George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

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model is the lack of appropriately trained personnel with experience and credentials to advise and assist on more than just military matters. Our senior combat leaders have experience through their time in grade and multiple deployments, but they are used sparingly through key leader engagements and well-crafted talking points with Iraqi leaders across a much larger landscape than in previous deployments. Simply put, there are not enough commanders to go around and those that are on the ground experience a diminishing marginal utility as the Iraqis react and plan for our withdrawal. The companies and platoons that interact daily with key ISF partners are typically limited by virtue of their own work experience, being young military professionals. It does not take a Master’s Degree in Social Sciences to identify problem sets in various subsections of Iraqi society, but coming up with solutions for the Iraqis to realize and enact does take training, innovation, and throughput. It is even more difficult convincing ISF that they should take up the mantle of responsibility when their faith in the civil leadership wanes and varies, especially in a diverse cultural landscape like Kirkuk Province. Pervasive issues of personnel, mission clarity, and strategy versus execution are the biggest challenges to tactical intelligence personnel from here until end of mission in Iraq. This article is meant to provide some simple recommendations in a not so simple environment and only speaks to our experiences as one of a handful of battalion S2 sections left in Iraq. Embracing the Change of Mission The media attention that Operation New Dawn received did not clarify for the American public what the military’s role in post-combat operations in Iraq is, and is not. In our microcosm, this was evidenced by the scores of phone calls and emails from confused family members after President Obama stated prior to 1 September 2010 that the last combat troops had left Iraq. The mission, as described by our commanders, is the only thing that has changed. The “advise, train, and assist” mission is still being carried out by American Soldiers, who by definition are combat trained troops. The paradigm shift to ISF completely in the lead has not meant that we sit around on bases and wait for the trip home. On the contrary, operation tempo increased, but in a different way. We still roll outside the “wire” with up-armored vehicles, in full protective gear, each wielding a personal weapon, and travelling in convoys. Unilateral travel to and from specific destinations is still permitted by Iraqi law, as is the inherent right to self-defense to include force protection patrols. What does this mean for Intelligence? IA and IP officers planning a mission based on Joint Intelligence. If anything, it means that instead of assessing only the enemy, we need to readjust our focus to security in a broader sense and “target” influencing those Iraqis we think can have the greatest lasting impact on security. As physical enablers like ground troop sensors pull back from engaging the population directly, collection assets like human intelligence (HUMINT) source pools and unabridged notes from key leader engagements are the best way to keep situational awareness. The question we pose to ourselves and our team daily is how can we engage ISF Intelligence officers and assist and advise them? However, the more we ask this question, the more we realize that we rely on them in terms of intelligence collection. It is important for commanders to have realistic expectations of what battalion S2 sections and company intelligence support teams (COISTs) can do to “advise and assist” Iraqi Intelligence officers on, since they live in and amongst the population, speak the language, and know the people more intimately than we ever will. However, there 34 Military Intelligence
are a number of areas in which we can help them develop an enduring capacity, and because time is so limited we must move to set the conditions for Iraq post-December 2011 now. Reinforcing the existing intelligence architecture by getting undertrained personnel into the Intelligence schools their own forces offer or offering exchange scholarships at Fort Huachuca to the brightest and most promising young officers might be a start. The problem is that even though the Iraqi Army (IA) has an established system of schooling, training, and on-the-job experience, the culture of mistrust when sharing information hampers further holistic development. As our Commanding General put it, “We must do some expectation management of what we can affect because we are looking at the IA system from an American standpoint and looking for ways to make it more efficient, whereas they are looking at the system with a legacy of corruption and attempting to fix that internally first.” 2 It seems we spend half of our time trying to catchup with the Iraqi brigade and division S2s who are not so willing to share information about their current targeting, not only with us, but also with each other and especially with sister security force organizations like the Iraqi Police (IP). As the country attempts to transition to police primacy, IA leaders must also understand how this affects the nature of their organization. In turn, the U.S. Forces’ mission to advise, train, and assist can ultimately be successful if we have the Iraqi Forces’ cooperation. Evaluating staff integration and coaching staff exercises to the willing may be an effective way to get the ISF to see the battlefield with a cross-sectional lens, but they have more on their plate than simply attending our recommended staff classes. Our focus should assist through tangibles like Actionable Intelligence derived from our technologically advanced platforms, but also significant time or more efforts spent on the advising aspect such as teaching tradecraft in bilateral programs and providing a focus through which the ISF will be able to conduct a full security assessment, not limited to threat actions. In order to be relevant and contribute to mission success in the Intelligence Warfighting Function, the mission tasks of “advise and assist” must be accomplished simultaneously, but should also take into account on what the Iraqis want to be advised and assisted. Finding Intellect in Intelligence Eighteen months following this unit’s redeployment, reset, and an NTC-rotation focused on the transition to an Advise and Assist Brigade, and here we are back in Iraq, in a new province with new problems spread over 4,000 square kilometers. As of 1 September 2010, the total strength of U.S. Armed Forces was capped at 50,000 personnel versus nearly 170,000 at the war’s height. In operational terms, this translates to roughly two battalions per province. In Kirkuk, where we are deployed, there is a Cavalry Squadron partnered with the IP in the City. Our Infantry Battalion is partnered with the ISF (to include the IA and IP) and Sons of Iraq (SoI)) in all areas outside of Kirkuk and the Combined Security Area. The challenge is being responsible for, “Kul Kirkuk, maad Medina,” or, “all of Kirkuk, except for the City,” as our IA counterparts like to say, highlighting the fact that everything affecting our area stems from the political developments in the provincial capital. In order to meet reduction in force numbers, our Intel section was reduced below the modified table of organization and equipment, without the augmentation of analysts that General Flynn’s article advocates. 3 Analyst shortfalls, however, have helped us focus on being more efficient and utilizing all available assets to include building competent COISTs that work in conjunction with direct-support HUMINT Collection Teams. What COIST leaders lack in formal intelligence training, they make up for in aggressive attitudes of would-be platoon leaders. Prior to deployment, familiarization with our proposed targeting process and tactical intelligence equipment was essential for their ability to cope with an ever-demanding deployment battle rhythm. Most of the COIST officers-in-charge are from the Field Artillery branch and use this additional assignment as an effective way to help focus their company’s targeting efforts. Still, getting the right personnel in the right jobs is always a challenge. While there has been some continuity in COIST makeup, many of the junior Soldiers were redistributed in order to meet line platoon shortages. That leaves us heavily dependent on OICs and NCOICs to take the initiative and be more than just an IST and who are, in reality, the company commander’s staff for all areas in which he wishes to advise and assist the ISF. What we’ve tried to instill in our April - June 2011 35
Page 2 and 3: Commanding General Brigadier Genera
Page 4 and 5: always out front by by Brigadier Br
Page 6 and 7: 4 Military Intelligence
Page 8 and 9: All the STX lanes included time for
Page 10 and 11: access to a higher echelon tactical
Page 12 and 13: We should also note that the 2006 F
Page 14 and 15: BCTs will face a more sophisticated
Page 16 and 17: Lieutenant Colonel (P) John Haynicz
Page 18 and 19: 1. A qualified field support engine
Page 20 and 21: The Role of the Company Intelligenc
Page 22 and 23: with operational requirements. Patr
Page 24 and 25: Targeting is another critical area
Page 26 and 27: Chief Warrant Officer Three Conan P
Page 28 and 29: provides and how HUMINT collects it
Page 30 and 31: We have the SIGINT equipment to cov
Page 32 and 33: Sergeant First Class Bryan J. Ward
Page 34 and 35: Engineer support provided to the TU
Page 38 and 39: COIST members is that their focus m
Page 40 and 41: fore information is pulled away by
Page 42 and 43: y Major Ismael R. Rodriguez Militar
Page 44 and 45: e no solution at all. Thus, determi
Page 46 and 47: 20. FM 2-01.3, MCRP 2-3A: Intellige
Page 48 and 49: a bodyguard and assassination unit
Page 50 and 51: device from a distance without expo
Page 52 and 53: Iraq and Afghanistan. None of these
Page 54 and 55: This, of course, is Intelligence’
Page 56 and 57: fined steps to prevent CIVCAS shoul
Page 58 and 59: Insurgencies are protracted by natu
Page 60 and 61: y First Lieutenant Tyler Jost In 19
Page 62 and 63: Services Intelligence (ISI), the or
Page 64 and 65: y Robert J. Leach In the U.S., inte
Page 66 and 67: plant, gave concrete evidence to th
Page 68 and 69: it was a case of mistaken identity,
Page 70 and 71: culturation, and one of its consequ
Page 72 and 73: of the actual negotiation process,
Page 74 and 75: leader who appears to have complete
Page 76 and 77: and data constantly bombards intell
Page 78 and 79: elies heavily upon on a person-to-p
Page 80 and 81: Eyes in the Sky: Eisenhower, the CI
Page 82 and 83: The event itself has been written a
Page 84 and 85: Soldiers at Camp Tracy deliberately
Page 86 and 87:
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George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

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