Bruce Allen Scharlau PhD thesis - Research@StAndrews:FullText

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UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS LEFT-WING TERRORISM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY A Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy BRUCE ALLEN SCHARLAU 20 December 1991
ABSTRACT The Federal Republic of Germany has coped with indigenous left-wing terrorism for several decades and not lost its liberal democratic character f which raises the question of why terrorists continue to attract recruits to fight the state. This case study of terrorist motivation also elucidates the concept of identification, the lasting influence of someone, some group f or some idea on others, to aid the understanding of motivation and responses to terrorism. Identification also enables the integration of three entwined levels of terrorism study- -individuals, groups and society. Elucidation of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany shows that a wide variety of persons became terrorists. The important factors in becoming a terrorist were the influence of 'significant others' both in the decision to join a terrorist group! and later wi thin the group! as well as the perception that terrorism was the only available option. The terrorist groups fonned 'macronarrati ves r based on the group members' shared history and culture which supported their decisions to offer incentives and sanctions to group members to enable their underground existence. Not all of the groups sought to influence public policy. The Red Army Faction was mainly interested in group survival! as was the Second of June, while some of the Revolutionary Cells and Alitonamen followed their self-interest in commiting terrorist acts. Other Revolutionary Cells and Autanamen groups, however! sought public policy changes through terrorist acts in support of protest groups. The other groups had limited concepts of the 'public'! which reflected their group direction. The government of the Federal Republic responded to left-wing terrorism with short-tenn paramilitary options taking precedence over the long~tenn socio-economic considerations. The Gennan government generally has perceived all left-wing terrorist groups as the same! and not given due consideration to the different terrorist organisations perceptions of the 'public'. A clearer perception of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany shows the usefulness of the concept of identification in the study of terrorism, and highlights the processes involved in terrorist motivation at individual, group and society levels.
Page 1: LEFT-WING TERRORISM IN THE FEDERAL
Page 5 and 6: i v In submitting this thesis to th
Page 7 and 8: The completion of a project of this
Page 9 and 10: V.J...J...J.. Chapter Three: Left-W
Page 11 and 12: List of Figures 1.1 Identification
Page 13 and 14: XLI. OPEC PFLP PIOS RAF RZ Rote AIm
Page 15 and 16: A.J..V Preface This thesis deals wi
Page 17 and 18: 2 Both the historical and analytica
Page 19 and 20: 4 left.7 This tradition continued i
Page 21 and 22: 6 terrorism in the Federal Republic
Page 23 and 24: 8 The result is that terrorism rese
Page 25 and 26: 10 (particulary murder f killing, e
Page 27 and 28: 12 government has to take the terro
Page 29 and 30: 14 The concept of identification us
Page 31 and 32: , , /1 sow.et:iJ1~s ~een tp a~t ()n
Page 33 and 34: 18 CHAPTER TWO: LEFT-WING TERRORISM
Page 35 and 36: 20 Third World liberation movements
Page 37 and 38: 22 and its continuation should not
Page 39 and 40: awareness. Fifth, the idea to form
Page 41 and 42: 26 was that 'late capitalism' neede
Page 43 and 44: 28 In this kind of atmosphere an as
Page 45 and 46: 30 vacuum some spontis fonned land
Page 47 and 48: 32 2.12 Second Phase, 1970-1972 The
Page 49 and 50: 34 The first of the follow-on group
Page 51 and 52: attacks against imperialist counter
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38 March 1968 shortly before Baader
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40 Schmuecker was a group member be
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42 2.3 Revolutionary Cells The Revo
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44 This group operated internationa
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46 Money, weapons, training and saf
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48 were not heroic and they signall
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50 integrated into the RAF prisoner
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52 Palestine to Western Europe [ wh
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justified their claim to be an inte
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act for their awn ideas of organisa
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four Second of June members were ar
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60 The effect of these Red Army Fac
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stated that the prisoners must be b
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64 on hunger strike more often and
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66 3.4 The Revolutionary Cells The
Page 83 and 84:
3.5 Autonanen Amidst the radicalisa
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70 hierachical RAF and its indoctri
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72 maintain their illegal/legal exi
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average 36.7%, 1980s), which were h
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amounted to $22. 5 million in ranso
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public may see models for their own
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80 between them, while others chang
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82 between imperialistic authori ti
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84 a stand collapes, be little surp
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86 needs South Africa to be under W
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88 3.3 Technology The technology as
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90 judges [abuse/violate] their sex
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92 3.51 Release of Prisoners Identi
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prisoners. Creating an elitist grou
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96 activities that placed the outsi
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98 call for the 'consolidation of p
Page 115 and 116:
100 More important for the RAF, how
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publicity than would have otherwise
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104 factors involved in operational
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106 and biographical processes call
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-: ........ ;:; .1.VO IT~els, both
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110 person's 10ng-teDm function~lg.
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112 The possibility of a death-wish
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114 responsibility" to the extent o
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116 nie ag~Legate exterr~l variable
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811 J .P1=ql= ~~ "6-8 '(1861) u~eT~
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()7T vt,.. ;... 0601 lupJ~ l~otLE~
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122 such situations adds further we
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124 3. The Individual in West Genna
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126 disturbances. This supports the
Page 143 and 144:
Table 4.1 Demographic Profile of th
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ebuild and maintain their material
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132 socialisation. 104 The developm
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134 Table 4.5 Biographical OcCUITan
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136 questioning about oneself and t
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oles and norms and offered a possib
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person feels less experienced and i
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142 Table 4.7 (page 143) shows that
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144 Table 4.8 Group Affiliations of
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146 A person's perceived level of a
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148 possibilities of legal extra-pa
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150 When the person joined because
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152 for a new identity which contra
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154 Three theoretical approaches ar
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156 cohesion, instead of lessening
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158 destructive group. The counterm
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160 interested in sociopolitical af
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162 addition of fantasy to their be
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164 to political groups. The person
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166 links with the legals (lawyers,
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168 1984 or 1985. 65 Then only the
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170 3.1. Group Benefits and Enterin
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172 Aid committee work had been in
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174 Constitution at the time. The S
Page 191 and 192:
176 As mentioned earlier, a person'
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178 feelings of resignation and irr
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180 together making it liable to co
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182 goals, but will not always rela
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184 a social revolution { which is
Page 201 and 202:
186 groups, but upon Baader's insis
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188 might reflect badly on the publ
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190 The effectiveness of any dissen
Page 207 and 208:
192 Leaving one terrorist organisat
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194 Cells and Alltonamen belong to
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196 of the relationship between the
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198 which views the justification o
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200 public interests when the dange
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202 policy must be to foster identi
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204 the government did arrive at an
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206 between projected and actual co
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208 holes in the table. A view of T
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210 and the police hierarchy that l
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212 first suspected terrorists push
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214 turn a multinational effort to
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216 7,265 to 14,073. However, these
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218 Beneath the BRA and LKAs are re
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220 response to the Munich Massacre
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222 everything th~ prison and court
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224 These changes in early 1976, al
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4. Strengths and Limitations of Cou
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228 did not hang over them. They we
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230 Preparations, on the other hand
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232 arrest of Rolf Heissler in 1979
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country and count the life, health
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236 StGB may only push terrorist sy
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238 only prevent future acti vi ty
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240 issue. The Federal Prosecutor G
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242 Ideological groups can be destr
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244 to organise their efforts accor
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246 arrested suspects. This was the
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248 ignored the order because they
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250 years were less often sentenced
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problems than it solved, because of
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254 and terrorism relationship. Bot
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256 'defence against subversion' in
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258 There is a large difference bet
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~bU indicate goals and stimulate as
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262 ground of innocent bystanders.
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264 and other activities. At that t
Page 281 and 282:
266 using unbelievable amounts of e
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268 but rather develop themselves.
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270 be used if the public were conf
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272 South Yeman! Iraq and Vietnam,
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274 not. A month later, 50% had tho
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[/b or radio or television programm
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[I'd CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION The
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280 the sole option available to th
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as the person assimilated their pas
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~nprisonment. This could only bind
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286 Pre-terrorist group groups also
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elieved the benefits outweighed the
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The government assisted the rise of
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3. Practical Applications The conce
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way. They are wedded to an organisa
Page 311 and 312:
prisoners and the active members, o
Page 313 and 314:
298 CHRONOLCGY OF MAJOR EVENTS 2 Ju
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300 12 June 1974 (RZ): The Chilian
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5 January 1977 (RAP): Christian Kla
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304 17 November 1978 (RAP): Peter-J
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6 September 1985 (RAF): Illegal mil
Page 323 and 324:
6 June 1990 (RAP): SUsanne Albrecht
Page 325 and 326:
310 Alexander I Yonah, Katwan Jakov
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Boelsche, Jochen. "Das Strahlnetz s
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314 "The Logic of Terrorism: Terror
Page 331 and 332:
Geronimo (pseudonym). Feuer und Fla
Page 333 and 334:
"Der Verfall der Roten AImee Frakti
Page 335 and 336:
Krumm, Karl-Heinz. "Terrorbekaempfu
Page 337 and 338:
Passerini, Luisa. "Mythobiography i
Page 339 and 340:
Verlagsgesellschaft politische Beri
Page 341 and 342:
326 Sartre, Jean-Paul. Critique of
Page 343 and 344:
328 , P.A. Fleming. "Terrorism and
Page 345:
330 PERIODICALS Angehoerigen Info (
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