George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists
George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists
George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists
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device from a distance without exposing themselves<br />
to capture. Since not all IEDs are emplaced on roadways,<br />
it is likely that alternate tactics that are used<br />
in Mexico, such as placing the device next to a body,<br />
would also be employed. Cartel members know that<br />
security forces will have to react to this discovery,<br />
making a successful strike all but certain. 16<br />
The emplacement <strong>of</strong> an IED inside a drug bundle<br />
is also a likely scenario. The Border Patrol is known<br />
to simply stack these bundles together and to move<br />
them into a warehouse or holding area after they<br />
are found which provides numerous opportunities<br />
for a casualty-inflicting remote detonation.<br />
In addition, the cartels have the potential<br />
to create more sophisticated devices<br />
than those that have been seen in<br />
either Iraq or Afghanistan. They have<br />
the luxury <strong>of</strong> learning from these insurgencies<br />
since the methodologies learned<br />
by those who participated in fighting<br />
U.S. forces are widely available on the<br />
Internet. The cartels have greater financial<br />
capabilities than the threat groups<br />
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they have<br />
the money to construct devices that use<br />
technologies that cannot currently be<br />
defeated. The cartels would also have<br />
a distinctly different target set, as the<br />
Border Patrol is a paramilitary force<br />
that is not trained in or equipped for CIED (counter-<br />
IED) operations. The cartels would likely outpace<br />
current CIED efforts and capabilities very quickly,<br />
and the U.S. would find itself at a serious disadvantage<br />
in a short time period.<br />
In reference to the threat <strong>of</strong> IED proliferation, the<br />
intelligence community has been limited to reactive<br />
rather than proactive measures, and the situation<br />
along the southern U.S. border is shaping up<br />
to become a scenario that will be similar to what<br />
has been seen in the past. The only thing currently<br />
preventing the use <strong>of</strong> IEDs along the border is an<br />
unsteady decision by the cartels. Appropriate measures<br />
must be in place and concrete steps must be<br />
taken to diminish any potential gain that could be<br />
obtained from IED use if the U.S. is to avert this<br />
threat.<br />
The reason IEDs are employed is because they<br />
are easy to use, effective and relatively inexpensive.<br />
If the cartels suffer more loss than gain from their<br />
early attempts to employ IEDs, they will be much<br />
less willing to spend the time and money to advance<br />
their devices and to overcome any countermeasures.<br />
However, if the cartels experience early<br />
success due to a lack <strong>of</strong> preparation on the part <strong>of</strong><br />
the U.S., they will have the opportunity and motivation<br />
to build upon their experiences, and to adjust<br />
their tactics and upgrade their devices, as any<br />
countermeasures are likely to arrive piecemeal. If<br />
early IED attacks by the cartels succeed, this kind<br />
<strong>of</strong> tactic will be perceived as cost-effective, and will<br />
turn what might have been a short-term threat into<br />
a long-term one.<br />
Protective Measures against Potential<br />
IED Threat<br />
A critical measure that must be implemented<br />
is the addition <strong>of</strong> various cartels to the Declared<br />
Terrorist Organizations list that is maintained by<br />
the U.S. State Department. This list currently contains<br />
no groups related to Mexico’s violence, despite<br />
these groups meeting all the necessary criteria, as<br />
they are an obvious threat to both U.S. citizens and<br />
interests. 17 The parallels between the cartels and<br />
other groups already on the list are readily identifiable,<br />
particularly since some <strong>of</strong> their more heinous<br />
acts <strong>of</strong> beheading, assassination, and mutilation<br />
are identical in nature.<br />
Adding these groups to the Declared Terrorist<br />
Organizations list would open new avenues for the<br />
prosecution <strong>of</strong> individuals associated with these organizations<br />
and would provide a secondary benefit<br />
<strong>of</strong> encouraging detained cartel members to work<br />
against their former comrades due to the threat <strong>of</strong><br />
48 Military Intelligence