engaging fragile states - Woodrow Wilson International Center for ...

sophisticated tool that is expected to manage responses to crisis situations, but it
has yet to be put into practice.
The second main obstacle is the imbalance of resources between DOD and
civilian agencies. The military has been seeking civilian partnerships to help plan
engagement strategies for stabilization operations, but these efforts have been
limited due to the severe resource constraints of civilian agencies. Consequently,
in order to support Department of State programs in security, reconstruction or
stabilization, Section 1207 of the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act
authorized the Secretary of Defense to support the transfer of up to $100 million
per year for two years for these purposes. It was renewed for an additional
$100 million in 2008. Until Congress recognizes that different legal and funding
mechanisms are a necessity for civilian capacities to have a robust enough capability
to engage in failed and fragile states, the advancement of US national interests
will continue to be hindered. Though progress is being made, Congress and its
committee structures continue to affect the development of S/CRS, which has
suffered from anemic financing. It was not until fiscal year 2009 that $250 million
were proposed to expand the CRC and create the reserve unit. Through two
supplemental appropriations, Congress has only provided about half that amount.
The only project money for S/CRS during this time came from the DOD of about
$100 million per year via the “1207” funds. In the view of many, Congress still
brings a Cold War mentality to matters of how the United States should approach
national security. Thus, Congress has not recognized that dramatically increasing
funding to USAID is possibly as relevant to protecting US security interests as
is promoting missile defense or building additional aircraft carrier battle groups.
This outlook needs to change if the US executive architecture is going to be restructured
to make its civilian agencies equivalent partners with the assets and
resources of the DOD.
A related problem is the continued tendency to militarize US foreign policy.
In recent history, the number of successful US stabilization and reconstruction
operations has been relatively weak, most often when the responsibility of formulating
them lies heavily in hands of US military forces. During the Bush administration,
the State Department developed a blueprint for reconstruction in
Iraq that was intended for use after the invasion. Even though it was never used,
the conceptual framework that the blueprint stemmed from provides insight into
the perspective of many who work in the agencies of the US government. The
US Army's Sustainable Range Program (SRP) was seen as a main source of funding
for immediate stabilization within Iraq. The SRP is a purely military delivery
capability with virtually no formal role for US diplomatic institutions to play,
yet it continues to be a rapidly growing source of funding for stabilization activi-
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