Synthesis Report A/W - IFAD

Synthesis Report A/W - IFAD

Gender Strengthening Programme for

Eastern and Southern Africa Division


Gender and Poverty Targeting

in Market Linkage Operations

November 2002

The study on Gender and Poverty Targeting in Market Linkage Operations and

this Synthesis Report was financed by a grant from the Government of Norway

to IFAD’s Gender Strengthening Programme.

The judgements made herein do not necessarily reflect the views of IFAD’s

Member Countries or the representatives of those Member Countries appointed

to its Executive Board. The contents of this document may be freely reviewed,

quoted, reproduced or translated in part or in full, provided the source is

acknowledged. IFAD does not guarantee accuracy of data included in this

document and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use.


1. Introduction 1

A. Study Context And Purpose 1

B. Methodology 3

C. Case Study Areas 4

2. Market Environment Case Study Settings 5

A. Socio-Economic Trends 5

B. Poverty and Socio-Economic Differentiation 6

C. Causes of Poverty 8

D. Policy Environment 8

E. Smallholders’ Understanding of Markets 10

F. Farming Systems 10

G. Use of Agricultural Technology 11

H. Passivity and Problem-Solving 12

I. Impact of HIV/AIDS 13

J. Group Formation 13

3. Findings – Market Environments 15

A. Overview of Market Environments 15

B. Enterprise Rankings 15

C. Price Differences by Season and Location 19

D. Producer Versus Consumer Prices 21

E. Enterprise Trends 22

F. Importance of Markets for Livelihood Systems 23

G. Household Food Security 24

H. Cash Cropping and Enterprise Diversification 25

I. Agricultural Product Sales 26

J. Capital Accumulation 29

K. Perceived Problems and Priorities 29

4. Findings – Gender Dimension 33

A. Factors Influencing Gender Roles 33

B. Women’s and Men’s Roles as Providers 36

C. Income Pooling 37

D. Products Under Women’s and Men’s Control 39

E. Gender Roles in Marketing 41

F. Commercial Activities of Women 44

G. Gender Targeting Possibilities 46

5. Findings – Poverty Targeting 51

A. Does Targeting make Sense for Market Linkage Programmes? 51

B. Should Market Linkage Programmes Target Only the Poorest? 52

C. Who Should be Allowed to Join Rural Enterprise Groups? 54

D. Options for Reaching the Poorest 55

6. Market Linkage Programmes: Gender and Poverty Focus

in Planning and M&E 57

A. Gender and Poverty Focus in Area-Based/Focal-Area Planning 57

B. Gender and Poverty Focus in M&E 66

7. Closing Statement 69

Attachment 73

Appendix – Supplementary Tables


List of Acronyms and Abbreviations


































Agricultural Cooperative Development Internatonal/Volunteers in

Overseas Cooperative Assistance

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere

Cooperating Institution

Cooperative League of USA

Country Portfolio Manager

District Development Support Project

Functional adult literacy

Focal area planning process

Focal area resource group

Farmers’ fora

Female-headed household

Food Relief Agency

Gross Domestic Product

Focal area resource group (in Portuguese)

Household food security


Investing in Developing Export Agriculture

Local Needs Assessment Team

Ministry of Agriculture (generic)


National Agricultural Advisory Services, Uganda

Non-Governmental Organization

Agricultural Marketing Support Project, Mozambique

Project Coordination Office

Programme for the Modernisation of Agriculture

Participatory rural appraisal

Rural Enterprise and Agribusiness Promotion Programme

Smallholder Enterprise and Marketing Programme, Zambia

Sub-county Integrated Development Association


Uganda Women’s Effort to Save Orphans

Uganda Women’s Finance Trust




Introduction 1


As a major thrust of its current strategy for eastern and southern Africa, IFAD has

initiated a number of market linkage programmes 1 aimed at improving smallholder

farmers’ access to input and output markets in order to increase their incomes and

food security. The overall objective of the Gender and Poverty Targeting in Market

Linkage Operations study is to help IFAD integrate gender and poverty dimensions and

initiatives into present and future market linkage operations, by improving understanding

of gender and targeting issues in market linkage operations and by developing

practical ideas, approaches and tools that can be used to mainstream gender and

promote poverty targeting in current and future market linkage projects and


The overall study was carried out in five phases: 2 (a) Zambia country visit and

status report preparation; (b) Mozambique country visit and status report

preparation; (c) Uganda country visit; (d) preparation of the draft Sourcebook and

the Synthesis Report and organization of/participation in the Synthesis Workshop;

and (e) finalization of documentation, incorporating outputs from the workshop as

well as comments and recommendations from IFAD management and other


The three countries were selected to provide the team with a range of different

economic, cultural/social and marketing settings within which to examine

agricultural marketing and gender dynamics. A second criterion for selection was

the presence of IFAD-supported market linkage programmes that allowed the team

to examine the approaches used by the programmes in dealing with gender and

poverty targeting. During the country visits the team: (a) carried out participatory

rural appraisals (PRAs) in villages within diverse market linkage environments with

the aims of, firstly, exploring marketing activities, roles, approaches, constraints and

opportunities for men and women and, secondly, developing and field testing a set

of tools for carrying out such case studies; (b) held discussions with participants

involved in market linkage operations (including traders, agribusinesses, NGOs,

market-oriented projects, donors and government agencies) to examine their

gender strategies and approaches and their involvement in and targeting of the

poorer segments of society; and (c) worked with IFAD market linkage project teams

to explore options for mainstreaming gender and targeting the poor in

management operations and development activities.

1 Four projects: Smallholder Enterprise and Marketing Programme in Zambia – USD 15.9 million loan approved in

1999; PAMA Support Project in Mozambique – USD 23 million loan approved 1999; Area-Based Agricultural

Modernisation Programme in Uganda – USD 13.2 million loan approved 1999; and Agricultural Marketing Systems

Development Programme in Tanzania – USD 15 million loan, approved 2001.

2 The team for the Gender Focus/Targeting in Market Linkage operations are the following: Vibecke Kubberud,

Coordinator of IFAD’s Gender Strengthening Programme for Eastern and Southern Africa; Alice Carloni, Senior Rural

Sociologist from FAO Investment Centre; and Howard Johnson, institutions specialist and team leader. Four other

experts worked with the team in the three countries visited between January and May 2002: Stephen Tembo in

Zambia; Paola Idelson and Carmen Ramos in Mozambique; and Catherine Barasa in Uganda.


The outputs of the exercise include: a Synthesis Report, a Sourcebook, a Toolkit for

Practitioners and three volumes of Gender and Market Environment Case Studies – one for

each of the three countries. Each output is designed for a different purpose and audience as

indicated below.


Synthesis Report


Toolkit for Practitioners

Market Environment

Case Studies

Intended Audience

IFAD Country Portfolio Managers (CPMs) and

missions, market linkage project coordination offices

(PCOs), government staff concerned with market

linkage operations, service providers for market

linkage projects, Cooperating Institutions (CIs)

involved in supervising market linkage projects

IFAD CPMs, IFAD design missions, PCOs, government

staff concerned with market linkage operations,

service providers for market linkage projects, CIs

involved in supervising market linkage projects

Participatory facilitators at district and village level

PCOs, Focal area resource groups

Participatory trainers

Intended Use

Presents the main findings from the three

country visits and the nine market

environment case studies; compares and

contrasts findings for different types of

market environments; draws implications for

project design and implementation

Manager’s guide: identifies key issues; gives

insights on how to approach project design

and implementation issues; presents

practical tools for gender and poverty

targeting in market linkage operations

“Nuts and bolts” guide on to how to

undertake participatory gender and market

linkage diagnostic studies, multi-stakeholder

workshops and impact assessments

Input for area-based planning

Training materials for local staff or

consultants wanting to undertake market

environment case studies, workshops or

impact assessments

This Synthesis Report has two main purposes: (a) to pull together the main findings

from the country visits and the market environment case studies; and (b) to draw

practical implications for gender mainstreaming and poverty targeting in the IFAD

market linkage projects.

The target audiences for the Synthesis Report and the Sourcebook are those people

and organizations integrally involved in designing and managing IFAD-supported

market linkage programmes. The assignment thus focuses on three main target

groups: (a) IFAD Country Portfolio Managers (CPMs) and their consultants;

(b) teams responsible for managing IFAD-supported market linkage projects; and

(c) the NGOs/service providers that are or could be contracted to implement specific

market linkage activities and programmes within these projects.




The country visits involved the following tasks: (a) collecting information at the

national and provincial level on agricultural marketing policies, strategies and

programmes that impact on gender and poverty; (b) preparing market

environment case studies; (c) reviewing NGO and donor experience with gender

and poverty targeting in connection with agricultural commercialization;

(d) reviewing how the IFAD market linkage project proposes to handle gender and

targeting issues; (e) synthesizing findings; and (f) providing selected stakeholders

with feedback. The majority of mission time and resources were allocated for

carrying out the market environment case studies and PRAs.

Market Environment Case Studies

The preparation of market environment case studies involved three-day visits to eight

selected sites, plus a half-day PRA in a ninth site (Manrasse village in Chiure district,

Mozambique) 3 . On the first day, following a courtesy call to the district administrator/

agricultural director, an impromptu meeting was held with stakeholders and a

preparatory visit was made to the PRA site. On the second day, PRAs were conducted

for the entire day in the pre-selected village. On the third day, household interviews

were conducted with a stratified sample of households.

In each case study site, participatory methods were used to collect data related to

gender issues, poverty and market linkages from farmers, traders and other market

stakeholders in selected villages. After a general introduction in which the team

explained the purpose of the visit, the people present were divided into three





▲ Enterprise ranking

▲ Price differences by season and


▲ Trends for top five commodities

▲ Mobility and marketing map

▲ Timeline (income sources and


▲ Gender roles in marketing and as

household providers

▲ Main income sources and

expenditure items of women and


▲ Cash inflow and outflow


▲ Seasonal activity calendar

▲ Gender roles in marketing

▲ Main income sources and

expenditure items of women and


▲ Cash inflow and outflow calendar

▲ Seasonal activity calendar

▲ Gender roles in marketing


▲ Wealth ranking and household

selection for interviews

▲ Group profiles

▲ Problem analysis

▲ Access and control of resources

by gender

▲ Problem analysis

▲ Access and control of resources

by gender

▲ Problem analysis

▲ Plenary session (women, men and leaders report back on their conclusions)

3 For this reason, the number of case study sites is sometimes referred to as eight sites and sometimes as nine.


working groups: village leaders (key informants), women and men. Different PRA

tools were used in the various groups. At the end of the day, a plenary session was

held where the villagers themselves presented the outcome of the exercises (PRA

sequence and modules are included in the Sourcebook) to the others. The matrix

above indicates the team’s first-day PRA activities.

On the second day, the team conducted household interviews with a stratified

sample of households identified through the wealth ranking exercise. The

interviews were conducted in the households’ compounds. The main topics covered

by the household interviews were: household composition, household resource

base, livelihood system, crop and livestock production, food security, marketing, and

market-related problems and priorities. Analysis of household interviews focused on

the relationship between a socio-economic status (wealth ranking), marketing

activities and market-related problems and priorities.

Each set of PRAs and household interviews was written up as a market environment

case study.


In each country, three areas were purposively selected to allow the team to

investigate different types of market environments: one peri-urban site near an

important national market, one or two sites growing traditional cash crops, and

preferably one site growing mixed food crops. The locations of case study sites are

given below. In Zambia and Mozambique, the team concentrated on sites where

IFAD market linkage projects are beginning to work, whereas in Uganda, where the

market linkage project has yet to be launched, two of the sites selected had an

ongoing IFAD project and the third had no connection with IFAD. An effort was

also made to sample a broad range of agro-ecological zones and ethnic groups.




Site 1

Southern province

Mazabuka district

Muvwela village

(Former maize surplus area)

Cabo Delgado province

Chiure district


(Cotton growing)

Mpigi district

Kammengo sub-county

Lunyerere village

(Peri-urban food crops)

Site 2

Lusaka rural province

Chongwe district

Libuko village

(Peri-urban vegetables)

Cabo Delgado province

Metuge district

25 Junho village

(Peri-urban, coastal)

Hoima district

Kyabigambire sub-county

Buraru village

(Tobacco and coffee growing)

Site 3

Copperbelt province

Mpongwe district

Kanyenda village

(Frontier area: maize)

Cabo Delgado province

Chiure district

Manrasse village

(Mixed food crop)

Apac district

Abongomola sub-county

Otorongole village

(Cotton growing)



Market Environment Case Study Settings 2


In terms of GDP per capita, Uganda is the least poor of the three countries and

Mozambique is the poorest, although recent economic growth in Mozambique has

been faster than in Zambia. Based on housing standards, asset ownership and food

self-sufficiency (below), the sites in Mozambique tend to be among the poorest. Sites

in Zambia are in the middle. Uganda has two of the least poor sites (Mpigi and

Hoima) and one of the poorest (Apac).

Relative Wealth

Less poor


Mpigi (UG) Hoima (UG) Mazabuka (ZM) Chongwe (ZM) Chiure (MZ) Apac (UG)

Mpongwe (ZM)


In Mozambique, villagers report that life is improving whereas in Zambia, they

report that socio-economic standards are deteriorating. There are several reasons.

Ten years ago, Mozambique was much poorer than Zambia. Now, after ten years of

peace, Mozambican villagers’ livelihoods have begun to recover from the devastating

effects of the civil war. The improvement is tangible, but living standards are still

very low.

In Zambia, ten years ago, living standards were higher than in Mozambique.

Ownership of cattle, draught oxen, ploughs, carts and animal-drawn equipment was

widespread in the south. Most households owned a radio and a bicycle and many

houses had iron sheet roofs. During the past ten years, poverty has increased as a

consequence of a combination of factors including: decimation of cattle due to

corridor disease and consequent reversion to hand cultivation with much-reduced

farm sizes; repeated crop failure (several years of severe drought and two or three

years of excess rain); HIV/AIDS-related illness and deaths; and changes in

government agricultural policies. In Southern province, which was particularly hard

hit by corridor disease, villagers reported that all socio-economic strata are getting

poorer – even the formerly better-off ones. People have lost hope of ever owning oxen

again and are in the process of selling off remaining assets such as ploughs, seeders,

cultivators and carts. Elsewhere in Zambia, villagers report that the socio-economic

gap is widening as a consequence of economic liberalization. The poor and very poor

are getting poorer, whereas the non-poor are beginning to accumulate wealth.

In Uganda, living standards have improved dramatically since the end of the civil

war in two of the case study areas (Mpigi and Hoima), whereas in Apac the

improvement has been more modest.



Leaders of eight case study villages identified either three or four categories of

households, based on wealth and ranging from “less poor” (Category A) to “middle

poor” (Category B) to “poor” (Category C) to “extreme poor” (Category D), as


Examples from


Mpigi District,

Lunyerere Village

Hoima District,

Buraru Village

Apac District,

Otorongole Village

Wealth categories




Relative poverty

Least poor area


Poorest area

Category A

▲ Abundant land

▲ Large permanent house

▲ Vehicle

▲ Crop and livestock sales

▲ Off-farm income (shop or

trading or transport

business or remittances)

▲ Abundant land

▲ Large permanent house

▲ Vehicle

▲ Off-farm income from shop

owning or trading, or salary or

pension or remittances

▲ Use of hired labour

▲ Getting too old to farm

▲ Adequate land

▲ Iron roof, mud walls

▲ Crop and livestock sales

▲ Bicycle

▲ Small radio

▲ May have 2-3 cattle

▲ May brew for sale

Category B

▲ Adequate land

▲ Brick house, iron roof

▲ Crop and livestock sales

▲ Motorbike

▲ Adequate land

▲ Brick house, iron roof

▲ Crop and livestock sales

▲ Bicycle

▲ Adequate land

▲ Mud huts, thatched roof

▲ May have a small radio

▲ May have a bicycle

▲ May have sheep or goats

Category C

▲ A little land

▲ Mud walls, iron roof

▲ Bicycle

▲ Crop sales and piecework

▲ Married with children

▲ Land

▲ Mud walls, iron roof

▲ Bicycle

▲ Radio

▲ Goats or pigs

▲ Crop sales and piecework or


▲ Little land

▲ Mud hut, thatched roof

▲ No radio

▲ No bicycle

▲ Poor clothing

▲ Children not in school

Category D

▲ No land (rented in)

▲ No house (rented)

▲ Casual labourer

▲ Elderly, disabled or ill

▲ No land (rented in)

▲ No house (rented)

▲ Fragmented family

▲ No relatives for support

▲ Elderly

▲ Disabled

▲ Poor health

▲ No land, no livestock

▲ House is appalling

In each case, the yardstick for measuring poverty was based on local standards.

Thus, the criteria for identifying someone as “less poor” or “poor” differed between

countries, and even between sites within countries. In Mpigi (Uganda), the entire

farm population of Lunyerere village lives in houses with iron roofs, whereas in

Metuge (Mozambique), only one household out of 400 had an iron roof. A typical



“less poor” household in Mpigi owns a brick house with plastered walls and an iron

sheet or tile roof, whereas an “extreme poor” household lives in a rented house with

mud brick walls, a mud floor and an iron roof. In Chiure, Metuge and Apac, a “less

poor” household has a mud house with an iron roof and the rest of the population

have mud houses with thatched roofs.

Wealth ranking criteria based on asset ownership also vary between case study sites.

In Mpigi, a typical “less poor” household owns a motor vehicle and television set; a

“middle poor” household owns a motorbike and a radio/cassette player; and a

“poor” household owns a radio and a bicycle, whereas in Apac, even the “less poor”

households own no more than a bicycle and a small transistor radio.

With only two exceptions, the proportion of households ranked as “less poor” is

small, ranging from a high of 35% of total households in Mpongwe (ZM) to a low of

only 2% in Chongwe (ZM). Likewise, the proportion of households among the

“extreme poor” is relatively modest, ranging from a high of 19% to 3% in villages

that distinguished between “poor” and “extreme poor”. In four villages – three of

which among the poorest in the sample – the majority of households were classified

as “poor”, whereas in the remaining villages the number of households classified as

“middle poor” exceeded those classified as “poor”.

Summary of Wealth Rankings

District (Village)

Mazabuka (Muvwela)

Chongwe (Libuko)

Mpongwe (Kanyenda)

Chiure (Ocua )

Metuge (25 Junho)

Mpigi (Lunyerere)

Hoima (Buraru)

Apac (Otorongole)

Number of Households

Percentage of Households

A B C D Total A B C D Total

16 29 23 2 70 23% 41% 33% 3% 100%

1 7 43 0 51 2% 14% 84% 0% 100%

65 71 51 0 187 35% 38% 27% 0% 100%

10 140 50 0 200 5% 70% 25% 0% 100%

2 11 30 0 43 5% 26% 70% 0% 100%

6 55 25 20 106 6% 52% 24% 19% 100%

4 26 98 5 133 3% 20% 74% 4% 100%

7 29 56 13 105 7% 28% 53% 12% 100%

There is more socio-economic differentiation within villages in Uganda and Zambia

than in Mozambique. In Mozambique, the destruction of infrastructure and

property during the civil war had a levelling effect, and socio-economic

differentiation is just starting. In Zambia, there was considerable socio-economic

differentiation even within the smallholder sub-sector, but levelling is reported to be

taking place. The non-poor are falling into poverty. In some cases, it is due to AIDS

and in others due to the loss of all their cattle. The situation is forcing the formerly

non-poor to sell off their assets. In Uganda, the opposite is true: rapid economic

growth is leading to rapid socio-economic differentiation – especially in Mpigi and




The principal causes of poverty in Zambia are AIDS, crop failure (erratic weather)

and loss of cattle (corridor disease), exacerbated by government policy and an

institutional environment that are unfavourable. Although many of the same factors

are also at work in southern Mozambique (drought, floods and AIDS), they do not

appear to be major factors in Cabo Delgado province where the market environment

case studies were carried out. It also appears that in central and southern

Mozambique, in spite of major setbacks due to floods, villagers’ livelihoods have

been more resilient than in Zambia. It is not clear to what extent the quicker

recovery in Mozambique is attributable to a more favourable policy environment.

In Uganda the situation is different. The policy environment is more favourable to

economic growth. The incidence of HIV/AIDS is lower than in Zambia or southern

Mozambique. Crop failure was not reported as an important cause of poverty in any

of the case study areas in Uganda. Poverty in Apac is mainly attributable to

widespread destruction during the civil war, loss of cattle due to raids by pastoral

Karamojong tribesmen, and poor market access.

Causes of




Crop Failure/Drought

Civil War

Loss of Cattle

▲ Zambia (all sites)

▲ Mozambique (less)

▲ Uganda (less)

▲ Mazabuka (Zambia)

▲ Chongwe (Zambia)

▲ Mozambique (all sites)

▲ Apac (Uganda)

▲ Mazabuka (Zambia)

▲ Apac (Uganda)


Zambia and Mozambique had a legacy of strong central government involvement in

the economy, including government-administered pan-territorial prices for maize,

cotton and other cash crops; state intervention in crop buying, agro-processing and

marketing; subsidization of farm inputs (fertilizer, seeds, chemicals and tractor hire

services); forced membership in government-dominated cooperatives; and tied

agricultural credit at subsidized rates with little repayment discipline.

Both countries had a dualistic pattern of resource ownership in the agricultural

sector, with commercial farms coexisting alongside smallholders. They had

agricultural policies that discriminated against smallholders in favour of large-scale

production units – not only in colonial times, but also after independence. In both

countries, the smallholder sub-sector was neglected and starved for resources. Past

legislation regulating agricultural trade was aimed at preventing African

smallholders from accumulating wealth and from competing on the market with the

commercial sector.

During the past ten years, both Zambia and Mozambique have begun to liberalize

their economies. In Zambia, it has been an erratic process, with frequent policy

reversals. Government periodically reverts to price controls and direct intervention



in the marketing chain, resulting in disruption and a climate of uncertainty. In

Mozambique, the evolution of policy in favour of liberalization has been more stable

and consistent. Nonetheless, given the legacy of strong government interference in

marketing in the past, farmers still expect government to intervene.

In both countries, villagers feel that they have been the primary victims of economic

liberalization rather than its beneficiaries. They feel that withdrawal of government

from price setting, crop buying and input supply has hurt them rather than helped

them. Due to currency devaluation, the cost of imported farm inputs has risen

sharply, to the point that inputs such as chemical fertilizer are generally uneconomic

under rainfed conditions and farmers no longer use them. Farmers are nostalgic for

the “good old days” when government controlled prices, parastatals bought their

crops, inputs were relatively cheap (although they were not always readily available

at the subsidized price) and credit was easy to obtain, with little pressure to repay.

The PRAs in both countries revealed that farmers do not understand why a market

economy is better than a government-administered one. If one of the intentions of

the IFAD market linkage programmes is to empower smallholders (and small

traders) to influence policies affecting their livelihoods, there is a serious risk that

farmers could lobby for a return to state economic intervention. Already the rural

politicians in Zambia have pushed the government to re-introduce a ceiling on the

price of maize meal and state-subsidized fertilizer distribution on credit to members

of government-sponsored cooperatives.

There appears to be surprisingly little difference between the reactions of the poor

and non-poor to prevailing government policies. Even if it could be shown that the

subsidies went mainly to the non-poor, the poor are not ready to scrap the past

policies in favour of liberalization. They keep hoping that subsidies will be revived

so that they have a chance to receive some. All categories of households think that

price fixing was better than what they have today (even if former administered prices

are said to have favoured urban consumers more than producers). Likewise, they

think that withdrawal of parastatals from crop buying has left them at the mercy of

private traders who are in a position to force them to accept low prices.

Although Uganda also inherited a legacy of state intervention in agricultural pricing

and marketing, its current situation contrasts sharply with that of Zambia and

Mozambique. Market reforms have been deeper and have paid off in higher growth.

Nonetheless, two opposing points of view were encountered in the case study sites.

Most small farmers in areas close to urban markets (such as Mpigi and Hoima) feel

they have benefited from market liberalization, whereas in areas far from markets

(such as Apac) they feel that liberalization has hurt them. In Apac, the district

chairman and the Otorongole village leaders are nostalgic for a return to

government-determined floor prices for maize and cotton, as well as government

intervention in crop buying. In Mpigi – on the other hand – villagers called for even

greater market liberalization.



Small farmers interviewed in Uganda and Zambia seem to have a much better

understanding of how agricultural markets work than the farmers interviewed in

Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique. In Zambia most farmers understand that

when supply goes up, prices tend to fall. They understand price seasonality and the

benefits of not selling all their crops at harvest time – when prices are lowest – and

of storing some of their produce to sell later in the season when prices are higher. In

spite of the awareness of what they “ought to” do, they sell nearly all their crops at

harvest time because they desperately need cash for school fees and other expenses.

The more skilful farmers, however, in Mazabuka, Chongwe and Mpigi districts, were

beginning to time their harvests to avoid the gluts and, whenever possible, to take

advantage of higher prices at the very start of the harvest period. They were also

diversifying into new crops enjoying high demand on either regional or

international markets.

Farmers interviewed in Mozambique, at least those in the north where the case

studies were carried out, lacked a clear understanding of how supply and demand

affect producer prices. They all sell their crops at the same time of year but blame

low prices on traders. They report that prices offered to producers are always

uniformly low (whatever the crop, there is no more than a 1:2 increase between the

harvest price and the peak selling price). While it may be valid that producer prices

are uniformly low and do not vary much by season or location, there still appears to

be scope for an information campaign aimed at improving farmers’ understanding

of markets. Farmers are not yet thinking in terms of staggering planting times and

harvests to reap higher producer prices, nor are they thinking of storing crops

destined for sale to cash in on higher prices later in the season.


The farming systems in the case study sites range on a continuum from perennialbased

systems in moist areas enjoying bimodal rainfall of over 1 500 mm per year to

cereal-based farming systems in drought-prone areas having a single rainy season

with rainfall under 600 mm.

Moist – bimodal rainfall

Perennial-based systems

Dry – monomodal rainfall

Cereal-based systems

Mpigi (UG) Apac (UG) Mpongwe (ZM) Metuge (ZM) Mazabuka (MZ)

Hoima (UG) Chongwe (ZM) Chiure (MZ)

The sites differ considerably in the degree of population pressure on land, farm size

and intensity of cultivation. The two peri-urban sites near Lusaka and Kampala have

the greatest population pressure and the smallest farm size; both have turned to

intensive market-oriented horticulture in order to make the most of their limited

land and resource base. At the opposite extreme, Mpongwe (Zambia) is a frontier

area, with abundant farmland, good natural soil fertility and ample farm sizes.



Case Study Site:

District (village)



Main Commodities

Cash Crop Staple






Input Use


(Muvwela village)


mixed farming



Oxen or







(Libuko village)







Upland low;

riverine ok




(Kanyenda village)


mixed farming



Oxen or





(Ocua village)







Only for



(25 Junho village)

Coastal rice/Fish






Only for



(Manrasse village)


mixed farming








(Lunyerere village)








Only for



(Buraru village)

Perennial crop-based







Only for



(Otorongole village)


mixed farming




Once oxen, now



Only for



The situation in Zambia is quite different from that in Mozambique and Uganda. In

Zambia, the issue is not lack of knowledge of improved technologies or even access to

farm inputs but rather one of affordability. Smallholder fertilizer use was formerly

widespread, especially on maize and especially in Southern province. It has fallen

sharply as a consequence of government withdrawal from supply, removal of

subsidies, rising prices of imported fertilizer, and erratic weather (which makes the

use of purchased inputs highly risky). Therefore, facilitation of farmers’ access to

farm inputs on a sustainable basis through an agent’s programme such as the Rural

Enterprise and Agribusiness Promotion (REAP) Programme makes a lot of sense.

Farmers in Mazabuka and Mpongwe are also familiar with animal-drawn

equipment, but its use is declining due to loss of cattle. Farmers who have lost hope

of returning to animal traction are selling their animal-drawn equipment.

In the three sites covered in Mozambique, few farmers use any purchased inputs.

Fertilizer and chemicals are used almost exclusively on cotton and are supplied to


smallholders by the cotton ginnery as part of their outgrower package. Farmers said

that they use inputs on cotton because “without fertilizer and spraying, you don’t get

a decent crop”. However, they are deeply concerned about the high cost of inputs.

They complain that “when the cost of inputs is deducted, there is no profit”.

Improved seeds and agrochemicals are also used by tomato-growers in Metuge.

Purchased inputs are rarely used on other crops because it is possible to get a

reasonable harvest without them. Therefore, farmers do not see access to farm

inputs as a burning issue. Hence the REAP programme in Mozambique differs from

the Zambia programme, in that it places greater emphasis on paprika growing,

feasibility studies and supply of other types of technology such as treadle pumps.

In the three Uganda sites, nearly all cultivation is manual and tractor hire is rare.

Apac had a tradition of animal traction but reverted to hand cultivation over a

decade ago when Karamojong raiders stole all the cattle. Soil fertility is not yet

limiting and the use of purchased fertilizer is rare except on cotton. Organic

manure, compost and mulch are used for banana gardens. Use of purchased seed

and agrochemicals is largely confined to vegetable growers in Mpigi, tobacco

outgrowers in Hoima and cotton growers in Apac. The cotton farmers have it

relatively easy because the seeds are supplied to growers on credit by the ginnery at

planting time and their cost is deduced from payments for the harvested cotton.

Agrochemicals and knapsack sprayers – on the other hand – have to be purchased

with cash. As in Zambia and Mozambique, Ugandan cotton farmers complained

about their profits being almost entirely eaten up by the high cost of inputs. The

cotton farmers and the vegetable growers also complained about the prohibitive cost

of knapsack sprayers and agrochemicals.

In Uganda, in spite of greater cash availability in comparison with Zambia and

Mozambique, even among the top 10% of households in the wealth ranking, only

60% used purchased seed or fertilizer or chemicals on any crop. Few of the middle

poor, poor or extreme poor used any purchased inputs. Typically, not even the

better-off households would use purchased inputs on staple crops such as bananas,

maize, beans or cassava.


In Zambia and Mozambique, given the legacy of former government intervention in

agricultural marketing, the average small farmer tends to look passively to the

central government to solve all problems related to marketing. Nonetheless, with the

help of local NGOs and donor projects, some villagers are beginning to look for

solutions that they can implement with little or no external assistance. In Uganda,

there is considerably more local initiative, possibly as a consequence of greater

decentralization. PRAs and community action planning are currently being

institutionalized in the agricultural extension system. The USAID-supported IDEA

project 4 has successfully assisted smallholders to export food crops such as beans and

4 The IDEA (Investment in Developing Export Agriculture) project operates within the USAID-supported

Agribusiness Development Centre.



maize to neighbouring countries. Technoserve, a US-based NGO, has also promoted

some successful commercial initiatives in connection with smallholder maize and

sesame production and marketing. There is considerable scope for encouraging

further local initiative and for strengthening problem-solving capacity at the

community level when it comes to market linkages.


In all of the case study sites, most of the households classified as “extreme poor” in

the wealth ranking (Category D) had one or more members with a serious disability

or disease (HIV/AIDS, TB). Death or serious illness of one or more of the main

breadwinners was one of the most frequent types of shock precipitating the fall into

poverty. Nonetheless, there are major differences between study sites in Zambia,

Mozambique and Uganda with respect to the impact of HIV/AIDS on livelihoods.

Zambia officially reports an HIV prevalence rate of 19.95%, Mozambique 13.2% and

Uganda 8.3%. It is reported that HIV prevalence in Cabo Delgado province is much

lower than in the south of Mozambique. In the case study areas in Zambia,

HIV/AIDS is fast becoming the number one social and poverty issue whereas in the

Mozambique study areas it is not yet the most important issue. In Uganda, where

HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns are more advanced than in the other two countries,

the rate of new infection appears to be levelling off. AIDS-related deaths have also

imposed a burden on the rest of the population. Information from household

interviews suggests that less poor and middle poor households (Categories A and B)

are much more likely to support orphans (in addition to their natural children) than

poor and extreme poor households.


After independence, all three countries forced smallholders to join governmentsponsored

agricultural cooperatives as a prerequisite for obtaining access to

agricultural inputs, credit and marketing services. The government-sponsored

cooperatives formed merely for expediency tended to be poorly managed and

corrupt. Consequently, many went bankrupt when government support was

withdrawn. In Mozambique, the cooperative movement continues to have a bad

reputation. Farmers have little desire to revive them. Hence NGOs affiliated with the

cooperative movement – such as the Cooperative League of the United States of

America (CLUSA) and ACDI/VOCA – are promoting what are called “economic

associations” or “rural group enterprises” in lieu of cooperatives. These economic

associations are registered and formally recognized as legal entities that can open

bank accounts and enter into contracts.

In Uganda, the situation is similar to that of Mozambique. Government-sponsored

cooperatives continue to be unpopular with smallholders since many co-ops

previously went bankrupt due to financial mismanagement. Hence NGOs affiliated

with the cooperative movement are promoting other types of producer associations.


In Zambia, on the other hand, agricultural cooperatives are undergoing a

government-sponsored revival. In 1999, in connection with the Food Relief Agency

(FRA) programme, farmers were required to join government-sponsored

cooperatives if they wanted access to subsidized credit for fertilizer. In late 2001, the

title of the Ministry of Agriculture was changed from MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture,

Forestry and Fisheries) to MAC (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives), seeming

to indicate that government wanted to give a higher profile to cooperatives.

Analysis during the PRAs in Zambia revealed that membership of informal farmers’

and women’s groups is better gender balanced and far more inclusive of the middle

poor and poor than the government-sponsored FRA cooperatives. Members of the

FRA cooperatives tend to be less-poor households, because the poor do not have

enough money to pay the membership fees and the down payment on the inputs. In

Chongwe, in particular, villagers reported that a lot of co-op credit was going to

urban retirees and town-based traders who are only part-time farmers. It was also

reported that substantial amounts of fertilizer from the FRA credit packs were being

resold on the free market at higher prices. In Libuko (Chiure), only ten villagers out

of several hundred were members and most of the serious vegetable growers could

not afford to join.



Findings – Market Environments 3


Among the case study sites, there is a broad range of market environments. Some

have ready access to a large urban market and others do not. Most sites have

reasonable road access but a few are inaccessible for brief periods after heavy rains.

Some – such as Mpongwe (ZM), Chongwe (ZM) and Mpigi (UG) – are booming,

whereas other sites – such as Mazabuka (ZM), Apac (UG) and Manrasse/Chiure (MZ)

– are stagnating or declining. Five of the sites are experiencing a crisis because of

low world prices of traditional cash crops – Mazabuka (ZM), Ocua/Chiure (MZ) and

Apac (UG) for cotton; Mpigi (UG) and Hoima (UG) for coffee.

Case Study Site

District (village)



Main Commodity

Former Current







Mazabuka (Muvwela)

Former maize bread



Mixed food





Chongwe (Libuko)





Very good


Mpongwe (Kanyenda)

Frontier maize

exporting area






Chiure (Ocua)







Metuge (25 Junho )

Peri-urban coastal


Rice, tomatoes




Chiure (Manrasse)

Mixed food crop

Mixed food


Mixed food





Mpigi (Lunyerere)







Hoima (Buraru)







Apac (Otorongole)








During the PRAs, village leaders ranked all farm products in order of importance,

considering their value as food staples in addition to sales. Then they ranked the

products according to which ones bring the most money (price x quantity sold).

Finally, they identified which products are easiest to sell and which are most difficult


to sell and for what reason. From the table below, it is clear that: (a) responses are

highly site specific (no two sites are the same); (b) the most important products are

not necessarily those that bring the most money; (c) the items that bring the most

money are not always easy to sell; and (d) many of the cash crops promoted by

government are among the most difficult for farmers to sell.

Top Five Enterprises in Case Study Sites

Case Study


Most Important


Brings the

Most Money

Easiest to


Hardest to


Mazabuka, Zambia

(Muvwela village)

1. Maize

2. Cattle

3. Chickens

4. Goats

(Not done)

1. Chickens

2. Goats

3. Cabbage

4. Sunflower

5. Irish potatoes

1. Maize

2. Cattle

Chongwe, Zambia

(Libuko village)

1. Maize

2. Sweet potatoes

3. Cassava

4. Groundnuts

5. Rape

1. Rape

2. Tomatoes

3. Cabbage

4. Chickens

5. Goats

1. Chickens

2. Rape

3. Tomatoes

4. Cabbage

5. Goats

1. Cattle

2. Sorghum

Mpongwe, Zambia

(Kanyenda village)

1. Maize

2. Sorghum

3. Sweet potatoes

4. Pumpkins

5. Cassava

1. Maize

2. Groundnuts

3. Sorghum

4. Chickens

5. Goats

1. Maize

2. Sweet potatoes

3. Chickens

4. Goats

5. Groundnuts

1. Paprika

2. Pigs



(Ocua village)

1. Maize

2. Cassava

3. Sorghum

4. Beans

1. Sesame

2. Cotton

3. Cashews

4. Groundnuts

1. Maize

2. Loco beans

3. Sesame

4. Beans

1. Cassava

Metuge, Mozambique

(25 Junho village)

1. Rice

2. Maize

3. Cassava

4. Fish

5. Sorghum

1. Fish

2. Tomatoes

3. Beans

4. Rice

1. Rice

2. Maize

3. Beans

4. Fish

1. Cassava



(Manrasse village)

1. Maize

2. Sesame

3. Groundnuts

4. Beans

1. Groundnuts

2. Sesame

3. Beans

4. Maize

1. Groundnuts

2. Sesame

3. Maize

4. Beans

1. Cassava

2. Cashews

Mpigi, Uganda

(Lunyerere village)

1. Bananas (matoke)

2. Tomatoes

3. Sugar cane

4. Ginger

5. Beans

1. Bananas (matoke)

2. Tomatoes

3. Sugar cane

4. Ginger

5. Beans

1. Groundnuts

2. Sesame

3. Maize

4. Beans

1. Paprika

2. Coffee

Hoima, Uganda

(Buraru village)

1. Bananas (matoke)

2. Beans

3. Sweet potatoes

4. Cassava

5. Maize

1. Tobacco

2. Bananas

3. Sweet potatoes

4. Beans

5. Cassava

1. Bananas

2. Milk

3. Tobacco

4. Sweet potatoes

5. Beans

1. Maize

2. Coffee





1. Maize

2. Beans

3. Cassava

4. Millet

5. Sesame

1. Maize

2. Cassava

3. Beans

4. Cotton

5. Millet

1. Maize

2. Chickens

3. Goats

4. Sesame

5. Sunflower

1. Cotton

2. Cattle

3. Pigs

4. Rice

5. Soybeans



In Zambia, maize is the most important crop in all three sites. In spite of low prices,

it is also the enterprise that brings the most money in Mpongwe and Mazabuka.

Vegetables such as rape, tomatoes and cabbage, and small livestock such as chickens

and goats bring the most money in Chongwe and they also rank high in Mpongwe

and Mazabuka in overall importance and ease of selling. Traditional crops such as

sorghum, sweet potatoes, groundnuts and cassava are important for food in

Mpongwe and Chongwe and are among the easiest products to sell in Mpongwe

and Mazabuka. In Mazabuka, maize is the most difficult product to sell due to lack

of organized marketing channels and the absence of local buyers. Farmers wanting

to sell must take their maize to Mazabuka or to millers in Lusaka. There is limited

profit to be made from transporting the grain to these markets because of low

buying prices and high transport costs. The second most difficult product to sell in

Mazabuka is cattle, because local farmers can no longer afford to buy them and

because it is expensive to transport them to town and it is difficult to drive them on

foot to Kafue junction to look for buyers. In Chongwe, the most difficult products

to market are cattle and sorghum because they are difficult to transport and the

nearest buyers are located in Lusaka. In Mpongwe, the most difficult product to

market is paprika, which has only one institutional buyer (Cheetah). Pigs are also

difficult to sell because of high transport costs.

In case study sites in Mozambique, the main farm products traded on the market

are cotton, maize, groundnuts, beans, cassava, cashews and vegetables. The

products that bring the most money are sesame, cotton and cashews, followed by

groundnuts and loco beans. Maize is the easiest product to sell and demand is high

because it is the staple food and it is in short supply in the south of the country due

to drought-related crop failure. Nonetheless, it does not rank among the

commodities that bring the most money because the producer price is very low.

Cassava is considered the most difficult product to market because it requires

elaborate processing. It is also bulky to transport and its value is low relative to

transport costs.

In the two sites in central and western Uganda, cooking bananas (matoke) are the

most important staple food. For this reason they are the easiest crop to sell and they

bring good money. In Mpigi, tomatoes rank second in importance, both in

economic contribution and in ease of selling, followed by sugar cane, ginger and

beans (in that order). The most difficult products to sell are paprika and coffee. In

Hoima, tobacco brings the most money, followed by traditional food crops. After

bananas, milk is the second easiest product to sell, then tobacco and traditional food

crops. The most difficult product to sell in Hoima is maize, because there was too

much maize offered on the market at harvest time and few buyers (as a

consequence, prices fell as low as 30 Ugandan Shillings per kg, or USD 0.02 per kg).

Coffee ranked as the second most difficult crop to sell, due to low prices and

declining production, rather than lack of buyers.

In Apac, the most important products and those that bring the most money are

maize, cassava, beans, cotton, finger millet (for brewing), sesame and sunflower,

followed by goats, cattle and chickens. Maize was ranked “easiest to sell” even

though the price is low, because it is the main staple and consumed throughout the


year. Chickens and goats ranked second and third because Kampala traders come

to the village buy them (Apac is renowned in Uganda for the good quality and

convenient price of its free-ranging chickens). Millet is easy to sell because it is used

for traditional brewing. Sesame is easy to sell because it is a traditional cash crop that

has a good informal trading network, although prices have been depressed since

1997. Even though sunflower is a new oilseed crop that does not have a wellorganized

marketing network, it is easy to sell because seeds can either be sold on

market days to private traders or exchanged for vegetable oil.

The most difficult product to sell in Apac is cotton – which continues to be the area’s

main cash crop. Although Otorongole is located 2 km from a cotton ginnery, the

marketing system collapsed when the state-owned ginnery closed ten years ago, never

to reopen. For over ten years, farmers had to travel to distant ginneries to find a buyer

for their cotton. Last year the problem eased somewhat when a private trader

established a cotton collecting point on the outskirts of the village and appointed an

agent to collect the crop on his behalf. Cattle ranked second most difficult to market

because the local market is depressed due to poverty and low purchasing power. The

nearest periodic cattle market is over 50 km away. Cattle are too costly to transport by

truck, but it is too far and too time-consuming to drive them to market on the hoof.

Pigs were ranked third most difficult to market because a fattened pig is too big to

transport by bicycle, too costly to transport by truck and too slow to drive to market

on foot. Upland rice was considered fourth most difficult to market because there is

no local market (farmers cannot afford to consume it except for special occasions like

Christmas). There is no market for unmilled paddy and the nearest milling machine

is 80 km away in Lira. Soybeans were ranked the fifth most difficult product to sell

because it is a new crop and there is no organized market for it.

Insights and Implications

The products that bring small farmers the most money are rarely the traditional cash crops. Nor are

they non-traditional export crops. In most cases, they are traditional food crops that are entering

the market as cash crops.

Farmers report that many of the cash crops promoted by government are among the most difficult

for them to sell.

Following government withdrawal from crop buying, in areas that are far from urban centres, maize is

difficult to sell due to lack of organized marketing channels and the absence of local buyers. There is

limited profit to be made from transporting maize from the village to the nearest city because of low

and unreliable buying prices and high transport costs.

Outside of peri-urban areas, cattle and pigs are difficult for farmers to sell because local farmers

cannot afford to buy them and the cost of transporting them to market is prohibitive.

The crops that are easiest for farmers – and especially women - to sell tend to be traditional food

staples that are entering the market. They usually have a ready market in the village and therefore

do not require transport.




In Zambia, price seasonality is the main marketing issue of interest to farmers –

especially the poorest. Because of pressing cash needs, they sell nearly all of their

crops at the harvest time when the price is lowest. Then, in the hungry season,

prices rise sharply. In Mpongwe (see the table below), a 50-kg bag of maize can be

12 000 kwacha (USD 2.70) at the harvest and peak at 90 000 kwacha (USD 20) in

the hungry season. In Chongwe, prices may rise from 12 000 kwacha (USD 2.70) at

the harvest to a peak of 75 000 kwacha (USD 17). In Mazabuka, the harvest price

can be even lower (10 000 kwacha (USD 2.26) per 50-kg bag) and rise to 70 000

(15.80) kwacha at the height of the hungry season.

In Mozambique, price seasonality is much more limited. In most cases, the price

paid to producers in the peak of the hungry season is no more than double the

harvest season price. In all three sites, it is reported that price differences between

seasons and between the village and urban markets are modest for the direct

producers, whereas there are large gaps (1:10) between the prices offered to

producers and those asked of urban consumers. This contrasts sharply with the

situation in Zambia, where price seasonality is a major issue for farmers. It appears

that in Cabo Delgado (MZ), seasonal price differences do exist at the level of the

consumer stores (lojas) and wholesalers, but farmers are unable to take advantage of

them. Farmers say that the prices offered to them by the lojas are not significantly

better later in the season than at the harvest time and that they are forced to accept

the low prices offered because they are powerless to do anything else. In

Ocua/Chiure, the difference between the price paid by shops to producers and that

charged to consumers was over 1 000%.

In Uganda, price seasonality is relatively unimportant because the country has two

overlapping cropping seasons with nearly continuous production in the perennialbased

banana/coffee farming system. In Mpigi, there are major seasonal price

differences for ginger, tomatoes and vegetables, but for other products the

differences are modest. In Hoima, both seasonal and village-to-town price

differences are modest. In Apac, there are moderate differences between seasons –

especially for maize. Since overproduction tends to saturate the entire region

during the harvest season, there is no difference between town and village prices.

There is only an advantage to selling in town when products are scarce.

The table below highlights four types of situations. In the three sites in Zambia,

there is relatively high price seasonality (600%) with modest differences between the

village and town. In the two Mozambique sites, there is little difference between

producer prices in the village and those offered in town in any season, but there are

major differences between prices paid to producers and those charged to

consumers. In Mpigi and Hoima there are major seasonal differences for

horticultural products but only modest differences for other products. In Apac,

seasonal differences are important, but prices in town are not much better than

those in the village.





Consumer Price


Seasonal Price Differences

Within Village In Town



Village-Town Price Differences


Peak Season






Few – little for


Few – little for





Only for pigs, sweet












Major for


Few, vegetables














* Major = 500% or more; moderate = 300-400%; modest = 100-200%; few =


Insights and Implications

In Zambia, price seasonality is the main marketing issue of interest to farmers – especially the

poorest. To meet pressing cash needs, they sell nearly all their crops at harvest time when the price

is lowest and buy back maize in the hungry season when the price is highest.

In Mozambique, price seasonality is not a major issue because the prices that traders offer to

farmers tend to be uniformly low throughout the year. There is little profit to be made on storing

crops and waiting for the price to rise or in transporting them to market.

Price seasonality is highest in areas that are drought-prone and have a single harvest season per

year. It is lower in areas with two cropping seasons and lowest where production is continuous

throughout the year. For this reason, price seasonality is greater in Zambia, which has only one

harvest per year, than in Uganda, which has two. Within Uganda, seasonality is more important in the

cereal-based system in the north than in the perennial-crop based system in south (which enjoys

nearly continuous production).

In peri-urban sites there seem to be fewer price differences between the village and town than in

places that are more distant from markets. In places that are very far from markets, another factor

is at play. During the harvest season, regional markets get so flooded that the price in district

towns often falls below the price in the village. This makes it highly risky for farmers to transport

their products to town for sale. Crop storage makes sense because there is only an advantage to

selling in town at the time of year when products are scarce.

An unexpected finding is that price distortions between countries are less than what one might

expect. Differences between countries appear modest when local currencies are converted into

US dollar equivalents. This suggests that liberalized markets may be working better than previously



In Mozambique, the big difference is not between seasons but between the prices

that private traders pay to producers and the prices they charge consumers.

Farmers said that beans sold for 2 500 meticais (USD 0.10) and were resold for

18 000 meticais (USD 0.77) and that an item sold for 9 000 (USD 0.77) meticais was

resold to consumers on the same day for 90 000 (USD 7.70) meticais. They say that

the problem is that traders are in a position to dictate low prices to producers and

to extract high prices from consumers. Farmers are in a very weak position because

it costs them so much to take their products to market that they cannot refuse an

offer. This points to a possible case of market failure due to asymmetric power of

traders relative to farmers. In Zambia, farmers complain a lot about having to pay

exorbitant prices for maize they buy on the market during the hungry season, but

this is attributable to selling too much of their annual supply at the harvest time and

having to buy it back later at high prices. At a given time of year, there is not a big

difference between the producer price and the consumer price. In Uganda,

villagers did not complain about large differences between the prices traders paid

them for their goods and the prices they charged to consumers. This might be due

to greater competition in retail trade.


Insights and Implications

In Mozambique, the big issue is the difference between the prices that private traders pay to

producers and the prices they demand from consumers. Because of farmers’ limited bargaining

power, traders are in a position to dictate low prices to producers and to extract high prices from

consumers. In Uganda, this appears to be less of an issue, possibly because there is greater

competition among small-scale retailers and a longer history of private trading.


In Zambia, input costs seem to be the main factor explaining trends in enterprise

profitability. Villagers report that crops and enterprises that need high cost

purchased inputs (such as maize, cotton and broilers) are declining in production,

sales and profits in favour of enterprises that do not require any purchased inputs

(such as local chickens, goats and groundnuts).

In Mozambique, the most promising enterprises in Chiure district (Ocua and

Manrasse) appear to be traditional food crops entering the market as cash crops,

whereas in Metuge, the most promising products are those enjoying high urban

demand such as rice, fish and tomatoes. Cotton production is decreasing because

production costs have sharply increased while producer prices have sharply

decreased, causing a dramatic fall in profitability. Cotton is traditionally controlled

by men whereas many of the food crops entering the market are grown by women.

Nonetheless, the income from the sale of traditional food crops is usually

controlled by men. The profitability of maize is less affected by rising production

prices than in Zambia because few purchased inputs are used. Nonetheless, maize

prices in Mozambique were reported to be unattractive even though sales are

increasing in response to rising demand from traders due to widespread droughtinduced

crop failure in southern Mozambique and in neighbouring countries.

Beans are increasing in profitability in 25 Junho and decreasing in Ocua/Chiure.

Groundnuts are increasingly profitable in Ocua/Chiure but prices and profits are

declining in 25 Junho. Sesame and cashews are increasingly profitable in

Ocua/Chiure but are not important crops in Metuge. Rice – grown only in Metuge

– is increasing in price, demand and profitability as are dry season tomatoes and


In Uganda, the main enterprises declining in profitability are the traditional cash

crops such as coffee, cotton and maize. These crops are traditionally maledominated

crops. The enterprises that are replacing them as rural households’ main

sources of cash fall into two categories: “new” enterprises and traditional food crops

that are entering the market as cash crops. New enterprises increasing in popularity

and profitability include tomatoes, sugar cane, ginger, sunflower, fruit and

vegetables. These are increasingly male-dominated. The traditional food crops that

are entering the market include female-dominated crops such as cooking bananas,

beans, cassava, sesame and sweet potatoes.



Insights and Implications

In Zambia, maize, cotton, vegetables and broilers are losing popularity with farmers because they

need costly external inputs that farmers can no longer afford (especially given low producer prices).

Groundnuts, goats and local free-ranging chickens are increasingly popular because they need few

purchased inputs.

In northern Mozambique, crop choice is less affected by rising input costs because it is still possible

to achieve good yields without using purchased inputs. Because of low world prices and relatively

high input costs, traditional export crops such as cotton are declining in popularity in favour of

those food crops that have a ready local market. The export crops that are losing ground tend to be

male dominated. The food crops coming up to replace them are grown by women, but income from

their sale is generally controlled by men.

In Uganda, traditional export crops are also declining in popularity due to low world prices and are

being replaced by staple food crops entering the market. The crops declining in popularity are mostly

male-dominated, whereas the traditional food crops that are increasingly entering the market tend

to be female-dominated crops.


The typical household has four or five livelihood sources, including production for

home consumption, crop and livestock sales or casual labour. For all socio-economic

strata, food production for home consumption is the main livelihood source. For the

vast majority of poor, middle poor and less poor, crop sales are the second most

important livelihood source, whereas for the poorest, they are of negligible

importance. Livestock sales rank third among the middle poor and less poor. The

range of livelihood sources is greater in the wealthier villages than in the poorest

(for instance, among the Uganda sites, it is greater in Mpigi than in Hoima and is

least in Apac). Within sites, the range of livelihood sources tends to be greater

among the less poor and middle poor than among the poor and poorest. On

average, male-headed households have a broader range of livelihood sources than

female-headed households. For instance, the average for Mozambique is two

livelihood sources for female-headed households compared with four livelihood

sources for male-headed households.


Ranking of Livelihood Sources by Socio-economic Stratum - Uganda

Livelihood Source

Total Score

(All Strata)

Less Poor

Category A

Middle Poor

Category B


Category C


Category D

Average number of sources

Own food production

Crop sales

Livestock sales

Piecework, casual labour




Brewing local drinks


House rental


Transfers, gifts

Transport (truck, tractor)









































Insights and Implications

Smallholder livelihood systems are based on a combination of production for home consumption,

crop and livestock sales and earnings from other sources such as petty trading, beer brewing and

casual labour. Most households have four or five livelihood sources in order to spread risk and

increase their capacity to withstand outside shocks. As a rule, the less poor have a broader range of

income sources than the poor, and male-headed households have more livelihood options than

female-headed households.

In the livelihood systems of the poor (except for the poorest), crop sales are second in importance

only to food production for home consumption and are considerably more important than income

from off-farm sources.


In deciding how much to sell and how much to retain for home consumption, most

households put food first: they only sell the surplus after meeting their consumption

needs However, the household interviews revealed that many food-deficit

households also sell a part of their production at the harvest time because of a

desperate need for cash. Later in the season, they are forced to buy back food at



higher prices. Households in the case study sites in central and western Uganda

(Mpigi and Hoima) are generally food self-sufficient throughout the year, whereas

in the centre-north of Uganda (Apac) and in Zambia and Mozambique, the majority

of households experience a two to three-month food gap.

Households in Categories A and B tend to be food secure even when their home

production does not cover their consumption requirement. The average months of

self-sufficiency for Category A appear deceptively low because the sample includes

a number of households that buy most of their food on the market. Some of these

grow only cash crops, whereas others are shop owners or retirees with pensions.

There is no major difference between food self-sufficiency of female and maleheaded

households in Zambia or Uganda, but in Mozambique it was much lower for

households headed by women than those headed by men.

Insights and Implications

In deciding how much to sell and how much to retain for home consumption, most households put

food first: they only sell the surplus to their consumption needs. Nonetheless, many food-deficit

households also sell a part of their production at the harvest time because of a desperate need for

cash. Even the poor sell crops and they welcome anything that would help them get higher prices for

the little that they sell.

Food security cannot be equated with food self-sufficiency. The less poor and middle poor are food

secure even when their home production does not cover their consumption requirement. The more

commercialized households have stopped growing food crops and depend on the market for

their food.


In Uganda, the non-traditional cash crops such as paprika, ginger and sunflower

tend to be grown almost exclusively by the less poor and middle poor households.

The poor grow the basic crops whereas the less poor grow all the basic crops plus a

range of cash crops. In addition, a few of the most commercialized households

among the less poor have stopped growing subsistence crops and have put all their

resources into growing cash crops. At the opposite end of the socio-economic

continuum, a few of the very poor households have put all their resources into a

single food security crop such as cassava. Male-headed households grow a wider

range of crops and have a broader range of enterprises than female-headed


In Uganda, the average farm household reported growing five crops, with only

minor differences between strata in the number of crops grown. However, the

proportion of households growing the cash crops promoted by agricultural

extension services in connection with the agricultural modernization programme is

small. The most widely grown crop is beans (grown by 81% of interviewees),


followed by cassava (67%), bananas (64%), maize (58%), sweet potatoes (44%) and

groundnuts (31%). Traditional cash crops such as coffee, cotton, sesame and tobacco

were grown by less than one quarter of the households. New cash crops such as

sunflower, tomatoes, onions, ginger, hot pepper, Irish potatoes, watermelon and

soybeans are location specific and are grown by a small minority of households.

The crops most widely grown by the poor and poorest are beans, cassava, bananas,

maize and sweet potatoes. Although poor households in Mpigi and Hoima also

reported owning a few coffee trees (usually in poor condition), they are unlikely to

grow either traditional cash crops such as cotton and sesame or non-traditional cash

crops such as tomatoes, hot pepper, tobacco, soybeans and sunflower. This suggests

that if agricultural advisory services in Uganda were limited to three crops or

enterprises per sub-county as proposed under National Agricultural Advisory

Services (NAADS) Programme, this might cut off all advice to the poor on the main

crops that they actually grow.

Insights and Implications

The non-traditional cash crops promoted by government are grown by a small minority of households

– usually the less poor. The crops that are most important for the poor tend to be traditional food

crops that are sold on a small scale. Most of the crops that the poor depend on are grown by women.

If agricultural commercialization programmes take enterprise prioritization too far – by limiting the

advice to no more than three enterprises – poor households and women are likely to lose out because

the traditional food crops they sell are unlikely to figure among the top three enterprises. There is a

strong tendency for the progressive smallholders who dominate the agricultural arena to give

priority to the non-traditional cash crops grown by a minority of better-off farmers.


Nearly all households in the case study sites – not only the “less poor” and “middle

poor” but also the majority of poor – sell agricultural products on the market. As

shown by the table below, only 12 of the 90 households interviewed by the team did

not report any sales. Households not involved in selling are found at opposite ends

of the socio-economic continuum – among the least poor and among the poorest of

the poor. A number of the less poor households in the case study sites are retirees

whose main income sources are remittances from their children. They also have

income from renting out buildings and equipment. Many are too old to farm. They

do grow some crops for home consumption but they do not sell because they have

other, easier ways of getting cash. At the opposite end of the continuum, there are

some poor households who do not have any agricultural sales because they are

either too old to plant crops or they find it easier to get cash from off-farm labour.

Nine out of 12 households with no sales (75%) were in this category (either “poor”

or “extreme poor”).



Households with No Crop Sales by Country Visited

Sites Visited/Household Type

Sites visited 1st (Mazabuka, Ocua, Mpigi)

Sites visited 2nd (Chongwe, Metuge, Hoima)

Sites visited 3rd (Mpongwe, Manrasse, Apac)

Category A – less poor

Category B – middle poor

Category C – poor

Category D – extreme poor

Female-headed Households

Male-headed Households

Orphan-headed Households













% 1















- 2 1









































1 Percentage of households interviewed at site

2 Household interviews were not done in Manrasse.

Interestingly, the wealthiest of the case study sites (Mpigi) had the largest proportion

of households reporting no sales. It is also the case study area with the greatest

alternative employment opportunities. This indicates that a considerable number of

households in the least poor categories will automatically fall outside the target

groups of the market linkage projects. Outside of Mozambique, the proportion of

female-headed households with no crop sales is roughly comparable to that of maleheaded


The typical smallholder sells two to four agricultural products per year, with a higher

average number of products sold by the less poor households (Category A) than by

the middle poor (Category B) and the poor (Category C). The extreme poor

households rarely had any sales. The total number of products sold per household

was highest in Uganda and lowest in Mozambique. On average, male-headed

households grow and sell a wider range of products than female-headed households.

However, most households – even among the poorer categories – do sell agricultural

produce (albeit in small quantities). Therefore, this indicates that poorer households

selling some produce will benefit from market linkage intervention insofar as they are

able to get better prices for whatever produce they do sell.

When the average value of the total products sold was calculated for each interview

and converted from local currency into US dollar equivalents, it revealed major

differences between countries. The value of produce traded in Uganda averaged

USD 350 per household, compared with USD 222 for Zambia and USD 136 for

Mozambique. There were also wide differences between sites within countries. For

instance, the average value of sales in Mpigi was over USD 850 per household

whereas in Hoima it was only around USD 150. In Zambia, the range was from

USD 444 in Mpongwe (a frontier area with booming maize production) to only

USD 51 in Chongwe. In Mozambique, the average value of marketed produce

among interviewed households ranged from USD 270 in Metuge to USD 130 in


Ocua/Chiure. In Uganda and Mozambique, the value of marketed produce was

higher in the peri-urban areas than in the other sites, whereas in Zambia, the periurban

site was the lowest of all eight sites.

Differences between socio-economic strata within the same country were greater than

differences between sites. In Uganda, an average “less poor” household (Category A)

earned USD 1 335 per annum, whereas a “less poor household” in Zambia averaged

USD 583 and in Mozambique it averaged only USD 344. The differences between the

middle poor (Category B) were moderate (average USD 274 per household per year

in Uganda, compared with USD 243 in Zambia and USD 134 in Mozambique). For

poor households (Category C), the order was reversed: the value of the marketed

output of the poor was highest in Zambia (USD 39) and lowest in Uganda (USD 11).

Although the dollar value of products sold by households in Category C appears low,

crop sales are Category C households’ second most important livelihood source and

their number one source of cash.

Crop Sales

Average for all sites

Site 1 (Mazabuka, Ocua/Chiure, Mpigi)

Site 2 (Chongwe, Metuge, Hoima)

Site 3 (Mpongwe, Apac)

Category A (less poor)

Category B (middle poor)

Category C (poor)

Category D (extreme poor)

Female-headed Households

Male-headed Households

Orphan-headed Households











































































1 335







Insights and Implications

Crop and livestock selling is of critical importance to the rural poor. Over 90% of households report

sales, including most of the households among the middle poor (Category B) and the poor (Category

C). Although sales do not bring Category C households a lot of money, it is practically the only money

they have.

The few households that do not sell any agricultural products are found among the poorest of the

poor and, surprisingly, among the least poor. The former sell no crops because either they are too old

to farm or they find it easier to get cash from sources such as casual labour. The latter do not sell

crops because they have no need to sell: they have business or rental income or remittances from

their children. Households in the latter category, whose main cash income sources are outside

farming, are unlikely to respond to market linkage opportunities. Likewise, the bottom 10% of the

poor will probably be unable to respond.




In Mozambique, the less poor households are rapidly capitalizing their enterprises

(mainly consumer good trading). The middle poor are also beginning to accumulate

assets such as goats and chickens for consumption and sale, as well as bicycles that

can be used to carry crops to market. But for the majority of households, the process

is only starting.

In two sites in Uganda (Mpigi and Hoima), most households have been able to save

enough money from crop and livestock sales to purchase a bicycle. Once they get a

bicycle, they are able to earn enough – either through crop sales or off-farm labour

– to build a brick house with an iron sheet roof. The next step up the socio-economic

ladder is to buy a motorbike or to invest in roadside a market stall or consumer shop

or in their children’s secondary schooling.

In Zambia, the opposite is true. Most of the former upper stratum farmers are

undergoing decapitalization of their enterprises. First, the cattle died. Then, the

crops failed and they were forced to sell their goats and chickens. Later, they even

sold their plough and cart. Human capital is being quickly eroded by AIDS-related

deaths. Social capital, such as mutual aid for funerals, is also reported to be breaking

down as people go deeper and deeper into poverty.

Insights and Implications

Smallholders in Mozambique and Uganda are rapidly building up their capital, whereas in Zambia the

opposite is true. A key issue in Zambia is to slow down the process of decapitalization.

Decapitalization is a consequence of people selling off their assets in response to the combined

effects of AIDS, cattle deaths, and repeated crop failures. Asset stripping is exacerbated by price

seasonality and the need for farmers to sell their crops at the harvest season when the price is

lowest and to buy back food later in the season when prices are highest.


Do women’s market-related problems and priorities differ significantly from those

of men? Do leaders’ priorities reflect their own elite interests or those of the

ordinary villagers? The market-related problems reported by men and women are

roughly similar. Women were just as likely as men to mention low producer prices

and unavailability and high cost of inputs. Women were more likely than men to say

that: (a) the markets are too far for us to walk; (b) traders cheat us on weights and

measures because we are illiterate; (c) the cost of food and consumer goods is very

high in the hungry season; and (d) fees at local produce markets are too high.

Women were also more likely than men to mention non-market constraints such as

poverty, sickness, high cost of schooling and drinking water shortages. Women were

far more concerned about low producer prices and lack of markets than they were

about commercialization undermining their control of income.


Village leaders generally voiced the same problems as the ordinary men and

women, although they were more likely to identify problems connected with: (a)

transport, (b) working capital shortage for agricultural trading and (c) high cost

(rather than unavailability) of inputs. This indicates that village leaders are

reasonably in touch with the needs of their constituencies. Ministry of Agriculture

(MoA) and district councillors and national farmers’ association leaders’ priorities

were not so in touch with those of villagers. There is a tendency in all three countries

for MoA to continue promoting the traditional cash crops even though the prices

and profits have fallen so low that most farmers have lost interest. There is also a

tendency for the national farmers’ associations to prioritize the non-traditional

export crops grown by a small fraction of smallholders. For instance, the Uganda

National Farmers’ Federation not only continues to promote the traditional cash

crops, but also newer cash crops such as paprika and vanilla, which are not a high

priority for the farmers. For villagers, the crops that bring the most money and are

the most interesting are often traditional food crops that are entering the market as

cash crops.

Problems tend to be country and site-specific. In Zambia, declining profitability of

traditional crops due to rising input costs and falling output prices was much more

important than elsewhere (where inputs are scarcely used). In Mozambique, input

availability is less of an issue; lack of buyers and poor market access are more

important. Problems related to loss of animal traction were also site specific,

experienced in two sites: Mazabuka in Zambia and Apac in Uganda.

Rankings of Marketing Problems


1. Input availability and cost

2. No organized market; no

marketplace in village

3. Low producer prices; no floor

price; price fluctuation

4. Transport availability and cost

5. Few buyers

6. Lack of seed capital to start


7. Non-market (poverty, hunger,

disease, unsafe water, loss of

animal traction)


1. Low producer prices

2. No agricultural buyers come to


3. Market access (distance and


4. Inputs unavailable or too costly

5. High price of consumer items

including food

6. Shortage of working capital for


7. Traders cheat farmers

8. No more company jobs


1. Low producer prices

2. Input availability and cost

3. Transport availability and cost

4. Middlemen cheat farmers

5. Lack of storage for crop bulking

6. Poor road access

7. Few buyers

8. Loss of animal traction

9. Vermin destroy crops

10. Non-market (poverty, disease, school

fees, water)

Note: results of rankings according to village women, men and leaders



Sites in different countries having similar market environments – such as the cottongrowing

areas – had similar problems with declining profitability of cotton due to a

combination of high input prices and low producer prices. Peri-urban horticultureproducing

areas near Lusaka and Kampala (and Pemba to a lesser extent) reported

problems of price fluctuation, perishability, lack of organized markets and shortage

of buyers.

Overall, the most important problem – by far – was low producer prices, followed

by problems with input availability and prices, transport availability and prices, lack

of organized markets, shortage of agricultural buyers and unscrupulous







Market-related problems*

Low producer prices

Input availability and price

Transport availability and price

No organized market

Few agricultural buyers

Middlemen cheat farmers

Lack of storage for bulking

High consumer prices

Poor road access

Working capital for traders

Seed capital for business













































Non-market problems*


Unsafe drinking water

Loss of animal traction


Vermin destroy crops


High school fees

Loss of government jobs

































* Frequency of occurrence of each problem by respondents.

The most common suggestion for how villagers could solve the problem of low

producer prices, lack of organized markets and shortage of buyers was that

producers should organize themselves into a group or association, bulk their

produce and either disseminate market information inviting buyers to come or hire

transport to market their produce jointly. An alternative suggestion – made mainly

in Zambia – was to form a group and store crops jointly for sale later in the season

at a higher price. This was perceived to require the construction of a shared storage

facility to protect the harvest from damage while in storage. Group members in one


case had already started building a store with assistance from the Zambian

Government. Others suggested that producers should organize themselves into a

group, agree on a selling price and then discipline one another to ensure that all

sellers hold out for the agreed price. However, this would not fully address the

problem of poor farmers being obliged to sell at very low prices because of their

desperate need for money. The idea of a grain bank or of village-level inventory

credit so farmers could borrow against the value of their stored produce was very

attractive to farmers in Zambia. Elsewhere, it was not seen as particularly attractive,

as seasonal price differences tend to be less important.

Possible solutions to the problem of absence of buyers were to build a marketplace

in the village, or to organize weekly market days in the village. Villagers were willing

to contribute the labour and materials to build the marketplace.

Possible solutions to the problem of high input costs were: (a) diversify into crops

needing low external inputs; (b) form an association and open an input shop; and

(c) form an income-generating group and seek credit for inputs as a group.

Possible solutions to the problem of high transport costs were: (a) attract buyers to

the village so farmers would not have to transport their products (preferred by

women) or (b) organize a group and share the cost of hired transport (preferred by


Insights and Implications

The market-related problems reported by men and women are roughly similar. Women were far more

concerned about low producer prices and lack of markets than they were about commercialization

undermining their control of income.

Village leaders generally voiced the same problems as the ordinary men and women, which indicates

that they are reasonably in touch with the needs of their constituencies. MoA and district leaders

are often less in touch. They continue to promote the traditional cash crops even though the returns

are no longer competitive with traditional food crops entering the market as cash crops. This

underscores the need for district and focal area leaders to consult with villagers and allow them to

set their own priorities.

Smallholders’ most important problem – by far – is low producer prices, followed by problems with

input availability and prices, transport availability and prices, lack of organized markets, shortage of

agricultural buyers and unscrupulous middlemen. Sites with similar market environments – such as

peri-urban or cotton-growing areas – voiced similar problems. This suggests that study findings

may be generalizable to other countries of the region that have a similar market environment. It also

suggests that market linkage programmes could benefit from developing different strategies for

dealing with problems in different sets of market environments.

The most common suggestion regarding a way that villagers should solve the problem of low producer

prices, lack of organized markets and shortage of buyers was that producers should organize

themselves into a group or association.



Findings – Gender Dimension 4



The Zambia study covered three different ethnic groups (Tonga, Nyanja and

Lamba), whereas sites covered by the Mozambique study were more ethnically

homogenous (Macua majority with a small Maconde minority). All five ethnic

groups are matrilineal. The Tonga and Nyanja are matrilineal and virilocal (the wife

moves to the husband’s village upon marriage), whereas the Lamba and Macua are

– or at least used to be – matrilineal and matrilocal (the husband moves to the wife’s

village upon marriage). The Uganda study covered three different ethnic groups

(Baganda in Mpigi, Banyoro in Hoima, and Langi in Apac).

In Uganda, where all three ethnic groups covered by the study are patrilineal and

virilocal, women have more access to and control over agricultural resources than

the women in the two other countries. Ugandan women control more of the income

from crop and livestock sales than women in Zambia and Mozambique, where all

ethnic groups covered by the study were matrilineal, and some even matrilocal.

In matrilineal societies, it appears (from the access and control profile) that, other

things being equal, women’s control over agricultural marketing (and the income

that it generates) is greater in sites in which the husband moves to the wife’s village

than in sites where the wife moves to the husband’s village. Women’s overall social

status tends to be lower in the latter situation. This finding is consistent with that of

the Gender Field Diagnostic Study in Zambia of June 2000. That study covered

three ethnic groups – Tonga, Kaunda and Lunda. Women’s involvement in

marketing and their control of income were greater among the Lunda – matrilineal

and matrilocal – than among the Tonga and Kaunda (who are matrilineal but


Secondary sources from Zambia suggest that women’s control of income from

agricultural marketing is even greater in sites with bilateral inheritance (such as the

Lozi ethnic group). Among the Lozi, many women have economic enterprises of

their own. It is also known from secondary sources that women’s involvement in

agricultural marketing is much higher in the southern half of Mozambique than in

Cabo Delgado (where the study was carried out). In the southern half of

Mozambique, inheritance is patrilineal and residence is virilocal. This suggests that

women’s role in agricultural marketing and their control of income is no worse (and

possibly better) in patrilineal-virilocal ethnic groups than in matrilineal ones.



In Zambia, all three case study sites are predominantly Christian, although there is

a visible Muslim minority in Chongwe (and the PRA was held at the mosque). In

Mozambique, Metuge is predominantly Muslim whereas Ocua/Chiure and

Manrasse/Chiure are mixed Christian and Muslim. Women’s role in agricultural

marketing appears to be more important among the Christian than among the

Muslim population. In the Muslim villages, women do sometimes engage in

marketing but they do not control the income from the sale. Apart from clay pots,

there was not even one crop or resource under women’s exclusive control.

The Muslims have the ideal that the wife does not need to have an independent

income of her own because the husband is responsible for providing for all of her

and the children’s needs. Nonetheless, Muslim women are expected to assist the

husband if he is unable to pay for children’s schooling or healthcare or clothing.


Polygamy was encountered on a small scale in all nine sites, in all three countries.

The husbands who marry a second wife are supposed to be able to support both.

Therefore, in theory, polygamous husbands should be economically better off than

the average husband. In practice they are not better off because the family usually

has too many mouths to feed. Women in polygamous marriages report that they

definitely need an income under their personal control to ensure that their own

offspring get the same life chances as their co-wives’ children do. This applies to

Muslims as well as animists and Christians. Women in polygamous marriages

usually have their own crop fields and buy all the inputs for their own crops with

their own earnings. They store the harvest in their own granary and use the food

from the granary to feed themselves and their own children. They have separate

cooking pots. They also own their own livestock, which are used for their own subfamily’s

needs. Co-wives do not pool income. Each wife controls the income from the

crops and livestock she sells and from her own petty trading and non-farm incomegenerating


Female-headed Households

In female-headed households, as expected, it is almost always the woman who

markets the agricultural produce and who controls the income from the sale. The

woman decides when, where and how much to sell. The woman goes to market,

receives the payment, keeps the earnings and decides how to spend the money. This

is true even among the Muslim population.

However, some female-headed households in Uganda do experience constraints in

that they have difficulties in taking produce to markets because they cannot use

bicycles (due to strict taboos within some ethic groups in central and western

Uganda) and they do not have access to other kinds of transport. Hence, they are

forced to sell their produce at low prices at the farmgate and to depend upon buyers

passing through the village.



In Mozambique as a whole, according to official statistics, women head 19% of total

households. This refers only to widows, divorced, abandoned or single women with

dependants – not to women whose husbands are working outside Mozambique or

who are the main family decision-makers even though they are married. For

cultural reasons, the percentage of households headed by women tends to be higher

in the south than in the north of the country.

Case Study Site

District (Village)

Mazabuka (Muvwela)

Chongwe (Libuko)

Mpongwe (Kanyenda)

Chiure (Ocua)

Metuge (25 Junho)

Mpigi (Lunyerere)

Hoima (Buraru)

Apac (Otorongole)

Female-Headed Households as Percent of Total Households in Wealth Category

Number of Female -Headed HHs

FHHs as a % of Total HHs in Stratum

A B C D Total

A B C D Total

1 13 10 1 25

6% 45% 43% 50% 36%

1 2 10 0 13

100% 1 29% 23% 0% 25%

3 28 30 0 61

5% 39% 59% 0% 33%

1 25 15 0 41

10% 25% 30% 0% 26%

0 0 17 0 17

0% 0% 57% 0% 40%

0 12 11 7 30

0% 22% 44% 35% 28%

0 5 27 2 34

0% 19% 28% 40% 26%

0 2 15 8 27

0% 7% 27% 62% 24%

1 This was the only case of category A in the village: the widow of an urban retiree who has outside income (her

husband’s retirement pension). She had the only house in the village with an iron sheet roof and urban-style furniture.

In all nine cases, the data show that most female-headed households are poor and

that they tend to be over-represented among the poor and very poor (Categories C

and D) and under-represented among the less poor (Category A). However, in

Ocua/Chiure (Mozambique) the majority of female-headed households were

reported to be in Category B (middle poor).

Case Study Site

District (Village)

Mazabuka (Muvwela)

Chongwe (Libuko)

Mpongwe (Kanyenda)

Chiure (Ocua)

Metuge (25 Junho)

Mpigi (Lunyerere)

Hoima (Buraru)

Apac (Otorongole)

Distribution of Female-Headed Households by Wealth

Number of Female-Headed HHs

Distribution of FHHs by Stratum

A B C D Total

A B C D Total

1 13 10 1 25

4% 52% 40% 4% 100%

1 2 10 0 13

8% 15% 77% 0% 100%

3 28 30 0 61

5% 46% 49% 0% 100%

1 35 15 0 51

2% 69% 29% 0% 100%

0 0 17 0 17

0% 0% 100% 0% 100%

0 12 11 7 30

0% 40% 37% 23% 100%

0 5 27 2 34

0% 15% 79% 6% 100%

0 2 15 8 27

0% 8% 60% 32% 100%


The household interviews revealed that, on average, female-headed households are

disadvantaged in their access to land, having only half the land of male-headed

households. They are much less likely than male-headed households to own a

bicycle, which greatly constrains their ability to market their produce at

remunerative prices. In Zambia and Mozambique, they are also less likely to own a

radio, which limits their access to market information. On the positive side, they are

more likely than male-headed households to own chickens and goats (but not oxen).

In Zambia, the average housing conditions of female-headed households are much

worse than those of male-headed households, whereas in the other countries there

are few differences in housing standards. The explanation may be that in two of the

sites in Zambia, when the husband dies, his relatives evict the widow from the house

and land. Or if she is allowed to stay, they strip the iron roof off the house. In the

other countries, where the widow continues to live in the same house after the

husband dies, housing conditions reflect the household’s former economic status

prior to the husband’s death.

Insights and Implications

The relative control of women over agricultural products and the income from their sale varies by

ethnic group in relation to inheritance and marital residence. It tends to be strongest in the ethnic

groups with bilateral kinship (such as the Lozi in Zambia) and those with patrilineal inheritance and

virilocal residence (as in all ethnic groups in Uganda). It appears to be less strong in ethnic groups

with matrilineal inheritance and matrilocal residence and weaker still in matrilineal ethnic groups

with virilocal residence. In matrilineal societies, when the individual husbands move to the wife’s

village on marriage, women’s control of income is greater than when each individual wife moves to her

husband’s village. Projects will need to take extra care to reinforce women’s control of income for the

products they traditionally sell, especially where control is weak.


There is a major difference between the three countries regarding who – husband

or wife – is responsible for what types of expenditure. In Zambia and Uganda,

women are expected to provide all of the food (including household utensils

connected with food preparation). In Zambia, women are also expected to provide

most of the money for their children’s schooling, healthcare and clothing. They also

buy most of their own clothes. While in Uganda, men are expected to assume the

main responsibility for paying for children’s school fees, clothing, medical expenses,

and farm inputs and implements. Although men are expected to cover such

expenditures (it was repeatedly reported that ideally this is how it should be),

women will contribute economically when the men are unable to cover the total

costs. In the project sites in Mozambique (which may not be representative of the

situation in the southern half of the country), responsibilities of husband and wife

as providers are more equal. Women are responsible for providing the family food

(including the utensils needed for its preparation) and men are responsible for



providing the non-food items, including clothes, schooling and medical expenses.

This is the ideal. In practice, husbands are not always able to provide adequately for

the clothing, schooling and healthcare of their children. In such cases, women use

their own income to assist their husbands to make up the shortfall.

Women’s and Men’s responsibilities as Providers


Women grow the staple foods

Women pay school fees

Women pay medical expenses

Women buy children’s clothes

Women buy own clothes

Men buy the high cost items

and durable goods (if any):

▲ Bicycle or vehicle

▲ Iron sheets for roof

▲ Furniture

▲ Cattle and animal-drawn


▲ Farm inputs and production costs

for household fields


Women feed the family

Men provide everything else

(in theory):

▲ Children’s schooling

▲ Medical expenses

▲ Clothes for whole family

In polygamous marriages:

▲ Each wife supports own

children, paying for their

schooling and clothes


Women feed the family and

buy some of their own and the

children’s clothing

Men provide everything else

(in theory):

▲ Children’s schooling

▲ Medical expenses

▲ Clothes for the family

▲ Farm inputs/implements

Women contribute economically

to make up the shortfall when

men fail to cover these expenses

Insights and Implications

The responsibilities of husband and wife for providing the family food and for paying for clothing,

shelter, school fees and healthcare are culturally determined and vary between countries and sites

within countries. Changes in women and men’s control of earnings from agricultural sales can affect

their ability to meet their obligations as household providers. This can unbalance household

expenditure, undermining food security and family well-being.


Women and men in both Zambia and Uganda have relatively separate purses. Each

has his or her own income sources and each keeps his or her own earnings. Some –

but not all – of the money is pooled in a single household purse. The husband keeps

a substantial share of money back for his own pocket money. Women report that

men (both married and unmarried) often spend the latter money on drinking,

smoking and entertaining their girlfriends. The case of women having separate crop

fields under their own control, for which they pay for all the inputs with their own

money, was most visible in Kanyenda village (Mpongwe District, Copperbelt

province, Zambia).

In Mozambique (at least in the case study sites), most income earned by men and

women is treated as household income (i.e., belonging to the household as a whole),


under the control of the household head, but to be spent in consultation with his

wife. Nonetheless, some income is held back by the husband as personal spending

money. Again, women reported that men spent money on drinking and prostitutes,

although it was less of an issue in Mozambique than in Zambia and Uganda. Men

themselves reported to spend money on prostitutes, but it was apparent that men in

Cabo Delgado do take responsibility for providing for their families to a greater

extent than what was observed in Zambia and Uganda. Women in Mozambique do

also have some personal income, in that they can control the money from the sales

of personal property such as their own agricultural produce. Women do not own

any livestock, though.






Income pooling

Relatively separate purses

Women have own fields (pay for all


Most income earned by men and

women is treated as HH income

(but some is held back and

treated by husband as personal

spending money)

Relatively separate purses, but

husband and wife assist each

other with expenditures

Women’s income


Women do have a personal income.

Women need a personal income

because they feed and clothe their

children and pay for their

schooling and healthcare; women

buy own clothes, kitchen utensils,

soap and hand tools.

Women and children own small

animals in own name.

According to village leaders, wives

do not have any personal income

(no need because husband

provides). However, both men and

women reported that women do

control (and sell) own maize,

beans, cassava, pottery and

thatched grass.

Female HH heads and poor women

do have independent earnings

(brewing, petty trade, sex work).

Women and children do not own

animals (animals belong

to husband).

Women do have personal income

from a wide range of income

sources such as crop sales

(bananas, beans, maize, peas,

vegetables, tobacco, etc.),

livestock sales (pigs, goats,

rabbits, and poultry), crafts

making and beer brewing.

In practice, women provide for a

substantial share of children’s

school fees, clothing and medical

care, in spite of it being

traditionally men’s responsibility.

In Zambia and Uganda, men acknowledged that women have independent

income sources under their own control, whereas in Mozambique, men said that

very few women have an independent income under their own control. They

tended to see women’s income (as well as their own income) as part of “household”


The wealth rankings and household interviews revealed that female household

heads, co-wives of polygamous men and poor women in general do have

independent earnings in all three countries. Even married women in the poorest



socio-economic stratum earn money from traditional brewing, pottery making,

selling wild products they gather from the bush, and petty trading bananas or fish

in the village market. Some even sell their fruit from compound to compound

on foot.

Insights and Implications

Nearly all households have multiple income streams and multiple earners. Some – but not all – of this

income is pooled and treated as joint income to be used for the benefit of the family as a whole. Part

is held back by individual family members as personal spending money. Women in many societies

complained that their husbands use too large a share of their income for personal spending on

drinking, smoking, prostitutes and marrying additional wives. Insofar as smallholder

commercialization usually increases the income under men’s personal control, often at the expense of

income under women’s control, it is important to monitor whether it aggravates this type of problem.


The main products under women and men’s exclusive control are listed in the table

below for the three countries. From the table it is evident that in all countries, nearly

all products of value are under men’s exclusive control. This includes cattle, oxdrawn

equipment, goats, bicycles (or vehicles, if any), means of communication

(radio, TV), boats and fishing gear (if any), and tree crops (cashews, mangoes,

bananas, papayas, coconuts and other fruit).

Nonetheless, there is a major difference: apart from clay water jars (controlled by

women in all three countries), in Zambia women do control a few agricultural

products such as groundnuts, pumpkins and their own personally-owned chickens

and goats, whereas in the case study sites in Mozambique, they do not have exclusive

control over any agricultural products. Women in Cabo Delgado seem to control

only items related to wild products such as thatched grass and bamboo baskets.

The case in Uganda also differs from the two other countries, in that women do

control a variety of crops and livestock, such as beans, cassava, sweet potatoes, own

chickens, goats and pigs. Nevertheless, even though women in Uganda seemingly

do control more agricultural products than women in the two other countries, men

in Uganda still control items of greater value such as vehicles, bicycles, radios

and cattle in addition to cash crops such as coffee, cotton, ginger, sesame and


This implies that in Zambia and Uganda there may be scope for reaching women by

targeting the commodities that women control (such as groundnuts), whereas in

Mozambique there are no women’s crops or products to target.

The study shows – conclusively – that commonly held stereotypes about African

women’s activities are misleading. Women in six of the nine sites in the three


countries do not control: sheep and goats, or chickens and ducks, or vegetables, or

maize, or beans, or cassava, or handicrafts or sewing. Therefore, if projects were to

target these commodities explicitly, men are likely to benefit instead of women. On

the other hand, the stereotypes about what activities are exclusively controlled by

men are equally misleading. Neither cotton nor cashews nor fishing are exclusively

male activities. The team interviewed women cotton farmers who farm without a

husband and women who fish from the shore even at night (whenever the tide is

out). This underlines the need for IFAD market linkage projects to build their

capacity to undertake baseline surveys of gender roles and socio-economic

differentiation before entering a new area, as an integral part of the focal area

planning process (FAPP) or local needs assessment process (LONAT).






Products under

women’s control



Own chickens

Own goats

Clay pots

Petty trading products

Clay pots

Chickens in Metuge (women


Not groundnuts (men only)

Not goats (men only)

Not chickens in Ocua/Chiure

(men only)



Sweet potatoes





Clay pots and kitchen


Not groundnuts

Products under

men’s control

Men control items of value:

Cattle, plough, cart, oil press



Men control all items of value:

Cashews, coconuts, fruit, goats

Bicycle (transport, mobility)

Radio (including market


Men control all items of value:


Sesame, soybeans, ginger,

tobacco, cotton








Goats/Sheep = women

Poultry = women

Vegetables = women

Cassava = women

Maize, beans = women

Honey = women

Handicrafts = women

Sewing = women

Rice = women

Goats = women

Poultry = women

Groundnuts = women

Vegetables = women

Cassava = women

Cotton = only men

Fishing = only men

Groundnuts = women

Cotton = only men

Coffee = only men

Vegetables = women



Insights and Implications

As a rule, high-value resources are controlled by men and low-value resources by women. When a lowvalue

crop becomes profitable or a food crop begins to enter the market as a cash crop, men may take

over the control of these commodities formerly under women’s control. Therefore, market linkage

programmes need to monitor changes in control of income to ensure that commercialization does

not unintentionally harm women and their families.

Although patterns of control are highly site specific, the number and range of products controlled by

women tends to be higher in Uganda, lower in Zambia and lowest in northern Mozambique. Where

women have some products under their exclusive control, there is a potential to establish women’s

enterprise groups centred on the commodities women control. Where women do not have exclusive

control over any agricultural products – as in northern Mozambique – there is no way to target

women by targeting “women’s crops”.

Because access and control over resources is highly site specific, market linkage projects need to

build their capacity to undertake baseline surveys of gender roles and socio-economic

differentiation before entering a new area, as an integral part of the focal area planning process

(FAPP), local needs assessment process (LONAT) or similar processes in other projects.


Gender roles in marketing vary according to who (husband or wife) “owns” the

product, who goes to market and whether the spouse comes along. Usually the

owner decides when and where to sell and markets his or her own produce and

controls the income from the sale. In most cases, the man is either the “owner” of

the produce or he sells it “on behalf of the whole family”. Women mostly control the

crops and animals that they personally own – but not the rest.

Since women are responsible for making sure that the family does not go hungry,

husbands usually consult them about what share of the harvest to sell and what share

to save for family consumption. For the same reason, husbands also consult their

wives before selling animals (whether chickens or goats or the family cow).


Gender Dimensions




Who decides when to sell?

Men for most products but

women for women’s products


Cotton and maize: men

Tomatoes, cassava and pigs:

joint decision

Who decides how much of the

harvest to sell and how much

to save for household


For food crops, women decide

more than men because

women are responsible for

feeding the family.

Husbands decide alone for

cash crops, but wives have a

say for staple food crops

(because women are

responsible for making sure

the family is properly fed).

Men decide more than women

for cash crops.

For food crops, women decide

more than men because

women are responsible for

feeding the family.

Who decides where to sell?

Men for the bulk of household

produce; women for their own

personal crops and animals


Men for the bulk of household

produce; women for their own

personal crops and animals

It also makes a difference who goes to market. In Zambia and Uganda, when crops

are marketed in small quantities within walking distance, both women and men

market them; whereas, when crops are transported in large quantities to distant

markets, men tend to take them. Whoever goes to market receives the money. If the

husband goes alone to market, he does the shopping; whereas, if the wife goes, she

does the shopping. If (as is usually the case) the shopping is done on the same trip,

whoever happens to be present has a say in how the money is spent. If both husband

and wife are present, they consult each other. In Mozambique, the same principle

holds, but it is usually the man who takes crops to markets outside the village and

who buys the consumer goods in town. When the wife happens to go along (for

instance to carry an extra bag of maize on her head), they do the shopping jointly

(and she assists to headload the consumer goods on the way back to the village).








Who goes to


Both men and women sell in local

markets (walking distance with

headloaded goods).

When goods are transported to

distant markets, men usually go

(without their wives) using bicycle

or hired transport.

Only men take products to

market by bicycle or can afford

transport (except in FHHs).

Women only accompany

their husbands to town

markets when the husbands

need them to headload bags of


Both women and men sell in local

markets (walking distance with

headloaded goods). When goods are

transported to distant markets,

men usually go without their wives

using bicycle and hired transport.

In some areas, women have access

to and use bicycles as much as men,

and may take produce to central


In Apac neither men nor women take

produce to town to sell, as there is

no price difference.

Who receives the


Whoever goes to market to sell

(mostly men but also women)

Whoever goes to market to sell

(usually the man)

Whoever goes to market to sell

(mostly men but also women)

Who controls

income from sale?

Women tend to control the income

from staple foods sold in small

quantities in the local market.

Men control the income from cash

crops and products sold in large

quantities in distant markets.

Women control income from their

“own” products if they sell directly

in local markets.

Women who sell products on

behalf of the husband do not

control the income even though

they (women) receive the


Men control the income

(whatever is sold and wherever),

unless the household is female

headed or the husband is a


Women control income from staple

food and other food crops sold in

small quantities at the farmgate or

in the local market and men control

the income from cash crops and

products sold in large quantities in

distant markets.

Women also control the income from

their own products if they sell them

directly in local markets.

Women who sell products on behalf

of the husband do not control the

income even though they (women)

receive the payment.

Who spends the


If men receive the payment in

town, and the wife is not with

them, they spend the money. If

the wife is present, she is


Both women and men buy items

from kiosks in the village (if

they have money), but men do

the shopping in town (on their

marketing trips).

If men receive the payment in town,

and the wife is not there, they spend

the money. If the wife is present, she

is consulted.

If the women take their own produce

to market, they themselves spend

the money.


Does selling influence control of income? In Zambia, women control the income of

the produce they sell locally and on a small scale, and men control the income of the

larger quantity of produce they take to town to sell. Whether it is the wife or the

husband who sells is largely determined by the selling place (i.e., whether it is sold

at the farmgate/local market/distant market) and the quantity of produce sold. In

most cases in Zambia, whoever sells controls the income – be it the man or the

woman. In one of the field sites (Chongwe), women sell vegetables on behalf of their

husbands, but the husbands control the income.

In Cabo Delgado (Mozambique), the issue of who does the actual selling has little

influence on who controls the income, as men tend to control all income no matter

who sells. In “respectable” homes, men do most of the selling, because female

traders and ambulant peddlers are perceived to be “loose” women. Most women

would not engage in trading if they had any other alternative for survival. Women

rarely control anything in northern Mozambique.

In Uganda, control of income is little affected by who does the marketing. Men

customarily sell and control the income from men’s crops and women do the same

for women’s crops. Many food crops belong to the household as a whole and are

jointly controlled, no matter who does the selling. Individual men and women sell

their personally-owned chickens and goats and treat the income from the sale as

personal income. When a husband sells his wife’s produce in town on her behalf or

vice versa, control rests with whoever is the “owner” of the crop.

Insights and Implications

Because market linkage projects affect the timing, place and the scale of agricultural marketing,

management needs to know how this affects women and men’s control over income. If the husband

takes the products to market instead of the wife, does she lose control of the income? In Zambia, the

answer is “yes”: when men take over the sale of produce, they also take over the control of income.

Women only control the products they sell locally on a small scale. Whenever quantities are

sufficient to justify taking produce to town to sell, men do the selling and they control the income.

Therefore, the risk of undermining women’s control of income is very high. However, if the market

linkage project helps women sell their produce directly in the village to outside buyers, for example

through a women’s group, women can retain control. In the other two countries, there is less risk of

undermining women’s economic power, since control of income is shaped by cultural norms that are

unaffected by who does the selling.


Women are much more likely to have their own commercial enterprises in Zambia

and Uganda than in northern Mozambique. In Cabo Delgado there is a social

stigma against women engaging in long-distance trade and in ambulant peddling.

This seems to be stronger among Muslims than among Christians and animists.

Women traders in the northern part of Mozambique, who travel from one place to

another, are perceived by villagers to be “loose women” who have to engage in

“transactional sex” to get a lift to town to buy and sell their goods or to get access to



a market stall. Women who sell home brew are also viewed as “loose women” in the

north. However, women who have some capital (for instance female household

heads who either own a proper store (loja) or a well-built and well-stocked consumer

kiosk) are subject to less criticism. In Zambia, the question of social stigma on

women traders was not examined by the team (but it seems to be less important). In

some areas of Uganda, women can more easily move around and engage in trading.

Some women buy and sell beans along the roadside, while others have access to

bicycles and take their own produce to central markets. No such stigma as found in

Mozambique was encountered by the team in Uganda.

High levels of illiteracy among women in both Zambia and Mozambique (over 85%

in Mozambique) definitely act as a barrier to their entering trade and commerce.

Women reported that they fear that traders are cheating them because they cannot

read and write or do sums. Women are also handicapped in Mozambique by the

absence of organized women’s groups. This is less of a problem in Zambia because

there are many women’s groups (although few groups engage in economic

activities). In Uganda, where illiteracy is less of a barrier (45% literate), women are

generally more engaged in trading activities than are Zambian and Mozambican


Gender Dimensions




Social stigma on women



Yes: seen as loose women,

prostitutes (especially those

selling local brew)


Cultural influences

▲ Christian ideals

▲ Muslim/Swahili: no female

seclusion in villages (in

town, yes) but stigma on

female economic activity

▲ Ideal of husband as sole

provider for the family

▲ Christian ideals

▲ Strong bicycling taboos

for women in western and

central Uganda

Commercial activities of


▲ Women’s poultry group

▲ Women’s sewing group

▲ Groundnut seed


▲ Mixed sex groups: paprika

▲ Woman kiosk owner, Ocua

▲ Women with market stalls,


▲ Woman ambulant traders

▲ Women selling beans

▲ Women selling bananas

▲ Women selling at roadside

market in Mpigi

▲ Women brewers in Apac

▲ Woman shop owners

Handicaps of women

▲ Low levels of rural female


▲ High illiteracy (>85%)

▲ Lack of organized groups

▲ Literacy levels not so low



Insights and Implications

Women entrepreneurs and market intermediaries are a potential target group in Uganda and

Zambia. Whereas, in northern Mozambique, due to high female illiteracy and restrictive cultural

norms, women are less likely to have their own commercial enterprises. Given that female ambulant

traders face social stigma, most northern Mozambican village women would prefer to sell their crops

jointly through local enterprise groups having links to organized buyers. This way they avoid engaging

in individual crop trading.

Illiteracy is a serious constraint that can discourage women from entering trading. Well-planned and

marketing-oriented functional literacy training can be an important element of market linkage



In Zambia, the main gender-related issue for the Smallholder Enterprise and

Marketing Programme (SHEMP) is to ensure that commercialization of agricultural

marketing does not undermine the income under women’s direct control. This

might be achieved by encouraging female farmers to form women’s enterprise

groups to reinforce their control over the larger-scale marketing of products that

are customarily considered to be women’s crops or activities. Therefore, in SHEMP

there is a case for a two-pronged approach (1) using the “Female Focused Market

Linkages Facility” to experiment with supporting women’s enterprise groups – as

CLUSA is currently doing under the Conservation Farming Project – while (2)

mainstreaming women in other programme components alongside men.

The Agricultural Marketing Support Project (PAMA) in Mozambique is likely to

require different gender strategies for different parts of Mozambique. In Cabo

Delgado, women are not major actors in agricultural marketing. Elsewhere in the

country their role may well differ. In fact, the World Bank Gender and Cashew

Study suggests that – even in a traditionally male-dominated crop sub-sector such as

cashews – women are more important than men in cashew production, processing

and marketing in southern Mozambique (Gaza and Inhambane), whereas in coastal

areas of the north (e.g., Nampula), the opposite is true.

Given that gender roles vary from place to place in all three countries and that none

of the usual African gender stereotypes hold, SHEMP and PAMA – and/or their

NGO service providers and other potential IFAD-supported market linkage

programmes in the region – need to develop the capacity to carry out their own

gender and poverty baseline studies as an input to the planning process, particularly

in the context of focal area and sub-focal area planning. Then, depending on

gender roles in marketing, the project would be in a position to make an informed

decision on whether to encourage women to form separate enterprise groups or to

work alongside men in mixed sex enterprise groups. The choice between gender

mainstreaming and a women’s component would depend on local circumstances



and the outcome of the gender diagnostic. It is possible that PAMA opts to support

women’s enterprise groups in the north (Cabo Delgado) using functional literacy

classes as an entry point for group formation, and to mainstream women in mixed

sex groups in Maputo province in the south of Mozambique. Alternatively, it could

adopt a two-pronged strategy: (1) women’s enterprise groups for marketing

traditional women’s crops where women’s control of income is threatened and

(2) gender mainstreaming in other components and activities.

In all three countries, and maybe in Mozambique especially, poor farmers and

women would benefit from forming farmers’ groups (and women’s enterprise

groups), and from being linked by contracts with companies that would go to the

villages and buy at the farmgate or at the local village market (as already proposed

for both SHEMP and PAMA). In an environment like northern Mozambique –

where female traders are being forced to engage in transactional sex for transport

and a place in the market and where only those women without any other

alternative would take part in ambulant peddling – encouraging the formation of

strong, local agribusiness groups for women is recommended rather than

promoting an increase in individual female traders.

In Mozambique, two possible entry points for reaching female farmers were identified:

CLUSA-sponsored functional literacy groups and CARE-initiated household food

security (HFS) groups. CLUSA reports that the vast majority (up to 80%) of the

participants in the adult literacy groups are female. The participants are wives and

daughters of CLUSA enterprise group members. CLUSA policy is that wives of

enterprise group members should be encouraged to join the groups in their own right,

but in practice, in most cases only one household member joins the producers’

association – the head of household, usually male. CLUSA’s intention is to build the

human and social capital of their enterprise group members and their families.

In the absence of special efforts to target women, women’s membership in CLUSA’s

regular enterprise groups (associations) continues to be as low as 10%. Moreover,

statistics for the past three years suggest that as more men join, female membership

in mixed sex groups is declining as a share of total membership. When membership

in single-sex women’s groups is added to the total, the proportion of total members

averages 19%.

The other possibility for involving women is to work with HFS groups such as those

initiated by CARE in Nampula Province. The majority of participants in HFS

groups are reportedly women. The HFS groups differ from the CLUSA-supported

enterprise groups in that they are informal (unregistered) groups of people who

come together because they share a common interest. They are more likely than

CLUSA enterprise groups to include the poor and extreme poor (Categories C

and D). The HFS groups usually have an elected chairperson and secretary and

treasurer, but do not have legal status. They do not have a joint bank account or

share capital and cannot enter into legally binding contracts. In Nampula province,

CLUSA and CARE work together, and CARE groups wanting to launch an economic

enterprise are encouraged to turn to CLUSA for assistance.


In Zambia, CLUSA has two complementary programmes: one works with HFS

groups on conservation farming and the other supports legally registered and

constituted enterprise groups. The participants in the former (HFS groups) are

40-60% female, whereas female participants in the latter (enterprise groups) are

much fewer (roughly 20%). CLUSA hopes to build on the HFS groups and – once

they have become food secure – encourage them to launch economic activities.

IFAD’s experience with adult functional literacy groups in Uganda is also relevant.

Under the District Development Support Programme (DDSP) and its

predecessors – the Hoima/Kibaale Community Development Programme and the

Masindi District Development Programme – villagers were encouraged to form

functional adult literacy (FAL) groups, which were later used as an entrypoint for

a whole range of other project activities including community development,

micro-projects, health/ hygiene and nutrition education, micro-credit, agricultural

extension and domestic water supply. The FAL groups tended to attract women

more than men – participants were 80% female. Although men’s illiteracy rate was

nearly as high as women’s, men were reluctant to join the groups because they

were more ashamed than women to admit their illiteracy in front of other

villagers. Since the main channel for participation in all project components was

literacy groups that were 80% female, benefits to women were very high. The

women’s savings and credit groups supported by IFAD under the DDSP – and

Uganda Women's Effort to Save Orphans (UWESO) project could also benefit

from support for development of group enterprises and market linkages. Roughly

80% of group members are female.

Under the Gender Strengthening Programme, Hoima DDSP has received a grant

to mainstream gender in the planning process at village level, and part of the

grant is used to investigate how to encourage men to participate in the FAL classes

until now predominantly composed of women. In addition, the IFAD-financed

UWESO project has received a grant to pilot FAL classes for caretakers of orphans

(85-90% women).

A further opportunity for gender targeting in Uganda would be to link the

existing federations of IFAD-supported savings and credit groups under the

DDSP and the clusters under UWESO to the sub-county level Farmer Fora (FF) to

be established under NAADS. These sub-county-wide associations have socioeconomic

composition (80% female with a high proportion of poor households)

and geographic coverage that should make them highly suitable to participate in

the local priority-setting process under NAADS. This would greatly improve the

chances that women and the poor influence the types of contracts awarded by

NAADS for agricultural marketing advisory services.

In Zambia and Uganda, it makes sense to target women through support for

marketing of commodities controlled primarily by women (such as groundnuts and

pumpkins) or women’s personally-owned chickens and goats. In the northern

coastal part of Mozambique, it would not be feasible because there are no

agricultural commodities controlled by women. However, it is possible that in other

parts of Mozambique, it would be a feasible option.








Entry points for

reaching women

▲ SHEMP female-focused

market linkages subcomponent

▲ CLUSA HFS groups

▲ Groundnut seed multiplication


▲ CLUSA functional literacy


▲ CARE HFS groups

▲ UMOKAZI women’s incomegenerating


▲ HELVETAS women’s incomegenerating


▲ Functional adult literacy

classes under IFAD-supported

programmes such as DDSP


▲ Savings and credit groups

through UWFT and UWESO

▲ Link SIDAs and UWESO

clusters to NAADS subcounty

farmers’ forum

Gender issues in


Ensure that commercialization of

agricultural marketing does not

undermine women’s control of

income from sale of products.

Women do not have income under

their control, except female

household heads or wives in

polygamous marriages (married

women not perceived by men to

need their own income).

Ensure that commercialization of

agricultural marketing does not

undermine women’s control of

income from sale of produce.

Severe social stigma exists

against female traders; women

peddlers involved in transactional


Possible activities

Women’s enterprise groups (to

strengthen women producers’

control over marketed produce

and the income from its sale)

Building economic activities onto

literacy groups

Creating and\or strengthening

local women’s enterprise groups

(to strengthen bargaining

capacity, etc.) to be linked to

buyers/companies that will buy

produce locally

Women’s enterprise groups (to

strengthen women producer’s

control over marketed produce

and the income from its sale)


Targeting Issues




Should the project target

village-based ambulant

trader women?

Yes in Chongwe: wives of

vegetable growers do not

control income from produce

sold on husband’s behalf. But

women who buy and sell

vegetables in the market are

poor and control income from

the sale of farm produce

(project should ensure that

formation of associations

does not undermine their

supply of produce or control

of products).

Probably not in Cabo Delgado

because woman traders are

stigmatized (as loose


The women with “bancas” are

also stigmatized in Cabo


Conditions are likely to be

different in Maputo Province

where PAMA will operate

(little stigma on women


Yes, women in all three study

sites control income from sale

of own produce.

Gender targeting: should the

project target commodities

controlled by women?

Scope exists to target

women’s enterprise groups

for groundnuts, pumpkins,

chickens and goats.

Little scope exists to do so

in Cabo Delgado (women

control nothing but cooking


Scope exists to target women’s

enterprise groups for sesame,

beans, sweet potatoes,

chickens and goats.

If women cannot be reached

by targeting commodities

controlled by women, how

can they be reached?

Build on CLUSA’s household

food security groups as

entry points for starting

enterprise groups.

Build on CLUSA functional

literacy classes as entry

point for economic activities.

Build on already existing and

well operating functional adult

literacy classes as entry points

for economic activities.

Insights and Implications

Encouraging female farmers to form women’s enterprise groups has been found to be a successful

way to reinforce their control over larger-scale marketing of products customarily considered to be

women’s crops or activities, and to help bring more money into the family.

Given that gender roles vary so much from place to place, projects and their NGO service providers

need to develop the capacity to carry out their own gender and poverty baseline studies if an

appropriate gender strategy is to be developed.

In all three countries, two possible entry points for reaching female farmers proved to be successful:

formation of functional adult literacy (FAL) groups and household food security (HFS) groups. In

both cases, it was found that the vast majority (up to 80%) of the participants are female. They

thus offer an effective way to self-target women.

A further opportunity for gender targeting appeared in Uganda: link women’s savings and credit

groups (such as the IFAD-supported women’s savings and credit groups under DDSP and the

clusters under UWESO) to the sub-county level Farmers’ Fora to be established under NAADS.



Findings – Poverty Targeting 5



Whether targeting makes sense or not depends on what we mean by targeting. If we

take targeting to mean exclusion of the non-poor or less poor in favour of the poor,

then targeting does not make sense. If by targeting we mean paying attention to who

benefits and trying to adjust project activities to make them as inclusive as possible of

all socio-economic strata able to respond to economic initiatives, then targeting does

make sense.

There are two points of view: one “for” targeting and one “against” it. Those “for”

targeting see market linkages as a vehicle for reducing rural poverty. They include

USAID, CARE and CLUSA. They are not calling for exclusion of the non-poor, but

they do want to ensure that the main beneficiaries are smallholder farmers and that

a substantial share of direct beneficiaries are women.

Those “against” targeting include some of the experts involved in managing the

IDEA project in Uganda, who argued that it makes no sense to target market linkage

programmes primarily to the poor, because the poor have few products to sell and

a limited capacity to bear the risks associated with commercialization. They think

that market linkage programmes should start from those farmers who are already

in the market and build on their experience. To capture export markets, one needs

to be able to fill entire containers with export-quality produce on a reliable basis –

year after year without wide inter-annual fluctuations. It is much easier to start that

with producers already able to produce reliably and on a significant scale. Later,

when regular linkages have been forged with export markets, other smaller farmers

can benefit from them as well. In this view, reaching the poor should not be the first

priority, but is something that can only come at a later stage of the process. They

tend to view their success in terms of the quantities and value of incremental export

earnings for the national economy. For them, gender and poverty goals are an “add

on” that is incidental to the programme’s core purpose.

Insights and Implications

If we take targeting to mean exclusion of the non-poor or less poor in favour of the poor, then targeting

does not make sense. If by targeting we mean paying attention to who is benefiting and trying to adjust

project activities to make them as inclusive as possible of all socio-economic strata able to respond to

economic initiatives, then targeting does make sense.

The poverty-oriented market linkage programmes of CLUSA, CARE and ACDI/VOCA are much more relevant

as models for future IFAD market linkage operations than programmes such as IDEA – a successful marketsupport/export

promotion project – that mainly target the emergent commercial farmers.




There is no justification for blanket exclusion of villagers in Category A, as they are

usually the main sources of dynamism in the market. They have the same interests

in selling their crops as households that are middle poor (Category B) and poor

(Category C). They cannot be excluded on income grounds, because even the “least

poor” households in the case study sites had incomes well below the absolute

poverty line of USD 1 per person per day. However, in sites like Chongwe, the

programme needs to be vigilant to ensure that the enterprise groups are not

dominated by urban retirees or town-based produce traders the way the

government-sponsored cooperatives have been. The retirees who farm for home

consumption but sell few if any crops are not an appropriate target group for

market linkage operations.

The market environment case study in Mozambique revealed that there are at least

four levels of persons involved in trading 5 , some of whose interests are in direct

conflict with one another. These conflicts of interest are an important factor to take

into consideration: (a) when constituting focal area resource groups and (b) when

forming enterprise groups.

5 Itinerant traders, petty village-based traders (bancas), kiosk owners in or nearby a village (barracas), and town

traders (lojas).



Market players and conflicts of interests in Mozambique

Market player


Interests at Stake

Conflict of Interests

Smallholder direct

producers wanting to sell

their products

Categories A, B and

C (less poor, middle

poor and poor)

Desire to maximize net profit from

sale of crops and to minimize

transaction costs; desire to minimize

prices paid for consumer goods

Crop buyers (lojas) look to buy crops

at as low a price as possible and to

sell consumer goods at the highest

price possible.

Asymmetric power: crop buyers are

able to dictate prices to producers.

Petty traders in agricultural

products, market stalls


Category B (middle


Possible loss of supply if produce

bought up at the farmgate by large

traders or taken to town

If farmers bulk produce and attract

outside buyers or hire transport to

town, petty traders will be bypassed.

Village-based farmerproducers

owning consumer

kiosks (barracas)

Category A

(less poor)

Desire to maximize net profit from

sale of crops and to minimize prices

paid to lojas for consumer goods they

sell in their shops

Insofar as they sell crops to

capitalize their enterprises, the

interests of barraca owners are

similar to those of farmers but

diametrically opposed to those of loja


Town-based traders involved

in crop buying and consumer

goods retailing (lojas)


Aim to make a profit on resale of

goods in the village (prices to

villagers cannot be too high or

turnover will suffer)

Desire to minimize prices paid to

producers and to maximize profits on

sale of consumer goods

Loja owners are more interested in

squeezing profits from existing

customers (crop sellers and

consumer goods buyers) than in

expanding their volume of business.

Unwilling to tie up much working

capital in crops

Desire to prevent barraca owners

from entering into crop trading in

competition with them

Agro-processing industries

(SODAM, etc.)


Fear that farmers to whom they have

advanced inputs could side-sell their

cotton to private traders or agents

for a competing cotton ginnery

Agro-industries’ interests could

conflict with those of private crop

buyers or competing ginneries.

According to this analysis, the direct producers, petty traders (bancas) and

consumer kiosk owners (barracas) share a common interest in maximizing profits

from the crop and livestock products they sell and in minimizing the cost of the

consumer goods they purchase on the market. These interests are in direct conflict

with the interests of town-based traders (lojas), who aim at maximizing their own


profits – even at the expense of the direct producers. On the basis of this analysis,

there is a strong justification for drawing a line between the three former categories

of produce sellers and the town-based traders. All three of the former are suitable

target groups for smallholder market linkage operations, while the town-based

traders are not.

Insights and Implications

There is no justification for blanket exclusion of less-poor villagers, as they are usually the main

sources of dynamism in the market and their incomes are well below the absolute poverty line of

USD 1 per person per day. However, in periurban areas such as Chongwe, service providers need to be

vigilant to ensure that enterprise groups are composed primarily of poor full-time farmers (such as

vegetable growers) rather than urban retirees or town-based produce traders who do not have the

overall good of the group – particularly the poorer members – in mind.



CLUSA in Mozambique – noting a possible conflict between the interests of farmers

and of traders – has a policy of not allowing traders to join their enterprise groups.

If traders were allowed to join, the enterprise groups could end up being dominated

by individuals whose interests might not coincide with those of farmers. In the

mission’s view, on the basis of interviews, it appears important to exclude townbased

retail store (loja) owners and produce buyers, but it would be difficult to

exclude the consumer kiosk (barraca) owners who live in the village, because most of

them are bona-fide farmers who are the main producers of crop surpluses. The

interests of the kiosk owners are the same as other farmers insofar as they also aim

at maximizing the selling price of their crops and minimizing the prices they pay to

lojas for consumer goods.

In Lunyerere village, Mpigi (Uganda), the team interviewed a villager who

combines smallholder farming with produce trading. In addition to selling his own

crops, he buys products such as coffee and ginger from other villagers and resells

them in Kampala for a profit. Insofar as his interest as a trader is to buy cheaply

from producers and to resell at a higher price, there might be a conflict of interest

if he were to join an enterprise group. However, in this case, roughly 90% of the

household’s earnings were from selling its own produce and only 10% was from

trading. Moreover, the main decision-maker for crop production was the wife –

because the husband was frequently absent on business trips. Although a case could

still be made for allowing the wife to join an enterprise group, in such cases, it would

be preferable to rely on the judgement of the villagers and the NGO service

provider regarding whether or not the trader and/or his wife should be a group




Targeting Issues




Should village-based crop

traders be allowed to join

enterprise groups?

No village-level crop buyers

were identified (consumer

shop owners do not want to

tie up their capital in crop


No village-level crop buyers

were identified (consumer

shop owners do not deal in

crops due to a shortage of

working capital; profits appear

relatively unattractive).

Some village-level crop traders

exist and their interests as

traders differ from their

interests as direct producers. Let

villagers and service providers

decide whether to let them join.

Should farm households with

small retail kiosks be allowed

to join enterprise groups?

The village consumer shop

owners who are also serious

market-oriented farmers

should be allowed to join.

Yes, since farming is the main

income source of all

interviewed kiosk owners.

Yes, if they have produce to sell

and are interested.

Should town-based traders

be allowed to join?

No, they should not be

allowed to join the groups. In

Chongwe, the town-based

traders already dominate the

FRA co-ops.

No, loja owners should not be

allowed to join the groups

because their interests

conflict with those of farmers.

No, because their interests

conflict with those of farmers.

Insights and Implications

Village-based consumer kiosk owners who market crops should be allowed to join the enterprise

groups because they share the same interests as other villagers, whereas town-based retail store

owners who buy farmers’ produce should not be allowed to join, since their interests can be directly

opposed to those of farmers.


In both Zambia and Mozambique, the main project beneficiaries are likely to be

those who have the greatest quantities of produce to market – mainly Category A

and Category B households. Category A is characterized as villagers who are “less

poor” by local standards but they are still “absolutely poor” by international criteria

and qualify as IFAD’s target group. In addition, the study revealed that insofar as

all households in Category C sell some produce to meet urgent cash needs (even if

they have a food deficit), they also have an interest in obtaining higher prices for the

products they sell and in paying less money for the consumer goods they buy. There

is a potential for increasing the participation in and benefit from the project by

Category C households (those able-bodied farming households classified as “very

poor”). Although the value of output sold by Category C is small, it is their main

source of cash so is critical.


In Zambia, the main market-related problem of Category C is related to price

seasonality and seasonal lumpiness of income. They have a serious cash flow

smoothing problem, which drives them to sell all their crops at harvest time when

the price is lowest just to be forced to buy back later when the price is six or seven

times higher. They would greatly benefit from a village-based “grain bank” where

they could store their maize, get cash up front for the value of that stored maize, and

sell it later when the price is higher to repay the loan.

In Mozambique, Category C also sells some crops and also stands to benefit from

efforts to obtain higher producer prices through joint action. They also face a cash

flow smoothing problem but price seasonality is less of an issue. The real issue seems

to be very low producer prices at any time of year due to the low-volume/highmargin

strategy of most traders and the very low bargaining power of the villagers.

The high transaction costs of selling aggravates the problem.

Targeting Issues




Possible entry points for

reaching the poor

1. Seasonality: use grain


2. Build on CLUSA HFS

groups that self target

the food insecure

1. Link informal groups

focused on food security

to market-oriented

service providers like

CLUSA (as with CARE

HFS groups in Nampula)


functional adult literacy

groups as an entry point

for enterprise-group


1. Link functional adult

literacy groups to market

linkage programmes

2. NGO service providers form

groups of poor smallholders

and help them request

assistance from NAADS,

Poverty Alleviation Fund

and Local Government

decentralization funds

Insights and Implications

It is important for market linkage projects to include Category C farmers (poorest segment of the

able-bodied poor) in their targeting. Even though the value of output sold is small, for them it is

critical as it is their main source of cash. Enterprise groups, which leverage improved producer prices

from outgrowing companies, and village-based grain banks in places with market seasonality and

large price differences are examples of initiatives that can be targeted to this segment of the rural




Market Linkage Programmes:

Gender and Poverty Focus in

Planning and M&E


The mission spent a considerable amount of time with the teams responsible for

managing IFAD-supported market linkage programmes/projects in the three

countries: the Smallholder Enterprise and Marketing Programme in Zambia

(SHEMP), the Agricultural Marketing Support Project in Mozambique (PAMA) and

the National Agricultural Advisory Services Programme in Uganda (NAADS). While

NAADS is not exclusively a market linkage project, per se, the institutional approach,

management processes and problems confronted are similar to those for the other

two projects. Working with the three teams allowed the mission to examine the

processes used to deal with gender and poverty targeting, to see the importance and

relevance of the market environment case study diagnostics in their operations and to

be able to put the comments and observations of the different stakeholders

interviewed by the mission into perspective in a practical/implementation context. In

this process, a number of observations and recommendations arose that are useful to

the three management teams and to the readers of the synthesis report in general.

These are recorded below for two of the key processes for these projects/programmes:

area-based/focal-area planning, and monitoring and evaluation.



The planning mechanisms of the IFAD-supported market linkage projects in all

three countries aim to put rural people – farmers, market intermediaries and the

NGOs that serve them – in the “driver’s seat”. The SHEMP programme is to be

driven by focal area resource groups (FARGs), and sub-focal area resource groups

(sub-FARGs) composed of persons representing the interests of farmers, market

intermediaries, business-oriented NGOs and, where applicable, agro-processors

such as outgrowing companies. A similar mechanism is envisaged for PAMA,

involving the establishment of GRAFs (Portuguese for FARGs) at the focal area and

sub-focal area level. In Uganda, NAADS is to be driven by a series of Farmers’ Fora

(FFs) to be established at the district and sub-county levels. In each case, there are

about 15 FARG or FF members, although the average population of a Ugandan subcounty

is smaller than that of a Zambian focal area. 6

The intentions of project designers were that the FARGs/GRAFs or FFs would be

broadly inclusive of all types of farmers – female and male, poor and less poor – as

well as a range of market intermediaries. However, intentions are not always easy to

translate into action. Country visits revealed the existence of major risks in the

6 A FARG in Zambia has been found to have about 90 000 households; if a typical village contains about 100 households,

implies that there are about 900 villages in the FARG catchment area, over 200 villages per sub-FARG. In comparison, in

Uganda each typical sub-county has some 60 villages with 100 households each and a parish has ten villages.


establishment of FARGs: (a) inappropriate persons could be selected to represent

farmers; (b) FARGs could be dominated by influential or simply better-educated

farmers, traders or NGO representatives, whose interests may be opposed to those

of the majority of the farmers; and (c) the process could be excessively dominated

by government officials. These risks are real, and represent in many ways the major

challenge for these programmes if they are to meet their stated goals.

In Zambia, in the first SHEMP focal area 7 , MoA staff facilitated the selection of the

participants for the original constitutive workshop, as well as being active participants

themselves. This was the first workshop in a series and is the one in which the process

for FARG selection was spelled out and the list of persons to be invited to the first

planning workshop was decided. Partly as a result of government influence, the

persons selected to represent the interests of smallholder farmers were often

progressive farmers, urban retirees and ex-NGO staff who were known to MoA

extension officers. This process resulted in the establishment of the sub-FARGs and

FARG in a less than truly representative way, in spite of the major effort by the

SHEMP team to achieve a balanced and fair representation. Three points need to be

made. Firstly, the SHEMP team and workshop participants decided that MoA staff

would not be members of the FARG or sub-FARGs but could be asked to contribute

in meetings as observers. This reduced government influence in sub-FARGs and

FARG decision-making. Secondly, procedures to bring women into the FARG and

sub-FARGs were successful and the portion of women members averages about 40%

(above the 30% minimum stipulated in the Focal Area Planning Process Manual).

Thirdly, the SHEMP team decided that in the two subsequent focal areas, it would

take a more active role in selecting workshop participants to ensure a better balance

and that the poorer members of the communities are adequately represented.

The lesson that can be drawn is that while MoA staff, especially extension officers,

can often be invaluable to the focal area planning team due to their knowledge of

the area and the stakeholders, it is essential that the process not be dominated by

them and that the farmers, traders and other stakeholders see it as their process and

the FARGs/GRAFs as their organizations. Thus, the decision in Zambia to exclude

government staff from being members of the sub-FARGs and FARG appears to be a

wise one. The Sourcebook provides guidance on how to ensure that FARGs and

Farmers’ Fora are as representative as possible of the interests of both women and

men in poor households.

The Experience in Zambia

The focal area planning process is more advanced in SHEMP than in PAMA. It has

already been launched in the first focal area and is starting in the second and third

areas. The process involves five main steps:

1) Identification of focal areas

2) Preparation for consultative workshops

3) Consultative workshops

4) Formulation of focal area action plans

5) Definition of roles and responsibilities for implementation and monitoring

7 The area immediately north of Lusaka, including parts of the following districts: Lusaka, Kafue, Chibombo,

Chongwe and Mumbwa.



Identification of focal areas involves two main activities: conceptual mapping and a

preliminary workshop. In SHEMP, in the conceptual mapping exercise, areas were

selected on the basis of the extent and value of surplus production, untapped

agricultural potential and ease of communications. Although neither gender nor

poverty were among the selection criteria, over 50% of Zambia’s poor are found in

the designated focal areas even though the areas only represent about one third of

the country’s population. The first planning workshop was MoA-driven. There was

token representation of women and farmers.

Preparations for consultative workshops did give attention to gender balance among

workshop participants and ensure a proper balance between three categories of

stakeholders – namely smallholder agricultural producers, traders and other actors

such as NGOs and donor projects. Targets were set for gender balance (at least 30%

female, preferably 50%; about 40% was achieved) and for stakeholder

representation (50% farmers, 30% traders, 20% other actors including NGOs).

The tasks of the consultative workshop include: (a) local priority setting and

(b) democratic election of FARG members in line with a set of criteria that include

quotas for gender balance and for representation of each stakeholder category. For

the former task, workshop participants split into smaller sub-focal area working

groups and used problem trees as a basis for priority setting. The SHEMP Focal

Area Planning Process Manual also calls for a second small group exercise in which

half of the participants do a problem analysis for a women’s crop or activity and the

other half do a problem analysis for a crop or activity controlled by men. This

exercise is intended to ensure that gender issues are adequately covered in priority

setting. However, its output is not linked directly to priority setting or the action

plan. Only the problem trees produced by the sub-FARGs during the initial exercise

feed into the action plan. For the FARG member election, the procedures give top

priority to meeting gender quotas.

The formulation of focal area action plans is to be done by FARG members during

their regular meetings (four meetings per year). Since NGO contractors for

enterprise group strengthening were only recently engaged, there as yet has not

been much thought about how the FARG and sub-FARG plans will interface with

village-level participatory planning as facilitated by the NGOs, such as those

responsible for formation/strengthening of enterprise groups (CLUSA and

Africare). There is no provision in the original programme design for a communitydriven

(as opposed to a FARG-driven) priority-setting process, and with as many as

900 villages in a focal area it is clear that planning on this level could only be done

in selected areas in conjunction with specific investment activities and by the NGOs

that are responsible for them. Nonetheless, the PRAs revealed that opportunities are

highly site-specific and the activities prioritized by farmers will often differ from

those prioritized by sub-county and district officials. As the NGO service providers

are likely to want to undertake their own community-level PRAs as a basis for

developing community or enterprise group action plans, it is most likely better to

leave it to them anyway.


The fifth step, roles and responsibilities, involves spelling out the reciprocal rights

and responsibilities of all actors in the implementation process: Programme

Coordinating Office (PCO), FARGs, NGO service providers, private contractors and

villagers. A start has already been made on this. Terms of reference for FARGs were

drawn up, debated and revised at a joint meeting of representatives of five sub-

FARGs. An example from Zambia is reproduced in the Sourcebook.

Gender and poverty targeting issues at each step in the process are summarized


Steps in the Focal Area Planning


1. Identification of Focal Areas

1.1 Conceptual mapping

1.2 Workshop

Gender Dimensions

Gender disaggregated data was not

considered in conceptual mapping

Gender balance among workshop

participants; women’s views/interests

are represented

Poverty Targeting Issues

Focal areas contain over 50% of Zambian

smallholders and over 50% of total poor


MoA, smallholders, traders and other

actors are proportionally represented;

interests of the poor are represented

2. Preparations for Consultative Workshops

2.1 Review of available focal area data

2.2 Division of focal areas into sub-focal


No explicit gender targeting is included

No explicit gender targeting is included

No explicit poverty targeting is included

Division was geographic: on the basis of

dominant farming systems, road networks

and location of markets – not poverty

2.3 Identifying important players at

grass-roots level in agricultural


▲ Primary stakeholders

(smallholder farmers)

▲ Secondary stakeholders

▲ Other local actors

2.4 Criteria for selecting workshop


Under the heading of primary

stakeholders, the Focal Area Planning

Process (FAPP) manual calls for

representation of five categories of

smallholder farmers, one of which is

characterized as “female farmers”

subdivided into three sub-groups:

married female farmers, divorced/

widowed and those never married

The manual calls for representation of

three women’s groups and two femaleheaded

households among the 15

primary stakeholders

Representation of the point of view of poor

small farmers is not explicitly considered.

Five categories of farmers are to be

represented: farmers growing traditional

cash crops, farmers growing emergent

cash crops, farmers growing traditional

food crops that are entering the market,

livestock producers and female farmers

The manual calls for 50% primary

stakeholders (smallholder farmers); 30%

secondary stakeholders (input suppliers,

produce buyers, outgrowers) and 20%

other actors (NGOs, MoA, local

government); no explicit poverty targeting



3. Consultative Workshops

3.1 Identification of key issues using

problem tree at sub-focal-area level

3.2 Synthesis of key issues – sub-focal

areas to focal areas

3.3 Identification of intervention


3.4 Criteria for selection of sub-FARG

and FARG members

Election of members

4. Formulation of Focal Area Action Plans

4.1 Roles and responsibilities of FARGs

and sub-FARGs

Problems and priorities are not

determined separately for men and


Gender is not explicitly considered

Gender is not explicitly considered

but women participate fully in the

decision making

Minimum is 30% female, with the ideal of


Female representatives are elected first

FARG and sub-FARG members are to

represent interests of all stakeholders

No explicit effort is made to differentiate

problems of poor versus less poor


Poverty targeting is not considered

There is no “pro-poor” approach applied, but

the strategies are intended to be inclusive

of different segments of the population




The Process in Mozambique

The focal area planning process in PAMA is in the latter planning stages, with a

strategy being currently elaborated and debated. When comparing the approach to

focal areas in PAMA with the approach to those in SHEMP (recently visited by

members of the PAMA team), a number of points of difference arose.

SHEMP requires that the FARGs be gender balanced – this is not currently a

requirement of the PAMA GRAFs. However, it could be included as one of the

criteria/guidelines for selection when the LONAT does the detailed planning for

GRAF selection.

Again, regarding the membership of the GRAFs, there is a question of

participation of poorer segments of society in the GRAF and in project decisionmaking.

PAMA decided not to aim for the “ideal” membership of the GRAF right

from the beginning. Instead, it decided to establish a provisional group, selected

by the PAMA management team (in consultation with officials and stakeholders

in the area) so as to be able to initiate the focal area planning and, subsequently,

the implementation process with minimal delay (in Zambia, it was over one year

before the first investment activities took place in the focal area 8 ). Later, when

8 Substantial delays in procurement of NGO services accounted for an important part of the delay.


the dynamics and roles of different interest groups and persons are better

known, a fully participatory process is to be undertaken to select the members of

the FARG (and sub-FARGs). While this was acknowledged as a practical

approach, it was pointed out that a lot of the key decisions would be made

during the first year on how the project would operate in the first focal areas –

including the selection of priority activities and signing of contracts with service

providers to implement activities over a number of years.

Instead of adopting the approach SHEMP employed – to involve the service

providers only after the main planning for the focal areas had been completed –

the PAMA team proposes that it start the identification of potential service

providers for each of the key activities right away (by advertising for an

expression of interest), prior to the completion of the focal area planning

process. This way the most suitable service providers can become involved in the

process at an early stage, when they can contribute to the formulation and

detailed planning of activities. As it is often the service providers themselves that

best understand the activities and how they should be implemented, bringing

them in early could result in considerable advantages to the project.

One of the key constraints for SHEMP in facilitating the implementation of the

focal area process and, in particular, the recruitment of NGOs to provide the

services identified has be the extremely lengthy procurement process. PAMA

should avoid such a cumbersome procurement process, as the government

procedures in Mozambique impose few strictures on projects. This will allow

considerably greater flexibility in the type and size/length of contracts that the

project can enter into with service providers.

One of the very positive elements of the management of the focal area process in

SHEMP has been the regular flow of information to the FARG and sub-FARG

members and the consultative process employed to keep them involved in the

planning and decision-making process. While this might be more difficult in

Mozambique because of the distances and difficulties of travel, PAMA does have

the advantage of provincial facilitation units. Nevertheless, it is advised that

PAMA build in a similar process to keep the interest and ensure the active

participation of the GRAF members in the project.

Regarding the inclusion of gender and poverty targeting in the focal area planning

process, two things were proposed. First, it was proposed that the use of PRAs

similar to those carried out during the current mission could be a valuable addition

to the focal planning process and could give the PAMA team the possibility to plan

more effectively for gender and poverty targeting. Secondly, the NGO service

providers that are to be contracted with SHEMP will be required to include in

their programmes – as stipulated in their contracts – approaches to gender

mainstreaming and poverty targeting that have been agreed with the SHEMP PCO.



The Experience of NAADS in Uganda

Although the Government’s Programme for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) is

intended to be among the main vehicles for implementation of the Poverty

Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), modalities for targeting the poor have not yet been

worked out. PMA has three main prongs: (1) farmer-driven agricultural advisory

services, (2) farmer-responsive agricultural research, and (3) agro-processing and

marketing. The national agricultural advisory services programme has been under

pilot implementation for over a year (through NAADS) and the national agricultural

research programme is commencing, whereas the third prong – the programme for

agro-industry and marketing – is lagging behind the others.

Although both NAADS and the research programme are intended to contribute to

poverty reduction, given PMA’s concern with transforming subsistence farming into

profitable commercial enterprises, there is a risk that subsistence farmers could be

neglected if the priority-setting process for both NAADS and the research

programme is driven mainly by the emergent commercial farmers. It is not selfevident

that – in the absence of any targeting – privatized and outsourced advisory

services and research will result in broad-based, inclusive, pro-poor agricultural


NAADS is seeking to transform a former, conventional message-based, public-sector

extension system into a privately-financed, commercially-sound, farmer-driven

advisory system. This is to be achieved by establishing a local Farmers’ Fora on two

administrative levels – sub-county and district – as a basis for priority setting and for

outsourcing of advisory services to private contractors. Each sub-county Farmers’

Forum is to have up to 15 farmer representatives. Correct selection of farmer

representatives is crucial to ensure that the interests of poor smallholders and

women are adequately represented.

The appraisal foresaw that those farmer representatives who would participate on

the Farmers’ Fora would be elected by and be spokespersons for grass-roots level

farmers’ associations, and that a minimum of 30% of the farmer representatives

would be females. However, during a two-year pilot or “trailblazing” phase,

different working arrangements were to be tested, among which: “options for

forming Farmers’ Fora” and “mechanisms and tools to ensure inclusion of the poor,

women and other vulnerable groups”. After assessing the situation in the six pilot

districts, taking inventory of existing farmers’ groups and having come to the

conclusion that “no suitably-constituted farmers’ groups could be found”, it was

decided that during an interim period it would not be possible to follow the

proposed system of electing farmer representatives from farmers’ groups. It was

thus deemed necessary to constitute “interim sub-county farmers’ fora” that will be

made up of one male farmer and one female farmer from each parish in the subcounty.

Clearly, this experience needs to be assessed to ascertain whether poor

households’ views will be adequately reflected. Even if 50% of the FF members are

female, the views of elite women – and for that matter, elite men – do not necessarily

coincide with those of poor women and poor men.


In the three case study sites, the number of farmers’ groups engaged in economic

activities ranged from a low of three to a high of seven. The challenge would be to

develop a set of criteria to select 15 representative groups from among over say 100

such groups in a typical sub-county. NAADS is planning a series of parish-wide or

sub-county-wide federations of grass-roots farmers’ groups. Surprisingly, in NAADS

pilot districts such as Hoima and Kibaale, the people responsible for organizing the

sub-county Farmers’ Fora seemed unaware that sub-county-level federations of

farmers’ groups have already been established for savings and credit under the

IFAD-supported DDSP and its predecessor. It was reported at NAADS headquarters

in Kampala that some farmers’ groups are trying to federate themselves into higherlevel

associations expressly to get access to NAADS financing. It would be important

for NAADS to ensure that farmers’ group formation/federation is not driven

exclusively by expediency. In addition to the experience in Uganda with, for

example, IFAD-supported women’s savings and credit groups, UWESO Clusters

and the Sasakawa Global 2000 farmers’ associations, CLUSA’s experience in

Mozambique might provide an interesting model for federating primary farmers’

enterprise groups into a higher-level association (forum).

Under NAADS, each sub-county Farmers’ Forum is expected to select three

products or enterprises as the sub-county’s priorities for future development and

commercialization. Extension contracts are to be focused on the priority enterprises.

However, the PRAs highlight the need for caution, on two grounds: (1) the crops

and enterprises selected by the district agricultural officer, local council chairman

and National Farmers’ Association as their top priority are often high-risk crops that

are at the very bottom of the villagers’ list of priorities; and (2) if all extension advice

were to be limited to only the top three enterprises, selected by the Farmers’ Fora, it is

likely that the women’s priority crops and those of poor men would not be included

among the top three. This would be tantamount to cutting off advisory services to

the majority of the farming population. In other countries, where experimentation

with farmer-driven extension services is also underway, any community-based

common interest group with a minimum of about ten members can qualify to

receive extension advice without arbitrarily imposing an upper limit on the number

of different types enterprises that are eligible for support. The top eight enterprises

for Lunyerere – cooking bananas (matoke), tomatoes, sugar cane, ginger, beans, pigs,

milk cattle and chickens, may not sound very exciting to agricultural planners but

they may be of more relevance to poor smallholders than the more exotic and

higher-risk crops.



Insights and Implications

Although the intentions of project designers were that the FARGs/GRAFs or FFs would be broadly

inclusive and representative of all types of farmers – female and male, poor and less poor – putting

the principle into practice is difficult. A concern of SHEMP and PAMA is that agricultural officers

are obvious participants in the planning process and are often the leaders in rural areas; therefore

they naturally see themselves taking a leading role. However, it is this often unconscious domination

that can compromise the process and alienate the private sector. The process of selecting people to

be representative of a large number of other people in a rural society, most of whom do not know each

other, is in itself challenging. Furthermore, once selected, their ability to represent their

constituency is also challenging, in social as well as logistical terms. If these aspects are not

carefully handled, there is a risk that: (a) inappropriate persons could be selected to represent

farmers; (b) the women who are elected as members of these groups might not be active or could be

sidelined; or (c) the FARGs could be dominated by wealthy/”less poor” farmers, government officials,

or even in some cases town-based traders or local agro-processors.

The lesson from SHEMP is that while MoA staff, especially extension officers, can often be invaluable

to the focal area planning team due to their knowledge of the area and the stakeholders, it is

essential that the process not be dominated by them and that the farmers, traders and other

stakeholders see it as their process and the FARGs/GRAFs as their organizations. Thus, the

decision in Zambia to exclude government staff from being members of the sub-FARGs and FARG

appears to be wise.

For NAADS, the context is different. While the private sector is certainly a player, the government

manages the process. Nevertheless, the responsibility for setting priorities and for decision-making

is intended to be in the hands of the farmers – a representative cross-section of farmers (to include

“gender, youth and people-with-disabilities considerations”) – with the Farmers’ Fora being the

mechanism to facilitate it. This is why constituting these Farmers Fora is so critical for the success

of NAADS. Not until NAADS has succeeded in forming fora that truly represent the interests and

priorities of the majority of the people in the communities – Category B and C social strata – can

the project clearly be successful. While the current interim process will satisfy politicians and get

the budgeted funds moving (also important), it will not create the essential foundation upon which

a new farmer-driven advisory service can be built.

Another point regarding NAADS: the PRAs carried out by the team clearly indicated that the crops

and enterprises selected by the district agricultural officers, the L.C. (local council) chairmen and

National Farmers’ Association as their top priority are often high risk crops that are at the very

bottom of the villagers’ list of priorities. This disconnect is very dangerous as it could compromise

the farmers’ prioritization process, in which they select their three most important enterprises. It

is only if the Farmers’ Fora are strong, independent and representative of a cross-section of the

farmers that the provision of extension advice will meet the farmers’ needs. At the moment, in this

interim phase, there is a risk that the enterprises selected will not be those that would be assigned

priority by poor women and men. This would be tantamount to cutting off advice to the majority of

the farming population for the crops that they grow and sell the most.



In SHEMP and PAMA, the main responsibility for monitoring gender and poverty

targeting is likely to rest with the service providers. The NGO contractors such as

CLUSA, CARE and Africare will be expected to compile data on numbers of men

and women supported through enterprise group development and other activities.

FARG and sub-FARG members are also to be involved in the monitoring of

women’s participation. However, the PCOs need to have an independent capacity

to check the figures provided by the service providers and to undertake ad-hoc

impact studies to document and assess unfolding outcomes. Given IFAD’s

commitment to gender and poverty targeting, PCOs will need consultants to assist

them to improve the gender and poverty focus of monitoring and evaluation


The M&E system in Zambia’s SHEMP programme has already been defined and a

draft manual prepared, whereas the M&E system for the PAMA programme in

Mozambique is still being designed. The two PCOs are supported by the same M&E

consultant, which should result in similar M&E designs. The Zambia team has

given most of its thought – to date – to gender disaggregation of workshop

participants, FARG and sub-FARG members, enterprise group membership, and

participation in training and capacity-building activities. Monitoring of poverty

targeting performance has received less attention. The SHEMP team recognizes

the need for a baseline and for ad hoc studies for impact assessment but has not yet

designed any such studies.

The Mozambique team intends to rely less on reporting of numbers of male and

female participants in programme activities and puts more emphasis on baseline

surveys and ad hoc impact-assessment studies than the Zambia team. PAMA wants

to have the capacity to assess the performance of service providers on its own. It

might consider outsourcing impact assessments to independent consulting firms.

Currently, the M&E systems in place at the level of the NGO service providers

such as CLUSA only allow for a rough assessment of what is happening to total

group membership, commodity sales and producer incomes. They are useful for

tracking changes in numbers of enterprise group members (male and female),

total sales value and average sales per producer but are not disaggregated enough

to allow management to assess how benefits are distributed between socioeconomic


NAADS in Uganda will rely heavily on local government and contracted service

providers for monitoring project performance. It will also depend on the

communities themselves to monitor and evaluate the performance of the service

providers who will be delivering the extension advice. It is planned that “at least

half of the M&E teams will be drawn from the communities”. This is an approach

SHEMP and PAMA could consider as a complement to the monitoring activities of

the FARGs and sub-FARGs, which will most likely be severely stretched to meet

their M&E responsibilities.



NAADS project implementation manuals call for a common monitoring and

reporting system that disaggregates participants in extension and training activities

by sex at sub-county and district level. Systems for assessing the programme’s

impact on poverty and gender equality are still being worked out (a donor-led

review of poverty targeting under the pilot phase was under way during the

mission’s visit). Guidelines have already been prepared to assist local government to

assess the gender-disaggregated impact of sectoral allocations under the annual

work plan and budgets. Funds are in place to train local government to use the

guidelines. A multi-sectoral national poverty monitoring system is also in place

under the guidance of the Ministry of Finance, involving a set of key indicators from

secondary data sources, complemented by periodic quantitative household

consumption surveys and by participatory poverty assessments.

The Baseline Surveys

SHEMP calls for baseline data on three levels:

▲ Focal-area or sub-focal-area level information (secondary data),

▲ Village-level information (PRAs)

▲ Enterprise-group-level information (PRAs)

Village-level baseline. When a service provider starts to work in a particular village,

SHEMP foresees it conducting a baseline survey using participatory techniques. In

the mission’s view, it is essential to have a baseline on the following items in the

“without programme” situation to permit comparison of changes in the “with

programme” situation.

Village-Level Gender Baseline

1. Main income sources of men and women

2. Main expenditure items of men and women

3. Access and control of resources by men

and women

4. Gender roles in marketing and control of income

5. Market-related problems and priorities

Village-Level Socio-economic Baseline

1. Wealth ranking: “without programme”

2. Ranking of top five marketed products

3. Prices of top five marketed products at harvest and peak

time, in village and in main market

4. Per cent of HHs selling the top five products (average year)

5. Per cent of HHs using purchased fertilizer on maize

6. Per cent of HHs using purchased maize seeds

For a socio-economic baseline, it is essential to have a “without programme” wealth

ranking as a basis for assessing the programme’s impact on poverty. It is also useful

to have a baseline on what crops are marketed, where and at what price. For areas

covered by rural input supply agent programmes, a baseline on pre-programme

input use and sources will also be necessary.

Group-level baseline. As a minimum, for each enterprise group entering the

programme, information should be recorded on numbers of members (separate

totals for males and females) and updated annually. A socio-economic baseline on


group membership by wealth category is strongly recommended to make it possible

to monitor whether the programme is reaching only the best-endowed households

(Category A, less poor) or is reaching (Category B and C, middle poor and poor but

able-bodied). This can be done using the wealth-ranking and card-sorting

techniques outlined in the Sourcebook.

Group Level - Gender Baseline

1. Group members (male, female)

2. Group leaders (male, female)

Group Level - Socio-economic Baseline

1. Group members by wealth category (A, B, C, D)

2. Female-headed households by wealth category

Monitoring Gender- and Poverty-Targeting Performance

Monitoring programme performance with regard to gender mainstreaming is

relatively straightforward. All service providers should be required to record – on

their periodic reporting forms – separate totals for male and female participants in

planning workshops, FARGs and sub-FARGs, enterprise groups, project-related

training, and capacity-building activities.

Poverty targeting is likely to require ad hoc surveys (it is not so straightforward to

count numbers of Category A, B C and D households as it is to count males and

females). One option for monitoring the programme’s outreach to the poor would

be to require NGO service providers to prepare baseline information on enterprise

group composition by socio-economic category (A, B, C and D) for new groups

entering the programme. It would be important – for impact assessment purposes

– to keep this information disaggregated on a group-by-group basis. Once a year,

the service provider could fill in a form reporting total numbers of households in A,

B and C at the end of the previous year. Or an ad-hoc survey – using card sorting

coupled with wealth ranking – could be undertaken on a sub-sample of enterprise

groups to assess how many members had moved up from Category C to B or from

B to A and vice versa during the previous year, and how many of the changes were

perceived to be attributable to the project.

Impact Assessment

For impact assessment, market linkage programmes will need to rely heavily on ad

hoc studies and surveys to compare the baseline (“without project”) situation to the

“with project” situation. Although baseline information on gender and socioeconomic

composition might be gathered for all enterprise groups at the time they

entered the programme, the ad hoc surveys would only cover a smaller proportion

of total enterprise groups. Some modules for rapid, participatory impact assessment

have been developed for use in other IFAD projects and are presented in the




Closing Statement 7

As is apparent, the current assignment has generated a wealth of information, only

a small part of which is incorporated in this Synthesis Report. It has concentrated

on ideas, insights and lessons learned from the discussions and interviews but

particularly on the information coming out of the market environment case studies.

The ‘Sourcebook’, which is intended as a companion document to the Synthesis

Report, provides ideas and recommendations for the design and implementation

of market linkage projects. It is structured around the processes that make up the

project design cycle (as presented in the IFAD Key File) and processes involved in

implementing such a project. It also contains practical tools and techniques that can

be used by project design and implementation teams. The ‘Toolkit for Practioners’

is a practical guide on how to undertake participatory gender and market linkage

diagnostic studies, multi-stakeholder workshops and impact assessments.

The team also produced two country status reports. These were “work in progress”

documents it shared with the people in each country and, in particular, with the

IFAD-supported project management teams. Working sessions were held with the

SHEMP and PAMA teams at the end of the first two country visits in order to

discuss the observations and findings coming out of the fieldwork and any

suggestions that the mission had for introducing new ideas or processes into the

two projects. While the main focus was on gender and poverty targeting, ideas

linked to marketing and market-support activities were also presented and the

implications discussed.

The authors are well aware that the observations, ideas and suggestions proposed

in this report and the market environment case studies, on which much of it is

based, are drawn from investigations in a limited sample of sites over a short period

of time. As such, they do not pretend to represent the universe of market

environments in the region. However, even though the particular contents of each

case are site specific, the techniques used to gather the information and the targeting

procedures are applicable beyond the specific sites for which they were developed.

Moreover, insofar as the case studies revealed that sites with similar market

environments – such as peri-urban or cotton-growing areas – face similar problems,

study findings are likely to be relevant to other sites in the region having similar

market environments. Market linkage programmes might want to reflect on how

they could develop specific strategies for dealing with gender and poverty targeting

problems in different types of market environments.


From among the findings and insights coming out of the assignment, the following

are particularly pertinent:

▲ Gender and poverty dimensions, and managing them, within a

project/programme framework are so different from place to place and

society to society that it is dangerous to extrapolate from one country to

another or one project to another. There is no “quick fix” or “one size fits all”

recipe for gender mainstreaming in market linkage operations. The issues on

the ground vary from place to place and so do the solutions. What appears to

be the best practice for Zambia may not be appropriate for Uganda or for

northern Mozambique.

▲ Because of site specificity, the teams responsible for project design and

implementation need to undertake the type of investigations that have been

piloted through the gender and market environment diagnostics in the three

countries. Such participatory techniques, if managed by experienced experts,

allow considerable information to be gathered in a relatively short time. The

consultation with farmers will often bring out key insights that can confront

established norms and foster critical ideas that can sometimes make a major

difference in project design and execution.

▲ In designing projects, it will generally not be possible to find the perfect

solutions to gender and poverty targeting – at least not up front. It is more

important for project designers to identify the gender and poverty related

issues and factors that could affect the implementation of the proposed market

linkage project; make sure the project concept provides a framework that

enables the project management/coordination team to deal effectively with

problems as they arise; and ensure that sufficient human and budgetary

resources are available to implement the solutions developed. If the project is

flexible enough in its technical and financial design, it can address gender

issues as they become apparent during implementation, as long as the

management team members have their eyes open and understand how to

approach these issues.

▲ For this reason, each project team needs to build its own capacity to deal with

gender and poverty targeting issues. They need to be able to:

▲ spot gender and poverty targeting issues relevant to their projects and

the activities within the projects;

▲ ensure that service providers deal with them;

▲ track what is happening on the ground to poor women and men as a

result of project actions;

▲ learn from ongoing experience; and

▲ adjust project activities continually to improve the participation of poor

women and men.

▲ Gender and poverty within a market linkage environment often appear to

those involved – particularly the private sector players – as irrelevant. What

the study has shown is that, rather than being irrelevant, in certain situations

a good knowledge of the gender dimensions, and especially the difference in



the constraints that women and men face in their societies, can make a

difference in how efficiently the private sector operator can manage his or her

business, how an NGO implements a market linkage programme, or how well

government agencies handle development initiative or the framing of policies

and legislation.

▲ Government and donors expect smallholder agricultural commercialization

to make a significant contribution to poverty reduction. However, it is not selfevident

that – in the absence of any targeting – privatized and outsourced

advisory services and research will result in broad-based, inclusive, pro-poor

agricultural modernization. Therefore, it is all the more important to put in

place a system capable of tracking what is happening to poor women and men

as the project unfolds. It is equally important to equip project coordination

teams to use this information to make informed decisions on gender and

poverty targeting issues.



Appendix – Supplementary Tables

Comparison of Wealth Ranking Criteria – Housing




house with

iron roof

Brick house +

iron roof

Mud house +

iron roof

Mud house +

thatched roof

No house






















B, C












B, C




Synthesis of Wealth Ranking Criteria Across Eight Sites

Brick house with iron sheet roof

Mud house Mud house – thatched roof

Vehicle Motorcycle Bicycle

with iron roof +

Bicycle No bicycle


Mpigi A

Hoima A

Mpigi B

Chiure A

Hoima B

Metuge A

Chongwe A

Apac A

Metuge B

Chiure B

Metuge C

Chiure C

Chongwe B

Mazabuka B

Mpongwe B

Mazabuka C

Mpongwe C

Apac C

Chongwe C

No house,

no land

no bicycle

Mpigi D

Hoima D

Apac D


Price Differences by Season and Location

in Kwatcha – Kanyenda [Mpongwe], Zambia

Item marketed


Price in village

Harvest Peak

Price in Town

Harvest Peak

Price Seasonality

Village Town

Village to Town

Harvest Peak




Tomato – rainfed

Sweet potato

Tomato – irrig.








50- kg bag

50- kg bag

50 kg

18 kg box

25 kg

18 kg box

50 kg

20 litre tin

50 kg

50 kg






























15000 90000

15000 90000

2000 10000

2000 10000

10000 15000

8000 12000

20000 25000

2000 2500

20000 25000

Not sold

10000 10000

45000 45000

20000 20000





















































Price Differences by Season and Location in Meticais – Metuge, Mozambique

Item marketed


Price in village

Harvest Peak

Price Outside

Harvest Peak

Price Seasonality

Village Outside

Village to Mazabuka

Harvest Peak







Cashew nuts




30-kg box

1 kg

50 kg bag

20 kg tin

20 kg tin

50-kg bag

1 kg

50 kg bag



























Not sold


Not sold



Not sold










Not sold











































Price Difference of Maize by Season, Location and Country

Case Study Site

Location of Town


Price/kg in Village (US$)



Price/kg in Town (US$)









Ocua [Chiure]

























Not sold











Comparison of Commodity Prices in USD – from PRAs in Eight Sites








Cashew nut












Sugar cane


Sweet potato








































Similar prices between Uganda and Zambia

Similar village prices; Pemba price is similar to Lusaka

Prices similar except for 1 site in Zambia [direct sale to a hospital]

Mozambique: town price is identical but village price is variable

Kampala & Lusaka bulk prices for dry cassava lower than rural price

Similar in Zambia and Uganda

Non-seasonal; high prices in Lusaka, low in Pemba;

Identical for 3 sites [Ocua/Chiure price is net of input cost]

Higher in peri-urban areas [Chongwe, Mpigi]; low elsewhere

Seed best, Namapa good, Lusaka okay at peak, Mpongwe worst

Prices are lower in Uganda, even at harvest time

Cheaper in Kampala than Lusaka

Cheaper in Lusaka at glut but higher at peak than Luanshya

Price in Apac is double that of Ocua/Chiure

Higher in Chongwe because sold to brewers

Cheaper by the truckload in Lusaka than in Kampala

Same price in Zambia and Uganda

Major differences between sites and countries

Many similarities, but prices are higher in Pemba than elsewhere


Summary of Enterprise Trends - Zambia



Profit trend






























Sharp rise


Major rise


Sharp rise


Major rise

Sharp rise




Low increase

Low decrease

Sharp decline

Demand high but prices and profits low due to perishability

Corridor disease [few households still have cattle]

High demand; do not require feed

High demand; do not require feed

High demand; do not require feed

High demand; do not require feed

Doesn’t need fertiliser; cost of inputs low – profit high

Doesn’t need fertiliser, low input cost, high profits

Production & profit are decreasing due to high input cost

Production decreasing [excessive rain, high input cost, late fertiliser

delivery and death of oxen [corridor disease],

Rising input costs; unavailability of fertiliser; dry, erratic weather;

reduced area planted due to shortage of oxen

Production decreasing due to high price of inputs

Profit declining because input prices are increasing

Profit declining because input prices are increasing

Summary of Enterprise Trends – Mozambique


Chiure district

Ocua village

Metuge district

25 Junho village






Cashew nut





price and profit decreasing;

demand increasing

price, market and profit


price and profit decreasing

price, market and profit


price, market and profit


price, market and profit


[no rice]



decreasing price and

profitability, moderate


price, market and profit


[no cotton]

[no sesame]

[not an important crop]

price, market and profit


price, market and profit


new crop: market and

profit increasing

new crop: market and

profit increasing

Profit decreasing due to high cost of inputs; price

and sales increasing due to famine in Southern Africa

Supply and demand are highly localised with wide

inter-annual fluctuations

High cost of inputs erodes profits; low world price

Highly specialised local demand

[Indian traders purchase]

Slight recovery after very low prices

Supply and demand are highly localised with wide

inter-annual swings

High consumer demand; many buyers; rising prices

and profits

High demand; many buyers; quick profits

High demand; easy to grow; easy to sell



Enterprise Trends – Uganda








Cooking banana





Sugar cane


Sweet potato



Increasing but erratic

Increasing profitability

Sharp decline

Profits increasing


Profits increasing

Moderate decline [glut]


Profits increasing


Hard to sell

No tobacco

Erratic price fluctuation

Increasing but erratic

Increasing profitability

Sharp decline

Profits increasing



Sharp decline [glut]




Increasing demand

Increasing profitability


Increasing but erratic

Increasing demand



Sharp decline


Sharp decline [glut]

Declining since 1997


Increasing profit




Household Food Self-sufficiency – Synthesis of Eight Case Study Sites

Food Self-sufficiency (months)




Average Food self-sufficiency (months)




Site 1 [Mazabuka, Ocua, Mpigi]

Site 2 [Chongwe, Metuge, Hoima]

Site 3 [Mpongwe, Apac]










Category A – less poor

Category B – middle poor

Category C – poor

Category D – extreme poor




[no category D]




[no category D]





Female-headed Households

Male-headed Households








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