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ISSUE 61 : Nov/Dec - 1986 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 61 : Nov/Dec - 1986 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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38 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. <strong>61</strong> <strong>Nov</strong>ember/<strong>Dec</strong>ember 86<br />

2. The destruction of the basis on which the<br />

Royal <strong>Australian</strong> Navy was organised, and<br />

as a result of which the <strong>Australian</strong> people<br />

committed themselves to the expenditure<br />

of several millions of public money. . .<br />

3. The announcement of a vital departure in<br />

many important respects from a policy<br />

agreed upon between the Dominions and<br />

the Imperial Government, without any previous<br />

consultation with, or even preliminary<br />

notification to, the government of the<br />

Dominions."<br />

Reid declared that Australia would pursue the<br />

policy on which she embarked in 1909 as it was<br />

seen to be "vital to the cause of Imperial defence<br />

and Imperial union, and an essential safeguard<br />

for her own protection."<br />

It was now accepted that Australia could not<br />

rely on Britain for its maritime defence and in<br />

June 1914, shortly before commencement of<br />

World War 1, the Minister for <strong>Defence</strong> announced<br />

that the Government would build two<br />

more light cruisers of the Brisbane class and<br />

two submarines at a total cost of 1,700,000<br />

Pounds. The material for the first cruiser, later<br />

named Adelaide, was to be obtained immediately.<br />

Adelaide was the only ship of this program<br />

to be built and she did not complete until<br />

August 1922.<br />

Synopsis<br />

In a little over a decade since achieving<br />

nationhood Australia had acquired a modern<br />

fleet unit and as such was the first British colony<br />

to take a substantive step to provide for her<br />

own maritime defence.<br />

To a large extent the strategic and defence<br />

policy perceptions, which culminated in establishment<br />

of the Royal <strong>Australian</strong> Navy in 1911,<br />

are synonymous with those which have been<br />

recently regenerated.<br />

Despite the incremental impact of technological<br />

developments on the nature of conventional<br />

warfare Australia's defence situation has remained<br />

essentially unaltered. This has been influenced<br />

in no small way by the enduring impact<br />

of geography and its central importance to the<br />

formulation of defence policy.<br />

Regardless of Australia's various alliance<br />

commitments, since Federation, the basic concern<br />

has remained the direct defence of Australia.<br />

There has over the years, however, been<br />

some fluctuation in views on how this might<br />

best be achieved.<br />

A central feature of the 1901-1914 period is<br />

the striking similarity to a number of aspects<br />

of Australia's present strategic and maritime<br />

perceptions. These include:<br />

• lack of a clearly defined or identified threat;<br />

• pre-eminence of the maritime environment<br />

in force structure planning;<br />

• assessment that small-scale raids, or in current<br />

jargon low-level contingencies, should<br />

be our primary force structure determinant<br />

rather than the threat of major invasion;<br />

• an awareness of the strategic importance<br />

of Australia's northern maritime approaches<br />

and the need to develop maritime<br />

infrastructure to support operations in the<br />

north;<br />

• lack of a clearly defined maritime strategy,<br />

or concept of operations;<br />

• focus on ship characteristics and performance<br />

directly relevant to Australia's geographic<br />

and strategic situation;<br />

• recognition that our allies might be either<br />

unwilling or unable to come to Australia's<br />

assistance in time of defence emergency;<br />

and<br />

• implicit acceptance of the benefits of local<br />

manufacture of defence equipment and<br />

willingness to incur the associated financial<br />

premiums.<br />

Given the enduring nature of Australia's defence<br />

posture it is unfortunate that greater attention<br />

is not accorded, in the formulation of<br />

defence policy, to reassessing the lessons of<br />

history with particular attention to the rationale<br />

for development of the earlier policies. U<br />

REFERENCES<br />

1. Hansard, Commonwealth of Australia, 1901-14.<br />

2. Parliamentary Papers, Commonwealth of Australia,<br />

1901-14.<br />

3. G. St. J. Barclay, The Empire is Marching — A Studv<br />

of the Military Effort of I he British Empire 1800-1945,<br />

Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1976.<br />

4. J. Bastock, Australia's Ships of War, Angus and Robertson,<br />

Sydney, 1975.<br />

5. R. Gillett, Warships of Australia, Rigby, Adelaide,<br />

1977.<br />

6. R. Gillett, Australia's Colonial Navies, the Naval Historical<br />

Society of Australia, Sydney, 1982.<br />

7. D.C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial<br />

Defense, 1870-1914, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1965.<br />

8. R. Hyslop, <strong>Australian</strong> Naval Administration 1900-1939,<br />

Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1973.<br />

9. C. Jones, <strong>Australian</strong> Colonial Navies, <strong>Australian</strong> War<br />

Memorial, Canberra, <strong>1986</strong>.

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