Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and ... - Ixarm

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and ... - Ixarm

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology

in defence and security

2009 Edition

Direction Générale de l’Armement

White left page intentionally

strategic plan

for research & technology

in defence and security

(PS R&T)

2009 edition

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 1

1 Preface Blandine Vinson Rouchon -

Director of the Research and

Technology in Defence and Security

Division (DGA/DS/SRTS)

DGAcom -F. Vrignaud

Recent events are a reminder of how much the world as we know it has changed and continues to

change ever more rapidly.

A year ago, the White Paper on Defence and National Security outlined our new priorities. The

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology outlines the way forward and the investments needed for

our defence system and future procurement programmes.

In order to meet future defence and national security challenges, we collectively (i.e. all stakeholders)

must be in a position to make the most of technological breakthroughs, whether we initiated them

or not. I therefore hope this Strategic Plan will stimulate substantial interest from our current

and future partners leading to an increase in cooperation allowing us to achieve the initiatives

highlighted in this plan. It is intended that this document will serve as a clear open reference for

men and women in the Ministry of Defence, be they officers, engineers or researchers in their

dealings with those who help us on a daily basis to prepare future systems for our Forces. Special

attention has been given to the type of contracts which are best suited to deliver fast joint work.

I also believe that this plan provides our current R&T partners, whether in industry, academia or

other organisations, with a clear understanding of what they have been sharing with DGA for a

number of years.

This English version will promote the DGA R&T vision which will facilitate exchanges with our

partners abroad. As we are particularly keen to share the majority of our R&T projects in Europe and

with our partners, we have made a special effort to identify priority areas suitable for cooperation.

As a matter of fact, the question now is not “Can I find a way to cooperate?” but rather “Is there

anything that stand in the way of cooperation?”

The Strategic Pan describes the implications for R&T following the publication of the 2009 “30-Year

Plan” (Plan prospectif à 30 ans, or “PP30”). The 30-Year Plan prepares and recommends the choices

to be made to procure and maintain operational capabilities for our forces now and in the future.

With that in mind, we have undertaken an exhaustive yet synthetic appraisal of all technical areas

related to defence and security. Priorities were identified and are listed according to technical

domains to ensure successful implementation by DGA Technical Team Leaders. The Strategic Plan

also complements the document entitled “Basic Research Policy” (POS) which serves as a reference

for DGA and focuses on low TRL (1) technologies from basic research to initial lab tests.

As this is a live document, we encourage you to add to it by sending us your views and observations,

preferably via our DGA web site, and by completing the attached questionnaire.

I now invite you to read on and familiarise yourselves with this Strategic Plan for Research &

Technology in Defence and Security.


Technology Readiness Level

2 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

Table of contents

1 Foreword





Issues 7 at strake indefence R&T



2.3. SECURITY 14




2.7. SPACE 18






PS R&T implementation strategy





3.5. FUNDING 37














5 Appendices







4 Technological analysis Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 3

4 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

1 Foreword


Evolution of global requirements

Our experience of recent military operations abroad, against a security context characterised

by the struggle against a number of disparate organisations, has highlighted a number of new

requirements, sometimes long term and often urgent. Societal changes in recent years have

accelerated the development of the regulatory corpus (health and safety, safety at work and in

using hardware, eco-design, case law, the precautionary principle, etc.) applicable to defence

systems and their use. The challenge for DGA is to target its R&T efforts appropriately in order that

its future systems meet the needs of this new context as fully as possible.

The White Paper on Defence and National Security constitutes the new reference document for our

medium and long term needs, the operational capacities we need to obtain and also the degree

of sovereignty and autonomy we need to preserve and the international partnerships we need to

develop for the planning, execution and implementation of each programme.

Apart from areas falling under pure national sovereignty, a very large degree of European and

NATO cooperation and sharing of the most costly know-how is necessary in order to reach our goals

within the budget available. European cooperation must become the normal operating mode for

defence and security research, which must only be abandoned in the case of a real, long-term

incompatibility of interests. Targeted cooperations outside Europe can also provide interesting


Finally, an optimal use of civilian research is required. Consultation of civilian bodies and their

awareness of defence and security needs must be deeply reinforced.

These various elements require a rational, flexible and opportunist approach to defence research.

It is through dialogue with the best research and development departments that technological

breakthroughs will be made and their emergence may be encouraged by new funding at the

expense, if necessary, of technologies at the end of their maturity cycle.



The Strategic Plan for Research and Technology

In this context of new requirements and sometimes of a possible contradiction between shortterm

and long-term interests, research priorities need to be define, to combine and rationalise the

efforts of many more participants, but whose budgets are structurally decreasing. This Strategic

Plan aims to present the results of this analysis in an educational format. It describes in detail the

mechanism linking defence research to available technology, knowledge of the state-of-the-art

abroad and in the civilian sector, and also to the capability and programmatic issues for Defence

and National Security. It is a public document, providing DGA’s partners with an overview of the

issues in this domain.

The document

The Strategic Plan for Research and Technology constitutes a global framework for DGA’s actions

in anticipating and mastering the evolution of the technologies required for future defence and

security systems.

Based on the operational needs and key priorities described in the PP30, the aim of this document is

to place the available R&T studies within an overall framework (future operational needs/technology

priorities/partnerships) in order to respond to operational requirements foreseeable by 2012-2025.

It complements the POS, which describes the basic research to promote in order to produce the

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 5

technologies which our future defence systems will require. It sets forth the areas where work is

needed in order to meet the challenges facing us in the next few years but the effective funding of

these studies will be reviewed in accordance with the resources available at the time.

It implicitly includes all research priorities that DGA intends to finance, including those outside the

“strictly defence” domain on which future systems may depend.

It is presented according to areas of application, corresponding to DGA’s weapon systems’

“architectural areas” and “joint technology and components areas”, and could provide a useful

reference tool for annual technical policy discussions between defence and security industries and

DGA technology areas leaders.

It will also structure dialogue with our international partners, encouraging the mutual understanding

of our goals and actions, and will provide a key tool for building efficient cooperation.


The main functions of R&T in defence and security, its beneficiaries and uses are presented below.

The different issues associated with its various functions will be set forth in details in Chapter 2:


Possess the scientific and technical skills in

order to advise decision makers.

Meet medium and long-term capability

requirements (PP30) with new technical

solutions in order to achieve autonomy and

supremacy of our means of action (on our own

or in coalition) while minimising costs and time.

Master defence system technologies

corresponding to the technical solutions

envisaged with the good degree of autonomy,

both at the national and European level.

Contribute to the construction of a European

Defence by federating efforts around

the launching of ambitious technological


Build a competitive defence and security

industry by:

• Communication of the sector based

(product), industrial and technological

priorities of each DGA technical expertise


• Support of the technological research


• Support of innovation by SMEs and

research laboratories.


• The Defence Ministry and its key staff, who validates

the major policy areas for preparing the future (LPM);

• Military staffs, directorates and departments of the

Ministry in charge of preparing the future.

• The military staff who evaluates the possibilities of

their integration into equipment;

• DGA, which integrates the results in the preparation

of armament operations and the enhancement of

coherency between military systems.

• The defence industry of the target DTIB (2) , which

uses the skills acquired or maintained to produce the

required equipment;

• DGA, which draws up the technical specifications for

future weapon systems while taking into account

regulatory and environmental considerations.

• Military staff, DGA and the defence industry of the

DTIB, to evaluate whether a specified performance

level is achievable in operational conditions of use;

• The defence industry, to motivate and federate teams

around major large-scale projects;

• European states, to focus and develop cooperation

on major projects;

• DGA and the defence industry of the DTIB, to reduce

the risks, costs and delivery times of future armament


• DGA, which identifies the products, industries and

technologies to be used for armament operations;

• The defence industry and laboratories, which carry

out research work;

• The SMEs and research laboratories concerned, which

will be able to maintain or develop their skills


DTIB: Defence Technological and Industrial Base

6 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009



1.3.1. scopE of thE ps r&t

Defence R&T is part of the global process of preparation of the future. It covers a large range of

activities. Apart from supporting the preparatory phases of armament programs, it also includes

many applications resulting from the life cycle of programs, such as qualification of equipment,

improvement of operational maintenance, dismantling, and reduction of renewal costs and

maintenance of the skills of the industrial and state-operated teams.

The purpose of this document is to present R&T priorities according to technical division, with time

to application ranging from 2 to 15 years, as well as the key potential areas for coherency within

the ministry regarding Research and Technology and ways of achieving them.

R&T covers:

- Research and technology responding to identified operational needs

- Demonstrators in characterised environments.

The PS R&T covers all defence and security technological needs regardless of the various forms of

financing the associated work. We can therefore find, for example:

- Contracted “research studies” including exploratory research and innovations (unsolicited


- Subsidies to and contracts with public agencies (3) and Engineering Colleges under the supervision

of the Ministry of Defence.

Civilian funding will be considered for some of the priorities mentioned, in particular for security

R&T for the technologies concerned (i.e. Biometry).



1.3.2. intErfacing BEtWEEn thE ps r&t and othEr docuMEnts and prioritiEs

The PS R&T corresponds to the priorities set forth in the White Paper on Defence and National

Security and draws from preparatory work undertaken for the Military Planning Law.

It also provides the Ministry’s r&t programming process with the major trends in R&T. This

programming process takes place once a year and consists of two complementary approaches for

the use of R&T study resources:

30 years: A long-terme vision (PP30)

12 years: (2 LPMs)


Review of needs: October

Choice of objectives: March

• Scientific policy

• R&T strategy

• Industrial strategy

• Cooperation strategy

• Technical expertise

3 to 5 years:

Plan of engagement

R&T study frame of work corresponding to objectives: March

Planning: June

1 year: Execution Plan



Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 7

- The capability approach, based on equipment plans, which determines the demonstrations, the

risk reduction operations and the technological developments to be carried out before launching

the programs,

- The technological approach, which identifies promising technological work to be supported,

without any precise timeline

The PS R&T sets forth the Defence R&T priorities contained in the Thirty-Year Plan (PP30). The

PP30 is written by military staffers and DGA engineers and aims to constitute a long-term forwardplanning

document, setting goals up to 30 years in advance in terms of defence and security needs.

The Basic Research Policy (POS) is the DGA reference document in terms of scientific priorities

(available at The POS is a document similar to the PS

R&T, but focused on technology with very low TRLs, from the basic research to its first experiments

performed in laboratories.

Along with the PP30 and the POS, the PS R&T presents the key areas of coherence in terms of R&T.n

8 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009



Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 9

10 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009


Issues at stake in defence R&T

2.1. issuEs concErning thE WhitE papEr and thE lpM (Military planning


The White Paper on Defence and Security set forth a new defence and security policy for the years

to come. The resulting military strategy is based on three key principles:

− Nuclear deterrence;

− Autonomous situation awareness;

− The decision to retain full military power.

The operational goals set for the Armed Forces correspond to five strategic functions (knowledge

and awareness, prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention) and their associated means

of implementation.

The White Paper also defines the main technological and industrial priorities resulting from the

strategic goals for National Security to 2025. It details a few domains where expertise could, or

should, be acquired and developed through European cooperation.

Alongside the long-term stakes exposed hereafter, overseas interventions have provided feedback

on experience and short-term technological solutions.

Those various inputs enable the identification of general characteristics that proper planning and

execution of defence and security research must possess:

• Enable sustained effort on sovereign

technologies with long term objectives and

slow maturation,

• Allow major changes in priorities such as

those suggested in the White Paper, while

controlling their pace and consequences,

• For shorter-term applications, provide

enough flexibility and reactivity in order

to maintain operational control in overseas

theatres facing an ever-moving and everevolving


The confrontation between these various issues

and the technological state of the art within the

defence and civilian sector, in France, in Europe

and worldwide, enables the definition of a

research policy as well as long term and short

term planning of the corresponding actions.


Issues at stake

in defence R&T


The aim of defence R&T is to satisfy the capability

requirements identified within the armed forces.

These requirements have been segmented

within defence into five main so-called systems

of force described in detail in this chapter.

White paper

C.Fiard - Dicod

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 11

● “deterrence” system

This system requires from R&T in defence and security the possibility to master the technological

capabilities rendering it possible to design and execute, with full national autonomy, the essential

elements of all the weapon systems necessary to exert a credible deterrence on a potential attacker

in order to:

- Ensure the technical credibility of weapons, their carriers and strategic transmissions: reliability

of complex systems often integrating non dual-use technologies and making it possible to

maintain the upper hand; resistance of weapon propellants and explosives to various categories

of attack; nuclear safety of weapons and nuclear steam supply systems, up to and including their

dismantling phase; stealth technology; efficiency, reliability and safety of weapons through

simulation, without nuclear testing;

- Implement nuclear forces: reliable and safe transmission of orders and information to nuclear

weapons carriers for the command and control of nuclear operations; sustainable invulnerability

of ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) with regard to the current and future threats, minimum

dependency on external means, improvement of certain ballistic missile performances; range,

precision, penetration and stealth for the airborne component; capability to identify the attacker.

● “command and information superiority” system

The objective is to acquire or improve a broad set of

features and capabilities:

- command and control: information sharing,

improvement of operations tempo, real-time

mission reconfiguration , optimisation of the

human factor in the Command and Control chain

(C2); use of aerospace vectors and weapon systems

optimisation offered in the operational command

general architecture ; transparency of the combined

battle-space and capacities of autonomous analysis

of the environment for the situation awareness;

- communicate: global network offering the forces a groupware and the inter-agency and

international interoperability necessary for network operations; processing and operating

capability compatible with foreseeable increases in volume of data and accessible information;

- supervise, acquire, recognise, inform: availability of long mission radar sensors to be integrated

onto Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance, accelerated information up-dating, multisensor

capability, use of Earth observation from space, use of electromagnetic signal intelligence

at all levels in the command chain, all weather national and/or European air/ground surveillance

capability, disposal of a global and reactive airspace surveillance network, space surveillance

(detection, recognition and identification of objects in space).

● “projection - Mobility - support” system

Defence strongly relies on technology from the civilian transport sector, but requires security and

defence R&T to master technological capabilities for

specific military needs and adapt civilian equipment

and concepts for military use, in order:

- to project forces: architecture of innovative air and

naval platforms to project forces, in-flight refuelling


- to ensure mobility: architecture of innovative land,

air and sea platforms in order to provide in-theatre

mobility, complementary to projection, self–protection

systems for such platforms against proliferating



Demonstrator Catamaran (CNIM)

DR DGA Flight Testing

12 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

- to maintain and restore on-the-ground support to operations: improvement of logistics and of

equipment availability, reduction of ownership costs, improvement of soldiers’ living conditions,

energy sources at a controlled cost and reduction of fuel consumption and optimisation of

transport flows for a global improvement of the service from beginning to end.

● “Engagement and combat” system

The aim of R&T is to prepare the evolution of the

forces’ equipment so that they dispose of the best

possible systems for asymmetric conflict, while

maintaining the capacity to design equipment

required to face the most serious threats.

Adaptation to asymmetric conflicts requires:

- Precision of armaments (ammunition and missiles)

and control of their effects;

- Observation and identification capabilities;

- Protection of platforms and soldiers against threats

which are no longer frontal but from all sides.

The low density of forces in such conflicts needs long

range, precise and fast support. Apart from work

to control the effects of the weapons, the role of

technology in the observation/decision/action loop is

essential to maintain freedom of action.

Improved collaborative action on land, in the air and

at sea is the key to superiority in both asymmetrical

and symmetrical conflicts.

Longer-term actions are necessary to prepare the

systems of 2030. Robotics, artificial intelligence,

will make it possible to design systems with enough

autonomy to avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers

to danger. Deep area interventions will use cruise

missiles, combat drones and stealth planes.


Caesar (NEXTER)

DGAcom - F. Vrignaud

Issues at stake

in defence R&T

● “protection and safeguard” system

This system is particularly well adapted to the exploitation of dualities between civilian and military

projects and corresponds to the defence/security synergy recommended in the White Paper. The

main capabilities put forward are as follows:

- protect approaches and national territory by means of five military capabilities: air defence

(ground to air, air to air, air policing) surveillance and intervention at sea based on sensor

networks and means of action (patrol boats, surveillance planes, etc.), control of space in order

to ensure continuity of services based at first on radar surveillance, advanced alert with detection

and identification of missile firings, anti ballistic missile defence with their interception in a given


- Ensure protection of armed forces and sites: protection of sites and physical networks, protection

of operations on the ground, protection in coastal waters; as well as capacity to limit or prevent

the acquisition of intelligence by the enemy;

- Ensure protection of personnel: health support for personnel in operations, improved rehabilitation

of wounded personnel, protection against the CBRN threat, capability to establish evidence

of attack and identification of the attacker in order to engage criminal proceedings (charges,

inquiries, etc);

- Ensure security of the civil environment: participation in the inter-ministry crisis and major event

management, participation in population security, search and rescue, assistance

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 13


The strategic plan of the Ministry of

Defence as regards security R&T is to

have civilian ministries benefit from its

know-how and skills, to use as efficiently

as possible the R&T carried out by

civilians and to actively participate in

work aimed at ensuring the coherence

of R&T in defence and security, from

an inter-ministry point of view aimed

at providing optimal protection of our

interests and of the population through

defence and national security policy.

Synergies exist to meet the needs of

the armed forces and security forces,

successfully using many important

dual technologies in several fields:

Medical evacuation

intelligence, sensors, surveillance, UAV, reduced lethality weapons, etc. 15% of defence R&T, nearly

€100M, directly concerns security, making the Ministry of Defence the largest investor in security

technologies. Thus, civilian ministries (Interior, Transport, etc.) are involved in the studies on dualuse

topics and they also benefit from defence R&T.

Defence also seeks to ensure coherence between its research and that financed by the civilian

sector. The European Union, the National Research Agency (Agence Nationale pour la Recherche,

or ANR) and the single inter-ministry fund (Fond Unique Interministériel, or FUI) for competitive

clusters finance research projects on dual topics (maritime surveillance, software radio, simulation,

etc.), fields in which DGA also invests.

Inter-ministry cooperation on the technology needs for defence and security makes it possible to

orient security R&T towards technological themes of common interest. DGA provides its expertise

and knowledge of R&T management and prioritisation. Under the coordination of the National

Defence Secretariat (Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, or SGDN), DGA chairs the national

thematic group which brings together the public and private R&T communities, maintains the list

of national R&T priorities and the security R&T program database.

DGA participates to the ANR program “concepts, systems and tools for global security”, launched

in 2006 and takes an active part in its executive board (composed of members of the Ministries of

Defence, Research and Interior At the inter-ministry and European level, this board is in charge

of chairing and managing the security part (European Security Research Programme – ESRP) of

the European R&T Programme (7th Framework Programme) and represents France on the ESRP

programme committee.

This strategy exists within a national and international context undergoing significant changes,

with an increasing emphasis on the use of technology to address new security issues (terrorism,

organised crime, pandemics, etc.) and on synergies between defence and security. The use of civilian

R&T enables early detection of technological advances while ensuring a permanent knowledge of

the industry structures and key skills availability.



Defence and security R&T provides the technological knowledge and needs necessary, in the best

possible economic conditions, to ensure the observance of existing regulations, adapt to regulatory

change and to control the establishment of new regulations.

For example, in the area of arms control, the adhesion by France on 11 April 2001 to the first

additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions requires its observance of Article 36 thereof, which

commands that the State systematically determines the compliance of weapons or methods of

warfare it plans to design or acquire with the relevant rules according to the law of armed conflict.

In other words, each State must assess the lawful nature of any new weapon, means or method of

warfare that it decides to study, develop, and acquire or adopt.

14 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

Some new weapons require regulations to be modified. For example, the development of drones

requires the regulatory adaptation and/or new regulations for their integration into airspace

shared with civil aviation.

For other topics (frequency management, technical authority, reliability of equipment, lifespan of

systems, costs of maintaining in operational condition), standardisation is an indispensable tool.

Having the security of the civilian world as its ultimate objective, and being mindful of the

efficiency of its equipment under any circumstances, defence has an active role in the regulatory

and normative environment, in particular in the following fields:

- Maintain State skills necessary for future programmes,

- Secure sources of technology,

- Reduce national dependency on foreign technologies,

- Eco-design,

- Deconstruction,

- Capacity to exert technical authority,

- Legal protection of the State and its agents.


Society expects eco-responsible behaviour from the military forces even during conflict. There are

many areas of application: waste sorting, in metropolitan area military sites as well as during home

or overseas operations, energy management, hazardous substance management, noise pollution

management around airbases and recycling of equipment are examples of topics which defence

has been taking into consideration for several years.


Issues at stake

in defence R&T

This is illustrated, for example, by the joint directive on environmental protection in operations (4)

and the manual on the law of armed conflicts (5) , referring to several texts and international law

agreements concerning environmental protection.

compliance with legislative and regulatory provisions

The “applicable regulatory corpus” is a notion which varies both in time and in space. Regulations

evolve and equipment, in the vast majority of cases, is mobile. While European and national

regulations are generally respected, local regulations must not be neglected, which may limit the

mobility and operation of equipment and compromise the export of defence equipment.

technological and industrial impact of these regulations

Even if some regulations include

exemption clauses for defence and

security activities, they nevertheless

strongly influence the domain.

Defence is increasingly less certain

to benefit from exemptions in its

favour, as all these regulations will

have an increasingly significant


Directive interarmées sur la protection

de l’environnement en opération PIA 05-

302 N°514/DEF/EMA/EMP.5/NP as of 17

May 2004.


Manuel de droit des conflits armés, DAJ,

22 October 2004, available on the Internet




No exception for defence electronics


Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 15

impact on the market and thus on technologies available in the long term. The market is generally

driven by civilian demand, and a “standardisation of the least polluting technologies” is taking

place making certain components whose only user remains defence obsolescent or over-priced.

The directive known as “RoHS (6) ” is a revealing example: it severely regulates the use of certain

hazardous substances, including lead, in electrical and electronic equipment. Defence equipment

is excluded from the scope of this regulation. However, in practice, defence electronics is not

significant enough on the electronics component market to preserve such components for its own

specific needs.

Similarly, the new European regulation on the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction

of chemical products will entail the disappearance from the market of some substances critical for

defence equipment.

Precautionary principle

The prevention and precautionary principles are written in the French Constitution since 2005.

Applying them requires the actors concerned to establish concrete provisions in order to prevent

risk (known risk in the case of the prevention principle, suspected risk in case of the precautionary

principle). The provisions must be adapted to the risks, use the best technologies available and take

into account proportionality imperatives.

The case of nanotechnology is interesting. In a 2006 report, the prevention committee of French

Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development advocated to balance public research funding

on nanotechnology between the evaluation of their risk on tho one hand and their development

on the other hand. Public incentives for research and investment in this domain must systematically

include safety and traceability provisions.

In general, the identification of health and environmental risk is becoming a necessity for research

and equipment programmes, in order to manage risk and be able to prove its proper management.

A pragmatic and progressive process

The procedure lies on a combination of two criteria, giving priority, on the one hand, to advances

easy to carry out providing immediate progress, and, on the other hand, actions that might be

more difficult but are motivated by more important risks.

Corresponding action must be determined in general according to two approaches:

- Curative: manage the heritage of the past (dismantling, maintenance in operational condition of

the existing systems, palliative solutions, etc.),

- Preventive: be able to develop future operational capabilities in satisfying conditions (substitution

of disappearing technologies, command tools including better control of effects, development of

sustainable and appropriate dismantling procedures, etc.).

Corresponding industrial and technological efforts

Future research programmes and demonstrators will include the following key priorities:

- Limit energy consumption and harness alternative sources of energy:

• consumption reduction of existing platforms;

• research and validation of alternative sources of energy for defence applications;

increased use of simulation.

- Develop less polluting technologies and processes

• research alternatives to critical substances used by defence and on the verge of disappearing

from the market (impact of REACH regulations);


Restriction of hazardous substances – Directive 2002/95 – January 2003 by European Union, came into force as of

1 July 2006

16 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

• processes for cleaning up polluted soil and for dismantling defence equipments in a more

environmentally friendly manner;

• Waste disposal during operations.

- Reduce noise pollution:

• Apart from the physical and

chemical risks, limitation of

noise pollution must be taken

into account by research

projects for local inhabitants,

those operating the equipment

and even for animals (impact of

active sonar on sea mammals).

- Acquire and integrate environmental

footprint assessment tools:

• In an operational context

• In a systems engineering context

for the preparation and design

of armament programmes.

DGA Missiles Testing / Isle du Levant: environmental


DGAcom -F. Vrignaud


Issues at stake

in defence R&T

European coordination

These recommendations may be reinforced by coordinated action with our European partners. The

European Defence Agency might be the appropriate framework to ensure this coordination; in

particular in the following areas:

- Monitoring of norms and regulations and active participation in their evolution;

- Joint technology research efforts;

- Harmonisation of procurement policies in terms of sustainable development requirements.


2.6.1. rEduction of oWnErship costs

Two major causes of economic and budgetary constraints that defence must face are:

- The raising costs to maintain some increasingly complex armaments in operational condition,

- The work needed to dismantle equipment at the end of its life cycle that new concerns regarding

sustainable development tend to develop.

The rather recent concept of the sustainability of a system integrates its financial cost throughout its

entire life cycle: it involves making sure that beyond its development, acquisition and commissioning,

the forces will have enough financial resources to implement it, maintain it, modernise it and

finally dismantle it.

The French equivalent of the cost concepts found in partner countries (7) is the concept of “overall

ownership cost” (coût global de possession - CGP), i.e. the calculation of costs over the whole

lifespan of the system, or the cost of the life cycle.

The overall cost is now a decisive criterion in the decision to launch a program. It has consequently

become a major performance aspect of a system and is paid full attention, in particular in terms of

technological studies chosen according to their capacity to decrease the CGP of existing or future


Cost reduction issues enter constantly into the preparation of programmes. They appear in all areas

of defence. R&T will enable, for example, to reduce the costs of air surveillance missions through

the use of UAVs, to increase the time between programmed maintenance periods of naval vessels,


Life Cycle Cost (LCC), Whole Life Cost (WLC), Cost of Ownership (COO), Total Ownership Cost (TOC)

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 17

in particular submarines, to reduce the size of crews, or, through systems architectures, to allow the

easy replacement of obsolete components or equipment. The associated trade-off studies make it

possible to present decisive arguments during the selection of R&T projects.

2.6.2. curtailing EnErgy consuMption

Apart from the operational advantage it

presents (autonomy, discretion, reduction of

logistics in particular), mastering the energy

consumed by weapon systems is a strategic


Energy consumption by the Ministry of

Defence was reduced by 30% between 1995

and 2005. This consumption is 80% dependent

on fossil fuels and in particular on oil.

In addition, the volatility of the cost of oil and

the prospect of exhausted energy reserves in

the long term have an obvious impact on the

contribution of energy to the budget of the

Ministry of Defence. Moreover, France has

laid down an ambitious policy for sustainable

Photovoltaic energy

development, requiring even more control over energy consumption by weapon systems.

One should also adapt to other European and international legislative and normative changes in

the field of energy and ensure that equipments operate with the fuel available in operation.

For the majority of platforms, the fundamental long-term purpose is to reduce dependency by using

other energy sources to replace conventional fuel. The use of synthetic fuels is under consideration,

according to their availability in the civilian sector and/or possible NATO type standardisations.

The evolution of other forms of energy (thermoelectric, fuel cells, high-efficiency solar, hydrogen,

etc.) is also being carefully observed. They may be considered for targeted operational applications

(generators, soldiers, UAVs, etc.).

DGAcom -F. Vrignaud

2.7. SPACE

In this field, synergies between defence and civilian research are fundamental and the National

Space Centre (Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, or CNES) is the key institution.

Conducted in close cooperation with CNES, space related defence R&T aims to satisfy users’ needs


• Reinforcing the robustness, precision

and autonomy of satellite positioning

and synchronisation information,

with the support of the governmental

department of the European program


• Developing dual and cooperative aspects

of the expansion of future network

systems via satellite to a global network

(communication and shared services) in

order to offer the military a groupware

as well as the necessary inter-ministry

and international interoperability;

• Extending the use of Earth imaging

from space and signal intelligence at all

command chain levels.

Galileo system


18 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

Lastly, space defence R&T aims to develop specific technologies necessary for new defence

applications and to validate them with space demonstrators. The R&T activity aims to respond to

spatial defence autonomy issues within a European framework. DGA make sure that competencies

are preserved and combine its efforts with those of the CNES in shared military & civilian fields.


In the civilian sector, companies must optimise, now more than ever, their products permanently,

first in order to face increasing competition, for example in terms of ownership costs, safety,

energy consumption and operational performances, and second to very actively seek technological

breakthroughs which will give them a durable competitive advantage. For some of them, the

strong growth of the worldwide market for consumer goods offers sufficient prospects of profits

to devote huge resources to the research and development of new products. This is the case in

aeronautics and land transport, where the key industries are all global players; or in manufacturing

sectors with large-scale production like electronic components, materials and IT.

This competition is extended to the level of States and even of continents. Thus, States organise

the public funding of civilian research so that their corporations can extract the best competitive

advantages within their various markets. Civilian research funding thus plays an increasingly

important role in the evolution of technological capabilities of industries. For example, as regards

sustainable development, one of the priorities of the European Commission, EU programmes are

setting the pace for the technological progress of European industries. This is also the case for dualuse

technologies for more electrical aircraft, the use of more energy efficient and less polluting fuel

or technologies used for modular aircrafts.

The defence research in this Strategic Plan is a research:

- funded by the State, as opposed to private sector investment in research motivated by

commercial perspectives based on innovative products,

- oriented according to precise and quantified technological objectives, and even by a specific

need identified for an operational system, as opposed to civilian public research oriented

according to research field and giving priority to the proliferation of ideas for a broad spectrum

of applications

Defence research is thus different from civilian research. Defence may however benefit from civilian

scientific and technological advances for its own purposes. It must do so for the simple reason that,

as they are easily accessible, they may be used at any time by another State or hostile organisation,

and thus induce a technological gap and a strategic handicap.

Dual research makes it possible to exploit synergies at the border between the two fields.

Coordination actions between civilian and defence organisations are covered in Chapter 3.

The area covered by civilian technologies is in a state of constant change, tending to increase

considerably. Defence research must evolve coherently in order to remain complementary, and

technological objectives must be adjusted even if capability objectives remain unchanged.

Thus, the cost reduction associated with the progress of civilian technologies have led to an increased

use of civilian technologies in defence systems, mainly electronics and software-related at the

beginning. Duality now increasingly concerns the design and the components of the systems, their

architectures and validation. This introduces an increasing overlap of civilian technologies with the

technological capabilities of defence, thus raising the question of the control of the architectures

and of in service support (ISS) during the lifespan of systems, as civilian and military systems have

different life cycles.

Indeed, civilian technologies develop and succeed one another at increasingly rapid pace,

significantly faster than the life cycle of defence systems, at the same time inducing new needs

in the Military. For example, dual-use information technology should ideally be able to be rolledout

in the Military simultaneously with its mass diffusion in civil society, in order to benefit from a

mature, robust and maintained technology.

Moreover, in some sectors (electronic components, materials) and for some needs, defence

becomes a marginal customer in term of series. There is a risk that certain technological fields on


Issues at stake

in defence R&T

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 19

which defence is dependent for its equipment in use may become extinct. To correct this situation,

defence must know how to anticipate and manage stocks, or improve modularity thus enabling

the replacement of equipment at reduced costs. This has resulted in a growing interest in research

themes such as behaviour with ageing, or the architecture of open systems and their qualification.

In order to better exploit the results of civilian research, defence research therefore tends:

- to accelerate the transition between the various phases of technological maturation: exploratory

research, technological development, demonstration,

- to master open architectures authorising technological insertions during the development

phase, partial upgrading during the life cycle of the systems, as well as incremental developments.


To satisfy the strategic capacities of defence and security defined by the White Paper, some

technologies fulfilling crucial functions are rare, difficult to acquire or implement. In order to

guarantee the national autonomy of the systems concerned, access to these technologies, called

technologies of sovereignty (TSV) must be rendered secure, notably by means of R&T action. This


- either their control by French industry;

- or guaranteed access to industrial capabilities present on national territory;

- or access guaranteed by intergovernmental agreements when they are not available on national


The most obvious technologies of sovereignty are linked to issues such as deterrence (design of

strategic missiles). In other cases, they are tied to strong economic issues: aircrafts, launchers,

satellites, nuclear energy, high power lasers, simulators, navigation, etc.

Other less obvious TSVs may be used at various subcontracting levels without a sufficient approval

process in place concerning their control by the customer or at a higher level of industrial integration.

However, they must be identified, anticipated and supported in coordination with the scientific and

industrial environment in order to direct investment and thus to maintain and develop state-owned

and industrial skills in these fields. In the long term, projects for intergovernmental component

licenses or the setting up of a European free trade area are among the possible solutions with

regard to the least sensitive equipment.

The security of TSVs cannot be addressed only at a national level. It is approached, with all necessary

precaution, with our allies having similar concerns.


With a few exceptions (8) , international R&T cooperation is seen as essential and will grow over

the coming years as long as it is in the technical, industrial and financial interest of all parties. Cooperation

should lead to:

• enlarging the scope of R&T work by sharing resources and competences. Co-operation is the

only way Europe can build a credible defence at an affordable price. France is very keen to

promote more exchanges.

• reducing cost and risk and joining R&T effort to meet future requirements at a faster pace.

• building European DTIB ahead of programmes and progressively contribute to its rationalisation.

• preparing groundwork for future procurement programmes.

In an ideal world, R&T cooperation should begin with a common strategy and could lead to mutual

technology dependency with a view to the best possible DTIB.

Although France wishes to maintain sovereignty on subjects such as deterrence, sensitive work on

certain threats, crypto and intelligence, it strongly favours bilateral cooperation or multilateral


See § 2.9 “Technologies of Sovereignty”

20 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

European cooperation within the European Defence Agency (EDA). For it is within Europe that,

most acutely, solving DTIB problems, meeting common requirements and agreeing on true

strategies to share competences is most relevant.

In 2008, France spent 835 million Euros on R&T (not including nuclear and dual research) of which

150 million (18%) was spent on collaboration. France is thus the first contributor to R&T cooperation

in Europe, equal to United Kingdom. Should France wish to increase that percentage and achieve

a figure in excess of 200 million Euros, we need to:

- undertake cooperation in the most appropriate frameworks while avoiding dispersal,

- identify the best tools for cooperation and,

- prioritise promising collaborative actions and consider early withdrawal from those appearing to

have little chance of success.



A large industrial sector in France

The defence industry is an industry of high technological value, with expertise essential in order

to satisfy military needs and to guarantee, even in the long term, the supply of our forces with

equipment, their freedom of action and the possibility to export.

France has a large, successful defence industry, the second largest in Europe after the United

Kingdom. French defence industry skills are well positioned in Europe, and, for some of them, in

the world: they form a complete spectrum, covering all sectors. France has an important group of

industrial clusters of excellence that gives it unquestionable leadership in some domains (electronics,

space and missiles, among other things), positions of excellence at the best technological level for

aeronautics and naval systems, and good expertise in the land sector.

Today, research and development represents 10 to 20% of the revenues of the ten largest defence

groups in France, which employ some 20,000 persons in their research centres. Research favours

technological innovation and constitutes a driving force in many major technologies, with some

civilian applications.

Issues at stake

in defence R&T

Essential industrial skills to maintain and develop

The armament industry is the key to defence; it is essential to maintain and develop a DTIB with a

proper level of autonomy on a European or national scale, while seeking a competitive edge. The

DTIB relies on various industrial expertises, some of which are strategic with regard of the wished

level of autonomy.

Some of this expertise is fundamental and concerns R&D capacities (research, studies, design,

engineering), but also some manufacturing know-how (industrialisation, processes, etc.) and is

associated to State-owned expertise and capacity, especially in terms of defence evaluation and

testing. Mastery of industrial expertise relies on the implementation of a policy to maintain and

develop this expertise in order to satisfy the needs of the armed forces in the long term and to

ensure the best economic efficiency of investment and reduce the burden on the nation. One of

the challenges is to perpetuate expertise in order to provide, maintain and upgrade the equipment

in service. For sectors currently under development, the challenge is to acquire and develop the

expertise that will enable us to answer future needs.

National public procurement

At the national level, the White Paper on Defence and National Security has reasserted the need

for an industrial policy and set forth the technological and industrial priorities resulting from the

strategic goals for national security to 2025. The chosen capacities as well as the renewal cycles

of key equipment resulting from the White Paper have been transposed in the Military Planning

Law (Loi de Programmation Militaire, or LPM) validated by the Parliament, and have a structuring

impact on the DTIB, depending on the sector and whether concerning production or R&D.

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 21

During production phases, implying low levels of work for research centres, the sustainability of

high technology industries implies the mobilisation of a core of expertise, comprising engineers

and researchers, towards technology goals aimed at preparing the next generation of weapon

systems: the load of the industrial engineering departments, which conditions the maintenance

of their technological expertise, is carried out through a substantial amount of “research studies”

funding and an adapted organisation of future programmes, firstly in the key sectors set forth in

the White Paper (deterrence – nuclear submarines, space, complex missiles), and secondly in the

strategic combat aircraft sector (platforms, electronic warfare, propulsion).

Europe: a reference framework

The current level of European budgets and the increasing cost of weapon systems mean that no

single nation in Europe, including France, has alone the size and thus the capacity to bear the cost

of a defence industry able to answer all its needs.

In the specific case of sectors falling strictly under national sovereignty, for which France wants to

retain national autonomous capacity, and with the exception of equipments with no particular

strategic value in terms of supply (shared equipment that can be supplied by many providers)

procurement can be carried out on the world market. In all other cases, the mutualisation of

procurement by European nations is an interesting perspective enabling control of industrial

expertise. This implies the acceptance of mutual dependencies between European partners, which

in turn implies reciprocity and balance.

Small and Medium Enterprises (SME)

Industrial expertise is present at all levels, from large industrial groups among world leaders to

many SMEs. Around an estimated 4,000 SMEs take a share in the defence effort, some of them

owning crucial and even strategic expertise. Generally speaking, SMEs are reactive and competitive,

and also, thanks to their capacity for innovation, indispensable for maintaining and developing

the technological excellence of weapon systems. SMEs’ expertise has to be fully exploited for in

“research studies” as well as in the armament programmes. n

22 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009


Issues at stake

in defence R&T

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 23

24 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009


PS R&T implementation



3.1.1. procEss

The organisation of defence to control its R&T reflects the specific nature of the latter, both

dedicated to reaching the highest possible levels for precise applications in the medium and long

term (up to several decades) and to best exploit the results of civilian research.

Its goals are:

• to ensure concentration of R&T efforts on the most strategic issues;

• to facilitate the work of key players in the process by providing them visibility adapted to their

level of command;

• to reduce the gap between the R&T scope statement and its realisation;

• to take into account the scientific, technological and industrial environments.

The link between the capability requirement and the innovative technologies needed (with a view

to their inclusion into future armament programmes) is established according to two approaches:

• global projects: global projects (Appendix 2) bring together in an ordered and coherent way

the capability requirements and work needed in order to meet them, prepare future armament

programmes and improve the associated operational capabilities. They are described in the

PP30 and are documented in a scope statement and roadmaps. They are under the shared

responsibility of the capability managers, within DGA, and the joint chiefs of staff (EMA).

Corresponding tasks are quantified by explicit goals.


PS R&T Implementation



Roadmap (RM)


and equipment

interested by

RM constraints



Platforms, equipment and their milestones

Links product


RM programmes



DTIB, cooperation

RM primary action




“Products” to realise in response to “why”:


Technological breakthroughs: required action



Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 25

• technological Basis: (Appendix 3) organised by the technical expertise areas, this is comprised

of the low readiness level technological breakthrough concept studies adapted to longer

term operational needs, generic technological developments (e.g. modelling tools), multiple

operational application technologies (e.g. electronic components present in many weapon

systems or subsystems, for which European autonomy desired); DGA heads of technical areas are

in charge.


Roadmap (RM)


and equipment

interested by



PlatePlatforms, equipment and their milestones

Links development


RM stages

of development,

DTIB, cooperation



Products” to realise in response to “why”:

feasibility stages in development

RM action

How :

Technological breakthroughs: required action

Links actions/stages

of development


With this double approach (unifying projects and technological basis) “R&T studies” are planned

according to a long medium and short-term process described in Appendix 3:

• priorities according to a 10-15 year time frame;

• research planning on a moving 3-5 year time frame;

• annual scheduling of action.

Execution of this planning is done by DGA management units.

a strong set of priorities, defined according to technological goals defined in terms of content,

deadlines and costs, organised according to stakes, was issued in early 2009 for the next twelve

years or so. It will be updated every 3 years or in order to remain consistent with revisions of the

Military Planning Law (LPM).

All R&T goals and actions are planned via road maps linking R&T action to the capability goals.

This project management process has been implemented progressively since the end of 2008.

Information management tools help updating, consistency management and capitalisation of all

synthesis data.

3.1.2. instruMEnts

The instruments used to allocate R&T budgets among the various providers depend on the status

of the latter and on the type and finality of the service provided.

research programmes (programmes d’études amont, or pEa (9) ) are applied research and technology

acquisition activities on well-defined themes. Their goals are to explore the military potential of

new technologies and to place the defence industry in a position to be able to integrate them into

defence equipments. They are implemented by public procurement or international cooperation

(see §4 for the technological priorities of each division). They account for more than 90% of the

funding of contracted research.

Exploratory research and innovation allows innovative companies (in particular SMEs), academic

laboratories and public organisations to have an easier access to defence research funding through


750 PEAs are managed in the 2008-2010 programme

26 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

unsolicited proposals via a single DGA portal, with specific eligibility criteria and contracting

procedures (see §3.4.4).

sME support for dual innovation (Régime d’Appui aux PME pour l’Innovation Duale - RAPID)

supports industrial research or experimental development projects with strong technological

potential, having military applications but also potential for the civilian market.

dga/osEo innoVation partnerships and participation on the management boards of competitive

clusters enable the support of dual application innovation. The partnerships provide funding of

up to 50% of the cost of the proposed programmes, reimbursable if the commercial applications

identified are successful.

partnerships and coordination with civil research organisations, like the National Research Agency

(Agence Nationale pour la Recherche, or ANR), the National Centre for Scientific Research (Centre

National pour la Recherche Scientifique, or CNRS), universities, for scientific innovation and

fundamental research, especially through the funding of doctoral theses.

grants to public research organisations (onEra, isl, cnEs, cEa) as well as to Engineering colleges

under dga supervision, allowing them to execute internal research programmes with the support

of the Ministry of Defence.


3.2.1. Balancing of r&t WorK

DGA has systematised the use of the technology readiness levels (TRL - see Appendix I): PEA are

described with their TRL from beginning to end.

Basic R&T (TRL 1 to 3) explores the field of the emerging technology with potential applications for

defence. It constitutes a breeding-ground for technology, of which the most promising will later be

subjected to deeper research, and possibly later still to demonstrators.

Technological studies (TRL 4 and 5) aim to reduce the technological risk. They enable to transition

from a laboratory concept to a model capable of evolving in an environment representative of its

future usage.

Demonstrators (TRL 6 and 7) make it possible to validate a set of technologies in an environment

representative of the operational environment. They unify teams around ambitious projects or

cooperation, which prepare them to meet the technical challenges of future programmes and to

validate State-governed and industrial organisations.


PS R&T Implementation


The relevant spread of the funding between these three types of activities makes it possible to

advance the targeted technologies in the short and medium term to an acceptable readiness

level for the programmes, without neglecting emerging technologies indispensable to long term


Technology Readiness Level (TRL) Scale


















Actual system “proven” on successful operational mission


Actual system completed and “qualified” through test and demonstration


System prototype demonstrated in an operational environment


System/subsystem model or prototype demonstrated/validated in a relevant environment


Component and/or breadboard verification in a relevant environment


Component and/or breadboard test in a laboratory environment


Analytical or experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof-of-concept


Technology concept and/or application formulated


Basic principles observed or reported

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 27

Hence, DGA aims to allocate:

- 15% of the budget to basic R&T (TRL 2, 3),

- 50% to technological research (TRL 4, 5),

- 35% to technology demonstrators (TRL 6, 7).

3.2.2. Demonstrators Policy

Like a prototype, a technology demonstrator

combines a set of new technologies, often

developed separately, to execute the key

functions of a future product. It makes it

possible to define and verify the accessible

performance in an operational environment,

and to manage the associated technological

and industrial risk.

Demonstrators realised or scheduled in

cooperation for the 2009–2012 period:

- Generic system of networking and information


- Software radio;

- Airborne ground surveillance radar;

- Airborne multichannel active modules radar;

- Electromagnetic multifunction integrated system;

- Cruise missile, post-BDI (Battle Damage


- Hyper-speed hyper-ramjet;

- Land System transformation (Bulle Opérationnelle

Aéroterrestre, or BOA);

Also, demonstrators offer an excellent

framework for structuring cooperation.

Much more than the simple mutualisation

of research effort, these large-scale projects,

like a demonstrator can create conditions

favourable to the realisation of complete

cooperative programmes, by validating the

share of work, industrial alliances as well as

the extension of common standards.

The UCAV European

demonstrator nEUROn:

A structuring project for the European defence industry

- Land combat missile;

- Metric precision ammunition;

- Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle;

- All-weather and re-enforced operational

capability helicopter;

- Close-range minesweeping system;

- Airborne optronics for fire control system;

- Global chemical, biological, radiological, and

nuclear (CBRN) defence system.

Within the next twenty years, the European combat aircraft industry will face two great challenges:

- Development of strategic technologies that the United States already have – or will have – and that will

never be transferred to Europe;

- Maintenance of its clusters of excellence and the workload of its research centres. The European industry

has developed many technological niches, and a lack of workload might make this expertise disappear.

The best way to face these challenges would be to launch a new combat aircraft programme, based on

European-only development. Unfortunately, the replacement schedule for the current generation of

European combat aircraft clearly shows that this opportunity will not come about before around 2030.

Given this situation, French Government has taken the initiative to launch an unmanned combat aircraft

technology demonstrator, project developed in European cooperation..

Via the nEUROn demonstrator, the aim of the French

initiative is to give European research centres a project

enabling them to develop and maintain their strategic

expertise over the coming years. This project will go

further than the theoretical studies conducted so far

within the European Union; up to the manufacture and

in-flight trials of a demonstrator.

The French initiative is also an opportunity to launch an

innovative process for the management and organisation

of a European cooperative programme. In order to be

efficient, the programme is managed by a single body,

DGA, and a unique executing unit, Dassault Aviation,

general contractor of the nEUROn programme.

Apart from France, the Italian, Swedish, Spanish, Greek and

Swiss governments, as well as their respective industries:

Alenia, SAAB, EADS, Hellenic Aerospace Industry (HAI)

and RUAG, constitute, around the nEUROn programme, a

successful model of European cooperation.


Dassault Aviation

28 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

3.2.3. Fast integration of technology

In order to extract the best from the most recent technological advances and encourage their

insertion into future systems, the Ministry of defence favours modular and open architectures.

This approach, introduced occasionally or in some sectors (avionics, naval combat systems, modular

drone systems) until 2003, has been re-enforced and used in a multi-disciplinary manner with the

creation of the “system of systems” technical expertise area.

The French MoD battlelab (LTO, Laboratoire Technico-opérationnel) is a powerful tool to study

and validate operational concepts and new technologies. In particular, it makes it possible to place

operational users in realistic future conditions of use.

Involvement of clients through the LTO

As a DGA-EMA national entity, managed by the CATOD (Centre d’Analyse Technico-Opérationnelle de la

Défense, or CATOD), in Arcueil, the Ministry of Defence’s battlelab (LTO) is a structure that instrumentalises

the definition and evaluation of capability issues in a collegial manner, involving DGA as well as the

armed forces and industry. Thus, the LTO provides a set of methods, services and tools enabling shared

and interdisciplinary discussion on doctrines, concepts, architectures or organisations, and offers the

opportunity to carry out experiments

virtually (through simulation) or

in the field (with hybrid devices

mixing simulations, prototypes

and real equipment). It can also

carry out inter-connection and

interoperability of several systems

and participants, from State,

industry or even allied countries or

organisations (NATO, etc.). It also

enables, through the use of concept

imaging and modelling tools, to

have a multi-cultural team share

a common interpretation of the

concepts and scenarios used. The

LTO has been operational since the

end of 2006 and has demonstrated

its added value in terms of

creativity and collaborative work

with clients (forces) and industrial

prime contractors. It has also been

used for global security issues,

passing outside of the strict defence

LTO Exercice




PS R&T Implementation


Special forces equipments

The role of the special operations is to offer the authorities nonconventional

options for riposte. In terms of equipment, Special

Operations Command (Commandement des Opérations Spéciales,

or COS) looks for equipments in limited quantity and with reduced

lifespan but offering breakthrough capabilities. Their needs are defined

between COS and DGA in the framework of a DGA-COS mixed creativity


The PEA objective is to develop and produce demonstrators that will

be used by the special forces in order to evaluate their operational

potential. They are selected using a scope statement and will allow to:

- increase the special forces operational capability

- enable the advanced use of technical solutions which may later be of

interest for the conventional forces

- test innovative procurement procedures.

This research programme is a perfect example of a short loop between

operational requirements, technical solutions and operational


VAB with electromagnetic jammer


Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 29



3.3.1. Cooperation with

civilian research

Collaboration and the search for synergies

between defence and the institutional research

community must be developed, encouraged and

reinforced in order to:

• Urge laboratories and motivate the best

researchers in the French science and

technology community to work on topics of

interest for defence;

• Increase the efficiency of the shared financial

resources and thus contribute to a more

efficient public research system;

• Spread the knowledge of defence needs

outside the ministry and share the defence

goals with the civilian community;

• Integrate defence into national and European

civilian research networks by stimulating new

research tracks with innovative laboratories

and SMEs, by supporting competitive cluster

projects of interest to defence.

The following must be developed in order to

stimulate these synergies:

• Direct contact and discussion with the bodies

in charge of research policy: civilian ministries

(Research, Interior, Industry, Transport, etc.),

agencies (ANR, OSEO, etc.), and the strategic

directorates of large research organisms

(CNRS, CNES, etc.)


Defence R&T contributes significantly to

the global security objective, encouraging

collaboration with civilian research organisms

and civil authorities on protecting against

the biological and chemical threat, as well as

medical support.

The policy of the Ministry of Defence aims to:

• Use the results of this civilian research,

notably by participating in their funding

• Encourage coordination between

different funding organisms (e.g. EDA and

the European Commission)

The search for synergies is the search for

the best use of State’s resources in order for

defence to guide and take advantage of

civilian “security” research programmes for

defence purposes, both at the national (ANR

programmes) and international (European

Security Research Programme - ESRP) levels.

For example, in the information processing

domain, the Ministry of Defence has long

involved the civilian ministries in the R&T

programms to develop technological building

blocks for the automatic processing of the

spoken word. The launch in early 2008 of

a permanent group will reinforce defencesecurity

synergies in the long term. Defence

also associates organisms concerned by

open information. It invests in video image

intelligent processing for video, noncooperative

biometry linked to work carried

out by the National Police.

• Participation in the ANR, European Commission and competitive cluster project management


• Exploitation of the dual research programme (191) of the Budget Law (Loi Organique relative

aux Lois de Finance, or LOLF)

• Implementation of joint Research and Development projects with civilian research.

Defence has also taken a strong position in favour of the development of competitive clusters

mobilising collaboration from universities and research institutions, industry (large companies and

SMEs), institutional territorial actors, around high visibility shared national and international R&D


Aware of the technical and economic issues at stake for the clusters, the Ministry of Defence

decided, as early as 2005, to provide financial support. This process makes it possible to involve

SMEs as well as large groups in research designed to promote technological innovation for dual

applications with an important leverage effect.

This cooperation between DGA and the civilian research community and industry, particularly SMEs,

can exist at the strategic level as well as on specific projects, shaped by agreements, partnerships

and also contracts.

30 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

3.3.2. Development of international cooperation Selected and better targeted forums

Bilateral cooperation has already proved very efficient. France intends to develop bilateral

cooperation with those countries in Europe that dedicate significant parts of their activities to

defence and share common goals in terms of DTIB and capability vision. As far as other countries are

concerned, European and non-European, France intends to engage into “a la carte” cooperation,

depending on specific interest and opportunities following a less structured path and concentrating

on very specific competences. France enjoys a special relationship with the five other European

countries (10) , with the largest R&T budgets.

France sees the European Defence Agency (EDA) as the preferred forum for multilateral cooperation.

The four departments of the Agency provide a coherent structure to prepare for the future. The new

organisation of the R&T department echoes the French approach. The European R&T strategy which

was approved of by Ministers in November 2008 sets the scene for R&T cooperation. Technological

priorities are now in place and will provide the background for common R&T projects.

In essence, NATO provides the appropriate forum to discuss interoperability issues and standards.

NATO Research & Technology Organisation (RTO) does not do R&T but offers the opportunity to

share experience in a large number of areas. France intends to carefully select its participation to

some of the many working groups even though, in terms of technology watch, it would be in its

interest to be more involved. New tools

So far R&T cooperation meant:

• Information exchange sometimes leading to an exchange of results of R&T national studies

and in turn to cooperation for the next phase.

• Coordinated work with each party placing a separate contract for part of the work and sharing


• Collaborative programme contracts placed with consortia made of industries belonging to

the participating nations (a variation consists in placing the contract with a prime contractor

supported by sub-contractors with the approval of the participating Nations).

The above methods are perfectly adequate. However, they are not ideal in terms of DTIB since each

country chooses their contractors locally. It makes sense to resort to a wider competition in order

to select the best technological solutions.

In the recent past, in agreement with its partners, France began to encourage the development of

new concepts to allow a certain level of competition. They are:

• Innovation Technology Partnerships (ITP) to structure certain parts of the DTIB. A prime

contractor, in partnership with Governments, co-ordinates R&T work in a number of technical

areas open to competition. The ITP is open to academia and research laboratories as well as

SMEs. The concept is already in use in two collaborative programmes: one bilateral (UK and

France) project on missiles and one on multifunction compact radars (France, Sweden and UK)

within EDA. France is determined to promote the concept using lessons learnt from the first

two projects.

• Joint Investment Programmes (JIP) in EDA which select a number of common technological

objectives with a view to find the best possible solutions by issuing a call for proposals to

a large audience. A group of experts chosen among participating Nations then assesses the

offers on the basis of criteria agreed in advance and later submits its selection to a Steering

Committee. Two programmes are now in the making.

- The “Force Protection” programme with 20 countries, including France, Germany and Poland

which contribute 60% of the overall project.

- The “ICET” (Innovative Concept and Emerging Technologies) programme with 11 countries

promoting R&T research. France, Germany and Spain contribute 2/3 of the overall programme.


The United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden


PS R&T Implementation


Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 31

France intends to use lessons learnt from the above JIPs to develop the concept based on a

competition of ideas. IPR (intellectual property rights) better suited to R&T cooperation

As mentioned in the above paragraph, R&T collaborative projects have been designed with a view

to preserve a balance between the contributions of each participant. This was done by resorting to

the traditional IPR concept.

While promoting state-of-the art technological innovation, France is aware that, in the absence of

a secure system ensuring the protection of innovation, the best players will discouraged. The risk

is less with low TRL since time is needed to go from concept to technology. With medium TRL, the

risk is high since there is no stopping those involved in the development of technologies (and not

necessarily as originators) from passing them on to integrators. France is therefore determined to

be part of any forum, particularly within EDA, addressing the issue. Which R&T cooperation?

For the moment, cooperation is limited to “basic research” and “applied research”, simple and

involving relatively small amounts of money. The new mechanisms, as mentioned above, should

allow making better use of their R&T potential.

With the exception of nEUROn, cooperations on demonstrators are still few and far between, even

though demonstrators would help serve European DTIB and represent significant investments.

France is determined to promote an ambitious approach of demonstrators. A recent list of European

technological priorities showed that several of our European partners were clearly interested in

developing collaboration on architectures, with a special interest for air and land.


3.4.1. Research Organisations Public establishments under the authority (or co-authority) of Ministry of Defence

These organisations contribute, at various TRL:

- To the acquisition of defence technological capability;

- To DGA‘s technical expertise capability, in their domains of excellence, and in coordination with

the Technical Directorate;

- In maintaining expertise.

They also facilitate the relationship between defence and civilian R&T organisations, facilitating

the monitoring of scientific progress and the exploitation of dual work.

For this, they receive subsidies (for their research activities) and contractual funding (for their

application activities and transfers to industry).

French Ministry of Defence has authority over three organisations, Institut Saint-Louis (ISL) (shared

with Germany), ONERA and CNES (shared with the Research Ministry) in order to:

• Improve the general framework of their activities and act in order to have the necessary

evolution take place in each of them, while respecting the spirit of a subsidy;

• Provide an interface with the DGA directions in charge of the prioritisation of their technical


• Follow the performance of the pluriannual contracts with the Government and the overall

financial balance of the establishments, and notably, oversee the contractual activity (finality

of funding, control of research and application activities).

Although DGA has no formal authority over CEA, it participates in the same manner in orienting

CEA’s activities with defence subsidies.

32 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

institut de saint louis (isl)

ISL is an important actor in defence research, and

contributes to the development of the technology

capacities of the industry, French and German in


It carries out work in five areas, oriented by the

CCRE (11) : laser-material interaction, perforation

and armours, protection and environment of the

combatant, projectiles acceleration, and projectiles

command. ISL is notably known for its expertise in

internal ballistic, explosions, electric acceleration

of projectiles, aero-acoustics, metrology, and laser


In the framework of the modernisation process in

recent years, the ISL has several major objectives,


PEGASUS: electric rail gun

- Open up its activity: by developing dual activities, notably linked to security; through the

development of contractual activity, notably through European projects (7th Framework Program,

European Security Research Programme, or ESRP); through the reinforcement of partnerships

with other research establishments and industry;

- “Europeanise”: by contributing firstly to the constitution of a network of European defence

research institutes, then to the creation, through EDA, of a European research centre for defence

and security.




The assessment of the first pluriannual 2004-2008

“objectives and means contract” (Contrat d’Objectifs

et de Moyens, COM) confirmed ONERA’s role in the

aeronautics and space domain; it contributes to

excellence in this field. This contract emphasised in

particular ONERA’s strengths: scientific excellence,

openness to the outside world, importance

of innovation and detection of technological

breakthroughs. Its capacity to conduct pluridisciplinary

research, control the systems, provide expertise for

the needs of the Ministry of Defence and its European

ambitions, especially in cooperation with its German

counterpart, DLR, are strong assets for ONERA. The

development of its expertise activities for DGA is an

important result of the COM.


The key priorities of ONERA for 2009-2014 - the new Military Planning Law period - to be included

in the next COM currently being finalised, are the following:

- ONERA contributes to defence research as a national technical referrer, a breeder of technologies

and concepts, and in providing specific support to DGA project management, in the following

technical domains: Airborne Systems Architecture, Command-Control-Communication-Intelligence

Systems Architecture, Sensors-Guidance-Navigation, Missiles, Arms and Nuclear Security, Materials

and Components, Systems of Systems;

- ONERA maintains a prospective dialogue with the Forces Systems Architects;

- ONERA contributes to the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB), with specific effort

in terms of SMEs.

The 2009-2014 COM sets forth these priorities in detail.


PS R&T Implementation



CCRE: Conseil Consultatif des Recherches et Etudes

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 33

national centre for space research (Centre national d’études spatiales, or cnEs)

Via the defence team at CNES (DGA-EMA-CNES

members), designed to detect and promote defence

and security dual activities of, DGA is involved in

guiding CNES activity toward the preparation of future

observation, intelligence and telecommunication

systems, and general R&T in defence and security.

This action has triggered DGA-CNES cooperation

on several projects, partly financed by the subsidy

attributed under the dual research programme,

notably: ELISA (Electromagnetic Intelligence

demonstrator), Pleiades (optical observation), Altika

(altimetric oceanography), Athena-Fidus (high

bandwidth telecommunications), MUSIS CSO (post-

Helios preparatory actions), CERES (Electromagnetic

Intelligence programme, in a preliminary research



Defence also encourages joint projects between

CNES and ONERA. This approach has materialised since 2004 with several partnership agreements

in the domain of space orbital systems, launchers, and exploration robotics.

EADS Astrium

Commissariat à l’énergie atomique, or cEa

Through its fundamental research, the CEA has

built up a scientific potential of great value. For

the future, in the domain of deterrence, the goal is

to lead and adapt the research activity of CEA to

its indispensable global reduction in a context of

restricted budgets. The challenge will be to maintain

this potential for nuclear safety and propulsion, and

to maintain the scientific credibility of CEA/DAM

(Military Applications Directorate) in the absence of

nuclear experimentation thanks to simulation.

In the framework of a CEA-DGA partnership

agreement, discussions are under way in order to

coordinate some complementary defence research

action to be carried out by departments within CEA

and DGA.

Megajoule Laser

CEA Enginnering colleges under the dga authority

In a context of the internationalisation of academia and of increased competitiveness, the

Engineering colleges under the authority of the Ministry of Defence (Ecole polytechnique, Ecole

Nationale Supérieure des Techniques Avancées - ENSTA, Institut Supérieur de l’Aéronautique et de

l’Espace - ISAE and Ecole Nationale Supérieure d’Ingénieurs des Etudes et Techniques d’Armement

- ENSIETA) have invested in several areas of change regarding teaching and research which they

have taken to care to coordinate with the cycle of change that recently took place in France in

the field of higher education: the Licence Master Doctorat! (12) reform, the creation of research and

higher education clusters, and the creation of advanced research thematic networks, etc.

Among the main development priorities that have been chosen, are, in particular; international

openness, a coherent set of Masters courses of interest for defence (e.g. an Ecole Polytechnique

Master in Systems of Systems Engineering) and increased internal sources of revenues (research

contracts, chairs, etc.)

DGA also uses the scientific and technical expertise of these establishments to carry out defenceoriented

research and provide expertise to the R&T work of the research programmes (PEAs).


Levels of diplom

34 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 Other research organisations

Relations with other research organisations, other than the direct contacts and joint participation

in scientific networks, essentially consist in the funding of research work, with exploratory research

and innovation contracts (REI) and the funding of researchers (doctors, post-doctors, researchers,

confirmed researchers). This mode of interaction enables the promotion of defence needs within

the national academic community and maintenance within DGA of a scientific monitoring capacity

by closely following advanced scientific research work

3.4.2. Acquisition Policy

The Ministry of Defence’s acquisition policy is based on the principle of competitive autonomy

enabling to seek the best economic efficiency for purchases while preserving an autonomous supply.

The goal of R&T acquisition is to enable the application of this principle for future programmes. This

principle leads to different responses (sovereignty, cooperation, recourse to the global marketplace)

depending on the end use of the equipments concerned.

Examples of acquisition policies:

- Sovereignty: nuclear submarines, strategic missiles, electronic warfare, navigation

- Cooperation: A400M, Tigre, NH90, nEUROn, UAV

- World Market: wheeled vehicles, air observation planes, catapult for aircraft carrier

This R&T acquisition policy (notably the scope of competitive purchasing) is set forth each year

for each technical division with regard to the operational, technological, industrial, financial

and international considerations. These recommendations, concerning top level contracting, are

grouped into around sixty products segments with technological and industrial coherency. They

determine the scope of the competition purchasing and cooperation.


R&T procurement

The principle of competitive autonomy applies to European cooperation R&T programmes. In order

to obtain the best economic conditions, but also to stimulate innovation and improve output,

procurement must be made with recourse to the widest possible competition. It must be carried

out within a geographical scope adapted to the desired degree of autonomy. For cooperative

research and technology programmes, the scope of competition is the area formed by the countries

participating to their funding.

PS R&T Implementation


Procurement Plans

At the second industrial contracting level, the Ministry of Defence favours the use of procurement

plans. These aim to give DGA visibility and transparency over the competitive acquisitions by the

prime contractor and favour competition-stimulated innovation.

Purchasing procedures adapted to exploratory research and innovation

Defence develops direct contracts with scientific actors, SMEs and industry, for exploratory research

and innovation. Special procedures (REI and RAPID) make it possible to establish contracts quickly

for non-solicited proposals.


3.4.3. Actions for SMEs

Defence action for SMEs consists firstly in maintaining a constant watch in order to identify and know

those SMEs with strategic interest for the needs of defence. The Ministry of Defence implements

different intervention tools in their favour. In the domain of R&T, it is more specifically for upstream

research, the REI (Exploratory Research and Innovation) projects and joint funding with OSEO-ANVAR.

SMEs’ access to defence research must be encouraged by accessible, relevant and clear information

offering SMEs a greater capacity to anticipate and direct their work. Greater value must be given to

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 35

SMEs, freeing their growth potential, by, for example, improving their administrative relations with

DGA. Different DGA-SME Action Plan initiatives must facilitate SMEs’ access to public procurement

by providing them with the resources, not only financial but also human, necessary for their

development and facilitate innovative technology transfer towards industry.

In this framework, the creation of a dedicated bureau within DGA’a SME Bureau, makes it possible

to implement SME support measures. One of the goals of this bureau is to propagate within the

Ministry of Defence better knowledge of the expertise and innovations of SMEs and to have a better

knowledge of market opportunities. SMEs thereby benefit from advice on the tools implemented

by defence and on the rules (contracting, exports, REI contracts, RAPID, etc.). SMEs have a dedicated

area on the DGA portal

The Ministry of Defence wishes to offer SMEs increased visibility of its R&T priorities and of the

resulting opportunities for upstream research contracts. For this purpose, defence organises every

year the “R&T workshops day” for technology SMEs and thematic forums.

Direct access by SMEs to public contracting is encouraged by the renewal and optimisation of

purchasing procedures, by the adaptation of the DGA organisation and by an improved link

between exploratory research, upstream research, development and production. The Ministry of

Defence has set up a purchasing team dedicated and adapted to small contracts, making it possible

to shorten contracting delays and adapt procedures to the SMEs. This reorganisation is accompanied

by the adoption of new contractual clauses aimed at limiting the financial risk of companies for

high technology contracts.

The Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employment and the Ministry of Defence announced

on 11 May 2009 the launch of RAPID, a mechanism supporting strategic innovation projects of

SMEs. The SME support regime for Dual Innovation, or RAPID (Régime d’Appui aux PME pour

l’Innovation Duale) will support high technological potential industrial research or experimental

development projects with military applications but also civilian market spinout. Any independent

SME with fewer than 250 employees, either alone or in a consortium with a company or research

organisation, may offer an unsolicited proposal, in order to benefit from

a “RAPID” subsidy. The mechanism is set up in order to be extremely

reactive and to be able to finance selected projects within a four-month

delay between submission of the dossier and the start of work. RAPID is

implemented by the Directorate General for Competitiveness, Industry

and Services (Direction Générale de la Compétitivité, de l’Industrie et

des Services, or DGCIS) and DGA, which will jointly assess the proposed

projects and thereby reinforce their strategic action in favour of

developing these companies.

3.4.4. Promote Innovation

Innovation is an essential component in preparation for the future. In both its mission to equip the

armed forces and that of preparation for the future, the Ministry of Defence places innovation at

the heart of its role as public contractor, responsible for the availability of technologies. For this

purpose, it aims to facilitate the emergence of innovative ideas that may lead to new concepts and

performance or cost improvements sought by users.

DGA has created at the end of 2004 the mechanism called “REI” - Recherche Exploratoire et

Innovation – whose goal is to manage the projects proposed without request by research laboratories

and innovating small and medium-sized enterprises, alone or in partnership.

More information is available on the DGA website “”. The link to “REI news” describes

themes that are of particular scientific interest for defence.

In addition, the Mission for Scientific Innovation and Research has been animating since 2004 and

in cooperation with the Council of French Defence Industries (Conseil des Industries de Défense,

or CIDEF) and the French Aeronautical and Space Industries Group (Groupement des Industries

Françaises Aéronautiques et Spatiales, or GIFAS) a working group whose goals are:

36 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

- identify the limits of present technological


- monitor emerging technologies;

- analyse breakthrough potentials and

their consequences for equipment

performance, costs and concepts of use;

- define technological roadmaps and

identify accessible or specific industrial

organisations concerned.

The group has established a list of forty

technologies considered to have potential

for breakthrough. The presence within this

group of the main companies forming our

defence industrial and technological base,

makes it possible to share the strategic

visions underlying R&T projects to be

launched, and also to have better visibility

with regard to the feasibility of integrating

technological advances into future

equipments. The group procedure must

make it possible to favour technological

innovation and anticipate its integration

into future systems.

Eligibility criteria for REIs

Beneficiaries of this

procedure must be:

- either public research


- or innovative SMEs,

- or private research laboratories, associated

with a SME or a public laboratory,

- or a group of laboratories and SMEs.

The REI projects must enable the exploiration of

new scientific approaches of interest for defence.

Innovative SMEs may act in partnership with

academic or industrial research laboratories.

The maximum funding by DGA is €300k (incl.

VAT) for periods up to 36 months. In case of

a particularly ambitious project with several

partners, including at least one SME, this can be

supplemented with an option carrying maximum

funding by DGA (base + option) of €500k (incl.

VAT). The selection committee is free to accept

or reject the proposed option.



Defence R&T depends on the defence section of the Budget Law, and more precisely on programme

144 “Environment and Prospective for Defence Policy”. Its budgets are thus included in the scope

of the Military Planning Law.

Defence R&T has represented an annual budget of around 800 million Euros in the Budget Law in

recent years. The Economic Recovery Plan (Plan de Relance de l’Economie) has pushed this budget

up to around 930 million Euros in the 2009 Budget Law.

So-called dual R&T, with military as well as civilian end uses, is the topic of programme 191 “Dual

Research”, that contributes to the Interministry Mission for Research and High Education (MIRES)

and that includes State funding to the two operators of this programme during this period, CNES

and CEA. Its annual budget has been about 200 million Euros over recent years. n

PS R&T Implementation


Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 37

38 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009


Technological analysis


4.1.1. Key technologies

The Ministry of Defence develops its strategy and its activity focusing on key technologies necessary

to prepare, use and evolve our weapon systems with the appropriate level of autonomy.

Research studies are always connected either to a capability requirement, or to new promising

technologies (see Chapter 3). They are always led by actors belonging to a technical division and a

DGA business activity (see Appendix IV (12) ). It belongs to a family of technologies identified in the

PS R&T and qualified by a Technology Readiness Level (see Appendix I).

The key technology approach of the PS R&T makes it possible to attribute to a single identified

project manager the definition of national competences desired, the organisation of discussions

with foreign partners or civilians, the launch and follow-up of actions in cooperation, and knowledge

management and training.

4.1.2. Tables of technologies

The tables presented below specify “required national capabilities”:

- Fields to be controlled at the national level (specifications and integrating industry on national


- Nature of the activity: techno-operational expertise of the government and industry, purchaser’s

skills (smart customer (14) ),

- Certain data influencing upstream R&T (critical performance, environmental conditions, safety,

vulnerability, conditions of integration, through life support, etc.) and some information on

crossover with civilian research.

Informations on “cooperation” indicate:

- Technical areas for which cooperation is sought,

- Forums under consideration, mentioning certain partner countries. The missing mention of

countries in the text and the table referring thereto means that every option is examined on an

individual case basis,

- Nature of cooperation activities: demonstration, benchmarking, preparation of design capability,

preparation of a capability for reactive adaptation,

- Methods of organisation considered: distribution of technological sets of themes among partners

under joint access terms; sharing of results; production of equipment or demonstrators by sharing

tasks or under the supervision of a sole contracting authority and prime contractor; preparation

of a joint programme or of an evolution; other constraints.





Appendix IV presents the technical divisions of the DGA as well as the business activities and their contribution

to R&T.


Acknowledgement of the industrial technical bid, its technical level, its accessibility; ability to propose and evaluate

acquisition strategy allowing to give rise to industrial organisation, technical solutions optimising the response to

the need; ability to propose R&T strategies to develop technologies and to give rise to technical and industrial fields,

if necessary

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 39

4.1.3. Eco-dEsign

Sustainable development requirements described in § 2.4, 2.5 and 2.8 bring the expression of key

priorities in terms of energy consumption and environmental impact reduction from the design

stage and all through the life-cycle of defence and security systems.

Apart from the unifying project “master energy dependency” which objective is to manage all R&T

activities related to weapon systems in the domain of energy, these priorities are described in the

technological analysis of the different divisions, in the paragraphs below.

The 5 following areas reflect transversal concerns shared by all analyses presented in this chapter:

- Research for less polluting technologies or procedures;

- Substitution of the most impactful or suspect substances (precautionary principle);

- Control of noise pollutions;

- Systematic integration of environmental aspects in project management;

- Systematic use of simulation for design, validation and training.


A system of systems (SoS) is a set of inter-connected autonomous systems, coordinated in order to

satisfy a military capability and/or to realise a number of predetermined effects that none of the

participating systems could achieve alone (emerging capability linked to the system of systems).

The SoS area covers activities linked to:

- Analysis and definition of the architecture of systems of systems, with tasking between the

participating systems and control of the interfaces,

- Rationalisation and urbanisation of the SoS (including the Information Systems),

- Design of methods and engineering and simulation tools necessary for the preparation, design,

acquisition, evolution and restoration, with controlled costs and risks, of systems and “systems of


SCCOA System of systems


40 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

The challenge concerns the capacity to control complexity and risks, design defence systems with

lower costs and shorter delivery times, increase their reliability, ensure interoperability of systems

at the various levels required by joint and multinational operations, and manage interfaces with

civilian devices.

The Ministry of Defence, and more particularly DGA, is interested in maintaining a high level of

skills for the various technical areas directly tied to the concept of system of systems and listed


4.2.1. rEpository, corE systEM nEtWorK and architEcturE fraMEWorKs

The approach for core system network chosen by DGA leads to mutualisation and rationalisation

of the elements used in C3I systems, with a goal of modularity. This modularity aims to reduce

dependency between components and limit the impact of local evolutions and thereby the risks

of related programmes. This approach contains a general framework of technical architecture, a

reference frame of standards (such as for example the “NATO C3 technical architecture”), a list of

hardware and software products and a reference frame of data architecture to guarantee control

of interoperability. The general architecture frameworks defines, for the Ministry of Defence,

a standardised manner to control architecture while taking as a starting point the enterprise

architecture approach of the civilian sector. They provide a means to model, represent, understand,

analyse, share and specify the capacities, systems, systems of systems and operational processes.

Those models may be very complex and they are therefore represented from various viewpoints, each

with a specific purpose (“operational”, “techniques”, “services”, etc.). The architecture frameworks

carry a standard set of views. They are commonly used in the governance of information systems.

In recent years, DGA has been using the “proprietary” architecture framework: AGATE (15) for the

Command and Control Information Systems (CIS) programmes. Taking into account the ongoing

convergence of the main frameworks of architecture adapted to defence and in order to facilitate

exchanges with the industry and allied forces, DGA has decided to adopt the NATO Architectural

Framework (NAF). Design evolutions are still necessary in order to meet the needs of the Systems

of Systems.

4.2.2. dEcision-MaKing procEssEs

One of the key interests in the increasing digitalisation of the battle-space and the networking of

actors is to benefit from a largely facilitated access to information and thus improve the preparation

of decisions and the coordination of actions. The engagement of our forces must be accompanied

and prepared with operational planning and decision making support tools. Progress is necessary

in corresponding technologies such as:

- Distributed man-machines interfaces, similar to those used for virtual enterprises and information

systems of corporations (beside this, not specifically for SoS, technologies allowing a rapid

reconfiguration of Man Machine Interfaces – widgets... - deserve special attention because they

allow to solve ergonomics problems that can stir up rejection by final users.)

- Multi agent systems with application to cooperative engagement, robotics and mobile networks.

Other fields of research, related to functional chains, are of special interest to DGA:

- Heterogeneous data fusion (including symbolic data) from multiple distributed sources

- Supervision and automatic reconfiguration of complex systems and systems of systems (autoregulated

computing, autonomic computing, etc.)

- Improvement of the robustness of the functional chains against breakdowns and attacks (jamming,

intrusion, computer attacks)





AGATE: Atelier de Gestion des Architectures Techniques

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 41

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Networked function


situation awareness

Fusion at plot level for multiplatforms/multi-sensors


panoramic watch, IR, ESM)

Heterogeneous data fusion

(including human information)

for land contact combat


function Command

Command/Decision aids

European cooperation

National expertise



Engagement and

collective use of

the weapons

Optimisation under

constraint in real-time

Networked function

Survivability of SoS

Fault-tolerance (failure detection),

robust architectures (SOA,

GRID) Self-configuring

(degraded mode)

Resistance to external attack

(collaborative protection, threat

detection and alert diffusion,

counter-measure coordination)

European cooperation

National expertise

Cognitive aspects in

Systems of Systems

Cognitive aspects in

systems of systems

European cooperation

National expertise

4.2.3. Network architectures

In the field of the Network Architectures, DGA will build its knowledge on important activity

existing in the civilian world. DGA considers as necessary to use civilian technologies such as:

- IPv6 protocol;

- Service Oriented Architectures (SOA). DGA is particularly interested in the evaluation of operational

and economic contribution of Services Oriented Architectures in defence systems;

- Real-time distributed Middleware.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

SoS architecture

Frameworks Development for SoS

architecture: generic architectures

(SOA) and applied architectures

(patterns: Ballistic Missile Defence,

Land networked capabilities)

National expertise

Battle lab

Interoperability within SoS: Standards

Tools and methods for battle labs

European cooperation

and NATO

European control

for the definition

of the methods

National control

for the application

In the long term, multi level security solutions, with the management of users’ rights, will be available

and standardised for the needs of corporations. The security aspects are also very impacted at the

tactical level by the dynamic nature of the network (compatibility with IPSEC, VPN with dynamic ad

hoc networks, architecture Red/Black, “by-pass” for QoS, etc.).

42 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

4.2.4. Methods and tools for systems engineering

In order to unify as much as possible the set of common tools, DGA wishes to develop a continuous

dialogue with industry and corporations in this field through the various usual forums for discussions

(AFIS, Industrial associations, etc.) and competitive clusters, and also promotes cooperation with

other interested countries.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Methods and tools for

systems engineering

Systems of systems engineering

(Agile software development,

representation of architecture,

testability of the systems of

systems and assistance to the

definition of tests, tools for rough

estimates of the cost of SoS)

Validation and qualification methods

of SoS architectures (metrics,

processes, integration labs)



European control

for the definition

of methods

National control

for the application

4.2.5. Engineering and reliability of embedded systems

The studies carried out in this field relate to the optimisation of embedded systems and to the tools

and methodologies to manage obsolescence and reliability (formal methods).

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Formal methods

Analysis and validation of the

reliability of life-critical systems

adapted to new distributed

information processing architectures

Engineering and

reliability of

embedded systems

Embedded systems engineering


independence, segmentation

of applications for IVVQ (16) )



European control

for the definition

of methods

National control

for the application

Open architecture

4.2.6. Infrastructures, tools, technologies and standards for simulation

The topics of interest for defence are in particular:

- Infrastructures for simulation, to build, on a national or cooperative basis, federations of

simulations, simulators and real systems, for experimentation with operators in representative

situations, within the framework of LTO (17) ;

- Methods and standards: development and application of a methodological and technological

common reference framework of Verification Validation Accreditation (VVA), HLA certification,

specification of environmental data exchange formats between simulations (SEDRIS);

- Generic models: the constitution of model libraries (generic, coherent with present needs,

evolutionary, perennial and validated) is necessary for simulation used for the analysis and design

of complex systems. Multi level studies (aggregation/disaggregation) of the modelling of human

behaviour for the automation of simulations, and of the impact on the command chain of new

forms of combat are essential to reach a high level of skill in this field;

- Simulation environments allowing fast and simple composition of the above-mentioned models,

notably in the framework of techno-operational analyses.





IVVQ: Integration, Verification, Validation, Qualification.


LTO: Laboratoire Technico-Opérationnel

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 43

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Interoperability between simulations

(standards, HLA certification,

SEDRIS) and between simulations

and Command & Control

Information Systems (CBML)

Architectures of simulation, structures

of federations (LAN, WAN)

Validation, verification and

accreditation of simulations (IVVQ)

Security of distributed simulation

systems (Protection of classified

simulations into federations)

Techniques and environments

for modelling, Domain

Specific Language (DSL)


tools, technologies

and standards

for simulation


cooperation, NATO

National control

for the application

Internet technologies (Webbased

Services, cartography,

etc.) for defence infrastructures

and simulation tools

Technologies developed for multi

player computer games applied

to defence simulation tools


The technical “Architecture and techniques for Aeronautical Systems” area covers technical activities

necessary for the preparation, public contracting and role of technical authority regarding systems

based on manned fixed-wing or rotary-wing air platforms including unmanned combat air vehicles

(UCAV) and also systems able to land men and equipment from the air (parachutes, airdrop, etc.)

The role of technical authority includes in particular expertise activities for the navigability of

aircrafts including UAV systems.

The major technological priorities are:

System design

R&T programs must address the primary concern which is to ensure in-service support and to enable

current platforms to evolve. The analysis of equipment plans shows that little new equipment will

enter into service before 2020, and even by 2040. Even before the preparatory phase of clarifying

operational needs prior to the launch of a new programme, it is necessary to prepare industrial

capabilities, in order to offer competitive technologies. However, the main primary contractors of

aeronautical systems are all dual, which ensures the renewal of most necessary skills. The sustainment

of skills is a major issue for the area, and relates also to aircraft in service, the evolution of which,

including management of obsolescence, requires certain specific military skills, in particular for the

carriage and integration of new armaments and combat systems.

It is necessary for DGA to preserve control of the tools enabling in-service support of existing and

future platforms (structural modelling, aging platforms, processing of in-service events), and the

validation of new technological solutions, enabling it to answer in a reactive and effective way to

requests for evolution resulting from operational needs.

With regard to European cooperation, DGA wishes to support the European Defence Agency

in launching actions to promote new technologies adapted to the needs of military aircrafts.

Other cooperation, for example bilateral, is however also possible, in the interests of efficiency.

For demonstrators of integration, the organisation of multilateral cooperation will have to be

implemented, with the need for identifying a single industrial prime contractor able to guarantee

the maintenance of integration skills and ensure overall consistency.

44 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Integration of combat

aircraft platform

Preliminary design tools

for combat aircrafts

Multidisciplinary design

Acceleration of design loops

Concurrent engineering

Share of the design


numerical design


Exchanges of results

in the preparation

of a demonstrator

National control for

the global design

overall concept of platforms without equipments

The control of basic technologies, which is constantly evolving (aerodynamics, structures, low

observable (LO) technologies), and of their association and implementation, is necessary for the

future in-service support of the aircraft

(processing of in-service events),

and will be essential for the design

of new platforms. In these fields,

certain technological breakthroughs

will remain possible and have to be

evaluated. The evaluation of these

aeronautical technologies must be able

to be based on the upstream scientific

skills existing in research laboratories,

like ONERA, which will remain a

key partner for industrial teams for

the modelling of complex physical

phenomena, or for the adoption

of innovative technologies. ONERA

also has an important role providing

scientific and technical expertise for

the benefit of DGA.


R&T areas Key technologies Coopération National capabilities

New piloting forms and laws


Aerodynamics and

flight control of

combat aircrafts

Aeroelasticity and



Flow control, new control surfaces

adapted to LO platforms

Carriage and internal

weapon carriage

Flutter prediction

Interaction with flight control

Design and justification

Prevision of dynamic effects


of tools

Exchange of results

Wind tunnel testing

for numerical

tools validations

National control for

the aerodynamic

and structural

environment of

combat aircrafts

including LO





Methods for



Structures of new platforms (LO)

Structural vulnerability

Control of ageing aircraft

(diagnostics and methods of repair)


of tools


Repair technologies

National control

to allow the

evolution of the

aircraft in service

(qualification of

storage integration)

and reparability

Control of the environment

(corrosion), eco-design

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 45

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Tools, modelling methods, tests

Reduction of


(EM) and Infrared

(IR) signatures of

combat aircrafts

Reduction of the detectability EM

and IR of existing platforms)

Reduction of detectability of

air intakes and afterbodies

Methods and means for in-service


Benchmarking of tools

Sharing of results


National expertise

Tools, modelling methods, tests



Behaviour under strain

(lightning, strong fields)

Electromagnetic and

radioelectric compatibility

Methods and tests


National control

of models and

test methods

Unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV)

Even if their entry into service is not foreseeable before at least 2020, the concept of the UCAV

is the object of multiple demonstration programmes, both in the USA and Europe. France has

involved itself with several other European countries in the definition and realisation of the

nEUROn demonstrator, which was centred on the design of a Low Observability platform able to

release an armament from an internal weapon storage. The observability goals are very ambitious

and much higher than those for manned combat aircrafts. The work has already highlighted a

few technical areas of difficulty that imply that the initial performance objectives will not be met

during the demonstration. It is thus necessary to maintain the research and demonstration efforts

on the Low Observability UCAV platform in order to be able to continue to follow the roadmap

towards an eventual programme.

UCAV engines will probably derive from existing civilian or military engines, while taking into

account the flight envelope and performances considered. It will be advisable however to examine

the specific constraints induced by the integration into the platform and in-service use: UCAV storage,

intermittent” use being able to comprise very intensive phases of use (for ex: flight in Operation).

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Architectures of

UCAV systems

Concept studies into UCAVs, etc


Definition of a

future aeronautical

combat system

National control

Official means

of simulation

UCAV engines

Determination of UCAV specificities

Simulation of use

Specifications of

propulsion function

Operational feedback


customer (access

to technologies)

Through life support

Low Observability

of the Platform

Concept studies and demonstration

Concept studies



customer (access

to technologies)

In-flight refuelling

Taking into account the operational issues of projection and hovering, in-flight refuelling is

impossible to avoid, whether in terms of inhabited platforms or, in the future, UCAVs. For UCAVs,

it will be necessary to be able to attain full automation of the process. As of now, its application

to combat aircrafts represents an important issue in terms of reducing the risks of accident and

incidents, in a context where the tiredness of the crews plays a major role.

46 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

In-flight refuelling

Improvement of in-flight refuelling

Automation of in-flight refuelling

Open to cooperation


Concept studies



customer (access

to technologies)

combat aircraft engines

The duality with civilian applications of methods and industrial resources is particularly marked

for engines. This reality must make it possible to increase the profitability of technical and human

investments, and spread out the industrial workload in a sector where the development of new

engines with purely military applications has become the exception to the rule, due to the size

and nature of the defence market. DGA is not considering the national development of a new

combat aircraft engine, except in order to adapt the M88 engine of the Rafale in order to improve

availability and reduce the costs of through life support.

This field will remain very dependant on new materials, but should also benefit from progress to

be achieved in in-service support and engine flight control. As regards basic technologies (multiphysical

modelling, high temperature materials, etc), the Ministry of Defence will rely on the

progress made on civilian engines except for certain needs attached to military applications like low

pressure compressors, afterbodies, engine control laws, architecture and integration. DGA supports

research into the applications of ceramic matrix composites, which are of particular interest in

improving the lifespan of several high temperature components in the engine).

Engines represent up to 40% of the overall cost of the through life support of a combat aircraft,

and it is therefore fundamental to seek and validate technological improvements enabling to

reduce the overall costs of ownership including ISS, production and fuel costs. The objectives


- to supply engines in conformity with the specifications, at the lowest cost and as soon as possible,

- to ensure follow-up of the airworthiness of the aircraft, while identifying during the instruction

of in-service events appropriate solutions for users in terms of availability and cost,

- to ensure the reliability, maintainability, and lifespan of the different engine components, and

finally in-service availability.

Engine control architecture and equipments should evolve gradually towards all-electrical systems

and more distributed and optimised architectures. Future engines could be “more intelligent”,

auto-adapting to the cycle of the engine, the missions, the engine status and environmental

conditions. Engines may have self-diagnosis and even fault detection and forecasting capacities.

These improvements will have to take environment protection objectives into account (reduction

of noise pollution mainly through engine usage procedures, and emissions reduction) as well as

the need to optimise the platform survivability aspects and the employment in context of interallied

operations. Defence will be

interested in American projects for

substitution fuels, while monitoring

similar European Union actions for

civilian applications.

As regards European cooperation, we

should seek to exchange information

and carry out joint research, which

could be developed on the basis of

future shared programmes (TP400 for

example). Defence would also like to

develop work on innovative topics such

as the specific issues involved in UCAVs


Engine M88-2 on Navy Rafale

DGAcom -F. Vrignaud




Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 47

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Engines: reduction

of the cost of


improvement of

availability, reduction

of consumption

Turbine blades

High temperature materials and

thermal barrier technologies

More economic

use (operational

analysis, through

life support)


exchange of

results & possibly

distributed access

to the technologies

National control

to ensure the inservice

support of

existing platforms

and to control

costs of ownership

(priority on M88)

Missile turbo-engines Specifications National control

High pressure core technologies

Cooperation for a

future platform

National control

to ensure inservice

support of

existing platforms

Engines better

adaptable to


Intelligent engines (cycle


Health control of the engine


National control

to enable the

evolution of

existing engines

More electric aircraft

Generalisation of the use of

electrical equipment

More electric engines architecture

(functions integration)



Intelligent customer

Tools and advanced


Ceramic materials

Design tools, evaluation of new

technologies and engine architectures

Environmentally friendly engines

(noise, fuel alternatives)


of technological


Cooperation in the

context of a new

platform design

National control of

the effects on the

general design of

a combat aircraft


customer (access

to technologies)

Aeronautical platform equipments

The introduction of new technologies driven by the concept of more electrical aircraft will be

realised primarily through research carried out in the civilian sector. Action by the Ministry of

Defence will consist mainly in technological monitoring, with occasional R&T support in cases

presenting technical specificities different from the civilian and linked to military environment and


In addition, in this equipment field, where industrial parties remain multiple, the priority issue is

the safety of flights, which depends on in-service support and a control of supply, which requires

an industry with sufficient stability to limit the risk of faults in in-service aircrafts, as well as in

programmes currently under industrialisation or production.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

More electric aircraft

More electric platforms

architecture (Energy management,

functions integration, more

electric components)

Integration of electrical

generation into the engine

Concept studies

National control



and integration

Start up on accumulator

or alternator

48 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Air conditioning

Hybrid air conditioning

Integrated power module (IPM)


National control of

the architecture,


and integration

Fire protection


extinguishing systems

Concept studies



customer (access

to technologies)

Modular avionics

The gap between the low rate of fleet renewal and the fast progress of avionics technologies is

increasing, pushed by the extending duality of certain hardware and software components with the

non aeronautical civilian world. As a result there is the need to implement on military aeronautical

platforms avionics architecture solutions which will be able to adapt in the future to the evolutions

of technologies and systems, as well as to the environment and concepts of use. In this field, DGA

also seeks to make the best use of advances in civilian research, which will need to be adapted to

military uses. The man-system interface including crew aspects will have to be tackled.

Since the end of 2006, a decree concerning the navigability of military aircrafts requires their

certification. New design methods have to be implemented in order to suppress early risks of

incoherency and errors, as well as to be able to justify compliance of the hardware and software

with the safety requirements.

In addition, the creation of a generic tool for the design, development and demonstration of a

shared physical and functional system architecture is under consideration for future air combat

platforms, whether or not unmanned. In supporting the implementation of open modular avionics

principles, it will facilitate, beyond the design and development of new platforms, management

of hardware and software obsolescence at a controlled cost, as well as the evolutions of needs and

concepts of use. This demonstration is to be built with European cooperation and aims to establish

a common methodology, accessible to all industrial and official teams concerned, and independent

of the final platform of integration. The research under consideration should also make it possible

to approach differently and in a more effective way the mid-life restoration of existing combat


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Open and shared

modular avionics

Definition of principles

and standards

Design methods integrating cost

aspects and demonstration

Functional and logical analysis

Logical architecture mock-up

Architecture demonstration



(definition of an




National control

of principles

and standards


capability of


State control

of costs

State customer





Combat systems

For the vulnerability assessment of combat aircrafts and their combat systems, the development of

global analyse simulations is necessary. The increasingly elaborated and technically representative

means of simulation must be able to be implemented both at the initiative of industrial teams and

in government facilities, with networking solutions when needed.

The importance of fast and accurate air-to-ground strike capability has been confirmed in all recent

conflicts. Operational analysis and the evolution of the programme in progress are fundamental

in this sense. The associated operational needs require the evolution of the technologies linked

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 49

to this capability, in order, for example, to

transmit coordinates in real time, identify

a target with ground assistance and return


The development of technologies making it

possible to achieve accurate all weather airto-ground

fire control systems is essential

to enable strike effectiveness and minimise

the risk of collateral damage or fratricide

effects. In the medium term, the purpose

is to address movable and even mobile

targets. It is necessary:

• to take into account the evolution

of sensor and effector technologies

and that of transmission systems,

IR decoys

and to evaluate performances under

conditions representative of operational use;

• to launch the integration demonstrations necessary to evaluate the prospects of application in

an operational context, including the possible impact on concepts of use.

The use of shared electromagnetic and optical antennas appears likely to greatly improve the

performance of communication, detection, fire control systems and recognition on future combat

platforms, on the condition that they are able to carry out their integration without degrading

aerodynamic performance or that of low observability.

Self-protection is an essential contributor to the reduction of vulnerability of aircrafts which should

be developed in coordination with the evolution of threats and the networking of platforms.

The functions of detection and threat jamming enter into a global strategy for managing the

vulnerability of aircrafts, tied to LO technology aspects.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

DGAcom - O. Guerr

Research into




Global survivability

Exchange of results

National control

State means of


Cooperation between aircrafts:

- Transmission and management

of tactical data

- Cooperation between sensors

Weapon systems architecture

(cooperation between functions,

sensors within a platform and MMI)

Evaluation of


Definition of

new sensors

Weapon system


High flow data transmissions

Air-to-ground fire-control systems

European cooperation



according to the

sensors used

National control

(taking into account

possible cooperation

on sensors and


Air-to-air fire-control systems

Integration and

evaluation of Meteor

Integrated architectures


European cooperation

Self-protection: architecture,

sensors, decoys


50 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Shared and

low observable


Antennas and apertures

architecture on aircraft (design,

integration, demonstration)

Radar, ESM and CNI antennas (18)

Optical apertures



Integration on a

future aircraft

National control


The priority in the helicopters field is

to ensure in-service support and the

evolution of the various rotary wing

platforms for national needs, which

implies effort targeted on the most

recent programmes: the Tiger, the

Cougar, and the NH90. Eurocopter is the

airframe prime contractor (along with

Agusta Westland for the NH90). European

cooperation would seem to be the proper

framework for the design of future rotary

wing platforms.

DGA takes advantage of the design skills Helicopter Tigre (EUROCOPTER)

of helicopters platforms used for civilian

applications. The cooperation established

between ONERA and the DLR should make

it possible to evolve basic technologies,

one important topic being low observable

propulsion integration with regard

to survivability needs in operational

contexts. As regards turbine engines, it

will be important at some point to be

able to develop more powerful versions

of the current engines (Tiger and NH90),

but priority will be given to introducing

evolutions and know-how enabling

Helicopter NH90 (EUROCOPTER)

significant gains in ownership costs and

operational availability.

Beyond the basic platforms, systems and survivability in operation aspects will require a sustained

effort in the decades to come, in particular with regard to the adaptation of capacities and use to

coalition operations. DGA is very open to cooperation on the development of all weather military

use capacities, and on Weapon systems’ capacities of evolution and adaptation, and is thus ready

to involve in close cooperation on these two subjects.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

DGAcom -F. Vrignaud

Eurocopter - Deulin




Weapon systems

Monitoring (electro-optical

sensors and radar)

Tactical data links and cooperation

with other aircrafts and UAVs

Target designation and

fire control system

Concept studies

Technology blocks

National control of:


performance of the

integration of tactical

data transmissions,

mission information



Communication - navigation - identification

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 51

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Conduct of flight

All weather sensors and navigation

Data processing (fusion)

and collision avoidance

Help in landing

Low altitude tactical flight

Crew vision and MMI (workload)

Sensors (mutual


Global performances



demonstration or

heavy helicopter



National control over

architecture and

data related to the

safety, performance

in precision of

navigation, and links

with Weapon systems

The technological priorities of specific interest to Defence include:

- Improvement of the protection and survivability of the helicopters, at the level of the crew or the

systems (in a passive way by the use of new materials or new architectures, and in an active way,

thanks to the evolution of sensors and effectors);

- Development of fly-by-wire flight control applications, in terms of evolved piloting laws, in

particular for all-weather flights close to obstacles;

- Insertion in the digital battlefield, which requires increased capacities of coordination of actions

and data transmission and processing;

- Applications linked to advanced sensors, with the appearance of new technologies (optronic,

electromagnetic, acoustic), precise navigation associated with the digitalisation of ground data,

development of the capability for fusion between this data, and, in the longer-term, cooperation

between sensors, on the same platform and in multi-platforms.

Lastly, to profit fully from new technologies from the civilian world, which will make possible a

better control of some obsolescence risks, it will be necessary to ensure there will be no dependence

creation at the level of the hardware and software components used.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


Protection of the crew

Behaviour in crash landing

Global survivability integrating

activation of the Weapon systems

(detection - protection - action)

Databases of tests

Exchange and tuning

of simulation

Knowledge and

fine modelling

of the threats

Official global

analyse simulations

Official modelling

of vulnerability

Low observability

of the helicopters

Modelling of IR, EM and

acoustics signature

Low observable propulsion


Tests databases

Exchange and tuning

of simulation

National control

Self protection of

the helicopters

Referencing of threats

Global analyse simulation

Studies of self-protection

architecture and integration

European cooperation:

exchanges of results,

new concepts of


National control

Transport and specialised aircraft

Beyond the A400M, in the long run, the prospects as regards future air transport being able to

interest defence will depend on the evolution of the civilian market for airliners, which should

profit from important technological advances, in particular as regards environmental impact

and fuel consumption reduction. Military needs may, however, require special adaptation of

52 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

these platforms (loading, carriage, dropping

techniques) and systems (interoperability,

network communication, self-protection,

navigation/guidance systems). In the very long

term, military applications of more innovative

solutions could be considered (tilt-rotor, VSTOL

techno for example), in response to significant

needs, and after the maturation of these


Prospects as regards specialised aircrafts

(intelligence and reconnaissance), beyond

the exploitation of advances in platforms not A400 M

dedicated to this, will depend in part on the development of specialised UAVs and satellite means,

and also on the operational needs, sensors and systems concerned.


landing systems (sMt)

Within the logistical chain, the costs of transboarding, in terms of delays and personnel, are a

permanent concern for the forces. New

reconditioning means for air pallets must

be perfected in order to interface with the

upstream chain (mostly civilian) and the

downstream chain (military).

At the end of the chain, theatres of engagement

such as Afghanistan have proven the need

to be able to supply advance units by air in a

context of air superiority and poor ground

security (ambushes, IED). This requires a sharp Airdrop from C160 TRANSALL

improvement in the precision of all-weather


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


High altitude airdrops

autonomous systems

Monitoring (foreign systems)

Soft wing control (sails)

Trajectory management and control

systems for precision landing

Concept studies

Technology blockss


National control

of landing systems

architecture and


This area is structured around activities: naval platforms (NP) and naval combat systems (SNA),

carrying out work applicable throughout the life of the ships, from design to dismantling phase.

NP covers general contracting activities and work on the architecture of ships and submarines,

activities relating to navigation safety systems, life on board as well as the implementation of

weapon systems on the ships and submarines and integration of nuclear steam supply systems

and nuclear weapons. SNA covers all activities relating to control of the combat capacity of naval

platforms, whether airborne, on the water or underwater, both in terms of global performance

and control, and the functional integration of the following components:

- “Combat Management Systems” and their operational use;

- Underwater Warfare, including Mine Warfare;

- Communications and Tactical/Navigation data-links;

- Situation Awareness;

- Implementation of surface-to-air, sea-to-sea and ground fire support weapons;

- Planes, helicopters or Unmanned Vehicles (UVs).




Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 53

With the recent launch of many large programmes to renew the fleet, now in production phase,

thus soliciting less engineering and innovation capacities, the R&D effort is devoted to sustaining

a qualification level sufficient to maintain the DITB in the domain surface ship and submarines

design, in order to ensure the superiority of the underwater, surface and air forces, in coastal zones,

and the implementation of the naval component of deterrence. In this last field, it must prepare

the future oceanic component of deterrence. It allows the maturation of breakthroughs, including

multi-platform engagement capability and underwater combat systems.

The aims of naval R&T are as follows:

- overall cost reduction of operational capabilities (in-service support and crew reduction);

- control of environmental impact and ships’ safety;

- surface warfare with synergies within the naval force (multi-platform situation awareness and

engagement capability);

- submarine warfare and emerging concept of underwater cooperative engagement;

- future mine warfare, with stealth threat and diversification of modes of action on surface or

submarines vehicules

- preparation of future oceanic deterrence..

4.4.1. Naval combat systems

A first area of effort is to streamline and ensure scalability of naval combat systems. Architectures

must be able to integrate short life-cycle equipments throughout the life of the system. Evolution is

linked either to new missions, threats, performance, or interoperability reasons such as, for example,

the use of new high rate telecommunication equipment, operational data-processing computer

systems (naval Intranet) or systems-of-systems standards. Future naval combat management systems

will have to be designed from a core software base shared by a group of ships, with interfaces with

the various traditional subsystems (air warfare, underwater warfare, land warfare, command and

information system) and with new additional functions (multi-platform engagement capacities),

without having to modify this core.

Since June 2007, in order to reduce the number of in-service naval combat systems, the Ministry

of Defence has prepared a strategic plan for naval combat management systems, which makes it

possible to plan evolutions by developing synergies between systems for the main two categories

of platforms: ships and submarines. In the future DGA will continue to engage its public and its

industrial partners (national and international) on the methods of implementing this information

system strategic plan.

At the stage of physical and functional integration, more compact and powerful aerial architectures

are required in terms of electromagnetic compatibility and signature reduction..

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Architecture of

naval combat


Integrated, modular and

evolutionary combat

management systems

Integration of tactical data

link into combat systems


Combat management

systems securityt

Integration of sensors and

armaments (general contracting

tools, “illustrateurs de besoins

d’exploitation opérationnelle”

(IBEO), reference and integration

platforms, interactive visualisation

of needs, specifications,

standards, naval Battle Lab)

Electromagnetic compatibility



NATO, EDA, Maritime

Theatre Missile

Defence (MTMD)

National control

54 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

4.4.2. on water warfare

These systems include combat against aircraft, missiles, ships and land, ballistic missile defence and

protection of platforms against asymmetrical and terrorist threats. Multi-platform integration, by

supporting the sharing of rough information, the development of common situation awareness

within the naval force and the automated optimisation of the use of sensors and weapons are

priorities for the improvement of combat superiority. For combat against aircraft, performance is

required in terms of early detection, robustness against manoeuvring targets, detection in a complex

or disturbed environment, identification of non co-operative targets and capacities to intercept

missiles whatever manoeuvre they make. For combat against ships, precision of target designation

and the capability to target over the horizon are top priorities. In the future UAVs should have

a major impact on the overall performance of detection and in controlling the operations. UAVs

must be studied according to their intrinsic capacities (VTOL (19) , autonomy, payload) and associated

integration constraints (time to operate, platform movements and sea state).

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilitiess

On water warfare

Implementation and integration

of UAVs into the combat

management system

Non-cooperative targets

above the surface

Allied interoperable force functions

Optimisation of multi

platform concepts of use

Implementation of new means

and weapons (ergonomics, crew

reduction, systems security)

Combat Systems






Research on



National capability

for classified tactical

data (ISS (20) )

4.4.3. Underwater warfare

Underwater detection is essential to ensure the invulnerability of the deterrence force, protection

of the aircraft carrier battle group in open seas and superiority in coastal areas. In this field, priorities


• sustain a high level of performance in detection to ensure the tactical advantage of ships

(widening bandwith of sonars, transients);

• signal processing (reduction of false alarm rates, backing sonars evolutions, influence of

environment and oceanography);

• synergies between underwater detection applications and other applications (detection

equipment, data processing);

inter platform cooperation: air (maritime patrol planes), surface and underwater, by developing


• dedicated sensors and their integration (antennas, light towed sonars) and integration to the

new carriers (underwater robotics).

Beyond detection, it is also fundamental to be protected against underwater threats (mines,

submarines, scuba divers, and unmanned vehicules) by regrouping the different detection,

prevention, neutralisation and threat processing surveillance. The priorities are:

• torpedoes: physical integration, on-board processing with capacities against targets with

sophisticated countermeasures in coastal areas, autonomous decision-making, concepts of use;

• protection against torpedoes (detection, jamming, deception, destruction);

• preparation of future mine-hunting systems. Work or evaluation concerns the following

technologies: multi-platform architectures, use of unmanned platforms, tactical underwater





VTOL: Vertical Take Off and Landing


ISS: Information Systems Security

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 55

communications, fast embedded

microcomputers, lasers (blue-green) for

detection, high frequencies sonars for

identification and recognition, sensor

data fusion, on-board integration and

implementation, joint operations, supply

chain management and storage (joint

equipments, transport, in service support),

on-board intelligence chain;

• design and demonstration of Unmanned

Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) for mine

detection and neutralisation. Research on

innovative solutions in artificial intelligence

and mission programming algorithms.

Barracuda submarine

The design of the mine-hunters systems

(Systèmes de lutte anti-mines futurs, or SLAMF) will differ from the dedicated tools currently in

service (tripartite class mine-hunters) by simultaneously working upon various platforms. Evaluation

of these systems and preliminary works mean considerable challenges in terms of operational issues

and ownership costs.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities




Mine hunting

Underwater warfare

Antennas, Integration of antennas

Development of an

interception demonstrator

Development of a transient

wave sonar demonstrator

Acquisition and signal processing:

self noise, false alarms, variable

environment, acoustic impact

of the environment, transient

and biological, hard underwater

environments (fluctuating,

reverberation, coastal areas

Impact of sonars on marine-life

Imagery sonars

No global cooperation



General architecture and design European cooperation

Physical integration and system

Firing control system

Use close to the coast and

in shallow waters

New concepts of use

Tactical systems

Underwater robotics

Video technologies

Underwater countermeasures:

alarm systems, anti-torpedo


Underwater warfare UUVs

Concept of use of air-dropped

underwater sensors

Analysis and evaluation

of the threat

Underwater jammers

No cooperation


European or



European cooperation

No cooperation


National control

Intelligent purchaser

Division of European


National control

Intelligent purchaser

National control

56 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

4.4.4. dEsign of naVal platforMs

Existing or future naval platforms must be

persistently maintained at the best possible

operational level throughout their life

cycle, whatever evolution occurs in terms

of missions, threats and/or regulations. It

is thus necessary to maintain architecture

skills in order to be able to answer any

questions regarding the integration of

new armaments, active or passive sensors

or dedicated platforms (Unmanned Surface

Vehicle - USV, UUV, UAV) and to evaluate

security levels and how they affect life on

board. Whenever possible, civilian state of

the art technology is used and skills must

be focused on specific military aspects:

survivability (damages prevention, sea

risk, combat damages) and ammunition

safety . The evolutionary nature of the

conditions of service favours use of the

Battle Lab in order to be able to test

quickly and thoroughly the consequences

of any material or organisational evolution

Interoperability trials of BPC Tonnerre

such as crew reduction. Evaluation of

survivability will be built upon the control

of integration developed within the industrial teams and based on their capacities for simulations

and tests (shocks, blows, fire, etc.). Consequences of crew reduction must be studied in terms of

ship’s management and weapon systems’ management, design and evaluation of man-machine

interfaces, organisations of tasks and maintenance and socialisation of crews. This also implies

consideration of crew time on station as well as the ship’s use (navigation, combat, etc).

Guaranteeing the safety of submarines (underwater safety and nuclear steam supply systems

integration) requires uninterrupted effort regarding submarine architecture, manufacturing

processes, design and construction of the hulls and specification and validation of the choices

of materials. To guarantee the invulnerability of the deterrence force, acoustic and non-acoustic

stealth skill must be maintained at the highest level, which requires uninterrupted efforts in the

processing of vibrations, active control, engines and rejections in their scientific, technological and

industrial aspects. Life in a confined environment requires effort to control the composition of this

atmosphere and to determine acceptable rates of pollutants for humans, means for measurement

these levels and regeneration processes.

DGAcom -F. Vrignaud


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilitiess

General architecture

of naval platforms

Evaluation and simulation

of the concepts

Architectural impact assessment

of the integration of new systems

or components (constraints linked

to propulsion and the safety of

the ammunition on board)

Optimisation of naval architecture

Safe-keeping of digital technical

information throughout the

life cycle of the system

Dimensioning and

construction of hull

Ship superstructures

Resistant hull of submarines

Results of simulation

Concept studies

National control

of architecture




General design of

naval platforms


preparing a


Capacity to specify

Access to technologies

National control

of safety

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 57

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

External structures (ballasts, bow

and stern frames, tower); internal

structures (bridge, compartment,

supporting structures, cradles,

etc) of submarines

Physical integration of

weapon systems

Use of simulations: virtual

prototyping, operational

use cases, IBEO; virtual ship

with men in the loop

General design of

naval platforms

Physical integration of UAVs,

USVs and UUVs, along with their

systems of implementation

Integration of ammunition

(concepts of deconfinement

and storage, regulation)

Safety studies (fire,

pyrotechnical, safety)

Fire modelling, Man Machine

Interface (MMI)


preparing a


Capability to specify

Access to technologies

National control

of safety

Manoeuvrability and speed of

submarines, exit of weapons

Constraints (compartments,

insulation, energy,

cooling, monitoring)

Crew reduction

Environmental protection: waste

management, use of pollutionfree

materials and paints,

monitoring of rejections

Control of confined

atmosphere in submarines

Comparison of tools

and methods

National control

Survivability of

naval platforms

Acoustic low observable (LO)

technologies: propellers, hydrojets,

accessories, noise of the hulls

LO EM and IR technologies

above water

Comparison of tools

and methods

National control

Combat damage

The control of energy production,

its transformation, delivery to

users and its storage will take into

account the general trend toward

an increased use of electricity

providing increased flexibility,

increased availability, a reduction

in ownership costs and reduced

gas emissions. In addition, the

wiring of military ships will have to

be also evaluated according to its

survival capability and its capability

to easily integrate future large

energy incentive systems.

Ibeo: virtual ship with men in the loop

DGA Naval Systems

58 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

Of proven interest for large ships, the concept of an all electric ship still needs to progress in term

of compactness of the delivery systems and propulsion. More electric technologies must also be

evaluated for applications such as small ships, submarines, USVs and for some platform systems like

aircraft catapults. For ships, the use of fuel cells would make it possible to reduce gas emissions in

ports and to supply energy for emergency (replacement of the small power thermal generators).

The combination of fuel cells and gas turbines makes it possible to consider improved yields for the

primary energy generators. More prospective technologies such as, for example, the application of

magnetohydrodynamics, supra-conductivity and thermo-electricity also merit evaluation.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilitiess

More electric ship:

Generation, delivery

Conversion, storage of electricity

Propulsion of submarines:

- Fuel, other anaerobic

nonnuclear systems

Propulsion and energy


Air processing

In the context of

the preparation

or improvement

of a program

Intelligent purchaser

National control for

nuclear propulsion

- Regeneration of the

atmosphere in submarines


The “Architecture and techniques for Land Systems” division (AST) covers activities necessary to

attain technical general contracting capability for land systems, vehicles and equipments, along

with their in-service support. Land armaments encompasses: fighting vehicles, special vehicles,

general purpose vehicles and equipments, soldier systems and autonomous systems.

The mastery of the architecture of the land systems relies on the mastery of exchanges with other

systems, requiring:

- high level standards ensuring coherency between elementary systems, use of systems engineering;

- constraints and methods of secure information systems architecture, constraints and methods of

architecture for human factors and protective Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear,(CBRN)


- interface standards with other systems: aeronautical, naval, and C3I systems;

- missiles and artillery;

- other products and technologies to be integrated (Battlefield Management Systems, small UAVs

(Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), telecommunications systems, monitoring equipment, positioning,


As an integration domain, AST mainly aims at opportunely exploiting R&T developed elsewhere

by/for other divisions. In addition to its own research AST benefits from research carried out in the

Missiles, Arms and Nuclear Defence Techniques area (Missiles, Armes et techniques Nucléaires de

défense, or MAN, including Metric Precision Munitions, Laser Guided Rockets, etc.), the SoS area

(BOA, PHOENIX II, etc.) and transversal areas (Sensors, Guiding and Navigation for the optronics of

future vehicles, or Component Materials, for the protection of soldiers, for example).

The following needs have been identified, with high expectations from new technologies:

- All-weather vision for the soldier, either mounted or dismounted, (including indirect and panoramic

vision for armoured vehicles) and autonomous systems;

- Reversible means of controlling a crowd or threatening individual

- Means of neutralisation with limited collateral effects

- Sniper detection systems;

- Mobility assistance for the dismounted soldier (for example: exoskeleton and/or sherpa robot);

- Weight reduction of ballistic protection and other equipment carried by the soldier;




Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 59

- Innovative technologies for vehicle mobility (hybrid,


- Autonomous decision-making for robots, either

mobile or fixed (including sensor networks), with

short-term focus on their capability to conduct

simple missions, in a reliable and robust way with

regard to the environment;

- Modular, standardised and more efficient vetronics

with better power management, integrating

automated functionalities (Detection, Recognition

and Identification - DRI, target tracking, aids

to mobility, etc.) and elaborated Man Machine

Interfaces (speech recognition, multimodal

interfaces, Augmented Reality, Head-up display);

- Construction of tactical information networks

which are flexible, intuitive, reconfigurable and

above all robust, including in harsh environments

(urban areas, etc.);

- Decision making support tools and efficient real

time tactical situation assessment;

- Protection of the soldier in aggressive conditions

(climatic, CBRN) and physiological support;

FELIN equipment with MINIROC robot

- Adaptation of training techniques and tools (virtual

reality, hybrid simulation integrated into combat equipment, networked training, etc.).

In this context, nanotechnologies as well as biotechnologies appear to be vectors of technological

breakthrough whose potentialities need to be further investigated (explosive detection, “smart

dust”, etc.).


4.5.1. land systEMs, tEchnology “usErs”

For land systems, the main challenge will remain access to multiple candidate technologies and their

quick exploitation within acceptable costs in terms of adaptation, integration and maintenance so

that they remain compatible with exploitation in land systems. One challenge is to reduce the

cost and time to “militarise”, which is today the main obstacle to the operational diffusion of

technological innovation. This is the case for innovative products (robotics) and also for more

classical equipment either under development or requiring reactive adaptation.

With respect to land applications, technologies can be categorised into three categories:

- dual-use technologies, which may mature within civilian market, which should in the future become

a reference and for which active observation for potential defence applications is sufficient;

- specific military technologies, which should be reduced to the sword/armour problem (weapons,

ammunition and protection against their effects);

- a number of under-employed innovations from the civilian sector for which the challenge remains

their identification, preliminary assessment then, once accepted, their fast maturation, adaptation

to the operational environment, and resolution of the difficulties of integration to the weapons

in service.

4.5.2. VEhiclE-systEM intEgration

Given the new operational needs, future vehicles will integrate more electric systems (observation,

protection, communications, etc.). There is a concern with providing enough energy to these

platforms. Weight, volume and cost constraints have resulted in a focus on vetronics and the

integration of functions and equipment. This field is open to cooperation notably taking advantage

of modular architectures and the mutualisation of equipments.

60 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Architecture (final integration of all

functions with respect to the tradeoff


Experience sharing,

open to cooperation

Reactive capacity

to integrate

“French Eyes

Only” equipment

Capability to operate in networks

Battlefield Management

System (embedded C3I)


to ensure an



capability in SoS.

Adaptation to

the needs and

organisation of

the Military






for modular


(including protocols)

and mutualised

equipments (at

least MMI)

National design


Organisation and crew workload

Safety of operation, maintenance, etc.:

Simulation of operating processes,

Monitoring systems for vehicles

Share experience -

open to cooperation

National capability

of controlled


National design


4.5.3. Vehicle Firing Function

In this domain, the issue is to find a good balance between survivability and platform mobility

requirements and the desired fire-power. France promotes in particular the Case Telescoped

Ammunition (CTA) system, a weapon system based on the concept of telescoped ammunition, of

which the main advantages are better reliability and space saving in the turret.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Vehicle Firing


4.5.4. Vehicle Mobility

Armaments and ammunition

integration (guns and missiles)

Turrets (weapon assembly,

pointing, optronics)

Observation, detection,

identification, target acquisition

Co-operative engagement

capability, non-line-of-sight fire

Cooperation with

the UK on 40 CTA




Design capability

Over and above increased mobility performance, the aim is to find technologies enabling the

reduction of the total cost of ownership of the system as well as a reduced footprint in overseas

contingency operations.




R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Vehicle Mobility

Energy production and management

“Exotic” fuels and their impact

on EURO norms engines

Tires, suspension, steering

and driveline

Hybrid transmission




Design capability

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 61

4.5.5. VEhiclE protEction

The survivability of armoured vehicles and their crews is directly linked to the global architecture

of the system (principle of “layers” for survivability). Even if the final resulting architecture is

mostly “French Eyes Only” (vulnerability of our systems), the constituent technologies are open to


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Passive protection

Passive protection against

mines and IEDs (21)

Vehicle vulnerability reduction

(backfire, blast and shocks)

Active protection by masking and


Active protection by interception

before impact

Control of signatures

Vehicle Protection


Capacity of reactive

adaptation for

French equipments

4.5.6. land roBotics

Robotics is one of the main vectors of

innovation, especially with the development

of cognitive functionalities in response to

operational needs. The use of robotics in land

operations should improve (all the more so as

the level of autonomy is high):

- the protection of soldiers by replacing them

in dangerous situations;

- the productivity and consequently the

availability of soldiers, by carrying out

repetitive tasks in the place of soldiers,

- flexibility of use.

Autonomous decision-making ranks among MINIROC (ECA)

the primary technologies to develop, in order to reduce the burden on transmission resources and

operator workload for monitoring autonomous systems. Focus should be given to navigation and

perception for navigation. Further work will no doubt include: “tactical” autonomy, cooperation

with heterogeneous entities, etc.

Robotic applications already under study include:

- semi-autonomous robots designed for mine-sweeping and countermining operations as well as

the detection and neutralisation of Improved Explosive Devices (IEDs).

- networks of unattended sensors, laid down or scattered on the ground (they could be used for the

protection of sites (see R&T priority) by ensuring peripheral surveillance, or for remote action, by

monitoring adverse activities in zones unoccupied by friendly forces, in addition to other means

such as land robots, satellites and UAVs);

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

DGAcom -F. Vrignaud

Innovating locomotion, and

associated command and control

Energy management



Intelligent purchaser

Efficient means of communication in

urban areas


IED: Improvised Explosive Devices

62 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Semi-autonomous navigation



(EDA project)

Autonomous “Tactical”


Sharing of

information possible


Global Control Architecture


cooperation for

interoperability and


Design capacity

Man/robot interaction

Multi-robot cooperation

and cooperation with

heterogeneous entities

Possible European


4.5.7. soldiEr - systEM intEgration

The digitization of the battlefield falls within the scope of future soldier programmes. The purpose

of digitization is to transform one to one communication into a capability to communicate with all

players on the ground at the same time all together.

However, the tactical use of future land combat systems architectures, necessary to control this

level of complexity, will not be possible unless production, storage and delivery of electrical energy

technologies keep pace with the increasing needs. The multiplication of electrical devices on the

soldier’s clothing as well as on individual

protection equipment (see corresponding

R&T priority) is also challenging as for

weight and volume. Civilian technological

developments are of interest to the

DGA and must be supported to meet

the specific military needs. As such, DGA

notably participates in security R&T, in

order to orient and sometimes monitor

this R&T for a better correspondence

between the technologies (for example,

in geolocalisation) and covers the needs

of the armed forces, as well as those of

the security forces (police, constabulary,

customs) and firefighters.




R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Mobility (light materials,

miniaturisation, optimised

integration of equipments, etc)

Observation/Vision (fusion of

sensors (II-IR (22) ), networking

of the equipment)



Soldier - System


C4I (networking for knowledge,

tactical situation assessment,

3D localisation in urban areas)

European cooperation

Design capacity

Future infantry armament

Coordinated management of fires

Support (biomedical

sensors, energy autonomy,

reduced support system)


II: Image Intensifier (Intensificateur de Lumière), IR: Infra-Red

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 63

4.5.8. protEction of soldiErs, sitEs,

routEs and conVoys

Protection during overseas contingency

operations is a field in which important

technological advances regularly occurs

Passive protection remains a priority, but is

increasingly associated with active protection,

which must enable a quick detection of


In terms of cooperation, the “Force

protection” programme, launched in 2006,

is the first joint R&T programme of the

European Defence Agency. Force protection

in urban environments corresponds to a major BUFFALO

need of the armed forces. In all theatres of

operations, our soldiers, as well as the rolled-out infrastructures and command and communication

systems, are exposed to multiple threats (suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices, CBRN risks,

snipers, etc.).

In parallel, with regards to the fight against terrorism, this military field possesses technological

synergies with the security field. Defence technologies are often used in the security domain.

Conversely, the DGA is interested in civilian technologies used for explosive detection.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


Soldier protection

Passive protection (new

materials, signature reduction)

Detection of snipers




Intelligent purchaser

Site protection

Networks of sensors, etc

EDA Cooperation

(Force Protection)

Design capability

Counter RAM (23)

Self protection: architecture,

sensors, effectors,

chain of lethality


Design capability

Itineraries and

convoys protection


war against IEDs)

Mines and explosives detection

Detection of any change,

suspect objects, etc.

Sensors fusion for detection


Design capability

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

4.5.9. diVErsification of MEans of action

The question here is to explore new weapons for soldiers and vehicles, in response to precise

objectives such as the control of lethality.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Graded responses, from

lethal to reversible effects

Diversification of

weapons for soldiers

and vehicles

Selective means to stop/impede

/counter adverse mobility

Multiple-effect weapons

Weapons with reduced lethality


Intelligent purchaser

Capability to lead

special operations


Reactive adaptation



War against indirect fire (rockets, artillery shells and mortars)

64 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009


C3I Systems (Command, Communication, Control and Intelligence) enable the acquisition, processing

and use of the required information by the forces.

The White Paper attributes an important role to C3R Systems by prioritising capabilities in areas

such as knowledge and anticipation, network warfare and interoperability, both combined and

civilian-military, as well as in the field of geophysical information.

These C3I systems can be divided into three domains, with a high level of technical interrelation:

- “Space, Observation, Intelligence and UAV Systems” (Espace Observation Renseignement et

systèmes de Drones, or EORD), the principal mission of which is intelligence, including airborne

and non-airborne theatre surveillance systems,

- “Command & Control Information Systems” (Systemes d’Information Operationnels or SIO), the

main purpose of which is to provide information support, enabling strategic command planning,

and decision-making both operational and tactical as well as logistical, if necessary within a


- “Geophysical Environment” (Environnement géophysique, or EN), which covers all information

required to properly describe the geographical and physical endo-atmospheric environment

(land, air and sea), as well as human geography, be it to provide environmental data as such or to

assess its impact on defence systems.

4.6.1. spacE, oBsErVation, inforMation and uaV systEMs

Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance and

Intelligence systems (Surveillance, Acquisition de

cibles, Reconnaissance et Renseignement, or SA2R are

involved at every level of the command chain (tactical,

operational and strategic), justifying the use of a variety

of means. This field is therefore essential to political

decision-making and to the operations preparation,

control and assessment. Cooperation is possible, but

only according to methods guaranteeing national

access to information and assessment autonomy.

A large variety of sensor systems exists due to the

diversity of the means devoted to intelligence: satellites, CSO

planes and helicopters and their pods (Reco NG, Clio,

etc.), UAVs, land vehicles, ships, other ground means of zone control (network of unattended

sensors, autonomous robots) and human intelligence.

Intelligence systems of have developed with the assistance of increasingly powerful sensors. A

comprehensive approach is needed. This is provided by the concept of “intelligence chain” covering

both intelligence and the surveillance chain (transferring information from the sensor to processing

and exploitation sites). Skills in information chain architecture are essential in order to optimise the

resulting information and its access time, support the development of sensors adapted to each

carrier and develop the adaptability of the information chain to the theatre. That means taking into

account the equipment available for the various types of engagement and phases of engagement

as well as improving the interconnection capacities of the information chains, both in the context

of a national operation or in cooperation.

DGA’s activity on SA2R systems and on their architecture consists in:

- defining continuous, coherent and effective information chains;

- contributing to integrate the intelligence systems into the information chains:

• by determining the sensors and processing characteristics which are key to the intelligence

performance ;

• by defining the adequate requirements to ensure that the integration of the intelligence

system into the intelligence chain will meet overall coherency needs (interconnection of the

intelligence tools with the processing and multi-sensors exploitation tools, data format and

exchanges standardisation, etc.);





Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 65

- ensuring the consistency of the production of systems dedicated to intelligence;

- providing space systems dedicated to intelligence and warning;

- providing UAV systems;

- providing the ground systems of sensor monitoring, transmission and exploitation of intelligence. space and satellite systems

By providing a permanent capability to see,

listen, communicate, locate and synchronise, on

a worldwide scale, satellites have acquired an

important role in the control of information in

situation assessment, preparation and action

phases. They contribute to save means by enabling

a better concentration of resources for maximum

military efficiency.

Satellite systems improvement research concerns

two main goals: the precision of information

obtained and the delay of information delivery.

Except payload, space system improvements require

control of integration with board/ground tradeoffs

and adaptation of concepts and techniques

SAR image

developed for civilian applications.

DGA and CNES regularly coordinate their action within the CNES-DGA framework agreement as

regards space research which deals with dual-use space technologies (mainly the platform and

propulsion). Hence DGA’s activity mainly concerns R&T relating to the global architecture, the

ground segment and the payload.

DGA has carried out various military satellite programmes, including HELIOS, for space observation,

which has contributed to reinforcing its national industrial skill in the field of satellites. DGA pursues

this by supporting new capabilities demonstrators in the field of intelligence. The guarantee of

autonomous access to information justifies the current existence of a national industrial basis in the

field of intelligence and observation satellites.

In the mid-term, France will favour:

- setting up solutions consisting in sharing capabilities at a European

level, following the examples of HELIOS 2/SAR LUPE and HELIOS

2/COSMO-SkyMed agreements (exchange between optical and

Synthetic Aperture Radar images);

- developing cooperation within the programmes.

DGA cooperates with its German, Belgian, Spanish, Greek and Italian

counterparts on the space based imaging system MUSIS, intended

to ensure the continuation of service of the HELIOS 2, SAR-Lupe

(Germany), COSMO-SkyMed (Italy) and PLEIADES (under French

leadership) systems.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


Observation and

Intelligence Satellites

Space SAR (24) detection


SAR: Synthetic Aperture Radar

General architecture

Actuators and sensors

Satellite systems

(constellation, cluster)

Integration of payloads

Structure and technologies of

space SAR remote detection

European cooperation

on the preparation

of new programmes


exchanges of space

SAR/optical capability

Control of the

architecture of

satellite systems

(space defence



contracting skills

66 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Space optics,

Zone monitoring

Access to the


National control

Observation and space

optronics detection

Optronic detection:

- fast detectors

- MTI radar detection

- multispectral, hyperspectral,

- optical interferometry

Transmission and

ground processing:

- fast digital link

- large capacity memory

- compression,

information security

- high data rate transmission

(including laser, relay)

- production of images (fast

calculators, archiving)

Access to the



European cooperation


contracting skills



production capacity

National expertise

for performances

and processing

Intelligent purchaser

National control of

information security uaVs and mini-uaV systems

In addition to observation satellites, UAVs

provide permanent zone capability to the

global information system. Connected to the

theatre telecommunications networks , they

have the capability to transmit to the forces

in real-time the information acquired . Their

missions require a number of sensors and

navigation systems, for which the technologies

are available but the integrability at various

levels of complexity still remains to be shown.

More particularly dedicated to intelligence

at strategic and operational levels, enduring

UAVs offer an essential information capability

within a limited zone with the required UAV‘s landing on a ship

permanence. The European context is suitable

for the construction of an industrial capability in this field. The Advanced-UAV (medium altitude,

long endurance) is being developed in cooperation with Germany and Spain. Beyond taking part

in controlling the architecture of this system of UAV, dga puts special emphasis on the systems,

mainly on the definition optimisation and the specifications homogeneity.

Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) UAVs respond to the need to collect tactical information for

land or naval forces and provide a solution minimising the logistical footprint in the case of ground

use and , subject to the development and validation of technological solutions for deck landing,

the integration constraints on a ship in the case of a naval application.

Insertion of UAVs in the general air traffic is a priority both for civilian and military applications.

This subject, of increasing interest in Europe, must progress at technological and standardisation

levels (USAR codes adopted by NATO for the flight of UAVs in controlled airspace). DGA supports

the launching of the MIDCAS operation, which will allow to unify European “sense and avoid”

efforts, an essential issue with regard to the circulation of UAVs in uncontrolled airspace.

DGA takes part in a European debate on critical standards as regards the safety of UAVs. It supports

a sufficiently open regulation to make it possible to develop competitive products.

Thomas Lockhart




Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 67

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

SAR Detection on UAV

SAR remote detection on UAVs:

Integration of active antennas,

SAR technologies (very highresolution,

low frequency, etc.)



cooperation (EDA)

Control architecture

of the sensors

and processing

Design and integration system:

Enduring UAVs,

Theatre UAV,

mini UAVs, micro UAVs

Access to decisions

and expertise on


National control of

Information Security

UAV systems

Rotary wings and new concepts

Hovering/fast advance

European cooperation


Intelligent purchaser

Light and/or compact

energy sourcess

Energy autonomous concepts


Control of integration

Sensors for UAVs and


Intelligent purchaser

Autopilot, automatic Landing

European cooperation


Control architecture

of onboard systems

and naval platforme

Data link

Control of architecture

& National controls

(Information security)

UAV systems

Perception of the environment

Behavioural autonomy

Insertion in air traffic

Sense and avoid


European cooperation


R&D Framework

Programme - RDFP)

Airworthiness certification European certification

Control of architecture

Expertise on


Control of onboard

and ground station


To define following

European debate Sensor orientation

The use and benefit of intelligence sensors is no longer limited to the unit of implementation or

these to which the sensor is organically attached; it is increasingly multilevel (tactical, operational

and strategic). At the same time, multi-sensor systems, like UAVs, are developing and implementing

several sensors at the same time during a mission, either for different needs or for the same need

for information. These evolutions result in a significant increase in the complexity of the sensors

orientation function, which must seek to provide the best response to the need within the means

available. Tools must be developed to help the operators.

This theme affects the forces organisation and must take interoperability into account. In cooperation

with NATO, DGA undertakes a multi-annual study on the management and orientation of sensors

(Optical, IR EM, on UAV or deposited vehicles) in a theatre of operations.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Orientation of sensors

Planning, optimisation,

Decision-making support





National Expertise

adaptation of

the standards/

methods, etc..

68 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 images exploitation (optical, ir and sar)

The mass of data collected by

means of military intelligence

is increasing significantly.

It is crucial to set tools to

assist in the processing of

this data, in order to be able,

with unchanged manpower,

to quickly identify relevant

information in the mass of

information collected, and

to correlate various data in

order to extract richer, higher

level information. The issue

of heterogeneous data fusion

must also take into account

accurate geo-referenced

information in relation to time.

DGA keeps its efforts in the

field of information fusion

as it strongly conditions the MAJIIC project: sensors fusion

intelligence chain architecture

by impacting the intelligence production processes, the chain organisation as well as the way

performances are allocated.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Exploitation of

SAR images

Exploitation of

optical images

Data fusion

Optimisation of filtering

Special filtering

Geolocalisation of images


Coordination of multiresolution


Multispectral processing

Automatic classification

Recognition and identification

Fusion at the pixel level

Fusion at the primitive level

Fusion at the decisionmaking



civilian research

European EDA



civilian research

European EDA


Methods, principles:

Institutional civilian

research European



National control

of raw data and

of interpretation



National control

of optoelectronic


National Expertise


of standards/

methods, etc. intelligence chains

Intelligence chains are essential in order to coordinate resources. Their design relies on innovative

tools such as the French MoD battle lab (LTO, see §3.2.3), or via NATO cooperation.




R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


Intelligence chains

Management support


General architecture


National control of

intelligence chain



Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 69 Goniometry, Elint, Comint

At the strategic and tactical level, the function of electromagnetic intelligence (Elint) is fundamental

for situation assessment at the highest levels of command or for managing information at the

battlefield level. At the strategic level, Elint is a fundamental source of information. The integration

of the exploitation of data in C4I systems is an essential need for command purposes.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities



Localisation and Tracking

of transmitters

Geolocalisation of transmitters

Super High Frequencies (SHF)

and Frequency-Hopping

Spread Spectrum (FHSS)




Control of


Interception of


Low TRL studies


Control of

architecture Voice recognition, translation

These techniques, linked to Comint, are essential to the rapid exploitation of the information

collected. DGA is deeply involved in civilian research networks and cooperates with OSEO

Innovation. It supports the study and development of the Quaero software product, providing

expertise dedicated to the evaluation of technologies for the automated processing of speech and


Experience shows that these subjects greatly benefit from the diversity of methods and experiments

in European countries and can provide significant contribution to improving interoperability.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Voice recognition,



Automatic transcription

Automatic translation

Translation of oral speech

Tools and corpus: EDA

or NATO cooperation

State control of

implementation (keywords

and topics) Data mining

The Internet is a great multilingual database. Data and information retrieval for the purpose of

military intelligence requires the definition of a specific ontology. The adaptation of civilian search

engines is the most promising method.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Data mining

Data mining

Unstructured data

Civilian institutional


Official control of

implementation (key

words and topics)


Accompanying the massive move toward digitised data use in weapon systems, environmental data

are becoming essential in operations preparation and control, systems navigation functions and

targeting. The data need is two-fold: information system and operation of the weapon system. The

operational context has a strong impact on environmental information needs, which requires the

development of a progressive approach for:

- Collecting data by means of off-the-shelf products, systematic acquisitions or even “reactive”

programme of work meeting operational deadlines, which play a fundamental role in the

organisation of defence;

- Data exploitation means (access services, etc.).

70 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

It is necessary to synchronise and control the

consistency between the evolution of needs

for user systems and the evolution of capacities

to acquire supply and delivery of information

(standardised services and products).

The control of the geometrical quality of

images, which requires adapted expertise

regarding the sources, comes under

sovereignty insofar as it conditions the

positioning capabilities of mobile defence


Rapid Environment Assessment


DGA is interested in all techniques and activities linked to knowledge of the geographical and

physical endo-atmospheric environment (ground, sea and air), as well as human geography. They

are necessary for the specification and development of systems and equipment aimed at acquiring

knowledge of this environment, representing it, and enabling its exploitation, in order to optimise

the operational efficiency of in-service arms and command systems or the design of future systems.

The three areas of principal interest, geographical information, military oceanography and

atmospheric physics, are requiring the following techniques and activities:

• Techniques for the in-situ or remote-sensing acquisition of environmental data, studies and

specific developments of sensors, methods of interpretation and qualification of the data


• Modelling and characterisation of the various media from the point of view of their influence

on the design and operational use of systems, in particular the influence of the environment on

propagation and radiation conditions;

• Production and qualification process for geographical, oceanographic or weather information,

including: techniques of informations geo-referencing or imagery whatever its finality

(information, targeting, geography), methods for environmental information fusion from

various origins and techniques to access to this information (infrastructure of geospatial services);

• Specific methods for the representation, transformation and fusion of environmental information

by allowing adequate exploitation in the user’s systems. The characterisation of the needs of

systems remains the responsibility of the designers of these systems;

• Management and exploitation techniques for environment information, in particular those

using geo-referenced databases;

• Definition and evolution of geographical, oceanographic or meteorological product ranges,

standards applied to storage, access, representation, and transformation of geographical,

oceanographic or meteorological data, and more generally to geo-referenced data.


state of the ocean analysis and forecasting

The sea state knowledge is gained through analysis and forecasting models by the SHOM, in

coordination with the armed forces and DGA.

In order to improve the analysis and forecasting systems performance, priority areas in the medium

term are : swell representation (state of sea), extension of the operational system to coastal zones,

provision of environmental parameters linked to the sea water turbidity (coupling of hydrodynamic

and bio-geochemical models), high performance computing means.



R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Analysis and

forecasting of the

state of the ocean

Representation of

swell (state of sea)

Extension of the operational

system to coastal zones

Provision of environmental

parameters linked to the

turbidity of sea water

Altimetry, colour

and temperature

measurements of

water satellites

Civilian cooperation (ESA)

Complete control

of information

systems for decisionmaking



parameters of


Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 71

Weather forecasting

Research and development efforts concern the local improvement of the resolution of models, via

the merging of various models, and the improvement of the data assimilation into the models. A

first operational version of a high-resolution model (a few kilometres) is planned by 2009-2011. At

the same time, assimilation into the models should be enriched by the information accessible from

the new geostationary meteorology satellites (MSG series), the first of which, MeteoSAT8, has been

operational since 2003. As a whole, these efforts aim to improve the means of forecasting local

phenomena in the lower layers of the atmosphere, such as fog or aerosols.

A version of the defence meteorology R&D roadmap has been written in cooperation with Météo-

France and has been presented to the Military. DGA intends to continue and consolidate the

drafting of this roadmap in cooperation with Météo-France and the Military.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Weather forecasting in the

medium and immediate term

Medium scale modelling

in the low layers

Fusion and assimilation of data

(coupling between models

and theatre measurements)

Modelling of rainfall, fog, diffusion

of contaminants, waves effects

Remote sensing of weather

parameters from ground or space

Delocalisation of

meteorological forecasting

Weather forecasting

Via Météo-France

NATO standards

Data routing and


Support to



Radiative and transmissive properties of the atmospheric environment and radiation of the natural


The field of atmospheric propagation (UV, visible, IR, EM, laser, etc.) is more specific to defence

applications. Except in the unlikely case of a technological breakthrough, significant and continuous

progress is expected from:

- The development of our understanding of the micro-physical processes determining the optical

properties of clouds and aerosols;

- The development of methods to obtain in-situ knowledge of atmospheric structures in order to

evaluate the propagation conditions;

- Generalisation of hybrid digital modelling.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Radiative and

transmissive properties

of the atmospheric

environment and

Radiation of the

natural environment

Propagation of UV, visible,

IR, EM, laser, etc.

Generalisation of hybrid

digital modelling


National expertise

Production of geographical information

From a geometric viewpoint models are reasonably well controlled for optical and radar space

sensors, but they do not usually allow carrying out local reconnaissance in hostile regions. On the

other hand sensor agility, a quality valued by intelligence, introduces poorly controlled uncertainties

regarding the geometric characteristics of the viewpoint. Other image sources are available in a

defence context (air reconnaissance and UAVs: optics, videos, radar), but their geometric models

are still poorly controlled. Achieve the best value from geometric models is a priority in order to

72 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

allow the producers of geo-referenced military information to benefit from the rich quality of

these sources (very high-resolution, all weather capability).

Needs in reactivity involve identification of solutions and rapid data production technology (guided

data selection among an available set, geo-referencing).

Since 2007, DGA has been implementing a new organisation for the production of geographical

data making improved use of the National Geographical institute resources (Institut Géographique

National, or IGN). The IGN also provides its skills in term of standardisation (IGN-Defence

standardisation unit).

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Production of



Control of geometry and

localisation capability

without local support

Geographic database

Fast production

Extraction of semantic

information, characterisation

of media (soils surfaces, etc.)

Exchanges and


of products in

cooperation (MGCP),

DGIWG (normalisation)

Control of

geographic database

Reactivity of


Control of produced

images quality

Control of soils



rapid evaluation of the naval environment

For the needs of underwater warfare, a deep understanding of the naval acoustic environment is


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

REA (Rapid



Acoustic naval evaluation by

discrete tomography, datafusion

and inversion

(at present) NATO

NURC research centre

and European and

Canadian universities

Control of the

naval environment

as support for



Knowledge of bathymetry is essential to ensure

the safe navigation of ships, submarines and towed

devices as well as for amphibious operations. It must

be acquired in all of zones of interest for defence, at

short notice. dga is directing its efforts, in civilian or

military cooperation, towards the improvement of

measurements and their processing and exploitation.

We are constantly searching for either civilian or

military cooperation.

SPIV Robot

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities






Bathymetry, gravimetry,


Bilateral agreements


National control

of the exploitation

of data

Management, access and representation of digital geo-referenced information

The civilian and defence international community has, in recent years, been making significant

efforts to define generic conceptual models enabling the cover of various elements entering into

the constitution and management of digitized geographical data. International standards and

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 73

their adaptation to the defence context are emerging and should be able to be used to draw the

basis of the joint information exchange datamodel for geo-referenced information. The subject of

access to the data and diffusion introduces various themes such as geo-space service infrastructure,

GHOM data fusion, decision making support tools and groupware (for easier data updates), in the

context of REP (Recognized environmental picture).

DGA will continue to participate in the groups defining the international standards.

This issue also applies to oceanographical and meteorological data.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


access, diffusion

and representation

of digitalised




Geospace service infrastructure

GHOM data fusion (REP)

Groupware (data updates

and additions)

Decision support


standards (generic

models, encryption)



National control

of the technology

implemented in

programmes (DNG3D

and GEODE4D)

Characterisation of systems requirements, tactical assistance for use of the systems, qualification

of available data

The geo-referenced information or tactical assistance for use of the systems, based on the state of

the environment, is a priority area of work.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Characterisation of

systems requirements,

tactical assistance for

use of the systems,

qualification of

available data

Rough estimate of data quality

Cooperation on

various geographical

products (maps, etc.)

Specification of the

quality required for

weapon systems

Control of the

available data quality

In order to keep up with rapid changes in the field and support the transformation, DGA is jointly

developing approaches such as CD&E (concept/design, development and experimentation) with

mixed DGA-Armed Forces structures and the relevant centres of expertise.


Command and Control Information Systems (C2IS) are systems for processing data at the tactical

and strategic levels in various environments (land, sea, air and joint) and in various fields (command

and control, mission planning, logistics, intelligence,…). These systems are software-intensive and

part of complex organisations, which are often unstable and where the human role is essential.

In addition, interoperability constraints are very common, vertically within systems in the same

hierarchy and horizontally between several organisations.

The need for complexity control and interoperability management has led to a joint and convergent

approach (through the CTFSIA study) in order to establish a governance of those systems at technical

and acquisition levels.

The technical skills necessary to build seamless information systems cover mainly the following

topics :

- software architectures;

- data and process models management;

- secured mail service;

- messaging on tactical data links. Software architectures

Basic IT architectures are increasingly used according to the widespread of internet technology.

In spite of a strong «web-based services» trend, systems are still disparate due to heterogeneous

74 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

architectures and contexts. A major simplification of the complexity of this topic amounts to the

design of a unique repository of core services, common to the different systems. The construction

and management of this repository depends also on strategic choices related to the acquisition


Other efforts are also in progress in order to control software complexity:

• Usage of system engineering methods;

• Design of new tools to improve software quality at different levels.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Software architectures

SOA & Web services

Core enterprise services



United States (NCES,



(Joint Core

Enterprise Services)

Common Operating

Environment Data and process models management

The key approach, led in coordination with the CIADIOS (25) Centre interarmées d’administration

de l’interopérabilité opérationnelle) consists in defining a method to ensure and to manage

the semantic interoperability of exchanged data. The french joint data model (MPIA model and

XML-IA transport model) is now converging towards the NATO JC3IEDM meta-model (Joint C3

Information Exchange Dated Model). Some progresses have still to be made in order to simplify the

model complexity (with help of ebXML technology for example) and to combine it with the other

commonly exchanged data sets (such as formatted messages, MIP sets).

The CTFSIA study will also help to build structured views of organizations, functions and processes.

These views are necessary to complete the data model and the SOA services architectures.

In addition, the efforts will be increased in the field of data storage and other advanced topics

(semantic web).

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Data and process

models management

Data models

XML views

Process models

NATO Standards

Civilian (ebXML)


for data models



R&T programme


POS French MoD

4 Secured mail service

Secured mail is a basic and essential operational service. The context of military mail is characterised

by a variety of end-systems and data-links and by specific military constraints. “Quality of service”

(interoperability, mail on constrained networks, trans-signature, trans-coding, secured gateway,

instant messaging, etc.) must be given the biggest level of effort under that view. Some of these

works are valuably done with help from the open source software community.



R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Secured mail service

Secured SMTP




mail client

Security and

certification (XIMF,

secure extension)


CIADIOS : Centre interarmées d’administration de l’interopérabilité opérationnelle des systèmes d’information et

de communication

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 75 Messaging on tactical data links

Progress is sought along two ways. Firstly, enhancement of interoperability with allied forces will

be sought throughout the examination of TDL standards to be used in France. At short or medium

term, the goal should be to select NATO standards only (e.g. Link16, JRE) instead of national

ones. This is likely to impact both host system architecture and media aspects of legacy platforms.

Secondly, R&T is focusing on emerging technologies such as NTDES (NATO Tactical Data Enterprise

Services) approach, SOA concepts, or Link 22 implementation. These avenues are explored under

the aegis of the Joint TDL Interoperability Coherence Team involving several DGA expertise entities

(Rennes, Istres, and Toulon). Technological moves are taken into account in studies such as CTFSIA,

for which international cooperation and sharing of solutions is sought.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Tactical data link

messaging systems

Tactical Data Links





Joint TDL IO

Coherence Team

(Rennes, Istres, Toulon)


The MAN technical area (Missiles, Armes et techniques Nucléaires de défense) covers tactical and

strategic missile systems, missile propulsion and defence energetic materials, weapons (guns,

rocket launcher, etc.), ammunition in the broad sense (shells, aeronautical bombs, rockets, etc.),

and activities related to nuclear defence techniques.

These are major components of combat systems or integrated weapon systems. They fulfil a military

function or a capability of deterrence. These systems of missiles, weapons and related technologies

must evolve continuously to satisfy the armed forces’ needs in the short, medium and long term.

The main issues for integrated combat systems upon which tactical missile systems and weapons

depend, are:

- efficiency and speed of military action. This requires reduction in reaction times and adaptability

to change (vis-à-vis moving or mobile targets);

- control of strike chronology and rate of land operations;

- o ptimisation of missiles systems’ use, within centralised means of command and real-time control

of operations;

- sustained action and aptitude to deliver a precise strike in all weather, from a safe distance

(introducing diversification of the carriers for deep strikes);

- increasingly complex environment (civilian/military mix, legal framework requiring control of the

level and effect of striking); capability to selectively impair various targets across an entire hostile

space; measured use of force; and

precision firing (guided ammunition;

ammunition with target designation)

for land combat;

- evolution of threats and targets:

increased performance of targets

(mobility, protection, jamming

capability or deception of existing

missile systems);

• new threats on deep strike capability

(surface-to-air, air-to-air or space


• new targets (e.g. for sea warfare,

small boats linked to an asymmetrical

threat or atypical air-to-air threats

with low radar signature and low



76 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

Armée de l’air

- preparation of possible anti-ballistic missile defence capability;

- Ordnance safety level of missiles in their life cycles (storage, transport, handling, during carriage).

Concerning strategic missile systems, national sovereignty is imperative. Beyond present

developments and in spite of the absence of any prospect of major developments in the medium

term, this national sovereignty imperative requires maintaining skills and industrial know-how as

well as full test facilities (e.g. DGA Missiles Testing, BEM Monge) and appropriate national expertise. sea-to-ground strategic ballistic missiles (MsBs)

R&T aims to adapt these systems to the evolution of operational needs and threats. It concerns

national sovereignty and the precise nature of the work is classified. cruise missiles

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Architecture of

hyperspeed aerobic

propulsion missiles

Subsonic combustion ramjet

Supersonic combustion ramjet

Cooperation on

technology blocks

National control

Bidirectional connexion for

battle damage assessment

and re-targeting

Architecture of

cruise missiles

Antijamming GPS (26) receiver

Algorithms for navigation

Systems and algorithms

for mission planning

Data link with satellite or UAV

Cooperation by


contributions within

an integrated

prime contractor

Control of design

and integration of


Expertise on

technology blocks

Architecture of the

chain of lethality

Missile turbojets tactical missiles

Air-to-ground missiles

Work is directed primarily towards:


- addition of guidance functionalities

or data links: bidirectional connexion

for battle damage assessment and

re-targeting, satellite connections,

jamming hardened GPS navigation;

- Penetration capacity of: furtive

architectural form, manoeuvrability

to diversify trajectories of intrusion

(hybridisation of guidance,

navigation and altimetry sensor


- Diversification of warheads, reduction

of collateral effects and processing of

strongly hardened targets.

Scalp under Rafale

MBDA / T. Wurtz




GPS: Global Positioning System

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 77

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities



for theatres of


Integration of GPS and semiactive

final laser guidance

devices for modular air-toground

armament (AASM)

Cooperation on

technology blocks

Definitions and mission

information, effects

control, integration

on platforms



for theatres of


Processing of mobile or

“time sensitive” target

Concepts and technologies

of “loitering” missile

Cooperation on

technology blocks

Pre-evaluation of the

need and possible

technological solutions

Definitions and mission

information, effects

control, integration

on platforms

Air-to-air missiles

Short-range air-to-air missile systems presently in service in Europe will have to be replaced around


DGA considers that dialogue with the European countries concerned for renewal of these weapon

systems should be launched as of now.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Short-range airto-air


Short-range air-to-air missile

architectures and technologies

Cooperation by


contributions within

an integrated

prime contractor

Control of design

and integration of

technologies, expertise

on technology blocks

Ground-to-air missiles

The short-range ground-to-air

systems currently in service in

Europe will have to be replaced

around 2015-2025. Consequently,

a future ground-to-air low layer

system should be launched through

European cooperation.

MBDA / D. Lutanie

Mistral vehicle (RTD)

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Structure and technologies for

integrated ground-to-air systems

Ground-to-air low

layer systems

Ground-to-air missiles (internal

architecture, aerodynamic

configuration, homing,

chain of lethality)

Launching device

Firing management system

(command, control and


European cooperation

on the definition of the

possible needs between

partners, production

and entry into service

Definitions and mission

information, controls

effects, integration

on platforms

78 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 anti-ballistic missile defence (BMd)

The development of a possible capability for anti-ballistic

missile defence in Europe first requires the acquisition of

industrial skills in key technologies of its main components

(missiles interceptors in particular).

The first requirements are technological demonstrations

on key design difficulties for the final stage of the missile,

which provides the function of interception by direct impact

on the target (“hit to kill”). Technologies or key functions

of the terminal vehicle of an interceptor relate to homing,

guidance/piloting and lethality.

For defence against the threat of theatre ballistic missiles, in

the short term France will have a capability with the SAMP/T

Block 1, compatible of integration in the architecture of

the NATO ALTBMD programme which can then evolve with

the arrival of new systems: radars, command centres and


Aster 30

DGA Missiles Testing

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

BMD – system




Take into account critical hard

points: alert, discrimination,

real-time, communications, etc.

Guidance-control device and

associated motorisation

Homing Sensors

On-board real-time information

and decision system

Autonomous interception





and sharing of the

technology blocks

within the EU

European control,

national expertise on the

critical performances land combat missiles

New generations of land combat missiles will have to be

adapted to future networked operations and will benefit

from the distribution of functions for detection, decision

and action between the various platforms and, in particular,

to enable firing beyond the direct line of sight (“non line of

sight” - NLOS). It is in this context that European cooperation

is built around future programs (MRCM (27) ).

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


ECPA D / Caporal J. Salles




Land combat


Modular architecture

of the weapon system

(missile and firing unit)

Guidance-navigation chain

integrating infrared imagery

and semi-active laser bimode

homing head.

Ad hoc cooperation

Definitions and mission

information, homing,

control of effects,

integration on platforms


MRCM: Multi-Role Combat Missile

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 79 anti-ship missiles

Exocet MM40 has recently been re-motorised

with a turbojet, doubling its operational range.

R&T studies will aim at preparing future trends:

integration of a new homing head, preparation

of post-2020 Air to Sea, Ground to Sea, Sea to

Sea evolutions.

To meet the need expressed by the Navy for

a light anti-ship missile to equip embarked

helicopters such as the Panther and the NH90,

DGA is currently carrying out certain preliminary

work. Cooperation with European countries

having comparable needs is encouraged.

Exocet MM40 Block3

MBDA M. Hans

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Heavy antiship


Motorisation of the Exocet

anti-ship missile by turbojet

(Exocet MM40 Block 3)

Integration of a coherent

homing head on Exocet family

Sovereignty for electromagnetic

homing heads.

Definitions and mission

information, homing, control

of effects, integration

on platforms, CCEM (28)

Light antiship


Light anti-ship missiles from

embarked helicopters:

- System integration to

the launch platform

- Internal architecture (military

charge weight, fuel weight,

and electronic components

weight adequacy)

- Guidance with operator in

the loop, infra-red imagery

Ad hoc cooperation

Definitions and mission

information, homing, effects

control, platforms integration aeronautical bombs

In order to better control the effects of strikes, we plan to study new generations of bombs with

reduced unintended damage effects compatible with the AASM (29) guidance and propulsion family. general munitions

The main area of work is to design battle tank kinetic ammunition able to penetrate future armours,

which will appear beyond 2015, taking environmental constraints into account.

For specific urban environment ammunition (non-lethal or with reduced lethality), defence will rely

on work carried out by the homeland security sector.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Tank ammunition

New generation of armour

piercing ammunition (sabots,

lined penetrator, head structure,

auto-rotation device)

Explosive ammunition

with programmable

delay (chronometric

fuse, insensitiveness)



European control of

design and manufacture

National expertise of

effects of weapons


CCEM: Counter-Counter-Electromagnetic-Measures


AASM: Armement Air-Sol Modulaire (Modular Air-to-Ground Armament)

80 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Tank ammunition

Ammunition for crowd control

Ammunition for high lateral

effect without explosive



European control of

design and manufacture

National expertise of

effects of weapons

Precision of

kinetic munitions

Prediction of flight trajectories

of armour piercing projectiles:

- internal ballistics

- intermediate ballistics

- external ballistics



National expertise Intelligent ammunition and warheads

Intelligent ammunition is equipped with systems enabling in-flight trajectory correction improving

their precision. The technological challenge is to attain metric precision at reduced cost. These

munitions will have to be implemented in existing weapon systems and integrate technologies

such as semi-active laser guidance or electromechanical micro-systems in the guidance and piloting


The weapon systems concerned are:

- Field artillery

- Tank artillery for firing beyond line of sight

- Mortars

- Assault helicopters rockets.

France is open to European cooperation in these fields. Steps have been initiated in this direction

since 2006.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Metric precision


Semi-active laser final guidance for:

- Artillery ammunition;

- Heavy tank ammunition

- Mortar ammunition

- Combat helicopter rockets


ammunition of

increased range

and decametric


Tank ammunition

of increased

range and



Precision ammunition of

increased range):

- Navigation and guidance

system suitable in a shell;

- System of spreadable control

surfaces to increase the lift

New generation of general

purpose ammunition

- System of spreadable control

surfaces to increase the lift

- Suitable inertial navigation device

- Fire shock resistant

ammunition electronics

European cooperation

European control for

design and manufacture

National expertise

for the effects of

the weapons





General-purpose warheads with

multipoint lightings (=TMPAM)

for artillery shell or mortar;

ammunition architecture

integrating a TMPAM

Diversification of ammunition

warheads of medium calibre:

- Ammunition with chronometric

fuse and dense fragment warhead

- Double safety fuse

- Projectile with high lateral effect

European cooperation

European control for the

design and manufacture

National expertise

for the effects of

the weapons

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 81 diversification of loads and their effects

The stress is on support for technologies allowing to

restrict the number of ammunition types necessary

vis-à-vis a given number of targets. The integration of

a general-purpose warhead is planned in the future

metric precision artillery guided ammunition of 155

mm or 120 mm. Cooperation is being sought with

interested European partners.

Trials to validate simulations

DGA Land Systems

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Warheads for

cruise missiles

Evolution of the warheads:

- Fusing system functioning

by measurement of

distance into the target

- Anti power plant warheads

- Models of evaluation of

the lethal effects and

unintended damages

effects of cruise missiles


bomb warheads

and/or short

range airground



- Development or improvement of vulnerability models for tactical propellants and energetic

materials as well as models for predicting the ageing of propellants;

- Exploration and evaluation of processes for the destruction of the energetic materials at the

end of their lifetime in order to prepare for possible change in legislation on environmental


- Technologies for modulation of thrust and guidance in force (pif/paf);

- Methodology and test facilities.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Concepts of engines with

modulation of thrust (multi pulse,

variation of the nozzle throat)


- energetic material formulation for

thermic cycles and ageing resistance

- predictive models for ageing of

propellants (ideal model and digital)

- new composite solid propellants


- characterisation of threats and

architectures guaranteeing

the safety of solid propellant

engines (database, modelling);

- new composite solid propellants

with attenuated risk


- techniques for processing waste

emitted during ground fires

- technique for dismantling


- new composite solid propellants

which can be recycled





National control

Solid propellant

anaerobic propulsion

of tactical missiles

Innovative propulsion

for tactical missiles:

- digital tools for diphasic flows

to improve engine operation

- new ignition systems for engine

with an integrated firing device

- manufacturing process

optimised in cost



Cooperation in


the framework

of the EDA

National control


New concepts of

aerobic propulsion

for cruise missiles

Energetic materials

Detonation wave, liquid

combustion engine

Solid propellants:

- combination of new energy

polymers and new oxidants

- 4th generation propellants

- new oxidising propellant

- manufacturing processes of

new energetic materials


- nano-particles energy

- non-energetic nano-particles

(aluminium, catalysts of combustion)

- simulation codes adapted

to these materials

- processes for obtaining formulations

starting from nano-components





cooperation under

the framework of

the EDA, safety,

ageing of energetic


European control

National control

European control



Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 83 Explosives

Work is being carried out in the following areas:

- The application of composite explosives to the various weapon systems. This family of explosive

optimises safety, lifetime and cost;

- Obtaining compositions for Low Vulnerability Ammunition (LOVA) or Insensitive Munitions.

- New processes using binders with shorter polymerisation times. They make it possible to reduce

the costs of production for composite explosives;

- Penetration capacities for hardened targets;

- Phenomenological studies of certain families of explosives likely to be met in theatres of operations

in order to protect our forces.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities



Composite explosives:

- Supersonic penetrators

- Small critical diameter


- Reduced collateral

effect explosives

- Reinforced blast

effect explosives

- Energetic molecules

- New High Energy Density

Materials (HEDM)

European cooperation

European control for the

design and manufacture

National expertise

for the effects of the

weapons control Gun propellants

Work on barrel weapons is being carried out in the following areas:

- Increased embarked energy;

- Improved ordnance safety and lifetime;

- Development of “green” gun propellant;

- Reduction of the erosion of the barrels.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities



Gun propellant:

- New concepts of propellant;

- “Green” gun propellants

European cooperation

European control


The Sensors, Guidance and Navigation area (Capteurs, Guidage et Navigation - CGN) covers

the major part of the equipment of many weapon systems for the various possible battlefields:

electromagnetic detection (détection électromagnétique - DE), electronic warfare (guerre

électronique - GE), techniques for guidance and navigation (GN) and optronics (OP).

The equipments involved are mainly radars and homing heads, systems of electronic and optronics

warfare, thermal imagers, aiming sights, designators, systems of navigation using inertial

technologies and radio-navigation. The area also addresses electromagnetic attack: resistance to

strong fields, electromagnetic compatibility, level of damage induced by radiation on weapons and

ammunition (DRAM), resistance to lightning strikes, etc. Environment knowledge (electromagnetic

propagation, background signature, etc.) studied at the ASC area level is taken as an input for

the equipments and systems performance evaluation. Likewise, microwave components and IR

detectors are found in the MC area.

The specific nature of the divisions comes mainly from its transversal nature – CGN equipment

is to be found on the vast majority of carriers and weapon systems of the Military - and from

84 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

the increasing importance of the value of these equipments because they mainly condition the

operational efficiency and the survival of the systems relying on them.

For these various capacities, the need to limit unintended damage effects and fratricidal effects

has led to a race for high precision: DE, GE and OP long range identifications, precise and reliable

hybrid navigation, high-precision designation, high and very high-definition radar and optronics

imagery, etc. Moreover, the complexification of the battlefield requires equipments with enhanced

capabilities: multi-target (wide-field imagery, digital beam forming, IRM (30) ) and generalised

real-time. Lastly, the increasing importance given to human life has resulted in higher needs of

survivability requiring top-level capacities for electronics and optronics warfare.

As a consequence of all these elements, it has become necessary at the same time to push available

technologies to their limits and develop breakthrough technologies to implement as soon as they

reach sufficient maturity in order to reduce costs with equal or even higher performance.

4.8.1. ElEctroMagnEtic dEtEction

Electromagnetic detection is and

will remain an essential function for

a large proportion of our Weapon

systems taking into account the

possible ranges and all-weather


Thanks to the possibilities provided

by the new electronic power

components, the capacities for

digitization and processing, new

processing architectures and

improved design and modelling

tools, the field should still evolve

significantly. A high level of

investment is nevertheless required,

and the limited home markets

Graves radar

cannot ensure the long-term

viability of a scattered DTIB at the

European level. Thus, R&T in this field, centred on technological innovation, will have to maintain

real European momentum for cooperation and consolidation of the DTIB.

The objectives of this technical area are as follows:

- support technological innovation (digitalisation, algorithms, multifunction integrated systems,


- seek cost reductions for the electromagnetic detection function (modularity and standardisation,

modelling and simulations, etc.);

- support actions enabling real European dynamism at the DTIB level;

- support actions enabling to federate at the European level actions concerning defence of the

spectrum usable by radars;

- support joint actions by DGA and ONERA concerning SAR data-processing, airborne radar antennas,

to follow the development of skills in surface radars architectures.




analysis observation information

High-resolution imagery for surface monitoring radar

It becomes necessary to satisfy increasing needs for all-weather imagery, of sufficient quality to

ensure the monitoring of ground areas even in complex environment (urban areas, forest zones,


IRM: Intelligent Radar Management

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 85

presence of very slow or fast targets, fixed or mobile, etc.). The modes and processing of very highresolution

SAR, STAP GMTI can meet these needs, thanks to improved performances of equipments

and better processing, taking into account integration constraints (structures deformations). For

the unmanned platforms (UAV or missile) low costs technologies are sought, with low weight,

volume and power requirements.

dga has been involved for a long time in this field of European cooperation and wishes to continue

an active policy of cooperation.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Radar imagery

for surface


Very high-resolution SAR

and GMTI/STAP Processing

Antennas and integration

of antennas

Low cost compact technologies

with reduced weight, volume

and power consumption

High realistic simulation

and modelling

Large demonstrators

(Europe and NATO)

Technology sharing

Specific waveforms

and processing.

Structure and global


MoD expertise in

simulations space monitoring

the monitoring of space will acquire increased importance. Beyond the capacities of monitoring and

trajectory calculation provided by the GRAVES system, we should be able to acquire identification

and attitude estimation capabilities for satellites of interest. Research work will continue on radar

concepts, technologies and processing.

This field is open to international cooperation.

R&T areas Key technologies Coopeation National capabilities


imagery radar

Radar architecture and concepts

(including multistatic aspects)

Imagery processing

(2D-ISAR, interferometric

image processing)

All aspects

Exploitation of duality remote engagement, various warfare, global security

Active antennas

Able to reach longer ranges and capable

of agile modes for scanning, pointing and

tracking, multifunction active antennas

are key components of modern detection

systems. in this domain, which is strategic

at the European level, and taking into

account the costs, dga supports structuring

cooperation for the European dtiB, in

particular capable of maintaining skills

in research laboratories and industries

for active antennas as well as European

capabilities in power components for t/r (31)

modules, specific to military applications.





86 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Electronic power components (GaN)

Active antennas

for airborne

or land



2D E/R (32) digital components

Adaptive processing and dynamic

management of the radar modes

Standardised “Open and

modular” architecture

Broadband conformal antenna

Demonstrators, most

technology blocks

Specific waveforms

and digital processing

Structure and global


MoD expertise

in simulation

EM multifunctional systems

HF Radars for coastal monitoring

Surface wave HF radars aim to extend the range of monitoring in a permanent way. Work underway

concerns more control of radar parameters than basic technologies (precise performance evaluation,

integration of environment constraints: management of frequency allocations, electromagnetic

compatibility, sites of integration, etc.).

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

HF coastal

monitoring radars

Structure and integration

of surface-wave radars

All aspects

Skills for acquisition

Radars in urban environments

The need relates to the detection of unusual or suspect activities inside urban areas.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Radars in urban


Modelling of propagation in

urban areas and compatibility

of required radar power

Concepts, architectures

and processing

Miniaturisation and integration

on mobile platforms (e.g. mini

UAVs, robots, light vehicles, etc.)

All aspects

Skills for acquisition

Architecture and

possibly overall


Remote early warning and fire-control system for ABM defence

The need implies capability in advanced and early warning, with a fire-control system, necessary

for the implementation of weapon systems. Ongoing studies deal with the feasibility of an early

warning system as well as of a target designation system.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Remote early


and target

designation for

ABM Defence


system for

ABM Defence

capability 2

UHF Technologies antenna Large demonstrators Specific waveforms

and processing

Architecture and

possibly overall

S-Band Active antenna GaN


Large demonstrators

technology (GS 1000 - 15000)





E/R: Transmission/Reception (Émission/Réception)

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 87

Electromagnetic detection - basic technologies:

In addition to the various applications described above, the following areas should also be


- processing and waveforms for discretion and ECCM (electronic counter counter measures),

adaptive modes, etc.

- passive & multi-static radar modes (including synchronisation aspects)

- radar modelling and simulation, necessary for a better understanding of the performance of

radars and antennas in their environment as well as development cost reduction.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Radar techniques

Processing and waveforms

for discretion and adaptive

Counter Electronic Counter

Measures, modes, etc

Passive & multi-static radar modes

(including synchronisation aspects)

Possibilities on most

of the aspects

Particular interest

for the defence of

the EM spectrum

Specific waveforms

and processing

Some technology blocks

Modelling and simulation

4.8.2. ElEctronic WarfarE

The field of Electronic Warfare is essentially a very restricted field, belonging to national sovereignty

because of the important links between the efficiency of deployed countermeasures and the

knowledge of the threats taken into account. Thus, the main axes of research aim to:

- maintain a thorough understanding of the threats and their concepts of


- maintain the aptitude to react quickly and effectively to take into

account new threats or new concepts of employment;

- control architectures and the associated key components;

- control the supply of “expandable” countermeasures (decoys, etc.).

While cooperation between States is not excluded, the above aspects are

very constraining and result in very limited technical interdependence

between countries. observation, intelligence

Interception and identification

Work in this area concerns technologies necessary for the architecture

of Electromagnetic Intelligence systems (the systems aspects are dealt

with by the Architecture and techniques for C3I systems (ASC) area).

The emphasis is on the reactivity necessary to take into account the

rapid evolution of threats encountered.

Antenna of La Fayette

class frigate

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

DGAcom -F. Vrignaud

High precision goniometry

and localisation (33)

Interception and


Demodulation, characterisation,

identification of emissions

Exploitation of information

Antennas and payload integration

Activities under

national control

Control global


Architecture of

exploitation aspects



Including multi platforms

88 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 remote engagement, various warfare, global security


Work in this area concerns the whole interception-identification-countermeasures loop, both

on technologies, algorithms and architecture aspects as architectures around automatic and

programmable systems. Credibility of the decoys (passive or active) is also studied. IED jamming

is an important priority, as well as control of the effects of compatibility induced by these


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Antennas and radomes

Broad band reception

Self-protection of

the platforms

Algorithms for tracking

and identification

Systems architectures and

platform integration

Techniques and technologies

of jamming and deception

Activities under

national control

Global performance

& key technologies

control for

defence aspects.

Electromagnetic signatures

(measurements, modelling

and processing)

HPM weapons and intended electromagnetic


The High Power Microwave (HPM) weapons, whose

technology readiness level is very variable, are likely

to be employed for any little or poorly protected

electronic system. Knowledge of mechanisms of

attack and levels of vulnerability is necessary. For

certain aspects, this field can be open to international


HYPERION test facility


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

HPM weapons

and intended



HPM technologies (including

metrology aspects)

Measure and modelling

of the effects

Possible on special


Control of the


of systems

Electromagnetic compatibility and resistance to strong field attacks

This involves developing methodological aspects (simulations, tests) tied to these aspects.

Work in this area mainly relates to the necessary tools to evaluate damage to the weapons and

ammunitions due to Electromagnetic Radiation, electromagnetic compatibility and the evaluation

of the effects of lightning




R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


and strong field

Measure and modelling

of the effects



Global control of

EM compatibility

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 89

4.8.3. naVigation and guidancE

control of localisation and final precision according to the required level is an essential operational

requirement, taking into account issues often associated with the deployment of forces and weapon

systems of variable levels of autonomy.

The development of deterrence has resulted in France developing international level skills in

the field of inertial guidance and navigation systems, which are advisable to maintain in order

to attain cost-effectiveness and simplify their implementation. Radio-navigation by satellites

offers increasingly powerful and sophisticated possibilities and services. The evolution of military

standards of GPS, the developments of the Galileo system and of the PRS secure service are

dimensioning elements. It is thus necessary to support the evolution of these systems from the

point of view of precision, increased security/integrity and resistance to increasingly constraining

electromagnetic environments (NAVWAR). Research for global coherency in the chain of precision

and the development of modular and standardised architectures for tactical applications are also

important areas of research. remote engagement

Integration of high efficiency inertial


Inertial technologies and their associated

techniques are used in the guidance and

navigation systems to know the course, attitude

and/or speed and position of a mobile weapon,

in an autonomous, covert, and permanent way,

robust to jamming and decoys.

“Vibrating” technologies, like HRG (35) or

MEMS (36) , have made rapid progress in recent

years. Work will now focus more on the problems

of integrating these technologies within

new generation navigation systems, taking

into account constraints of cost containment,

volume, reliability, consumption and robustness,

while maintaining optimal performance.

HRG - hemispherical resonator

gyro/Wine glass resonator


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Integration of high

efficiency inertial


Vibrating inertial technologies

(VBA (37) , CVG (38) , HRG)

including i-MEMS (39)

Atomic interferometry

Technologies for

tactical applications

High efficiency

control (deterrence)

Means of recalibration

As essential addition to inertial techniques are those relating to recalibration on given “ground

data” (i.e. altimetry), stellar data or output from vision sensors, in this last case for future low-cost

applications for UAVs.


PRS: Public Regulated Service


HRG: hemispherical resonator gyro/Wine glass resonator


MEMS: Microelectromechanical systems


VBA: Vibration Beam Accelerator


CVG: Coriolis Vibrating Gyro


I-MEMS: Inertial Micro Electro-Mechanical Systems

90 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Means of


Techniques of recalibration: ground

data correlation - radio-altimetry

Technologies and techniques

for stellar aiming

Integration of visual information

in the guidance and navigation

loops (contribution in

autonomous navigation)

Technologies for

tactical applications

To be developed

High performance

control including

space applications

High performance


Radio-navigation by satellites

The aim here is to accompany the evolution of the American military GPS (need for compatibility)

but also in parallel to support the development of the PRS (Public Regulated Service) Galileo service,

both with regard to the commitment concepts and more technological aspects linked to reception

or local improvement of precision. The NAVWAR aspects are also taken into account, in particular

in terms of resistance to jamming. In this context, miniaturisation of radio-navigation equipment

is also being addressed.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


(GPS & Galileo)

Concepts and commitment

(including NAVWAR)

Secure reception

Technologies and techniques

for antijamming and


According to

programmes, GPS

or even Galileo

Commitment concepts

Related services

Integrity control

Resistance to



code M GPS

Transverse functions for guidance, navigation and localisation

- Overall performance and architecture:

The objective of these activities is to control the chain of overall precision inside and between

overlapping systems. The studies relate to architectures, the modelling of performances, coupling

between sensors (hybridisation techniques) aiming to optimise, with reduced costs, the benefits of

inertial approaches (sustainability and integrity of information) and of radio-navigation (precision

and cost). This includes guidance techniques, in particular for strategic missiles.

- Autonomous navigation:

The association of ground recognition means with all types of sensor, coupled with more traditional

techniques of inertia and radio-navigation, can make it possible to localise in an effective way both

familiar and unknown terrains, both inside or outside. The first applications planned relate to land

UAVs and robots.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


and overall




Hybridisation and techniques

of coupling between inertia

and radio-navigation

Algorithms for navigation

Modelling and simulations

at the system level

Algorithmy and techniques

for recalibration

Algorithms for autonomous


Algorithms for guidance

Modularity and


of architectures

To be developed

Control and coherency

of overall performance

Control of high





Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 91

Time stamping - Synchronisation

The multiplication of networking requires the development of miniaturised, ultrastable timestamping,

as well as very high accuracy clocks necessary for the establishment of time references or

for systems synchronisation.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Time stamping -


Miniaturised ultrastable clocks

High accuracy compact clocks for

high performance applications


No cooperation


Improvement of the

reception of GPS and

Galileo signals

Control of high



Day-night detection and identification are major needs for military action, and have been at the

origin of the spectacular development of optronics. The spectrum of applications has steadily

broadened to functions of observation, information, guidance and optronic warfare. The joint use

of vision and lasers has further increased the range of applications both for detection, telemetry

and designation and for countermeasure lasers of medium or high energy. The optronics field is

and will remain an important contributor to global security applications.

With regard to the expansion of applications in the civilian field, it has been decided to focus R&T

effort on innovative technologies enabling to obtain significant advantages in military terms and

to use technologies from the civilian sector as much as possible when similar needs exist. This is

the case in particular for visible window detection systems. Defence efforts aim to:

- increase performances in detection/identification, beyond the enemy capacities of engagement

(capacities of long range identification on non co-operative targets, remote sensors),

- ensure force protection (self-protection of airborne, naval, armoured platforms, infrastructures

and sites),

- facilitate the operational use of optronics (cost, size, reliability and integration in chains of

command and information).

This field is generally very open to cooperation making it possible to consolidate the European

DTIB (bilateral or multilateral within the EDA). European autonomy regarding technology access is

also taken into account. Observation Intelligence (40)

The need relates in particular to multifunctional optronic means, which are compact and integrable

with high performance on airborne platforms, able to supply data enhanced images for later

graphical exploitation.

Similar to electromagnetic detection, observation by satellites is an emerging need. The support of

civilian technologies (space, astronomy) is required here.

Lastly, while IR detection has already shown its potential contribution for military space observation,

hyperspectral imagery is a field in which a great deal of progress is still required.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Observation &


Long range


Very high resolution techniques

(optical aperture synthesis,

adaptive optics, etc.)

Techniques enabling the

detailed characterisation of

scenes observed (hyperspectral

imagery, vibrometry, etc.)

Image processing

Search for European

independence on

technology blocks and

large demonstrators

Very high performance

(strategic intelligence)


This paragraph does not consider space imagery, which is under the responsibility of EORD

92 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 Remote engagement, various warfare, safeguard and global security

Navigation and attack systems

The need here relates to capacities of engagement on small moving targets in stand off conditions

from air defence systems (4 th generation laser designation pods). In the field of image processing,

work concerns improvement to the capacities of acquisition and identification of targets in complex

environments. As for the medium and high energy laser weapons, they should, in the long term,

fill important gaps for the protection of sites, explosive ordnance disposal or ABM Defence. These

weapons will be quite complex and expensive to develop. One of the major critical points remains

the laser source which must be compact, efficient and produce a high quality beam.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Line of sight stabilisation

Active imagery

Lasers designation

Processing for identification

and designation

Navigation and

attack systems

On technology

blocks and large


Control of final

precision and of

capacity of integration

Alert systems

Concerning armoured, naval and airborne platforms, it is necessary to process threats in an

omni directional manner, with ranges and false alarm rates compatible with these platforms’

countermeasures or self-defence systems.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Alert systems

Multi-spectral systems

Omni-directional systems

Specialised image processing

On technology

blocks and large


Control of the

false alarms rate

Night vision

Not only for mobility but also for observation, the goal is to reduce the weight and power

consumption of the devices without reducing performance and at reduced costs.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Night vision

Very low light level

detection technologies

Image Intensifier/Infra-Red fusion

On technology blocks

and algorithms




The fight against manpads and more generally against the missiles with infra-red (IR) guidance

constitutes a major challenge to improving the safety of military and civilian aircraft. Nevertheless,

civilian and military crisis-handling doctrines are based on different logics, and, as a result, a partial

agreement has been reached on the recommended technological solutions. DGA wishes to increase

European cooperation on this subject.



R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Self-protection and



Multi-spectral, with

adapted kinematics,

morphological IR decoys

Laser jamming systems

(DIRCM( 41 ))

On technology

blocks and large


Control of performance

according to threat


DIRCM: Directed Infra-red Counter Measures

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 93

In the domain of force protection, halfway between optronics and electromagnetic detection,

tera-hertz detection seems to offer interesting potential for short-distance surveillance and the

protection of restricted areas. The work supported by DGA is currently at the research level and will

be able to lead to work of demonstration of feasibility.

Directed energy weapons and offensive laser

Medium and high power laser directed energy weapons

may offer high military potential, subject to considerable

investment being made. The technologies used in civilian,

industrial or scientific domains may lead to technological

breakthroughs that will have to be analysed. In the long term,

the development of laser weapons will require cooperation at

the European level. Lastly, it is equally as important to develop

protective systems against the military use of lasers and the

methods and means to guarantee the ocular safety of the


Sphinx test facility


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Medium and

high energy laser

weapon systems

High power and energy Laser

Aiming systems and corrective

of the atmospheric disturbance


Depending on access

to the technology

Vulnerability and

protection against

laser weapons

Nonlinear optical limiters

Technology aspects

Control of performance

according to threat

Airborne ABM alert

Airborne optronic systems can provide limited zone coverage in addition or substitution to space

alert systems. Work currently underway concerns the demonstration of feasibility of such a system.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Airborne ABM alert

Knowledge of the

backgrounds and signatures

On technology

blocks and large


Performance optimisation optronics - basic technologies and human protection

Miniaturisation of sensors (nano-technologies, on-focal plane integration of functions , etc.)

The integration of miniaturised components to focal planes paves the way for sensors having

multiple, specific and miniaturised functional capacities.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


of sensors (nanotechnologies,

on-focal plane,

integration of

functions, etc.)

MEMS and infra-red sensors


According to the

possibilities of access

to technology

Multi-applications 2D or 3D laser active imagery

The use of laser to scout out scenes with controlled types of illumination offers multiple possibilities

to increase the range of detection, eliminate masks, discriminate in distance and allow specialised

image processing. We need to develop basic blocks of detectors and sources: compact and universal

laser sources for all military applications of telemetry, designation and active imagery.

94 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


2D laser imagery

Laser sources for

airborne TM/

designator, laser

imagery and active

homing heads

Focal planes for 2D or

3D active imagery

Lasers for active imagery

Components for lasers (diodes,

fibres, nonlinear crystals)

Military laser architectures


According to the

possibilities of access

to technology

Optic materials, image processing and analysis, visualisation:

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Innovative optical



New infra-red materials (very

broad band, resistant to

aerothermic effets), multispectral

optic materials

Fibres for infra-red optic

Frequency conversion crystals

Visualisation technologies

(OLED, LCD, etc.)


According to the

possibilities of access

to technology

Images processing

and analysis

Low level real-time processing


The telecommunications field covers transportation of the information necessary to operate and

maintain the performance of the weapon systems, the operation of nuclear weapon, systems of

command and intelligence for analogical and digital data services, phone and video on strategic,

operational and tactical levels.

Telecommunications are at the heart of the Network Centric Warfare concept which aims to enable

the information sharing between the various players, the decision making according to available

informations and, finally, a rapid reaction. The purpose is clearly to speed up the cycle “perception

- decision – action”.

Telecommunications are at the heart of joint and combined interoperability. They are essential to

unify ad-hoc coalitions (NATO/EU/not-NATO). Requirements for telecommunications are linked to

the digitization of the Military and operational issues to identify and localise in real time to avoid

friendly fire. In addition, new needs appear in particular because of the multiplicity of small areas

of operations in a large theatre of operation, which need to communicate with isolated soldiers,

even if they are beyond the radio range.

The main issues concerning the area are:

- software defined and its potential;

- UVs data links;

- SATCOM ground stations & the future post-Syracuse 3 space segment;

- Air to Ground and Ground to Ground identification;

- IP network protocols;

- Antennas

- Frequency management, and radio spectrum engineering;

- Meta-system [tactical radio / infrastructure network / long

range] to connect;

- Telecommunication standards. Syracuse system

DGA/Comm - F. Vrignaud




Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 95

4.9.1. Architecture of telecommunications

Secure architectures must meet the needs of sensor networking, the decision-making centres, and

the weapon systems, in an area covering tactical, operational and strategic fields.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


Secure, global, coherent and

evolutionary telecommunication



Control of architecture

4.9.2. Software Defined Radio (SDR)

The advent of the software defined radio (SDR) follows the operational logic of interoperability

and cost-reductions to rationalise stocks of radio equipments by implementing various waveforms

on the same telecommunication equipment, with at the same time standardisation of the

software and hardware parts of the radio equipment. US efforts on net-centric operations and on

telecommunications (SCA (42) standard, JTRS (43) program) have led the European countries to take

the same route. The SDR offers the flexibility necessary for future net-centric operations by easy

implementation of many wave forms (new or legacy) and interconnection of several networks.

In addition, the SDR represents a major technical challenge. The success of the actions launched

will have military and civilian impacts and important economic interests. Thus, the generic SDR

platform will be part of future telecommunications, spectrum management, and electronic warfare


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


UHF radio with


Software defined radio



Demonstration in

European cooperation


European cooperation

Other international


Intelligent purchaser

National control on

Information Security

Access to waveforms

(expertise on



France supports the European cooperation which resulted in November 2006 in the launch of the

ESSOR project by the Ministers of Defence of 6 partner countries within EDA (Spain, Finland, France,

Italy, Poland and Sweden). The purpose of this project is to:

- define a European reference frame of secure software radio which relies on the SCA standard, of

US origin;

- develop a common European coalition wave-form;

- carry out technological demonstrators of nodes of tactical communications;

- carry out full-scale experiments.

4.9.3. Transmissions for airborne tactical data links

Tactical data links are essential to the inter-operability of NATO air-forces. France has integrated

link 16 on its Mirage 2000 and Rafale fighters. It has access to the MIDS/JTRS component in the

context of the MIDS/JTRS agreement, making it possible to have interoperable equipment available

and to incorporate standard evolutions in the medium-term. The change of the L16 wave form to

the SDR standard is under consideration

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Transceiver” part

of the tactical

data links

Embedded equipment MIDS/JTRS agreement Control of use


SCA: Software Communication Architecture


JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System

96 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

4.9.4. SDR certification

Certification to the ESSOR standard is a major issue for the SDR because of the ambitions of this

technology and the extent of the capacities to be evaluated. In using an open standard, the capacities

can be shared in Europe. The centre of reference in France is “DGA/Information superiority” located

in Rennes (formerly CELAR). DGA wishes to develop relations with its counterpart certification

centres in Europe with, at the same time, civilian and military prospects. The security aspects of the

information systems will be dimensioning for defence applications.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Certification of

the software

defined radio

Control of large objectoriented



European commissione

Contribution to

European certification

4.9.5. Antennas

A large variety of antenna technologies suitable for defence needs exist. The areas of interest are

linked to problems of the integration of many antennas onto military platforms and relate to: the

reduction of the dimensions of antennas, simulation, new materials, broadband antennas, control

of electromagnetic couplings, propagation.

Axes R&T Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


amplifiers, filters

Great diversity of technologies

according to the platforms


Expertise (integration,

performances, electromagnetic


4.9.6. Radio spectrum engineering

DGA recommends increasing cooperation between the European military institutions in particular

within the EDA forum (Project Team “Radio Spectrum”) in synergy with civilian institutions. In the

short term, military institutions would like to:

- better manage the military uses of the spectrum while taking care to maintain permanent access

to the frequencies (prospection and anticipation of the use of the frequencies);

- develop common positions between European countries to improve interoperability;

- extend the operational ranges of our respective systems;

- have a common visibility with regard to the operating safety.

In the longer term, the cognitive radio, allowing a dynamic adaptation in frequency, is a very

promising technology which must be studied in cooperation.


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


of frequencies

Static planning tools Open Control of tools

Cognitive radio (dynamic)


European cooperation

Expertise (impact

on future




4.9.7. Space communications

The areas of interest are the use of frequency bands [7-8GHz], [20-30GHz], and 44 GHz (X , K Ka, Q),

of the broadband communication protocols, and protected protocols, the “Satcom on the move”

and the satcom laser communications.

This last technology offering high throughput, long distance, point-to-point telecommunication

is complementary to the first two. The technology in its satellite-to-satellite and satellite-to-UAV

versions has been developed to a high TRL. It has important potential for improving performance,

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 97

with high throughput and low vulnerability of the beam. It also addressed important issues with

respect to civilian problems (monitoring of fishing zones, coastal access security, customs, etc.).

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


by satellite


Maintain space

telecommunications on a

moving carrier (On The Move)

European cooperation

Control of EHF


Integration to carrier

(antennas, solid state

amplifiers, etc.)

Optical link




Identification of


Expertise in integration

4.9.8. Airborne communication nodes

The need for a local function of telecommunication processing data in “real time” has been

underlined by:

- the cohabitation of several different types of UAV in the land force zone of action;

- the mutualisation of satellite resources to the benefit of different systems.

“Airborne communication nodes” technology was thus developed to meet the need for increased

traffic in a limited geographical area and has been developed to a high TRL. Civilian applications

exist such as, for example, the provisional re-establishment of communications after a natural


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Embedded terminal

Connections for

UAVs (standard)

European cooperation

Control of integration

National control

of Information

Systems Security

Airborne communication nodes Open Intelligent purchaser

4.9.9. IFF (Identification Friend or Foe)

Interoperability and compatibility with civilian radiocommunications play a crucial role in this field.

The arrival of the IFF mode 5, which is compatible with mode S installed on civil aircrafts, should

satisfy the needs in the long term. In addition, DGA is involved in international discussions on

reversed IFF projects (STANAG 5527).

DGA needs to take part in the work for the standardisation of mode 5 (NATO) as well as in

conducting interoperability tests. DGA supports the development, in cooperation, of European

means of evaluation.

DGA also supports technologies of low cost air-to-ground identification.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

IFF Signal Processing NATO Expertise

4.9.10. IP (44) and IPv6 migration technologies

Future tactical networks will have to include radio equipments providing a point-to-point service

like a true mobile IP network. Defence must monitor civilian technological change in order to

anticipate needs. A tactical IP network approach aims to provide responses to the following

technical issues:


Internet Protocol

98 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

- Seamless interconnection of elements through standard mechanisms;

- Support of various applications;

- Increased throughputs and satisfaction of real-time needs.

DGA intends to continue evaluation studies of IP technologies and to measure the impact of changes

in standards on its own systems. The EDA forum makes it possible to address problems common to

European telecommunications systems.

Quality of service (SLA, LAN, WAN, QoS IP aspects)

DGA will benefit from technologies developed in the civilian sector and will devote special attention

to the variety of throughputs necessary for operations, response times and processing security. DGA

supports research into the application of future SLA tools (Service Level Agreement) for the defence

purposes, SLA management methods (syntax, management, etc.) and application exercises.

Ad hoc networks (MANET, mobile IP)

By 2015, the development of access networks equipment incorporating civilian technology blocks

such as the MANET protocol will allow a dynamic reconfiguration of the networks. DGA will rely on

academic work, in particular that carried out by the Institut National de Recherche en Informatique

et Automatique (INRIA).

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities



Interoperability standards


European bilateral


Implementation and

use in weapon systems

IP Protocol


Tools for radio supervision


Mobile Ad hoc

networks (MANET)



European cooperation

Expertise (impact

on future


Control of quality

of service

Intelligent procurement

of the tools

Quality of service (SLA, LAN,

WAN, QoS IP aspects)




4.10.1. Cryptography (algorithms and protocols, cryptographic

components, integration of cryptography in the equipment and systems)

With regards cryptography, it is necessary to have:

- National capability for the design of algorithms and cryptographic protocols (capability ensured

by “DGA/Maîtrise de l’information” in Rennes);

- National industrial capability for the manufacturing of cryptographic equipments;

- Good involvement of public and private research laboratories.

It is essential to maintain a high level of skills in the design and evaluation of encryption algorithms

in particular to enable the development of cryptographic components for future defence

equipments. In order to maintain security performance at the highest level, DGA will undertake

studies into the theoretical and applied mathematical disciplines of the design of the algorithms

and the cryptographic protocols, as well as techniques to evidence the security of the protocols.

If interoperability is sought, these protocols will have to take into account combined standards

(NATO and the EU).



Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 99

Technological monitoring must be carried out on the specification of the integration of

cryptographic processes into equipments or systems with for example the follow-up of standards

of security for telecommunications protocols (HAIPIS, SCIP, etc.), and architectures for the exchange

and management of cryptographic keys.

Technological evolution linked to cryptographic components must be watched with attention,

such as for example the use of the FPGA or SoC (System on Chip) for all the functions of security

concerned with cryptography.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities



Hardware components

Standards (data

transmission and phone)

AQUA Countries

of EU and NATO

work in groups

Possible for NATO-

EU equipments

AQUA Countries of

the EU and NATO

National control

Control of a French


Evaluation (technology blocks,

cryptographic equipment)

AQUA countries in

the framework of

double evaluation

National control

4.10.2. Information Technology security

Research in this field comprises:

- Security of the operating systems and control of their interaction with applications and equipment

such as virtualisation software:

- Techniques and products for the set up of multi-level security (trusted visualisation of documents,

certification, authentication, Key management infrastructure);

- Identification and authentication systems (biometrics, etc.);

- Contents Access control.

R&T areas Technologies déterminantes Cooperation National capabilities

Access rights


Biometrics, cryptography,

smart card, etc



Management of

multi level security

Hardware partitioning


Partitioning software

Not necessary today


National control

Control of French


4.10.3. Means of defensive cyber warfare

Defensive cyber warfare aims to keep operational networks and systems at a high security level,

in a potentially hostile cyber-environment. The defence organisation will use intrusion detection

techniques and inforensics tools in the watch/alert/react cycle, in order to be able to detect cyber

attacks, and identify the perpetrators.

Cyberdefense is a field where cooperation with NATO countries (technical exchanges, combined

exercises, etc) is necessary to fight efficiently cybercrime or cyberwar actions

R&T areas Technologies déterminantes Cooperation National capabilities

Computer defensive


Computer threat analysis


response tools



Expertise and control of

French implementation

100 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

4.10.4. Systems of Systems security

An important field in which DGA is involved is systems of systems security: the (layered) indepth

defence and supervision of complex networks of sensors, weapons, and communication &

information systems.

Security modelling and risk analysis are research topics of high interest for DGA, which can be

addressed in collaboration with civilian research organisations. Other topics too, such as evaluation

of the security breaches in dual-use technologies (RFID, WIMAX, WIFI, etc…).

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Architectures of security

Security of ad-hoc networks

Security of infrastructure

networks (Netsec)

Management of


Biometrics (for memory: see

Architecture and techniques

for C3I Systems, Social

Sciences and Protection)

Security of systems

of systems


Expertise and control of

French implementation

4.10.5. Security of Weapon systems

Weapon systems (unmanned platforms, missiles, UAVs, sensors, etc.) use embedded hardware,

software, and data, sensitive or classified, which must not be compromised, before, during, or after

operation. The design of architectures and mechanisms able to protect executable code and mission

data against such access, cloning, reverse engineering, or alteration, in operational environments is

an unavoidable challenge, calling for specific techniques (obfuscation (46) , cryptography, etc).

Protection against compromising signals of systems is also an important subject for defence. It

implies vulnerability analyses which can be taken into account by main defence equipment

suppliers. The studies undertaken in this field must result in a transition from a “product” focus to

a “system” focus..

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Security of

weapon systems

Technologies for security

of weapon systems



National control

The Human Sciences and Protection (SHP) area is structured around questions relative to humans

in operational environment. The aim is to improve their safety and operational capability and, if

necessary, provide the necessary care.

This area addresses issues concerning Man faced with risk, in order to offer means of protection

against the risks of complex socio-technical systems, with the aim of improving the effectiveness of

soldiers. It is composed of two parts, SH (Human Sciences and Human Factors) and CBRN (Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence).

The purpose of research is to increase knowledge on CBRN agents and conventional hazards that

soldiers may encounter. The first objective is then to be able to optimise the requirements for

protection devices and more widely for the defence systems including medical counter-measures.

Another objective is to improve medical support interfaces on the field in a global approach called

“télésanté” (Health Information System).

The major technological areas of work for this field are:





Obfuscation is used to prevent reverse engineering of executable code

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 101

4.11.1. cBrn risK ManagEMEnt

this field is fundamental. firstly, dga is the recognised national authority (inter-ministerial) on

chemical and biological risks assessment.

The first aim is to manage these hazards and risks.

A system approach is currently carried out. A global

architecture for an integrated system is currently being

studied with various component functions: detection,

identification, neutralisation, individual and collective

protection, decontamination and medical countermeasures.

The system is completed with a forensic

capability. At the industrial level, industrial integrator

companies are developing the system with a network

of small and medium businesses, start-up and research

laboratories and institutes. They thus cover most of

the technical functions cited above. Concerning

cooperation, the system that is currently in place at

the national level may be shared in mid-term at the

European level except for biological reagents and

some databases.

The second objective of risk assessment capability is

to actively participate in non-proliferation initiatives,

which are of prime interest for dga. DGA contributes

to work concerning international treaties and their

verification measures, export controls and discussions

concerning reagents and sensors. DGA also participates

in the G8 global partnership and other external CBRN risk assessment


Lastly, the DGA position as the French authority in B

and C risk assessment renders it an essential actor in

the fight against cBrn terrorism in an inter-ministerial

framework. As in other areas concerning security, DGA

can provide its expertise and know-how to the various

ministries concerned (Homeland, Justice, Health,

Transportation). With the lack of normalisation and

standards for CBRN protection equipment, DGA may

supply needs in the field of tests and evaluation in

representative operational conditions. The aim for

DGA is to make its reference tests and evaluations the

standard for civilian as well as military CBRN security

systems. Fulfilling this purpose may make future

interoperability between civilian and military security CBRN security exercise

systems necessary, as mentioned in the White Paper.

Moreover, DGA contributes to setting up a laboratory

network, in particular the BIOTOX-PIRATOX network,

for unknown sample analysis, especially through its

chemical analysis laboratory for chemical warfare



DGA provides a subsidy to the CEA to carry out an

inter-ministerial programme of research in the

field of terrorism counter-measures CBRN-E. DGA is

involved in directing the research in relation with the

Secretary General of National Security and Defense

(at the executive level, a DGA-CEA unit meets every 3

102 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

P3 aerosol chamber in DGA CBRN defense

DGAcom -F. Vrignaud

DGA CBRN Defence

DGA CBRN Defence

months to direct the research). When this research will be completed, it is hoped to find emerging

technologies that may be of interest for the future for CBRN security

On sub-systems dedicated to specific technologies, DGA aims at prioritising cooperation, bilateral

in the beginning. This might lead to the realisation of common demonstrators. A prototype has

already been realised with Germany for the decontamination of sensitive equipment. Several

projects are in preparation with the United Kingdom.

DGA also advocates the participation in specific technical subjects under the umbrella of the

European Security Research Programme (ESRP) of the European Union. The research will look at

new technologies proposed by the industry, on the one hand, and at the development of standards

or normalisation for CBRN security systems based on a reference frame constructed by DGA, on the


In the specific field of medical countermeasures, DGA is planning on information exchanges with

its European partners. Trilateral cooperation with the UK and US is under consideration. In the field

of therapeutics and prophylaxis, the financial stakes imply that only a concerted civilian-military

approach at the European level at least would be viable.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Neutralisation of

improvised BC devices

Stand-off detection: LIDAR

and passive image sensors

Local detection: spectrometry

of flame, LIBS, LIF, Thz

B&C monitoring

Biological identification:

genetic analysis, immunological

analysis, mass spectrometry

Bilateral cooperation

European cooperation

on the technology;

demonstrator in ad

hoc cooperation except

biological reagents

Intelligent purchaser

for the global system.

Expertise on the

performances to reach

and their evaluation.

Synthesis capacity of

chemical warfare agents

at national level.

Control of decontamination

Bilateral NATO


Control of RBC risk

Personal and collective


RBC protection of critical


Architecture of alarm and

command RBC systems

Architecture of protection

of civilian sites

Forensic capability

European cooperation

on the technology

demonstrator in ad hoc

NATO cooperation

Demonstrator in ad

hoc cooperation

Open to European


NATO cooperation

Intelligent purchaser

for the global system.

National expertise

on performance.

National laboratory

capacity for biological

and chemical analysis

for forensics


Integrated demonstrator of

future defence RBC: system

approach and coherency

Biology for detection: strains,

reagents, protocols, databases

Demonstrator in ad

hoc cooperation

Significant field being

able on a case-by-case

basis to give place

to cooperation

Intelligent purchaser

for the global system.

National expertise

on performance.

Collection of agents



Skin decontamination


Medical countermeasures:

Vaccines development

Therapeutic antibody

Antibiotic and antiviral molecules

Open to cooperation

Open to cooperation

DGA and SSA (47)

official expertise


Service de Santé des Armées – Joint Armed Forces Health Services

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 103

4.11.2. Depollution

The depollution of chemical sites is of increasing concern. Research mainly concerns the rehabilitation

of areas that have been polluted by explosives, sometimes in association with chemical agents.

This type of pollution is specific to the Ministry. Otherwise, DGA aims at exploiting available

technologies developed by civilian research first. DGA will direct research only for specific cases.

European cooperation on technologies of depollution is possible.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Control of RBC risk Technologies of depollution Bilateral cooperation Control of architecture

4.11.3. TElEsantE systems

The system called “Télésanté” refers to the application of medical instrumentation, communication

and information technologies linked to medical support of the armed forces in operation. It aims at

preparing future equipment, making it possible to facilitate the circulation of medical information

and to optimise the use of skills and health support resources based on the theatre and at home. Work

must be carried out on the health follow-up of personnel, on remote medical support technologies,

and on means of tracing of invalids and injured and on health information circulation to the forces.

The developed global system shall be able to integrate civilian technological innovations and to

remain compatible with civilian organisations as they evolve.

DGA wishes to open this field up to European cooperation, for both technological and systems

aspects. A broader opening is possible for the technological and subsystems aspects.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


support and

repair actions

Functions of “Télésanté”:

Remote follow-up of

the combatant

Help to the isolated

health workforce

Health follow-up of personnel

Means of traceability

Information circulation


Management and

communication equipment

Sensors for the

measurement of human

physiological parameters

Medical robotics

Mini invasive surgery


SSA major player

4.11.4. Care of wounded in the theatre of operations and repair actions

This field aims to develop the required capabilities to care of the wounded on the field and in

hospitals. As a first step, it undertakes basic research and develops new technologies, if necessary,

enabling the improvement of the rehabilitation of personnel wounded in operation (including

trauma linked to combat and urgent medical aid). It is imperative to keep a global vision on the

capacities to reach.

The actions carried out aim at drawing from technologies developed in the civilian sector, except for

certain specific pathologies. The fields receiving particular attention relate to the early processing

of wounded (polytraumatised, traumatised cranial, burned), analgesia, cellular therapies and

transgenesis, the regeneration of tissues, transplants and autografts, blood derivatives and

substitutes, restoration of the auditory functions. This field benefits from the significant expertise

of the Department of Health of the Armies (Service de Santé des Armées – SSA).

DGA considers it possible to develop cooperation with countries having a similar health structure.

104 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


support and

repair actions




SSA major player


support and

repair actions

Processing of traumatic

brain injuries, processing

of wounded and burned

“Clinical” follow-up (historical)

of the combatant in a

potentially toxic environment


SSA major player

4.11.5. Control of environmental and operational risks except CBRN

This domain aims at a better understanding and analysis of the conventional risks facing the

combatant: ballistic, toxicological, aural, visual, etc. It must take into account the socio-psychophysiological

characteristics of the combatant in his environment. The main objective is to adapt

the soldier’s protection while limiting the operational constraints due to wearing such protection.

Present research is oriented towards ballistic risks. It relates to weapons and technologies with

reduced lethality. The effects of conventional weapons are also taken into account in research

for new concepts of mixed protection vis-à-vis several effects. In addition, the effects of induced

physical agents are evaluated to take into account new environmental factors generated by future

weapons (new active auditory stopper to avoid aural traumatisms, uniforms and glasses to limit the

effects of electromagnetic radiation and laser, etc.).

At the technological level, particular effort is being made with regard to the sustainment of the

combatant’s operational capabilities and the prevention and management of default risks due

to exhaustion. In this field, DGA is open to cooperation in so far as it does not relate to research

trespassing the legal standards enforced in France and in the European Union.

Axes R&T Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Analyses and

evaluation of the

risks, except CBRN,

and protection

Environmental risks,

Risks in operations


Expertise within

Ministry of Defence

(DGA and SSA)

4.11.6. Human factors in weapon systems

For many years, systems have been conceived and optimised around their technology. With their

increasing complexity, it is not anymore possible for users and organisations to regulate and adjust to

their use. For that purpose, the combination of systems engineering and engineering of the human

factor enables the engineering of complex systems covering all systems, i.e. including human and

procedural components all too often neglected in the past. The systems being designed are not only

weapon systems, IT systems transporting information, but also socio-technical systems linking human

beings acting according to procedures in precise operational contexts able to produce determined

effects. By increasing the number of systems in interaction, exploiting technological agents with

adjustable or adjusted autonomy, seeking to encourage polyvalent platforms, synergising actions

and placing greater value on IT, it is clear that it is no longer possible to easily take the human

element and organisational and procedural considerations into account. The three components of

the socio-technical system (man, technology and procedures), must be analysed equally. We should

not limit ourselves to what is best understood by engineers, considering that “common sense” is

sufficient to take the other two into consideration. This repositioning of engineering is essential in

that what is at stake at the end of the day is the “applicability” of future systems.

DGA is favourable to the establishment of cooperation as long as the studies remain coherent with

the legal standards and rules in force in France and the European Union. They could be directed at

the European level on a basis targeting a common future application.




Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 105

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Control of human risk factors:


Guide to taking human

factors into consideration

Demonstrators of studies

into the human component

(ergonomics) in Weapon

systems (IBEO)

Advanced functionalities on

headwear in aeronautics

Future trend in military

populations (anthropometry,

biomechanics, cognitive

capacities, impact of



Expertise within the

Ministry of Defence

Integration of the

human element into

the weapon systems

Cooperation by


Expertise within the

Ministry of Defence

(SSA and ISL)

Ergonomics of

robotised systems

Ergonomics of

information systems

Decision support systems


Expertise within the

Ministry of Defence


DGA and SSA)

Expertise within the

Ministry of Defence

4.11.7. Methods of representation of information and sharing authority

between men and automats

The production of simulators of future complex socio-technical systems is targeted for the study of

operational scenarios, the specification of man-systems interfaces, the organisation of work and

certain elements of systems architecture. They aim to study and optimise the management of high

flows of information (data fusion, intelligent interfaces), to establish models of distribution of

authority between operators and automats (in particular for UAV).

In this field, DGA considers that information exchanges and cooperation on technical sub-domains

(such as UAV) and on human factors is possible. For high level systems and illustrators of operational

exploitation needs the studies will remain national.

In the case of work on new concepts, the framework of the European defence Agency appears very


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Innovative concepts in MMI

Share authority operators/

system in the systems of UAVs

Integration of the

human element into

the weapon systems

Ship with reduced manpower


Expertise within the

Ministry of Defence


Materials and electronic components form the basic building blocks of all weapon systems and

contribute in an important way to the cost of these systems (between 20% and 35% for materials,

from 15% to 40% for components). The choices made strongly impact the capability to be functional

under normal conditions but also under the extreme conditions, in training or in operation. All events

occurring in the life of the weapon systems, either under expected normal operating conditions

or close to and beyond their limits (behaviour under severe climatic or mechanical environments,

combat damages, various upgrades with the integration of new armaments or equipment, ageing,

lifetime extensions) significantly affect the behaviour of their materials and components.

106 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

4.12.1. MATERIALS (MA)

Materials are the building blocks for the elementary mechanical functions of weapon systems:

structure of ship hulls, aircrafts and armoured vehicles, aircraft engine components, propulsion

systems for missiles and ships. They also take an active part in ballistic protection, control of

signatures, sonar domes, radomes of aircraft and missiles, coatings for low observable (LO)

technologies, and products for surface protection.

The MA technical area covers materials for structures and functional materials, as well as the

various associated specific processes. These are mandatory during the general contracting phase

to provide operational capability at the best cost, to ensure operational availability and safety of

weapon system objectives at every stages of the life of the current and future programs, taking

into account maintenance under operational conditions and withdrawal from active service. It

integrates the shock behaviour of materials being used into infrastructures. It addresses the whole

industrial process leading to the final product in conformity with the requirements: employment,

ISS as well as withdrawal from active service. It does not cover materials for electronics, optronics

and energetic materials. Materials for nuclear installations and deterrence are not covered either

by the “materials” technical division or by the “components” technical division.

The area covers in particular topics linked to the control of integrity, fire behaviour, vulnerability

and weight reduction of materials used for structures. For the benefit of armament operations,

it manages the material obsolescence resulting from foreign dependence or the evolution of

regulations, such as environmental, including the European regulation REACH which concerns the

manufacture, trade and use of chemical substances presenting toxic effects and/or eco-toxicity.

On all these topics, the “materials” division benchmarks technologies ahead of programs in order

to identify technological risks. Signature reduction

The R&T priority areas relate to the search for new stealth material solutions with respect to the

various electromagnetic and optical detection systems, either structural or in the form of coatings

(films, paintings), in order to reduce the radar signatures or the infrared signatures of platforms.

Research also relates to stealth transparent materials for radomes and high temperatures IRdomes

compatible with an optimal operation of the systems, as well as materials solutions for aircraft

canopy ensuring low observability, but also good visibility for the pilot.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Control of EM,

IR and acoustics



Radar and Infra-red

absorbing coatings

Acoustic absorbing coatings

Paintings and films

Materials with controlled

emissivity for high temperatures

Materials for electrooptical


Electro-active materials

Materials for IR-domes

(ceramic, etc.)

Materials for radomes

(composite materials

with organic matrix,

dichroic materials, etc.)

Materials for sonardomes

Possible on a caseby-case


Under national control

Possible on a caseby-case


Under national control

National control

according to the weapon

System considered

National control of

design and integration

National control

according to the weapon

system considered

National capability

of integration


of global performance

National control for

design and integration

National capability

of integration

Control of global





Materials for canopy

Possible on a caseby-case


Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 107 pErforation and arMour

This topic includes:

- materials for the protection of platforms and dismounted soldier

- materials for penetrating rounds, shaped-charges and Energy Formed Projectiles (EFP).

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities



National capability

of integration

Control of global


Perforation and


High density metal alloys

Composites with metal matrix

Rolled homogeneous armour




National capability

of integration

Control of global


Technical textiles structural MatErials - intEgrity and VulnEraBility

Work is being carried out in the following priority areas:

- Materials with high thermal and mechanical resistance for aircraft and missile engines;

- Surface protection and corrosion control:

work relates primarily to the acquisition

of technologies for the corrosion control

of maritime platforms and “sea water”

piping. This action is particularly critical

taking into account the imminence

of the environmental, health and

safety regulation evolutions, which

will prohibit traditional technological

solutions of protection in the next few


- Weight reduction of aircrafts, armoured

vehicles, ships and satellites structures;

- Integrity, robustness, vulnerability and

safety of structures;

Lightning impact on material

- Behaviour and damage models which take into account complex degradations under severe

environments (thermo-mechanical, crash landing, impacts, etc.).

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities


Ceramic matrix composite

Super alloys

European sharing

High temperature

materials for engines

and structures

Thermal barrier coatings

Carbon-carbon composites


European sharing

National capability

of integration

Metal matrix composites

European sharing

Organical matrix composites

European sharing

108 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Ecological antifouling paints

Corrosion control

Scouring techniques


for surface protection

Cathodic protection

Noble materials/Composite

materials for sea water circuits


Impact on through life

support (limitation of ISS)

military specificities

(long lifetime, speed,

maritime environments)

Integrated health monitoring

Weight reduction

Metal matrix composites

Aluminium alloys

Organical matrix composites

Magnesium alloys


Capacity of use for

military systems

Capacity of use for

military systems

Control of fatigue and damage

Control of global

performance control

Integrity &

vulnerability of


Techniques for control

and repair

Fire resistance

Modelling and simulation tools


Control of through

life support

Control of safety

Control of powerful

tools for design,

reliability and safety

Integrated health monitoring

Control of through

life support Advanced materials

Various technological breakthroughs can come from evolution in materials. DGA is particularly

interested in materials for sensors and actuators, health monitoring technologies integrated into

the structures, active materials for the control of vibrations, nano-technologies, materials inspired

by nature (artificial muscles for example), technologies for micro-drones inspired by dragonflies,

etc. Technological watch, possibly followed by exploratory studies into their interest for defence

should be carried out on the following subjects: meta-materials with singularity of index, materials

for acoustic stealth, tools for the in-situ characterisation of EM properties (on equipment in

service), protection against the directed energy weapons, consideration of vulnerability reduction

in the dimensioning of structures, the state of the art in ceramic turbines, post-superalloy materials,

thermal barriers, materials for the propulsion of missiles, super-hydrophobic materials.


R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

New concepts

of materials

Bio-inspired materials

Nanomaterials (48)

Metamaterials (48)

Active materials




Capacity of use for

military systems



Materials for energy storage


This field is characterised by a large civilian market, with production volumes far larger than

military needs, and rather short life cycles compared to the lifespan of a military system. However,


open to wider cooperation for low TRL levels but restricted international cooperation if

concerning warheads ( nanomaterials ) and integrated antennas (metamaterials)

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 109

the vast majority of components needed for weapon systems can be supplied by the civilian market

for an obviously lower cost when the needs correspond to standard products, with the help of

intelligent management of the resulting problems (obsolescence, reliability). The Ministry of

Defence must thus monitor civilian innovation and adapt to the fast pace of its evolution, which

requires architectures allowing technological insertion. It must examine the specific aspects of the

military environment: extended temperature range, vibrations, small overall dimensions and an

electro-magnetic environment. Some requirements such as component life and reliability (taking

into account very long storage times) deviate from civilian applications. Their impact must also be

carefully evaluated.

During the lifespan of armament programmes, DGA seeks to control risks linked to the components,

to predict their reliability, which conditions the availability and size of the replacement stocks as

well as the management of obsolescence.

However, not all components can be supplied by the civilian market: some requirements concerning

performance, reliability, etc. make it essential to use specific high performance components. These

components are known as “critical”, because they have a direct influence on the operational

performance of the systems which integrate

them. We can distinguish two types:

components using civilian technologies,

with a specific design (for example,

Analog-to-digital converters - ADC) and

components using technologies primarily

developed by the military (which does not

exclude their use in the civilian world, but

the latter is then not the driving force). This

last case covers in particular high power

microwave and broadband components

and IR detectors. The Ministry of Defence

must then anticipate new needs and launch

technological studies very early, starting

with low TRL studies, before the launching

of programs. Actually, the total term of

the cycle of R&T, R&D, industrialisation and

entry in service can reach 15 to 20 years.

In addition, these critical components are

subjected to thorough export controls: the

availability and sustainability of European

industrial sources for the whole chain (from

wafer to packaging) are fundamental. The existence of a European capability for research on these

subjects is obviously a requirement.

These components include in particular:

- The power MMIC (GaAs or GaN), from wafer to packaging;

- Microwave power tubes;

- High stability local oscillators;

- High performance light intensifiers;

- High performance infra-red detectors, cooled and not cooled;

- ADC and DAC (Converters);

- Radiation-hardened components;

- Some connectors;

- Some types of batteries (thermal batteries for example);

- High-speed alternators;

Chip FH35 - Wideband mixer for electronic warfare

Société UMS

110 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

The following technologies are also employed, for certain specific applications

- Packaging;

- Interconnection;

- Thermal management;

- Strong integration technologies (SiP for example);

- Microsystems.

For all specific components, the purpose of R&T is to increase performance and/or reduce costs, in

order to be able to satisfy the needs of future armament programs.

For all components (specific or not), DGA must make sure to control the risks associated with their

use. This implies work on management methodologies, prevention and cure of obsolescence, as

well as on reliability prediction. Thus, DGA is extending the use of the Fides methodology for the

evaluation of the reliability of components and the dimensioning of stocks for through-life support.

In this framework, R&T is directed towards knowledge of the failure mechanisms and comparison

with feedback from experience, in order to make reliability predictions more effective.

All fields, with the exception of hardened components, are open to cooperation with European

and even extra-European partners.

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Local oscillators



Monolithic microwave

integrated circuits (MMIC)

Optical microwave components

Cold cathodes electron tubes

Microwave chains simulation

Visible light detectors

(CCD, CMOS, etc.)


UV detectors



Digital and/

or hardened


Cooled IR detectors

Uncooled IR detectors


Image intensifiers


Hardened components



Capacity of

orientation, analysis

and specifications

of R&T: Control of

global performance







Thermal management

Risk control



Reliability prediction

Obsolescence management

RoHS impact


Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 111 Electrical engineering (management of power and energy,

actuators of all types)

Work is being carried out on the use and adaptation of civilian technologies to military constraints,

in particular in the fields of conversion, storage and energy management, actuators and engines

of all types:

R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities

Electrochemistry (batteries,

primary and secondary, fuel

cells) and energy sources


Superconductive storage

Thermal batteries

Superconductive machines

Inertial alternators

Materials for permanent


Ferromagnetic materials

Driving actuators

Starter alternators

High speed alternators

Power electronics (SiC

components, diamond,

implementation, etc.)




Capacity of analysis

and specifications:

control of global



R&T for test and evalution exists more specifically at the level of R&T studies aiming to obtain more

efficient testing methods.

This efficiency must be considered in terms of the provision of results adapted to the depth of

expertise required and the reduction of costs. The latter could be obtained, for example, by

reducing the number of the useful operators, or even by a simplification of equipments (such as

measurement equipments).

The “tests” area launched in 2008 a research programme (Programme d’études amont, or PEA),

the purpose of which is to develop new methods of engineering and testing in order to reduce the

technical and human cost of test services and be able to carry out development and qualification

tests on new technologies at the appropriate time.

To reduce costs and better adapt the results provided to what the experts really need, several

approaches are possible:

- to reconsider methods in order to limit the number of operators (automation of processes);

- to adapt equipments in order to make them more general-purpose, or more flexible of use;

- to resort to simulation, either to choose the essential configurations to test in reality, or reduce

the duration of testing to a strict minimum;

- to use sensors and innovative test facilities allowing faster and more efficient preparation of tests

and/or exploitation of results.

Other R&T subjects of potential interest concerning land weapon and ammunition trials (firing

range observation, acquisition and processing measure) or applied environment and eco-design

trials are developed. n

112 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

Test capacities

Simulated flight

tests on engines or

in icing conditions

Missile flight tests

Ground tests

of aircrafts

Main areas of R&T work

- Improvement of test conditions for small turbojets, according to several themes:

maintenance of in-flight conditions, adapted measurement of the net thrust,

improvement of the start-up conditions in simulated Mach (missile turbojet)

- Reduction of the costs of tests on profile in icing conditions by the adaptation

of the assembly to the S1 bench of DGA Aero-engine Testing (in Saclay)

- Development study of the equipment necessary (including an innovative

measurement tool by Laser-Induced Fluorescence) to carry out certification

tests in icing conditions according to the future Appendix X (standardisation

document in the process of international validation), relating to drizzle

and rain (problem of generation of a new definition frosting cloud)

- Innovation and rationalisation in future systems of trajectory

- Improvement of the definition and safety gauges

adapted to the testing of high speed missiles

- Improvement of telemetry equipment, both in terms of speed

(according to the frequencies available) and data recording

- Improvement of airframes tests (use of simulation), aerothermic tests (simulation

of air conditioning testing facilities), night vision device tests: evaluation

and measurement equipment (wireless technologies for displacement

measurements, non-destructive control system, system of stereo-correlation)




Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 113

114 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

5 Appendices



The TRL scale is a scale for rating the degree of maturity reached by a technology. It was initiated

by NASA in order to manage the technological risk of its programmes. Initially composed of seven

levels, since 1995, it comprises nine levels [1]:

The TRL scale has been adopted by the defence sector with the same principal aim of technological

risk management for programmes, with the help of some small adaptations (replacement of the

concept of space by the concept of operational environment).

It is officially applied in particular by:

- the United States Department of Defense (DoD) since 2001,

- the British Ministry of Defence since 2001,

- the Australian DSTO (Defence Science and Technology Organisation) since 2003.

The following defence organisations use it regularly:

- DRDC (Defence Research and Development Canada),

- TNO (Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research),

- FMV (Försvarets Materiel Verks),

- NURC (NATO Undersea Research Centre).

Lastly, in the space sector, the biggest space agencies, ESA (European Space Agency), JAXA (Japanese

Space Exploration Agency), have joined NASA in using the TRL.

Note : On the basis of the following reference grid which is well suited to hardware and equipment

technologies, the DoD has developed specific grids [2] for software, manufacturing and

biomedical technologies. A final scale has also been added [3] for technologies based on

practices such as processes, methods, etc.


TRL Definition Description Supporting Information


Basic principles

observed and


Lowest level of technology

readiness. Scientific research begins

to be translated into applied

research and development.

Examples might include paper studies

of a technology’s basic properties.

Published research that identifies

the principles that underlie

this technology. References

to who, where, when.



Technology concept

and/or application


Invention begins. Once basic

principles are observed, practical

applications can be invented. The

application is speculative and there

is no proof or detailed analysis to

support the assumption. Examples

are still limited to paper studies.

Publications or other references

that outline the application being

considered and that provide

analysis to support the concept

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 115


TRL Definition Description Supporting Information


Analytical and

experimental critical

functions and/

or characteristic

proof of concept

Active research and development

is initiated. This includes analytical

studies and laboratory studies

to physically validate analytical

predictions of separate elements

of the technology. Examples

include components that are not

yet integrated or representative

Results of laboratory tests

performed to measure parameters

of interest and comparison to

analytical predictions for critical

subsystems. References to who,

where, and when these tests and

comparisons were performed.


Component and/

or breadboard

validation in



Basic technological components

are integrated to establish that the

pieces will work together. This is “low

fidelity” compared to the eventual

system. Examples include integration

of “ad hoc” hardware in a laboratory.

System concepts that have been

considered and results from testing

laboratory scale breadboards.

References to who did this work and

when. Provide an estimate of how

breadboard hardware and test results

differ from the expected system goals


Component and/

or breadboard

validation in relevant


Fidelity of breadboard technology

increases significantly. The basic

technological components are

integrated with reasonably realistic

supporting elements so that the

technology can be tested in a

simulated environment. Examples

include “high fidelity” laboratory

integration of components.

Results from testing a laboratory

breadboard system are integrated

with other supporting elements

in a simulated operational

environment. How does the

“relevant environment” differ

from the expected operational

environment? How do the test

results compare with expectations?

What problems, if any, were

encountered? Was the breadboard

system refined to more nearly

match the expected system goals?



model or prototype


in a relevant


Representative model or prototype

system, which is well beyond the

breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested

in a relevant environment. Represents

a major step up in a technology’s

demonstrated readiness. Examples

include testing a prototype in a high

fidelity laboratory environment or in

simulated operational environment

Results from laboratory testing of

a prototype system that is near the

desired configuration in terms of

performance, weight, and volume.

How did the test environment differ

from the operational environment?

How did the test compare with

expectations? What problems,

if any, were encountered? What

are/were the plans, options, or

actions to resolve problems before

moving to the next level?


System prototype

demonstration in

an operational


Prototype near or at planned

operational system. Represents

a major step up from TRL 6,

requiring the demonstration of

an actual system prototype in an

operational environment, such

as in an aircraft, vehicle or space.

Examples include testing the

prototype in a test bed aircraft.

Results from testing a prototype

system in an operational

environment. Who performed the

tests? How did the test compare

with expectations? What problems,

if any, were encountered? What

are/were the plans, options, or

actions to resolve problems before

moving to the next level?

116 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

TRL Definition Description Supporting Information


Actual system

completed and

“flight qualified”

through test and


Technology has been proven to work

in its final form and under expected

conditions. In almost all cases, this

TRL represents the end of true system

development. Examples include

developmental test and evaluation

of the system in its intended

weapon system to determine if

it meets design specifications

Results of testing the system in

its final configuration under the

expected range of environmental

conditions in which it will be

expected to operate. Assessment of

whether it will meet its operational

requirements. What problems,

if any, were encountered? What

are/were the plans, options,

or actions to resolve problems

before finalising the design?


Actual system

“flight proven”

through successful

mission operations.

Actual application of the technology

in its final form and under mission

conditions, such as those encountered

in operational test and evaluation.

Examples include using the system

under operational mission conditions.

OT&E reports.

The following table supplements the nature of TRLs by defining some of the terms used in the

description of the latter.




Integrated components that provide a representation of a system/subsystem and

that can be used to determine concept feasibility and to develop technical data.

Typically configured for laboratory use to demonstrate the technical principles

of immediate interest. May resemble final system/subsystem in function only


A functional form of a system, generally reduced in scale, near or at operational

specification. Models will be sufficiently hardened to allow demonstration

of the technical and operational capabilities required of the final system.


A physical or virtual model used to evaluate the technical or

manufacturing feasibility or military utility of a particular

technology or process, concept, end item, or system.


Simple element of the technology. The smallest subsystem giving a

sufficient granularity to identify technical risks and opportunities.




Sub-element of an overall system which can be limited/

defined in terms of functionality

All technical elements constituting the project and acting like

a single group in order to deliver a definite capacity.


Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 117




Systematic activity, structured and progressive of test, validation and checking

out of the interactions between subsystems until the complete system.

High fidelity

Addresses form, fit, and function. A high-fidelity laboratory

environment would involve testing with equipment that can simulate

and validate all system specifications within a laboratory setting

Low fidelity

A representative of the component or system that has limited ability to

provide anything but first-order information about the end product.

Low-fidelity assessments are used to provide trend analysis.



Environment that addresses all the operational requirements and

specifications required of the final system to include platform/packaging

Relevant environment

Testing environment that simulates the key aspects

of the operational environment

Simulated operational


Either (1) a real environment that can simulate all the operational

requirements and specifications required of the final system or (2) a

simulated environment that allows for testing of a virtual prototype.

Used in either case to determine whether a developmental system meets

the operational requirements and specifications of the final system

Bibliography :

[1] Technology Readiness Levels, A White Paper.

John C. Mankins, NASA, 1995.

[2] Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook.

DoD, May 2005.

[3] TRL Corollaries for Practice-Based Technologies.

Carnegie Mellon Software Institute, 2003.

118 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009



A methodology for describing global projects and those relating to the technological base is being

generalised within DGA. The roadmaps drawn up are mainly of internal use. Some versions are

distributed more widely such as that presented below as an illustration of the method.

General presentation of unifying project

A global project is documented by technical specifications and a roadmap. These documents make

it possible to describe:

- c apability requirements and environmental constraints in the broad sense. This level of description

makes it possible to answer the question “why this unifying project?”

- technological, industrial and cooperation objectives to reach in order to meet these needs. This

level of description makes it possible to answer the question “which products to produce in order

to meet the capability requirements?”

- actions to carry out to reach these objectives. This level of description indicates how to proceed in

order to obtain the products listed at the former stage


Roadmap (RM)


and equipment

interested by

RM constraints



Platforms, equipment and their milestones

Links product


RM programmes



DTIB, cooperation

RM primary action



“Products” to realise in response to “why”:


Technological breakthroughs: required action






Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 119

Example of the TELESANTE unifying project

The environment and the capability need (the “why?”) is described as follows


Products to be produced in order to answer the capability requirements (the “what?”) are then




Lastly, the actions to carry out to meet these aims (the “How?”) are determined:

120 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009



The technological basis is structured by technical areas. It is documented by the industrial and

technological sector orientations roadmaps for each area. Its content is divided into two parts:

the first relates to breakthrough technologies, the second relates to specific constraints (technical

authority, for example).

The construction of the technological basis requires initially to identify the potential technological

breakthroughs likely to be of interest for future defence equipments.

The roadmap then describes:

- the platforms that could integrate new very low TRL technologies. This level of description makes

it possible to answer the question “why study this technology?”.

- attainable technological, industrial and cooperation objectives. This level of description makes it

possible to answer the question “which products to produce in order to assert the feasibility of a

breakthrough technology?”

- actions to advance breakthrough technologies to a TRL of 4 or 5


Roadmap (RM)


and equipment

interested by



PlatePlatforms, equipment and their milestones

Links development


RM stages

of development,

DTIB, cooperation



Products” to realise in response to “why”:

feasibility stages in development

RM action

How :

Technological breakthroughs: required action

Links actions/stages

of development




Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 121



Technical areas

Technical fields

Systems of force


Products (programmes)


Systems of systems

Tools simulation

methods (MOS)



of Systems of

Systems (AESS)

All systems

of forces

No product segment

Key areas of research,

excluding upstream studies:

Systems engineering support for

operations, SCCOA, Scorpion…

and programmes in

preparation phase

Battle Lab experimentations

SASF’s unifying projects


Architecture and

techniques for

land systems

Land platforms (PFT)

Land combat

systems (SCT)


and combat

Fighting vehicles

Special vehicles

General purpose vehicles

and equipment

Combat systems

Autonomous systems


Architecture and

techniques for

air systems


platforms (PFA)



propulsion (PRA)

Aeronautical combat

systems (SCA)


Protection mobility

and support


and combat

Combat aircrafts

Transport aircraft

Specialised aircraft


Combat aircraft engines

Engines for transport of

aircraft and derived products

Helicopter engines

Auxiliary Power units

Avionics and mansystem


Aircraft equipments

Aircraft aeronautical

support systems


Architecture and

techniques for

naval system

Naval platforms


Naval combat

systems (SCN)


Protection mobility

and support


and combat

Surface ships



except nuclear

steam supply systems

Naval combat systems

Underwater naval and

mine warfare including

underwater weapons

Nuclear steam supply systems


Architecture and

techniques for

C3R systems



systems (SIO)

Space, observation,

intelligence and UAV

systems (EORD)


environment (EN)

Command and



Tactical systems of UAVs

Systems of long endurance UAVs

Exploitation stations for

observation data

Systems of information

by satellites

Production of geographical data

Operational information systems

122 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009

Technical areas

Technical fields

Systems of force


Products (programmes)



system security

Information system

security (SSI)

All systems

of forces

Cryptography equipment

Computer security equipment





All systems

of forces

Architecture and services of

telecommunication systems

Infrastructure networks

Satellite telecommunications


Tactical radio networks

IFF equipment

Communications for

strategic systems


Missiles, weapons

and nuclear

techniques of


Tactical and strategic

missiles (MTS)

Propulsion, energetic

and explosive

materials (PE)

Nuclear techniques

of defence (NUC)

Weapons and

ammunition (ARM)



and combat

Protection and


Ballistic missiles

Ramjet missiles

Antisurface missiles

Anti-aircraft missiles

Homing heads and radomes

of tactical missiles

charges and final effect

of tactical missiles

Propulsion of tactical missiles

Propulsion of ballistic missiles

Aeronautical bombs and mines

Munitions, rockets and weapons


Human sciences

and protection

Defence CBRN


Human sciences (SH)



CBRN Defence Systems

Télésanté system


Sensors, guidance

and navigation

Optronics (OP)


detection (DE)

Electronic war(GE)


Navigation (GN)

All systems

of forces

Airborne surveillance radars

Ground battlefield radars

Ground-air surveillance radars

Naval radars

Combat aircraft radars

ESM systems or functions

(electronic surveillance) and

ECM (electronic attack) COM

ESM systems or functions

(electronic surveillance) radar

ECM systems or functions radar

and self protection systems

Guidance, navigation and dating

systems, except for deterrence

Common and land

optronic equipment

Airborne optronic equipment

Naval optronic equipment


Materials and


Materials (MA)

Components (CO)

All systems

of forces

No product segments

Support to programmes for:

Structural and engines materials,

functional materials, specific

processes, Electronic processing,

electro-optical sensors, hardening,

electrical engineering.

Energy coordination



Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 123



















B and C

















2 Dimensions

3 Dimensions

Analog-to-Digital Converters

Anti Ballistic Missile

Association Française d’Ingénierie Système, French

association for systems engineering

Atelier de Gestion des Architectures Techniques (de SIO),

Management workshop for technical architectures (of CCIS)

Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence

Agence Nationale pour la Recherche, National Research Agency

Agence Nationale de Valorisation de la Recherche,

National research promotion agency

Country with qualified authority in Information system security

Architecture et techniques de Systèmes Aéronautiques,

Architecture and techniques for aeronautical systems

Architecture et techniques de Systèmes C3R,

Architecture and techniques for C3R systems

Application Specific Integrated Circuit

Architecture et techniques de Systèmes Navals,

Architecture and techniques for naval systems

Architecture et techniques de Systèmes Terrestres,

Architecture and techniques for land systems

Architecture et techniques de Systèmes Terrestres,

Architecture and techniques for land systems

Biological and Chemical

Battle Damage Information

Bâtiment d’Essais et de Mesures, Testing and measurements ship

Bulle Opérationnelle Aéroterrestre, Land system

transformation research programm

Command, Control and Communication

Bulle Opérationnelle Aéroterrestre

Coalition Battle Management Language

Commandement et Conduite

Command, Control and Communication

Commandement, Communication, Conduite et Renseignement,

Command, Control, Conduct and Intelligence

Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence

Centre d'Analyse de Défense, Defence Analysis Centre, part of DGA

Coalition Battle Management Language

Chemical, Bacteriological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Charge-Coupled Device

Command and Control Information Systems

Conseil Consultatif des Recherches et Etudes, ISL

Research and study consultation council

124 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009






































Conception, Développement et Expérimentation,

Concept, Development and Experimentation

Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique, French atomic energy centre

CEA/Direction des Applications Militaires, CEA/Military Applications Division

Capteurs, Guidage et Navigation, Sensors, Guidance and Navigation

Coût Global de Possession, Overall ownership cost

Centre Interarmées d’Administration De l’Interopérabilité

Opérationnelle des Systèmes d’information et de communication,

Joint centre for the administration of the operational

interoperability of IT and communications systems

Conseil des Industries de Défense Françaises, French Defence Industries Council

Composites with Ceramic matrix

Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor

Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, French national space research centre

Communication Navigation Identification

Centre National pour la Recherche Scientifique,

National Centre for Scientific Research

Contrat d’Objectifs et de Moyens (ONERA), Objectives and Means Contract

Communication Intelligence

Common Operational Picture

Centre National pour la Recherche Scientifique

Common Operationnal Picture

Commandement des Opérations Spéciales Special Operations Command

Commercial Off The Shelf

Case Telescope Ammunition

Défense Anti- Missile Balistique

Coriolis Vibrating Gyro

Digital-to-Analog Converters

Défense Anti-Missile Balistique, Anti-Ballistic Missiles Defence

Détection Electromagnétique, Electromagnetic detection

Direction Générale de l’Armement, Directorate General of Armaments

Direction Générale de la compétitivité, de l’Industrie et des Services,

Directorate for Competitiveness, Industry and Services, part of …

Working Group

Direction Générale des Systèmes d’Information et de Communication,

Directorate for Information and Communications Systems, part of …

Directed Infrared Counter Measures

Deutsche Forschunganstalt für Luft und Raumfahrt, Germany

Données Numériques Géographiques et 3 Dimensions,

Geographical and 3D Digital Data

US Department of Defense

Dommages dus aux Rayonnements électromagnétiques sur les systèmes d’Armes

et les Munitions, Damage induced by radiation on weapons and ammunition

Détection Reconnaissance Identification, Detection

Reconnaissance Identification

Domain Specific Language

Defence Technological and Industrial Base



Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 125


eb XML






































Emission/Réception, Emission/Reception

Electronic Business using extensible markup language

Electronic Counter Counter-Measures

Electronic Counter-Measures

European Defence Agency

Extremely High Frequency

Electromagnetic Intelligence


Etat-Major des Armées, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Geophysical environment

Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Ingénieurs des Etudes et

Techniques d’Armement, Armament engineering College

Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Techniques Avancées,

Armament engineering College

Espace, Observation, Renseignement et systems de Drones,

Space, Observation, Intelligence and UAV systems

European Space Agency

Electronic Support Measures

European Security Research Programme

European Secured Software Defined Radio Referential

European Union

Evasion de Fréquence, Frequency evasion

Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum

Guide allowing estimated reliability calculation

for electronic components and systems

Field Programmable Gate Array


Fond Unique Interministériel, Single interministerial fund

Gallium arsenide

European service of navigation by satellite for civilian and commercial use

Gallium nitride

Guerre Electromagnétique, Electromagnetic warfare

Géographie Hydro Océano Météorologique, Hydro-,

Oceano- and Meteorological Geography


Groupe des Industries Françaises Aéronautiques et Spatiales,

French Aeronautical and Spatial Industries Group

Global Monitoring on Environment and Security programme

Ground Moving Target Indicator

Guidance - Navigation

Global Positioning System

Grand Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale, Major

network suitable for spatial monitoring

Grid computing

High Assurance Internet Protocol Interoperability Specification

High Energy Density Materials

126 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009





High frequency

High Level Architectures

High Power Microwaves

Hemispherical resonator gyrometer

HSCT Hygiène, Sécurité et Conditions de Travail, Hygiene,

safety and working conditions

HumInt Human Intelligence

HVUHF High, Very, and Ultra High Frequency

IBEO Illustrateur de Besoins d’Exploitation Opérationnelle,

Operational application needs illustration

ICET Innovative Concept and Emerging Technologies


Improvised Explosive Device


Internet Engineering Task Force


Identification Friend or Foe,


Institut Géographique National, French National Geographical Institute


Interface Homme Machine, Man Machine Interface (MMI)


Image Intensifier , IL Intensificateur de Lumière,

i-MEMS Inertial Micro Electro-Mechanical Systems

INRIA Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatisme,

French national institute for IT and automation research


Internet Protocol


Integrated Power Module


Intellectual Property Rules

IPSEC Internet Protocol Secure

IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6




Intelligent Radar Management

ISAE Institut Supérieur de l’Aéronautique et de l’Espace,

Aeronautics and Space Institute

ISAR Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar


Institut franco-allemand de Saint Louis, French-German Institute of Saint Louis


In Service Support


Innovation Technology Partnership

IVVQ Integration, Verification, Validation and Qualification

JC3IEDM Joint C3 Information Exchange Data Model


Joint Investment Programme (EDA)

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System


Local Area Network


Liaison de Données Tactique, Tactical Data Link


Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy


Lutte Informatique Défensive, Computer defence

LIDAR LIght Detection and Ranging

LIDAR Light Infrared Detection And Ranging


Laser Induced Fluorescence

LOLF Loi Organique relative aux Lois de Finance, French Budget Law

LPM Loi de Programmation Militaire, Military Planning Law



Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 127








































Laboratoire Technico-Opérationnel, French MoD Battle Lab

Engine of the Rafale

Missiles, Armes et techniques Nucléaires de défense, Missiles,

weapons and nuclear techniques of defence

Mobile Ad-Hoc Network

Matériaux et composants, Materials and Components

Ministère de l'écologie, de l'énergie, du développement durable et de la

mer, Ministry of ecology, energy, sustainable development and the sea.

Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems

Multinational Geospatial Coproduction Programme

MID-air Collision Avoidance System

Multi functional Information Distribution System

Mission Interministérielle pour la Recherche et l’Enseignement Supérieur,

Interministerial Mission for Research and Higher Education

Man-Machine Interface

Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit

MultiNational Exercise

Ministry Of Defence

Méthodes, Outils et Simulations, Methods, Tools, Simulations

Modèle Pivot Inter Armées, Joint information exchange datamodel

Multi-Role Combat Missile

Meteosat Second Generation

Moving Target Indicator

Maritime Theatre Missile Defence

Multinational Space-based Imaging System

NATO Architecture Framework

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Navigation Warfare

Noeud de Communication Aéroporté, Airborne Node of communication

Net-Centric Enterprise Services

Network Centric Warfare

NEtwork MObility protocol

Not in Line of Sight

NATO Network Enabled Capability

Nuclear, Radiological, Bacteriological and Chemical (CBRN)

Nouvelles Technologies de l’Information et de la Communication,

New technologies of information and communication

NATO Undersea Research Centre

Office National d’Etudes et de Recherches Aérospatiales,

National office for aerospace studies and research


Opérations Extérieures, External Operations

Public institution: OSEO was born in 2005, by bringing together ANVAR

(French innovation agency) and BDPME (SME development bank)

Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord, North

Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

128 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009








































Preparatory Action on the enhancement of the European industrial

potential in the field of Security Research (European Commission)

Programme Communautaire de Recherche et Développement,

European R&D framework programme

Programme d’Etudes Amont, R&T programme

Programme Européen de Recherche et de Sécurité,

European Security Research Programme (ESRP)

Projets Fédérateurs, Global projects

Experimental land combat battle lab

Petites et Moyennes Entreprises, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME)

document Politique et Objectifs Scientifiques, Basic Research Policy

Plan Prospectif à 30 ans, 30-year Plan

Public Regulated Service

Plan Stratégique Recherches et Technologies de défense et de sécurité,

Strategic plan for research and technology in defence and security

Quality of Service

A collaborative program aiming at the development of new tools

for navigation in large volumes of audiovisual content.

Research and Development

Research and Technology

Rockets, Artillery & Mortars (counter RAM)

Régime d'Appui aux PME pour l'Innovation Duale,

System of support to SMEs for Dual Innovation

Radiological, Bacteriological and Chemical

Research and Development Framework Program

Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals

Reconnaissance de nouvelle génération, New generation reconnaissance pod

Recherche Exploratoire et Innovation, Exploratory research and innovation

Recognised Environment Picture

Retour d’Expérience, lessons learned

Radio Frequency Identification

Restriction of use of certain Hazardous Substances in electronic equipment

Research & Technology Organisation

Surveillance, Acquisition de cibles, Reconnaissance et Renseignement,

Surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance and intelligence

Sol-Air Moyenne Portée Terrestre, Land ground to air midrange missile

Synthetic Aperture Radar

Satellite Communications

Software Communication Architecture

Secure Communication and Interoperability Protocol

Systèmes de Combat Navals, Naval combat system

Systèmes de Systèmes, Systems of systems (SoS)

Software Define radio

Suppression of Enemy Air Defence

Synthetic Environment Data Representation & Interchange Specification

Secrétariat Général à la Défense Nationale,

General Secretariat of National Defence (Prime Minister)



Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 129


























TP 400


















Sciences de l’Homme, Human sciences

Super High Frequency

Service Hydrographique et Océanographique de la Marine,

Marine hydrographic and oceanographic service

Sciences de l’homme et protection, Human sciences and protection

Systèmes d’Information Opérationnels, Operational information systems

Software Integration Plan

Service Level Agreement

Système de Lutte Anti Mines Futur, Future mine warfare system

Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

Service Oriented Architecture

System on the Chip

Systems of Systems

Système Préparatoire Infra-Rouge pour l’ALErte,

Infra-red prototype system for alert

Service de Santé des Armées, French MoD Medical Service

Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information, Information systems security

Standardisation Agreement

Spatial and Time Adaptative Processing


Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol


Très Haute Résolution, Very high resolution



Têtes Militaires Polyvalentes à Allumages Multi-points,

Polyvalent multi-point initiation warheads

Turbopropellant of the A 400 M

Time Resolved Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy

Technology Readiness Level

Technologie de Souveraineté, Sovereignty technology

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle

Ultra-High Frequency

Unmanned aerial vehicle Systems Airworthiness Requirements

Unmanned Surface Vehicle

Unmanned Underwater Vehicle


Unmanned Vehicles

Vibration Beam Accelerator

Véhicule Blindé de Combat d’Infanterie, Armoured infantry combat vehicle

Very High Frequency

Virtual Private Network

Vertical Take Off and Landing

Validation, Verification, Accreditation

130 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009







Wide Area Network

Wireless Fidelity

Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave access

Extensible Markup Language

Extensible Markup Language – Inter-army

Extensible Simple Mail Transfer Protocol



Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 131



This map shows the location of the different sites of DGA in France:


DGA Naval Systems


DGA Hydrodynamics

(Val de Reuil)

LRBA (Vernon)

DGA Engineering and Integration

DGA Aero-engine Testing (Bagneux)


DGA Information Superiority


DGA CBRN Defence

(Vert le Petit)


DGA Land Systems


DGA Land Systems


CAEPE (Saint Médard)

DGA Flight Testing (Cazaux)

DGA Missiles Testing (Biscarrosse)

DGA Aeronautical Systems


DGA Flight Testing


DGA Naval Systems


DGA Missiles Testing

(Toulon + Île du Levant)

132 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009


This questionnaire is aimed at improving the dialogue and tools set up by DGA as regards R&T

To be returned to DGA/DS/SRTS

fax no. = 33 (0)1 46 19 76 14) or mail:

Organisation: :

DGA ❑ Military ❑

Administration ❑ indicate which one

Industrial prime contractor ❑ SME ❑ Research institute ❑

You are:

French ❑ European ❑ Other country ❑

Which are your principal uses of this document?

- It is a useful information document on the activity of DGA in technical areas

other than mine or on transversal topics

- It is an important information memorandum without being essential,

which enables me to place my R&T activities with respect to the needs of DGA ❑

- It is an essential document, a systematic reference for each R&T meeting

in which I take part with DGA

Compared to the other reference documents on defence strategy, is the role of the PS R&T clear

to you?

- with regard to the 30-year plan (PP30): well-defined ❑ to specify ❑

- with regard to the basic research policy document (POS): well-defined ❑ to specify ❑

- with regard to other documents (space policy, etc.): well-defined ❑ to specify ❑

Areas of improvement

Appreciation of the various chapters:

Chapter II issues:

essential ❑ useful ❑ information available elsewhere ❑

Chapter III implementation of the PS R&T

essential ❑ useful ❑ information available elsewhere ❑

Chapter IV technological analyses

essential ❑ useful ❑ information available elsewhere ❑

Areas of work by divisions:

Clear vision of the areas of work ❑

quite useful information

does not address real R&T issues ❑

Technology tables:

wording indicating the priorities: clear ❑ too precise ❑ not precise enough ❑

comprehension of expectations regarding cooperation: clear ❑ to improve ❑

comprehension of expectations regarding national capabilities: clear ❑ to improve ❑

Priority technology lists:

sufficient ❑ too exhaustive ❑ too selective ❑

Comments (including other information that could be featured):

Innovation policy:

Convincing ❑ clear ❑ not detailed enough ❑ not clear ❑

Presentation of the means implemented by defence:

Convincing ❑ clear ❑ not detailed enough ❑ not clear ❑


Continuation of the dialogue with the ministry regarding R&T:

After publication of the PS R&T, which are the topics that you consider a new R&T document should

address? (please note by decreasing order of priority from 1 to 8 where 1 is high priority and 8 is

low priority):

Concrete implementation of the R&T strategy

Transformation of operational needs into technological needs ❑

Representation of needs in priority technologies

Global project

Tools and methods of the ministry as regards R&T (procurement, etc.) ❑

Specify which:

Policy of the ministry with respect to technological breakthroughs ❑


National capabilities

Relationship to civilian researche

Other: :

Your general satisfaction with the publication of the PS R&T:

Very Satisfactory ❑ Satisfactory ❑ Positioning to improve ❑ Disappointing ❑


The DGA’s own web site:

Public procurement portal:

Industry portal:

Direction générale de l’armement

Service des recherches et technologies de défense et de sécurité

7 rue des Mathurins

92 221 Bagneux Cedex - France

DGA Comm - 02 - 04.2010