George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

The Role of the Company Intelligence Support
Team in Full Spectrum Operations
by Thomas Tomes and Christopher Maxwell
Introduction
In the usual theater mission rehearsal exercises
(MRE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center
(JRTC), the Company Intelligence Support Team
(CoIST) in each maneuver battalion (BN) is pivotal
in supporting company commanders (CO Cdrs)
and BN S2s. Rotation 11-01 with the 3rd Brigade
Combat Team (BCT), 82 nd Airborne Division was the
first full spectrum operations (FSO) rotation at JRTC
in eight years. Recognizing that CoISTs should play
a role in FSO, 3/82 ABN elected to use a modified
CoIST concept with CO command posts (CPs) serving
this critical requirement among all of its other
requirements.
What was discovered during the BCT’s rotation is
that FSO does not lessen the need for CoISTs at the
maneuver company; it modifies the mission’s priorities
and adds to them. During this rotation, both
the 3/82 ABN and JRTC observed several CoIST
challenges. This article will discuss three of those
challenges:
Manning a CoIST for FSO.
Resourcing a CoIST with appropriate automation
and communication resources.
Establishing standing operating procedures
(SOP) for CoISTs during FSO.
Building the CoIST
The initial challenge for the BCT was to select the
right Soldiers to build these CoIST cells and provide
those Soldiers with the necessary tools and training.
CoISTs may not be the three to five man elements
normally seen in a counterinsurgency (COIN) rotation
because of manning constraints and priorities
but they need to have the same functionality. They
must be properly configured and properly trained.
The Army has become much more technologically
advanced in the last 10 years and is able to process
much more data as compared to previous decades
when we last trained for FSO. Analytical and battle
tracking cells (CoISTs) at the lowest level help process
this data in a near real-time environment. The
Army must continue to allocate resources such as
Soldiers, equipment, and time to “train” on critical
CoIST tasks such as intelligence preparation of the
battlefield, CoIST system technology, battle tracking,
report writing, and other skills to be successful.
“CoIST-like” duties were assigned to the CO CPs
as opposed to identifying an independent element to
perform these functions. These CPs used SOPs specifically
designating responsibilities, processes, and
formats as well as a primary, alternate, contingency,
and emergency (PACE) plan for communications.
No two CP SOPs were the same for 3/82 ABN with
respect to CoIST duties. This caused much confusion
across the BCT and never allowed the Intel War
Fighting Function to effectively connect from CO to
BCT. Having an independent CoIST, resourced with
personnel and equipment, and clearly assigning
that intelligence functions would have significantly
enabled 3/82 ABN to make the intelligence connection.
Additionally, CoISTs would have assisted BCT
CO Cdrs understanding of the threat and assisted
BN S2s with threat analysis at the company level.
Soldiers manning a CoIST do not have to be intelligence
analysts. In most cases, a BCT will likely
not have the MOS 35F, Intelligence Analyst Soldiers
available to man each maneuver company CoIST. 1
The BCTs will continue to have to train other
Soldiers already in the company on how to generate,
build, and update map graphics and how to push
and pull information from the BN S2 over the FM
operations and intelligence (O/I) net. This is a full
time requirement and cannot be effectively managed
by the Soldiers manning the CO CP. The BN or BCT
S2 should create an SOP with the Cdrs and S3s that
specifically defines a digital and analog PACE plan
along with a timeline of how information and intelligence
will be passed vertically.
Automation Obstacles
The second challenge for CO CPs during this FSO
rotation was the reduced communication capabilities
(both digital and analog). During a JRTC MRE
rotation, communication capabilities organic to
the unit or JRTC issued, are shipped in on convoy
logistics patrols or signed over from the outgoing
unit and are setup at the CO CP with little effort or
18 Military Intelligence