Foreign Agents in Russia - Doria
Foreign Agents in Russia - Doria
Foreign Agents in Russia - Doria
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transparent foreign agents, the NKOs were hidden <strong>in</strong> <strong>Russia</strong>. Although <strong>in</strong> the chapter 4.1.1. I argued<br />
that the identification of foreign agents is more dependent on the political characters of their<br />
activities than f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g, the transparency discourses have more balanced pressure on both the<br />
political activity and f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g of NKOs.<br />
In many of the cases where high officials such as the central members of the state duma (Ria<br />
2012c) or prime m<strong>in</strong>ister Dmitry Medvedev (2012m) or president Vladimir Put<strong>in</strong> (Ria 2013f1)<br />
legitimized the foreign agents the arguments were emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g the transparency of f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g, often<br />
not connect<strong>in</strong>g the transparency to the political activities of NKOs per se. The bill <strong>in</strong>itiative to<br />
subjugate media organizations to foreign agent regulations was overruled <strong>in</strong> Duma ma<strong>in</strong>ly because<br />
the media is already report<strong>in</strong>g their f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g sources (Echo 2012h). In cases like this the foreign<br />
agent discourses seem to produce transparency more <strong>in</strong> the foreign f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g features of NKOs than<br />
<strong>in</strong> their political actions. As a part of the amendments made to the law on NKOs, <strong>Russia</strong>n banks are<br />
obliged to automatically report all money transactions over 200,000 rubles (approximately 4 570<br />
euros) from abroad to the officials of Federal Service for F<strong>in</strong>ancial Monitor<strong>in</strong>g (Ria 2013v.) The<br />
obligation considers every foreign transaction over the def<strong>in</strong>ed amount of money regardless of the<br />
receiver. In such rul<strong>in</strong>g the desired function of the transparency <strong>in</strong> foreign f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g appears to be<br />
an <strong>in</strong>dicator, not a violation of law per se but a signal demand<strong>in</strong>g for more precise attention <strong>in</strong><br />
receiver's activities.<br />
As I have earlier noted the NKOs have little denied their foreign fund<strong>in</strong>g as their more<br />
popular issues with the foreign agent def<strong>in</strong>itions have been <strong>in</strong> the recognition of the def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
political activities. The problems with the transparency of political activities are strongly l<strong>in</strong>ked to<br />
the def<strong>in</strong>ition of political activities and the claim<strong>in</strong>g of action as non-political has at times it has<br />
been portrayed to be hidden as well. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to a report of the prosecutor, the human rights center<br />
Memorial tried to hide that besides of us<strong>in</strong>g its resources to educational and historical purposes it<br />
also had a mission to solve social and political problems by formation of public op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>in</strong> <strong>Russia</strong><br />
and <strong>in</strong>fluenc<strong>in</strong>g to authorities (2013g1). The case of Memorial is only one example of the NKOs the<br />
prosecutors found cover<strong>in</strong>g their political activities. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the compet<strong>in</strong>g discourses the<br />
concept of foreign agent per se was seen to cause the operations of NKOs go underground because<br />
otherwise it would disallow their work (2012n). While this is a more rare k<strong>in</strong>d of a statement, it<br />
describes how the fear of the foreign agent label positions NKOs to circumstances where they might<br />
need to work illegally and hidden. If such statement does necessarily not describe exist<strong>in</strong>g reality, it<br />
can function as a self-fulfill<strong>in</strong>g prophecy. In paragraphs 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 I have noted how these<br />
hidden political activities were described <strong>in</strong> different ways more or less transparent.<br />
The possible foreign agents are reported to have been found <strong>in</strong> human rights organizations,<br />
law offices, environmentalists, volunteers, festivals, research centers, even <strong>in</strong> presidential offices