engaging fragile states - Woodrow Wilson International Center for ...

window of opportunity to achieve post-conflict peace could close.
In some situations, the mediator may have considerable leverage over the structure
or substance of the agreement. This is afforded most dramatically when the
previous state structure has been destroyed, as happened in Iraq. But leverage can
exist far short of that. If the mediator has sufficient leverage to hold the structure
or the substance, the opportunity exists to give the country’s citizens a chance to
take the structure into their own hands. A tactical question the mediator must
address is whether to bring the extremists into the talks, as they could prevent any
kind of agreement. It will never be known, for example, what would have happened
in Rwanda in 1993-4 if the Hutu CDR extremists had been brought into
the Arusha talks.
In other cases, such as Sri Lanka, the mediator may not have sufficient leverage
vis-à-vis the warring parties to hold that structure in his or her hands. In this
circumstance, there is little the mediator can do. Either he or she is invited in or
alternately, takes the initiative and has enough leverage. In any case, the present
structure of international relations means that third party mediators from international
organizations or mediator states are expected to deal with their counterparts,
which are the leaders of the state. In state-to-state relations, the mediator does not put
people in power, but deals with the people who are in power. Even though this grants
the mediator an opportunity to develop good relations with the country to which he or
she is accredited, this “diplomacy as usual” approach can create problems.
Second, in Zartman’s words, "the mediator can set the machine running and
turn the crank, but it has to go by itself down the road." If instead, various crutches
are written into the agreement, such as providing for the mediator to always be involved
afterwards, this can become habit-forming. The country will never be left
on its own to learn to deal with its own conflicts and never develop the capacity to
handle its own problems.
Third, notwithstanding the need to let the country go on its own, one can still
utilize diplomatic tools, such as applying carrots and sticks, to keep the machine
somewhat on track and for developing its capacity and effectiveness. Capacity and
effectiveness are the keys to state building. A state whose capacity and effectiveness
is well-anchored is a state that is responsive to its people by being participatory
and accountable. In that sense, the crux of the problem is to listen to the needs
and requirements of the people, as well as to the requirements of peace and conflict
resolution. In regard to Iraq, it has been argued that the US has not failed
to provide for a democratic society; there is more democracy there than existed
before. However, the US did not provide services from the very beginning, did
not buttress the new government so it could be effective, did not provide for disarmament,
demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR), and did not
develop local organizations.
Responding to Fragile States: Lessons From Recent Experience | 53