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George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

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device from a distance without exposing themselves<br />

to capture. Since not all IEDs are emplaced on roadways,<br />

it is likely that alternate tactics that are used<br />

in Mexico, such as placing the device next to a body,<br />

would also be employed. Cartel members know that<br />

security forces will have to react to this discovery,<br />

making a successful strike all but certain. 16<br />

The emplacement <strong>of</strong> an IED inside a drug bundle<br />

is also a likely scenario. The Border Patrol is known<br />

to simply stack these bundles together and to move<br />

them into a warehouse or holding area after they<br />

are found which provides numerous opportunities<br />

for a casualty-inflicting remote detonation.<br />

In addition, the cartels have the potential<br />

to create more sophisticated devices<br />

than those that have been seen in<br />

either Iraq or Afghanistan. They have<br />

the luxury <strong>of</strong> learning from these insurgencies<br />

since the methodologies learned<br />

by those who participated in fighting<br />

U.S. forces are widely available on the<br />

Internet. The cartels have greater financial<br />

capabilities than the threat groups<br />

in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they have<br />

the money to construct devices that use<br />

technologies that cannot currently be<br />

defeated. The cartels would also have<br />

a distinctly different target set, as the<br />

Border Patrol is a paramilitary force<br />

that is not trained in or equipped for CIED (counter-<br />

IED) operations. The cartels would likely outpace<br />

current CIED efforts and capabilities very quickly,<br />

and the U.S. would find itself at a serious disadvantage<br />

in a short time period.<br />

In reference to the threat <strong>of</strong> IED proliferation, the<br />

intelligence community has been limited to reactive<br />

rather than proactive measures, and the situation<br />

along the southern U.S. border is shaping up<br />

to become a scenario that will be similar to what<br />

has been seen in the past. The only thing currently<br />

preventing the use <strong>of</strong> IEDs along the border is an<br />

unsteady decision by the cartels. Appropriate measures<br />

must be in place and concrete steps must be<br />

taken to diminish any potential gain that could be<br />

obtained from IED use if the U.S. is to avert this<br />

threat.<br />

The reason IEDs are employed is because they<br />

are easy to use, effective and relatively inexpensive.<br />

If the cartels suffer more loss than gain from their<br />

early attempts to employ IEDs, they will be much<br />

less willing to spend the time and money to advance<br />

their devices and to overcome any countermeasures.<br />

However, if the cartels experience early<br />

success due to a lack <strong>of</strong> preparation on the part <strong>of</strong><br />

the U.S., they will have the opportunity and motivation<br />

to build upon their experiences, and to adjust<br />

their tactics and upgrade their devices, as any<br />

countermeasures are likely to arrive piecemeal. If<br />

early IED attacks by the cartels succeed, this kind<br />

<strong>of</strong> tactic will be perceived as cost-effective, and will<br />

turn what might have been a short-term threat into<br />

a long-term one.<br />

Protective Measures against Potential<br />

IED Threat<br />

A critical measure that must be implemented<br />

is the addition <strong>of</strong> various cartels to the Declared<br />

Terrorist Organizations list that is maintained by<br />

the U.S. State Department. This list currently contains<br />

no groups related to Mexico’s violence, despite<br />

these groups meeting all the necessary criteria, as<br />

they are an obvious threat to both U.S. citizens and<br />

interests. 17 The parallels between the cartels and<br />

other groups already on the list are readily identifiable,<br />

particularly since some <strong>of</strong> their more heinous<br />

acts <strong>of</strong> beheading, assassination, and mutilation<br />

are identical in nature.<br />

Adding these groups to the Declared Terrorist<br />

Organizations list would open new avenues for the<br />

prosecution <strong>of</strong> individuals associated with these organizations<br />

and would provide a secondary benefit<br />

<strong>of</strong> encouraging detained cartel members to work<br />

against their former comrades due to the threat <strong>of</strong><br />

48 Military Intelligence

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