(44b)
(45a)
(45a)
Bill was (much) frightened by my remark.
In those days, Bill was often being (*much) frightened by one thing or another when
I would come home from work.
Sue was continually being scared by sudden noises.
*Sue was continually being scared of sudden noises.
Pesetsky (1995: 32)
Thus, Pesetsky claims that the adjectival analysis of frighten-type psych-passives, and thereby the
unaccusative hypothesis of Belletti & Rizzi, is — at least in part — unfounded.
In Norwegian, progressive aspect is typically represented in phrasal constructions which
force progressive interpretation. Examples of this are mostly in the present tense and often involve
conjoined clauses, one clause expressing aspectual factors and another expressing the event type;
certain prepositional verbs such as holde på "hold on" are often used to mean "is doing" and take an
infinitival clause as complement; again, the first clause expressing aspect, the second clause
expressing event type.
(46a)
(46b)
[ IP
Kim i
sitter [ IP
PRO i
og gråter.]]
Kim sits and cries.
'Kim is crying'
[ IP
Kim i
holder på [ IP
PRO i
å bli døv.]]
Kim holds on to become deaf
'Kim is going deaf'
These phrasal constructions are incompatible with most psych-verbs; some constructions are more
borderline, but these are isolated fear-type verbs such as (47a), which are nevertheless mostly
judged as unacceptable.
61

(47a)
(47b)
(48a)
(48b)
?*Kim sitter og hater krig.
Kim sits and hates war
'Kim is hating war'
*Kim holder på å hate krig.
Kim holds on to hate war
*Krig sitter og skremmer Kim.
War sits and scares Kim
*Krig holder på å skremme Kim.
War holds on to scare Kim
It is interesting that Norwegian psych-verbs are broadly incompatible with the progressive, this
seemingly points to a general coherence in the group, however, this is not the case. The
incompatibilities observed for fear-type and frighten-type psych-verbs in Norwegian cannot share
their explanation; (47) shows that Norwegian fear-type verbs are stative and are incompatible with
the progressive, as statives are in English; the thing that is certain is that this does not hold for
frighten-type verbs. The fact is that reflexive frighten-type constructions in Norwegian are
compatible with the progressive of the kind in (46a), but not (46b):
(49a) Kim i
sitter og irriterer seg i
.
Kim i
sits and irritates REFL i
'Kim is irritating himself'
(49b) *Kim i
holder på å irritere seg i
.
Kim i
holds on to irritate REFL i
It seems that in (40a), properties of the subject must match for both clauses; thus when the
construction is reflexive, an animate, sentient participant is realized as subject and the construction
is grammatical. The properties of the subject argument are not enough to save the holde på
construction in (46b), but this is perhaps to be expected as this construction expresses progression
to a terminal point. This is seen in the sense of 'going deaf' in (46b), and, if (46b) is adapted slightly
also Norwegian:
(50) Kim i
holder på å irritere seg i
i hjel.
Kim i
holds on to irritate REFL i
in death
'Kim is irritating himself to death'
Here the terminal point is defined and the construction is grammatical. From the Norwegian data, it
62

is possible to develop an analysis which explains the ungrammaticality of fear-type verbs in the
progressive because of their stativity, and frighten-type verbs because of the incompatibility of a)
the subject argument with the other verbs in the construction and b) the meaning of the frightentype
verbs clashing with the progression-to-a-terminal-point interpretation implied by some
constructions.
Adding to this, there is further evidence which directly contradicts the data provided by
Belletti & Rizzi and Grimshaw regarding frighten-type verbs and passivization. This evidence
comes from Norwegian; the first reference to contain this fact seems to be Åfarli (1989: 141): 'If
this [Belletti & Rizzi's analysis of frighten-type psych-verbs] is the correct representation for
Norwegian psych-verbs too, they should not allow the addition of PASS[IVE morphology]….
However, it turns out that Norwegian psych-verbs do allow passive morphology … [i]t is
important in this connection that an s-passive cannot be interpreted as an adjective.' The Norwegian
s-passive is marked by an -s suffix, thus 15 :
(51) Kim skremmes av Sandy.
Kim scare+PASS of Sandy
'Kim is scared by Sandy'
This shows that Norwegian, at least, allows passivization of frighten-type psych-verbs. Pesetsky
argues that English differentiates between verbal and adjectival passives on the basis of which
preposition is chosen. Thus, (52a) is verbal, while (52b) is adjectival):
(52a)
(52b)
Kim is frightened by Sandy.
Kim is frightened of Sandy.
This seems to be a not unreasonable argument, since many psych-verbs are characterized by
the wide variety of prepositions that are allowed in their passive constructions. Additionally,
Grimshaw assumes that the frighten-type verbs that allow an agentive interpretation, in addition to
a psych interpretation, must heteromorphic between their two interpretations (one with a "normal"
internal structure ('Sandy deliberately frightened Kim') and one with a "quirky" internal structure
('The paper bag frightened Sandy'); this is also implicit in Belletti & Rizzi's analysis, such that the
15
For more data on the Norwegian passive, see Åfarli (1989) and Engdahl (1999).
63

Theme is replaced by an Agent and a different internal structure is postulated in non-psych
interpretations. In this sense, Italian frighten-type psych-verbs should allow proper verbal
passives; their absence disproves either the existence of agentive interpretations or calls into
question the veracity of Belletti & Rizzi's analysis as a whole. Grimshaw explicitly states that the
agentive/non-agentive interpretational distinction produces heteromorphic structures. Bouchard
notes that this is problematic, because the different internal structures do not result in any effect on
syntax (there is no discernible difference between the surface structures of the two interpretations),
rather it seems an entirely invisible process. This is problematic under Bouchard's scheme because
of the insistence that — as far as is possible — only that which is present at the level of semantics
relevant to grammar should be mapped into syntax; and since Bouchard does not believe that
semantic roles have any influence on syntax, he assumes the agentive/non-agentive distinction is
fatuous. It must be admitted that the evidence against a heteromorphic analysis is compelling: the
lack of difference in the overt structure, and the lack of clear indication whether a sentence should
be interpreted as agentive being but two examples. A comparison of verbs that do and do not allow
agentive interpretations is also indicative of the lack of structural distinction here.
(53a)
(53b)
(54a)
(54b)
Kim deliberately/voluntarily frightened Sandy.
Kim *deliberately/*voluntarily concerned Sandy.
Kim often/suddenly frightened Sandy.
Kim often/suddenly concerned Sandy.
Irrespective of whether the verb allows agentive interpretation or not, there is only a problem of
acceptability, not one of grammaticality: insertion of a "non-intentional" adverb into the same
position creates a well-formed sentence. This puts paid to two ideas: firstly, the idea that the
agentive/non-agentive distinction is relevant to syntax; and consequently, Grimshaw's contention
that the frighten-type verbs ought to be divided into those that allow/do not allow agentive
interpretations.
64

3.2.3.3 Extraction out of complements
Both frighten-type and fear-type psych-verbs in English and Norwegian take sentential
complements. The facts associated with these are somewhat problematic within most frameworks
because these complements behave in ways that are somewhat unusual. In fact, Belletti & Rizzi's
(1988) argument regarding frighten-type verbs is based, to a certain extent, on facts associated with
extraction from sentential complements. They claim that the status of the direct object of frightentype
verbs as a sister of V' is proven by the fact that frighten-type verbs do not allow a number of
processes that are generally associated with canonical objects. The phenomena they refer to are
extraction of phrases out of sentential complements in Italian, including wh- phrases and ne- clitics.
The examples below are taken from Belletti & Rizzi (1988:325):
(55a)
(55b)
La ragazza de cui Gianni teme [il padre t].
The girl of whom Gianni fears the father
*La ragazza di cui Gianni preoccupa [il padre t].
The girl of whom Gianni worries the father
(55a) is a fear-type psych-verb, which is compatible with wh-extraction out of the object; by
contrast, (55b) is a frighten-type psych-verb, which is incompatible with this kind of extraction.
Belletti & Rizzi claim that this distinction is the result of the internal structures of these verbs; the
fear-type verb, which has — according to Belletti & Rizzi's account — a canonical transitive
structure with a q-marked Theme object, allows extraction as would any other canonical verb. They
claim that the frighten-type verb does not allow extraction because its Experiencer object is not
lexically q-marked; the lack of lexical q-marking causes the NP in [comp, VP] to act as a barrier for
movement.
(56a)
(56b)
(56c)
Gianni ne teme [molti t].
Gianni of-them fears many
?*Questo fatto ne preoccupa [il presidente t].
This fact of-it worries the president
??Questo fatto ne preoccupa [molti t].
This fact of-them worries many
Here it is seen that ne-extraction is acceptable with fear-type verbs and partially acceptable with
65

frighten-type verbs; Belletti & Rizzi claim, on the basis of this evidence that ne-extraction is a
weaker barrier than wh-extraction. Because this cannot hold directly — if neither position is
lexically theta-marked, they are surely equally much barriers for movement — Belletti & Rizzi
postulate yet another structure (57a) for ne-objects, which contrasts with the structure (57b) that
pertains in in all other instances:
(57a) VP (57b) VP
VP NP V' NP
V' V° NP
V° NP
Belletti & Rizzi claim that the structure of (57a) presents a weaker barrier than (57b), thus allowing
the weakly unacceptable (ne-) examples in (56b,c). Under Belletti & Rizzi's analysis, the frightentype
verbs are special cases: they are two-argument unaccusatives; thus, their objects cannot be
expected to have the properties of canonical objects. Under the present scheme, this analysis is not
acceptable, as the internal structures of both verbs can be demonstrated to be quite normal.
The first thing to note is Pesetsky's (1990: 74) comment that verb choice plays a part in
respect to compatibility with extraction phenomena; while examples of this may be somewhat
strange, they are not directly unacceptable. The verbs in (58) illustrate that extraction from the
object is possible even with wh-elements.
(58) ?La ragazza di cui Gianni offese/spaventò [il padre t].
The girl of whom Gianni offends/frightens the father
The second thing to note is that the weakly acceptable examples in (55, 56) have analogues in
French (Bouchard (1995: 365)) that are perfectly acceptable. How is this data relevant to English
and Norwegian? Since neither English nor Norwegian have anything equivalent to ne- clitics, the
analysis must rest on wh-elements; the data in (59, 60) demonstrates the acceptability of extraction
out of the object in both English and Norwegian.
66

(59a)
(59b)
(60a)
(60b)
Which play does Kim hate the director of?
Which play does Kim frighten the director of?
Hvilket skuespill hater Kim regissøren av?
Hvilket skuespill skremmer Kim regissøren av?
In these examples, Kim is an avid theatregoer and critic for a regional newspaper, who has just seen
a production of his favourite play, which he feels was ruined by the introduction of a political
interpretation of the play's theme; as a result, Kim firstly hates the director for ruining the play,
and secondly frightens the director because he writes critical reviews (claiming that the director is
criticizing the government which may get the director into trouble with the authorities). From these
examples, it can be seen that it is possible to extract wh-elements out of the objects of both feartype
and frighten-type psych-verbs in English and Norwegian, and that incompatibilities occur at
the level of semantics, rather than as a result of any syntactic irregularity.
3.2.3.4 Arbitrary interpretation of pro
Belletti & Rizzi claim that more evidence for their unaccusativity analysis is found in the
realization of arbitrary pro, where pro can be interpreted as either they or someone.
(61a)
(61b)
(61c)
(62a)
(62b)
(62c)
pro hanno telefonato a casa mia.
Somebody telefoned my place
pro mi hanno mandato un telegramma.
Somebody sent me a telegram.
pro arrestato Gianni.
Somebody arrested Gianni
*pro sono arrivati a casa mia.
Somebody arived at my place
*pro mi sono sembrati matti.
Somebody seemed to me crazy.
*pro sono stati arrestati dalla polizia.
Somebody has been arrested by the police
Examples: Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 300)
On this basis of this Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 300)) claim that '[t]he discriminating property seems to
be that arb[itrary] interpretation can be assigned to deep subjects pro's only: it is incompatible
67

with unaccusative structures…raising structures…and passive[s]….' This, of course, means that
their analysis predicts that fear-type psych-verbs should be grammatical and frighten-type verbs
should be ungrammatical when proarb is used, and this is indeed the case:
(63a)
(63b)
Evidentamente, in questo paese per anni pro hanno temuto il terremoto.
'Evidently, in this country people feared the earthquake for years'
*Evidentamente, in questo paese per anni pro hanno preoccupato il governo.
'Evidently, in this country people worried the government for years'
Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 301)
English has a counterpart for arbitrary pro in the shape of the third-person plural pronominal;
examples of which can be seen in (64). Pesetsky (1995: 38-42) argues that there are several flaws in
Belletti & Rizzi's argumentation; firstly, there is a distinction between the existential or corporate
reading, i.e., where reference is to a body of people (typically a company, institution, organisation,
etc.), and the generic reading, where reference is to no-one in particular, but rather a generic
individual.
(64a)
(64b)
(64c)
(64d)
(64e)
(64f)
(64g)
They robbed Mrs. Johnson.
?They rob someone different every night.
They're making us fill out our income tax forms early this year.
They came for Charley.
They accepted our che[que] at the supermarket.
They punched me at the supermarket.
They sell cigarettes on Melrose
Examples: Pesetsky (1995: 39)
They, in the examples above, can refer to an individual, but that individual is seen as a member of a
corporate entity, for example, in (64a, b) they are "thieves", in (64c) they is the government/Inland
Revenue. The glosses using somebody given by Belletti & Rizzi are somewhat misleading, claims
Pesetsky, because this ignores the corporate reading.
Pesetsky points to the fact that some unaccusatives are inherently agentive; these motion
verbs, should, according to Belletti & Rizzi, be ungrammatical with pro, but they are not:
68

(65a)
(65b)
(65c)
Sono venuti a riparare il lavandino.
Somebody came to fix the sink.
[one person came]
Sono venuti a cercare Gianni.
Somebody came looking for Gianni
[one person came looking]
Sono andati a cercarlo a casa sua madre.
Somebody went looking for him at his mother's house
[one person went]
Pesetsky replaces the notion that proarb is an indicator of deep/derived subjects with one where it
is related to agentivity. Pesetsky argues that even non-agentive deep subjects do not allow the
corporate readings:
(66a)
(66b)
(67a)
(67b)
*They received a punch in the nose at the supermarket.
*Al mercato hanno preso un pugno sul naso.
*They received a phone call yesterday.
*Ieri hanno ricevuto una telefonata.
Examples: Pesetsky (1995: 40)
Pesetsky 16 (1995: 41) states that 'It is merely sufficient to note that the subject of [frighten-type]
predicates is typically not an Agent….' Thus pro/third person subjects of frighten-type predicates
are ruled out from receiving a corporate interpretation. Belletti & Rizzi's hypothesis predicts the
ungrammaticality of derived subject pros/third person pronominals in the following examples:
(68a)
(68b)
(68c)
In Japan, they drive on the left.
In America, they're required to fill out income tax forms every year.
In Canada, they wilt if the temperature goes above 60°F.
(69a) In Giappone, viaggiano sulla sinistra.
(69b) In America, sono ?costretti/obbligati a fare la dichiarazione dei redditi tutti gli anni.
(69c) In Canada, ?avvizziscono/?soffocano quano la temperatura supera i 15 gradi.
Examples: Pesetsky (1995: 41)
(68b, c) and (69b, c) are grammatical, thus providing evidence against Belletti & Rizzi's analysis.
Pesetsky remarks that Belletti & Rizzi agree that (62a) has a generic reading in this sense; he notes
16
Pesetsky uses semantic roles in his analysis, these are abandoned in this thesis; the term Agent in this context may
be replaced by 'intentional individual' or some other token for the relevant properties that allow/rule out interaction
with the given construction.
69

the contrast between fear-type and frighten-type psych-verbs in this respect:
(70a)
(70b)
(71a)
(71b)
In the country, they hate modern technology.
In the town, they fear cows and sheep.
*In the country, they concern you.
*In the town, they please you.
Pesetsky argues that the distinction here is due to the fact that the argument represented by the
third person plural pronominal must be affected by the action described by the verb, through
participation or affectedness. This explains why the involuntary, unaffected subjects of (59a, b) are
ungrammatical. Agentive frighten-type psych-predicates are compatible with arbitrary
interpretations:
(72) At school, they deliberately scare teenagers, so that they don't take drugs.
(72) At the restaurant, they actively disgust me so that I leave early.
Of course, the outcome of these arguments is that Belletti & Rizzi's analysis of proarb as a means
of detecting derived subjects must be rejected.
3.2.3.5 Causative constructions
Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 302-304) present data related to the behaviour of Italian psychverbs
when realized as infinitival complements of the verb fare. Such constructions compare with
causative clauses predicated of auxiliaries such as make (English), faire (French) and gjøre
(Norwegian). Belletti & Rizzi note that Burzio (1986) argued that derived subjects cannot appear as
infinitival complements in causative constructions:
(73a)
(73b)
Gianni ha fatto telefonare (a) Mario.
Gianni made Mario call
*Gianni ha fatto essere licenziato (a) Mario.
Gianni made Mario be fired
Examples: Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 302)
Burzio's analysis of these facts involves a DS like (74a, b) giving rise to an SS like (74a, b) via VP
extraction:
70

(74a)
(74b)
(75a)
(75b)
Gianni ha fatto [Mario telefonare].
Gianni made [Mario call]
Gianni ha fatto [Marioi essere licenziato ei].
Gianni made [Marioi be fired ei].
Gianni ha fatto [VP telefonare][Mario VP].
*Gianni ha fatto [VP essere licenziato ei][ Marioi VP].
Examples: Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 303)
Of course, (75b) is ruled out because the antecedent no longer c-commands its trace after extraction;
Belletti & Rizzi point to Burzio's analysis for further details as to why VP reconstruction cannot
resolve this. Belletti & Rizzi show that this contrast is seen between fear-type and frighten-type
verbs, exactly as their theory predicts; fear-type verbs allow extraction/raising, while frighten-type
verbs do not:
(76a)
(76b)
Questo lo ha fatto appreszzare/temere/ammirare ancora di più a Mario.
This made Mario estimate/fear/admire him even more
*Questo lo ha fatto preccupare/commuovere/attrarre ancora di più
a Mario.
This made Mario worry/move/attract him even more
Examples: Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 303)
Belletti & Rizzi further note that this construction allows only the non-psych interpretation of
colpire 'strike':
(77) Questo me lo ha fatto colpire. (non-psych interpretation only)
This me him made strike
Examples: Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 304)
Belletti & Rizzi claim that the relevant structures for the fear-type verbs in (76a) and the frightentype
verbs in (76b) are those in (4a) and (4b) respectively. This being the case, frighten-type verbs
should be incompatible with this construction; Bouchard (1995: 357-360) points out that this
analysis ignores certain facts:
71

• Embedding of the auxiliary verb is disallowed
• Semantic constraints on reference of the causee related to control
• Causatives allow derived subjects to be embedded
The first point is demonstrated by the fact that (78) is fine with a bare infinitive, but with an
auxiliary it is ungrammatical:
(78a)
(78b)
Jean a fait manger la tarte aux enfants.
Jean made the children eat the pie
* Jean a fait avoir mangé la tarte aux enfants.
Jean made the children have eaten the pie
An infinitival unaccusative verb embedded in the same way is grammatical, which is a problem for
Burzio's analysis of unaccusatives as VP reconstruction is allowed here (note, the trace is not c-
commanded in the required way, but the example is nevertheless grammatical):
(79) Le directeur a fait [VP k
venir t i
] Mario i
t k
à son bureau.
The director made Mario come to his office
The second point is related to the idea that the causer must be able to control the causee and the
causee, in turn, must be able to carry out the act described; in other words, the causer must be able
to cause the causee to perform an act which is "do-able", hence the ungrammaticality of the
following examples:
(80a)
(80b)
*Jean l'a fait être grand.
Jean made him be tall.
*Jean l'a fait avoir des grands yeux.
Jean made him have big eyes
The final point is expressed in (81), where the derived subject of a raising verb is grammatical with
this construction even though it is embedded:
(81) Dans son film, Paul l'a fait sembler être grand/avoir des grands yeux.
In his movie, Paul made him seem to be tall/have big eyes
Frighten-type psych-verbs, of course, fail at the first point because the auxiliary is required
72

in this kind of causative construction; they fail at the second point because the stimulus for the
psychological state is not necessarily an individual, or an individual that can express control, nor is
the experiencing participant able, necessarily, to "experience on command". It seems, then, that a
further supposed test of unaccusativity is refuted.
3.2.3.6 Grimshaw's evidence for the adjectival analysis of frighten-type
passives
Grimshaw points out that frighten-type psych-verbs fail to passivize verbally because they
have no maximally-prominent, external argument to suppress; this argumentation agrees with that
of Belletti & Rizzi's unaccusativity analysis. Grimshaw claims that the passives of English frightentype
verbs are adjectival. One test she presents is negative un- prefixation, producing examples
such as:
(82) Unfrightened, unamused, unappeased.
While Grimshaw claims that this is a property of adjectival passives, Bouchard (1995) notes that
the matter is not quite so straightforward because a great number of frighten-type verbs do not
allow un- prefixation (83), while a number of fear-type verbs do (84):
(83) *Unannoyed, *undisgusted, *unchagrinned, *unhorrified, *unscandalized.
(84) Unappreciated, unenjoyed, unloved, unmissed, unsupported, unenvied, untrusted.
This argumentation cannot be held to exemplify anything at a concrete level, and must therefore be
rejected.
Grimshaw also claims that frighten-type passives, in common with other adjectival
passives, are 'unfussy' about which propositions they take. This is a somewhat strange assertion
because, frighten-type passives are not particularly 'unfussy' (85), but neither are adjectival
passives as a general rule (86).
(85) Kim is interested in /*with/*of/*for trains.
(86a) Kim is ashamed of/*with/*in/*for his sixth finger.
(86a) Kim is proud of/*with/*in/*for his sixth finger.
73

Again, this test must be discarded as the claim that adjectival passives are unfussy as regards
prepositions is incorrect; the use of by aside — which may be taken to indicate a verbal passive —
many adjectival passives take only one kind of preposition.
Grimshaw claims that the progressive form is fine with active forms of frighten-type verbs,
but not passives:
(87a)
(87b)
The rumours were depressing Sandy.
*Sandy was being depressed by the rumours.
Grimshaw associates the ungrammaticality of (87b) with the incompatibility of progressive forms
with stativity, the stative-progressive incompatibility is seen in the fear class, which Grimshaw
assumes to be stative:
(88) *Sandy was fearing the rumours.
Why should frighten-type psych-verbs that are not stative in the active, become stative in
the passive? Grimshaw claims that the stativity of (87b) can be accounted for by claiming that the
passive here is adjectival, based on the fact that '…English adjectives by and large are states…'
(Grimshaw (1990: 114)). Grimshaw argues that, had the passive been verbal, it would have retained
its eventive reading because passivization does not affect the aspectual interpretation of a verb:
(89a)
(89b)
Kim was eating cake.
Cakes were being eaten by Kim.
Here, the progressive is fine with a canonical transitive (89a), and it is fine with the passive when
the verb denotes an act (89b). This seems to prove the fact that passivization does not affect
aspectual interpretation.
Within Grimshaw's analysis, the lack of an external (or maximally prominent) argument
disqualifies frighten-type psych-verbs from verbal passivization; thus, an adjectival passive is the
only title Grimshaw has to bestow upon passives observed with these verbs. As has been pointed
out, Grimshaw claims that adjectives are generally stative, and that statives are incompatible with
the progressive — therefore, these passives are adjectival by analogy because they are stative.
74

Pesetsky points out that generalisations regarding stativity and adjectival passives are correct, and
demonstrates that this can be tested using the modifiers much and very as in (39) and (40) above.
Pesetsky argues, however, that certain verbs are as unacceptable with the progressive in the active
as they are with it in the passive (as is the case with fear-type psych-verbs, see (88) above):
(90a)
(90b)
(91a)
(91b)
??Odd noises were continually depressing Sue.
??Bill was sitting around happy as a lark, when an unexpected groan from the next
room suddenly depressed him.
??Sue was continually being depressed by odd noises.
??Bill was sitting around happy as a lark, when suddenly he was depressed by an
unexpected groan from the next room.
Examples: Pesetsky (1995: 29-30)
These contrast with a second group of frighten-type psych-verbs that allow the progressive with
both active and passive forms:
(92a)
(92b)
(93a)
(93b)
Odd noises were continually scaring Sue.
Bill was sitting around happy as a lark, when an unexpected groan from the next
room suddenly scared him.
Sue was continually being scared by odd noises.
Bill was sitting around happy as a lark, when suddenly he was scared by an
unexpected groan from the next room.
Examples: Pesetsky (1995: 29-30)
Pesetsky argues that these verbs allow what he terms the "iterative progressive", where the action
of, for example, 'scaring' takes place repeatedly as "staccato" events. Pesetsky also argues that
examples of the kind in (76a) are surprising because they yield acceptable active progressives; these
ought to be as unacceptable as (91a). He points to the similarity of (87a) and fear-type verbs that
ought to be stative, but which yield grammatical active progressives:
75

(94a)
(94b)
(95a)
(95b)
(96a)
(96b)
Karen is finally understanding this proof.
??This proof is finally being understood by Karen.
Donald is finding your accusations ludicrous.
*Your accusations are being found ludicrous by Donald.
Sue is truly hating the sea-urchin sushi.
*The sea-urchin sushi is truly being hated by Sue.
Examples: Pesetsky (1995: 30-31)
These examples are akin to Grimshaw's examples, and share the property that they are not iterative
progressives, entailing that they disallow progressive passives. The fear-type verbs in (94, 95 and
96) are not analysed as having derived/non-VP-external subjects by either Belletti & Rizzi or
Grimshaw, and it seems therefore that the progressive cannot be used to diagnose the
deepness/derivedness of subjects.
3.2.3.7 A note on the passive and the progressive
Bouchard (1995: 310) points to Dowty (1979) and Van Voorst (1988) regarding stative verbs that
allow the progressive; Dowty and Van Voorst identify stative verbs that are compatible with the
progressive:
(97) *Kim was knowing all of the answers.
(98a)
(98b)
Kim was lying/sitting/sprawling on the floor.
Kim was standing/resting/perching on the rock shelf.
Dowty attributes some predicates incompatibility with progressive aspect to interval semantics;
that is, progressive aspect clashes with the interval naturally delimited by the event structure of
those predicates. For example in a predicate which consists of a process and a state, the interval
denoted is delimited by the beginning of the event and the end-point which results in the state.
Prototypically, a predicate such as writing an essay consists of the process of writing and a
finished state which is the result — an essay. This is, of course, simplified, because the point at
which the essay begins to be an essay is not delimited by the writing of the last word in the last
sentence, but rather the essay exists as a state as soon as pen is put to paper ("This is my halffinished
essay!"). This is, however, irrelevant to the interval, because the overlap between the
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process and the state is probably — in this instance — the delimitation of the interval.
Dowty argues, then, that interval predicates are compatible with the progressive because the
progressive captures a "frame" of this interval; thus, a subpart of the complex event is reported,
between the initiation of the process and the cut-off point marked by the state. This goes some
way to explaining why non-interval predicates — such as statives — are incompatible with the
progressive; it is because of a general mismatch between the lack of delimitation of a persistent state
and the capturing of a moment within certain bounds. Liken this to a photograph of a runner
running a race and a photograph of a house in an estate Agent's window; the former is a snapshot of
a moment in a process (perhaps deemed to be in some way significant), whereas the latter is a,
hopefully accurate, depiction of the state and location of a building. In the case of these two images,
one could not hope to see precisely the same race taking place if one went to the spot where the
image of the runner was taken, whereas one would hope to see the house as depicted by the estate
Agent's photograph. As Bouchard (1995: 311) puts it:
'In John is building a house, the speaker focuses on an intermediate frame in an
interval. At the end of that interval, as far as the speaker can tell, a house is likely to have
been built. Stative predicates, on the other hand, are true at interval I, just in case they are
true at all moments within I….'
This outline, however, contradicts the examples given in (98) above, which are statives that take the
progressive. Dowty argues that these states are intervals, because they describe a situation in which
an individual is static in relation to their surroundings, but which is demarcated by the beginning and
the end of the state; hence in (98b), the state begins with the Kim's instalment on the rock shelf and
ends with Kim's removal. This contrasts with other predicates which are not defined in a such a
way, for example know. It can be argued that the event structure of know is demarcated by, for
example, the discovery of the content of knowledge and the terminal state where, in extreme old age,
this fades; this, however, is not contained in the immediate meaning of the verb — it is generally
accepted that things cannot be unknown, or for that matter re-known.
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Non-interval stative verbs such as know, can be made intervalic; consider this example: Kim
and Sandy both have a common acquaintance called Les; Les claims to know everything, something
which is, of course, untrue. One day Les comes up to Kim and says 'Did you know that I speak
fluent Breton?' Somewhat later, Kim and Sandy see Les talking to someone nearby, Sandy wonders
what Les is talking about (knowing that Les is fond of spinning yarns) and Kim says 'Well this
morning Les was knowing Breton, but now I'm not sure'. Of course, Les never really knew Breton,
but the claim to the knowledge is delimited by the initial claim and the terminal forgetting what has
been claimed (say for instance that Les has changed that day's falsehood to 'I own the rights to the
entire back-catalogue of Crosby, Stills, Nash and Young', which in turn generates the otherwise
unacceptable 'Well, this afternoon Les was owning the entire back catalogue of…').
The lack of a linguistically relevant interval explains why fear-type verbs do not generally
allow the progressive, but those that do (see (94a) above), Dowty argues, involve a vague interval,
something which does not generally allow progressive aspect, but given the right circumstances
makes the verbs compatible, if a little strange, with the progressive. Bouchard (1995: 312-313)
notes that Mufwene (1984), Pesetsky (1990) and Van Voorst (1990) all argue that the definition of
interval is important as regards the progressive. Pesetsky claims that those verbs that define
emotions that take hold suddenly allow the progressive, whereas those that define emotions that
come into being gradually do not. Mufwene argues that stative predicates can be divided into those
that are transient states (love, sit) and those that are non-transient (know); Van Voorst argues that
transience is scalar between Mufwene's two classes. Van Voorst (1990: 5, cited in Bouchard (1995:
313)) expresses the idea that 'A psychological verb without the progressive form can describe a
more permanent, non-generic, feeling. When the progressive form is present, a less permanent
feeling is involved or an interpretation emerges under which the subject is somehow active.' This
activity is demonstrated in Van Voorst's examples:
(99a)
(99b)
The gourmets are adoring the wine at today's banquet.
They are admiring the beautiful Van Gogh.
Bouchard (1995: 313) points out that these examples involve a snapshot of an event, the gourmets
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are adoring the wine during the banquet even if at some other point in time they might not like the
given wine; the people admiring the Van Gogh are doing so while looking at it. Bouchard remarks
that this association of active subjects with intervals is often presented as an argument for the idea
that the incompatibility of a passive with the progressive may be because the progressive requires
the active subject that is suppressed under Passivization.
Thus, if a subject can be made active and the event defined in terms of this activity (cf. the
example of 'Les knowing things' above), the progressive becomes increasingly acceptable.
Pesetsky's argument regarding the iterative nature of certain stative predicates is not invalidated,
indeed, it indicates that the concatenation of the activity of the subject and the demarcation of the
duration of the state is central to explaining the acceptability of passive progressive constructions.
An active subject iteratively takes part in an action until such a point that this is no longer possible,
thus:
(100) Kim is really loving the pizza.
Here Kim is enjoying the pizza as long as there is pizza to eat; after the source of pizza has run
out, Kim will no longer be disposed to love the pizza (it has ceased to be a relevant element in
Kim's cognitive space). If, however, the pizza causes food poisoning, it may return to Kim's
cognitive space, but this time as the stimulus for a different emotion — making hate acceptable in
the progressive.
3.2.4 Problems with Pesetsky's (1995) analysis
Pesetsky (1995) presents an approach which attempts to "de-quirkify" psych-verbs,
unfortunately, this approach is based on semantic roles and principles at odds with the present
endeavour. It will be seen, in the next chapter, exactly why Pesetsky's approach is untenable; but, it
will also be seen that its clarity regarding the problems of the other approaches gives a valuable
starting point for a minimalist analysis.
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3.3 Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter has shown that the approaches of Belletti & Rizzi (1988) and
Grimshaw (1990) cannot be accepted on the basis of the following:
• Frighten-type verbs are not unaccusatives;
• they passivize verbally, demonstrating that they have external arguments;
• many of the properties Belletti & Rizzi and Grimshaw associate with
unaccusativity/aspectual-thematic mismatch have to do with properties of the
arguments (identified as agentivity in this chapter).
• aspectual properties are responsible for many of the things that Belletti & Rizzi
(1988) and Grimshaw (1990) ascribe to the derivedness of the subject of frightentype
psych-verbs.
On the basis of the analysis here, the following questions have arisen:
• What properties are important for the arguments of psych-verbs and how do
frighten-type and fear-type verbs differ in this respect?
• What aspectual properties are common to these verbs and how do frighten-type and
fear-type verbs differ in this respect?
• How can the syntax of these verbs be characterized?
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4.0 Introduction
This thesis is based on minimalist principles; among these principles is the explicit aim to
avoid unnecessary theory and maintain an "economical" analysis. The present chapter begins with a
presentation of Bouchard's division of semantics and view of why situational semantics is irrelevant
to syntax; exactly what kind of semantics is relevant to syntax, and how this view contrasts with
previous research on psych-verbs. This is followed by a look at the properties of psych-verbs and
their arguments. Following this, a way of representing information in syntax is presented. Finally, a
new way of analysing psych-verbs is presented.
4.1 Bouchard, syntax and semantics
There are two core elements to Bouchard's (1995) analysis. The first is the view of the
interface between syntax and semantics; he states that, if one is to rely on truly minimalist
principles, there must be one-to-one correspondence between the levels of syntax and semantics.
The second core element is a philosophy regarding the kind of semantics that grammarians should
concern themselves with. He claims that most semantics is irrelevant to grammar — that an
understanding of the world around us, so-called "Global knowledge", and understandings of spaciotemporally
designated phenomena, "situational semantics", are unnecessary (as we shall see, it is
into this latter category that semantic roles fall). Bouchard argues further that if there is a set of
semantics that is relevant to language, only a portion of this can be accessible, and thereby relevant,
to grammar. The interaction of these sets and subsets is largely irrelevant to the present study,
however, the status of what Bouchard claims to be a subset of situational semantics, semantic roles,
is of importance. In this respect, most modern theories are flawed because of the simple fact that
they rely on semantic roles, which Bouchard claims are situational notions. The theories of grammar
for psych-verbs appeal to notions that can be demonstrated to be irrelevant to grammar, and these
approaches can be revealed as inherently flawed because of this fact.
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4.1.1 Semantics and syntax
The status of semantic roles 17
in grammatical theory has always been a matter of some
debate, many (among others, Boons (1985), Dowty (1991) and Schlesinger (1995)) have viewed
semantic roles as highly problematic and of little theoretical use because of their inability to capture
the generalisations they purport to capture. Dowty (1991) suggests that semantic roles can have
different meanings in different situations, and introduces proto-roles — feature-based concepts
intended to replace semantic roles — and it is suggested (also by Filip (1996)) that these protoroles
can account for why psych-verbs behave as they do; Dowty's proto-roles are returned to in a
moment.
Schlesinger (1995) points out that there are a number of arguments that simply resist
definition in terms of the semantic roles suggested by Gruber (1965); those marked with square
brackets "[noun phrase]" are problematic 18 :
(1a)
(1b)
(1c)
(1d)
(1e)
(1f)
(1g)
(1h)
(1i)
(1j)
One click grants [permission].
[Unsalted butter] costs [a fortune].
[The newspaper] reported [the incident].
[The automaton] calculated [the cost].
[The society] lacks [funds].
Beware [the Jabberwock].
[Such a statement] indicates [approval].
[The statue] resembles [a lion].
Some students study [Latin].
The bag full of popcorn proved [Kim's guilt].
Examples adapted from Schlesinger (1995: 55)
Schlesinger also notes that one of the core reasons for integrating semantic roles into syntactic
17
It should be noted that Bouchard (1995) and many other detractors of semantic roles assume rigid definitions of
semantic roles; Gruber's (1965) definitions stand as they are. This entails that the roles be clearly defined with specific
semantic content. Many approaches that use semantic roles do not take this line, preferring to approximate the standard
definitions, rather than stick to them rigidly. The present work follows Bouchard in assuming a rigid definition of
semantic roles; the reasoning behind this is not based in a misunderstanding of what semantic roles are, rather in order
for the criticism of semantic roles to hold, it is necessary to define the object of criticism precisely. Since so many
different authors assume so many different things about the content of semantic roles, it would be impossible to
address each and every variant account. The varying nature of assumptions about semantic roles potentially leads to a
situation where each and every criticism has some justified response from some account; this situation would prove the
case of semantic roles relying on accounts that were potentially fundamentally incompatible. It should perhaps also be
be noted that the fact that the definitions of semantic roles vary is not in itself a positive factor, as this results in
coarse-grainedness and necessary overlap between the functions of the different semantic roles.
18
It is little coincidence that many of these arguments would be described as Themes in most analyses: it seems that
Theme is a dustbin for all vague semantic role-concepts, being associated with a diverse array of argument types.
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theory does not pan out because there are no systematic mapping-relations between syntactic
positions and semantic roles. Schlesinger presents a wide variety of examples of inconsistent
mapping, where different verbs map different arguments into different positions. This can be seen
especially clearly in the case of psych-verbs, where theories relying on extraordinary syntactic
configurations have been developed to explain why Experiencers are mapped as subjects for feartype
verbs and objects for frighten-type verbs, and vice versa for Themes.
Bouchard's (1995) analysis is, however, focussed on the inability of semantic roles to do
what they are intended to do, namely represent the semantic information that is perceived to be
important for linking and meaning-construction. It is Bouchard's claim that semantic roles are unable
to perform their intended task because they represent situational semantics. Bouchard cites Boons
(1985), who points out that situations, generally, can vary very greatly, but that this variation is
not reflected in syntax. A sentence is greatly dependent on context, that is a given situation, in order
to be meaningful in the real world; however, one unique syntactic structure can be associated with
any number of situations. An example of this can be found in the possible real-world incidents that
can be associated with the sentence in (2); here, a simple sentence involving a ditransitive verb can
be seen to have numerous interpretations; this being the case, the semantic roles associated with
arguments also vary.
(2) Kim shut the cat in the living room.
(Example adapted from Boons (1985))
In (2a), Kim is typically analysed as an Agent, the cat a Theme and the living room as a Location.
If, however, Kim did not perform the act of shutting the cat in the living room on purpose, the title
"Agent" is not appropriate. If, on the other hand, Kim shuts the cat in the room so that it keeps
warm, then the cat is not a Theme, but a Beneficiary. Many other possible situations can be
developed, but it suffices to say that these changes in interpretation have little effect on the syntax
of the sentence. How then can Kim be an Agent and an as-yet-unidentified semantic role all-at-once,
not to mention the other roles in the sentence? Irrespective of the theoretical problems, the fact that
differing semantic roles can be applied to the arguments in (2) according to the changes in the
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situation which it attempts to describe indicates that semantic roles, as Bouchard claims, are
situational concepts, and therefore fall outside his conception of semantics that applies to grammar.
There are potentially several ways of rescuing the analysis, one being generalization of the
already existing roles so that they encompass the potential meanings they attempt to capture;
another being a change in the way that we assume verbs assign semantic roles (perhaps
accompanied by the development of further semantic role-types). The application of the former in
an analysis of (2) leads to a situation where one can say that an Agent is a volitional, intentional
individual, but can also be an individual who performs involuntary, non-intentional actions. This is
unsatisfactory because it has no descriptive power, in fact it allows contradiction in the sense that
the Agent role may be either volitional and intentional or non-volitional and non-intentional. The
application of the scheme for changing role assignment and the number of roles leads to an analysis
where a verb might assign an infinite number of roles. This approach is unsatisfactory because it
lacks descriptive power because the link between the verb and its semantic roles is weakened,
reducing predictability. Increasing the number of roles does not help, because the new roles will be
as inefficient as the old ones, being further sub-divisible into new, more primitive roles. A third
approach can be developed along the lines that the link between the verbs and the semantic roles
taken by its argument is weak, such that the semantic content of the arguments and the verb are not
related under many of the non-core meanings of the verb. Applying such an approach weakens the
argument for using semantic roles by rendering them useless for the purposes of syntactic analysis;
the lack of coherent links between the meaning of a verb and the arguments it takes results in a
"non-theory", where semantics is purely coincidental to all other processes. A fourth potential
approach is changing the way we assume that semantic roles interact with the verb, where the
arguments are vaguely more like an Agent if they are external arguments, or vaguely more like
Patients if they are internal arguments; this approach is not dissimilar to that of Dowty (1991).
Dowty's approach involves assessing the properties of the arguments of a verb up against a
table of properties associated with a "proto-Agent" and a "proto-Patient"; if an argument has more
of the properties of the proto-Agent, then it will be realized as an external argument, if it has the
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Subjects:
One click
Unsalted butter
The newspaper
The automaton
The society
Such a statement
The statue
Some students
The bag full of popcorn
[+causative]
[+independantly-extant]
[+independantly-extant]
[+independantly-extant]
[+independantly-extant]
[+independantly-extant]
[+independantly-extant]
[+independantly-extant]
[+independantly-extant]
Objects:
Permission
[-independantly-extant]
A fortune ??
The incident ??
The cost ??
Funds
[-independantly-extant]
The Jabberwock ??
Approval ??
A lion ??
Latin ??
Kim's guilt ??
A further argument against this approach can be found in the co-dependence of volitionality and
sentience. A volitional act indicates that it is something done with will and intent; notions which are
associated with sentient beings: can something act volitionally if it is not sentient?
Further evidence of the failure of situational semantics to be relevant to grammar can be seen
in the failure of Dowty's proto-roles to account for the dichotomy seen in the class of psych-verbs.
Here, Dowty's account simply translates the difference between fear-type and frighten-type verbs
by reference to semantics — the "strangeness" is still present, as seen in (3).
There is a rather counterintuitive element to this approach, as it has generally been assumed
that the grammatical structure of language is meaningful in a non-trivial way — it is no coincidence
that grammatical relations are formalised in many frameworks (for example, HPSG, LFG and
Relational Grammar). An inherent outcome of Dowty's approach is not just that the grammatical
relations are irrelevant (as is generally accepted in mainstream transformational grammar), but also
that the structural positions "specifier of IP" and "complement of VP" are open to any element as
long as the elements are comparatively fit to occupy those positions. An example of this can be
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seen in the idea that the properties of the Experiencer of a mental state make that participant better
suited to being realised as the object because it passively experiences something, or is affected —
much like a Patient. A paradox of this is that the subject of fear-type verbs is, thereby, anomalous,
in that it is a proto-Patient: it is an affected role and yet it is realised as a subject. The argument
goes that the properties of the objects of fear-type verbs are more Patient-like because of their
stativity, an X that is feared is stative 20 , whereas the subject of a frighten-type verb initiates
(voluntarily, or involuntarily) an event (albeit one which takes place in mental space) — and is thus
a good candidate for subjecthood.
The fact that Experiencers make poor candidates for "externality", while Causes make good
candidates actually allows us to abstract away from the previously mentioned problem of
homonymy; it introduces the possibility that it is enough that an argument has a given property for
it always to be associated with a given structural position; this fits in with the understanding of
structural positions presented in this thesis, as will be seen in section 4.3.2. This is, however, at
odds with Bouchard's reality, because in order to specify what properties are associated with the
proto-Agent and proto-Patient, one has to look at situations; even if it were possible to develop a
generalized situation which captures all the situations that can be associated with a given verb, that
generalised situation and the semantic roles that took part in it would nevertheless remain
situational concepts.
There is a central observation from Dowty's work that is pertinent here, and that is that the
properties of the arguments of the fear-type and frighten-type verbs do differ; what makes them
map as external or internal arguments may however have less to do with features of the arguments
than the requirements of verbs themselves. Dowty's view of argument features abstracts the
arguments away from their verbs, leaving the verb to act as a hub around which the arguments
revolve, supplying the centre-point, but playing no real role in selection (because the properties
differ with differing arguments), rather like the fulcrum of a seesaw where the children are the
arguments causing the seesaw to function. Lexicalist approaches (cf. Pustejovsky (1995)) to the
20
Is this the case? It does not seem to be so, as fear is compatible with eventive NP complements.
(i)
Kim feared the explosion of the bomb.
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same problem would tend towards a more holistic view, where the verb is of a type, say causative
and the arguments are distributed as the Causer and the Caused. This approach, while tantamount
to saying the same as Dowty and Pesetsky (who introduces the Cause role as the stimulus for the
experience in frighten-type verbs), avoids situations because the verbs are of the same class
irrespective of situation. The terms associated with the subjects and objects of the verbs are
irrelevant, and the only features necessary for an argument to qualify as internal or external
argument are those that ensure that it is capable of performing that function in whatever terms the
verb denotes. This idea is central to the arguments presented later in this chapter.
4.1.2 Mapping problems
Bouchard, however, does not just argue that semantic roles are unacceptable because of their
situationality, he also states that unacceptable, but grammatical, examples such as Chomsky's
colo[u]rless green ideas sleep furiously baffle any attempt to apply semantic roles, because
selection licences syntactic structures. Within mainstream generative grammar, a grammatical
sentence must have a semantic structure that licences it; if not, the string is ungrammatical. Thus, if
a string is grammatical, then it must also — at some level — be semantically acceptable. Thus, in
cases of true ungrammaticality, it is difficult to postulate semantic roles for participants. Because
semantic roles have no input in regard to this, they must be rejected in favour of some other theory
that solves this licensing problem. The solution, in Bouchard's eyes, is to be found in the commonsense
assumption that there is no reference for colourless and green in relation to something that is
without form. It will be shown later on that such semantics are available to grammar, and that these
limit mapping in the required way.
Further arguments against the mapping infrastructure that semantic roles rely on is found in
Davis & Koenig's (2000) argumentation against thematic hierarchies of the type outlined in Chapter
3. Their first argument is based on the widespread phenomenon of causitivization of agentive
sentences, where the would-be Agent is expressed as an object of the causative verb:
(4a)
(4b)
Kim sang "Jerusalem".
Sandy made Kim sing "Jerusalem".
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The thematic hierarchy does not account for this phenomenon; the structural relationships between
the verb and its arguments remains the same, but the roles have changed. Davis & Koenig also point
out that problems arise for thematic hierarchies where two verbs with similar meanings have the
reverse order of arguments, as is the case with psych-verbs:
(5a)
(5b)
(6a)
(6b)
Kim owns this book.
This book belongs to Kim
Beautiful drawings adorn the pages.
The pages feature beautiful drawings.
In such cases, at least one set of roles remains unaccounted for irrespective of the order of the roles
in the hierarchy. They also point to examples, following Dowty (1991), where the arguments have
such similar properties that they cannot be distinguished and must therefore, logically, be defined as
having the same semantic role:
(7a)
(7b)
The telephone box is near the shop.
His house borders the town.
Further examples, where there seems to be a reversal of arguments, which go contrary to
thematic hierarchies are found with verbs such as follow and precede:
(8a)
(8b)
B follows A in the alphabet.
A precedes B in the alphabet.
Davis & Koenig (2000: 59) also present an ontological argument based on the fact that
certain combinations of roles from the hierarchy, such as [Beneficiary, Goal], remain unattested; in
this case they point out that
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'…the answer cent[re]s on the meaninglessness of calling a participant a beneficiary in an
event lacking another participant that performs some benefactive action. Likewise, a
participant designated a goal is hard to imagine in the absence of another participant that
moves toward[s] the goal. Treating thematic roles as primitives that are unrelated to one
another (except for their ranking in the thematic hierarchy) makes such patterns purely
accidental; the excluded pattern could just as well be [Agent, Theme]. What is lost is that, as
we define the various thematic roles, we are implicitly defining types of events (to the
extent that out definitions of thematic roles are semantically grounded). The thematic
hierarchy is ontologically dependent on the notion of event class. Unattested thematic grids
are unattested event types.'
Thus, semantic roles lack not only descriptive power, but also do nothing to explain the facts
related to linking. Indeed, semantic roles seem to cause more problems than they solve.
4.1.3 Problems with the semantic-role analyses — heteromorphy
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, Belletti & Rizzi's (1988) and Grimshaw's (1990) analyses
of psych-verbs are problematic because they rely on semantic roles; the source of this problem for
Belletti & Rizzi can be seen in (9) below, where (9a) represents the internal structure of an agentive
reading of frighten, and (9b) is a psych reading of frighten. Because both Belletti & Rizzi and
Grimshaw agree that at least some of the psych-verbs have an agentive reading, their analyses
cannot account for both agentive and psych readings without postulating two different aspectual/
syntactic structures. It is pertinent to discuss exactly what agentive and psych readings are: in a
sentence Kim frightened Sandy, Kim may be acting as an Agent, deliberately saying "Boo!" to
frighten Sandy, in which case, the sentence has an agentive reading; on the other hand, Kim may
have walked into the room, casting a shadow which frightened Sandy, in which case, the sentence
has a "pure" psych reading. Note that both of these readings involve the same psychological event,
but the semantic role of the stimulating argument will differ; Agent and Theme/Stimulus
respectively. The problem of heteromorphy arises purely as a result of the use of semantic roles.
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(9a) VP (9b) VP
NP V' V' NP
(Agent) (Experiencer)
V° NP V° NP
frighten (Experiencer) frighten (Theme)
Grimshaw's analysis of frighten-type psych-verbs, being based on a notion of crossover
between the aspectual and thematic tiers, is also forced to postulate one form for each reading, as
we saw in Chapter 3; (8) from Chapter 3 is repeated here as (10) for convenience:
(10a) Experiencer Theme Frighten-type (psych reading)
Cause State
(Bouchard (1995: 261-262))
(10b) Agent Experiencer Frighten-type (agentive reading)
Cause State
Both of these analyses result in heteromorphic syntactic structures being given to homomorphic
sentences. This is problematic because of two things: firstly, the fact is that the two structures, as
was shown in Chapter 2, do not differ in terms of word order in either English or Norwegian, and
both agentive and psych readings passivize. The second point is that both analyses are motivated
to present heteromorphic structures by their reliance on semantic roles: had it not been for the fact
that Belletti & Rizzi appeal to a notion of thematic hierarchy, they would not need to generate
structures to explain why the subject of frighten-type verbs was a Theme (an argument lower down
on the hierarchy than Experiencer), while the object was an Experiencer, which would later prove to
be incompatible with the non-psych reading of the verbs. It will be shown in a moment that the
problem of expecting arguments and roles to be mapped uniformly is based on a, perhaps
subconscious appeal to certain peri-theoretical notions.
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One might suggest that there are, in fact, different syntactic configurations for each different
interpretation, much as one might argue that there are more semantic roles than is normally
assumed. If this is the case, then psych-constructions of the type in (11) are even more
problematic, because they need structures to represent the agentive, causative and psych uses of
the verbs. The example in (11a) may be agentive (if Kim is putting on a "charm offensive"), or have
a psych reading. In the first case, Kim is an Agent, Sandy a Theme and a daze some other semantic
role 21 . On a psych reading, Kim is a Theme, Sandy an Experiencer and a daze some other semantic
role. In (11b), however, we see that, on and agentive reading, Kim is an Agent, Sandy a Theme and a
swimming pool is a Location. If (11b) is thought to be non-volitional (if Kim ironically "puts", e.g.
knocks, Sandy), then Kim is a Cause, Sandy is a Theme and a swimming pool is a Location.
(11a)
(11b)
Kim put Sandy into a daze
Kim put Sandy into a swimming pool.
Note that this means that the same syntactic structure results in four differing interpretations,
where, using Belletti & Rizzi's analysis, the first NP can be an Agent, a Cause or a Theme; the
second NP can be a Theme or an Experiencer and the PP object can be either a Location or some
other, undefined, semantic role. It is worth pointing out that the fact that a swimming pool is
consistently given the role Location is not necessarily a positive feature of the analysis, because
Location is a very broad-ranging concept. A Location is anywhere, and is tantamount to having a
role called Thing, but with a geographical bias; this is evident because Goal, Source and Location are
often confused, where Source and Goal are the initial and terminal points respectively for
directional movement events, and Location is everywhere else.
21
"Some other semantic role" is used here because none of the traditional semantic roles seem to fit.
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4.1.4 Summary: the irrelevance of semantic roles to grammar
It has been shown that there are a number of arguments against the use of semantic roles in
grammar, related to:
• the practical aspects of defining roles that "fit the bill";
• the notions of mapping roles into syntax in a descriptively useful way;
• the fact that semantic roles are situational and that situations are irrelevant to
grammar;
• the inability of theories that rely on semantic roles to economically describe the
observed facts.
It has also been shown that other situational approaches, such as that of Dowty (1991), fail on the
same counts as semantic roles, showing that situations are irrelevant to grammar. With these facts in
mind, it is pertinent to ask a few questions about certain implicit expectations some grammarians
have regarding syntax, and why these may also be responsible for the view taken in certain analyses
of psych-verbs.
4.1.5 Problems associated with peri-theoretical grammatical
relations
One of the core motivations for the introduction of q-theory into grammar was in order to
account for how and why arguments are mapped as they are. One of the core problems in applying
any theory of mapping is that the descriptive tools used often ignore the simple fact that human
understanding is tainted by another simple set of descriptive tools, namely the terms "subject" and
"object". These terms for grammatical relations, as has already been pointed out, have no status in
mainstream, transformational, generative grammar — this is qualified with "transformational"
because the concepts "subject" and "object" do have status in other mainstream, nontransformational
approaches such as Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG as outlined in
Pollard & Sag (1994) incorporates grammatical relations based on Borsley's (1987, 1989. 1990)
argumentation, such that each verb subcategorizes its arguments explicitly distinguishing subject
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and complements), Lexical Functional Grammar (Bresnan 2000) and not least Relational Grammar
(Perlmutter (1983) and Perlmutter & Rosen (1984)) itself. It is undeniably the case that certain
languages mark the relations subject and object overtly by means of morphology. It is also the case
that modern transformational approaches have used a number of "subject-identifying" processes,
not least the EPP, which ensures that the specifier of IP/AgrSP is filled. Theoretically, however,
subjects are always seen as derived in the context of most mainstream GB approaches, and as such,
the status of the notion "subject", and consequently "object", is not theoretically fixed.
Is this a problem? It can be argued that analyses of psych-verbs have, at least at some level,
relied on grammatical relations as their fundament. Belletti & Rizzi (1988) demonstrate this in the
following terms: 'There are two kinds of empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. The first is
that the subject of [Questo preoccupa Gianni 'this worries Gianni'] has a cluster of properties
typical of derived subjects' (Belletti & Rizzi (1988: 295)); 'A very reliable test discriminating
between deep and derived subjects...' (ibid. 295); '...hence there is no reason to assume anything else
than a simple transitive structure with a deep agentive subject' (ibid. 298); 'Burzio (1986) has
shown that the structures containing a derived subject cannot be embedded...' (ibid. 302); '...a
selective compatibility with a non-thematic subject...' (ibid. 302 fn); '..the object of psych-verbs can
bind an anaphor properly contained within the subject, but cannot bind with an anaphor which is
the subject.' (ibid. 317) [emphasis in the original]. The point to be made here is that two things are
happening; one is that the terms "subject" and "object" are often being used as shorthand for
elements in the DS/SS of a sentence, where "subject" typically denotes the NP preceding the verb in
the sentence (or, using Belletti & Rizzi's argumentation, the highest NP (configurationally) in the
structure) and object the NP in [comp, VP], the second is that the terms "subject" and "object" also
denote things with "a cluster of properties".
The problem has its root in the first use, because most people would define the elements of
a sentence in terms of subject, verb and object — an easy shorthand to use; it is, however, the case
that this shorthand implicitly encourages a non-physical description of the elements given these
labels. Consider the common understanding of the "subject" of passives; this is typically analysed
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as a "raised object", a description of the movement of the element following the verb to a position
preceding the verb – a quite clean, physical description? Not really, as it entails a view of the
qualitative semantics of the notions "subject" and "object"; a subject may be a raised internal
argument or a "raised" external argument. Of course,the argument that the shorthand applies to the
"deep subject" and "deep object" applies; this is not, however, unproblematic because — as will be
shown — it can be argued that a subject is not a subject until it fulfils certain "subject requirements"
(yet another "cluster of properties") which DS "subjects" perhaps do not. Accepting that the
subject/object shorthand denotes DS elements does not actually help, as it patently contradicts
certain statements made by Belletti & Rizzi; '...a derived subject' (ibid. 296), which points to a
subject that is a subject in SS (that is to say that it replaces the function of a "deep subject").
Subjects, it seems, may be two things at once; this is not problematic as long as the modifiers deep
or derived are included, and the term is applied to the physical, syntactic realizations of the things
to which they refer. If, however, "subject" is also applied as a token for a concept associated with a
given set of properties, it is problematic, which leads on to the next topic: the cluster of properties
associated with subjects.
The cluster of properties associated with derived subjects by Belletti & Rizzi are — on the
whole — of a syntactic nature, including binding properties and modal selection; there are, however,
a number of indications that the traditional conceptualization of subjects and objects has
inadvertently crept into the picture. '[A] simple transitive structure with a deep agentive subject'
(ibid. 298) [my emphasis] may seem to be an innocuous statement, but it bears the understanding
of what a simple transitive is (a particular configuration involving subject, verb and object) and
what a deep agentive subject is. It is widely assumed that subjects — by-and-large — are agentive;
that is, they are typically aligned with the role of "do-er". It cannot, however, be argued that this is
not an obvious assumption on the part of Belletti & Rizzi, because the following statement
indicates that they consider it to be surprising — and that they believe that the reader ought to
consider it surprising too — because the statement is formulated in the way it is '...there is no
reason to assume anything other than a simple transitive...' (ibid. 298) [my emphasis] as well as the
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fact that this suddenly unsurprising (and therefore prototypical) subject is compared with some
other subject (of a transitive sentence) that is presumably surprising in some way (which hence
becomes an element in a not-so-simple transitive sentence; cf. the structure in (4b) in Chapter 3).
Belletti & Rizzi's main argument is that the subjects of fear-type verbs are "proper" deep
subjects, whereas the subjects of frighten-type verbs are "improper" derived subjects. Aside from
the fact that they never bother to define the concept "subject" in terms other than those already
discussed, they manage to produce a convincing — on the surface — account of these verbs based
on what can be termed the reader's goodwill regarding their understanding of the properties of
subjects.
Having demonstrated exactly how Belletti & Rizzi use the terms "subject" and "object", it is
pertinent to ask exactly what these concepts entail in a general sense. The fact of the matter is that:
'[i]n recent linguistic work it has been made clear that the essential constituent of the
sentence is the verb, often a verb with an object. That is to say, the syntactic element
generally referred to as subject is secondary.'
Lehmann (1976:447)
The fact that the subject is "secondary" is a theoretical view of the elements in grammar; it entails
that the subject is largely neglected; because it is difficult to pry apart the nitty-gritty of subjects,
they have largely been ignored. There exists, however, a seminal collection, Li (1976), which
investigates "topics and subjects"; of the articles in that volume, it is perhaps Keenan (1976) that is
most widely cited. Keenan treats the "cluster of properties" that is associated with subjects, arguing
that not all subjects necessarily subscribe to every individual property, but that there is a defined
collection of things that can typically be associated with subjects. Many of these properties are not
relevant to English, such as morphological features associated with topics and subjects. The most
relevant properties are included below:
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Autonomy conditions
Independence
If an x is referred to by a subject, then it must exist
independently of the semantic expression of the predicate.
Sandy wrote a book (because writing generates books, the book is not
independent of the writing event).
Non-deletion
The subject cannot (typically) be deleted.
The sight of books burning annoys (me).
*Annoys me.
Å se bøker brenne irriterer meg.
To see books burn irritates me
*Irriterer meg.
Irritates me
Reference
Subjects can refer to (sometimes-restricted classes of) co-referents.
Sandy i
scared Kim j
and then he i, j
left
Sandy i
scared Kim j
and then Ø i, *j
left
Henrik i
skremte Johan j
og godtet seg i,*j
.
Henrik i
scared Johan j
and gloated REFL i, *j
Henrik scared Johan and gloated
Absolute reference
Typically, a subject in a sentence that is true exists (as a concrete or
abstract entity), whereas an object's existence or otherwise has no
effect on the felicity of the sentence. In the examples, Sandy is taken
to refer to an existing person irrespective of whether it is realized as
subject or object; the spirits, however, are only taken to exist
definitively when they are realized as subject (when they are realized
as an object, they may be assumed not to exist).
Sandy prays to the spirits.
The spirits asked Sandy to leave.
Sandy ber til åndene.
Sandy prays to sprits-the
'Sandy prays to the spirits'
Åndene ba Sandy om å gå sin vei.
Spirits-the asked Sandy PRT to go his way
'The spirits asked Sandy to leave'
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Semantic roles
Predictability
Agentivity
The semantic role of the subject depends on the verb.
Certain semantic characteristics are discernible (such
as animacy and causation), but the semantic content of subjects is
typically a lot less predictable/decomposable than that of objects.
The Agent in an action is typically expressed as the subject.
Note how very vague these points are; it is typically the case that the subject is a thing in the
world, it is linked to a verb and may not be deleted, but may refer to other elements in the sentence
by nature of its being a subject; in terms of semantics, it is typically an Agent or Cause, and is often
animate, but other than this it is difficult to nail down any hard-and-fast characteristics. This is not
much, but perhaps it is enough to develop a theory of subjecthood.
4.1.6 Bouchard's conception arguments regarding psych-verbs
In this section, a brief look is taken at Bouchard's analysis of the arguments of psych-verbs
and how Bouchard reconciles the observed facts with his conceptualization of what is relevant to
grammar.
Bouchard (1995) and Pesetsky (1995) point out that the properties of the arguments of
fear-type and frighten-type psych-verbs differ; Bouchard claims that this difference is to be found
in three things:
• the sentience of the experiencing argument;
• the vagueness of the stimulus;
• and the existence of a (possibly unexpressed) argument (psy-chose).
Pesetsky — as we have seen — claims that frighten-type verbs are causative and map the
semantic roles Causer, Experiencer, whereas fear-type verbs map the roles Experiencer,
Target/Subject of Emotion. As we will see, Bouchard's argumentation is not incompatible with the
first of Pesetsky's claims, i.e., that frighten-type verbs are causative. Bouchard's analysis draws the
conclusion that frighten-type verbs behave as they do because of the properties of their arguments,
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and that this may, to a certain degree, be associated with causativity 22 . In order to facilitate his
analysis, Bouchard presents three argument types, these are defined in the following way:
(12a) Concept: i. external point-of-view with respect to the entity
ii. objective judgement of speaker, omniscient narrator
(12b) Substantive: i. internal point-of-view
ii. entity as participant
(12c) I-Subject: i. internal point-of-view, feelings of the entity
ii. entity is conscious of event (attributed by speaker)
These are exemplified by the following:
adapted from Bouchard (1995: 278-27)
(13a) Kim is a really nice person. (Concept)
(13b) Kim watched TV. (Substantive)
(13c) Kim wants to go to the cinema. (I-Subject)
In fact, I-Subject is a subtype of Substantive, as I-Subjects have the features of Substantives plus a
few extra that distinguish them from Substantives (those of internal emotivity and awareness). The
distinction between Concepts and Substantives/I-Subjects is reflected in syntax, Bouchard cites
Coppieters (1982,1990), noting that the use of çe or il, in French, depends on the status of the
subject in the mind of the speaker, thus Concepts are uniformly presented as çe, whereas il, is used
with Substantives or I-Subjects. This discussion explains non-agentive sentences; for the agentive
sentences, the external argument must be a Substantive; this is not problematic under the
Bouchardian view, because he has not postulated any unusual syntactic or thematic/aspectual
structures for the non-agentive interpretations.
Bouchard claims that because the event associated with psych-verbs takes place in "mental
space", the reference to the elements involved is different to the kind of reference seen with events
in the real world — this is self-evident in the emotive concepts denoted by these verbs. This leads
Bouchard to conclude that the stimulus for a change in mental state is a Concept (in his scheme)
which comes into contact with a sentient being, an I-Subject/Substantive, however, Bouchard claims
that this contact does not occur directly, as there is another argument involved: a psy-chose.
22
Note that this is not the same as saying that these verbs are in some way odd; rather, it is the case that these verbs
behave as all others: they are governed by the properties that they have, in order to express the concept they denote.
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Bouchard's claim is that this third argument is either incorporated or unincorporated; in the former
case, the argument is "internal" to the verb itself, resulting in a canonical transitive psych-verb,
whereas verbs that are also members of other verb classes tend to express this argument in syntax:
(14a) Kim hates Sandy. (incorporated)
(14b) Sandy frightens Kim. (incorporated)
(14c) Sandy struck Kim with his intelligence. (unincorporated)
(14d) Sandy put the fear of death into Kim. (unincorporated)
A possible problem with this approach is that one might consider the "psy-chose" to be of the
same type as the stimulus, i.e., a Concept under Bouchard's framework. This would traditionally
lead to a clash, as two items cannot typically be identified with the same semantic-role type. It is,
of course, quite sensible to claim that the psy-chose is a conceptualization of the stimulus as the
event described by psych-verbs takes place in mental space – hence the acceptability of the psychose
"with his intelligence" in (14c), and perhaps, in this sense, a conceptualization of a Concept
is fine as this would distinguish the argument types. It is also entirely possible that the psy-chose
is of yet another type, adding a fourth possible "type", but this would seem to go against the aims
of rejecting the notion of semantic role because of the overgeneralization-overgeneration problem.
Whatever the solution here is, Bouchard fails to address the central problem of why it should be
that fear-type and frighten-type psych-verbs differ at all.
In his claim that frighten-type verbs have certain properties associated with their arguments,
Bouchard neglects the fact that the arguments of fear-type verbs also share these properties, hence
the desire of theorists working within the Generative-Semantics-influenced TG tradition to
transform frighten-type strings from DSs resembling fear-type strings. Bouchard's argumentation,
while describing the properties of the arguments, does not explain their distribution; in fact, it
entirely ignores the problem for much of the discussion, focusing rather on the perceived
"quirkiness" of frighten-type verbs. This seems to be much the same as saying that the object is
realized as subject and vice versa; it does not explain why the two classes of verbs exist and what
distinguishes them – in fact, Bouchard's explanation that there is no restriction on where arguments
are realized in a configuration ties the two verb classes closer together. It is thus that the analysis
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must look elsewhere for explanation of why the two classes of psych-verbs differ so radically in
realization.
Pesetsky's claim that frighten-type verbs are causative is based on the notion that these
verbs display similar syntax and semantics to other causative verbs. The causativity of certain
frighten-type psych-verbs is undeniable, whereas in other cases this analysis is rather more
questionable:
(15a)
(15b)
(16a)
(16b)
Kim made Sandy a cake.
Kim made Sandy scared.
Kim frightened Sandy = "Kim made Sandy frightened".
Kim pleased Sandy = "?Kim made Sandy pleased".
In terms of the overall "causativity", these verbs seem to be covered by an umbrella
conceptualization, which involves a causing event followed by the caused event; much of the
literature on causativity agrees with this general conceptualization. The next section covers how
this thesis applies minimalist thinking to the analysis of psych-verbs and their arguments.
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4.2 The arguments and aspects of psych-verbs
4.2.1 Causativity
Arad (1998), Pesetsky (1995) and Pylkkänen (2000) among others claim that frighten-type
psych-verbs may be causative, such that the stimulating argument is realized as a cause argument.
This accounts the realization of the experiencing argument the in object position — cause arguments
are always realized in subject position. Evidence for this position is found in English and
Norwegian, but the most revealing evidence is found in Japanese and Finnish: both of these
languages express causative morphology in causative constructions.
(17a) Taroo-ga yasai-o kus-ase-ta.
(Japanese)
Taro-NOM vegetable-ACC rot-CAUSE-PAST
'Taro caused the vegetable to rot'
(17b) Liisa hajo-tti ikkuna-n. (Finnish)
Liisa-NOM break-CAUSE window-ACC
'Liisa broke the window'
Frighten verbs in these two languages display the same causative morphology:
Examples: Pylkkänen (2002: 73)
(18a) Ongaku-ga Taroo-o tanosim-ase-ta. (Japanese)
music-NOM Taroo-ACC be amused-CAUSE-past
'The music amused Taro'
(18b) Auto pelästy-tti Liisa-n. (Finnish)
car-NOM fear-CAUSE Liisa-ACC
'A car frightened Liisa'
Examples: a: Pesetsky (1995: 67); b: Nelson (1999: 151)
Given that frighten-type verbs display causative morphology, it is pertinent to as exactly what a
causative verb is. Pustejovsky (1995) characterizes causative verbs in the following way:
(19)
[ [ ( )] Ÿe 1
< µ
e 2 ]
lylxle 1
le 2
$P$R [ R( e 1
,x, y)
] Ÿ P e 2
, y
In (19), there are four inputs, two arguments (x and y) and two event-types (e 1
and e 2
). These are
distributed † across two events in the following manner: the first predicate involves the action of x
upon y in terms of e 1
; the second event involves y expressed in terms of e 2
; these two events are
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structured as an "exhaustive ordered part of", or one event followed by another, where the first is
seen as leading to or bringing about the second. For example, Pustejovsky presents build and arrive
as representative of a structuring of events according to

as being "built"? When the last slate is put on the roof? When the last knob is screwed onto the
drawers in the kitchen? When does someone on a train to Paris qualify as having "arrived"? When
the train enters the suburbs? When the train stops at the station?
This point towards a norm-based conception of building and arriving, and thus causation
generally. It can be claimed that the problems raised by the example and discussion of (21) fall into
part of a wider pattern. Exactly what this pattern consists in is difficult to define; the relevant idea
at this juncture is that all causative predicates denote a progression towards a terminal point and
that overlap between the two is inevitable. This is not problematic if the causative structure is one
that overlaps in the way seen in the following figure:
Planning — Groundwork — Foundations — Walls — Roof — Windows — Fittings
Figure 1: Causative time scale for build – progression towards the terminal point
Finally — under the minimalist approach outlined above — it is important that the theoretical view
of causation denote the causing argument as a single aseity, and that the semantic properties of this
argument be relevant in the context of selection and interpretation, but be transparent to
grammatical processes.
(22a) Kim's liking Les irritated Sandy.
(22b) That Kim had done a triple somersault and then spilt ice-cream on Sandy's costume
annoyed Les.
Given the facts that the events Kim's liking Les and That Kim had done a triple somersault and
then spilt ice-cream on Sandy's costume in (22) are grammatically the same as the NPs Kim, Sandy
or it, it is safe to assume that the fine-grained semantic properties of these NPs are irrelevant to
their selection as subject; it can, however, be demonstrated that ability to act as the causing
argument of a causative structure is relevant to their selection. The selection and felicity of Kim's
liking Les as a cause of irritation for Sandy testifies to the fact the semantic properties of cause
arguments (and arguments more generally) are subject to coarse-grained selectional restrictions. The
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cause arguments in (22) denote events/states; the fact is that these verbs are also felicitous with a
wide array of other arguments types (NPs denoting individuals, inanimate objects and concepts). In
(22), it is not the semantic properties of the (individual parts of) the cause arguments that coerce a
psych interpretation, but the meaning of the verb itself in conjunction with its selectional
restrictions. In cases where the verb at hand is not a psych-verb, e.g. The article gave Sandy a fright
it is the grammatically-relevant semantic properties of the cause argument that most obviously
distinguish this verb from its non-psych usage.
Thus, for psych-verbs, one property of the causing argument is that it may be a simple NP
or a complex structure denoting a thing capable of carrying out the act denoted by the verb; it is
pertinent to ask what other properties the argument must/may have other than those that qualify it
as a suitable phrase type. It is obvious that the causative argument of psych-verbs can be a
multitude of things, here are some examples:
(23a)
(23b)
(24a)
(24b)
(25a)
(25b)
(26a)
(26b)
Kim/The dog frightened Sandy.
Kim/Hunden skremte Sandy.
Kim/Dog-the scared Sandy
'Kim/The dog scared Sandy'
Kim's behaviour frightened Sandy.
Kims oppførsel skremte Sandy
Kim's behaviour scared Sandy
'Kim's behaviour scared Sandy'
The darkness/The painting frightened Sandy.
Mørket/Maleriet skremte Sandy.
Dark-the/Painting-the scared Sandy
'The darkness/The painting scared Sandy'
That idea frightened Sandy.
Denne idéen skremte Sandy.
That idea-the scared Sandy
'That idea scared Sandy'
Thus, English and Norwegian frighten-type psych-verbs allow the following to be their causing
arguments: animate, sentient individuals (23), conceptual properties of individuals (24), inanimate
objects (25) and concepts (26). These are diverse; how can this be reconciled with the coherence
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normally expected of verb-group arguments? Bouchard's conclusion that all subjects of frightentype
verbs are Bouchard-type Concepts allows us avoid discussion of the topic in a neat way:
saying that these arguments are Concepts allows us to claim that these arguments involve
conceptualizations of the things they denote, rather than the things themselves because the event
takes place in "mental space". This argument is beneficial to the analysis in a number of ways, as
will be seen below. And, the fact that agentive/intentional interpretations select a (Bouchardian)
Substantive as subject proves unproblematic under the present analysis too because "mental space"
must be located in a suitable "vessel". A final matter is the competency of the argument realized as
the subject to perform the activity described by the verb itself: the subject must generally be held to
carry out the action described by the verb. Since the action expressed by psych-verbs takes place in
"mental space", it is safe to assume that this action is carried out by some conceptualization that is
in turn created in the mental space of the individual (the cause argument may, for example, be
created by relation to some property associated with that cause; for example, the fact that dogs bite
makes Sandy scared of the dogs). This too is unproblematic under Bouchard's analysis because the
properties are assumed to be associated with Concepts (in the Bouchardian sense), rather than
individuals (Substantives and I-Subjects).
Thus, it has been argued pace Bouchard (1995) and Pesetsky (1995) that frighten-type
verbs are generally causative and that these have a bi-eventive structure; it has been demonstrated
that psych-verbs can successfully be analysed as taking a Concept as their causing argument and a
Substantive (again in the Bouchardian sense) as the experiencing argument. This is not, however, the
full story as regards the experiencing argument; in Chapter 5, an explanation will be given as to why
fear-type verbs behave the way they do.
4.2.2 An argument against the causative analysis of psych-verbs
Martin (2001) offers an aspectual analysis where she claims that there are two subtypes of
frighten-type psych-verbs, type I and II, (27a) and (27b) respectively:
(27a)
Le chat a enquiquiné/calmé/séduit/encouragé la souris pendant toute l'après-midi.
The cat annoyed/calmed/seduced/cheered the mouse during the whole afternoon.
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(27b)
Le chat a irrité/émerveillé/impressionné/attiré la souris pendant toute l'après-midi.
The cat irritated/filled-with-wonder/impressed/attracted the mouse during the whole
afternoon.
Martin claims that type I and type II are distinguished on the basis of causation, where the
members of the first group "clearly describe the causing", whereas members of the latter group do
not. Martin (2001: 2) argues:
'With narrow scope, sentence [(27a)] is true iff the mouse feels annoyed the whole
afternoon. The annoying E performed by the cat can occur from 14.00 until 14.30 only.
With work scope, the same sentence is true iff the cat performs annoying E or is in an
annoying E for the mouse the whole afternoon. The mouse can feel annoyed from 17.00
only. With wide scope, the cat must be annoying the mouse and the mouse must feel
annoyed by the annoying E the whole afternoon. While [(27a)] has the three readings, only
two are available with [frighten-type psych-verbs] in [(27b)]: the work scope reading is
always ruled out. With [frighten-type psych-verbs] of type II, it is impossible for a durative
adverbial to modify the causing E only. For instance, [(27b)] could not apply if we want to
say that the cat performs impressive actions the whole afternoon whereas the mouse feels
impressed by the cat from 17.00 only.'
Aside from the questionable status of "work scope", where the annoyed state begins only after the
annoying event has ended, the confusion here seems to be aided-and-abetted by the use of examples
where the Cause has a possible agentive interpretation. This associates the interpretations with
agentivity distinctions rather than scopal distinctions.
The claim that the causing event cannot be modified alone, however, is plain incorrect. In the
following examples, we see that this notion is situation-bound:
(28a)
(28b)
The mouse annoyed the cat all afternoon by running in and out of its hole.
The mouse irritated the cat all afternoon by running in and out of its hole.
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(29a)
(29b)
The mouse (deliberately) annoyed the cat all afternoon, but the cat didn't even stir.
The mouse (deliberately) irritated the cat all afternoon, but the cat didn't even stir.
Note that in (28a, b) the interpretations are the same for both verb types, note that the causing
event is modified in both (29a, b). The sentences here define similar situations; what Martin points
out is that annoy is more readily interpretable in terms of the success or otherwise of a deliberate
annoying event than irritate, however, the lack of effect of this on syntax (the verbs pattern in the
same way) leads to a conclusion that this is a situation and that situations remain irrelevant to
syntax. Contrary to what Martin assumes, durative modification cannot be used as evidence that
type II verbs are not causatives.
Martin states that both subtypes of frighten-type psych-verbs behave in the same way
with locative modifiers (while one would expect them to show the same difference she claims is
seen with durative modifiers). Martin argues, however, that this cannot be taken as evidence of
uniform causativity, because it is not certain what element is being modified; whether the event or a
participant is being modified.
(30a)
(30b)
The actor *for a long time/*all afternoon bothered me.
The actor on stage bothered me.
For Martin, (30a) is ungrammatical because the durational modifier does not modify the
appropriate argument (the causing event), by contrast the locational modifier does modify the
appropriate element (the subject argument). The point here is that Martin works within a system
where the causation event is viewed á la Davidson (1966); an approach that Bouchard (1995:
318–329) shows is untenable. Firstly, note that the replacement of The actor with The noise forms
more, if not wholly, acceptable sentences; secondly, the syntactic representation of the PP
describing manner for a long time may be analysed as being of a different syntactic derivation than
on stage.
Martin presents one further argument, based on perception statements involving the two
subtypes:
(31a)
Marie a vu Pierre enquiquiner/encourager/calmer/séduire quelqu'un.
Mary saw Peter annoy/cheer/calm/seduce someone.
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(31b)
Marie a vu Pierre irriter/émerveiller/attirer/impressionner quelqu'un.
Mary saw Peter irritate/fill with wonder/attract/impress someone.
Following Parsons (2000), Martin claims that (31a) describes several situations, one of which is a
situation where Mary can see Peter, but not the person he is annoying. In Martin's terminology, the
causing event is seen, but not the caused event. On the other hand, (31b) cannot take this
interpretation, because the person Peter is annoying must be seen in order for the situation to be
"true". However, this is again situation-bound, in that a situation can be constructed where (31b)
takes this meaning: if irritating people is a characteristic function of Peter, then it is acceptable to
state that Mary saw Peter irritate someone without that person being visible to Mary. Again,
syntactic form is not affected by this, the causative analysis may be maintained irrespective of any
supposed semantic variation; again, situational notions are irrelevant to syntax, and causation is
taken to be pertinent at the level of semantics-relevant-to-syntax and syntax only.
4.2.3 Affectedness of experiencing arguments
It was mentioned above that the experiencing argument of psych-verbs was an affected
argument in the sense that it is the participant that has undergone a change of mental state. This is
demonstrable by comparison with other affected participants:
(32a)
(32b)
(33a)
(33b)
(34a)
(34b)
Kim/*The apple bit Sandy/the apple/*the idea.
Kim/*Eplet bet Sandy/bordet/*idéen.
Kim/*Apple-the bit Sandy/table-the/*idea-the
'Kim/*The apple bit Sandy/the table/*the idea'
Kim/the apple hit Sandy/the ball/*the idea.
Kim/Eplet slå Sandy/ballen/*idéen.
Kim/Apple-the hit Sandy/ball-the/*idea-the
'Kim/The apple hit Sandy/the ball/*the idea'
Kim/The Book/The idea scared Sandy/*the apple.
Kim/Historien/Idéen skremte Sandy/*eplet.
Kim/Story-the/Idea-the scared Sandy/*apple-the
'Kim/The story/The idea scared Sandy/*the apple'
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(35a)
(35b)
Sandy/*the apple feared Kim/the truth/the idea.
Sandy/*eplet fryktet Kim/sannheten/idéen.
Sandy/*apple-the feared Kim/truth-the/idea-the
'Sandy/*the apple feared Kim/the truth/the idea'
The examples in (32)–(35) show a number of things regarding the argument selection. The first thing
to notice is that the apple is unacceptable as a participant in the context of biting (32), because it
cannot carry out the action described by the verb (unless it, for example, is an animated apple with
teeth). To be acceptable, the affected participants in (32) must have substance (unless the verb is
used in a metaphorical sense), so they can be bitten, which explains the unacceptability of the idea;
affected participants such as Sandy and the table are acceptable on the grounds of their substance.
The pattern in (33) is somewhat different due to the fact that the verb can describe two different
action-types (one body-part bound and one not), both Kim and the apple are acceptable as affecting
participants; this is because there is no specification for a body-part inherent in the verb (which
there is with bite). The apple is, however, unacceptable as affecting participant if the PP with
flailing fists/med sinte never is added, because it adds a restriction that the participant must have the
described body-parts. Again, the idea is unacceptable because it has no substance, and so cannot be
met in collision. The examples in (34) reverse the pattern seen in (33), because there is a restriction
on the experiencing participant: it must be able to experience, and therefore must be sentient, which
the apple is not. Note that the stimulating/affecting participant may essentially be anything. The
pattern seen in (34) is completely reversed in (35); the affected role is now in pre-verbal position,
the affecting role in post-verbal position; the same restrictions apply to the participants in (35) as
in (34).
The examples in (32)–(35) demonstrate one further thing: the way in which fear-type verbs
in (35) pattern is to place an affected participant pre-verbally, all of the other examples place the
affected argument post-verbally. This means that frighten-type verbs are, suddenly, more "normal"
than fear-type verbs; a reversal of the usual understanding. The fact that affected roles are realized
post-verbally is a well established truth, and the notions "subject" and "object" are generally
associated with "doer" (affecting participant) and "done to" (affected participant) respectively. It
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will be seen later that this is of great importance as regards the way in which fear-type verbs are
analysed in this thesis.
4.2.4 Aspects of aspect
Van Voorst (1992) presents an interesting analysis of the aspectual properties of psychverbs;
his data is summed up in figure 2.
State
Achievement
Accomplishment
Activity
Psychological verbs
Example
have
see
notice
break
eat
detest
in X minutes
begin
begin
begin
begin/end
begin
?begin
for X minutes
ok
ok
*
*
ok
ok
almost
begin
begin
begin
begin/end
begin
begin
individuation
no
influence
no
influence
no
influence
influence
influence
no
influence
takes place
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Figure 2: Van Voorst's analysis of the aspects of the various verb groups
(adapted from Van Voorst (1992: 81)).
Van Voorst's analysis is an application of Dowty's (1979) tests 23 , developed for aspectual
verb-classes originally presented in work by Vendler (1967). The relevant tests (represented in the
leftmost column of the table above) include:
• in X minutes tests how verb meaning is modified by a temporal adjunct in five
minutes; verbs differ between a beginning or ending interpretation (only
accomplishments, such as break, allow an ending interpretation);
• for X minutes tests whether or not verbs form acceptable sentences with this
temporal adjunct (only "non-punctual" (verbs that, for example, denote a change of
state that occurs in a very short space of time such as break) verbs are compatible
with this adjunct);
• almost tests whether the action denoted by a verb is interpreted as beginning or
23
Note that Van Voorst (1992: 81) states that a sixth test can be omitted '…as it cannot be applied across the board to
all data.' In fact, this test, titled "was Xing" by Van Voorst, potentially differentiates the two groups of psych-verbs as
some members, but not all, are incompatible with this test.
(ia) *Kim was fearing Sandy. (ib) The cats are adoring their fish.
(iia) Kim was frightening Sandy. (iib) The hatstand is putting Kim into a tizz.
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ending when modified by this adverb (only accomplishments, such as break, allow
an ending interpretation);
• individuation tests whether verbs allow both in X minutes and for X minutes when
when their objects are individuated (a specific individual is denoted, such as John, or
the man), thus distinguishing those verbs that do (accomplishments and activities)
from those that do not (states, achievements and psych-verbs);
• "takes place" tests whether a verb is a state or not, because states are (arguably) the
only aspectual class that does not take place (they just are).
Note that Van Voorst's analysis shows psych-verbs to have similar properties to non-punctual
achievements. This is interesting because psych-verbs are normally assumed to be states. Consider
the following examples:
(36a)
(36b)
(37a)
(37b)
Kim fears dogs.
Dogs frighten Kim.
Kim frykter hunder.
Kim fears dogs
Hunder skremmer Kim.
Dogs frighten Kim
(36a, 37a) and (36b, 37b) are normally assumed to denote states where a participant (Kim)
experiences a persistent emotional state (fear) because of some stimulating participant (dogs). On
closer consideration, however, this does not seem to be the case: two different psych
interpretations are relevant in (36). (36a) can, intuitively, be said to denote a persistent state, where
Kim need not necessarily be in the presence of dogs in order to fear them (the idea of dogs may act
as stimulus for fear for Kim; this particular interpretation seems to be entailed by (36a, 37a)). On
the other hand, (36b, 37b) does not allow such an interpretation, Kim is only frightened by dogs
when in their presence, or in the presence of something that triggers the concept dogs in Kim's
mind.
Note that Dogs frighten Kim also has a generic, habitual interpretation, but the meaning
remains something like 'whenever Kim is in the presence of dogs/or some other stimulus that
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triggers the concept dogs, Kim experiences this emotion'; this is quite different to the
interpretations of (36a, 37a). This difference between fear and frighten-type psych-verbs can be
defined in terms of whether they entail the occurrence of some incident or not. The examples in (38,
39) below demonstrate that some incident has occurred in (38a, 39a), whereas no definable incident
has occurred in (38b, 39b).
(38a)
(38b)
(39a)
(39b)
(The) Ferris wheels frightened Kim.
Kim feared (the) ferris wheels.
Pariserhjul skremte Kim.
Paris-wheel scared Kim
'Ferris wheels scared Kim'
Kim fryktet pariserhjul.
Kim feared Paris-wheel
'Kim feared ferris wheels'
(38a, 39a) denotes an incident where Kim has ridden on/been in proximity to a ferris wheel and been
frightened by the experience; no such statement is true about (38b, 39b). This can be seen in how
these verbs react to stimuli such as X's death:
(40a)
(40b)
(41a)
(41b)
Kim feared Sandy's death.
Sandy's death frightened Kim.
Kim fryktet Sandys død.
Kim feared Sandy's death
Sandys død skremte Kim.
Sandy's death scared Kim
It is quite feasible to interpret that Kim thinks that Sandy might die from (40a, 41a), whereas this is
not possible for (40b, 41b); (40a, 41a) may also mean a number of other things, such as Kim fears
dying in the same way as Sandy. (40b, 41b) is restricted to meaning that Sandy is deceased and this
has frightened Kim (Kim has perhaps started eating low-cholestorol products, and exercises far
more often than used to be the case). This contrast allows for an interesting distinction between fear
and frighten-type verbs: when the stimulating argument is his/her own death, fear only allows an
interpretation where the experiencing participant is not looking forward to dying, frighten allows
the curious image of a ghost that is emotionally affected by recalling how it died:
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(42a)
(42b)
Its own death frightened the ghost.
The ghost feared its own death. (= the ghost fears dying again)
This shows that there is an aspectual difference between the fear and frighten-type verbs,
contradicting Van Voorst's claim that no such difference exists. What the difference consists in is a
question that remains to be answered. Before doing so, it is pertinent to ask why Van Voorst would
choose to group fear and frighten-type verbs together in one class.
Van Voorst (1992: 82) argues that psych-verbs are like achievements because:
'…psychological verbs occur in constructions that are unlike accomplishments, as they do
not imply a process leading up to a final change of state. They are unlike activities, as a
change in their direct object in terms of individuation does not turn them into
accomplishments. They are also unlike states because they take place or happen.'
Exactly how true is this? Returning to the tests Van Voorst uses to differentiate the classes, it
should be noted that the examples he uses tend towards the strange:
(43a)
(43b)
?I admired these Chagalls in an hour (because, at first I had to try hard to understand
them). (begin)
He felt dreadful at first, but that clown amused him in an hour (by jumping up and
down, he was really sad and after an hour he suddenly shows a smile). (begin)
It can not be argued that fear-type verbs allow begin-only interpretations when combined with in X
minutes, nor can it be argued that frighten-type verbs allow both beginning and ending
interpretations:
(44a)
(44b)
Kim will frighten Sandy in five minutes, after we've finished lunch.
Kim will frighten Sandy in five minutes, and then won't need to carry on trying.
(45) The television programme will amuse Kim in five minutes (that's when the funny bit
is).
(46) His behaviour will strike you as odd in five minutes, you won't notice it before then.
It seems then that only agentive frighten-type psych-verbs allow beginning/ending interpretations,
causative and psych constructions do not. This counters Van Voorst's argument that there are no
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frighten-type verbs that are compatible with in X minutes.
The next test is a plain mistake, Van Voorst claims that (47) below is ungrammatical:
(47) He constructed a boat for just over fifteen days.
The example in (47) is grammatical for me; it does not entail that the boat was finished, but it is
grammatical. Thus, this cannot be used as a test to distinguish Accomplishments from other
aspectual verb classes. The frighten-type psych-verbs repeat this pattern, showing that they
pattern with build rather than notice.
The next test involves insertion of almost into a sentence and observing whether the result
allows a beginning or an ending interpretation or both.
(48a)
(48b)
Kim almost frightened Sandy, but then decided to frighten Les instead.
Kim almost frightened Sandy into telling Les about Kim's brother.
(49) The television programme almost bored Sandy to death.
(50) The nastiness of the idea almost made Kim sick to the gills.
These examples show that frighten-type verbs are compatible with "result phrases" that give
almost an ending interpretation. When added to the illustration of compatibility with the
progressive outlined in footnote 11 above, there are a number of indicators that point to a split
analysis for psych-verbs. Van Voorst's analysis of the aspect of psych-verbs cannot be relied upon
as a firm basis from which to argue that fear and frighten-type verbs share aspectual properties. It
seems to be more the case that fear-type verbs map in a similar way to non-punctual achievements
as Van Voorst claims, while frighten-type verbs map with accomplishments. On the basis of this, it
is the case that fear-type verbs have similar aspectual properties to verbs such as see. Taking a
closer look at these verbs reveals that the similarity extends to the domains of syntax and semantics
too.
(51a)
(51b)
Kim fears Sandy.
Kim frykter Sandy.
Kim fears Sandy
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(52a)
(52b)
(53a)
(53b)
(54a)
(54b)
(55a)
(55b)
(56a)
(56b)
(57a)
(57b)
(58a)
(58b)
(59a)
(59b)
(60a)
(60b)
(61a)
(61b)
Kim sees Sandy.
Kim ser Sandy.
Kim sees Sandy
*Kim is fearing Sandy.
*Kim is seeing Sandy.
Kim feared that Sandy was ill.
Kim fryktet at Sandy var syk.
Kim feared that Sandy was sick
Kim saw that Sandy was ill.
Kim så at Sandy var syk.
Kim saw that Sandy was sick
*Sandy fears easily.
*Sandy frykter seg lett.
*Sandy sees easily.
*Sandy ser seg lett.
Kim feared Sandy's honesty.
Kim fryktet Sandys ærlighet.
Kim feared Sandy's honesty
Kim feared the honesty in Sandy.
Kim fryktet ærligheten i Sandys ansikt.
Kim feared honesty-the in Sandy's face
'Kim feared the honesty in Sandy's face'
Kim saw Sandy's honesty.
Kim så Sandys ærlighet.
Kim saw Sandy's honesty
Kim saw the honesty in Sandy.
Kim så ærligheten i Sandys ansikt.
Kim saw honesty-the in Sandy's face
'Kim saw the honesty in Sandy's face'
While this is the case, see does not pattern exactly like fear, as they are distinguished by
participation in the following alternations:
(62a)
(62b)
Kim saw/??feared Sandy jumping through the window.
Sandy was seen/*feared jumping through the window.
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(63a)
(63b)
Kim feared/saw Les and Sandy's honesty.
Kim feared/*saw Les and Sandy for their honesty.
(62) demonstrates that fear-type verbs do not take a small clause as complement; (63b)
demonstrates that see does not participate in the fear-type psych-verb-specific possessor object
possessor-attribute factoring alternation (as discussed in Chapter 2). A remaining difference can be
seen in the way these verbs interact with subordinate clauses containing modal verbs:
(64a)
(64b)
(65a)
(65b)
Kim fears that the ceiling might fall in.
Kim feared that the ceiling would fall in.
Kim saw that the ceiling might fall in.
Kim saw that the ceiling would fall in.
The sentences in (64) and (65a) mean the same: that the ceiling may fall in. In (65b), that the ceiling
is going to fall in is a foregone conclusion; this points back to elements of the discussion regarding
stimulating participants of fear-type verbs. The properties of the stimulating participant seem
account for a number of the differences between see-type verbs and fear-type verbs; it is also the
case that see involves direct perception, whereas fear does not (a Concept which authors fear may,
for example, be the result of third-hand information).
4.2.5 Frighten-type psych-verbs compared with other causatives
The fact that frighten-type psych-verbs are similar to causative constructions has already
been discussed, but it remains to discuss how they differ. Again, the difference lies in the properties
of arguments, in conspiracy with the notion that psych causation takes place in "mental space".
This is amply demonstrated by the restrictions on types of activity that are associated with psychverbs;
it must be possible to cause these events in mental space, which can be seen in the fact that
we interpret one and the same verb in two different ways (psych or non-psych) according to which
activity is caused:
(66a)
(66b)
Kim gave Sandy a stick.
Kim gave Sandy a fright.
In (66a), the event is one which cannot be interpreted as being in mental space; in (66b), the event
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can only be interpreted as taking place in mental space. But this is not the only special feature of
psych-causation; the properties of the participants are also relevant: if a non-psych causative verb
is coupled with psych-compatible participants, it becomes a psych-verb:
(67a)
(67b)
Kim sent a firecracker down Sandy's spine.
Kim sent a chill down Sandy's spine.
Norwegian is somewhat more restrictive, in that class crossovers are less common; they are,
however, to be found, although the example uses a combination of the two effects outlined above: a
change in activity that is caused and the use of psych-compatible participants:
(67a)
(67b)
Kim sendte småstein nedover ryggen til Sandy.
Kim sent small-stones down-over spine to Sandy
'Kim sent small stones down Sandy's spine'
Kims blikk sendte ilinger nedover ryggen til Sandy.
Kim's gaze sent shivers down-over spine to Sandy
'Kim's gaze sent shivers down Sandy's spine'
Note that the "agentive" Kim and the causative Kims blikk both occupy the same position, this fact,
noted in Grimshaw's analysis, will prove to be important in the the next section.
4.3 The analysis
This section presents a minimalist perspective on the analysis of English and Norwegian
psych-verbs, which accounts for the phenomena discussed above. The first part recapitulates some
important matters, the second part presents an analysis of psych-verbs from the perspective of the
discussion presented above.
4.3.1 Internal arguments and external arguments
In the sections above, it was noted that the aspectual and selectional properties of fear-type
and frighten-type verbs are actually quite different. While their meanings are similar, their syntactic
and aspectual behaviour is far from congruent. It was demonstrated that frighten-type verbs have
similar properties to causative verbs, and that fear-type verbs are similar in certain ways to verbs of
perception; this proves to be an important factor in the analysis presented here.
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The properties of the arguments of psych-verbs were also presented as different to what
has normally been assumed: the arguments of frighten-type verbs have been analysed here as a
causative participant and an experiencing participant, while the arguments of fear-type verbs have
been analysed as an experiencing participant and a stimulating participant. This has been the case in
order to avoid an analysis which relies on thematic notions, but results in one which is nevertheless
broadly compatible with analyses which rely on such notions. The next section covers the syntactic
realization and mapping of these arguments within the minimalist framework presented here.
4.3.2 vP, VP, internality and externality
Given the current framework and its assumptions regarding the syntax and semantics of fear
and frighten-type psych-verbs, the following facts have appeared in the preceding sections:
• the subject of frighten-type psych-verbs is a "proper" subject 24 ;
• it displays causative behaviour, and frighten-type constructions pattern, generally,
in a similarly way to causative constructions (including causative morphology, in
those languages that have it);
• the subject of fear-type verbs is a "proper" subject 25 ;
• while this is the case, the subjects are not "canonical" subjects 26 because they are
affected participants;
• the objects of frighten-type verbs are candidates for objecthood because they are
affected participants, and the often cited fact that causative arguments are always
realized as subject (cf. Grimshaw (1990) and Pesetsky (1995));
• the object of fear-type verbs is a candidate for objecthood because it is a noncausative
stimulating argument.
Any subsequent analysis must account for the following facts in a satisfactory manner: the
24
"Proper" in the sense that it is not an object or in some rightward VP-adjoined position, as analysed by Belletti &
Rizzi (1988), or that the subject of frighten-type verbs has some "quirky" aspectual properties involving a mismatch
between aspectual and thematic properties, as Grimshaw (1990) assumes. "Proper" subjects may be aligned with the
configurationally highest argument in a predicate.
25
See previous footnote.
26
If one assumes that "canonical" subjects are typically "affectors" not "affectees".
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mapping of causative participants to subject position; the observed difference between subjects of
fear and frighten-type verbs; and the mapping of the objects: the experiencing participant for
frighten-type verbs and the stimulating participant for fear-type verbs.
The solution postulated here is a simple analysis based on a version of the Larsonian VPshell.
The Larsonian shell consists of a complex VP, such as that in (68):
(68) VP
NP i
V'
V° VP
NP j
V'
V° NP k
The use of this particular shell is not new, variants can be found in, among others, Chomsky
(1995b, 2000) and Hale & Keyser (1993) and in the literature on psych-verbs in both Arad (1998)
and Bennis (2002) 27 . It is generally assumed that the upper [spec, VP] is the locus of agentive/
causative arguments, while the lower [spec, VP] is reserved for affected arguments. The difference
between the upper VP and the lower VP is demonstrated in (69):
27
Arad (1998) presents an analysis of psych-verbs that differs from the approach presented here, Arad's approach
revolves around the idea of reconciling a Grimshaw-type approach — splitting the frighten-type verbs into two groups,
one agentive, one non-agentive. This results in an analysis of a subset of frighten-type verbs which map the
stimulating participant of their agentive readings to the upper [spec, VP], whereas their Stative readings map their
subjects to the lower [spec, VP]. This analysis is unacceptable under current assumptions as it maps participants
heteromorphically into syntax.
Bennis (2000) presents an analysis using the VP-shell, where he claims that there is a subgroup of Dutch
psych-verbs that are unaccusative, based on Burzio's tests (which were demonstrated to be indicative of nothing in
Chapter 3) and data from Dutch adjectives. The analysis is outside the scope of the present work because it relies on a
class of verbs that is found only in Dutch, namely those that select the auxiliary zijn as opposed to hebben, a
distinction which is seen in neither English nor Norwegian. It is also the case that this is a spurious test as Bennis
inadvertently points out himself, as "[i]n general, ergative verbs select the auxiliary zijn 'to be', whereas unergative
verbs select the auxiliary hebben 'to have'…." (Bennis (2000: 33) [my emphasis]
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(69) VP Less affected
NP i
V'
V° VP More affected
NP j
V'
V° NP k
Thus there is a division of labour such that the upper part takes those arguments that are
agentive/causative and the lower part takes those that are affected. Quite logically, then, causative
participants will be mapped to the upper [spec, VP], whereas experiencing — being affected —
participants will be mapped to the lower part of the structure.
The Larsonian VP-shells were developed to account for so-called light verbs such as get and
give. The modern notation for the VP-shell is presented thus:
(70) vP
NP
v'
Sandy v° VP
[+v] NP V'
Kim V° NP
got the ball
The lower VP is headed by the lexical verb, the upper vP by an abstract verbal head (represented
by [+v] in (70)). The content of the abstract verbal feature contained in v° is potentially many
things, under the present analysis, it need only be assumed that it contains features associated with
the function of affecting, namely a cluster of properties associated with agentive/causative
interpretations. This explains the difference between the different possible interpretations of get. In
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order to account for the differences observed, a raising analysis is proposed for those verbs that
have agentive/causative interpretations, where the lexical verb itself raises to v° and absorbs the
affecting features of the abstract element found there.
(71a) Kim got the ball ('receive' interpretation)
(71b) Sandy got v
Kim t v
the ball ('give' interpretation)
(71c) Sandy got v
t v
the ball ('take' interpretation)
(71a) presents a grammatical construction contained entirely within the lower VP, where Kim
receives the ball from an unexpressed third party. (71b) presents a ditransitive construction spread
across the VP-shell; here, the verb moves from V° to v° incorporating the abstract head in v°. Note
that the verb then takes on the causative/agentive properties associated with the abstract verbal
head. In (71c), a third reading is presented, one where an activity is initiated to retrieve the ball;
here the verb moves from V° to v° and incorporates the abstract verbal head in v°. A question that
it is pertinent to ask is whether or not the subject argument is generated in the lower VP and moves
with the lexical verb. Under the present analysis this is assumed not to be the case; the abstract
verbal head in v° directly selects an argument capable of carrying out the agentive/causative activity
the abstract element denotes. It is therefore inappropriate to assume movement of an element from
[spec, VP] to [spec, vP].
These patterns account for psych-verbs in the following way: fear-type verbs, which
always denote events that are typically describe "affectedness", are generated and remain in the
lower VP. This affectedness can be characterized as an analogue to that of a "receive" interpretation
of get, in that there is an affected argument in subject position. This fits in with the discussion in
the previous sections, where the affectedness of the external argument of fear-type verbs was
pointed out.
Frighten-type verbs, however, describe an affecting event, where the pre-verbal argument
affects the post-verbal argument. This pattern is often viewed as canonical: the subject is often
aligned with the "do-er" and the object the "done to". In the present context, this means that the
pre-verbal argument is selected by the abstract verbal head in v° and realized in [spec, vP] and that
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the lexical verb moves to and incorporates the abstract head in v°, thus obtaining the affecting
features generated there.
A new question arises relating to where the post-verbal argument is realized in the lower
VP: is this argument realized in [comp, VP] or [spec, VP]? Of course, stating that the external
argument is realized in [spec, VP] means that the experiencing argument is realized in the same
position for both frighten and fear-type verbs; assuming that this is the case allows one to imagine
that there is a universal position for affecting and affected arguments, such that — to use Pesetsky's
terminology — the Cause argument is the highest in its predicate, and the Experiencer argument is
the highest in its predicate. This would result in the following structure:
(72) vP
NP
v'
Kim v° VP
[+v] NP V'
Sandy V°
frighten
The fact that the majority of psych-verbs pattern in this way adds more evidence for this particular
analysis. It should be remembered, however, that [spec, vP] is assumed to be associated — through
selection by the abstract verbal head in v° — with the semantic properties of that head. Since, in
the cases seen so far, these properties have been associated with "affecting", [spec, vP] has been
termed a locus for affecting arguments (e.g. agentive/causative arguments). In turn, it cannot be
claimed that the lower VP is subject to anything other than the same processes, e.g. the selectional
restrictions of the verbal head in V°. Thus, the argument in the position [spec, vP], is constrained
by the selectional restrictions of the abstract verbal head denoting an "affecting" event, which can be
roughly defined as an argument capable of performing an affecting event. The arguments in the
lower VP, however, are selected by a wide array of different heads, and it is thus that [spec, VP]
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cannot be claimed to be a default position for specific affected arguments. This is evident in the
examples below:
(73a)
vP
NP
v'
Kim v° VP
[+v] NP V'
Sandy V° NP
gave a fright
(73b)
vP
NP
v'
Kim v° VP
[+v] NP V'
the fear V° PP
of God
put into Sandy
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(73c)
vP
NP
v'
Kim v° VP
[+v] NP V'
Ø V° AgrP
gjorde/made NP Agr'
Sandy j
Agr° V/AP
redd/scared k
NP V/A'
t j
V/A°
t k
(73a) and (73b) show that on a psych interpretation give allows so-called diathesis alternations,
alternating complements between the forms NP NP and NP PP, where the affected argument is
realized as the underlined phrase. This alone shows that the experiencing argument is realized in
two positions. In (73c), the experiencing argument is realised in [spec, V/AP] and moved up the tree
to [spec, AgrP] to fulfil requirements of the Case filter 28 , in which case, it is debatable whether the
lexical verb gjøre/make is generated in V° at all as these verbs are often assumed to be associated
only with causation. It is assumed here that the verbs are generated in V° in order to select an
affected argument as complement (in English and Norwegian, this will always be an AgrP).
In any of these cases, [spec, VP] cannot be said to be directly linked to the experiencing
argument. This, in essence, is also a counter argument to Pesetsky's claim that the Experiencer is
always the configurationally-highest argument in its predicate; a fact contradicted directly by the
realisation of the experiencing argument in (73b). The correlation Pesetsky describes is due to the
28
In order to be realized phonetically, an element must receive Case; in the present instance, the Case-assigning
position may be assumed to be [spec, AgrP].
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fact that the majority of heads generated in the lower VP do indeed select the experiencing argument
as their specifier, but this is perhaps due to a number of coincidental factors, including the scarcity
of ditransitives in English and Norwegian. It is, principally, the assumption that the experiencing
argument is not always the highest argument in the configuration of its predicate that distinguishes
this analysis from that of Pesetsky (1995).
What has been shown is that the argument realized in [spec, vP] is selected to carry out the
affecting event denoted by the abstract verbal head in v°; the argument realized in [spec, VP] by
contrast is associated with a variety of lexical items which may select different arguments as their
specifiers — the seeming correlation between affected arguments and [spec, VP] is in truth due to
the fact that many, but by no means all, verbs generated in the lower VP select one and only one
argument and if the upper vP describes an affecting event, then the argument in the lower VP will,
by default, be affected. In cases where there are two arguments in the lower VP, an experiencing
argument is not necessarily realized in [spec, VP], but often is (cf. (73a, b) above).
This project therefore analyses the basic structure of fear-type psych-verbs as being a a
transitive complex (one verb with two arguments) generated in a simple VP. This simple VP
describes the emotion event, and defines the relationship between the arguments in a predictable
way; this predictability is extended to other verbs which realize similar argument-relationships,
such as perception verbs as discussed above.
Frighten-type verbs are realized in a VP-shell, where the affected, experiencing argument is
selected by a verbal or adverbial head; in the former case, if the frighten-type verb selects only two
arguments, the experiencing argument will most likely be generated in [spec, VP]; if the frightentype
verb is ditransitive, then the realization of the two post-verbal arguments varies. The affecting
argument is realized in [spec, vP] and is selected by an abstract verbal head denoting an affecting
event; this abstract head is later incorporated into the lexical verb generated in V°, when this lexical
verb raises to v°.
In terms of marvel-type verbs, the analysis is the same as that of fear-type verbs, but with
the object realized as a PP; in terms of wonder-type verbs, a particle analysis must be adopted:
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(74) VP
NP V'
Kim V x NP
V° Prt Sandy
marvel at
In this case, the verb and particle are sisters, this analysis allows a definition of the object as a
direct object, thus allowing passivization and the other alternations these verbs are observed as
undergoing.
The objects of wonder-type verbs are realized as simple PPs:
(75) VP
NP V'
Kim V° PP
wonder
about Sandy
Note that the PP-object cannot raise to form a grammatical passive, this fact is accounted for by the
structure here: the fact that the object is a PP-object, and not a direct object (an NP in [comp, VP]),
prevents raising.
The object of appeal-type verbs is also realized as a PP-object, thus:
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(76) vP
NP v'
Kim v° VP
appeal v
NP V'
V° PP
t v
to Sandy
Note that the positions to which the arguments are mapped does not appear to be systematic,
especially in the sense applied by analyses that appeal to the thematic hierarchy. The mapping
does have structure structure: the assignment of (intentional) causative arguments to the upper vP;
the assignment of Bouchard "psy-chose" arguments and experiencing arguments to the lower VP.
It has now been shown that the division of labour between the upper vP and lower VP
accounts for the observed structures, and provides a simple mapping schema. Turning away from
this for a moment, it may be desirable to present an account where the causing argument of frightentype
verbs is not selected by the abstract verbal head in v°, but by the lexical verb in V°. In this
way, the subject of frighten-type verbs may be realized in [spec, VP]; this entails that the subject
of frighten-type verbs have similar properties to other affected subjects (cf. experiencing arguments
in fear-type constructions). This does not at first glance appear to be a correct hypothesis,
however, some approaches have suggested exactly this, especially in regard to those verbs that
Grimshaw (1990) claims not to have agentive interpretations. The linking of agentivity with the
upper vP is tenuous, because the agentive/causative distinction is tenuous: can the properties of an
agent and a cause really be delimited as separate entities? If the inclusion of "intention" is what
marks out an agent from a cause, then Kim concerns Sandy ought to be agentive in relation to the
causative The exams concern Sandy. This is not the case: some properties of verbs such as concern
and please make it impossible to interpret them as agentive in the sense applied by Grimshaw
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(1990). This fact makes the argument for not mapping the pre-verbal argument directly to [spec,
vP] inconsequential; note that it cannot be argued that the pre-verbal argument is not a cause for
concern.
The remaining argument for not mapping the pre-verbal argument of frighten-type verb to
[spec, VP] is the fact that the lexical verb of frighten-type constructions is assumed to move from
V° to v°. Since this is true, the movement of the pre-verbal argument to [spec, vP] may not take
place, because of Chomsky's (1995: 185) notion of equidistance: that '…two targets of movement
are equidistant if they are in the same minimal domain….' Minimal domain refers here to the
projections of v°/V° and the categories dominated by them, thus if the lexical verb raises to v°, the
experiencing and stimulating participants are equidistant from [spec, vP], allowing either element to
move. This prevents one from applying a VP-internal hypothesis for the causing argument of
frighten-type verbs, because the experiencing argument is never seen pre-verbally in active
constructions involving verbs in this class (the antecedent argument of reflexive constructions in
Norwegian may be considered to be a preverbal experiencer, but this is would make the reflexive
element superfluous, if the pre-verbal element could be both causing and experiencing argument.).
The next chapter demonstrates how this analysis fits in with the data from English and
Norwegian presented in Chapter 2.
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5.0 Introduction
This chapter constitutes an analysis of the English and Norwegian data presented in
Chapter 2 in light of the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4. This chapter is structured in the following
way, the first part treats basic data, the second part presents an analysis of more complex data such
as sentential complementization, backward binding and middles. The final section treats the class of
psych-constructions described in Chapter 2, in addition to some constructions identified by Bech
Lutnæs & Åfarli (2000).
5.1 Accounting for the basic data
As was seen in Chapter 4, psych-verbs are amenable to a VP-shell analysis; it is pertinent
to ask how this works in practice. Does the VP-shell provide a useful way of describing the
syntactic patterns associated with psych-verbs? Can it describe the patterns observed in
Norwegian? It will be shown in the next sections that the answer to these questions is "yes".
5.1.1 Prepositional alternations
(1b):
It was noted in Chapter 2 that certain frighten-type verbs allow alternations of the type in
(1a)
(1b)
(2a)
(2b)
Sandy delights Kim.
Kim delights in Sandy.
Sandy frightens Kim.
*Kim frightens at Sandy.
This is an alternation between a transitive and a prepositional-transitive form of a verb; the
prepositional form should perhaps be grouped with the prepositional subtype of fear-type verbs.
This is backed up by tests used to disambiguate wonder-type verbs (intransitive verbs) from
marvel-type verbs (prepositional verbs), i.e., do they passivize?
(3) Sandy was delighted in (by Kim).
On the basis of this, it seems to be the case that some English frighten-type psych-verbs have two
forms: one a simple transitive — the frighten-type usage — and another, prepositional, usage. The
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transitive use clearly depicts the affectedness of the object, indicating causation (the object is
affected, while the subject clearly is not) and placing focus on the causation event, while the
prepositional use moves the focus to the resultant state, without direct reference to causation. In
fact, it is fair to say that (2b) denotes some eternal property of Kim, while (2a) denotes some
property of "Kim in contact with Sandy". Recall that Norwegian does not allow such derivations,
this is perhaps because the verb-class boundaries are stronger in that language.
The radical change in meaning indicates that the prepositional form is quite unlike the plain
transitive form, indicating that an analysis where these two verb forms are different lexical items is
correct: it is not desirable, nor is it possible to derive the surface order of (2b) from (2a). This is
clear because it would require that one of these constructions have a derived subject, and since both
forms passivize, this cannot be the case. Therefore, the prepositional form is assumed to be
congruent with marvel-type verbs, sharing their analysis.
5.1.2 PRO-arb Object alternation
The PRO-arb object alternation involves suppression of the object; while the object is not
syntactically present, it is nevertheless implicit. This object is interpreted as a generalized body of
people, i.e, somebody. The examples in (22) and (23) from Chapter 2 are repeated here for
convenience.
(22a)
(22b)
(23a)
(23b)
The story about the Scotsman never fails to annoy Scottish people.
The story about the Scotsman never fails to annoy.
Historien om skotten slutter aldri å irritere skotter.
Story-the about Scot-the stops never to irritate scots
'The story never stops/fails to irritate Scotsmen'
*Historien om skotten slutter aldri å irritere.
Story-the about Scot-the stops never to irritate
The syntactic analysis here requires that the deletion of the object be reflected in some way.
Note that Bouchard (1995) argues generally against the use of non-overt syntax on the grounds that
there should be an one-to-one correspondence between the levels of syntax and semantics.
However, in cases where there is an apparent mismatch between the two levels, because of the idea
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that all elements '…must respect Homomorphic Mapping' (ibid.: 25) — this can be read as entailing
that a perceived element must be mapped into syntax, even though it is phonetically null.
Whatever element is in object position, it must fill the space left by the deleted NP, and
carry the semantics that are obviously present. Surprisingly, PRO is not a candidate here, because
PRO is restricted to non-governed positions, and here the position is governed by V°. In fact, using
Haegeman's (1987) analysis, it is possible to postulate that the gap is filled by some other empty
category, the contents of which are unfortunately outside the scope of the present discussion. The
reason for the absence of this construction from Norwegian is probably linked to the some
parameter in Norwegian does not allow object deletion without overt reference to a topic, thus (6)
is grammatical.
(6) Rør ut [posens innhold] i
. Kok opp ec i
under omrøring. 29
Move out [bag's contents]. Cook up under about-moving
'Mix. Boil while stirring'
English, on the other hand allows object deletion without reference to an overt topic (as in (22b)),
such that the object is replaced by an empty category, which links to the level of semantics and fills
the complement position of the verb, forming a grammatical sentence.
5.1.3 Possessor Subject Possessor-Attribute Factoring
alternation
Both English and Norwegian allow the possessor subject possessor-attribute factoring
alternation; the examples from Chapter 2 are repeated for convenience.
(24a)
(24b)
(25a)
(25b)
Kim irritated Sandy with his silly jokes.
Kim's silly jokes irritated Sandy.
Jon irriterte Tor med de dumme vitsene sine
Joni irritated Tor with silly jokes-the REFLi
'Jon irritated Tor with his silly jokes'
De dumme vitsene til Jon irriterte Tor.
silly jokes-the REFLi to Jon irritated Tor
'Jon's silly jokes irritated Tor'
29
This example is adapted from the instructions on a packet of TORO tomato soup.
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The analysis presented in this thesis accounts for the facts of the relationship between the subject
and the PP by indexical reference, following the usual anaphoric referential criteria implemented in
the grammar. The semantic properties of the object, however, mark it out as the object of a psychverb,
it is thus that (7) has a non-psych interpretation, whereas (8) has a psych interpretation.
(7a)
(7b)
(8a)
(8b)
Kim struck Sandy with his bat.
Kim slo Sandy med pisken sin.
Kim hit Sandy with whip-the REFL
'Kim hit Sandy with his/her whip'
Kim struck Sandy with her intelligence.
*Kim slo Sandy med intelligensen sin.
Kim hit Sandy with intelligence-the REFL
Note that the grammatical English sentences show that a non-psych-verb can be made to have a
psych interpretation if a psych argument is inserted (her intelligence). This is not the case for
Norwegian, which restricts the insertion of such psych-compatible arguments; this is an example of
parametric restriction on Norwegian verbs: it is not as usual for Norwegian verbs to change meaning
as it is in English. This construction is syntactically straightforward, and can be inserted into the
VP-shell analysis without problem. Note that the PP should be considered a complement in (8a),
not an adjunct: the meaning of strike without the PP with his intelligence is non-psych, thus the
meaning of the psych interpretation of strike depends on the PP in a way that disallows its
interpretation as an adjunct: Kim struck Sandy is not grammatical as a psych construction, because
the necessary psych-interpretation inducing argument is absent.
5.1.4 Passives
Both Norwegian and English frighten-type verbs passivize; under the present view,
passivization is a simple process: when no element is present in the highest specifier position of
the VP, a passive element is generated under an inflectional head, which absorbs the Case features
of the verb. This allows the highest NP argument in the VP to be raised to [spec, IP], to fulfil the
EPP. If one assumes that, in English, to be is a raising verb — Norwegian allows similar passive
constructions to English, involving bli 'become', where this element replaces to be in the English
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construction — that allows the object argument to pass through its VP and inflectional projection,
to be come subject, then the following tree represents the derivation of a frighten-type passive in
English and a bli-passive in Norwegian:
(9) IP
NP I'
Sandy i
I° VP
ble/was v
NP V'
t i
V° IP
t v
NP I'
t i
I° vP
[past] NP i
v'
t i
v° VP
[+v] NP j
V'
t i
V° NP k
skremt/frightened 30
t i
The passive of English fear-type verbs seems to undergo exactly the same process, because no
element is present in the highest specifier of the VP.
Norwegian also displays verbal passive morphology, where it can be assumed that the
passive morphology is generated in the inflectional head, and that the verbal head subsequently
moves to this position and absorbs it:
30
The lexical verb moves to v° and perhaps then to I°. This analysis is unproblematic for Norwegian, but is perhaps
more problematic for English; due to space restrictions, this discussion must be left to one side.
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(10) IP
NP I'
Sandy i
I° VP
fryktes v
NP V'
t i
V° NP k
t v
t i
Note that this analysis functions for both fear and frighten-type verbs in Norwegian.
5.1.5 Compatibility with intentional adverbs
Both English and Norwegian frighten-type verbs are divided into two classes , those which
take the adverbs personally and voluntarily, and those that do not. This can be explained by the fact
that the verbs that take arguments that have the properties of the individual — Bouchard's I-
Subject/Substantive — take such adverbs, while those that have the properties of Bouchard's
Concept may not. The examples from Chapter 2 are repeated here for convenience.
(49a)
(49b)
(50a)
(50b)
(51a)
(51b)
(52a)
(52b)
Kim (deliberately) scared Sandy (by banging doors and making ghost noises)
Something about Kim (*deliberately) scared Sandy.
Kim (*deliberately) concerned Sandy (?*by changing tone of voice).
Something about Kim (*deliberately) concerned Sandy.
Kim skremte Sandy med vilje.
Kim scared Sandy with will
'Kim scared sandy on purpose'
Noe ved Kim skremte Sandy (*med vilje).
Something with Kim scared Sandy (*with will)
'Something about Kim scared Sandy (*on purpose)'
Kim bekymret Sandy (*med vilje).
Kim worried Sandy (*with will)
'Kim worried Sandy (*on purpose)'
Noe ved Kim bekymret Sandy (*med vilje).
Something with Kim worried Sandy (*with will)
'Something about Kim worried Sandy (*on purpose)'
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(56a)
(56b)
(56c)
(56d)
(57a)
(57b)
(57c)
(57d)
*Personally, I concern people.
*Kim voluntarily concerns people.
Personally, I frighten people.
Kim voluntarily frightens people.
*Personlig, bekymrer jeg folk.
Personally worry I people
*Kim bekymrer folk med egen vilje.
Kim worries people with own will
Personlig skremmer jeg folk.
Personally, frighten I people
'Personally, I frighten people'
Kim skremmer folk med egen vilje.
Kim frightens people with own will
'Kim deliberately scares people'
Note that (49a), (51a), (56c, d) and (57c, d) are compatible with deliberately/med vilje/personally/
personlig; all of these constructions contain an argument responsible for causation that can be
assumed to be intentional. Grimshaw (1990) aligns this with agentivity, but this is not the case,
because agentivity assumes a thematic substrate, which has been argued not to be present under the
current approach. Note that frighten and skremme can both take an I-Subject as external argument,
but that concern and bekymre take a Concept instead. The two are mapped to the same
configurational position because the verbs in themselves are causative, and both Concepts and I-
Subjects can be causing participants. The properties that allow an I-Subject to participate with
these adverbs are those of intentionality — an I-Subject is attributed intentional awareness, on the
other hand, we know nothing of the intentions of a Concept, and these are irrelevant to the selection
of the external argument of verbs that do not require intentionality of their arguments — it remains
the case that one cannot deliberately concern someone, when concern is an activity of the mind of
the experiencing participant. Thus, the present account utilizes Bouchard's (1995) analysis: the
relevant properties of the subject argument can always denote causation, but not necessarily
intentional causation. The distinction is subtle, and thus does not affect the overall grammar of
these constructions, but does restrict interaction with adverbs that require intentional properties of
the event-initiating argument.
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5.1.6 Psych constructions
As regards psych-constructions, it is pertinent to ask why they do not allow the imperative
mood in either English or Norwegian.
(11a)
(11b)
(12a)
(12b)
??Make him fear!
*Strike him as foolish!
??Gjør ham redd!
Do him scared
*Gjør dem trist!
Do them sad
Inability to participate in imperative constructions indicates that the subjects of these constructions
lack certain properties. Since it is also the case that psych-constructions are not compatible with
personally or voluntarily, it is safe to assume that the same processes that hinder frighten-type
psych-constructions from interacting with these adverbs also hinder interaction with imperative
mood. In Bouchard's argumentation regarding psych-constructions and frighten-type psych-verbs
generally, it is assumed that the type of participant of the subjects of psych-constructions is
Concept; this type of participant does not have the core intentional properties that are necessary
for these verbs to be compatible with intentional adverbs and moods.
The situation is not, however, quite that simple, because there are a number of psychconstructions
that allow the imperative:
(13) Allow yourself to be scared (by the story)!
(14) La deg imponere (av historien)!
Let you impress (of story-the)
'Allow yourself to be impressed (by the story)'
Admittedly, these constructions would be a little strange outside the context of, for example, a film
advertising campaign. This does not, however, detract from the fact that they are acceptable. The
reason for this, it would seem, is the inclusion of the reflexive, which allows the antecedent subject
to be recovered. The antecedent subject is nevertheless incompatible with intentional adverbs
(Allow yourself to be *deliberately scared). Note that they are not the same as other psychconstructions
in that the stimulating participant is only ever presented as a PP object. The focus of
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these constructions seems to be on the intentional relaxation of the usual control and constraints
that hinder the development of the emotional state described in the construction; it can hardly be
argued that allow is not an intentional verb.
5.1.7 Possessor-attribute-object alternation
Norwegian and English differ in respect to the possessor-attribute-object alternation; (27)
and (29) from Chapter 2 are repeated for convenience:
(27a)
(27b)
(29a)
(29b)
Kim liker Karis holdning.
Kim likes Kari's attitude
?*Kim liker Kari for holdningen hennes.
Kim likes Kari for her attitude
Kim admires Sandy's optimism.
Kim admires Sandy for her optimism.
The fact that English allows both possessor and attribute, whereas Norwegian allows the
possessor, but is strange with an attribute, may be taken as to mean a number of things. It seems to
be the opinion of Norwegians that (29b) is a loan translation from English; the acceptability or
otherwise is therefore cloaked by the possibility of it being a neologism.
The properties of the post-verbal arguments are indicative of the type of things that can be
stimuli for psych-verbs: these are Bouchardian Concepts, which describe some property — or
conceptualization thereof — of some individual or thing. This is clear in (27a) and (29a), where the
Concept is expressed as a concept (i.e. some property of the individual Sandy). In (27b), on the
other hand, it is Sandy the individual that is expressed as the Concept, but Sandy seems to be a
Substantive. This problem can be resolved by stating that the thing that is actually admired is
expressed in the adjunct for her optimism, and is a Concept. If the sentence Kim admires Sandy, it
is not possible to conceive Kim as admiring Sandy as a whole, but rather in terms of some property
or properties of Sandy that are admirable. In this way, Sandy is a Concept with or without an
adjunct defining what kind of conceptualization is involved.
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5.1.8 Possessor-and-attribute alternation
This construction appears in English in a slightly different form to that of Norwegian; in
Norwegian, the PP-object must be of the correct type in order for the sentence to be grammatical.
(30) and (28) are repeated here for convenience.
(30a)
(30b)
Kim hated Sandy's jealousy.
Kim hated the jealousy in Sandy.
(28a)
(28b)
Kim hatet Karis forakt.
Kim hated Kari's contempt
Kim hatet forakten i Karis øyne.
Kim hated the contempt in Kari's eyes.
Some property of the individual referred to in the simulating argument is triggering the emotion
denoted by the verb; it seems that this fact needs to be spelled out more clearly in Norwegian than
in English. In this respect, note that the translation of (28b) is perfectly acceptable in English;
English allows the less spelled-out example in addition to the more defined object. Again, the object
is a Concept: this is clearly expressed in both alternations. The realization of the possessor in a PP
helps make this even clearer.
5.1.9 Appeal-type verbs
The English and Norwegian appeal-type verbs are limited in their distribution; indeed one of
the five appeal-type verbs identified in Norwegian is a loan-word (appelere). These verbs
nevertheless share syntactic realization; they have properties associated with monotransitives. It is
assumed here that these verbs have the same internal structure as frighten-type verbs, i.e. they
project an argument to [spec, vP], because they behave in the same way in regard to
intentionality/intentional causation:
(15a)
(15b)
The painting appealed to Sandy.
The prisoners appealed to Sandy (for a Stay of execution).
Note that the other appeal-type verbs are less compatible with intentional interpretations, and the
Norwegian appellere has no intentional sense. Norwegian has a potential intentional interpretation
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with the verb å jage opp.
(16a)
(16b)
?Kim jaget opp stemningen i publikum.
Kim hunted up atmosphere-the in public
'Kim aroused the emotions of the audience'
Kim jaget opp sauene.
Kim hunted up the sheep
'Kim scattered the sheep (by frightening them)'
Note that the VP-shell analysis is consistent in respect to mapping of arguments: the PP-object of
these constructions is mapped to the same position as the PP-objects of other VP-shell verbs,
namely [comp, VP] (and, as often as not, NP experiencing arguments of these verbs).
5.1.10 Marvel-type verbs
These verbs are analysed as being monotransitives; they do not passivize, and so this
analysis seems to be correct. It is assumed that they are generated in a simple VP, akin to fear-type
verbs, with the distinction that the stimulating argument is realized as a PP object.
(17) VP
NP
V'
Kim V° PP
marvel at Sandy
5.1.11 Wonder-type verbs
It was pointed out previously that not all wonder-type verbs are, in fact, monotransitive;
some of the verbs are transitives that take prepositional complements. These prepositional verbs
behave much as their non-prepositional transitive counterparts; the true monotransitive marveltype
verbs behave like canonical monotransitives, in that they do not passivize. Wonder-type verbs
share the common feature with fear-type verbs that they project an affected argument as subject, on
the basis of this fact, it is assumed here that these verbs also share the internal structure of fear-
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type verbs, namely they are mapped to a simple VP:
(18) VP
NP
V'
Kim V x NP
V° Prt Sandy
wonder about
Since (18) is a prepositional transitive, the NP Sandy can be raised in a passive construction: Sandy i
was wondered about t i
by Kim. This demonstrates that the analysis in (18) is correct, because the
NP object is open to raising in this configuration.
5.2 Accounting for the complex data
As was seen in the previous part of this chapter, the simple data can be accounted for in a
number of ways, relying on generic — rather than class-specific — processes; in this way, the
present approach moves towards integrating psych-verbs with other verb classes by postulating
that "common concepts", such as causativity and affectedness, are behind the phenomena observed
of these verbs. The next section, treats a number of processes that are generally assumed to mark
psych-verbs out as "special".
5.2.1 Backward binding
Backward binding is typically thought to be one of the most distinctive behaviours — and
thus most cited evidence of their unusualness — associated with frighten-type psych-verbs. The
facts associated with such binding properties have proved hard for many analyses to explain;
indeed, Belletti & Rizzi (1988) present a whole range of adaptations of Chomsky's (1986) binding
theory to account for backward binding.
It is a trivial truth that the conceptualization of backward binding as unusual is a direct
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esult of the inability of most binding analyses to account for it — there are, in fact, a large number
of verbs that allow backward binding. Consider the following examples:
(19a) Pictures of themselves i
frighten Kim and Sandy i
.
(19b) Pictures of themselves i
frighten Kim and Sandy i
.
(19c) Pictures of themselves i
would prove good presents for Kim and Sandy i
.
(19d) Pictures of each other i
help Kim and Sandy i
to feel at peace.
(19e) Pictures of themselves i
make Kim and Sandy i
want to eat less cake.
(19f) Closeness to each other i
ensures Kim and Sandy's i
mental well-being.
From the examples in (19), it is obvious that this phenomenon is not restricted to frighten-type
psych-verbs. This fact stops the "unusualness" argument dead in its tracks because the supposed
problem becomes associated with verbs usually accepted as canonical transitives such as help or
ensure. It is of no surprise that backward binding is also compatible with causative constructions,
as seen in (19e). In fact, it can be assumed that the properties of the arguments associated with the
verbs in the examples allow some kind of causative interpretation. Firstly, consider help; this verb
is causative: consider the examples below 31 :
(20a)
(20b)
Kim helped Sandy.
The arnica helped Sandy (get over the shock).
In (20a), Kim can be attributed intentional properties allowing an intentional interpretation of the
sentence; in (20b), on the other hand, the arnica is a chemical preparation which cannot be
attributed any such properties. The logical interpretation of (20b) is something akin to the arnica
made Sandy feel better. Note that this interpretation is causative, at the same time as forcing an
interpretation that describes an action taking place in "mental space", i.e., a feeling or an emotion.
This falls very much into line with the analysis presented above.
(21a)
(21b)
Kim ensured the children were strapped in.
The morphine ensured the patients slept.
The case is also clear-cut for ensure. In (21a), the subject is intentional; in (21b) the inanimate
subject cannot be assumed to have the required properties to be a Substantive (in Bouchard's
31
This perhaps requires a broad conception of causation; cf. the notion of an event which brings about an event, as
discussed in section 4.2.1.
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sense), and thus the sentence is interpreted as causative. This shows that the properties of these
verbs change when associated with Concept-subjects (in Bouchard's sense). The properties of the
participants thus pattern in a similar way to all other causative verbs; typically expressed as a
causing participant coupled with an affected participant. The latter is generally animate and sentient
in these constructions, but not necessarily.
(22a)
(22b)
Its i
latch ensured the door i
held against the wind.
Falling onto each other i
made the stones i
rounded.
This shows that the properties of these constructions can be observed among a broad range of
causative constructions, not just the psych-verb subset under study here. This points to an
analysis which takes the facts of causativity into account, because backward-binding constructions
seem to be inherently causative. This is not, however, the full picture:
(23a) ?Each other's i
dog bit Kim and Sandy i
.
(23b) ?Each other's friends i
friends betrayed Kim and Sandy i
.
The examples in (23) are potentially intentional, and although they are strange, they remain
acceptable; this is not problematic under the VP-shell analysis assumed here, as the locus for
intentional/ agentive and causative participants is one-and-the-same, i.e., [spec, vP]. On the basis of
the facts seen so far, it is fair to assume that backward binding is associated with the position of
[spec, vP]; a hypothesis which would entail a prediction that verbs with subjects in the lower
[spec, VP] are incompatible with backward binding.
(24a) *Each other's i
dog i
fears Kim and Sandy i
.
(24b) Their i
dog saw Kim and Sandy *i
coming.
This prediction holds for (24a) and (24b). The analysis must therefore uncover what properties
account for this difference, in addition to accounting for the reason why frighten-type verbs allow
the relationship between antecedent and anaphor to be reversed.
144

In the standard configurational analysis for binding 32 proposed in Chomsky (1986), there are
two types of binding relevant in the present instance. The first kind of binding is that of a governed
pronominal; in this case, the pronominal must be A-free (not realized in an argument position) in
the least maximal projection containing a subject and the governing category of the pronominal. The
consequence of this is that the ungrammaticality of (25a) is predicted, because the NP Kim and
Sandy governs the NP them; the position occupied by them must be A-free in order for the string to
be grammatical; in fact, this is not the case, because the pronominal is in the [comp, VP], which is
an A-position.
(25a) *Kim and Sandy i
like them i
.
(25b) Kim and Sandy i
like their i
families.
(25b) is grammatical, because in their families, their, is not realized directly as [comp, VP], rather it
is embedded in the NP containing families and so is A-free.
The second type of binding pertains to anaphors; here, the anaphor must be governed, A-
bound and indexed with an antecedent in the least maximal projection containing a subject and the
governing category, in addition, there must also be an indexical relationship that pertains within this
least maximal projection such that the anaphor is A-bound. This relates to anaphors of the type in
(26):
(26a) Kim and Sandy i
love themselves i
.
(26b) Kim and Sandy i
love each other's i
families.
Here, the anaphor themselves is in its governing category, NP, which is in an A-bound position
([comp, VP]), and is governed by its antecedent, Kim and Sandy. Since VP here is the least maximal
32
Chomsky's is not the only theory of binding, Jackendoff (1997) presents an account of binding based on the
principle that binding operates at the level of conceptual structure. Jackendoff (1997: 67) claims that '…binding is
fundamentally a relationship between conceptual constituents, not between syntactic constituents.' This fact seems
incontrovertible, but it goes no way to explaining how and why binders and bindees are realized in syntax.
Others to have presented non-configurational accounts of binding include Pollard & Sag (1994), whose
account is best described as a semantic theory of binding that appeals to a hierarchy of obliqueness for nominal
elements. The semantic conditions relate to similar reference (the binder must have similar properties to the bound —
himself must be bound by a masculine NP); the obliqueness hierarchy is one where a less oblique NP can bind a more
oblique NP; the hierarchy is similar the the following: non-pronominal > pronominal > reflexive/reciprocal
pronominal. Applying this latter theory to reflexives means that the reflexive must be bound by a nominal from higher
up the obliqueness hierarchy that has suitable semantic content. This would account for backward binding, and most
other kinds of binding. This approach has not been adopted here, because it is not a part of mainstream
transformational generative grammar.
145

projection containing a subject, the indexical relationship holds at this level. (26b) is somewhat
more complex, requiring extra indexing. Here, Kim and Sandy is indexed to an anaphor each other's,
which is embedded in an NP each other's families. This means that, had this anaphor been bound as
a pronominal, it would have been A-free; because of the extra indexing, however, each other's is A-
bound under the least maximal projection containing a subject, the anaphor and its antecedent,
which, in this case is [spec, VP].
This approach cannot, however, be used to explain backward binding because it does not
correctly predict that an NP in a configurationally higher position can be anaphor to an antecedent
in a lower position because there is no way for the antecedent to c-command its anaphor. Avoiding
the use of non-standard approaches to binding (cf. footnote 33 above) involves developing a new
type of binding to complement those that already exist, which accounts for the backward binding
observed in causative constructions.
On the basis of the evidence in (24), it seems to be the case that there is a configurational
solution for backward binding. For a start, it suffices to say that the verbs in the lower VP do not
allow backward binding; there are certain parametrically-defined prohibitions which apply at this
level. Secondly, the upper vP is a domain associated with backward binding, so verbs that project
an external argument into [spec, vP] allow backward binding; it should also be noted the antecedent
argument is realized in [comp, VP]. This constraint can be formulated as follows:
(27) Let I be an indexing of NPs in a sentence S, where A is an NP of S.
If A is an anaphor that is A-free in a category governed by v°, then A is bound
by a category that is minimally m-commanded by, but does not asymmetrically c-
command, the lexical verb of S before derivation.
Here, an appeal is made to the specifics of the VP-shell, whereby an NP predicated by a category in
the specifier of the upper vP is indexed with an NP lower down the tree; the relationship between
these is one of backward binding: the configurationally higher NP is bound by the lower NP. In
order to exclude binding by/of NPs in [spec, VP], a prerequisite is included such that the antecedent
must bed minimally m-commanded by, but can not asymmetrically c-command, the sentence's
lexical verb before derivation, which in effect selects only an NP in [comp, VP]. The usage of the
146

terms c-command, asymmetrical c-command, m-command and minimal m-command is presented in
(28–29):
(28a)
(28b)
(29a)
(29b)
c-command:
An X c-commands a Y if iff X does not dominate Y, & all projections that dominate
X also dominate Y.
Asymmetric c-command:
X asymmetrically c-commands Y iff X c-commands Y, & Y does not c-command X.
m-command
X m-commands Y iff X does not dominate Y, & some projection of X dominates Y.
Minimal m-command:
X minimally m-commands Y iff X m-commands Y, & there is no Z that m-
commands Y, but not X.
Thus in (30), NP 1
contains an anaphor (NP 2
) which is A-free (because it is not realized directly as
an NP in the A-position [spec, vP]); there exists a relationship of symmetrical c-command between
V° and NP 4
; NP 3
on the other hand asymmetrically c-commands V°. V° minimally m-commands
NP 3
and NP 4
, but since NP 3
is excluded because it asymmetrically c-commands the lexical verb (V°),
only NP 4
remains as a suitable category to bind the anaphor realised in NP 2
.
(30) vP
NP 1
VP
N° PP NP 3
V'
P° NP 2
V° NP 4
Note that the inclusion of a requirement that the lexical verb minimally m-commands the NP that
binds the anaphor also excludes all projections lower than [comp, VP] because the minimal m-
command relationship is blocked by the category-internal m-command relationship that pertains in
the category realized below [comp, VP].
This section ends by mentioning a fact that has thus far been ignored: that Norwegian does
not allow backward binding at all; this fact will prove important in the next section in explaining
how English and Norwegian differ parametrically in regard to anaphoric binding in the VP-shell.
147

5.2.2 Extraposition of sentential arguments of psych-verbs
It is the case, however, that some unusual behaviour can be observed of the objects of
psych-verbs in both English and Norwegian, but this behaviour is not that identified by Belletti &
Rizzi. The examples below shown how fear-type verbs allow extraction of sentential arguments
(the term comes from Levin (1993)).
(31a)
(31b)
(32a)
(32b)
(33a)
(33b)
Kim likes it that Sandy has red ears.
Kim liker det at Sandy har røde ører.
Kim likes it that Sandy has red ears
*Kim frightens it that Sandy has red ears.
*Kim skremmer det at Sandy har røde ører.
*Kim thought it that Sandy had red ears.
*Kim tenkte det at Sandy hadde røde ører.
Fear-type verbs contrast with many other transitive verbs in this respect; they allow the inclusion
of an object that refers to an argument that is realized as a complement clause. They contrast with
frighten-type verbs by the fact that it is the subject that is extraposed in the latter, but otherwise
the pattern is similar:
(34a)
(34b)
It annoyed Kim that Sandy had red ears.
Det irriterte Kim at Sandy hadde røde ører.
It irritated Kim that Sandy had red ears
The same pattern is seen with — among other constructions — causatives.
(35a)
(35b)
It knocked the aerial down when the wind came.
It broke the window that Sandy closed the door with a bang.
(58a) ?Det veltet antenna når vinden blåste 33 .
It knock-down aerial-the when wind-the blew
'It knocked-down the aerial when the wind blew'
33
Consider the following in light of (58a) above:
(i)
Det veltet antenna når Sandy kappet sikringskablene.
It knocked-down aerial-the when Sandy cut safety-cables-the
'It knocked down the aerial when Sandy cut the safety cables'
Note that (i) is more acceptable than (58a), probably because the causing argument is more closely defined. This fact
allows the context to be more readily available to interpretation; extraposition in Norwegian seems to require a welldefined
context; English psych-verbs seem to require less of their arguments (although this may be a result of the
interviewed Norwegian speakers' willingness to accept contextless examples).
148

(58b)
Det knuste vinduet når Sandy slo igjen døren så hardt.
It broke window-the when Sandy struck again door-the so hard
'It broke the window when Sandy shut it so hard'
It seems then that this kind of extraposition from the object is common to causative constructions
generally.
From a structural standpoint, in such frighten-type extrapositions, the causing argument
expressed in [spec, IP] is bound by the element to which it refers (the complement clause); the
semantic qualities of these two elements are co-referential,
• the element in [spec, IP] is a referential pronoun, it has only very limited semantic
content of its own, and must refer to some (expressed) outside element to be
grammatical/acceptable;
• the inherent semantic content of it means that reference to an outside element is
limited by way of genderlessness;
• the element in [spec, IP] is bound as an anaphor.
These simple rules account the observed phenomena:
(36a)
(36b)
It amazed Kim that Sandy was happy.
It amazed the dog that the bone was so big.
Recalling that it has been identified as being bound like an anaphor, the discussion of binding in
section 5.2.1 can account for the structure in (37).
149

(37) vP
vP
CP
NP v' [that the bone was so big] i
It i
v° VP
amazed v
NP V'
V° NP
t v
the dog
In this construction, the anaphor it is bound by the antecedent CP that the bone was so big. The CP
c-commands the NP it and the NP is bound in an A-position, [spec, vP].
Consider the following data regarding fear-type verbs:
(38a)
I love it that we hear languages other than English every single day, and that we hear
English in all sorts of dialects. 34
(38b) I hate it that people think they're smarter than I am, especially when they're not. 35
(38c) Well, apparently enough people have believed it that Microsoft has been getting "a
flood of angry telephone calls and electronic mail messages" according to Reuters. 36
(39a) Jeg bare hater det at Nintendo solgte Rare. 37
I just hate it that Nintendo sold Rare
(39b) Mari likte det at alle var greie. 38
Mari liked it that all were nice
'Mari liked it that everyone was nice'
(39c) Så vi tenkte det at det hadde vært kult med 3 gitarer. 39
So we thought it that it had been cool with three guitars
'It occurred to us that it would be cool if we had three guitars'
34
http://parents.berkeley.edu/whyBA.html
35
http://quizilla.com/users/Sc0tty/quizzes/Which%20Biological%20Molecule%20Are%20You%3F/
36
www.fiction.net/tidbits/computer/micro.cath.after.html
37
http://www.nintendo.no/forum/forum_posts.asp?TID=4087&PN=2
38
http://fribu.no/FSK/gruppene/barumsverk.php
39
http://home.no.net/nosleep/Fakta.htm
150

Looking at these examples, it is obvious that there are several constructions which allow this kind
of extraposition from the object, not just psych-verbs. There are, however, certain points that
should be mentioned: firstly, the kind of verb that allows this kind of extraposition in English can
be delimited to those that involve perception, such as see, and those that involve "mental space"
activities, such as believe and accept. That the latter examples are compatible with these
constructions is no surprise, as they take more-or-less the same argument types as psych-verbs:
the subjects are affected in the same way as the subjects of fear-type psych-verbs, and the objects
may be NPs or sentential complements. The fact that the activity described takes place in mental
space cannot be denied, as accept and believe both depend on a participant that has the faculties of
a sentient being, thus non-sentient aseities are anthropomorphized in order to comply with this:
(40a)
(40b)
The stone accepted the judgement of the court.
The tree believed the spider.
Such anthropomorphism in recognized from children's literature, where it is prevalent. In the
current context, these verbs should be considered to have the structure of fear-type psych-verbs,
that is they lack the external argument of the agentive/causative verbs. This can be tested by simple
intentionality tests involving intentional adverbs.
(41a)
(41b)
Kim *deliberately/*intentionally/??voluntarily accepted Les' story.
Sandy *deliberately/*intentionally/??voluntarily believed Les' story.
Many of Levin's (1993: 180–185) "Verbs with predicative complements", such as
characterize verbs and declare verbs show similar behaviour. Again, the fact that a verb has similar
properties in terms of participants and activity type is recognized as an indicator that their syntax
ought to be similar. The final group of verbs in English involves see; this may be seen as surprising,
but it is not in the context of the present work 40 . As was pointed out in the previous chapter, many
of the properties of the perception verbs are similar to those of fear-type psych-verbs. Note that in
(42) and (43), see/se is interpreted as understand.
40
It ought not to be surprising, as the event described by perception verbs also takes place in "mental space"; a seeing
event is not just a matter of a physical activity, it is also a complex event of interpretation and cognition.
151

(42) I see (it) that you like this idea.
(43) Jeg ser det at du liker denne idéen.
I see it that you like this idea-the
'I see it that you like this idea'
In this sense, see is clearly akin to the other verbs that allow extraction of this kind. It seems,
therefore, that see can also be taken to involve a mental activity of realization, it is thus not
surprising that it should allow this kind of extraposition. Note, however, that not all verbs of
perception allow this construction:
(44a)
(44b)
(44c)
(45a)
(45b)
(45c)
??Kim detected it that we were ready.
??Les observed it that Kim was mad.
??Kim noticed it that they were in trouble.
Kim perceived it that Sandy was lying.
Sandy discovered it that Kim and Les had given their children genderless names.
Les sensed it that they were in trouble.
It seems that punctual verbs are less compatible with extraposition than those that are not
punctual. It is evident that no such restriction is present in Norwegian, allowing both å se "to see"
(43) and å merke "to notice". Otherwise, Norwegian seems to echo the pattern seen in English,
perhaps allowing even more constructions. The examples include å tenke 'to think' (60c), but other
possibilities include:
(46a)
(46b)
Kim og Les tror på det at de kommer til å tjene godt på denne ordningen.
Kim and Les believe on it that they come to to earn good on this arrangement-the
'Kim and Les think that they are going to earn a lot of money from this'
Sandy aksepterer det at Gud finnes.
Sandy accepts it that God find+PASS
'Sandy accepts (it) that God exists'
It seems that the fact that fear-type verbs involve "mental space" activities means that they are
compatible with this kind of extraposition; this also explains why frighten-type verbs allow them.
The syntactic reality of these constructions can be explained in terms of anaphoric binding
of the kind expressed in mainstream theory:
152

(47) VP
VP
CP
NP V' [that Sandy will hate [him] j
] i
John j
V° NP
fears it i
Again, an anaphoric binding relationship (see section 5.2.1) holds between the CP and the NP it.
And again, it is grammatical because the VP-adjoined CP c-commands the bound NP. Note that
there is a second binding relationship between the NP John and the pronominal him; this
relationship is permissible because the bound pronominal must be locally free (and it is free within
its local binding-domain CP). This analysis supports the analysis of it as an anaphor because if it in
these cases is a pronominal, then (47) should be ungrammatical, because the bound pronominal is
not locally free: the binder CP and the bindee are in the same binding domain.
5.2.3 Middles
'In general, it is assumed that middles ... have some essential properties in common
with passives: that (i) the logical subject argument is syntactically absent although it is
semantically present, and that (ii) the grammatical subject ... is the logical object.'
Hulk & Cornips (2000:207)
English allows so-called middle constructions 41 of the type illustrated in (48) (see Levin (1993:25)
for an extensive list of references for English on this topic):
(48a)
(48b)
(48c)
House plants die easily.
Red meat fries well.
Kim frightens easily.
41
For further details on the middle construction in English and other languages, see Condoravdi (1989), Dimitrova-
Vulchanova (1999), Hale & Keyser (1986, 1987, 1988) and Keyser & Roeper (1984, 1992).
153

Note the following central properties of middle constructions in English:
• Derived subject;
• Presence of adverbial;
• Lack of specific temporal/spatial reference;
• Presence of unexpressed causing argument;
• Associative link between noun and verb.
The derived subject is typically analysed as a raised Theme object; the presence of the adverbial
distinguishes this class of verbs from inchoatives, as certain members of the class do not have an
adverbless, inchoative counterpart. The middle is characterized by a lack of direct reference on a
temporal/spatial level (the property described is identified as a general property of the deleted
subject), an unexpressed causing argument is therefore implicit, and it is the absence of this
argument that accounts for the described generality. Middles typically describe actions that are
associated with a defined semantic area, and a non-associable (unaffected) noun-verb pairing results
in unacceptability.
This last point is perhaps a little controversial, as it appears to place a great deal of
responsibility on the shoulders of semantics. It is the case, however, that the following sentences
are unacceptable without a mitigating context:
(49a) ??The ice pounded flat.
(49b) ?The mercury pounded flat 42 .
The middle construction is found in many languages, including the Romance languages and German;
Norwegian displays some idiosyncratic behaviour in respect to realization of the middles:
(50a)
(50b)
(50c)
Potteplanter dør lett.
House plants die easily.
*Rødt kjøtt steker bra.
Red meat fries well.
*Kim skremmer lett.
Kim frightens easily.
42
Recall that mercury is a liquid at room temperature, and cannot, therefore, technically be pounded flat if it is not a
solid. A mitigating circumstance may be that the mercury is in an environment colder than mercury's freezing point.
154

Norwegian represents the meaning of many "easily" middles in the form of predicative adjectives
involving a compound of the adverb "lett" and the verb, thus:
(51a)
(51b)
(51c)
*Potteplanter er lettdødde.
Potted plants are easy-killed
Rødt kjøtt er lettstekt.
Red meat is easy-fried
'Red meat fries easily'
Kim er lettskremt.
Kim is easy-scared
'Kim scares easily'
Cross-linguistically, middles are often realized as reflexive constructions, as these examples from
German and Bulgarian 43
show:
(52a) Euro i
erholt sich i
leicht. 44
Euro i
recover REFL i
easily
'The Euro recovers easily'
(52b) Die Jünger i
ängstigen sich i
sehr. 45
The youth i
worry REFL i
much
'Youths worry a lot'
(53a)
(53b)
Hljabât i
se i
reze lesno.
Bread-the i
REFL i
cuts easily
'The bread cuts easily'
Kotkite i
se i
plas at lesno
Cats i
REFL i
frighten easily
'Cats frighten easily'
It will be seen that this pattern is repeated in Norwegian.
As stated above, middles are observed in both the Romance languages and German; much
work has been done on these constructions in these languages, although — as pointed out by Pitz
(1988), the majority of the work on German has been based on analyses adapted from those of
Romance languages. Pitz puts forward an analysis based on Agent deletion, using the framework of
Hellan (1988). Although this framework is at odds with the present work, on the grounds that it
incorporates much semantic data that is considered, here, to be irrelevant to grammar, the central
43
Thanks are due to Rositsa Panayotova Dekova for the Bulgarian examples.
44
http://www.dm-online.de/euroaktuell/heuteaktuell/presse_20010509162124510.html
45
http://www.kanzelgruss.de/predigt/predigtdatenbank/ weitere/NT/w201102e.html
155

insight adapted from (Keyser and Roeper (1984)) in Pitz' analysis is compatible with the analysis
at hand.
'Although the AGENT is not expressed, it is still a characteristic of the middle construction
that such a role is involved, or understood, in the event described.'
Pitz (1988:3)
The agentive/intentional/causative argument that is suppressed must be generated in [spec, vP]
since this is the locus for all such arguments. When it is suppressed, it cannot be mapped into overt
syntax because its Case is taken by the remaining argument realized in [comp, VP]; the verb,
however, retains an implicit reference to the suppressed argument, because it is assumed to take an
argument with a given set of properties, and when no such argument is expressed in the syntax, the
argument is conspicuous by its absence.
Recall that the lower VP is characterized by affectedness; all intentional/causative arguments
reside outside this domain. In the absence of an element to fill [spec, vP], another argument must
raise to [spec, IP]. This entails that English maps an empty (reflexive) category to [spec, VP]; this
is not unexpected as middles can be demonstrated to be reflexive phenomena in other languages.
There are several other approaches that postulate empty, reflexive categories in relation to the
reflexive (cf. Keyser & Roeper (1984)).
Thus, middle constructions are characterized by the absence of any element in [spec, vP],
the presence of a reflexive argument in [spec, VP] and an adverbial element. Note also that many
theories have been advanced regarding the presence of the adverbial element in middle constructions;
the view taken here is that middle constructions are, on the whole, to be characterized as inchoative
constructions with a context-driven constraint regarding what information must be included in order
for a sentence to be grammatical, thus:
(54a)
(54b)
This book reads easily.
*This book reads.
However, (54b) is grammatical in the context that A says "The book I am reading reads easily",
156

whereas B says "The book I am reading reads" (implying that it is not a good book and that it is
difficult to read). In order for the inchoative construction to be acceptable, there must be descriptive
information beyond that contained by the correlation of the verb and noun. (In the case of (54b),
the fact that a book "reads" should be obvious from the information contained by the noun-verb
complex; thus the sentence is unacceptable unless there is some other context which makes it
acceptable in that the sentence is communicative of some new information.) Thus, the analysis
accounts for middles with no inchoative, adverbless, counterpart (consider, for example, pound:
what would be the point of saying "The metal pounded"? It describes a property of (ductile)
metals, and one which would not, generally, be either new or interesting information. Consider, on
the other hand "The metal crumbled", which is not a typical property of metals, would be
acceptable). Thus, a general pragmatic constraint applies.
The examples in (55) demonstrate reflexive middle constructions in Norwegian:
(55a) Nettsidene i
åpner seg i
lett i nettleseren din. 46
Web-pages-the i
opens REFL i
easily in web-browser-yours
'The web-pages open easily in your web-browser'
(55b) Spylepistol i
som stenger seg i
automatisk. 47
Spray-pistol i
which closes REFL i
automatically
'Spray-pistol which closes automatically'
(55c) Den i
sprer seg i
lett. 48
It i
spreads REFL i
easily
'It spreads easily'
(55d) De i
vrir seg i
lett under tørking. 49
They i
twist REFL i
easily during drying
'They twist easily during drying'
Note that Norwegian does not generally allow this kind of construction with psych-verbs:
(56a) *Kim i
liker seg i
lett.
Kim i
likes REFL i
easily
(56b) Kim i
bekymrer seg i
lett 50 .
Kim i
worries REFL i
easily
(56c) *Kim i
irriterer seg i
lett.
Kim i
irritates REFL i
easily
46
www.no.lycos.de/dir/Skole_og_utdanning/ Dataundervisning/MCSE/
47
www.nederman.no/Media/spylepistolny.htm
48
www.stash.no/matogdrikke/urter_virkning.php
49
www.sag.no/default.asp?show=art&artID=130
50
Note that bekymre is one of the few psych-verbs that allows the middle.
157

The fact that Norwegian does not allow middles with fear-type psych-verbs (56a) is unsurprising
as this would involve deletion of the subject as suggested by Pitz, or promotion of the object to the
already filled [spec, VP] as in the present framework; it is also the case that the lack of an external
argument is generally thought to preclude verbs from participating in middle constructions
(compare this with Grimshaw's assertion that reflexives are unable to refer to internal arguments). It
is rather more surprising that many middles involving frighten-type verbs are unacceptable. Many
Norwegian transitive verbs take part in middle constructions, many do not; it is interesting to note
that those transitive verb that do appear in the middle construction do so only in conjunction with
the reflexive particle. On the other hand, no unaccusative verb appears with a reflexive particle.
Note also that unergative verbs do not appear as middles:
(57a) *Kim i
løper (*seg i
) lett. Unergative
Kim i
runs (*REFL i
) easily
(57b) *Maten i
lager (*seg i
) lett. Transitive
Food-the i
makes (*REFL i
) easily
(57c) Suppen i
koker (*seg i
) lett. Unaccusative
Soup-the i
boils (*REFL i
) easily
'The soup boils easily'
(57d) ??Brødet i
steker (*seg i
) lett. Unaccusative
Bread-the i
bakes (*REFL i
) easily
(57e) *Huset i
bygger (*seg i
) lett. Transitive
House-the i
builds REFL i
easily
(57f) *Brødet i
skjærer (*seg i
) lett. Transitive
Bread-the i
cuts REFL i
easily
(57g) Glasset i
knuser (*seg i
) lett. Unaccusative
Glass-the i
breaks (*REFL i
) easily
'The glass breaks easily'
(57h) *Metallet i
hamrer (*seg i
) lett. Transitive
Metal-the i
pounds (*REFL i
) easily
It is unclear exactly which properties distinguish the transitive verbs that participate in/do not
participate in the middle construction, unfortunately this question is outside the scope of the
current work. The fact that Norwegian psych-verbs are generally incompatible with the middle
construction, however, becomes less surprising given the fact that Norwegian utilises the reflexive
158

in another construction with these verbs 51 :
(58a)
(58b)
(58c)
Kim i
liker seg i
i Spania.
Kim i
likes REFL i
in Spain
'Kim likes it in Spain/enjoys Spain'
Kim i
bekymrer seg i
over ting.
Kim i
worries REFL i
about things
'Kim worries about things'
Kim i
irriterer seg i
over Sandys oppførsel.
Kim i
irritates REFL i
about Sandy's behaviour
'Kim gets irritated by Sandy's behaviour'
However, not all frighten-type verbs participate in this reflexive construction either:
(59) Verb Participates in reflexive constructions
skremme no
bekymre yes
irritere yes
ergre yes
terge no
erte no
glede yes
vemme yes — in certain idioms
frastøte/støte no
blidgjøre no
gjøre X no
It is the case that some frighten-type verbs represent the meaning of middles with predicative
adjectives, in common with the transitive verbs that do not allow reflexive middles:
51
Note that the middle may also be expressed in the following way in Norwegian:
(i) Jeg i har lett for å irritere meg i .
I i have easy for to irritate me i
'I get irritated easily'
There are very many verbs that take part in this construction including all of the frighten-type psych-verbs that take
part in the reflexive construction (excluding, for example, å skremme "to frighten") — including å like seg "to like
REFL", but not fear-type verbs.
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(60a)
(60b)
(60c)
(60d)
(60e)
(61a)
(61b)
(61c)
(91d)
Maten er lettlagd.
Food-the is easy-made
'The food is easily made'
Brødet er lettstekt.
Bread-the is easy-baked
'The bread is easy to bake'
Huset er lettbygd.
House-the is easy-built
'The house is easy to build'
Brødet er lettskjært.
Bread-the is easy-cut
'The bread is easy to cut'
Metallet er letthamret.
Metal-the is easy-pounded
'The metal is easy to pound'
*Kim er lettlikt.
Kim is easy-liked
?Kim er lettbekymret.
Kim is easy-worried
*Kim er lettirritert.
Kim is easy-irritated
Kim er lettskremt.
Kim is easy-scared
'Kim is easy to scare'
Unaccusatives are also compatible with this construction:
(62a)
(62b)
?Suppen er lettkokt.
Soup-the is easy-boiled
'The soup is easy to boil'
Glasset er lettknust.
Glass-the is easy-broken
'The glass is easy to break'
Bouchard discusses a number of examples from Van Voorst (1992), of the kind in (63):
(63a)
(63b)
(63c)
Kim blew the snow off the window-ledge.
The wind blew the snow off the window-ledge
The snow blew off the window-ledge.
It is apparent, from the examples, that (63a) cannot be a logical precursor to (63c), whereas (63b)
can. Bouchard argues that this is a result of the fact that, in (63a), Kim is responsible for the action
from beginning to end, whereas (63b) says something about the nature of snow (its being light
160

enough, etc., for the wind to blow it away). It is also the case, however, that both (63a) and (63b)
can be precursors to (64):
(64) The snow blew off the window-ledge easily.
This may be because (64) has a "feat" interpretation, but it also links the sentence (recalling the
requirement that an argument must be present in [spec, vP] in order for the middle to be possible)
to its deleted, intentional/causative argument in a way that is not the case in the inchoative example
in (63c).
One final point in respect to (reflexive) middles and unaccusatives is the aspectual difference
between the two:
'...the two inchoative constructions differ aspectually in a rather subtle way: whereas
both are said to be transitions expressing telicity or boundedness, in the intransitive
construction the (aspectual) focus is on the process whereas in the ergative reflexive
construction the (aspectual) focus is on the endpoint or final state of the event.'
Hulk, A. & Cornips, L. (2000:214)
This difference is also clearly represented in (63c) and (64); the process being present as the main
focus in (63c), and the end-point being the main focus of (64). It can be assumed that this has much
to do with the notion that deletion of the intentional/causative argument results in a skewing of the
focus to the affected end of the event, paradoxically drawing attention to the deleted argument,
which is only conspicuous by its absence. In languages such as Norwegian, where the reflexive is
only compatible with verbs with arguments in [spec, vP], this is even clearer.
As was stated above, the following properties characterize middles:
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• Derived subject;
• presence of adverbial;
• lack of specific temporal/spatial reference;
• presence of unexpressed causing argument;
• associative link between noun and verb.
Since this is the case, the syntax of the middle construction requires a number of pieces to be in
place before "the jigsaw can become a whole"; these are:
• The presence of a deletable, intentional (I-Subject/Substantive) subject;
• compatibility of the semantics of the verb with middles;
• compatibility of the language with middles.
The syntax of the middle — if middles are specified in the parameters of the given language —,
then, is dependent on two factors; these are the presence of an NP in [spec, vP], the residence of
the intentional/causative subject and the compatibility of the semantics of the verb with the sense
of the middle. In terms of the former requirement, a middle can only be formed from a verb which
projects an NP to [spec, vP].
Regarding the presence of reflexive particles, French displays some middles with reflexives
and some without; Labelle (1989:10; the quote is taken from Bouchard (1995:200)) observes that
'[t]he intransitive construction in French is used when the entity in subject position has the
properties that are sufficient for bringing about the process, whereas the reflexive construction is
used when the properties of the entity in subject position are insufficient for bringing about the
process.' Although this simple axiom is somewhat changed in its translation into analyses for
English and Norwegian, it is revealing as to why certain verbs do or do not appear in certain
constructions. The properties of frighten-type verbs such as "worry", "irritate" and "frighten" are
actually quite different:
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(65a)
(65b)
(65c)
(66a)
(66b)
(66c)
(67a)
(67b)
(67c)
The fish worried Kim.
Kim worried (??himself) about the fish.
Kim worried.
The fish irritated Kim.
Kim irritated himself (with the fish-problem).
*Kim irritated.
The fish frightened Kim.
Kim frightened himself (with the fish problem).
*Kim frightened.
Once the argument in [spec, vP] has been removed, the Experiencer argument does not present a
unified face to the world; the syntax of "Experiencer" arguments are more fine-grained than is
normally assumed — a fine-grainedness which, it can be argued, ultimately determines which
syntactic realization is entailed. Note that a verb like "worry" is compatible only with an I-Subject,
to use Bouchard's terminology, object; this is important because, when the cause argument is
deleted, the I-Subject is more than capable of replacing it, without deference to a reflexive. With
verbs such as "irritate" or "frighten", it is a different matter; these verbs require a reflexive if they
are to be placed in subject position, bearing out Labelle's observation. Norwegian, on the other
hand, seems more restrictive in its syntax than English:
(68a)
(68b)
(68c)
(69a)
(69b)
(69c)
(70a)
(70b)
(70c)
Fisken bekymret Kim.
Kim bekymret seg (over fisken).
*Kim bekymret.
Fisken irriterte Kim.
Kim irriterte seg (over fisken).
*Kim irriterte.
Fisken skremte Kim.
*Kim skremte seg (over fisken).
*Kim skremte.
There is less variety in Norwegian; a fact borne out in the consistent realization of reflexives in
conjunction with the derived Experiencer subjects. It seems then, that Experiencers make "poor"
subjects, in line with Labelle's observation; in English, this is reflected by the fact that only a
handful of verbs allow reflexiveless derived subjects; Norwegian is more restrictive, allowing no
163

eflexiveless, derived psych-object subjects and only a handful with reflexives.
One psych-construction, which only ever appears as a reflexive, displays a very obvious
lack of "the properties that are sufficient for bringing about the process" described by the main
verb:
(71a)
(71b)
(71c)
Jeg i
lot meg i
(lett) skremme (av fuglene).
I i
let REFL i
(easily) scare (of birds-the)
'I allowed myself to be (easily) scared by the birds'
Jeg i
lot meg i
(lett) irritere (av fuglene).
I i
let REFL i
(easily) irritate of birds-the
'I let myself be (easily) irritated by the birds'
?Jeg i
lot meg i
(lett) bekymre (av fuglene).
I i
let REFL i
(easily) worry of birds-the
'I allowed myself to worry about the birds (easily)'
The distinguishing feature here is that the inclusion of å la "to let", which makes perhaps every
frighten-type verb compatible with the reflexive (middle) construction. La removes the burden of
independence from the object such that the experiencing participant "allows" the event to occur,
which is a much less active role than actually worrying, being irritated or scared. Since the causing
participant can be recovered in a post-posed PP headed by av, this can be taken this as yet more
evidence that there is a link between the the reflexive and the presence of an argument in [spec, vP].
One matter remains, however, unclear: how does Kim liker seg i Spania "Kim enjoys Spain"
fit into the picture; the answer, it seems, may be accessible through the translation into English.
Where å like would normally be translated as "to like", it is normally translated as "to enjoy" when
used as a reflexive. That this construction differs from all other Norwegian fear-type verbs can be
no coincidence, but the verb does not seem any different to the other verbs in its class in any other
respect. Å like is perhaps a remnant of some older construction, "frozen" and stored as an idiom in
the lexicon.
Because of the fact that Norwegian requires the presence of the reflexive in psych middleconstructions,
the following analysis (after Bouchard (1995)) is proposed; the element seg in
Norwegian and the element –self in English fill the same space, those verbs that have external
arguments and possess internal arguments that are capable of carrying out the action described by
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the verb, possess an argument position for the reflexive element. This argument may be an empty
category/phonetically null in some languages (English may optionally include it (compare 72a and
72b) below), whereas others, such as Norwegian, require its realization generally, or with
specifically "weak" objects (see Bouchard (1995: 106-7) for examples in French).
(72a)
(72b)
(73a)
(73b)
Kim angers easily.
?*Kim angers himself easily.
*Kim irriterer lett.
Kim irritates easily
Kim i
irriterer seg i
lett.
Kim i
irritates REFL i
easily
'Kim irritates easily'
Bouchard (1984) argues that the reflexive "absorbs" the theta-role of the external argument;
this however, is against the minimalist approach presented in Bouchard (1995) and adopted here.
The present view is that the absence of the external argument/promotion of the object deploys the
reflexive element in the lower VP in Norwegian/English. The reflexive element, although its
deployment is intendant on the absence of the causative argument, is intrinsically related to the
raised subject because of their relationship at the level of VP. The following tree structure accounts
for these facts by clustering the reflexive element in the lower VP with the trace of the raised object:
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(74a) IP
NP I'
Kim i
I° vP
[agr/tense] vP AP
NP v' easily
Ø v° VP
frighten v
NP V'
REFL V°
NP
t v
t i
(75a) IP
NP I'
Kim i
I° vP
[agr/tense] vP AP
NP v' lett
Ø v° VP
bekymrer v
NP V'
seg V° NP
t v
t i
Kim worry REFL easy
'Kim worries easily'
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Note that this structure predicts that these verbs cannot be passivized because the object is already
raised. This is, indeed, the case for Norwegian and English.
(76a)
(76b)
(76c)
(77a)
(77b)
*Kim i
bekymres seg i
lett.
Kim i
worry+PASS REFL i
easy
*Kim i
ble bekymret seg i
lett.
Kim became worried REFL i
easy
*Seg bekymres/ble bekymret lett.
REFL worry+PASS/becomes worried easy
?*Kim is frightened easily with scary faces.
?*Kim is frightened easily by scary faces.
5.2.4 Productivity
It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that productivity in English and Norwegian is generally
limited to so-called psych-constructions; these are formed using typically causative verbs with
psych arguments. The absence of creative, new single-word psych-verbs is marked. It is the case,
however, that is is possible to find Norwegian verbs that have borderline acceptability and/or are
idiosyncratic or uncommon, but are nevertheless used. An example of such verbs can be seen in
Unni Lindell's (1996) novel Slangebæreren, where the author regularly uses the verb å ekle "to
disgust", formed from the adjective ekkel "disgusting". The examples come from page 55, 134 and
167 respectively. 52
(78a)
(78b)
(78c)
Den blå himmelen eklet ham.
The blue sky-the disgusted him
'The blue sky disgusted him'
Det var tydelig at mannen eklet henne.
It was clear that man-the disgusted her
'It was clear that the man disgusted her'
Det skremte ham at hun eklet ham mer og mer.
It scared him that she disgusted him more and more
One can imagine that such neologisms are also present in English, among these might be verbs such
as "to freak (out)"; while this verb may have a sexual connotation because of its use in popular
culture to replace another, similar word, it is also used to mean something like "frighten" in the
52
Thanks are due to A. K. Greenall for these examples.
167

following contexts:
(79a)
(79b)
It freaked me out.
The way Kim's face changed freaked me.
The number of such verbs is, however, limited, and as will be seen in the next section, the lion's
share of the productivity of this class is contained in so-called constructions.
5.2.5 Constructions
Psych-verbs are limited in number, though as a class the frighten-type is among the more
numerous presented in Levin (1993). This fact aside, Levin does not include psych-constructions
among those verbs. The group of psych constructions which proves to be not only more numerous,
but also productive.
5.2.5.1 Gjøre/Make constructions
The first subtype of psych-construction is gjøre constructions; these are represented in
English by make constructions. The English constructions involve canonical causative constructions
with psych-compatible arguments. (80) and (81) are canonical causative constructions, whereas
(82) and (83) are psych-constructions.
(80) Kim made Sandy shout.
(81) Kim fikk Sandy til å rope.
Kim got Sandy PRT to shout
'Kim made Sandy shout'
(82) Kim made Sandy sad.
(83) *Kim fikk Sandy trist.
Kim got Sandy Sad
Note that the Norwegian sentence (83) is ungrammatical. The grammatical form for such
constructions is that in (84).
(84) Kim/Filmen gjorde Sandy trist.
Kim/Film-the did Sandy sad
'Kim/The film made Sandy sad'
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(85) Gulrøttene gjorde Sandy gul.
Carrots-the did Sandy yellow
'The carrots made Sandy orange'
Note that Norwegian differs from English in one major respect: causatives with verbal complements
take å få "to get", while adjectival causatives take å gjøre "to do", thus explaining the difference
between the English and Norwegian constructions. Note that the properties of the arguments of
(84) and (85) also differ as radically as those of the English examples in (80) and (82); the causal
relationship between Sandy and the carrots is one whereby some property of the carrots causes
Sandy to change colour. The change in Sandy undergone as a result of contact with Kim or the film
is one of "mental state". In this sense, Sandy is an affected argument in both constructions, but only
an Experiencing participant in (84). The properties of the aseity that causes the specified change,
and the specified change itself seem to be intrinsically linked; this can be seen in the fact that it is
some property of carrots that is linked to the colour orange; the link between Kim/the film and the
emotion sadness is less clear, but it may be the case that more-or-less anything can bring about a
change in mental state (because most things can be a Bouchardian Concept). Because of the fact that
a Concept is a conceptualization of something, the Concept bears an inherent "imprint of the
experiencer" who forms the Concept. This imprint may validate the relation of an emotion in the
given experiencing individual to a given Concept. In this way, it is not hard to imagine a context for
even the unlikeliest constructions of this type:
(86a)
(86b)
(86c)
(87a)
(87b)
(87c)
The carrots made Kim sad.
Happiness made Sandy angry.
The examples made the students cross.
Gulrøttene gjorde Kim trist.
Carrots-the did Kim sad
'The carrots made Kim sad'
At folk var glade gjorde Sandy irritert.
That people were happy did Kim irritated
'That people were happy made Kim irritated'
Eksemplene gjorde studentene sinte.
Examples-the did students-the angry
'The examples made the students angry'
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In (86a, 87a), Kim must be assumed to have a conceptualization of carrots that causes
sadness; in, (86b, 87b), Sandy must be assumed to have a negative conceptualization of happiness
in others; in (86c, 87c), the students must be assumed to dislike certain kinds of examples, perhaps
because of their content, or type — either way, the students have a conceptualization of these
examples. All of these Concepts have a conceptualization which perhaps builds on previous
experience; this allows virtually anything to act as causing argument because anything can be
conceptualized in a negative or positive way, and psych-verbs typically express polar emotions,
which can be divided into positive and negative groups.
5.2.6 Bouchard's psy-chose argument
Since psych-constructions generally express a third "participant" — in the case of frightentype
constructions, the adjective — it is possible to assume Bouchard's (1995) analysis whereby
psych-verbs are characterized by the presence of a, sometimes overt, psy-chose argument; that is,
an argument that defines and delimits the scope of the relationship between the two participants in
psych constructions. This conceptualization is avoided here, because applying it to the core verbs
entails postulation of a non-overt argument (note that these differ from non-overt reflexive
arguments in that many languages realize reflexive arguments, but do not realize unincorporated
arguments — it seems to be the case that Bouchard's en-clitic (in This enraged Kim), which is
supposed to be evidential of an incorporated argument does not have the properties of an
unincorporated argument such as a chill (in This sent a chill through Kim)).
5.2.7 Bech Lutnæs & Åfarli (2000)
Bech Lutnæs & Åfarli (2000) present a number of phenomena from Norwegian in the
framework outlined by Bouchard (1995). They present a two verbs similar in many ways to
English raising verbs such as seem and occur.
(88) Slike ting forekommer meg (svært ofte).
Such things occur me (very often)
'Such things occur to me (very often)'
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(89) Slike ting foresvever meg (svært ofte).
Such things appear (dimly) me (very often)
'Such things appear to me (very often)'
(90) Det forekommer meg at han sier slike ting.
It occurs me that he says such things
'It occurs to me that he says such things'
(91) Det forekommer at han sier slike ting.
It occurs that he says such things
'It happens that he says such things'
The analysis provided by Bech Lutnæs & Åfarli is one which analyses forekomme-type verbs as
unaccusatives within a VP-shell of the kind used by Aoun & Li (1989), with an Experiencer
argument generated as the specifier of the lower VP and subsequently moving to the upper [spec,
VP].
(92) VP
NP
V'
V° VP
forekomme i
NP
V'
meg V° NP
t i
slike ting
This, of course, is very similar to the approach presented here. The approach differs because Bech
Lutnæs & Åfarli present this structure for forekomme-type verbs alone, suggesting that the
frighten-type verbs do not project a VP-shell. In order to attain the surface structure Slike ting
forekommer meg, a crossover must take place. Bech Lutnæs & Åfarli claim that the movement of
the verb from V° to v° in turn allows this movement (which would otherwise be blocked by
Minimality/Shortest Move (Rizzi (1990), Chomsky (1995))), which 'makes the Experiencer
argument and the subject position equidistant [with respect to] the Theme/Cause/Stimulus
171

argument….' This equidistance is that referred to in section 4.3.2 above.
If one, for a moment, imagines that this is not the case, and that the internal structure of the
verb is that assumed in the present work, and that the stimulating participant is projected to [spec,
vP] and the experiencing participant is projected to [comp, VP], then a quite different picture
emerges:
(93) vP
NP
v'
Slike ting v°
VP
Ø NP V'
Ø V° NP
forekomme
meg
It is important to note that one of Bech Lutnæs & Åfarli's major reasons for implementing the tree
as drawn in (132) is in order to account for the "raising" constructions in (130–131). Note,
however, the similarity of these constructions to those in (134–135):
(94a)
(94b)
(95a)
(95b)
It irritated Kim that Sandy said such things.
It pleased Kim that the bike worked.
Det irriterte Kim at Sandy sa slike ting.
It irritated Kim that Sandy said such things
Det gledet Kim at sykkelen fungerte.
It pleased Kim that cycle-the functioned
'It pleased Kim that the bike worked'
These extrapositions are not uncommon, especially in Norwegian. The Scandinavian languages have
a general predilection for extraposed sentences (cf. Johansson (2002), Gundel (2002)), and these
constructions phenomenologically resemble clefts: they serve a similar purpose, placing focus
elsewhere in the sentence. Whether or not this is an important factor is arguable, but the similarity
between the forekomme verbs and frighten-type verbs is quite apparent; the VP-shell tree
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postulated in the present account for frighten-type verbs accounts for forekomme and foresveve, as
well as frighten-type extrapositions, in an adequate way.
(96) vP
vP
AP
NP v' at han sier slike ting
Det v° VP
forekommer v
NP V'
meg V° NP
t v
Ø
It occurs REFL that he says such things
'It occurs to me that he says such things'
5.3 Conclusions
In this chapter, an approach using a Larsonian VP-shell has been presented, where the
upper [spec, vP] is a locus for agentive/causative arguments and the lower A-positions are
characterized by their affectedness, taking affected arguments accordingly. It has been demonstrated
that this framework is capable of accounting for the data presented in Chapter 2, accounting for
simple structures as well as those considered to be generally more complex. In many places, the
analysis has presented a number of quite simple answers, adding support to the central hypothesis.
It has been demonstrated that the analysis using a Larsonian VP-shell, accounts for the
observed facts neatly, providing evidence against other applications of this same type of structure
on the grounds that such applications do not capture generalizations regarding causativity and
affectedness.
It has become apparent during the course of this chapter that English and Norwegian vary in
regard to certain parameters; these have to do with specifications of what processes are allowed
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where. It has been shown that many of the processes are similar, such as middle formation and
extraposition, and that the differences between English and Norwegian can be explained in terms of
the parametric variation expected between languages, examples of which can be found in backward
binding phenomena and the requirements verbs place on their arguments.
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6.0 Conclusions
This thesis has been concerned with reanalysing the properties of psych-verbs in English
and Norwegian, and providing an account which is compatible with current minimalist thinking.
This has lead to an approach based on the work of Bouchard (1995) and numerous recent works by
Chomsky. The analysis took root in a rejection of "quirky" approaches, which suggest that psychverbs
are in some way "special cases", and approaches which rely on situational semantics.
Chapter 4 introduced the response to the failure of previous approaches to account for the
observed data in a consistent and non-quirky way. It was also shown that the flaws in
conceptualization involving semantic notions had "muddied the waters" to a certain extent.
Pesetsky's (1995) characterization of frighten-type verbs as causative was shown to be correct, but
that fear-type verbs differ from the usual way they are conceived, namely, more focus was placed
on the fact that these verbs have an affected subject. It was here that Bouchard's (1995) conception
of participant types came into play; it was shown how Bouchard's methodology could be adapted
and applied in light of the findings about the semantics of fear-type verbs. On the basis of this new
distinction, a VP-shell analysis was invoked; this features a causative locus in the upper vP, and an
affected locus in the lower VP. Two previous analyses (Arad (1998) and Bennis (2000)) using this
type of analysis were shown to have failed to account for the data as interpreted here.
In Chapter 5, it was demonstrated that the VP-shell analysis could indeed account for the
observed phenomena, drawing analogies with other verb classes, notably the similarity between
fear-type verbs and certain verbs of perception. This, to my mind, is perhaps the clearest
demonstration of the applicability of this approach.
One of the primary motivations behind the approach presented here has been the overt aim
of developing as little new structure as possible, at the same time as presenting a coherent account
based on justifiable semantic principles. In utilizing a VP-shell, where the lower VP is the locus for
affected arguments, and the upper vP locus for agentive and causative arguments, it has been
demonstrated that it is indeed possible to explain the observed facts of psych-verbs without
resorting to "quirky" explanations.
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The proof of the efficacy of this approach is the fact that the data does seem to fit; and that
the problems that arise when utilizing less "kosher" configurations are avoided: standard theory is
appealed to, and returns a straightforward response.
In terms of the outlook of this approach, it would be interesting to apply it to wider
phenomena and other verb classes. The application of the approach to a contrastive study of
English, Norwegian and other non-Germanic/non-Indo-European languages would also help
determine the usefulness of the ideas presented here.
The current approach has shown that it is possible to characterize psych-verbs in terms of
wider verb classes, causative and Perception verbs; it is of particular interest to see whether these
generalizations hold cross-linguistically, especially in non-Indo-European languages. The final proof
of the analysis is to show that it can account for the variance in parameters observed in many
languages.
A second topic that has arisen from the current study that would also be of great interest is
the comparison of the distribution of reflexives and middles across a number of unrelated languages.
It was argued in the present work that middles were impossible with fear-type verbs because of the
absence of an (external) argument in [spec, vP]; this leads to the conclusion that all verbs with
arguments mapped to the lower VP alone are incompatible with the middle construction. It was
shown that this approach accounted for examples from English and Norwegian, but it is also the
case that these languages are closely related, weakening the hypothesis that this is a universal
property of the lower VP in the shell-VP as defined here.
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Appendix A — Norwegian Verbs
Frighten-type verbs
arge
'irritate'
begeistre
'fascinate/enchant'
bekymre
'worry'
berolige
'calm'
beruse
'enthral/intoxicate'
beta
'thrill/impress'
blidke
'mollify'?
blende
'stun/blind'
demoralisere
'demoralize'
desillusjonere
'disillusion'
distrahere
'distract'
egge
'encourage'
engste
'worry'
erge
'annoy/irritate'
fascinere
'fascinate'
fengsle
'captivate'
fjetre
'bewitch'
forarge
'scandalize/offend'
fornærme
'offend'
forskrekke
'frighten/scare'
forurolige
'worry'
gnage
'gnaw at/worry'
gremme
'grieve/annoy'
imponere
'impress'
inspirere
'inspire'
interessere
'interest'
irritere
'irritate'
kjede
'bore'
knuse
'break/dishearten/destroy'
lamme
'make lame/incapacitate'
narre
'deceive/fool/make fun of'
opphisse
'agitate'
oppmuntre
'encourage/cheer'
opprøre
'agitate/shock/disgust'
overbevise
'convince'
overraske
'surprise'
overvelde
'overwhelm'
pine
'torment/torture'
pirre
'stimulate/excite/titillate'
plage
'annoy/irritate'
provosere
'provoke'
ryste
'shake/stun'
såre
'wound/hurt'
sjarmere
'charm'
177

sjenere
sjokkere
skamme
skremme
skuffe
smigre
terge
tirre
trette
trollbinde
trøste
underholde
uroe
ydmyke
'bother/trouble/annoy'
'shock'
'shame (oneself)/to be ashamed'
'scare/frighten'
'disappoint'
'flatter'
'annoy/irritate'
'tease/provoke'
'tire/bore'
'captivate/enchant'
'comfort'
'entertain'
'worry'
'humiliate'
Fear-type verbs
beundre
'admire'
elske
'love'
forakte
'despise'
foretrekke 'prefer'
forgude
'idolize'
frykte
'fear'
hate
'hate'
like
'like'
lovprise
'esteem'
mislike
'dislike'
nyte
'enjoy'
oppelske
'cherish'
savne
'miss'
tåle
'tolerate'
tilbe
'adore'
verdsette
'appreciate/value'
Marvel-type verbs
lure på
'wonder (about)'
kjæle for
'cherish'
sørge over 'grieve (about)'
stole på
'trust (in)'
Appeal-type verbs
appelere til 'appeal to'
gnage på
'eat at/annoy'
jage opp
'chase up/agitate'
skurre i
'grate on'
178

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