Chapter 5 — Maritime Logistics and Support

RFA WAVE KNIGHT refuels the Type 23 frigate HMS SUTHERLAND

5 

Maritime Logistics 

and Support 

The purpose of logistic support is to ensure the provision, sustainment 

and recovery of forces, thus enabling the maintenance of combat capability 

and allowing the operational commander to deploy forces at the time and 

place of his choosing. Logistic support includes medical and repair 

facilities, movement of personnel, and the transport of the fuel, lubricants, 

ordnance, spare parts, food and other provisions, and the many stores 

required for missions. The sea will remain the principal transport medium 

for large, heavy and bulky items. Ships are, therefore, important joint 

logistics assets. The availability of shipping and the ability to transfer ashore 

may ultimately govern whether, where and when military operations can 

take place. However, the use of sea lines of communications to a campaign 

may be considered a critical vulnerability, and shipping may require 

protection, increasingly so against the threat of asymmetric attack. 

Similarly, at the tactical level, a formation’s organic logistic shipping will 

invariably be essential to its mission and thus require special effort to be 

devoted to its protection. 

The ability of ships to carry and transfer stores and fuel allows maritime 

forces to conduct self-sustained operations at considerable distances from 

fixed bases with little or no Host Nation Support (HNS) required. Indeed the 

sailor is so used to the level of organic logistics support that is provided 

routinely in a ship and its tactical formation that logistic considerations are 

intrinsic to maritime doctrine. For the operational commander, maritime 

93

BRITISH MARITIME DOCTRINE / THIRD EDITION 

and land logistics are not conceptually dissimilar, because the ability to use 

lines of communications along which a maritime force is consolidated, is 

comparable with tasks relating to seaborne support of land operations and 

to land lines of communications. In any event, logistic support is a 

fundamental activity in which resources and facilities must be pooled and 

focused to sustain a joint campaign in all its phases and environments. It is 

a tenet of joint doctrine that administrative services of common usage in 

the three Services can be provided by one Service for the use of others. At 

the operational level, logistic policy, planning and execution will be jointly 

co-ordinated. 

Maritime logistics support to joint operations comes with two important 

advantages. Joint sea basing of logistics support optimises the ‘footprint’ 

ashore and allows that support to be landed in sufficient quantities as 

required without necessarily placing it all in a vulnerable and essentially 

immobile location. Sea basing also allows for the protection of logistics 

support, especially important in operational environments that may be 

affected by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or asymmetric attack. 

Logistics at the Strategic Level 

At the strategic level, the logistics process provides the link between the 

resources of the nation and the military operations of combat forces. The 

creation of logistic resources (or production logistics) is almost entirely a 

civilian commercial process. Once they are manufactured, the employment 

of these resources in support of military operations (consumer logistics) 

becomes a military function, albeit one heavily dependent on civilian 

support. The integration of production and consumer logistic systems 

takes place at the military-strategic level and is the responsibility of the 

Chief of Defence Logistics (CDL). The determination of strategic 

requirements, procurement, planning of logistic aspects of regeneration 

capability, central storage and bulk distribution are all military-strategic 

logistic functions. 

Logistics at the Operational Level 

Maritime operational logistic functions are: 

94


hoc coalitions where there may be little standardisation between nations’ 

equipments. However, NATO has developed Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine 

encompassing a principle of collective responsibility between member 

nations and Allied authorities, although specific national requirements, 

especially in ammunition resupply and the maintenance and repair of 

weapon systems, still limit the effectiveness of multinational logistics. The 

doctrine includes the establishment of a Multinational Logistic 

Commander (MNLC) to plan, co-ordinate and control all maritime logistic 

shore support and a Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) to coordinate 

theatre wide logistic support for all components. Interoperability 

within an alliance is a prerequisite if one nation’s logistic resources are to 

support another’s, and considerable work in NATO’s standardisation 

agencies is devoted to this end. Standardisation of fuel grades, 

replenishment rigs and connections allow for regular transfer of fuel 

between NATO nations and, indeed, between other nations that have 

adopted NATO standards. Medical support, supply of provisions and 

general stores, and non-specialist transport can generally be treated as 

common resources. 

Logistic Principles 

The principles of joint logistics are foresight, economy, flexibility, simplicity 

and co-operation. The need for foresight in logistic planning has been 

discussed earlier in this chapter, as has the requirement for co-operation 

between Services, nations and commands, particularly where control of 

logistics is not unified. Economy, flexibility and simplicity deserve special 

mention. 

Economy 

Logistics resources will usually be in short supply and sufficiency should be 

the objective of the logistician. It is possible to overplan as well as to 

underplan logistic requirements. Over-planning can consume resources 

that could be devoted to combat forces. Furthermore, an over-large 

logistic organization may require additional logistics staff who, in turn, will 

need logistic support, and the whole may draw forces for protection away 

from the main effort. 

96

MARITIME LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 

5 

Flexibility 

A logistic plan must be capable of responding to the inevitable changes in 

any operational plan. Equally, the logistic system that executes the plan 

must be capable of adapting to rapid changes of requirement. A large 

logistics organization geared to supporting a major campaign can acquire a 

momentum of its own and generate wasteful stockpiles of materiel, if it is 

not sensitive to change. It may also be necessary for an operational 

commander to take a calculated risk over logistic sufficiency, in particular 

where there are opportunities to exploit success or to maintain tempo. For 

example, he may allow the fuel and ammunition levels of a naval force that 

is exploiting success to fall below prudent norms in the expectation that 

consolidation forces will arrive. A flexible logistic system will minimise 

differences between operational and logistic tempo and therefore the 

attendant risk. It is relevant that a major reason for the planning of 

operational pauses in a campaign is to allow the consolidation of logistics 

and to avoid reaching culmination before success is achieved. 

Simplicity 

Any unnecessarily complicated aspect of operational planning will be 

prone to disruption. Logistic planning is in large part carried out by experts 

and can appear intractable to non-experts charged with assessment and 

execution. The principal non-expert may be the operational commander. 

A comprehensive, but simple, plan that accords with the direction given by 

the operational commander is more likely to gain approval and be correctly 

interpreted and executed. 

Roulement 

Consideration must be given at an early stage in strategic and operational 

planning to relieving maritime forces and personnel likely to be in an 

operational theatre for an extended period. Although ships, given 

sufficient logistic support, can remain on station almost indefinitely, the 

efficiency of personnel can be expected to decline during deployment. 

Furthermore, some aspects of maintenance may suffer if the tempo of 

operations is high. The rotation of ships and personnel on station to 

maintain a high state of readiness is known as roulement and is an 

important feature of the maritime component of a campaign plan. 

97


Shore Support 

Shore support, whether at home or abroad, provides the starting point for 

any maritime logistic chain. The home base will provide the main supply 

depots and dockyard facilities. Most supplies and repairs are obtained from 

the private sector under contract. Procurement of materiel must be 

carefully monitored both to ensure that adequate stocks of equipment and 

stores are available for transfer to the fleet and to avoid wasting resources 

in the production and retention of unnecessarily large stocks. When HNS is 

available, it may supplement afloat support by providing useful forward 

airheads and seaports for logistic and personnel movements to and from 

the theatre of operations, and forward operating bases for replenishment, 

maintenance and repair. HNS may help to economise on the need for 

logistics, but such support is not an essential feature of purely maritime 

operations. Indeed, a forward operating base may be no more than a 

sheltered anchorage for a support or repair ship. However, once troops are 

ashore, the significance and dimensions of the organization to co-ordinate 

and take advantage of HNS can increase substantially. HNS arrangements 

are often pre-planned in outline and formalised by inter-governmental 

Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). They are, nevertheless, not 

guaranteed to remain in force as the situation changes. Lack of HNS may 

cause the emphasis of an operation to remain with maritime logistics 

support. 

Sustained Reach 

No maritime force is complete without support vessels to provide fuel and 

other essential stores. An integral part of the Fleet, the Royal Navy’s logistic 

shipping is organized as the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), manned by 

personnel employed under Merchant Navy articles, and whose officers 

provide afloat support expertise on Command staffs. Replenishment at 

Sea (RAS) from auxiliary ships enables naval forces to extend their reach 

world wide without the need to enter port. The RFA, supplemented where 

necessary by chartered vessels, gives British maritime forces a unique 

capability to carry out sustained operations at considerable distances from 

their home base, and the UK continues to maintain considerable 

investment in these ships; the effort is enhanced by in-theatre 

98


5 

consolidation and the provision of air based supply. The mechanism for 

obtaining shipping from the commercial sector is well established and, in 

crisis, early identification of the need for chartered shipping is important if 

forces containing such vessels are to be formed in a timely fashion. 

MV MAGDALENA GREEN, 

chartered in support of 

operations in the Arabian Gulf, 

with RFA FORT VICTORIA in the 

background 

99


The Maritime Operational Logistics Pipeline 

The sustained reach of maritime forces and the reach that they in turn 

provide to other forces are key components of maritime power. However, 

military and RFA support shipping form only a part of the maritime logistic 

system. Figure 5.1 shows the extent of the Operational Logistics Pipeline 

from the UK bases to the furthest forward fighting unit. The Pipeline may 

include an Advanced Logistic Support Site (ALSS) and, potentially, several 

Forward Logistics Sites (FLS) within the operational theatre. The 

establishment and maintenance of these sites, together with the provision 

of transport between them, will, in most cases, be a joint and frequently 

multinational requirement. The locations of the ALSS and FLS would be 

chosen to provide optimal support to the campaign and may need to move 

if the situation changes. 

The pipeline must handle the movement of materiel and people into, 

within and from the operational area. Personnel may include casualties, 

refugees, displaced persons and prisoners of war. Segments of the pipeline 

may consist of air, land or sea transport, which could be supporting all three 

Services as well as multinational requirements. Priorities across 

commodities, services and nations will need to be established to cater for 

constraints on transport capacity. 

5/1. El Alamein. 

“Rommel greatly underestimated the importance of Naval cooperation 

during this campaign…..I was not in favour of the Alamein 

offensive because of the impossibility of maintaining the lines of 

supply.” 

(Vice Admiral Weichold, German Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean) 

100


5 

Supplying Montgomery 

Montgomery’s strategy at Alamein was entirely dependent on the safe 

delivery of supplies and reinforcements drawn from across the globe. 

The principal supply route ran from Britain and the United States, 

around the Cape of Good Hope and up through the Red Sea, a distance 

of 14,000 miles. During the five months leading up to the Alamein 

offensive 8th Army was massively reinforced and re-equipped via this 

route, with over 97% of cargoes and more than 99% of troops arriving 

without loss. 

Concluding comments 

The accurate preparation, sequencing and positioning of logistics in 

peacetime, and the seamless understanding between logisticians and 

warfare specialists at each level of command, are fundamental to the 

success of operations throughout the spectrum of likely tasks. Modern 

joint operations will only retain their effect when complemented by 

flexible, mission focused logistics drawing together single-Service, joint 

and civilian elements. 

101


FIG 5.1 – THE O 

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS PIPELINE 

Industry 

Depots 

SPOE/ 

APOE 

ALSS 

/FMB 

FLS 

APOD/ 

SPOD 

FRONT 

LINE 

UNITS 

Sea/Air/Land 

Transportation 

Sea/Air/Land 

Transportation 

Consolidation 

Underway Replenishment 

or FLS 

Dockyard 

Salvage 

Forward 

Repair Ship 

Hospital 

APOD/ 

SPOD 

ALSS 

Joint Casualty 

Treatment Ship 

Fig 5.1 

102


5 

The Royal Fleet Auxiliary FORT GEORGE 

103

Chapter 5 — Maritime Logistics and Support

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?