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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN<br />

COMMISSION’S SUPPORT TO THE<br />

REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

Final Report<br />

Volume II – <strong>Annexes</strong><br />

September 2008<br />

Evaluation for the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>


Hildastrasse, 66<br />

D-79102 Freiburg<br />

Germany<br />

This evaluation was commissioned by:<br />

the Evaluation Unit common to:<br />

Aide à la Décision<br />

Economique<br />

Belgium<br />

EuropeAid Co-operation Office,<br />

Directorate General for Development and<br />

External Relations Directorate-General<br />

France<br />

Germany<br />

This evaluation was carried out by EGEVAL<br />

The evaluation was managed by the evaluation unit who also chaired the reference group composed by members of the<br />

services EuropeAid, Relex, DG Budget and the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Delegation in Ghana<br />

The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors’ points of view which are not<br />

necessarily shared by the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> or by the authorities of Guyana.


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Table of contents<br />

ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE<br />

ANNEX 2 – INFORMANTS MET BEFORE THE FIELD MISSION<br />

ANNEX 3 – FIELD MISSION PLANNING & INFORMANTS MET<br />

ANNEX 4 – BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS<br />

ANNEX 5 – INTERNATIONAL DONOR COOPERATION<br />

ANNEX 6 – PRESENTATION OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS<br />

ANNEX 7 – INFORMATION MATRIX<br />

ANNEX 8 – LIST OF INTERVENTIONS<br />

ANNEX 9 – BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008<br />

Table of contents


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Annex 1 - Terms of Reference<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 1


EUROPEAN COMMISSION<br />

EuropeAid Co-operation Office<br />

Evaluation<br />

I:\1. Evaluations - ON-GOING\Guyana\1.ToR\draft ToR 15nov06a.doc<br />

Evaluation of the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>’s support to<br />

the Republic of Guyana<br />

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE<br />

November 2006<br />

o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o


Table of contents<br />

1. MANDATE...............................................................................................................................3<br />

2. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................3<br />

3. SCOPE ......................................................................................................................................5<br />

4. THE EVALUATION’S BASIC METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH............................6<br />

4.1. PREPARATION PHASE .............................................................................................................7<br />

4.2. DESK PHASE ...........................................................................................................................7<br />

4.3. FIELD PHASE ..........................................................................................................................9<br />

4.4. FINAL REPORT-WRITING PHASE ..............................................................................................9<br />

4.5. DISSEMINATION AND FOLLOW-UP ........................................................................................10<br />

5. IDENTIFICATION OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS............................................10<br />

6. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND THE MONITORING OF THE<br />

EVALUATION.....................................................................................................................................11<br />

7. THE EVALUATION TEAM ................................................................................................11<br />

8. TIMING ..................................................................................................................................12<br />

9. COST OF THE EVALUATION...........................................................................................12<br />

10. PAYMENT MODALITIES...................................................................................................12<br />

ANNEX 1: KEY DOCUMENTS FOR THE EVALUATION ..........................................................13<br />

ANNEX 2: OUTLINE STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL REPORT..................................................15<br />

ANNEX 3 - QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID ..................................................................................16<br />

ANNEX 4 - COUNTRY OVERVIEW................................................................................................17<br />

2


1. MANDATE<br />

Systematic and timely evaluation of its expenditure programmes is a priority of the<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> (EC), as a means of accounting for the management of the<br />

allocated funds and of promoting a lesson-learning culture throughout the<br />

organisation. Of great importance also, particularly in the context of the programmes<br />

of the so-called Relex Family of Directorates-General 1 , is the increased focus on<br />

impact against a background of greater concentration of external co-operation and<br />

increasing emphasis on result-oriented approaches.<br />

The evaluation of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s co-operation with the Republic of Guyana in its<br />

2006 is part of the 2006 evaluation programme as approved by External Relations and<br />

Development <strong>Commission</strong>ers.<br />

The main objectives of the evaluation are:<br />

− to provide the relevant external co-operation services of the EC and the wider<br />

public with an overall independent assessment of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s past and<br />

current cooperation relations with the Republic of Guyana<br />

− to identify key lessons in order to help improve the current and future<br />

strategies and programmes of the <strong>Commission</strong>.<br />

2. BACKGROUND<br />

1) The <strong>European</strong> Union's co-operation policy is based on Article 177 of the Treaty<br />

establishing the <strong>European</strong> Community (EC). It determines that the sphere of<br />

development co-operation shall have three objectives namely: fostering<br />

sustainable development of developing countries 2 ; assisting the smooth and<br />

gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy and<br />

campaigning against poverty in the developing countries.<br />

2) In November 2000, the Council and the <strong>Commission</strong> endorsed a Development<br />

Policy Declaration 3 that identifies six priority themes/areas. These are: Trade and<br />

Development; Regional Integration and Co-operation; Support to Macroeconomic<br />

Policies linked to Social Sector Programmes; Transport; Sustainable<br />

Rural Development and Food Security; and Institutional Capacity Building, Good<br />

Governance and the Rule of Law. Environment and Gender are considered as<br />

crosscutting issues, which needs to be integrated into all these six themes in order<br />

to make development sustainable.<br />

3) The EC has made Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs) the point of departure<br />

for its Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) in all countries that have/produce a PRSP.<br />

The PRSP approach, with its six principles: (1) national ownership, (2) results<br />

focus, (3) comprehensive, (4) prioritised, (5) long-term, and (6) partnershiporiented,<br />

forms the core for donor support, and the common framework within<br />

1<br />

2<br />

3<br />

Directorates General of External Relations (RELEX), Development (DEV), Enlargement (ELARG),<br />

Trade (TRADE) and the EuropeAid Co-operation Office (AIDCO).<br />

Sustainable Development is defined as the improvement of the standard of living and welfare of the<br />

relevant populations within the limits of the capacity of the ecosystems by maintaining natural<br />

assets and their biological diversity for the benefit of present and future generations.<br />

Council document 13458/00.<br />

3


which all stakeholders supporting poverty reduction in a country expect to work 4 .<br />

Furthermore CSPs are the culmination of a joint programming process, which<br />

started with the launching of the Cotonou Agreement in January 2001 and<br />

involved many actors (the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>, EU Member States, the<br />

Government, civil society and the private sector).<br />

4) Guyana's CSP 5 2002-2007 is the current framework for EC/Guyana cooperation<br />

which combines all relevant resources and instruments. This CSP takes Guyana’s<br />

development agenda as its starting point together with EC’s co-operation<br />

objectives. Accordingly the overall aim of the CSP is to reduce poverty through<br />

accelerating the process of sustainable economic and social development. Support<br />

is focused on infrastructure (flood protection of major population area with main<br />

economic activities), as well on macro-economic support for the social sector,<br />

especially low-income housing and the health sector.<br />

5) The 9th <strong>European</strong> Development Fund (EDF), makes available up to €48 million<br />

(€34M for envelope A and €14M for envelop B to cover emergencies and<br />

unforeseen needs, international debt relief initiatives, instability of export<br />

earnings). (see also Country overview in Annex 1) .<br />

6) In November 2000, the IMF and the World Bank approved the Interim Poverty<br />

reduction strategy paper (PRSP) and agreed to support a comprehensive debt<br />

reduction package for Guyana under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor<br />

Countries Initiative (HIPC). This deal will save Guyana about USD 590 Million<br />

in debt service over the coming years. Among the requirements for the release of<br />

the funds are the completion of a PRSP and the implementation of a set of social<br />

and public sector reforms and the maintenance of financial stability.<br />

7) In October 2002, the IMF agreed to a credit of USD 73 million under the PRSP.<br />

8) In December 2003, IMF and World Bank agreed that Guyana had reached the<br />

completion point under the enhanced HIPC. Debt relief on this account amounts<br />

to USD 334.5. This comes in addition to the USD 256.4 that Guyana received<br />

when it reached the completion point under the original HIPC framework in May<br />

1999.<br />

9) Guyana's position on the UN's Human Development Index went further down<br />

from 104 in 2004 to 107 in 2005.<br />

10) Regional context<br />

Guyana is among others, a member of the UN, ACP (Guyana is full Member),<br />

ACS, CARICOM and CARIFORUM.<br />

The Headquarters of the Caribbean Community, Caricom, is in Georgetown;<br />

new HQ offices at Liliendaal were opened in February 2005. Also the Caribbean<br />

4<br />

PRSP review: key issues<br />

http://www.cc.cec/home/dgserv/dev/body/theme/docs/B2/PRSP_review_key_issues.pdf#zoom=100<br />

5<br />

Country Strategy Paper for Guyana<br />

http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/csp_rsp/csp_en.cfm<br />

4


Forum of ACP States, Cariforum is headquartered in Georgetown. Relations<br />

with Brazil are quite good and occasionally common regional projects are put<br />

forward. Relations with Venezuela maintaining a significant territorial claim on<br />

Guyana are improving.<br />

A Guyana-Suriname border dispute re-ignited in 2000, following exploratory<br />

drilling for oil off the coast of the disputed area. Guyana in February 2004<br />

referred this long-standing maritime boundary dispute the United Nations for a<br />

legally binding resolution under article 287 of the UN Convention on the Law of<br />

the Sea. The legal representatives of the two governments met at the end of May<br />

2004 to continue their discussions about the arbitration panel to adjudicate the<br />

maritime boundary dispute. A final ruling is expected in 2006.<br />

11) Relations with EU Member States<br />

The UK is the only EU Member State with a permanent representation in the<br />

country: EC Delegation and British High <strong>Commission</strong> have regularly contacts.<br />

12) Guyana is a high cost producer of both sugar and rice. Both these commodities<br />

have enjoyed preferential access to the lucrative EC market through special<br />

Lome/Cotonou protocols. However, these preferences will change by 2009, and<br />

already from 2006 the "Everything but Arms initiative" will allow free access to<br />

EC for sugar and rice originating from least developed countries, thus creating<br />

competition for Guyanese exports. To facilitate the transition, funds have been<br />

allocated from the EDF for the rice sector under the CARICOM Rice Project.<br />

(EUR 24 million for Guyana, Suriname and regional).<br />

13) Guyana is highly dependent on trade because of its small economic base. The<br />

major exports are sugar, rice, gold and bauxite. The pattern of Guyana's trade has<br />

changed very little in recent years. The country's main trading partner remains the<br />

United States (22% of exports and 25% of imports), the EU - mainly the United<br />

Kingdom - (30% of exports and 19 % of imports) and Canada (24% of exports<br />

and negligible imports).<br />

Please also refer to Country overview in Annex 4.<br />

3. SCOPE<br />

The scope of the evaluation is the <strong>Commission</strong>’s co-operation strategies with the<br />

Republic of Guyana and their implementation for the period 1995-2006.<br />

The Consultant should assess:<br />

- the relevance, coherence and complementarity of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s co-operation<br />

strategies for the period 1995-2006;<br />

- ,the consistency between programming and implementation for the same period;<br />

- the implementation of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s co-operation, focusing on effectiveness<br />

and efficiency for the period 1995-2002 and on intended effects for the period<br />

under the current programming cycle 2002-2006;<br />

5


– the following co-operation areas in particular:<br />

(a) macro-economic framework and economic reforms,<br />

(b) social reforms and human resources development,<br />

(c) infrastructures.<br />

- the cooperation framework with the country, including the main agreements and<br />

other official commitments between EU and the Republic of Guyana.<br />

NB: Previous relevant evaluations, at country level and at regional level as well as<br />

global thematic evaluations relating to the country and evaluations of instruments are<br />

important reference material to be taken into account. The Consultant should not deal<br />

with the points already covered by these evaluations but use them and carry out<br />

further analyses. Result Oriented Monitoring of Projects (ROM) related to Republic<br />

of Guyana should also be taken into consideration (see CRIS database) on the<br />

assessment of the country programme.<br />

4. THE EVALUATION’S BASIC METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH<br />

The evaluation basic approach will consist of five phases in the course of which<br />

several methodological stages will be developed. The Consultant’s contribution is<br />

essentially the area marked grey in the table below, to which the launch note should<br />

be added.<br />

Phases of the evaluation: Methodological Stages 6 :<br />

1. Preparation Phase • Reference group constitution<br />

• ToR’s drafting<br />

• Launch Note (Consultant)<br />

2. Desk Phase 7<br />

3. Field Phase<br />

4. Synthesis phase (seminar in the<br />

country)<br />

• Structuring of the evaluation<br />

• Data Collection 8 , verification of<br />

hypotheses<br />

• Analysis<br />

• Judgements on findings<br />

5. Feedback and Dissemination • Quality Grid<br />

• Summary for the <strong>Commission</strong>ers<br />

concerned<br />

• Evinfo (summary for OECD and<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> databases)<br />

• Fiche contradictoire (a statement<br />

of key recommendations followed<br />

by the <strong>Commission</strong>’s response)<br />

6<br />

7<br />

8<br />

These components are not entirely sequential.<br />

It includes interviews in Brussels and could include a short mission to the country<br />

The study will draw on the contents of (i) all relevant documentation supplied by the <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Services, and (ii) documentation from other sources (to be detailed).<br />

6


4.1. Preparation Phase<br />

The evaluation manager identifies the <strong>Commission</strong> services to be invited to be part of<br />

the reference group, taking care that the objectives are met: an input of expertise and<br />

information, the expression of a range of pertinent opinions from the <strong>Commission</strong> and<br />

the legitimacy of the evaluation process.<br />

The reference group acts as the main professional interface between the Consultant<br />

and the <strong>Commission</strong> services. The group's principal functions will be:<br />

• to provide an opinion on the draft Terms of Reference ;<br />

• to provide the Consultant with all available information and<br />

documentation about the subjects of the evaluation;<br />

• to examine the inception note and subsequent reports produced by the<br />

Consultant;<br />

• to provide a judgement on the quality of the work of the Consultant;<br />

• to assist in assuring feedback and the update of the findings and<br />

recommendations from the evaluation into future programme design and<br />

delivery.<br />

The evaluation manager prepares the draft ToR for the evaluation and sends these to<br />

the Consultant.<br />

The Consultant will present a Launch note 9 which should contain: (i) his<br />

understanding of the ToR; (ii) the provisional composition of the evaluation team with<br />

CVs; (iii) a budget proposal. The launch note will be referred to the reference group<br />

for comments.<br />

4.2. Desk phase<br />

4.2.1. Inception report<br />

Upon approval of the launch note by the Evaluation Unit, the Consultant proceeds to<br />

the structuring stage, which leads to the production of an inception report.<br />

The main part of the work consists in the analysis of all key documents which are to<br />

the <strong>Commission</strong>’s co-operation (past and present) with the Republic of Guyana (in<br />

particular the strategy and programming documents).The Consultant will also take<br />

account of the documentation produced by other donors and international agencies.<br />

On the basis of the information collected and analysed, the Consultant will:<br />

9 In the case of a tender procedure, the launch note will be replaced by the financial and technical<br />

proposal of the tender<br />

7


a) reconstruct the intervention logic of the EC in the framework of its co-operation<br />

with the Republic of Guyana.The reconstructed logic of the intervention will be<br />

shaped into one or more logical diagrams of effects which must be based<br />

strictly on official texts. Prior to the elaboration of the effects diagram(s), the<br />

Consultant will have (i) identified and prioritized the co-operation objectives as<br />

observed in official texts;(ii) translated these specific objectives into intended<br />

effects. These intended effects will form the “boxes” of the diagram(s). Possible<br />

“gaps” in the intervention logic should be indicated and filled on the basis of<br />

assumptions to be validated by the reference group. The logical diagram(s) of<br />

effects will help to identify the main evaluation questions;<br />

b) propose evaluation questions and prepare explanatory comments for each. The<br />

choice of the questions determines the subsequent phases of information and<br />

data collection, elaboration of the methods of analysis, and elaboration of final<br />

judgements;<br />

A first meeting will be held with the Reference group to explain and approve the<br />

logical diagram(s) and the evaluation questions.<br />

c) identify appropriate judgement criteria and preliminary indicators for each<br />

evaluation questions selected. For each question, at least one judgement<br />

criterion should be identified, and for each such criterion appropriate a limited<br />

number of quantitative and qualitative indicators should be identified;<br />

d) include a description of the development/co-operation context of the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> with [country];<br />

e) propose suitable working methods to collect data and information in the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong>’s headquarters and in the country and present appropriate methods<br />

to analyse the collected data and information, indicating any limitations.<br />

The report will also confirm if necessary, (i) the final composition of the evaluation<br />

team and (ii) the final calendar. These two latter points will be agreed and confirmed<br />

through a formal exchange of letters between the Consultant and the <strong>Commission</strong>.<br />

This phase may include a short preparatory and exploratory visit in the field by the<br />

Consultant and/or a representative of the Evaluation Unit.<br />

4.2.2. Desk phase report<br />

Upon approval of the inception report, the Consultant proceeds to the final stage of<br />

the desk phase during which he will:<br />

• present the finalised quantitative and qualitative indicators;<br />

• present the first elements of responses to the evaluation questions and the<br />

first hypotheses to be tested in the field;<br />

• present suitable methods of data and information collection in the country<br />

indicating any limitations and describing how the data should be crosschecked<br />

;<br />

• propose appropriate methods of analysis of the information and data<br />

collected, again indicating any limitations of those methods in [country];<br />

8


• propose a list of activities, projects and programmes for in-depth analysis in<br />

the field.<br />

At the conclusion of this work, the Consultant will present a draft desk phase report<br />

setting out the results of this first phase of the evaluation including all the above listed<br />

tasks (the major part of the Inception report will be put as an annex of the desk phase<br />

report).The field mission may not start until the proposed methodology will be<br />

approved by the evaluation manager.<br />

4.3. Field phase<br />

Following acceptance of the desk phase report, the Consultant undertakes the field<br />

mission. The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the desk phase<br />

report and approved by the Reference group in accordance with the Delegation. If<br />

during the course of the fieldwork any significant deviations from the agreed<br />

methodology and/or schedule are perceived necessary, the Consultant must have<br />

received the approval of the Evaluation Unit before they can be applied. At the<br />

conclusion of the field study, the Consultant presents the preliminary findings of<br />

evaluation:<br />

(1) during a de-briefing meeting with the Delegation;<br />

(2) to the Reference group, shortly after his return from the field.<br />

4.4. Final report-writing phase<br />

The Consultant will submit the draft final report in conformity with the structure set<br />

out in annex 2 with account being taken of comments received during de-briefing<br />

meetings with the Delegation and the Reference group (cf.4.3).<br />

If the evaluation manager considers the report of sufficient quality (cf. annex 3), he<br />

will circulate it for comments to the reference group, which will convene to discuss it<br />

in the presence of the evaluation team.<br />

On the basis of comments expressed by the Reference group and the Evaluation Unit,<br />

the Consultant will make the appropriate amendments. The revised draft final report<br />

will be presented at a seminar in the Republic of Guyana. The purpose of the<br />

seminar is to present the results the conclusions and the preliminary recommendations<br />

of the evaluation to the National Authorities, to the Delegation as well as to all the<br />

main stakeholders concerned by the co-operation (representatives of civil society<br />

organisations, other donors, etc.).<br />

The Consultant should prepare a presentation (power point) for the seminar. This<br />

presentation shall be considered as a product of the evaluation in the same way as the<br />

reports.<br />

On the basis of the comments expressed at the seminar and on the basis of further<br />

comments from the Reference group, the Delegation and/or the evaluation manager,<br />

the Consultant will prepare the final report. The Consultant may either accept or reject<br />

the comments but in case of rejection he must motivate (in writing) his reasons (the<br />

comments and the Consultant’s responses are annexed to the report).<br />

The presentation (power point) will be revised in accordance to the final report.<br />

9


4.5. Dissemination and follow-up<br />

After approval of the final report, the Evaluation Unit proceeds with the dissemination<br />

of the results (conclusions and recommendations) of the evaluation. The Evaluation<br />

Unit (i) makes a formal judgement on the quality of the evaluation (cf. annex 3);<br />

(ii) prepares an evaluation summary following the standard DAC format (EvInfo);<br />

(iii) prepares and circulates a “Fiche contradictoire”. The final report, the quality<br />

assessment grid, the EvInfo and the “Fiche contradictoire” will be published on the<br />

Website of the Evaluation Unit.<br />

5. IDENTIFICATION OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS<br />

The evaluation will be based on the five criteria endorsed by the OECD-DAC:<br />

relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The criteria will be<br />

given different weight according to the precise evaluation questions.<br />

In general, questions will refer to the following main areas:<br />

• Relevance of the strategy/programme: this includes both relevance to the general<br />

objectives of the EC and relevance to the needs and priorities of the Republic of<br />

Guyana (including the choice of target groups).<br />

• Design of the intervention strategy/programme: this mainly concerns the extent<br />

to which the resources foreseen are adequate in relation to the objectives set out in<br />

the programming documents. The Consultant will also verify the extent to which<br />

the intervention modalities (instruments, aid delivery channels, etc.) are<br />

appropriate to the objectives.<br />

• Consistency of the implementation in relation to the strategy: the Consultant<br />

shall verify the extent to which the calendar and implementation of the<br />

intervention programming (type of interventions, geographical and sectoral<br />

distribution, instruments, aid delivery channels, etc.) are consistent with the<br />

strategy. He shall demonstrate who are the real beneficiaries, direct or indirect, of<br />

the intervention and compare them to the target population(s) in the programming<br />

documents.<br />

• Achievement of main objectives: the Consultant shall identify all recorded results<br />

and impacts, including any unintended ones, and compare these to the intended.<br />

The Consultant will also identify the changes with occurred in the areas on which<br />

EC programmes were supposed to produce an impact.<br />

• Efficiency of the implementation: for the activities which were effective, it will be<br />

necessary to question to what extent funding, human, resources, regulatory, and/or<br />

administrative resources contributed to, or hindered, the achievement of the<br />

objectives and results.<br />

• Sustainability of the effects: an analysis of the extent to which the results and<br />

impact are being, or are likely to be, maintained over time.<br />

10


• Key cross-cutting issues: for example gender, environment human rights,<br />

HIV/AIDS, institutional capacity building, etc. Verification should be undertaken,<br />

on the one hand, of the extent that account has been taken of these priorities in the<br />

programming documents and, on the other hand, to what extent these issues have<br />

been reflected in the implementation modalities and in the effects of the<br />

intervention.<br />

• The 3Cs (co-ordination, complementarity and coherence):<br />

co-ordination and complementarity with EU Members States, and other donors;<br />

coherence with EU policies (including the Member State own policies).<br />

6. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND THE MONITORING OF THE<br />

EVALUATION<br />

The Evaluation Unit (AIDCO 03) is responsible for the management and monitoring<br />

of the evaluation with the assistance of the Reference group (cf.4.1).<br />

7. THE EVALUATION TEAM<br />

The evaluation team should possess a sound level of knowledge and experience in:<br />

− evaluation methods and techniques in general and, if possible of evaluation in the<br />

field of development and cooperation;<br />

− the country and/or the region;<br />

− the following fields:<br />

1) trade and economic cooperation;<br />

2) social sector and human resources development<br />

3) infrastructures (water sector, in particular);<br />

4) good governance and human rights.<br />

Additional expertise could be requested after the drafting of the specific<br />

evaluation questions.<br />

−<br />

the following language(s): English<br />

The Evaluation Unit strongly recommends that the evaluation team should include<br />

local consultants (notably, but not only, during the field phase) with in-depth<br />

knowledge of key areas of the evaluation<br />

The team composition will initially be agreed between the contractor<br />

and the Evaluation Unit but may be adjusted subsequently, if<br />

necessary, on the basis of the findings of the desk phase.<br />

Regarding conflict of interest, experts who have been involved in the<br />

design or implementation of programmes or projects that are covered<br />

by this evaluation, are excluded from this assignment.<br />

A declaration of absence of conflict of interest shall be signed by each<br />

consultant proposed for the study team, and annexed to the launch<br />

note.<br />

11


8. TIMING<br />

The dates mentioned in the following section are indicative<br />

Evaluation Phases<br />

and Stages<br />

Notes and Reports Dates Meetings<br />

RG Composition Notes November 2006<br />

ToR Draft November<br />

Starting Stage Launch Note December<br />

Desk Phase<br />

Structuring Stage Short presentation (logical<br />

diagram and EQ)<br />

January 2007<br />

RG Meeting<br />

(kick off meeting)<br />

Draft Inception Note<br />

February<br />

Final Inception Note<br />

March<br />

Desk Study Draft Desk Report March RG Meeting<br />

Final Desk Report<br />

April<br />

Field Phase<br />

Final Phase<br />

(report-writing)<br />

Presentation May RG Meeting<br />

Draft Final Report<br />

1rs draft Final June RG Meeting<br />

2 nd draft Final July<br />

Seminar<br />

September<br />

Final Report<br />

October<br />

9. COST OF THE EVALUATION<br />

The overall cost of the evaluation is expected to be around € 180.000<br />

This amount includes a provision (reimbursable costs) of € 7.000 for the organisation<br />

of the seminar in the country.<br />

10. PAYMENT MODALITIES<br />

The payments modalities shall be as follows:<br />

30% on acceptance of the inception note;<br />

50% on acceptance of draft final report;<br />

20% on acceptance of final report.<br />

Seminar related costs are to be invoiced, and paid, separately.<br />

12


ANNEX 1: KEY DOCUMENTS FOR THE EVALUATION<br />

NB: the following list is indicative and by no means exhaustive. The consultants are<br />

requested to take into account any other documents relevant to the present evaluation.<br />

− Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & National Indicative Programme 2002-2004<br />

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/csp_rsp/print/gy_csp_en.pdf#zoom=100<br />

− Addendum to the CSP and National Indicative Programme:<br />

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/csp_rsp/addentum/Add_CSP_GY.pdf#zoo<br />

m=100<br />

− Regional Lomé 4 (1997-2002))<br />

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/region/docs/rb_en.pdf#zoom=100<br />

− Regional Sheet<br />

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/publications/rep98/pdf/en/rb.pdf#zoom=100<br />

− Regional for 2003-2007:<br />

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/csp_rsp/print/r9_rsp_en.pdf#zoom=100<br />

− Annual reports and mid-term reviews<br />

− Evaluation regional cooperation Caribbean (2005)<br />

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/evaluation/document_index/2005/951663_docs.htm<br />

− Previous Project/programme Evaluations Guyana:<br />

Caribbean Regional Tourism<br />

Sector programme (99810)<br />

7 ACP RPR<br />

443/444<br />

final<br />

(draft)<br />

dec-02<br />

Guyana Training Agency<br />

Project<br />

8 ACP GUA<br />

008<br />

mid-term<br />

Feb-03<br />

Strengthening the Institutional<br />

Response to HIV/AIDS/STI in<br />

the Caribbean (SIRHASC)<br />

8 ACP TPS<br />

018<br />

mid-term Feb 2004<br />

Linden<br />

Advancement<br />

(LEAP)<br />

Economic<br />

Programme<br />

8 ACP GUA<br />

009<br />

final Aug 2004<br />

Strengthening of Medical<br />

Laboratory Services in the<br />

Caribbean<br />

8 ACP RCA<br />

020<br />

final Dec 2004<br />

13


Urban development projects,<br />

phase2, Guyana. Final report<br />

Small business credit initiative -<br />

Guyana final report<br />

(GUA/7001)<br />

Small business credit initiative<br />

(Guyana) final report<br />

Rehabilitation of the bauxite<br />

industry of Guyana - final<br />

report - Global evaluation of the<br />

cooperation between ACP and<br />

EU in the mining sector and<br />

Sysmin<br />

950968 01/01/1995<br />

951054 01/01/1995<br />

951319 13/07/1997<br />

951339 01/06/1998<br />

Coopération nord-sud en<br />

matiere de lutte contre<br />

l'expansion de l'epidemie du<br />

vih/sida et aide aux politiques<br />

et programmes démographiques<br />

dans les pays en developpement<br />

951552<br />

01/11/2000<br />

- Monitoring Reports on EC (co-financed) actions in Guyana (ROM Database)<br />

- Relevant documentation from other donors<br />

14


ANNEX 2: OUTLINE STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL REPORT<br />

The overall layout of the report is as follows:<br />

- Summary<br />

- Context of the evaluation<br />

- Replies to the evaluation questions<br />

- Conclusions (1)<br />

- Recommendations (2)<br />

Length: the final report must be kept short (75 pages maximum excluding annexes).<br />

Additional information on the context, the programme or the comprehensive aspects<br />

of the methodology and of the analysis will be put in the annexes.<br />

(1)<br />

The conclusions have to be assembled by homogeneous "clusters" (groups). The<br />

setting out of the conclusions according to the 5 DAC criteria is not required.<br />

The chapter on "Conclusions" has to contain a paragraph or a sub-chapter with the 3<br />

to 4 principal presented in order of importance.<br />

The chapter on "Conclusions" must also make it possible to identify subjects for<br />

which there are good practices and the subjects for which it is necessary to think<br />

about modifications or re-orientations.<br />

(2)<br />

– Recommendations have to be linked to the conclusions without being a direct<br />

copy.<br />

– Recommendations have to be treated on a hierarchical basis and prioritised<br />

within the various clusters (groups) of presentation selected.<br />

– Recommendations have to be realistic, operational and feasible. As far as is<br />

practicable, the possible conditions of implementation have to be specified.<br />

– The chapter on "Recommendations" has to contain a sub-chapter or a specific<br />

paragraph corresponding to the paragraph with the 3 to 4 principal conclusions.<br />

Therefore, for each conclusion, options for action and the conditions linked to<br />

each action as well as the likely consequences should set out.<br />

15


ANNEX 3 - QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID<br />

Concerning these criteria, the evaluation<br />

report is:<br />

1. Meeting needs: Does the evaluation<br />

adequately address the information needs of the<br />

commissioning body and fit the terms of<br />

reference?<br />

2. Relevant scope: Is the rationale of the<br />

policy examined and its set of outputs, results<br />

and outcomes/impacts examined fully,<br />

including both intended and unexpected policy<br />

interactions and consequences?<br />

3. Defensible design: Is the evaluation design<br />

appropriate and adequate to ensure that the full<br />

set of findings, along with methodological<br />

limitations, is made accessible for answering<br />

the main evaluation questions?<br />

4. Reliable data: To what extent are the<br />

primary and secondary data selected adequate.<br />

Are they sufficiently reliable for their intended<br />

use?<br />

5. Sound analysis: Is quantitative information<br />

appropriately and systematically analysed<br />

according to the state of the art so that<br />

evaluation questions are answered in a valid<br />

way?<br />

6. Credible findings: Do findings follow<br />

logically from, and are they justified by, the<br />

data analysis and interpretations based on<br />

carefully described assumptions and rationale?<br />

7. Validity of the conclusions: Does the<br />

report provide clear conclusions? Are<br />

conclusions based on credible results?<br />

8. Usefulness of the recommendations: Are<br />

recommendations fair, unbiased by personnel<br />

or shareholders’ views, and sufficiently<br />

detailed to be operationally applicable?<br />

9. Clearly reported: Does the report clearly<br />

describe the policy being evaluated, including<br />

its context and purpose, together with the<br />

procedures and findings of the evaluation, so<br />

that information provided can easily be<br />

understood?<br />

Taking into account the contextual<br />

constraints on the evaluation, the overall<br />

quality rating of the report is considered.<br />

Unacc<br />

eptabl<br />

e<br />

Poor Good Very<br />

Good<br />

Excelle<br />

nt<br />

16


ANNEX 4<br />

COUNTRY OVERVIEW<br />

General Background<br />

Guyana, located at the point where the Caribbean meets South America on its North Atlantic<br />

seaboard, is historically and culturally a part of the Caribbean region. Georgetown hosts the<br />

Secretariat of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).<br />

Guyana is a country with a small population 751,000 ( (2002 census) living in a large area of<br />

214 969 km 2 . With a per capita income of+/- 850 USD, Guyana is also one of the poorest<br />

countries in the Caribbean and the Western Hemisphere. Ethnic 9 %, others and mixed 17%.<br />

Guyana has three distinct geographical areas: the coastal zone, the tropical forest zone, and<br />

the savannahs, in the south. Close to 90 % of the population lives and works in the coastal<br />

plain, an area around 10 000 km 2 , roughly 5% of the country's total land mass. Over 80% of<br />

GDP, including the entire agricultural production and the vast majority of all non-mining<br />

industrial activities are concentrated in this area, which is located below sea level, and needs<br />

constant protection from the sea.<br />

Guyana's economy is based on exporting bauxite, sugar, rice, and more recently gold and<br />

forestry products. In spite of some acute ethnic polarisation problems, the overall political<br />

situation of the country had been improving at a satisfactory rate until recently. GDP<br />

fluctuated from - 0.7% in 2003 to + 1.6 % in 2004 and to - 2.5% in 2005, the latter figure<br />

relating to the floods in January 2005 (source EIU).<br />

In November 2000, the IMF and the World Bank approved the Interim Poverty reduction<br />

strategy paper (PRSP) and agreed to support a comprehensive debt reduction package for<br />

Guyana under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). This deal will<br />

save Guyana about USD 590 Million in debt service over the coming years. Among the<br />

requirements for the release of the funds are the completion of a PRSP and the<br />

implementation of a set of social and public sector reforms and the maintenance of financial<br />

stability.<br />

In October 2002, the IMF agreed to a credit of USD 73 million under the PRSP.<br />

In December 2003, IMF and World Bank agreed that Guyana has reached the completion<br />

point under the enhanced HIPC. Debt relief under the enhanced HIPC amounts to USD 334.5.<br />

This comes in addition to the USD 256.4 that Guyana received when it reached the<br />

completion point under the original HIPC framework in May 1999. The HDI continued to<br />

drop from 104 in 2004 to 107 in 2005.<br />

Political situation<br />

Guyana's political scene is dominated by two main parties, the People's Progressive Party<br />

(PPP) and the Peoples National Congress (PNC). Each represents one of the two main<br />

ethnicities of the country, the PPP electorate being mostly indo-Guyanese and the PNC's<br />

mainly afro-Guyanese.<br />

After 28 years of undemocratic rule, the first internationally recognised fair and free elections<br />

took place in 1992 and Dr Cheddi Jagan (PPP) was elected President. The following general<br />

elections were held in December 1997 and were once again won by the PPP.<br />

The elections of March 2001 which returned the government of President Jagdeo and the<br />

PPP/C to power were considered by most observers to have been fair and open. But as it was<br />

the case after the 1997 elections which were also won by the PPP, civil disturbances erupted<br />

17


again after the election.<br />

Progress in the political reconciliation process has been slow and the process as a whole is<br />

still rather unstable. Currently government and opposition are not on real speaking terms. The<br />

country is gearing up for the next elections on 28 August 2006.<br />

Concerning the human rights situation freedom of press and opinion are respected. However,<br />

the police force has been criticised locally and internationally (Amnesty International) for<br />

alleged extra-judicial killings.<br />

Regional framework<br />

Guyana is among others, a member of the UN, ACP, ACS, CARICOM and CARIFORUM.<br />

The Headquarters of the Caribbean Community, Caricom, is in Georgetown and a new<br />

Caricom headquarters at Liliendaal was opened in February 2005. The Caribbean Forum of<br />

ACP States, Cariforum is headquartered in Georgetown. Relations with Brazil are quite good<br />

and occasionally common regional projects are put forward. Relations with Venezuela<br />

maintaining a significant territorial claim on Guyana are improving. A Guyana-Suriname<br />

border dispute re-ignited in 2000, following exploratory drilling for oil off the coast of the<br />

disputed area. Guyana in February 2004 referred their long-standing maritime boundary<br />

dispute with Suriname to the United Nations for a legally binding resolution under article 287<br />

of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The legal representatives of the two<br />

governments met at the end of May 2004 to continue their discussions about the arbitration<br />

panel to adjudicate the maritime boundary dispute. A final ruling is expected in 2006.<br />

Relations with the EU<br />

The UK is the only EU Member State with a permanent representation in Guyana and the EU<br />

Delegation and the British High <strong>Commission</strong> have contacts on a regular basis.<br />

Guyana is highly dependent on trade because of its small economic base. The major exports<br />

are sugar, rice, gold and bauxite. The pattern of Guyana's trade has changed very little in<br />

recent years. The country's main trading partner remains the United States (22% of exports<br />

and 25% of imports), the EU - mainly the United Kingdom - (30% of exports and 19 % of<br />

imports) and Canada (24% of exports and negligible imports).<br />

Guyana is a high cost producer of both sugar and rice. Both these commodities have enjoyed<br />

preferential access to the lucrative EC market through special Lome/Cotonou protocols.<br />

However, these preferences will change by 2009, and already from 2006 the Everything but<br />

Arms initiative will allow free access to EC for sugar and rice originating from least<br />

developed countries, thus creating competition for Guyanese exports. To facilitate the<br />

transition funds have been allocated from the EDF for the rice sector under the CARICOM<br />

Rice Project. (EUR 24 million for Guyana, Suriname and regional).<br />

Country Strategy<br />

Top of page<br />

The objectives of the EC assistance program to Guyana are the reduction of poverty and the<br />

promotion of sustainable development.<br />

The two areas of concentration proposed for the 9 th EDF are:<br />

• Infrastructure: Sea Defences and coastal management and<br />

18


• Macro-economic support to social sectors (health and housing)<br />

Both of these programs would receive project and/or budgetary sector support.<br />

Outside these areas of concentration assistance is proposed for:<br />

• Transport sector planning<br />

• Support to Economic Actors : Strengthening the NAO office / Micro-project<br />

programme<br />

Priorities for co-operation<br />

Top of page<br />

The EC Country Support Strategy for Guyana will be financed through different instruments<br />

under the 9 th EDF, which amounts to a total of EURO 48 million.<br />

9 th EDF A-allocation (EUR 34 million). From the B-allocation EUR 4,9 million concerning<br />

Sysmin resources will be used to support the focal and non-focal sectors, bringing the total<br />

resources allocated to EUR 38,9 million for the following purposes.<br />

Focal sector 1. Infrastructure: sea defences and coastal management. Total amount EUR 19<br />

million or 49% of the programmable resources.<br />

Focal sector 2. Macro economic support. Total amount EUR 14,9 million or 38% of the<br />

programmable resources.<br />

Other programmes outside the focal sectors Total amount EUR 5 million or 13% of the<br />

programmable resources.<br />

Balances from previous EDFs at the date of entry into force of the Financial Protocol as well<br />

as decommitments made at a later stage, have been added to the above mentioned indicative<br />

allocation. These funds will be used for projects and programmes already identified under<br />

Indicative Programmes of preceding EDFs, for which no financing decision was taken before<br />

the entry into force of the 9 th EDF.<br />

In May 2004, the Guyanese Government and the EC signed a five-year agreement to fund the<br />

establishment of a micro projects programme for vulnerable groups and NGOs. This initiative<br />

is part of a larger commitment to eradicate poverty.<br />

The Macro-economic support programme was approved in July 2004.<br />

9 th EDF B-allocation (EUR 14 million) This envelope includes EUR 4,9 million from 8 th<br />

EDF Sysmin resources allocated to the focal and non-focal sectors above. These funds are<br />

used under the programmed activities as listed above. From the remainder of the B-envelope<br />

under the flex procedures, 8,4 million has been allocated in January 2002 to be programmed<br />

as part of the budget support, bringing it to 23,3 million. The last EUR 0.7 million has been<br />

allocated by ECHO for relief after floods which hit Guyana in January 2005.<br />

Apart from the above-mentioned financial instruments, of which the A-envelope is the main<br />

programmable basis for the Indicative Programme, the 9 th EDF also includes the "Investment<br />

Facility" as a financing instrument managed by the <strong>European</strong> Investment bank. The<br />

Investment Facility does not form part of the Indicative Programme.<br />

Specific actions could be financed via budget lines, inter alia, in the areas of decentralised co-<br />

19


operation, NGO financing, human rights and democracy, disaster prevention and<br />

humanitarian and emergency assistance. These are subject to specific rules and regulations<br />

and depend on availability of funds. Guyana can also benefit from the Regional Indicative<br />

Programme or from trade specific operations, according to needs and availability of funds.<br />

Specific activities may be supported through the Centre for the Development of Enterprise<br />

(CDE).<br />

9th EDF Financial Data<br />

Top of page<br />

Focal areas<br />

Infrastructure: Sea defences and costal management 19 M EUR 49 %<br />

Macro economic support 14.9M EUR 38 %<br />

Non- focal areas<br />

Transport Sector Study & Support to Economic Actors 5 M EUR 13%<br />

Total 38.9 M EUR* 100 %<br />

The amount shown above accounts solely for EDF allocations - programmable aid<br />

* From the B-allocation EUR 4,9 million concerning Sysmin resources will be used to<br />

support the focal and non-focal sectors, bringing the total resources allocated to EUR 38,9<br />

million for the indicated purposes.<br />

Previous EDF financial data<br />

Top of page<br />

(All EDF in MEUR (million EUR)s<br />

(8th EDF)<br />

National Indicative Progr. 12.8 14.6 22.1 32.8 32<br />

EIB loans: Risk capital 3.2 4 4 1 12.5<br />

EIB loans - - - 7.8 -<br />

Structural adjustment support - - - 8.5 11<br />

Sysmin - 34.5 - 5 -<br />

debt relief - - - 6.4 -<br />

Food aid 0.7 3.8 4.3 - -<br />

Other (emergency aid, AIDS, damage compensation) - 0.5 0.30.1 -<br />

Environment and NGO budget lines - - - - 4.1<br />

From regional funds - - 1.2 12.3 0.8<br />

Total 16.7 57.4 31.9 73.9 60.4<br />

20


Main Development Projects<br />

Top of page<br />

Major project activities presently undertaken are:<br />

• 8 th EDF Sea Defences Programme (EUR 20 million)<br />

• 8th EDF Economic Diversification Project in Linden . (12, 5 million )<br />

• 8 th EDF Low-income housing 9, 1 million<br />

• 9 th EDF budget support programme (EUR 23.3 million)<br />

21


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Annex 2 – Informants met before the<br />

field mission<br />

ABDUL Yusuf Guyana Sugar Corporation inc.<br />

General Manager, Technical<br />

services<br />

ALLI Ronald Guyana Sugar Corporation inc. Chief Executive Manager<br />

BALGOBIN Tarachand Ministry of Finance Head of NAO office<br />

BARROWS Lunch Guyana Micro-projects programme<br />

Head of association of timber<br />

producers<br />

BOGUSZ<br />

Grazyna<br />

DG EcFin Unit 4 Horizontal<br />

issues and co-ordination of<br />

financial assistance. Development<br />

policy. Links with multilateral<br />

banks.<br />

Economic and financial assistant<br />

for development policy<br />

BRANDT Manfred EC AIDCO Administrator<br />

BURBAN Florence Elections process evaluation / EC Head of mission<br />

CHAMPANHET Bernard<br />

Bio-ethanol study / ACP countries<br />

/ EC<br />

Energy economist<br />

CHAND Komal<br />

Guyana Agri.&General Workers<br />

Union<br />

President<br />

FRASER Neil LEAP PMU<br />

Manager, Business Development<br />

Unit<br />

GAFOOR-CHIN Zorina Ministry of Housing & Water Expert<br />

GARCIA<br />

EuropeAid Unit E.7 Responsable thématique dans le<br />

Manuel<br />

PUERTA<br />

Macro-economic support<br />

secteur des transports<br />

GIRARD Felix NAO Task Force Team Leader<br />

HERLANT Patrick<br />

EuropeAid Unit E.6 Natural Senior officer for operations<br />

ressources<br />

quality support and coordination<br />

HESPEL Evelyne<br />

Programme Manager - Assistant<br />

EuropeAid Unit E.1<br />

Officer - Quality Management<br />

Macro-economic support<br />

Officer<br />

HORN Kevin Guyana Water incorporated Team Leader<br />

JACKSON Nick Guyana Sugar Corporation inc. Chief Executive<br />

LOPEZ Patricia World Bank Country representative<br />

Mc CORMACK Mike Guyana Human Rights association Team Leader<br />

MINASYAN<br />

Charlotte<br />

EuropeAid Unit C2 Geographical<br />

coordination and supervision for<br />

ACPs<br />

Assistant programme manager<br />

MUCI Giampiero<br />

Delegation of the <strong>European</strong><br />

<strong>Commission</strong><br />

Economic section<br />

NORTON Shawn LEAP incubator Tenant<br />

PERMAUL Dindyal Ministry of Agriculture Permanent Secretary<br />

PERSAUD Robert Ministry of Agriculture Minister of Agriculture<br />

SALLMÉN Ritva<br />

Delegation of the <strong>European</strong> Programme manager, Head of<br />

<strong>Commission</strong><br />

economic section<br />

SANKAR Beni Kayman Sankar Group Chief Executive Manager<br />

SHARPE Valérie LEAP PMU Manager, LEAF unit<br />

SIMMONS Coralie Guyana Micro-projects programme Team Leader<br />

SINGH Ashni Ministry of Finance Minister of Finance<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 2 /page 1


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

SURUJBALLY Nisa Guyana Sugar Corporation inc. Marketing director<br />

TERNOY Jacques<br />

Bio-ethanol study / ACP countries<br />

/ EC<br />

Head of mission<br />

VANHELDEN<br />

Bast<br />

DG Dev Unit 1 Relations with the<br />

countries and the region of the<br />

Caribbean and the OCTs<br />

International Relations Officer -<br />

Desk Officer: Jamaica, Belize,<br />

Bahamas, Guyana, Suriname,<br />

Trinidad & Tobago<br />

VARAS OLEA Sergio<br />

Inter-American Development<br />

Bank<br />

WHALEN Kathleen LEAP PMU Team Leader<br />

ZEPHYR Patrick SMEs association President<br />

Country representative<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 2 /page 2


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Annex 3 – Field mission planning &<br />

Informants met<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 3 /page 1


Evaluation of the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>'s<br />

Support to the Republic of Guyana<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Team with<br />

Clem Duncan<br />

Michel Nadon Karolyn Thunissen Virginie Morillon Wim Klaassen<br />

1 - Relevance / 6 - Efficiency 8 - 3C's / 4 - Budget support 7 - CCI / 3 - Private sector support 2 - Sea defences / 5 - MPP<br />

Wed. 10 DEC/DNAO Joint Briefing 9:00 DEC/DNAO Joint Briefing 9:00 DEC/DNAO Joint Briefing 9:00 DEC/DNAO Joint Briefing 9:00<br />

NAO Task Force 11:00 NAO Task Force 11:00 NAO Task Force 11:00 NAO Task Force 11:00<br />

DEC 14:00 DEC 14:00 DEC 14:00 DEC 14:00<br />

Thurs. 11 Mr. Bal Persaud, Director, PSC 11:00 Budget Office 10:00 Mr. Bal Persaud, Director, PSC 11:00<br />

Gail Texira, Acting Presidential Secretariat 14:00 Gail Texira, Acting Presidential Secretariat 14:00 Gail Texira, Acting Presidential Secretariat 14:00 Gail Texira, Acting Presidential Secretariat 14:00<br />

Fri.12<br />

Hon. Mr. Henry Jeffrey, Minister of Foreign<br />

Trade and Int'l Cooperation<br />

Hon. Mr. Harry Narine Nawbatt, Minister of<br />

10.30<br />

Housing & water<br />

Hon. Mr. Henry Jeffrey, Minister of Foreign Trade<br />

11:00<br />

and Int'l Cooperation<br />

Hon. Mr. Harry Narine Nawbatt, Minister of<br />

10.30<br />

Housing & water<br />

Ms. Denise Bereforrd, Prog. Manager, GTA<br />

Mr. George Howard, Sea & River Division 14:00 Ms. Tamara Whalen, World Bank 15:30<br />

Programme<br />

12:00 Mr. George Howard, Sea & River Division 14:00<br />

Mr Amsterdam, SRD 15.00 Felix Girard - Adèle Clark / LEAP 15.00 Mr Amsterdam, SRD 15.00<br />

Bernhard Weihs, TLPMU Housing 16.00 Bernhard Weihs, TLPMU Housing 16.00<br />

Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00<br />

11:00<br />

Saturday 13 Field visit / Sea Defences 7.00-18.00 Hon. Dr. Leslie Ramsammy, Minister of Health 11:00 Field visit / Sea Defences 7.00-18.00 Field visit / Sea Defences 7.00-18.00<br />

Sunday 14 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00<br />

Team with<br />

Clem Duncan<br />

Michel Nadon<br />

1 - Relevance / 6 - Efficiency<br />

Karolyn Thunissen<br />

8 - 3C's / 4 - Budget support<br />

Virginie Morillon<br />

7 - CCI / 3 - Private sector support<br />

Wim Klaassen<br />

2 - Sea defences / 5 - MPP<br />

Hon. Mr. Robeson Benn, Minister of Public<br />

Hon. Mr. Robeson Benn, Minister of Public<br />

Hon. Mr. Robeson Benn, Minister of Public<br />

Hon. Mr. Robeson Benn, Minister of Public<br />

8:00 8:00 8:00<br />

Works<br />

Works<br />

Works<br />

Works<br />

8:00<br />

Monday 15 Adèle Clarke, NAO TF 9.00<br />

Collin Lord, NAO / Rice 10.00 Collin Lord, NAO / Rice 10.00<br />

Mr. Abubarcy Tal, UNDP 14:00 Mr. Abubarcy Tal, UNDP 14:00 Roel Ubbink, TLPMU Sea Defences 11.00<br />

Team meeting 17.00 Team meeting 17.00 Team meeting 17.02 Team meeting 17.00<br />

Tuesday 16<br />

Mrs Whalen, programme Manager, LEAP<br />

Programme<br />

Mrs Whalen, programme Manager, LEAP<br />

10.00 DFID 9.00<br />

Programme<br />

10.00 Mr. Amsterdam, Sea Defences 8.00<br />

Irène Bacchus, Linden Arts & Craft 12.30 Pauline Cummings EC Delegation 10.00 Irène Bacchus, Linden Arts & Craft 12.30 Mr. J. Bhojedat, PMU MPP 9:30<br />

National Drainage Irrigation Authority, Min. of<br />

R. Glasgow, Regional Devlopment Unit 1.30 R. Glasgow, Regional Devlopment Unit 1.30<br />

Agriculture<br />

Farmers Association, Region 10 3.00 Farmers Association, Region 10 3.00<br />

Sebrai Woods 4.00 Sebrai Woods 4.00<br />

Hon. Miss Priya Manickchand, Minister of<br />

Wed. 17 Mayor & Town Council 8.00<br />

Labour,<br />

13:30 Mayor & Town Council 8.00 Mr Ravi Marine, Nat. Drain. & Irr. Auth. 9.00<br />

Hon. Mr. Priya Manickchand, Minister of Labour,<br />

Linden Chamber of Commerce 9.00 ECD Head of Economic section 15.00 Linden Chamber of Commerce 9.00<br />

Human Services and Social Security<br />

13:30<br />

Tourism Association, Region 10 10.00<br />

LEAF Executive officer 11.00 LEAF Executive officer 11.00<br />

Mrs Whalen, programme Manager, LEAF<br />

Mrs Whalen, programme Manager, LEAF<br />

12.00<br />

Programme<br />

Programme<br />

12.00<br />

Toucan Call Centre 14.00 Toucan Call Centre 14.00<br />

Balgit's Demonstration farm 15.00 Balgit's Demonstration farm 15.00<br />

Team meeting 17.00 Team meeting 17.00 Team meeting 17.00 Team meeting 17.00<br />

Briefing meetings preparation 18.00 Briefing meetings preparation 18.00 Briefing meetings preparation 18.00 Briefing meetings preparation 18.00<br />

Team with<br />

Michel Nadon Karolyn Thunissen Virginie Morillon Wim Klaassen<br />

Clem Duncan<br />

1 - Relevance / 6 - Efficiency 8 - 3C's / 4 - Budget support 7 - CCI / 3 - Private sector support 2 - Sea defences / 5 - MPP<br />

Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00 8.00 Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00 Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00<br />

Thursday 18 Mr. Tarachand Balgobin, work meet. 9:00 Mr. Tarachand Balgobin, work meet. 9:00 Mr. Tarachand Balgobin, work meet. 9:00 Mr. Tarachand Balgobin, work meet. 9:00<br />

Hon. Mr. Permaul, PS, Minister of Agriculture 14.00 USAID 13.30 MPP Beneficiaries (Salv. Army & ..) 12.00 Hon. Mr. Permaul, PS, Minister of Agriculture 14.00<br />

Mr. Sergio Varas-Olea, IDB 11.30<br />

EC Delegation, work meeting 15.30 EC Delegation, work meeting 15.30 EC Delegation, work meeting 15.30 EC Delegation, work meeting 15.30<br />

Sonya Roopnauth, Budget office 17.30<br />

Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00<br />

Debriefing meeting preparation 19.00 Debriefing meeting preparation 19.00 Debriefing meeting preparation 19.00 Debriefing meeting preparation 19.00<br />

Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00 Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00 Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00 Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00<br />

Friday 19 DNAO / ECD De-briefing 9:00 DNAO / ECD De-briefing 9:00 DNAO / ECD De-briefing 9:00 DNAO / ECD De-briefing 9:00<br />

Bureau of Statistics 11;30 Mr Amsterdam, SRDD 11.00<br />

Mr Vaugh, SRDD 13.00<br />

ECD, Head of Delegation 16.00 ECD, Head of Delegation 16.00 ECD, Head of Delegation 16.00 ECD, Head of Delegation 16.00<br />

Mr Roel Ubbels, Monitoring Sea Def. 18.00<br />

10.00<br />

Final Report - September 2008


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Annex 4 – Basic economic indicators<br />

Population<br />

Population<br />

(thousands)<br />

Population growth<br />

(%)<br />

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

747 746 748 752 755 757 759 761 763 765 NA<br />

-0.3 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3<br />

Production and prices<br />

Nominal GDP<br />

(G$M)<br />

99.0 106.7 108.0 120.7 130 130.4 137.7 143.8 154.6 157.4 166.2<br />

Annual percentage changes<br />

Real GDP 7.9 6.2 -1.7 3.0 -1.4 2.3 1.1 -0.7 1.6 -2.6 0.7<br />

Real GDP per capita 6.6 5.5 -1.7 1.9 -1.7 1.9 0.8 -1.2 1.3 -2.9 0.4<br />

GDP deflator 3.1 2.7 2.6 12.8 4.3 1.5 3.7 5.4 5.8 4.5 4.9<br />

Consumer prices 7.1 3.6 4.6 7.5 6.1 2.7 5.3 6 4.7 5.0 5.0<br />

(average)<br />

Origin of GDP<br />

As percentage of GDP<br />

Agriculture and 57.8 52.7 50.6 48.7 NA NA NA NA 31.3 NA NA<br />

mining<br />

Manufacturing and 14.9 16.4 14.8 14.8 NA NA NA NA 27.0 NA NA<br />

construction<br />

Services 27.3 30.8 34.6 36.5 NA NA NA NA 41.7 NA NA<br />

National<br />

As percentage of GDP<br />

accounts<br />

Investment 30.0 30.3 28.8 23.4 22.6 20.8 21.6 21.5 22.1 33.2 34.8<br />

Private sector 10.9 12.2 13.4 11.8 8.8 6.8 8.3 6.5 5.7 6.3 6.3<br />

Public sector 19.1 18.1 15.4 11.6 13.8 14 12.6 14.5 16.4 26.9 28.5<br />

National saving 22.3 16.2 15.0 12.6 7.3 2.3 6.2 8.9 10.1 6.7 8.0<br />

Public finances<br />

As percentage of GDP<br />

Revenue 34.6 31.9 30.6 29.9 34.6 32.6 33.4 34.9 37.6 37.2 37.5<br />

Expenditure 39.6 42.6 39.1 36.6 48.4 49.1 52.5 48.4 48.6 62.0 62.4<br />

Overall balance (after<br />

grants, including<br />

HIPC)<br />

1.2 -3.0 -4.8 -1.0 -6.0 -7.1 -8.2 -8.7 -4.4 -15.1 -16.9<br />

Balance of<br />

In millions of US dollars<br />

payments<br />

Current account -33 -63 -56 -50 -82 -96 -66 -47 -30 NA NA<br />

balance<br />

Exports, fob 572 591 545 522 503 485 490 508 584 NA NA<br />

Imports 550 591 553 519 550 541 514 525 598 NA NA<br />

Trade balance 23 0 -8 4 -47 -56 -24 -17 -14 NA NA<br />

Capital account<br />

balance<br />

Financial account<br />

balance<br />

618 24 13 16 16 32 31 44 46 NA NA<br />

-563 100 89 43 94 68 50 34 -39 NA NA<br />

External debt<br />

1352 1329 1198 1130 1124 1095 1145 1217 1140 NA NA<br />

Public debt<br />

outstanding (US$m)<br />

Debt service / 14.1 17.0 18.8 12.4 9.7 6.6 8.9 7.5 5.8 NA NA<br />

exports (%)<br />

Sources: IMF, Guyana Statistical Annex, 2001, PRSP 2002, PRSP Progress report 2005, 2006, World Bank, World<br />

Development Indicators, 2006.<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 4 /page 1


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Annex 5 – International Donor<br />

Cooperation<br />

Table - Donors main sectors of Intervention, 1996-2005<br />

In ms of dollars In per cent<br />

VI.0 Action Relating To Debt 330,49 256,38<br />

United Kingdom 276 84<br />

Germany 26 8<br />

Denmark 6 2<br />

I.5 Government & Civil Society 133,19 10,23<br />

IDB Special Fund 66 50<br />

United States 17 13<br />

United Kingdom 17 13<br />

II.3 Energy 114.33 8.78<br />

IDB Special Fund 73 64<br />

United Kingdom 23 20<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> 18 16<br />

II.1 Transport & Storage 105,73 7.83<br />

IDB Special Fund 104 98<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> 2 2<br />

I.1 Education, Total 101.89 7.83<br />

Canada 36 35<br />

IDB Special Fund 30 29<br />

United Kingdom 15 17<br />

IV.3 Other Multisector 68,94 5,29<br />

IDB Special Fund 48 69<br />

IFAD 10 15<br />

United States 7 9<br />

III.1 Agriculture - Forestry - Fishing, Total 64,99 4.99<br />

IDB Special Fund 60.6 93<br />

V.2 Developmental Food Aid/Food Security 58,50 4,49<br />

Assistance<br />

United States 58 99<br />

V.1 General Budget Support 57.09 4,38<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> 41 72<br />

IDA 12 21<br />

Japan 4 7<br />

I.6 Other Social Infrastructure & Services 54.06 4,15<br />

IDB Special Fund 40.45 75<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> 9 16<br />

Canada 3 6<br />

I.4 Water Supply & Sanitation 45,25 3,47<br />

United Kingdom 40 91<br />

Canada 3 7<br />

I.3 Population Programmes 39,46 3,03<br />

United States 18 47<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 5 /page 1


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

IDA 10 26<br />

GFATM 9 23<br />

IV.1 General Environment Protection 29.42 2,26<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> 25 85<br />

Germany 3 11<br />

I.2 Health, Total 28,90 2,22<br />

Japan 12 42<br />

Canada 7 23<br />

IDB Special Fund 6.5 22<br />

III.2 Industry - Mining - Construction, Total 17,53 1,35<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> 11.8 67<br />

Canada 5.7 33<br />

Other 56.59 3,73<br />

Total 1301.36 100,00<br />

Source: OECD, CRS online database on aid activities.<br />

Note: The numbers in front of the codes are a reference to OECD codes.<br />

IDB<br />

Fund<br />

United<br />

Kingdom<br />

Table - Breakdown of the support of principal donors<br />

to Guyana by DAC sector, 1996-2005<br />

Special<br />

<strong>European</strong><br />

<strong>Commission</strong><br />

Transport Storage (28%), Energy (20%), Government & Civil<br />

Society (18%), Other social Infrastructure and Services (11%),<br />

Other Multi-sector (13%), Education (8%), Health (2%)<br />

Action relating to debt (73%), Water Supply & Sanitation (11%),<br />

Energy (6%), Government & Civil Society (5%), Education<br />

(4%), Other Emergency & Distress Relief (1%)<br />

General Budget Support (33%), General Environment<br />

Protection (20%), Energy (15%), Industry Mining –<br />

Construction (10%), Infrastructure and Services (7%),<br />

Unallocated/Unspecified (6%), Other social Government &<br />

Civil Society (6%), Education (1%), Transport & Storage (1%),<br />

Other Emergency & Distress Relief (1%)<br />

United States Development al Food Aid/Food Security Assistance (52%),<br />

Population Programmes (16%), Government & Civil Society<br />

(15%), Other Multi-sector (6%), Business & Other Services<br />

(4%), Action relating to debt (3%), Banking & Financial Services<br />

(2%), Other social Infrastructure and Services (1%)<br />

Canada<br />

Education (42%), Government & Civil Society (20%), Industry<br />

Mining – Construction (7%), Action relating to debt (7%),<br />

Other social Infrastructure and Services (4%), Water Supply &<br />

Sanitation (4%), Banking & Financial Services (2%), Multisector<br />

(2%), Other Multi-sector (2%), Business & Other<br />

Services (1%), Agriculture – Forestry – Fishing (1%)<br />

IDA General Budget Support (24%), Population Programmes (20%),<br />

Other Emergency & Distress Relief (18%), Business & Other<br />

Services (18%), Action relating to debt (10%), Government &<br />

Civil Society (10%)<br />

Germany<br />

Japan<br />

Action relating to debt (89%), General Environment Protection<br />

(11%)<br />

Health (44%), Unallocated/Unspecified (30%), General Budget<br />

Support (15%)<br />

GFATM Population Programmes (76%), Health (24%)<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 5 /page 2


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

IFAD Other Multi-sector (100%)<br />

Netherlands<br />

Agriculture – Forestry – Fishing (43%), Action relating to debt<br />

(57%)<br />

Denmark Action relating to debt (100%),<br />

UNICEF Population Programmes (61%), Unallocated/Unspecified (39%)<br />

France Education (48%), Action relating to debt (52%)<br />

Norway Action relating to debt (100%)<br />

UNDP Other Multi-sector (100%)<br />

Source: OECD, CRS online database on aid activities.<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 5 /page 3


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Annex 6 - Presentation of the Evaluation<br />

Questions<br />

Within the set of eight Evaluation Questions, one question relates to the overall relevance<br />

of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s interventions (EQ 1), four to their effectiveness, impact and<br />

sustainability in specific areas (EQs 2-3-4-5), one to the overall efficiency of the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong>’s interventions (EQ 6) and the remaining two to wider issues relating to crosscutting<br />

issues (EQ 7) and to Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence<br />

(the "3Cs": EQ 8).<br />

EQ 1 - Relevance of the Strategy – This Question concerns the appropriateness of the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy design to the priorities set by the GoG in its development policy.<br />

The criteria of effectiveness, sustainability and impact of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support to<br />

Guyana’s economic and social sectors will be considered through the four main focal<br />

sectors of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s intervention. These questions are closely related to the<br />

expected effects of the 8 th EDF NIP and the 9 th EDF CSP as identified in the intervention<br />

logic.<br />

EQ 2 – Effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the support to economic and<br />

social infrastructure for the protection of coastal belt population – This EQ assesses<br />

how the <strong>Commission</strong>’s activities have contributed to supporting the rehabilitation of sea<br />

defences as a key sector of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy and interventions. The other<br />

infrastructures relating to water and transport are not included since no resources have<br />

been allocated to their rehabilitation. The rationale or otherwise of this situation is<br />

addressed through EQ 1.<br />

Thus sea defences will be regarded as a major sector of <strong>Commission</strong> support, and special<br />

attention will be given to the strategy developed for this sector and to institutional aspects<br />

bearing on investment in, and sustainable management of, sea defence hardware and<br />

software. Ultimately the extent of attainment of the intended specific impact “Livelihoods<br />

and dwellings of coastal belt population are protected” will be assessed.<br />

EQ 3 – Effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the support to the private sector<br />

for restoration of and increase in production capacity – This EQ assesses how far<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> support to SME development has effectively enhanced the competitiveness of<br />

private sector firms and contributed to sustainable private sector strengthening. Ultimately<br />

the question analyses the specific impact of these interventions on increasing production<br />

capacity.<br />

EQ 4 - Effectiveness, impact and sustainability of interventions for improvement to<br />

social conditions – This EQ aims at estimating the extent to which (general or sector)<br />

Budget support contributed to achieving the PRSP objectives, in particular in terms of<br />

improving social and economic conditions.<br />

EQ 5 - Effectiveness and sustainability of the support to Civil Society organisations<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 6/ page 1


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

for the provision of social benefits to local communities – This EQ assesses the extent<br />

to which interventions through the micro-projects programme have contributed to<br />

empowering Civil Society organisations and to improving the socio-economic conditions<br />

of local communities.<br />

EQ 6 - Efficiency of the overall <strong>Commission</strong> Country Strategy – This EQ assesses<br />

the extent to which the cooperation instruments and the financial, human and technical<br />

resources and processes have been used to achieve the required objectives in a timely and<br />

cost-effective manner. The question also addresses the role and commitment of the NAO<br />

Task Force in this respect. Institutional aspects of Strategy implementation will be<br />

considered in the context of the organisational structures of the GoG, the <strong>Commission</strong> and<br />

the project stakeholders. Issues related to institutional development and strengthening of<br />

capacity to overcome the brain drain problem will also be considered in this section.<br />

EQ 7 - Cross-cutting issues – This EQ seeks to address how far cross-cutting issues<br />

related to good governance and human rights, gender, protection of the environment,<br />

institutional development, capacity building and HIV/AIDS have been taken into account<br />

in the design and implementation of the programmes.<br />

EQ 8 – Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence – This EQ aims at<br />

appraising the extent to which the design and implementation of the <strong>Commission</strong> Strategy<br />

in Guyana has been fostered by appropriate application of the "3Cs" principles. Coherence<br />

applies both between <strong>Commission</strong> policies (in particular trade and CAP) and also in<br />

relation to the programmable (NIP, RIP) vis-à-vis non-programmable instruments (Sysmin,<br />

SAF, Budget Lines). Coordination between the <strong>Commission</strong>, the GoG and the donor<br />

community in designing and implementing its Country Strategy is also considered in the<br />

context of enhancing complementarity between the various programmes. In particular,<br />

coordination mechanisms with the IMF, IDB and WB will be considered.<br />

Given the diversity and financial weight of other instruments in the <strong>Commission</strong>’s<br />

interventions in Guyana, after deeper investigation the evaluation team slightly revised the<br />

intervention logic presented in the Inception Report so as to incorporate instruments<br />

unrelated to the planned strategy but designed to set the <strong>Commission</strong> intervention within<br />

the budget of the indicative programme. These other instruments have been taken into<br />

consideration in EQ 8 for their coherence with the identified strategy, and in EQ 6 to<br />

assess their contribution to the overall efficiency of programme implementation.<br />

Furthermore, interventions funded through these ‘non-programmable’ instruments can<br />

also be considered under EQs (3 and 5) concerned with the intervention sectors which<br />

they are specifically supporting, respectively the private sector and the general or sectoral<br />

budget.<br />

Where in-depth investigation of the documentation was found to necessitate unavoidable<br />

revision of the indicators, their replacement or adaptation is mentioned in the following<br />

section.<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 6/ page 2


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Alignment of EQ with Evaluation Criteria<br />

Relevance<br />

Effectiveness<br />

Impact<br />

Sustainability<br />

Efficiency<br />

Cross-cutting<br />

Issues<br />

3Cs<br />

EQ 1<br />

Relevance<br />

EQ 2<br />

Protection of coastal belt population<br />

EQ 3<br />

Production capacity<br />

EQ 4<br />

Social conditions<br />

EQ 5<br />

Social benefits to local communities<br />

EQ 6<br />

Efficiency of implementation<br />

EQ 7<br />

Cross Cutting Issues<br />

EQ 8<br />

Coordination, Complementarity and<br />

Coherence with other donors<br />

The Evaluation Questions in brief<br />

EQ1:<br />

EQ2:<br />

EQ3:<br />

EQ4:<br />

EQ5:<br />

EQ6:<br />

EQ7:<br />

EQ8:<br />

To what extent is the <strong>Commission</strong> Country Strategy in Guyana consistent with the<br />

priorities set by the GoG in its development policy?<br />

To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to the rehabilitation of<br />

Guyana’s sea defences and ultimately to sustainably protecting the livelihoods and<br />

dwellings of the coastal belt population?<br />

To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to private sector strengthening<br />

and ultimately to sustainably restoring and increasing Guyana’s production capacity?<br />

To what extent has <strong>Commission</strong> budget support contributed to the improvement of social<br />

conditions?<br />

To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to empowering Civil Society<br />

Organisations and ultimately to improving the socio-economic conditions of local<br />

communities?<br />

To what extent have the financial, human and technical resources been used to reach<br />

objectives in a timely and cost-effective manner and was the regulatory and administrative<br />

framework appropriate for doing this? To what extent has the support to the NAO Task<br />

Force contributed to reaching objectives in a timely and cost-effective manner?<br />

To what extent were cross-cutting issues related to good governance and human rights,<br />

gender, environment, institutional development, capacity-building and HIV/AIDS taken<br />

into account in the design and implementation of the programmes?<br />

To what extent has the <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana been fostered by the consideration<br />

of the “3Cs” principles?<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 6/ page 3


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

EQ1 : Relevance<br />

To what extent is the <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana consistent with the priorities set by<br />

the GoG in its development policy?<br />

Justification and coverage of the question: This question firstly aims at understanding if and how the<br />

overall and specific objectives and the design of the <strong>Commission</strong> co-operation with Guyana reflect the<br />

priorities of the partner country and adequately addresses the constraints of the country in order for it to<br />

achieve its national objectives. It also examines to what extent the evolution from the 8 th EDF NIP to the 9 th<br />

EDF CSP is consistent with the evolution of the National Strategy from the medium term Policy Framework<br />

Papers geared towards macroeconomic stabilisation, adjustment and consolidation during the first period<br />

under observation, to the focus on poverty reduction in the PRSP during the second period.<br />

Utility: This question on relevance will assess the extent to which the right strategic choices were made at<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> level regarding the priorities expressed in the National Strategy.<br />

Criterion: Relevance.<br />

Feasibility: The question will be answered mostly on the basis of written material. The Question is<br />

challenging as it encompasses different elements of <strong>Commission</strong> support, NIP, RIP, compensation schemes<br />

(esp. Sysmin) and specific Budget Lines, over a ten-year period (with important recent changes in the design<br />

and implementation modalities of some of these instruments).<br />

Judgment criteria<br />

• JC 1.1 - The<br />

<strong>Commission</strong>’s Strategy<br />

objectives are coherent<br />

with those of the GoG’s<br />

medium term policy<br />

strategies<br />

• JC 1.2 – The<br />

<strong>Commission</strong>’s<br />

intervention logic,<br />

programming and choice<br />

of beneficiaries are<br />

coherent with the GoG<br />

priorities in its<br />

development strategy<br />

Sources of information:<br />

• 8 th EDF NIP<br />

• 9 th EDF CSP<br />

• Policy Framework Papers (1996-1998; 1998-2002)<br />

• National Development Strategy (NDS)<br />

• PRSP (2002-2005)<br />

• Sectoral policy documents<br />

• Diagnostic studies<br />

Indicators<br />

• I 1.1.1 – Degree of alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> objectives<br />

(NIP/CSP) to Guyana’s development policy objectives as expressed in<br />

its NDS, the 1996-1998 Policy Framework Paper and the 2002 PRSP<br />

at general level<br />

• I 1.1.2 – Degree of alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> objectives<br />

(NIP/CSP) and Guyana’s sector policy objectives as expressed in<br />

sector policy documents (infrastructure, health, housing, private<br />

sector).<br />

• I 1.2.1 – Degree of alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> priorities (NIP/CSP<br />

and non-programmable tools) and Guyana’s development strategy<br />

priorities as expressed in sector policy documents (infrastructure,<br />

health, housing, private sector)<br />

• I.1.2.2 – Explicit reference in the <strong>Commission</strong> strategic documents<br />

(NIP/CSP and non-programmable tools) to their adherence to the<br />

prioritised public expenditure identified in the medium term<br />

expenditure framework (MTEF) and to the prioritised donor support<br />

identified as required in the medium term.<br />

• I.1.2.3 – Explicit reference in the <strong>Commission</strong> strategic documents<br />

(NIP/CSP and non-programmable tools) to their adherence to<br />

prioritised investment programming<br />

• I 1.2.4 – Explicit reference in the <strong>Commission</strong> strategic documents<br />

(NIP/CSP and non-programmable tools) to their adherence to target<br />

the beneficiaries identified as the target population in Guyana’s<br />

development strategy.<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 6/ page 4


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

EQ2 : Protection of coastal belt population<br />

To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to the rehabilitation of<br />

Guyana’s sea defences and ultimately to sustainably protecting the livelihoods and<br />

dwellings of the coastal belt population?<br />

Justification and coverage of the question: Support to sea defences has been a major feature of the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong>’s cooperation programmes with Guyana since the 4 th EDF and most resources have been<br />

directed towards this in the 8 th and 9 th EDFs. The NIP and CSP justify the large investments in sea defence<br />

structures by the fact that the coastal area (much of which is situated below sea level) houses the majority of<br />

Guyana’s population and sustains much economic activity, in particular rice and sugar cane culture. The main<br />

question pertaining to this highly capital-intensive support relates to the sustainability of the rehabilitated<br />

infrastructures, with particular regard to institutional and financial aspects.<br />

Utility: The question focuses on the effectiveness of the support to sea defence infrastructure and the<br />

sustainability and impact of these infrastructures in the longer term, and also in terms of institutional<br />

improvements.<br />

Criteria: effectiveness, impact, sustainability.<br />

Feasibility: Existing documentation will facilitate adequate coverage of the question relating to sea defences,<br />

including aspects of impact and measures adopted to ensure sustainability. This information will be<br />

complemented by interviews.<br />

Judgment criteria<br />

• JC 2.1 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />

interventions were in line<br />

with the CSP/NIP strategy<br />

• JC 2.2 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />

intervention has contributed<br />

to the rehabilitation of<br />

Guyana’s sea defences<br />

• JC 2.3 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />

intervention has contributed<br />

to the setting up of a<br />

sustainable sea defence<br />

management<br />

and<br />

maintenance system<br />

• JC 2.4 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />

support to infrastructure has<br />

enabled the protection of<br />

livelihoods and dwellings of<br />

the coastal belt population<br />

Indicators<br />

• I 2.1.1 – Degree of alignment of the programme’s IL with the IL of<br />

the NIP/CSP<br />

• I 2.1.2 – Discrepancies between the programmes and the strategy<br />

are explicitly justified<br />

• I 2.1.3 – ‘Impact on livelihoods’ of sea defence programmes has<br />

been well formulated and placed in the IL<br />

• I 2.2.1 – Km of sea defences in critical condition rehabilitated by<br />

the <strong>Commission</strong> interventions as a share of the total no. of km<br />

rehabilitated during the period<br />

• I 2.2.2 – Km of prioritised tranches of sea defences in critical<br />

condition rehabilitated by the <strong>Commission</strong> interventions as a share<br />

of the total no. of km of prioritised tranches rehabilitated during the<br />

period<br />

• I 2.2.3 – The sea defence infrastructure has been constructed in<br />

accordance to the approved design and technical specifications<br />

• I 2.3.1 – The capacity to monitor water levels in view of flood risks<br />

and conditions at the seafront by local stakeholders.<br />

• I 2.3.2 – Number of contingency plans for higher tide levels<br />

• I 2.3.3 – Sea defence management systems and related staff capacity<br />

have been established and are effective<br />

• I 2.3.4 – Sea defence routine maintenance and repair staff capacity<br />

has been established and is effective<br />

• I 2.3.5 – National budget provision for maintenance and operation<br />

of the sea defence systems<br />

• I 2.3.6 – Evidence of beneficiary - in particular household -<br />

involvement in management and maintenance of the established<br />

structures.<br />

• I 2.4.1 – Evidence that the pursuit of maximum impact on the<br />

livelihoods and dwellings of the coastal belt population has been a<br />

selection criteria in identifying the infrastructures rehabilitated<br />

(studies, public consultations)<br />

• I 2.4.2 – Acreage under cultivation in coastal areas protected<br />

• I 2.4.3 – Number of dwellings in coastal areas protected<br />

• I 2.4.4 - Number of very small enterprises or estimated size of<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

informal productive activities in coastal areas protected<br />

• I 2.4.5 - Evidence that the value of property and land in the coastal<br />

belt has increased due to greater flood control<br />

Sources of information:<br />

• NIP/CSP<br />

• GoG sectoral strategies<br />

• Programme documents: FA<br />

• Feasibility studies, project documents (financing proposals), project monitoring and completion reports,<br />

project evaluation reports.<br />

• Transport sector strategy<br />

• Transport maintenance plan<br />

• National Sector Policy on sea defences<br />

• Water supply and sanitation strategy<br />

• Water tariff studies<br />

• National budget allocations for infrastructure sector (operating and investment expenditure) 1995-2005<br />

• National Sector Policy on sea defences<br />

• Project completion reports and project evaluation reports<br />

• Living conditions surveys<br />

• Agricultural surveys<br />

• Housing surveys<br />

• Beneficiary surveys<br />

• Interviews with <strong>Commission</strong>, NAO Task Force, GoG, national institutions and companies, private<br />

organisations and entrepreneurs, representatives of the civil society, technical assistance and PMUs<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

EQ3: Production capacity<br />

To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to private sector strengthening<br />

and ultimately to sustainably restoring and increasing Guyana’s production capacity?<br />

Justification and coverage of the question: Under the 8 th EDF, in line with the GoG’s priority of<br />

facilitating private-sector-led growth, the <strong>Commission</strong> proposed support for SME development, in particular<br />

enhancement of SMEs’ ability to face competition in internal and external markets. Implementation focused<br />

on establishment of business advisory services and financial services (funded from Sysmin resources in the<br />

Linden area) and on the setting up and running of a training agency. The evaluation will assess to what extent<br />

these initiatives contributed to strengthening the private sector, taking account of the best practices identified<br />

in PSD Evaluation, what impact they might have had on restoring and increasing Guyana’s productive<br />

capacity, and to what extent the effects achieved (are likely to) last after the intervention 1 .<br />

Utility: The question will seek to assess the effectiveness of the support provided, its impact in the context of<br />

the objective pursued and the actual or likely sustainability of the effects achieved.<br />

Criteria: Effectiveness, impact and sustainability.<br />

Feasibility: The assessment will to a large extent depend on the availability of indicators that allow<br />

measurement of improvements in terms of private sector development.<br />

Judgment criteria<br />

• JC 3.1 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />

interventions were in line<br />

with the CSP/NIP strategy<br />

• JC 3.2 – Interventions in<br />

Guyana are in line with the<br />

best practices identified in<br />

PSD Evaluation<br />

• JC 3.3 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />

support to private sector<br />

development in Business<br />

Development Services (BDS)<br />

has been conducive to<br />

enhanced SME activity<br />

• JC 3.4 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />

support to private sector<br />

development in financial<br />

services has been conducive<br />

to increased SME activity<br />

• JC 3.5 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />

support to private sector<br />

development in training has<br />

been conducive to increased<br />

SME competitiveness<br />

Indicators<br />

• I 3.1.1 – Degree of alignment of the programmes IL with the IL of<br />

the NIP/CSP<br />

• I 3.1.2 – Discrepancies between the programmes and the strategy<br />

are explicitly justified<br />

• I 3.1.3 - Degree of alignment of <strong>Commission</strong> interventions with the<br />

NDS and the National Competitiveness Strategy for Guyana<br />

• I 3.2.1 – Evidence that a methodological procedure has been<br />

adopted to select the areas of intervention to support PSD in<br />

Guyana<br />

• I 3.2.2 – Evidence that the key constraints conditioning success in<br />

the areas of intervention have been addressed<br />

• I 3.2.3 – Evidence that coherence & complementarities between<br />

areas of intervention has been maximized<br />

• I 3.3.1 – Market for business services increased<br />

• I 3.3.2 – Number of local market SME beneficiaries<br />

• I.3.3.3 – Evidence of encouragement of know-how and<br />

technologies & support to cooperation between industry and<br />

scientific research<br />

• I 3.3.4 – Evidence of the impact of BDS on SME competitiveness<br />

• I 3.4.1 – Number of beneficiary SME<br />

• I 3.4.2 – Volume of financing<br />

• I 3.4.3 – Quality of the financing (recovery rate)<br />

• I 3.4.4 – Economic activities targeted by LEAF<br />

• I 3.4.5 – Evidence of the impact of financial services on SME<br />

competitiveness<br />

• I 3.5.1 – Number of beneficiary enterprises<br />

• I 3.5.2 – Number of trained people<br />

• I3.5.3 – Evidence of the impact of training on SME<br />

competitiveness<br />

1 The Desk and Field Phases and the review of the findings of the PSD evaluation led the team to revise some of the<br />

JC and I of EQ 3. The new JC and I will allow the team to better assess the enhancement of private sector<br />

competitiveness through EC interventions as they focus on three areas of interventions evaluated in the PSD<br />

evaluation: business development services, financial services, and training.<br />

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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

• JC 3.6 – Results achieved by<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> support are<br />

maintained after the end of<br />

its direct support<br />

• JC 3.7 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />

support to private sector<br />

strengthening has<br />

contributed to restoring and<br />

increasing Guyana’s<br />

productive capacity<br />

• I 3.6.1 – Explicit reference in the FA to measures to ensure<br />

sustainability<br />

• I 3.6.2 – Evidence that the benefits continue to be used after the<br />

end of the intervention<br />

• I 3.7.1 – Evidence of increased production capacity and private<br />

sector activity:<br />

- increased number of new firms, including SMEs<br />

- higher employment levels<br />

- higher production levels<br />

- increased volume and value of non-traditional exports<br />

• I 3.7.2 - Evidence of increased private sector investments relative to<br />

public investments<br />

• I 3.7.3 – Evidence of increased private capital inflows (foreign<br />

direct investment and remittances)<br />

• I 3.7.4 – Number of bankruptcy filings and number of new SMEs<br />

per year.<br />

• I 3.7.5 - Existence of new SME-friendly regulations and specific<br />

measures to enhance private sector investments in the productive<br />

sectors<br />

• I.3.7.6 – Testimonies of Guyanese officials on the impacts of<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> support on Guyana’s productive capacity<br />

Sources of information:<br />

• NIP/CSP<br />

• GoG sectoral strategies<br />

• Programme documents: FA<br />

• Sector strategy<br />

• National accounts<br />

• Balance of payments<br />

• Surveys and studies of private sector activities<br />

• Chamber of Commerce and Industry<br />

• Employment data per sector<br />

• Emigration data<br />

• Evaluation of <strong>Commission</strong> support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries, December 2005<br />

• Interviews with beneficiary enterprises & Guyanese officials<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

EQ4: Social conditions<br />

To what extent has <strong>Commission</strong> Budget Support contributed to the improvement of public<br />

finance management and to the improvement of social conditions?<br />

Justification and coverage of the question: The <strong>Commission</strong> extended Budget Support to Guyana under<br />

the 8 th and 9 th EDFs, and whilst implementation modalities evolved from targeted Budget Support to general<br />

Budget Support, all programmes focused on improving public finance management and securing levels of<br />

budget expenditure facilitating improvements in Guyana’s social conditions, especially in health and housing.<br />

The question will assess the extent to which the <strong>Commission</strong>’s Budget Support has succeeded in improving<br />

Guyana’s budgeting planning, systems and scope and whether this has been translated into increased and<br />

sustainable public expenditure levels in the social sectors which have in turn led to improved use of social<br />

services and improved social conditions. The use of Budget Support is also an important tool for<br />

<strong>Commission</strong>-partner dialogue and the evolution of the quality of this dialogue will also be assessed.<br />

Utility: This question addresses the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of Budget Support in attaining<br />

the PRSP objectives.<br />

Criteria: Effectiveness, impact and sustainability.<br />

Feasibility: The effectiveness criteria can be verified at the hand of existing documentation and data;<br />

however, the assessment of impact criteria will depend upon availability of appropriate data. The issue of the<br />

quality of policy dialogue might be difficult to verify for the earlier period because of staff turn-over and<br />

depends very much on the willingness of interlocutors to provide their views on the subject.<br />

Judgment criteria<br />

• JC 4.1 – The use of Budget<br />

Support has enabled the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> to engage in a<br />

dialogue with the GoG<br />

regarding PRSP design and<br />

implementation.<br />

Indicators<br />

• I 4.1.1 – Frequency and quality of meetings between GoG and<br />

DEC on macro-economic, fiscal and poverty reduction strategy<br />

issues<br />

• I 4.1.2 – Evidence of changes in GoG strategy following policy<br />

dialogue with <strong>Commission</strong><br />

• I 4.1.3 – Participation and role of <strong>Commission</strong> in donor-wide<br />

discussions on public finance management issues and PRSP<br />

• JC 4.2 - The use of BS has<br />

contributed to improving the<br />

government’s planning and<br />

budgetary system including<br />

its public finance<br />

management capacity.<br />

• I.4.2.1 - Budget planning has improved and the budget is more<br />

realistic<br />

• I.4.2.2 - The budget is prepared with due regard to government<br />

policy<br />

• I.4.2.3 - The predictability of the budget has improved<br />

• JC 4.3 – BS has contributed<br />

to establishing sustainable<br />

levels of public expenditure<br />

in the social sectors<br />

• JC 4.4 – The GoG is carrying<br />

out planned expenditures.<br />

• I 4.3.1 – Trends in budgeted and realised expenditure in social<br />

sectors<br />

• I.4.3.2 – Funding mechanisms are in place for maintenance and<br />

operation of social infrastructure<br />

• I 4.4.1 – Evolution of external account balance and budget balance<br />

as share of GDP<br />

• I 4.4.2 – Public expenditure outcomes: budget execution in the<br />

social sectors, in particular pro-poor expenditure<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

• JC 4.5 – Social conditions<br />

have improved<br />

Sources of information:<br />

• GoG Budget and budget execution<br />

• National accounts and financial data<br />

• Central Bank<br />

• Social sector reviews<br />

• PRSP joint donor assessments<br />

• PRSP annual monitoring reports<br />

• Minutes of meetings<br />

• Cost recovery mechanisms in health and education sectors<br />

• Living conditions surveys<br />

• IDD and Associates, Evaluation of GBS, May 2006<br />

• Interviews (<strong>Commission</strong>, GoG-NAO and donors)<br />

• I 4.5.1 – Performance of PRSP indicators measuring access to<br />

health, housing and water such as infant immunisation rates<br />

(measles and DPT), % of population with access to health services,<br />

% of population with access to adequate sanitation, house lots<br />

distributed, land/house titles distributed.<br />

• I 4.5.2 – Quality of available social services<br />

• I 4.5.3 – Living conditions<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

EQ5: Social benefits to local communities<br />

To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to empowering Civil Society<br />

organisations and ultimately to improving the socio-economic conditions of local<br />

communities?<br />

Justification and coverage of the question:<br />

The 9 th EDF CSP identifies MPP as one of the three activities to be financed outside the areas of<br />

concentration. During the period under evaluation, one MPP (9 ACP 1) has been financed and is currently<br />

under implementation. The financing agreement was signed in May 2004 for an amount of €4m for a<br />

duration of 5 years.<br />

The question is closely linked with the intervention logic that stipulates that MPP should first contribute to<br />

empowering Civil Society and subsequently improve the socio-economic conditions of local communities.<br />

The question will examine to what extent the programme is likely to yield the expected results and the role it<br />

has played in providing social benefits to communities.<br />

Utility: MPP is part of the intervention logic of <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana but as the programme<br />

started only recently the assessment will focus mostly on the design and the programming. Effectiveness,<br />

impact and sustainability would only be assessed in respect of their potential.<br />

Criteria: Effectiveness, impact and sustainability<br />

Feasibility: Because the implementation of the MPP is so recent, it is assumed that documentation and<br />

institutional memory are easily accessible. Nevertheless the programme having only started in 2005, only its<br />

potential effectiveness and impact would probably be assessed as it is possible that only small effects will yet be<br />

visible.<br />

Judgment criteria<br />

• JC 5.1 – <strong>Commission</strong> intervention was in<br />

line with the CSP/NIP provision and with<br />

the GoG policy<br />

• JC 5.2 – Local communities have better<br />

access to socio-economic infrastructure<br />

• JC 5.3 – The capacity for self-help of local<br />

communities has increased<br />

• JC 5.4 – Civil Society organisations<br />

participate more in the development<br />

process<br />

Indicators<br />

• I 5.1.1 – Degree of alignment of the programmes IL<br />

with the IL of the NIP/CSP<br />

• I 5.1.2 – Discrepancies between the programmes and<br />

the strategy are explicitly justified<br />

• I 5.1.3 - Degree of alignment of the programme with<br />

the GoG policy<br />

• I 5.4.1 – Clear reference in the programming<br />

document to the promotion of socio-economic<br />

development of local communities<br />

• I 5.4.2 - New socio-economic services are available in<br />

the communities supported<br />

• I 5.3.1 – Evidence that MPP is conceived to be<br />

undertaken at the request of local communities<br />

• I 5.3.2 – Clear reference to participation of local<br />

communities in the programming documents<br />

• I 5.3.3 – Evidence that MPP is based on needs<br />

assessment undertaken by local communities<br />

• I 5.3.4 – Evidence that an adequate level of capacity<br />

building investment has been foreseen in the<br />

programme<br />

• I 5.3.5 – Evidence that local communities benefited<br />

from capacity-building<br />

• I 5.4.1 – Evidence of local development process<br />

weaknesses in policy papers<br />

• I 5.4.2 – Clear reference to this objective in the<br />

programming documents<br />

• I 5.4.3 – Measures to ensure the strengthening of civil<br />

society are in place<br />

• I 5.4.4 - Extent to which the MP-Office/Board<br />

implemented and facilitated MP development and<br />

cooperation with civil society<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

• JC 5.5 - Results achieved by <strong>Commission</strong><br />

support are maintained after the end of its<br />

direct support<br />

• I 5.5.1 – Explicit reference in the FA to measures to<br />

ensure sustainability<br />

• I 5.5.2 – Evidence that the benefits continue to be<br />

used after the end of the intervention<br />

Sources of information:<br />

• NIP & CSP<br />

• Project documents (FA, MR, Annual Reports, Internal Monitoring, Evaluation…)<br />

• Interviews with local communities/organisations supported<br />

• Interviews with beneficiaries (population)<br />

• Evaluation of <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> support to Micro-Project Programmes under the <strong>European</strong><br />

Development Fund in ACP countries, August 2006<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

EQ6: Efficiency of implementation<br />

To what extent have the financial, human and technical resources been used to reach<br />

objectives in a timely and cost-effective manner and was the regulatory and administrative<br />

framework appropriate for doing this? To what extent has the support to the NAO Task<br />

Force contributed to reaching objectives in a timely and cost-effective manner?<br />

Justification and coverage of the question: The question aims at assessing to what extent deadlines were<br />

respected and resources used in an optimal manner when implementing the interventions. It also aims at<br />

examining whether the regulatory and administrative framework has been conducive to timely and costeffective<br />

programme implementation. Specific attention will be dedicated to the support to the NAO, as<br />

specific interventions were planned in this respect and the planned activities also aimed at increasing<br />

efficiency.<br />

Utility: The present question is complementary to the questions on effectiveness. Indeed, it is important not<br />

only to determine to what extent objectives have been reached, but also to examine whether or not objectives<br />

were reached at a reasonable cost and within reasonable deadlines. The question is also useful for determining<br />

the role the support for the NAO has played in this respect.<br />

Criterion: Efficiency<br />

Feasibility: Measuring cost-effectiveness is challenging in the absence of precise data. There might be some<br />

difficulties in collecting sufficient reliable data especially for the period 1996-2002. Where quantitative data<br />

are lacking, assessments will be based on qualitative approaches based on evaluations, monitoring reports or<br />

interviews.<br />

Judgment criteria<br />

• JC 6.1 – The institutional<br />

set-up foresees a clear<br />

distribution of roles at each<br />

level of project<br />

implementation,<br />

design to closure<br />

from<br />

• JC 6.2 – The financial<br />

instruments used for<br />

implementation contribute<br />

to reaching objectives in a<br />

timely manner<br />

• JC 6.3 – The institutional<br />

support to <strong>Commission</strong><br />

projects is improved<br />

through the NAO Task<br />

Force<br />

• JC 6.4 – Programme and<br />

projects are implemented in<br />

a timely manner and at<br />

planned cost<br />

Indicators<br />

• I 6.1.1 – Evidence of organizational structure and management<br />

culture through well-defined procedures and job roles in particular at<br />

NAO Task Force level, at DEC level and at project level<br />

• I 6.1.2 – Degree of appropriateness of the organizational structure (in<br />

particular at NAO, DEC and project level) to (i) the country’s<br />

capacity and constraints, (ii) to the <strong>Commission</strong>’s available resources<br />

and (iii) the scope and size of the programmes and projects<br />

• I 6.1.3 – Evidence of emphasis on conformity in the whole<br />

organization in particular at NAO, DEC and project level<br />

• I 6.1.4 – Emphasis on timely and cost-effective management in<br />

particular at NAO and DEC levels.<br />

• I 6.1.5 – Existence of co-ordination mechanisms among<br />

implementation actors (consultations, coordination working groups)<br />

• I 6.2.1 – Number and amount of global commitments and financing<br />

agreements by sector<br />

• I 6.2.2 – Types of financing agreements: number and amounts of<br />

contracts, grants, programme estimates by direct labour operations or<br />

externalised direct labour operations<br />

• I 6.2.3 – Types of procedures laid down in the financing agreements<br />

(i.e. according to financing thresholds)<br />

• I 6.2.4 – Delays and rates of disbursements by financing agreement<br />

• I 6.3.1 – List of new management tools in place in the NAO task<br />

force (retro-planning, support to projects…)<br />

• I 6.3.2 – Perception of NAO Task Force, <strong>Commission</strong> task managers<br />

and programme managers on the effects of the support to the NAO<br />

and on the overall efficiency of interventions, in terms of time<br />

management and cost-effectiveness.<br />

• I 6.4.1 - Average MR efficiency rate<br />

• I 6.4.2 – Project evaluation conclusions on efficiency<br />

• I.6.4.3 – Identification of implementation difficulties that are not due<br />

to deficiencies in financial, human and technical resources or to the<br />

regulatory and administrative set-up<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Sources of information:<br />

• GoG financial, technical and administrative procedures<br />

• EDF procedures<br />

• Monitoring Reports<br />

• Mid-term, final evaluation reports<br />

• CRIS database<br />

• National counterparts<br />

• Documents from and interviews with the NAO<br />

• Documents from and interviews with the DCE representatives<br />

• Interviews with <strong>Commission</strong> staff (HQ, DEC), NAO Task Force, ministries, projects team leaders<br />

• Interviews with:<br />

- NAO task force<br />

- <strong>Commission</strong> task managers<br />

- <strong>Commission</strong> financial and contract unit of the DEC<br />

- Programme staff<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

EQ7: Cross-Cutting Issues<br />

To what extent were cross-cutting issues (CCIs) relating to good governance and human<br />

rights, gender, environment, institutional development, capacity building and HIV/AIDS<br />

taken into account for the design and implementation of the programmes?<br />

Justification and coverage of the question: The question will cover five issues that the <strong>Commission</strong> has<br />

committed to take systematically into account in its different areas of cooperation. Good governance entails,<br />

according to the Cotonou agreement (art 9.3), “clear decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities,<br />

transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources and capacity<br />

building for elaborating and implementing measures aiming in particular at prevention and combating corruption”. Respect for<br />

human rights is a clear condition of good governance. Gender issues will be considered “as the elimination of<br />

inequalities and the promotion of equality between men and women” (Treaty establishing the EC (Part 1 – Art. 3.2).<br />

Environment issues are related to sustainable development. Institutional development and capacity-building<br />

is clearly recognised as a CCI in the Cotonou Agreement. HIV/AIDS is not a classical CCI but in recent<br />

years mainstreaming of this issue has been taken into account in countries with high prevalence of<br />

HIV/AIDS. (Guyana HIV/AIDS prevalence is relatively high-medium (Population 17-49: 2.4%- 2005<br />

UNDP).<br />

Utility: This question aims to verify the application of CCI in <strong>Commission</strong> interventions in Guyana. The<br />

utility of this question goes further than the Guyanese context given the high potential of the question to<br />

draw out transferable lessons regarding the manner in which CCI have been taken into account during<br />

implementation.<br />

Criteria: Cross-cutting issues<br />

Feasibility: JC 7.1 depends on the availability of programme documentation. As previously mentioned, the<br />

1996-2002 documentation might be not available. JC 7.2 will use information from the ROM obtained<br />

through a specific request to the ROM contractors, as this information appears to be not readily available in<br />

the <strong>Commission</strong>.<br />

Judgment criteria<br />

• JC 7.1 – CCI have been taken into account in the<br />

CSP and the NIP and in the design of<br />

programmes (non-specific interventions)<br />

Indicators<br />

• I 7.1.1 – Extent to which the CSP and the NIP<br />

explicitly promote CCI<br />

• I 7.1.2 – Number of projects per CCI that<br />

explicitly identify measures on CCI at the<br />

project design stage<br />

• I 7.1.3 – Number and list of specific<br />

interventions planned by CCI<br />

• JC 7.2 – Measures identified during design for<br />

inclusion of CCI in non-specific interventions are<br />

in place<br />

• JC 7.3 – Cross-cutting issues have also been<br />

supported by specific interventions<br />

• JC 7.4 – <strong>Commission</strong> interventions have<br />

contributed to advancement of the CCIs in the<br />

country<br />

• I 7.2.1 – Percentage of measures in place as<br />

planned<br />

• I 7.2.2 – Perception of direct beneficiaries of<br />

the CCI<br />

• I 7.3.1 – Number of specific interventions on<br />

CCIs out of all the interventions of the period<br />

• I 7.4.1 – Evolution of respect for human rights<br />

• I 7.4.2 – Corruption rates<br />

• I 7.4.3 – Evolution of gender-friendly policies<br />

and laws<br />

• I 7.4.4 – Evolution of gender-sensitive<br />

indicators (education, health, employment)<br />

• I 7.4.5 – Evolution of environment-friendly<br />

policies and laws<br />

• I 7.4.6 – Evolution of percentage of technical<br />

assistants<br />

• I 7.4.7 – Evolution of HIV/AIDS prevalence<br />

rates<br />

• I 7.4.8 - Testimonies of Guyanese officials on<br />

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Sources of information:<br />

• Treaty establishing the EC (Title XX, art 177, Part 1 art. 3.2)<br />

• Lomé IV Convention (art.4)<br />

• <strong>European</strong> Consensus on Development (3.3 - 101)<br />

• Programme documents (FA, MR, Annual Reports, Monitoring reports)<br />

• Interviews with project managers and staff<br />

• Interviews with Guyanese officials<br />

the linkage of the evolution of the CCI in the<br />

country with <strong>Commission</strong> interventions<br />

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EQ8: Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence with other donors<br />

To what extent has <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana been fostered by consideration of the<br />

3Cs?<br />

Justification and coverage of the question:<br />

This question seeks to verify how far the “3Cs” – Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence - have<br />

been taken into account and what have been the effects of their application or non-application.<br />

On the question of coherence, this question seeks to investigate to what extent the individual elements of<br />

the policy mix implemented in Guyana have been coherent and mutually reinforcing in terms of attaining the<br />

stated objectives of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support to Guyana and to what extent they have affected this Strategy.<br />

This question will investigate the trade agreements (sugar, rice, rum), the CAP policies, the programmable<br />

national and regional financial instruments and the non-programmable financial instruments (Sysmin, SAF<br />

and Budget Lines).<br />

As regards coordination and complementarity, this question seeks to determine whether the <strong>Commission</strong><br />

has used coordination mechanisms (government-donor, government-<strong>Commission</strong> and <strong>Commission</strong>-other<br />

donors) in Guyana to develop a coordinated approach to its interventions at country and sector levels and<br />

whether this has led to complementarity of actions undertaken.<br />

The question covers both programming and implementation (including alignment of procedures, monitoring<br />

and evaluation of the <strong>Commission</strong> interventions).<br />

Utility: The answer to this question will provide insights into the extent to which coherence between<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> policies, and coordination and complementarity with other multi-donor support, have<br />

contributed to improving the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support.<br />

Criteria: Coordination, Complementarity, Coherence<br />

Feasibility: The question is challenging. First it encompasses different elements of the <strong>Commission</strong> policy<br />

mix, including foremost the CAP, trade agreements (sugar, rice, rum), compensation schemes (esp. Sysmin)<br />

and specific Budget Lines, over a ten-year period (with important recent changes in the design and<br />

implementation modalities of some of these instruments). Therefore it is essential to specify clearly the scope<br />

of the question as expressed in the JC and I below. Second, obtaining answers to questions related to<br />

coordination during the design phase relies partly on institutional memory which might be jeopardised by<br />

unavailability of written documentation and high turnover of staff in the earlier period (1996-2000).<br />

Implementation questions will be answered on the basis of written materials (meeting notes, DEC files, MR)<br />

and on interviews.<br />

Judgment criteria<br />

• JC 8.1 – The <strong>Commission</strong><br />

has designed its NIP/CSP<br />

taking full account of other<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> policies and<br />

trade<br />

potentially<br />

Guyana<br />

agreements<br />

affecting<br />

• JC 8.2 - The <strong>Commission</strong><br />

has designed its NIP/CSP<br />

taking full account of the<br />

resources potentially<br />

available under nonprogrammable<br />

support<br />

(namely Sysmin and<br />

Budget Lines) and the RIP<br />

Indicators<br />

• I 8.1.1 – Extent to which the design takes into account the results of<br />

specific analyses of resources available to Guyana under the trade<br />

agreements (sugar, rice, rum) and of their potential uses<br />

• I 8.1.2 – Integration of these potential resources in the GoG balance<br />

of payments projections and financing gap projections<br />

• I 8.2.1 – Extent to which the design takes into account the results of<br />

specific analyses of resources available to Guyana under Sysmin,<br />

specific Budget Lines and the RIP, and their potential use.<br />

• I 8.2.2 – Integration of potential resources available under the<br />

compensation schemes and under <strong>Commission</strong> interventions in the<br />

GoG’s balance of payments projections and financing gap<br />

projections.<br />

• I 8.2.3 – Existence of a dialogue within the different <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Services on the expected impact of the various elements of the policy<br />

mix on implementation of activities and achievement of NIP/CSP<br />

objectives.<br />

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• JC 8.3 – Activities<br />

programmed under the<br />

CSP/NIP have been<br />

redesigned to remain<br />

coherent with actions<br />

implemented under other<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> policies and<br />

instruments.<br />

• JC 8.4 – The <strong>Commission</strong><br />

has built its intervention<br />

strategy in close<br />

coordination with the<br />

GoG and other donors<br />

• JC 8.5 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />

activities are implemented<br />

in full coordination with<br />

GoG and other donors on<br />

interventions in the same<br />

area<br />

• I 8.3.1 – Existence of a dialogue within the different <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Services on the impact of the various elements of the policy mix on<br />

implementation of activities and achievement of NIP/CSP objectives<br />

• I 8.3.2 – Evidence of changes in planned activities and/or scope of<br />

financial intervention under the NIP/CSP following unforeseen<br />

changes in resources or implementation modalities linked to other<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> policies and instruments<br />

• I 8.4.1 – Modalities and quality of <strong>Commission</strong>-GoG dialogue<br />

through the NAO’s office<br />

• I 8.4.2 – Evidence of common understanding of Guyana’s needs<br />

(general and sector) by the <strong>Commission</strong> and other donors, and<br />

particularly of participation in common needs assessment studies<br />

• I 8.4.3 – DEC participation and role in government/multi-donor<br />

consultation processes (general and sector) and in coordination<br />

committees or working groups (government/donor and<br />

donor/donor) at general (macro or PRSP) and sector levels dealing<br />

with programming of donor interventions<br />

• I 8.4.4 – NIP/CSP explicitly refers to other donor strategies<br />

• I 8.5.1 – Evidence of synergies or conflicts between activities<br />

implemented by the <strong>Commission</strong> and those implemented by other<br />

donors and GoG<br />

• I 8.5.2 – Modalities of coordination mechanisms between the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong>, GoG and other donors at implementation level<br />

(meetings, coordination groups, task forces…)<br />

Sources of information:<br />

• Sector strategies: agriculture, mining<br />

• Diagnostic studies of the agricultural sector, esp. sugar, rice and rum production<br />

• Study of projections of resources stemming from trade agreements during the period 1995-2005<br />

• Diagnostic study of the mining sector and projections of Sysmin resources and their use<br />

• Balance of payment projections 1995-2005<br />

• CSP mid-term reviews and addendum to CSP/NIP<br />

• PRSP and MTEF (or budget proposals), sector strategies<br />

• Needs assessments and diagnostic studies<br />

• Programming documents of the <strong>Commission</strong> (NIP/CSP) and other donors<br />

• Minutes of meetings of working groups<br />

• Programme documents (FA, MR, Annual Reports…)<br />

• Interviews with representatives of:<br />

- DG DEV<br />

- Ministries of Finance - Relations with donors<br />

- NAO task force<br />

- Sectoral ministries: Finances, Public Works, Housing and Water Supply…<br />

- Other donors (IDB, WB, UK, Canada, USA)<br />

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Annex 7 – Information matrix<br />

P Nber Source<br />

- - EQ1 To what extent is the <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana consistent with the priorities set by the<br />

GoG in its development policy?<br />

- - JC 1.1 The <strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy objectives are coherent with those of the GoGs medium term policy<br />

strategies<br />

- - I 1.1.1 Degree of alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> objectives (NIP/CSP) to Guyana’s development policy<br />

objectives as expressed in its NDS, the 1996-1998 Policy Framework Paper and the 2002 PRSP at<br />

general level<br />

I 1.1.1<br />

1 - The Guyana Development strategy<br />

The Guyana Development strategy is designed through five main documents: (i) the National<br />

Development Strategy (NDS), (ii) the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), (iii) the National<br />

Competitiveness Strategy (NCS) and (iv) the Guyana Action Plan (GAP) for the sugar sector and the (v)<br />

Public sector Investment Programme (PSIP). The common rationale of these documents in defining the<br />

Guyana Development strategy aiming at the Poverty alleviation in the long-term is to focus on two main<br />

orientations: economic growth on one hand, enhancement of social services on the other hand.<br />

The economic development objectives are both targeted the macroeconomic level through incentive<br />

policies including macroeconomic policy, competition, taxes, and trade policies and the microeconomic<br />

level in fostering the private sector to reach higher productivity, to expand the traditional economic<br />

sectors and to diversify activities to non traditional sectors. Macro-economic support and private sector<br />

development are the two main pillars of the Guyana economic strategy.<br />

The social development objectives are the second main orientation of the global development of<br />

Guyana. These objectives encompass the governance of the country in ensuring that all segments of<br />

society feel that they have an equal stake in the political process. Re-examination of the educational system<br />

and development of the country’s human resources are emphasized as conditions of the economic<br />

development. The PRSP highlights the need to sustain economic expansion within the context of<br />

deepening participatory democracy and access to social services including health, water and housing,<br />

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strengthening and where necessary expansion of social safety nets. The use of resources supporting the<br />

PRSP objectives is ranging from €255m in 2000 to €340m in 2010. The NCS includes policy measures<br />

with respect to education and training, business development services, finance investment and promotion.<br />

The GAP for the sugar sector aims at providing infrastructural and human resources development support<br />

to achieve the regeneration programmes planned in the sugarcane and non-traditional agriculture subsectors<br />

(projects funded up to €23m).<br />

2 - The <strong>Commission</strong> co-operation strategy<br />

The overall objective of the 8 th EDF (1995-2000) was to improve Guyana's production capacity so as to<br />

generate income in a sustainable way and to improve its competitiveness on external markets. The purpose<br />

was to foster Guyana's gradual integration in the regional and world economy. EC funded actions were<br />

concentrated on two focal sectors: economic and social infrastructure and private sector development.<br />

These were the same sectors of concentration as those of the 6th and 7th EDFs.<br />

The overall objective of the 9 th EDF (2002 – 2007) is the reduction of poverty and the promotion of<br />

sustainable development. The two focal sectors are infrastructure (i.e. sea defences and coastal<br />

management) and macroeconomic support. Outside these areas of concentration assistance was<br />

committed to a transport sector study; strengthening the NAO office; a Technical Cooperation Facility<br />

and a micro-projects programme. In addition the EC supported the holding of General and Regional<br />

elections in 2006.<br />

Eventually over the ten year period 1997-2007 of the current evaluation, the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support to<br />

Guyana trough bilateral agreement s was focused on five sectors for a total budget €71m.<br />

1997-2002 2003-2007<br />

STRATEGY<br />

Ū (million)<br />

Ū (million)<br />

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19<br />

1 INFRASTRUCTURES<br />

SEA DEFENCES<br />

21 19<br />

TRANSPORT 8<br />

1<br />

HOUSING<br />

2 PRIVATE SECTOR<br />

3<br />

3 BUDGETARY support<br />

14,9<br />

4 CIVIL SOCIETY support<br />

3<br />

5 PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 1<br />

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1 – Rehabilitation of Social and Economic infrastructure: € 49 million (69%)<br />

Sea defences is the main programme of the <strong>Commission</strong> support; the initial budget allocation defined in<br />

the strategy is €40m, 56% of the total budget. The project objective is, in the long-term, the improvement<br />

of the security of the coastal belt against the dangers of sea incursion and flooding. Two key points are to<br />

be considered for the funds mobilisation. (i) The financial support of this program is highly demanding: as<br />

average one kilometre of sea defences costs approximately €2,8m. Thus 5 km of sea defences<br />

rehabilitation are planned in the 8 ACP GUA 5 programme under the 8 th EDF, compared to the 160 km<br />

of the whole infrastructure and the 40 km recognised to be repaired. (ii) The results of this financial<br />

support are depending on the management capacity of the public institutions involved in the sea defences<br />

investment and maintenance.<br />

Regarding also the social and economic infrastructure, water supply and transportation programmes and<br />

projects were planned in the second instalment of the NIP with a budget of € 9 million.<br />

2 – Private sector and business development: € 3 million (4%)<br />

The <strong>Commission</strong> strategy aimed at two objectives: (i) strengthen competitiveness of private enterprises; (ii)<br />

increase economic growth through development of SMEs and job creation.<br />

3 – Budgetary support: € 15 million (21%)<br />

Poverty Reduction Budgetary support is the second focal sector under the 9 th ED <strong>Commission</strong>-CSP with<br />

an original budget of €14,9m. This PRBS support was provided as non-targeted budgetary support which<br />

in the future could form the basic support mechanism in the social sectors provided Guyana’s continued<br />

eligibility to this aid instrument. The objective is twofold: on the one hand, it is well embedded in the<br />

Poverty Reduction Strategy of Guyana; on the other hand, the front loaded fixed tranches have helped the<br />

Government in covering the budget deficit, decreasing need for external lending and thus facilitating the<br />

GoG to release budgetary means for overall objectives of the development of the country.<br />

4 – Support to civil society organisations: € 3 million (4%)<br />

The CSP objective refers to the social benefits provided to communities with the result to increase<br />

empowerment of civil society organisation to carry out programmes that reduce poverty.<br />

5 – Programme management: support to the NAO office: € 1 million (1,4 %)<br />

The Institutional strengthening of the NAO’s office, initially funded through SASP IV counterpart funds<br />

from the 8 th EDF, was put in place to set up a comprehensive task force team to help the NAO handle his<br />

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increased responsibilities with emphasis on institutional building and local ownership of projects. The<br />

view is to contribute to transparency and improvement of the <strong>Commission</strong> programme design and<br />

implementation. The allocated budget for 5 years is € 1 million.<br />

Guyana’s development strategy<br />

Economic development<br />

<strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy<br />

Economic development<br />

€ million %<br />

> Macro-economic support > Budgetary support 15<br />

> Micro-economic support > Private sector support 3<br />

Social development<br />

Economic and social<br />

infrastrucures<br />

> Sea Defences 40<br />

> Water & transport 9<br />

Social development<br />

> Civil society org. 3<br />

> EC programme impl. 1<br />

71<br />

25%<br />

69%<br />

6%<br />

3 - Synthesis: alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> objectives (NIP/CSP) to Guyana’s development<br />

policy objectives<br />

The <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana, as designed in the NIP 8 th EDF and the CSP 9 th EDF meets the<br />

Guyana’s development policy objectives as expressed in the NDS (2000), PRSP (2002), NCS (2006) and<br />

GAP (2006) to the following extent: :<br />

Economic development<br />

The relevance of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy with the GoG policy development strategy is established<br />

through the budgetary support (macro-economic support of the GoG policy) and the Private sector<br />

support (micro-economic support of the GoG policy) at the extent of 25% of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support.<br />

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I 1.1.2<br />

I 1.1.2<br />

Social development<br />

As far as Sea defences and Transport are infrastructures conducive to social development, 69 % of the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy budget is concerned.<br />

Degree of alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> objectives (NIP/CSP) and Guyana’s sector policy<br />

objectives as expressed in sector policy documents (infrastructure, health, housing, private<br />

sector)<br />

Coherence between <strong>Commission</strong> objectives and Guyana’s sector policy objectives:<br />

The GoG objectives are outlined in the NDS through the listing of 28 intervention sectors.<br />

Two main objectives of the Guyana’s sector policy are met by the <strong>Commission</strong> intervention objectives:<br />

a. The objective n° 2: macro-economic support. First budget of the <strong>Commission</strong> intervention :<br />

€42,5m (43 % of the total committed budget);<br />

b. The objective n° 5: eradication of poverty entailing improvement of productivity and<br />

enhancement of social services. Three sectors of <strong>Commission</strong> intervention cover this<br />

objective and totalise €27,2m (28% of the total <strong>Commission</strong> budget);<br />

Common objectives without significant <strong>Commission</strong> funding concern: Good governance, Environment, Transport<br />

and Development Programme implementation. 6 other GoG objectives are not funded:<br />

JC 1.2<br />

I 1.2.1<br />

I 1.2.1<br />

The <strong>Commission</strong>’s intervention logic, programming and choice of beneficiaries are coherent with<br />

the GoG priorities in its development strategy<br />

Degree of alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> priorities (NIP/CSP and non-programmable tools) and<br />

Guyana’s development strategy priorities as expressed in sector policy documents (infrastructure,<br />

health, housing, private sector)<br />

Coherence between <strong>Commission</strong> interventions and Guyana’s sector policy priorities:<br />

1 The GoG’s development strategy priorities<br />

The Guyana’s National Development Strategy 2001-2010 defines the following priorities:<br />

1. Sound macroeconomic policies and economic management, coupled with creation of incentives<br />

for private sector development;<br />

2. Improvements in transport infrastructure;<br />

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3. Enhancing the role of ICT in the modernization of Guyana:;<br />

4. Strengthening social services through which poverty can be eradicated and productivity improved,<br />

to be achieved through education, health and low-income housing programmes;<br />

5. Reform of public sector institutions.<br />

6. Conservation of Guyana’s environment. Prescriptions are being made for the environmental<br />

monitoring and control of all of social and economic endeavours. The importance of utilising<br />

resources sustainably is also emphasised;<br />

7. Investments in drainage and irrigation systems and sea defences.<br />

8. Development assistance to a specially-disadvantaged group, the Amerindians;<br />

9. Improving inclusiveness, accountability and transparency of central, regional and local<br />

governments.<br />

The main goals of Guyana’s poverty reduction strategy 2 focus on:<br />

• Sustained economic expansion;<br />

• Access to social services including education, health, water and housing;<br />

• Expansion of social safety nets.<br />

To achieve these goals, the strategy rests on seven pillars 3 :<br />

1. Broad-based economic growth;<br />

2. Environmental protection;<br />

3. Stronger institutions and better governance;<br />

4. Investment in human capital, with emphasis on basic education and primary health;<br />

5. Investment in physical capital, with emphasis on better and broader provision of safe water and<br />

sanitation services, farm-to-market roads, drainage and irrigation systems, and housing;<br />

6. Improved safety nets;<br />

7. Special intervention programmes to address regional pockets of poverty.<br />

The National Competitiveness Strategy to Guyana (NCS)<br />

GoG has defined in 2006 the core policies to improve competitiveness through :<br />

1. Incentive policies including macroeconomic policy, competition policy, taxation policy, trade<br />

policy;<br />

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2. Supply side policies, mainly including policy measures with respect to education and training,<br />

business development services, finance, investment and export promotion.<br />

The Guyana Action Plan for the sugar sector (GAP)<br />

The Guyana Action Plan for the sugar sector seeks to generate economic growth by bringing sustainable<br />

improvements in the competitiveness of the sugarcane industry and the non-traditional agricultural subsector.<br />

Its specific objectives are threefold:<br />

1. Expansion and diversification of the sugar cane industry (80% of the funding);<br />

2. Growth and development of specific non-traditional agricultural sub-sectors (6%);<br />

3. Infrastructural and human resource development support to achieve the regeneration<br />

programmes planned in the sugarcane and non-traditional agriculture sub-sectors (4%);<br />

In addition, the GoG’s contribution to the Skeldon project amounts to 10%.<br />

2 - The <strong>Commission</strong>’s support priorities trough interventions and non programmable instruments<br />

The strategy has been subject of evolutions modifying significantly the original design. The use of non<br />

programmable instruments was conducive to important changes even if the general orientations were<br />

maintained.<br />

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STRATEGY S 1997-2002 2003-2007<br />

71 146<br />

INTERVENTIONS I Ū (million)<br />

Ū (million)<br />

93<br />

Non Programmable Instrume NPI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 53<br />

1 INFRASTRUCTURES<br />

SEA DEFENCES S 21<br />

19<br />

40<br />

I 20,53 18,13 39<br />

TRANSPORT S 8<br />

1 9<br />

I 1 1<br />

NPI 0 7th EDF 0<br />

HOUSING<br />

S<br />

I 9,17<br />

9<br />

2 PRIVATE SECTOR S 3<br />

3<br />

I 1,54<br />

2<br />

NPI Sysmin<br />

12,6<br />

13<br />

3 BUDGETARY support S 14,9<br />

15<br />

I<br />

35,18<br />

35<br />

NPI Structural adjustment - Debt relief 19,19<br />

19<br />

4 CIVIL SOCIETY support S 3<br />

3<br />

& good gov. - environment I 0 6,3<br />

6<br />

NPI 2,21 Budget lines 2<br />

5 PROGRAMME manag. S 1 1<br />

I 0 1 1<br />

RICE SECTOR NPI 9¸me RIP<br />

12,93<br />

13<br />

SUGAR SECTOR NPI Budget lin 5,66<br />

6<br />

As a whole € 146m were decided under the NIP/CSP 8 th and 9 th EDF, including the RIP (€ 13m) for the<br />

Rice sector to Guyana and the allocation for the sugar sector at the end of 2006 (€6m). This is twice the<br />

budget designed €71m.<br />

By focal sector, the main changes are the following:<br />

1 – Rehabilitation of Social and Economic infrastructure: € 49m<br />

Sea defences: with the commitment decided at the end of 2007, the whole budget defined in the NIP /<br />

CSP is promised to be used with €38,66m committed.<br />

Otherwise the water supply and transportation programmes planned in the 8 th EDF NIP were not<br />

implemented afterwards. Only a transport study € 0,95m was committed under the 9 th EDF CSP.<br />

But despite the NIP did not mention the housing as a sector to be supported, the low-income housing<br />

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programme under the 8 th EDF –– was decided in October 2002 for a total budget of €9,17m plus €0,12m<br />

from the 7 th EDF. This programme clearly fits into the GoG policy in the social sector in improving<br />

access to affordable housing for low-income groups in Guyana as well as improving quality of settlements<br />

through community participation.<br />

2 – Private sector and business development: € 14,14m<br />

Beyond the 8 th EDF support to the Guyana Training Agency (€1,54m), the private sector received support<br />

under the SYSMIN instrument for the Linden Economic Advancement Programme (LEAP) in Region 10,<br />

approved in 2000 with a budget of €12,6m. LEAP’s objectives are to create conditions likely to attract<br />

new businesses, as an alternative to the bauxite industry in order to increase employment. As a whole,<br />

€14,1m were allocated to the private sector and business development.<br />

Additionally, it has to be mentioned that the <strong>European</strong> Investment Bank also provided support : a €11m<br />

loan for the financing of the Institute of Private Enterprise Development (IPED) for on-lending to small<br />

businesses; a €40m loan allocated to the Caribbean Development Bank; and €32m to other economic<br />

entities (DFL, CLICO, GRENLEC).<br />

3 – Macro-economic support: € 54,37 million<br />

Total commitments for financial aid in the form of budget support (BS) over the period under review<br />

have reached € 39,9 million (including HIPC), of which € 10.2 million originated from the 8 th EDF<br />

Structural Adjustment Facility , € 6.4 million came from the special HIPC fund and the remainder (€ 23.3<br />

million) was programmed as BS under the 9 th EDF (initially € 14.9 million were foreseen under the A<br />

envelope which was increased with € 8.4 million from the B envelope using the FLEX resources for the<br />

2000 and 2001 shortfalls in export earnings). Since end 2006, another € 12 million have been committed<br />

under the 9 th EDF (stemming from the 25% top-up of funds allocated to Guyana on grounds of its<br />

positive mid-term review and positive governance profile), bringing total commitments to budget support<br />

to Guyana under the 8 th and 9 th EDFs to a total of nearly € 52 million, including HIPC. The latest<br />

commitment will serve to bridge the budget support gap in 2007, between the end of the PRBS of 2004-<br />

2006 and the beginning of the new budget support programme to be designed under the 10 th EDF.<br />

Over the period, three BS programmes were implemented, the SAS IV (1998), SAS V (foreseen for 1999<br />

and 2000 but implemented in 2000 and 2001) and the PRBS (2004 to 2006). A sixth SAS programme was<br />

being designed in late 2000/2001 to follow-up from SAS V but it never left the drawing board as<br />

Guyana’s macro-economic situation deteriorated, its reform programme went off track thus precluding<br />

new budget support. Currently a new ‘bridging programme’ is being designed for support to the 2007<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

budget.<br />

The earlier as well as the latest budget support programmes all supported the Government’s budget by<br />

either providing funding for specific budget lines (SAS IV and V) or providing non targeted direct budget<br />

support (PRBS). This change from the earlier Balance of Payments approach (with the use of counterpart<br />

funds for projects) was made possible by the improvements in public service management and<br />

accountability such as the introduction of programme budgeting. By funding specific lines of the budget<br />

and later supporting the budget as a whole, the EC’s budget support programmes thus totally espoused<br />

Guyana’s development objectives as translated into the budget. In conformity with the policy objectives<br />

expressed in the 1998-2001 PFP and the HIPC documents, the <strong>Commission</strong>’s SAS IV and V supported<br />

Guyana’s entire reform agenda, including policies to enhance service delivery in education and health, civil<br />

service reform, public enterprise restructuring, financial and insurance sector modernisation, land reform<br />

and improvements in budget management. In line with overall government policy which emphasized the<br />

implementation of a second generation of reforms after successful stabilisation of the economy, the<br />

priority of SAS IV and V (and later of PRBS) was to contribute to enhancing the efficiency and<br />

effectiveness of public spending by facilitating further reallocation of fiscal resources to priority activities<br />

in the social sectors. The SAS programmes gave particular emphasis to support to the social sectors<br />

(health, education and housing) by :<br />

• targeting the use of counterpart funds to specific budget lines in these ministries’ budgets (mainly<br />

on the maintenance costs of existing infrastructure and on operational costs enabling improved<br />

service delivery) and<br />

• using disbursement conditionalities from the programme agreed with the BWI (PFP) which were<br />

linked to improved budget management, in particular improved budget allocation to education and<br />

health and improved execution of HIPC expenditure.<br />

The PRBS abandoned the targeting of specific budget lines in favour of direct and untargeted budget<br />

support underpinned by the close monitoring of outcome indicators in the health and social housing<br />

sectors as well as in the area of public finance management.<br />

Overall, with the new generation of budget support starting from SAS IV in 1998, the EC thus placed<br />

total confidence in the soundness of the GoG’s public finance management system and in the spending<br />

priorities set by the Government in its public expenditure programme: the EC’s strategic objectives using<br />

the instrument of BS were thus not only coherent with the GoG’s medium term policy objectives but<br />

totally aligned to them<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 10


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

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EGEVAL<br />

4 – Support to civil society organisations: € 8,7 million<br />

The purpose of the main programme, the Micro-Projects Programme (MPP), is to improve the socioeconomic<br />

conditions of vulnerable groups through the development of sustainable and participatory selfhelp<br />

schemes; 75 micro-projects at the community level on the area of employment/income generation;<br />

training/education; communication and good governance, strengthening of non-state actors and<br />

establishment of regular and structured dialogue between the government. For duration of five years, the<br />

total amount is € 4.5 million of which € 4,05m from EDF.<br />

Other interventions concern good governance, democracy enhancement and humanitarian assistance for a<br />

total € 2,40m plus actions with budget lines €2,21m for good governance (€0,37m) and environment<br />

(€1,84m) .<br />

5 - Support to the NAO office: € 1 million (1,4 %)<br />

This support is implemented as per the allocated budget for 5 years.<br />

Other actions involving non programmable instruments are the following:<br />

Regional cooperation: Under the 8 th EDF, the Caribbean Regional Indicative Programme (CRIP) is<br />

relevant to Guyana through the Caribbean Tourism approved in 2002, the €70m grant to support rum<br />

producers with the 4-year project started in June 2002, and the Caribbean component of the all-ACP<br />

HIV/AIDS/STIs Programme with CARICOM as implementing agency.<br />

Under the 9 th EDF, the CRIP is mainly supporting the competitiveness of the Caribbean Rice sector. A<br />

diagnostic study and feasibility study of the Caribbean rice industry were carried out in 2002 in view of<br />

increasing the trade competitiveness of rice production, primarily in Guyana and Surinam, and thereby to<br />

contribute to the region’s social and economic development and to prevent socio/economic deterioration<br />

which might occur as a result of the ongoing process of trade liberalisation. The total envelope of the<br />

programme is €23,6m including a financial facility of €10m. The amount to the direct benefits of Guyana<br />

is €12,93m.<br />

Sugar sector: The Government strategy is defined within the ‘National Action Plan on Accompanying<br />

Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries Affected by the Reform of the EU Sugar Regime’. The DG Dev<br />

has prepared the EC Response strategy in support of the Guyana Action plan for the period 2007-2013 :<br />

‘Implementation of accompanying measures for sugar protocol countries’ (27/07/2006).<br />

It contains four objectives:<br />

1. Structural support to production;<br />

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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

2. Support to diversification, research and development (bio-ethanol, energy saving and other new<br />

technology);<br />

3. Support to infrastructure and human resources and training;<br />

4. Mitigation of harmful consequences from the sugar industry restructuring on the social sector.<br />

The State company GUYSUCO employs over 18K persons and influences the welfare of nearly 120K<br />

persons including employees’ families, Contractors, Suppliers, etc.<br />

The <strong>Commission</strong> response strategy in support of the Guyana National Action Plan for the period 2007-<br />

2013 is to define the onward planning of the accompanying measures and assistance by the <strong>Commission</strong><br />

to the alleviation of the impact of the EU sugar reform. The delivery mechanism will be mainly sector<br />

budget support to the four areas: Structural adjustment of the sugarcane industry; Diversification to nontraditional<br />

agriculture; Training and infrastructure; Mitigation of social impact. A first financing for the<br />

2006 allocation was submitted at € 5.66 m covering the first support to the above four areas.<br />

The emergency needs caused by the January 2005 floods have been addressed by the remaining<br />

€0.7m from the B-envelope (after allocation of €8.4m to budgetary support). These funds were drawn<br />

upon by ECHO and, as such, have not been included in the <strong>Commission</strong> ‘strategic’ support.<br />

3 - Synthesis of the <strong>Commission</strong> interventions regarding the Guyana’s development strategy<br />

The evolution of the <strong>Commission</strong> intervention over the two main programming periods is the following:<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 12


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

GoG' strategy<br />

Economic development<br />

EC strategy (€ million)<br />

Economic development<br />

EC interventions (with Non Pr. Instr.)<br />

1997-2007 1997-2002 2003-2007 1997-2007 %<br />

> Macro-economic support > Macro-economic support 15 19,19 35,18 54,37<br />

> Micro-economic support > Micro-economic support 3 14,14 14,14<br />

> Rice sector 12,93 12,93<br />

> Sugar sector 5,66 5,66<br />

Economic and social<br />

infrastrucures<br />

> Sea Defences 40 20,53 18,13 38,66<br />

> Housing & transport 9 9,29 0,95 10,24<br />

Social development<br />

Social development<br />

> Civil society org. 3 2,3 6,4 8,7<br />

> EC programme impl. 1 0,2 0,9 1,1<br />

71 65,65 80,15 145,8<br />

60%<br />

33%<br />

7%<br />

EC interventions have been completed with non programmable instruments have been geared to meet the<br />

GoG development strategy over the two periods of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support implementation.<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> interventions for the support of the macro-economy, to the private sector and in favour of<br />

social services provided to the civil society are in line with the priorities defined in the NDS and the PRSP.<br />

Other priorities have not been taken into account to the same extent: Good governance, Environment,<br />

Transport, Development Programme support. Nevertheless the rationale of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy is<br />

justified by the size of the financial envelope for EC-Guyana cooperation which entails to focus on 2-3<br />

focal areas in order to avoid a dispersion of funding.<br />

Eventually the <strong>Commission</strong>’s priorities can be compared to the GoG’s priorities defined in the<br />

NDS, the PRSP and also directly expressed to the evaluation team during the field mission:<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 13


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

<strong>Commission</strong>'s support Ū million Priority GoG development sectors NDS PRSP NCS GAP GoG / Field visit<br />

Budgetary Support 54 1 Macro-economic support 1 1 1 +++<br />

Sea defences 39 2 Infrastructures (eco & social) 7 5 Flooding<br />

Linden-IPED 13 3 Micro-economic support 1 & 9 1 2 2 +++<br />

Regional co-operation progr. 13 4 Rice sector 1 1 ++<br />

Housing 9 5 Infrastructures (social) 4 5 +/-<br />

Accompagnying measures 6 6 Sugar - diversification 1 1 1 ++<br />

MPP 4 7 Civil society support/jobs creation 4 4 -<br />

8&9 NIP projects - Budget lines 3 8 Governance 5 3 ++<br />

Budget lines 2 9 Environnement 6 2 +<br />

Guyana Training Agency 2 10 Education & vocational training 4 4 2 3 Brain drain<br />

Feasibility studies 1 11 Transport 2 5 +<br />

Support to the NAO 1 12 Programmme implementation ++<br />

0 ICT 3 6<br />

0 Assistance to Amerindians 8<br />

Total 146<br />

At large, the alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> priorities (NIP/CSP and non programmable tools) to Guyana’s<br />

development strategy priorities defined through the NDS and PRSP is effective on three sectors:<br />

Budgetary support, Private sector support, Rice sector support, cumulating 56% of the total EC<br />

interventions. Inversely, the rehabilitation of sea defences is not mentioned as a strategic priority in the<br />

GoG orientations.<br />

During the field mission the following priorities were highlighted<br />

Budgetary support : The PRSP is a very controversial subject in Guyana. PRSP II was supposed to be<br />

produced in 2006 but no outcome in 2007. The same priorities given by the GoG and the <strong>Commission</strong> to<br />

the budgetary support do not infer policy dialogue even if there are communication with sector ministries<br />

(Sugar, Housing and Health). Policy dialogue is not very extensive apart from the health sector where<br />

technical staff, donors, other ministries participate in the thematic group meeting and they can discuss<br />

strategic options because there is a long term plan.<br />

Other element reducing the evidence of the relevance of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support is the lack of<br />

cooperation regarding the choice of indicators, the choice of TA and the lack of PFM sequenced action<br />

plan.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Infrastructures : There is a great need for filling the physical gap in infrastructure in roads, sea defences,<br />

harbours, etc.<br />

Flooding<br />

Water management includes flooding from upcountry and storm water as well as inundation from the<br />

ocean. Flooding has been a common feature in Guyana but in areas where population density was low so<br />

flooding from upcountry featured less than inundation from ocean. But floods in 2005 had dramatic<br />

economic and social consequences. It appeared that water management and regulation was needed. The<br />

establishment of the Water management Council was decided and set in motion in the Ministry of Water<br />

and housing in view of instalment by the end of 2007. This Council emerged from the amalgamation of<br />

Guyana Water and Sewer <strong>Commission</strong> and Guyana Water Authority in May 2002.<br />

Sea Defences : EC main focus on sea defences only does not meet GoG interests and priority. The GoG<br />

is carrying on a shift from Sea defences programme to Shore development programme. The issue is to<br />

shift from the management of the Sea Defences line to development of the Costal zone taking into<br />

account all dimensions of the economic, social and environmental aspects of the sustainable development,<br />

including biologic and ecologic solutions. For instance, mangrove replacing sea defences walls and<br />

mangrove as substitute of human activity in the coastal belt. Furthermore the coastal zone development<br />

entails the sustainability of actions in the long run. But this approach appears to be a new orientation<br />

which is not yet finalized.<br />

Brain drain problem : the Guyanese population is decreasing because of brain drain. Human resources<br />

in Guyana are a serious challenge due to massive migration and lack of qualified workers (lack of<br />

vocational and technical training). There is a strong need in Guyana for vocational and technical training.<br />

The GTA project was a well-conceived programme in this respect. But the country is loosing qualified<br />

locals after training, as salaries are often lower than other international agents can pay in the country.<br />

Negative effects are that trained people are leaving the country. Positive effects could be considered when<br />

emigrants support the economy with remittances, investments from abroad and after coming back later.<br />

The Private Sector <strong>Commission</strong> is – in 2007 - putting in place a strategic plan to reverse the brain drain<br />

problem. Without such a strategy, it seems meaningless to finance projects dealing with vocational and<br />

technical training. Within this strategy, the institutional strengthening is in all sectors and especially for<br />

socio-economic infrastructures and the agriculture sector.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Rice sector<br />

The Rice sector has to be regarded from a social point of view in focusing on consequences of the sector<br />

decline especially for small holders; Four components of the Ec support to Guyana through CRIP : (i) TA<br />

: €1,8m; (ii) water rehabilitation : €3,2m ; (iii) Financial facility : €6,5m; (iv) training €190,000 ;<br />

The Water rehabilitation is a public sector issue connected to the overall water management issues in<br />

Guyana. The primary areas identified for technical assistance involved Research & development and<br />

Marketing. The principal external markets identified for penetration were in the Caribbean region.<br />

Poverty Alleviation was a primary social factor identified for resuscitation in the rice sector especially<br />

through financial injection among the small farmers. But the Government approach to Poverty Alleviation<br />

was being questioned. The larger Farmers/Millers seem to believe that the bulk of the financing should be<br />

given to them for fuller utilization of existing acreage and for them to provide satellite farming support to<br />

the outputs of the small farmers.<br />

I.1.2.2<br />

I.1.2.2<br />

I.1.2.3<br />

Sugar Sector: the GoG priority is highly political and justified for social considerations.<br />

The relevance of the GoG strategy relies on institutional feasibility and of Government capacities to have<br />

the full command of reforms with due consideration of internal constraints/potentialities and external<br />

threats/opportunities. The Sugar sector contributes to 18% of the GDP and 55% of the agricultural<br />

GDP,has direct consequences on the social sector and infrastructure.<br />

Restructuring and privatizing Guysuco is impossible to circumvent to foster the private investment in the<br />

sugar sector and to increase productivity and profitability. Restructuring is also needed to overcome the<br />

drastic cut pricing: 5% reduction price has already being supported. The EU ‘compensation’ (€160 )<br />

represents 36% of the total estimate of the cut pricing consequences (€440m)<br />

Explicit reference in the <strong>Commission</strong> strategic documents (NIP/CSP and non-programmable<br />

tools) to their adherence to the prioritised set of public expenditure identified in the medium term<br />

expenditure framework (MTEF) and to the prioritised required donor support identified as<br />

required in the medium term<br />

The BS FAs do not explicitly refer to prioritised set of public expenditure but BS is implicitly focusing on<br />

nothing else but the prioritised set of expenditure, especially as from the PRBS 2004-2007 onwards. BS<br />

provides supplementary funds for the budget in the medium-term with the aim of facilitating the<br />

reallocation of fiscal resources to priority activities; even in the earlier BS programmes where particular<br />

priority budget line items were targeted for support, fungibility of funds allows for improved room of<br />

manoeuvre for GoG’s reallocation of funds to priority areas<br />

Explicit reference in the <strong>Commission</strong> strategic documents (NIP/CSP and non-programmable<br />

tools) to their adherence to prioritised investment programming<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

I.1.2.3<br />

I 1.2.4<br />

I.1.2.4<br />

The NIP refers to the GoG programming in general wording which does not express specific<br />

adherence to prioritised investment programming. The CSP is clearly designed with due<br />

consideration of the NDS and of the PRSP and special reference to the HIPC. The sections<br />

related to ‘Economic situation’, Trade policies and Trade relations’, ‘Social situation’,<br />

‘Sustainability of current policies’ and ‘Medium term challenges’ provide analysis giving evidence<br />

of adherence to prioritised investment programming.<br />

Explicit reference in the <strong>Commission</strong> strategic documents (NIP/CSP and non-programmable<br />

tools) to their adherence to target the beneficiaries identified as the target population in Guyana’s<br />

development strategy<br />

In all the Structural Adjustment Support programmes (SAS) as well as in the later Poverty<br />

Reduction Budget Support Programme, the beneficiaries are very clearly targeted as the poor,<br />

most vulnerable population. Whereas the first SAS target improved access to and delivery of<br />

basic social services in education, health and social housing, the more recent PRBS focuses<br />

attention on health and social housing.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

8ACP<br />

GUA 005,<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA 11<br />

FA,<br />

Evaluation<br />

report, NIP<br />

EQ2<br />

JC 2.1<br />

I 2.1.1<br />

I 2.1.1<br />

To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to the rehabilitation of Guyana’s<br />

sea defences and ultimately to sustainably protecting the livelihoods and dwellings of the<br />

coastal belt population?<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> interventions were in line with the CSP/NIP strategy<br />

Degree of alignment of the programmes’ IL with the IL of the NIP/CSP<br />

The <strong>Commission</strong> carried out one main programme in the sea defences field under the 8 th EDF NIP: the<br />

8 ACP GUA 5. The <strong>Commission</strong> programme IL is congruent with the IL of the CSP/NIP strategy.<br />

The overall objective of the 8 ACP GUA 5 programme is i) the improvement of living conditions of<br />

coastal zone population, ii) the stimulation of economic growth and iii) the reduction of poverty. It<br />

contributes to the overall impact of the 8 th EDF NIP: the enhancement of a sustainable economic and<br />

social development.<br />

The purpose of the programme is the improvement of long term security prospects of the coastal zone<br />

against sea water incursion and is and is in line with the outputs of the 8 th EDF NIP (sea defences<br />

rehabilitated).<br />

The results of the programme consist in the re-establishment of structural integrity of sea defences<br />

(reconstruction of 5km of sea defences), the improved capacity of the SRDD, the increased involvement<br />

of the coastal belt population in the sea defences sector and are therefore in line with the activities of the<br />

8 th EDF NIP (renovation of essential coastal equipment).<br />

Under the 9 th EDF, a new sea defences programme decided in 2007 will pursue the 8 th EDF NIP<br />

orientations. The results of the programme focus on : Reduction of the length of the sea wall which is<br />

classified as ‘in critical condition’ (estimated 20 km) by approximately 40 % thus providing protection to<br />

housing and agricultural land and the setting-up of a sustainable (Sea defence) management system<br />

(Institutional Capacity Building), and on the development of contingency plans for higher tide levels due<br />

to global warming.<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

CSP/NIP,<br />

FAs, reports<br />

I 2.1.2<br />

I 2.1.2<br />

Discrepancies between the programmes and the strategy are explicitly justified<br />

There are no discrepancies between the programmes and the <strong>Commission</strong> strategy.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

I 2.1.3 ‘Impact on livelihoods’ of Sea defence programmes has been well formulated and placed in the<br />

IL<br />

FAs I 2.1.3 ‘Impact on livelihood’ is identified in the IL at the level of OO, not at the level of Purpose or Result. As<br />

a consequence ‘Impact on livelihood’ is not specified and only used as a general condition without<br />

reference to beneficiary and resource base.<br />

FAs,<br />

CSP/NIP,<br />

Haskoningevaluation<br />

Training<br />

programme,<br />

JC 2.2<br />

I 2.2.1<br />

I 2.2.1<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> intervention has contributed to the rehabilitation of Guyana’s sea defences<br />

Km of sea defences in critical condition rehabilitated by the <strong>Commission</strong> interventions as a<br />

share of the total km rehabilitated during the period<br />

Sea defence and coastal management is a priority area in Infrastructural development. From desk work<br />

at SRDD during the mission an overview was composed over the past 10 years regarding all works done<br />

(EDF 8,9-Euro 20 million)<br />

Nature of<br />

Work<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

of 6.2km sea<br />

defence<br />

Structures at<br />

Region 2 & 3<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

of Sea Defence<br />

Structure<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

of Sea Defence<br />

Structure<br />

Construction<br />

of Sea Defence<br />

Structure<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

of Sea Defence<br />

Structure<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

of Sea Defence<br />

Structure<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

of Sea Defence<br />

Structure<br />

Remedial<br />

works to Sea<br />

Location Year Sea<br />

Defence<br />

District<br />

• Anna<br />

Regina/Henrietta<br />

• Land of Plenty<br />

• Le Destin/Ruby<br />

• Barnwell/Vergenoegen<br />

• La Jalousie/Windsor<br />

Forest<br />

No. 76/77 Village<br />

Corentyne, Berbice<br />

No. 78 Village Corentyne,<br />

Berbice<br />

Mon Repos East Coast<br />

Demerara<br />

1996 No.1<br />

No. 1<br />

No. 4<br />

No. 4<br />

No. 4<br />

Length Cost G$ Contractor Donor<br />

Agency<br />

1.4km<br />

1.3km<br />

1.1km<br />

1.3km<br />

1.1km<br />

1,655,541,078 Pac - Gelfi EU<br />

1996 No. 8 400m 137,585,055 Gyu Co IDB<br />

1997 No. 8 640m 176,758,979 Guy Co IDB<br />

1997 No. 5 375m 124,216,432 BK Int. IDB<br />

Aberdeen Essequibo Coast 1998 No. 1 200m 52,596,980 Sammic Civil<br />

Work<br />

Taymouth Manor<br />

Essequibo Coast<br />

Devonshire Castle –<br />

Essequibo Coast<br />

IDB<br />

1999 No. 1 350m 116,807,117 Falcom IDB<br />

2000 No. 1 100m 83,459,740 Guy Co IDB<br />

Henrietta Essequibo Coast 2000 No. 1 200m 51,098,410 Guy Co EU<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 2


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Defence<br />

Structures<br />

Remedial<br />

works to Sea<br />

Defence<br />

Structures<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

of 1.7km of<br />

Sea Defence<br />

Structure<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

of Sea Defence<br />

Structure<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

works<br />

Sea Defence<br />

Construction<br />

Works<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

works to Sea<br />

Defence<br />

Structure<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

works to Sea<br />

Defence<br />

Structure<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

works to Sea<br />

Defence<br />

Structure<br />

Construction<br />

of Sea Defence<br />

Structures<br />

Institutional<br />

Capacity<br />

Building<br />

Activities<br />

- Surveys,<br />

Data,<br />

Management,<br />

Modelling,<br />

Structural<br />

Analysis,<br />

Mangrove<br />

Management,<br />

Strategy &<br />

Master Plan<br />

Aberdeen Essequibo Coast 2000 No. 1 200m 65,358,153 BK Int IDB<br />

• Good Hope<br />

• Reliance<br />

Montrose East Coast<br />

Demerara<br />

Cornelia Ida – West Bank<br />

Demerara<br />

Mon Repos – East Coast<br />

Demerara<br />

Stanleytown – West Bank<br />

Demerara<br />

Hague – West Bank<br />

Demerara<br />

Veregenoegen – West<br />

Bank Demerara<br />

Bel Air Mon Chosi – West<br />

Coast Berbice<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

No. 1<br />

Georgetown 2005 Head<br />

Office<br />

600m<br />

1,100m<br />

658,003,239 BK Int. IDB<br />

2001 No. 5 40m 19,483,575 BK Int. IDB<br />

2001 No. 4 220m 91,818,821 BK Int. Inc. IDB<br />

2001 No. 5 290m 118,910,812 BK Int. Inc. IDB<br />

2002 No. 4 290m 175,010,819 BK Int. Inc IDB<br />

2002 No. 4 310m 164,030,468 BK Int. Inc IDB<br />

2002 No. 4 330m 165,901,673 BK Int. Inc IDB<br />

2002 No. 7 2.1km 955,792,061 BK Int. Inc CDB/WB<br />

To-date<br />

payment<br />

393,708,377<br />

Royal Haskoning<br />

(Netherlands)<br />

EU<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 3


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Quality<br />

Control for<br />

Main ICBA<br />

Contract<br />

2005 Head<br />

Office<br />

To –date<br />

Payment<br />

16,901,626<br />

Rogan Associates<br />

Ltd - Niras<br />

EU<br />

Construction<br />

of Sea Defence<br />

Rip Rap<br />

Profit Foulis Belladrum –<br />

West Coast Berbice<br />

2006 No. 7 1.8km To – date<br />

Payment<br />

828,488,994<br />

BK International<br />

CDB/WB<br />

Supervision of<br />

Sea Defence<br />

Construction<br />

Works<br />

Profit Foulis Belladrum –<br />

West Coast Berbice<br />

2006 No. 7 1.8km To – date<br />

Payment<br />

98,388,000<br />

CEMCO<br />

CDB/WB<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

of 4km Sea<br />

Defence rip<br />

rap structure<br />

• Capoey/Columbia-<br />

Region 2<br />

• Tuschen – Region 3<br />

• Menten – Meer<br />

Zorg/De Kindren<br />

Region 3<br />

• Hague – Region 3<br />

Ongoing No. 1<br />

No. 4<br />

No. 4<br />

No. 4<br />

2,030m<br />

619m<br />

950m<br />

1,005m<br />

To –date<br />

Payment<br />

1,896,413,477<br />

BK<br />

International/Gelfi<br />

Transportation.<br />

EU<br />

Supervision of<br />

Sea Defence<br />

Rehabilitation<br />

Works<br />

• Capoey/Columbia-<br />

Region 2<br />

• Tuschen – Region 3<br />

• Menten – Meer<br />

Zorg/De Kindren<br />

Region 3<br />

• Hague – Region<br />

Ongoing No. 1<br />

No. 4<br />

No. 4<br />

No. 4<br />

2,030m<br />

619m<br />

950m<br />

1,005m<br />

To –date<br />

Payment<br />

95,725,514<br />

E&A<br />

Consultant/DHV<br />

Environment<br />

EU<br />

Institutional<br />

Capacity<br />

Building<br />

Activity –<br />

Bridging<br />

Phase<br />

Ongoing<br />

Head<br />

Office<br />

To date<br />

Payment<br />

41,759,604<br />

EU<br />

The above information covering 1996 to 2005, was obtained from SRDD but could not be verified with<br />

other internal sources in SRDD and/EC Delegation. It may be summarised as follows:<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 4


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Donor agency Sea defence works Organisational capacity<br />

development<br />

EC 11,004 metres 2005: ICD Haskoning<br />

2005: Quality control Rogan<br />

Ass.<br />

2004: ICB ongoing<br />

CDB 5,700 metres<br />

IDB 5,445 metres<br />

The EC funded ICB components, including training of staff has been well implemented. However, the<br />

newly qualified staff, and or new skills could not be retained in the SRDD organisation as other<br />

employers were able to offer better working conditions and literally all trained and capacitated left the<br />

organisation. As a consequence the capacity of SRDD has not been strengthened.<br />

Although efforts were made to obtain information about the spending by GoG itself on construction of<br />

sea defence works no figures could be obtained in the end. In the SRDD 4-year budget 2004-’08 no<br />

figures could be found on new works. On maintenance it was derived that G$ 943.770.608 (or Euro<br />

3,390,771) was reserved.<br />

I 2.2.2<br />

Km of prioritised tranches of sea defences in critical condition rehabilitated by the <strong>Commission</strong><br />

interventions as a share of the total km of prioritised tranches rehabilitated during the period<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

FAs, CSP-<br />

NIP, MRs,<br />

JAR’05(draft),<br />

Agrifor-C,<br />

I 2.2.2<br />

Works component is planned to cover the lengths of sea wall which is classified as in critical condition<br />

will be reduced with 5 kms. The total length of sea defence structure, either natural or constructed is<br />

quoted as extending to approx. 425 kms (Waine River to Corentyne River). The total length of sea wall<br />

in critical condition is quoted different in different reports. In the appraisal studies for the 8 th EDF<br />

(1998) it is mentioned 30 to 40 kms and confirmed by verbal information in SRDD.<br />

Despite foreign funded reconstruction works over the last decade and a half the critical lengths has<br />

remained the same. This may be explained by the limited routine repair and maintenance works which<br />

has found place by SRDD. With reference to section I. 2.2.1, there is evidence that the objective to<br />

rehabilitate 5 kms of sea defence has been achieved.<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 5


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

Final Design<br />

Report,<br />

Detailed Design<br />

and Preparation<br />

of Tender<br />

Documents of<br />

the Works,<br />

Supervision and<br />

supply on the<br />

Guyana’s Sea<br />

Defence (8 th<br />

EDF)<br />

November<br />

2004, Field<br />

mission<br />

I 2.2.3<br />

I 2.2.3<br />

The sea defence infrastructure has been constructed in accordance to the approved design and<br />

technical specifications<br />

The design work for EDF 8 has been approved by SRDD and DHV. The current design is locally<br />

known as ‘rip-rap’ whereby the embankment body dimensions are determined after soil stability analysis.<br />

The embankment sloops are covered with natural rocks (boulders) which reduce the impact of dynamic<br />

energy of the waves on the banks. Drawings are adequately detailed and available. According to the<br />

design the crest level of the embankments has been fixed to 18.80 metres. At the time of the field trip it<br />

was suggested that at the completed sections the current crest level was 18,80 metres. At several places<br />

visited, e.g. near Den Amstel, at Richmond, it was observed that during high tide considerable<br />

overtopping occurs which lead to erosion at the land side of the embankment.<br />

According to the final design report (2004) “with regard to the crest level, due to the partially unfavourable soil<br />

characteristics and the danger of collapse of the structure, it has been suggested that the effective crest level should be initially<br />

kept at a lower level, until at a later stage, the conditions allow to be raised to the appropriate level. With this concept in<br />

mind, the initial design life of the crest level shall be lower than the service life time in the structure. It was suggested to<br />

adopt an initial 10 year design life for the crest level and wave overtopping and then extend it to the 30-years.”<br />

In follow up discussions the following information was obtained from DHV, the monitoring firm:<br />

Current crest levels:<br />

‐ Region 2: (Essequibo Coast) Crest level at +18.60 mGD; embankment at 18.30 mGD. Slope<br />

1:3, no berm)<br />

‐ Region 3: Tuschen: crest level at 18.80 mGD, embankment at 18.55 mGD, slope 1:3, no berm;<br />

‐ Region 3: DeKinderen: near fishing village): West of sluice: low crest construction in the zone<br />

in front of the mocha mocha bush and balck sand. Crest level of low crest structure 17.00m-<br />

17.40mDG, embankment: 17,40 mGD. East of Sluice primary sea defence crest levelat<br />

18.00mGD. Secondary dea defence structure crest level at 18.00 m<br />

‐ Hague: crest level at 18.80 mGD, embankment at 18.55 meter, slope 1:3, berm of 4 meters at<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 1


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

4.00 mGD<br />

‐ Blankenburg at 18.70 mGD, embankment at 18,70mGD slope 1:4, berm of 5 meters at 16,40<br />

meters;<br />

‐ According to the information the current crest levels include an expected sea water rise of 20<br />

centimeters over the next 15-20 years.<br />

‐ The above indicates that the current crest level is the final crest level at this stage and if needed<br />

additional workswill have to be done in the years to come to reduce or stop the overtopping of<br />

the waves and hence erosion. There is however no information about availability of additional<br />

funds to increase the level of the crest;<br />

‐ DHV states that the current erosion results from the lack of vegetation of the embankment<br />

structure and the limited setting of the surface and due prone to erosion;<br />

‐ All repairs will be done before the contractors completes the works;<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

AGRIFOR:<br />

Elaboration<br />

study: final<br />

propject<br />

proposal<br />

0104<br />

MMcDonald:<br />

Feasiblity<br />

study, Final,<br />

0806<br />

JC 2.3<br />

I 2.3.1<br />

I 2.3.1<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> intervention has contributed to the setting up of a sustainable sea defence<br />

management and maintenance system<br />

The capacity to monitor water levels in view of flood risks and conditions at the seafront by<br />

local stakeholders.<br />

According to GoG/<strong>Commission</strong> planning there is room for stakeholders to be involved in the planning<br />

and also implementation of the functions of the sea defence.<br />

At Sea defences policy level priorities are expressed in the NDS, PRSP, MDG, PSIP. Each document,<br />

at the basis of flood protection, has in a varying degree a focus on the involvement and on the<br />

functioning of the local –beneficiary- structure. The NDS (1993-2000) places great emphasis on<br />

maintenance capacity, management of mangrove forests and establishment of sea defence maintenance<br />

tax. PRSP does by nature is focussed at the social and economical domain of the beneficiaries and needs<br />

further development to bring it to the local structures for instance building maintenance and/or<br />

observer capacity to participate in the programme.<br />

The Sea defences legislative framework incl. the Sea Defences Act (2), the Environmental Protection<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 2


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Act and the Drainage and Irrigation Act. The SDA -1998 version- enables the government to create Sea<br />

defences districts, develop central and decentralised maintenance capacity, regulate offences and<br />

imposition of penalties, etc. The EPA provides the establishment of semi-autonomous bodies, including<br />

local level, and coordinates an integrated coastal zone management programme. A number of reports<br />

mentions the overexploitation of the mangrove vegetation, by the government, local communities and<br />

external players and the role local communities could play to prevent for overexploitation.<br />

Key institutions are the Ministry of Public Works and Communication, Sea Defence Board, SRDD,<br />

Environmental Protection Agency and others.<br />

In the field few local dwellers were met. It appeared that neither the Neighbourhood Democratic<br />

Council nor the locally based SRDD office have been involved with the project cycle of the project. In a<br />

statement of the Minister of Public Works and Communication it was also foreseen that the<br />

beneficiaries would be involved in monitoring of the sea defence infrastructures in terms of basic<br />

maintenance and the measuring of water levels. This has not yet been followed up.<br />

Experience in other developing countries has shown that local communities, provided their leaders have<br />

access to formal structures and the programmes are of benefit to them, are interested to participate in<br />

flood control programmes, proper usage of flood prevention systems through local CBOs/structures. It<br />

should be noted that in documents available, including the latest planning documents (MMDonald),<br />

linkage of the formal and informal structures has not been worked out in detail.<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

MMcDonald,<br />

9 th EDF,<br />

CSP ’02-’07,<br />

Haskoning<br />

ICB<br />

evaluation<br />

2005<br />

MRs,<br />

Haskoning,<br />

ICB<br />

I 2.3.2<br />

I 2.3.2<br />

I.2.3.3<br />

I 2.3.3<br />

Number of contingency plans for higher tide levels<br />

Floods Contingency planning is mentioned in the CSP ’02-’07 as a ‘major intervention’. It has been<br />

included in different training programmes. At the level of SRDD there was no information of<br />

Contingency planning updated or applied from the input provided in the EDF 7,8 capacity development<br />

programme.<br />

Sea defence management systems and related staff capacity have been established and are<br />

effective<br />

The national policy and legislative framework are adequate. But the institutional framework is not<br />

supportive and hampers the efforts of the Sea Defence Board and of the SRDD to carry out their<br />

functions adequately.<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 3


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

GUA 005<br />

evaluation<br />

2005, Agrifor,<br />

0104,<br />

MMcDonald<br />

0806, FA<br />

EDF IX,<br />

Sea defences management hinges on two major components, which are, firstly, the organisational<br />

structure and required functions and secondly the availability of human resources to fulfil the tasks.<br />

Currently the Sea Defence Board has a number of recognised weaknesses (e.g. unclear allocation of<br />

responsibilities and duplication with the Min.PW & Comm, too large and a diverse membership, no<br />

direct access to funding and bank accounts, no internal annual planning and reporting, lack of a<br />

permanent secretariat, etc.) The SRDD, which is supposed to be the operations arm from SDB shows a<br />

large number of weaknesses (MMcDonald) which prevent it from being to a reasonable extend<br />

operational. Over and above there is a consensus in the documentation that the department gained little<br />

from the extensive training programmes under 8 th , 9 th EDF as most documents indicate that trained<br />

staff left the department for other lucrative employment outside government quite soon after being<br />

trained.<br />

In the sequence of 5 MR over the period 2001-’06 the above is confirmed and there is a general trend in<br />

the area of ICB of limited delivery at Result and OO level. In the MR the project scores well in<br />

Relevance but increasing low in Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability.<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

Guyana National Water Board<br />

Currently, a National Water Board is being established within the Ministry of Water and Housing. It is<br />

composed of experts in the water sector. This is an advisory group and it was due to be appointed by<br />

the minister in December 2007. The first mandate of Board will be to to draft a national water policy.<br />

The key question will be whether this Board will also be equipped with an executive secretariat.<br />

Following the National Water policy it is most likely that the Board will be tasked with the restructuring<br />

of the water and sanitation sector in Guyana.<br />

I 2.3.4 Sea defence routine-maintenance and repair staff capacity has been established and is effective<br />

CSP/9 th EDF I 2.3.4 Actual procedures and conduct of maintenance work at the sea defence structures is in the<br />

documentation limited reported or virtually absent. Funding of routine maintenance is from a GoG<br />

allocation for emergency works included in the annual budget estimates. Most of these funds are used<br />

for repair stead of –sustainable- maintenance.<br />

The concept of sustainable maintenance is not –yet- applied although stressed in all documents. As the<br />

maintenance requirement of most of the new structures is limited GoG has insufficiently provided<br />

procedures, budget and HR as note above. The lack of Maintenance is facilitated by a –natural?-<br />

reduction of sea water incursions and inundations over the past period. In the medium and longer term<br />

it must be expected however that serious periodic inundation will occur if long term maintenance policy,<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 4


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

9 ACP<br />

GUA<br />

005/8ACP<br />

GUA 005<br />

MMcDonald,<br />

CSP/NIP<br />

8 th EDF<br />

NIP,<br />

MMcDonald<br />

MMcDonald,<br />

CSP/NIP,<br />

FA<br />

I 2.3.5<br />

I 2.3.5<br />

I 2.3.6<br />

I 2.3.6<br />

JC 2.4<br />

I 2.4.1<br />

I 2.4.1<br />

annual funding and financial reservation form internal and external sources and sustainable technical<br />

maintenance capacity is developed in the organisation is not put in place. Effective sustainable<br />

maintenance will reduce also frequent and sizeable repairs.<br />

National budget provision for maintenance and operation of the sea-defence systems<br />

Currently budgeting for sustainable maintenance, whereby local structures and beneficiaries play a role is<br />

extremely limited. With the development of sustainable maintenance capacity on the short/long term<br />

considerable expenditure resulting from inundations will be prevented. Against these savings for damage<br />

repair and rehabilitation it may be expected GoG to provide for reservations from internal as well as<br />

external sources and a medium to long term maintenance plan.<br />

Evidence of beneficiary - in particular household - involvement in management and<br />

maintenance of the established structures<br />

The 8 th EDF NIP explicitly mentions that it will “foster active participation of the coastal belt<br />

population to the maintenance of the coastal equipments and to the protection of the sea coast. There is<br />

however no participation of the local decentralised government structures in the operation and<br />

maintenance of the sea defences works.<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> support to infrastructure has enabled the protection of livelihoods and dwellings<br />

of the coastal belt population<br />

Evidence that the pursuit of maximum impact on the livelihoods and dwellings of the coastal<br />

belt population has been a selection criteria in identifying the infrastructures rehabilitated<br />

(studies, public consultations)<br />

None of the documents consulted reported that the population targeted by the sea defences<br />

interventions has been a criterion in identifying the sea defences to be rehabilitated.<br />

I 2.4.2 Acreage under cultivation in coastal areas protected<br />

- I 2.4.2 This indicator could not be completed due to a lack of data. In July 2007 a Socio-Economic Survey and<br />

Public Awareness Programme (SESPAP) has been set in motion. It will develop key socio-economic<br />

information from the geographical area and the beneficiaries from the sea defence works. The results of<br />

this study are however not been made public so far.<br />

I 2.4.3 Number of dwellings in coastal areas protected<br />

- I 2.4.3 This indicator could not be completed due to a lack of data. In July 2007 a Socio-Economic Survey and<br />

Public Awareness Programme (SESPAP) has been set in motion. Itwill develop key socio-economic<br />

information from the geographical area and the beneficiaries from the sea defence works. The results of<br />

this study are however not been made public so far.<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 5


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

I 2.4.4<br />

I 2.4.4<br />

I 2.4.5<br />

I 2.4.5<br />

Number of very small enterprises or estimated size of informal productive activities in coastal<br />

areas protected<br />

This indicator could not be completed due to a lack of data. In July 2007 a Socio-Economic Survey and<br />

Public Awareness Programme (SESPAP) has been set in motion and will develop key socio-economic<br />

information from the geographical area and the beneficiaries from the sea defence works. The results of<br />

this study are however not been made public so far.<br />

Evidence that the value of property and land in the coastal belt has increased due to greater<br />

flood control<br />

This indicator could not be completed due to a lack of data. In July 2007 a Socio-Economic Survey and<br />

Public Awareness Programme (SESPAP) has been set in motion. It will develop key socio-economic<br />

information from the geographical area and the beneficiaries from the sea defence works. The results of<br />

this study are however not been made public so far.<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 6


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

FA, Evaluation<br />

report, 8 th EDF<br />

NIP<br />

EQ3<br />

JC 3.1<br />

I 3.1.1<br />

I 3.1.1<br />

To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to private sector strengthening and<br />

ultimately to sustainably restoring and increasing Guyana’s production capacity?<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> interventions were in line with the CSP/NIP strategy<br />

Degree of alignment of the programmes IL with the IL of the NIP/CSP<br />

The initial logical framework of the LEAP programme is in line with the 8 th EDF NIP.<br />

- The results of the programme consist in business support services, vocational training and financial services<br />

and are therefore in line with the activities of the 8 th EDF NIP.<br />

- The purpose of the programme is the development of the local market for business advisory services to attract<br />

new national and foreign investment and is in line with the outputs of the 8 th EDF NIP.<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 8<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 8<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 8<br />

Evaluation<br />

report<br />

Mid-term<br />

evaluation, 8 th<br />

EDF NIP<br />

Mid-term<br />

evaluation, 8 th<br />

EDF NIP<br />

I 3.1.1<br />

I 3.1.1<br />

I 3.1.1<br />

The revised logical framework (January 2005) is also in line with the 8 th EDF NIP.<br />

- The results of the programmes focus on the availability of business services, the creation of new SMEs,<br />

and on the strengthening of new private enterprises.<br />

- The purpose of the programme aims at increasing sustainable employment opportunities.<br />

The LEAP programme is aligned to the national priorities and answers to the problems identified both in the<br />

NDS and the PRSP. LEAP is one of the PRSP’s special intervention programs.<br />

The logical framework of the GTA programme is in line with the 8 th EDF NIP.<br />

- The results of the programme mainly consist in training.<br />

- The purpose of the programme is the enhancement of the competence of work force and is in line with<br />

the outputs of the 8 th EDF NIP.<br />

The GTA is committed to support the objectives of the PRSP and the NDS, focussing on the restoration and<br />

improvement of the productive capacity through upgrading and training.<br />

I 3.1.2 Discrepancies between the programmes and the strategy are explicitly justified<br />

FA I 3.1.2 There are no discrepancies between the programmes and the strategy<br />

Mid-term<br />

evaluation<br />

I 3.1.2<br />

I 3.1.3<br />

There are no discrepancies between the programmes and the strategy<br />

Degree of alignment of <strong>Commission</strong> interventions with the NDS and the National Competitiveness<br />

Strategy for Guyana<br />

NDS, NCS I 3.1.3 The NDS underlines that the role of the private sector in the growth and development of Guyana’s economy is<br />

of strong importance. During the 1980s and the 1990s, the private sector suffered from a declining economy<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 1


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

and the absence of a national policy on private sector development. The NDS identified several challenges that<br />

the Private sector development suffers from. Industrial development concentrated on the export of a few<br />

primary commodities and manufacturing has been neglected. The marketing capacity is poor: the domestic<br />

market size is too small and Guyana’s exports are mostly earmarked for CARICOM markets. Access to financial<br />

assistance to invest is also difficult. Moreover enterprises fail to retain skilled labour force who have been<br />

trained at their expense.<br />

The GoG drafted a National Competitiveness Strategy to deal with these issues. It identified the core supplyside<br />

impediments to competitiveness: a workforce with low productivity and narrow skill base, a weak<br />

vocational and technical training system, an insufficient access to affordable finance for investment and working<br />

capital, etc. The core elements of the competitiveness policy focus on: an incentive structure, investment,<br />

human resources, BDS, Infrastructure, Finance, the legal system and the export information and marketing.<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> interventions, which focused on BDS, training and financial services, are therefore in line with the<br />

GoG priorities in private sector development.<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 8<br />

JC 3.2 Interventions in Guyana are in line with the best practices identified in PSD Evaluation<br />

I 3.2.1 Evidence that a methodological procedure has been adopted to select the areas of intervention to<br />

support PSD in Guyana<br />

Identification I 3.2.1 The LEAP programme has been designed following an identification study for the economic diversification of<br />

study for the<br />

Linden realised in October 1999. An analysis and diagnosis of the Linden region has been realised to formulate<br />

economic<br />

the project. The study recommends that the project should support the future diversification of the economic<br />

diversification<br />

base in the Linden area, helping it to move from reliance on the bauxite industry to alternative sources of<br />

of Linden<br />

economic growth. Indeed, the future of the bauxite mining in Linden is uncertain. The study highlights that the<br />

(1999)<br />

insufficient employment opportunities in Linden are due to a poorly developed private sector, an unskilled<br />

labour pool, weak local institutions and a lack of infrastructure that enhances business development. The private<br />

sector of Linden is poorly developed because of a poor access to capital and credit, enterprise skills are poorly<br />

developed, a lack of incentives to promote manufacturing, and a small local market. The study recommends that<br />

the focus of the project is almost entirely on support to micro, small and medium start-up or existing enterprises<br />

in Linden in the private sector. The support measures proposed mainly focus on 3 areas of intervention:<br />

business development services, financial services, and vocational training.<br />

FA, MR I 3.2.1 The GTA programme has been designed following a pre-feasibility study and a “Training Programme Guyana –<br />

Inception report”. The area of intervention –training- has been chosen after an analysis of Guyana PSD and<br />

training sectors main features. Indeed, the private sector organisations in Guyana have identified the dearth of<br />

skilled human resources as one of the main factors hindering improvement of the country’s productive capacity<br />

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and still insufficiently addressed by GoG’s or donor activities. The vocational training sector in Guyana is<br />

characterized by a lack of capacity to produce skilled workers adapted to the needs of modern production units.<br />

The GoG’s Education Policy encourages the involvement of private sector in vocational training. Therefore, the<br />

project’s main component is the creation of a Training Agency which will identify and enable training<br />

companies, facilitate qualification of instructional personnel, design courses based on identified needs and<br />

improve in-plant training facilities. According to the 2001 MR, the project is very relevant in view of the limited<br />

possibilities in the country for vocational training and the project design is based on a good situation analysis<br />

and covers the need industry has for good in-company training.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

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EGEVAL<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

Identification<br />

study for the<br />

economic<br />

diversification<br />

of Linden<br />

(1999)<br />

I 3.2.2<br />

I 3.2.2<br />

Evidence that the key constraints conditioning success in the areas of intervention have been<br />

addressed<br />

The identification study of the LEAP programme identified the key constraints of the areas of<br />

intervention selected for the project.<br />

- Business Development Services: due to the long term dependency on Linmine, little or no<br />

manufacturing tradition has developed in the area. The business community identified the main<br />

factors to account for the difficulties Linden has faced in diversifying its economy: the adding of<br />

value through processing of primary commodities is hardly practised, the step from producing<br />

for a local market to export markets is large, lack of readily available credit or long term<br />

financing, no organisation specifically geared towards business promotion within the Linden<br />

area.<br />

- Financial services: the formal banking institutions provide no specific facilities for small scale<br />

credit and no business support facilities in Linden. The Institute of Private Enterprise<br />

Development IPED is active in Linden providing financial services to small scale productive<br />

enterprises but its portfolio in Linden has gone down over the years due to a lack of demand.<br />

- Training: Accompanying the decline in the bauxite industry, there has been considerable outmigration<br />

of educated and skilled personnel from the town. The Linden Technical Institute has<br />

only little capacity to provide technical and vocational training in those areas where new<br />

employment opportunities exist.<br />

Moreover, the identification study followed a participatory approach to the identification of the<br />

opportunities and constraints and to the development of an economic diversification programme in<br />

Linden. Consultations have been held with all the parties involved: DEC, other donors, public sector<br />

officials, private sector representatives and members of the financial community. A number of<br />

stakeholder and beneficiary meetings were held in Linden to interact on potential interventions,<br />

implementation issues including their sustainability.<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 8<br />

Mid-Term<br />

evaluation<br />

I 3.2.2<br />

Guyana’s dearth of skilled human resources as a major impediment to the improvement of the country’s<br />

productive capacity has been correctly assessed. The last MR indeed points out that the design of the<br />

project does not need to be adapted since professional training is desperately needed. But, one key<br />

constraint has not been addressed in the design of the project: the migration of skilled technical and key<br />

management personnel. In addition to the problem of insufficient qualification of workers, company<br />

managers stressed the problem of high emigration rates. The unfavourable changes in the economy have<br />

increased the migration of skilled workers and professional workers and this is posing a risk for<br />

employers considering training.<br />

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8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

FA,<br />

Evaluation<br />

report<br />

I 3.2.3<br />

I 3.2.3<br />

The Guyana Training Agency – Inception report followed a participatory approach: briefing meetings<br />

with the DEC and the Private Sector <strong>Commission</strong> were held; some of the major stakeholders both in<br />

the training sector as well as from the donor community were consulted. Several companies expressed<br />

their willingness to accommodate training on their premises using their facilities and to send trainees to<br />

other companies for training and pay for it.<br />

Evidence that the coherence & complementarities between areas of intervention have been<br />

maximized<br />

The LEAP programme focuses on 3 main complementary areas of interventions: business development<br />

services, financial services and training.<br />

It has seven different components: Business development Unit, Business incubator, LEAF, Inward<br />

Investment Facility, Training, development of local capacity for economic planning and project design,<br />

and identification of infrastructure constraints to economic development.<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 8<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

Annual<br />

Report 2006<br />

I 3.2.3<br />

JC 3.3<br />

I.3.3.1<br />

I.3.3.1<br />

The Consultative Association of Guyanese Industry (CAGI) is a training centre that already exists. There<br />

is therefore a risk of overlapping of training activities.<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> support to private sector development in Business Development Services (BDS)<br />

has been conducive to enhanced SME activity<br />

Market for business services increased<br />

LEAP aimed at increasing the availability of market for business services and successfully met its targets.<br />

It is indeed essential to keep in mind that the market for BAS in Linden is very small.<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

Annual<br />

Report 2006<br />

I 3.3.2<br />

I 3.3.2<br />

Aim of the LEAP by 2009 Until 2006 Cumulative (%)<br />

2 privately run business advisory services (BAS) 4 200%<br />

agencies established and utilised<br />

10 BAS businesses established 1 10%<br />

Number of local market SME beneficiaries<br />

Until 2006, 25 small enterprises benefited form the incubator created by LEAP. The targets in terms of<br />

BAS provided and BAS workshops executed are also met.<br />

Aim of the LEAP by 2009 Until 2006 Cumulative (%)<br />

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8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

> 35 BAS workshops executed 43 123%<br />

200 BAS provided per year 574 114%<br />

300 active clients per year 2002-06: 1500 693 46%<br />

30 entrepreneurs benefit from the Incubator 25 83%<br />

I.3.3.3 Evidence of encouragement of know-how and technologies & support to cooperation between<br />

industry and scientific research<br />

I.3.3.3 There is definitely no such evidence. LEAP is mainly providing support to the agricultural sector, and<br />

apart from the exchanges of experience between farmers of different regions in Guyana or countries in<br />

the Caribbean, one can not state that LEAP facilitates cooperation between industry and scientific<br />

research.<br />

I 3.3.4 Evidence of the impact of BDS on SME competitiveness<br />

Field Mission I 3.3.4 The NCS stresses that many Guyanese enterprises suffer from a number of deficiencies in BDS which<br />

affect their ability to effectively compete. The BDS market in Guyana is deficient in both quality and<br />

quantity in a number of critical areas. There are not many BDS suppliers operating in Guyana and their<br />

range of services is limited.<br />

LEAP is providing support to private sector development in BDS through 2 main components: the<br />

Business Development Unit and the Business Incubator. The BDU provides BAS dealing with<br />

management and organisation issues whereas the BI provides support for start-up businesses.<br />

The MTR already stressed the beneficiaries’ satisfaction with LEAP services. Several interviews with the<br />

beneficiaries conducted during the field mission allowed the evaluation team to appreciate the impacts<br />

of the BDS provided by LEAP on SME competitiveness in Linden.<br />

The BAS component helped to build the capacity of the community. It created or supported already<br />

existing associations in the region (the national craft association, the tourism association, the logging<br />

association, the farmers association – the last one being created through LEAP). The associations<br />

provide services to their members and the LEAP provides physical capacities to these associations.<br />

The incubator (beyond the schedule for 2 years) is nowadays providing support to around 10 small<br />

enterprises in Linden through provision of subsidized facilities, training and advice and allows the<br />

enterprises to grow. One beneficiary has criticized the lack of practicality of the approach of the LEAP<br />

and the lack of skills of the PMU staff in terms of accounting and HRD. The establishment of a second<br />

incubator for industrial enterprises is planned.<br />

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Moreover, a business centre has been created whereas it was not foreseen at the design of the<br />

programme. This is the only facility of this kind in the country.<br />

Finally, a call centre has been established in Linden: it employs 50 people and plans to hire until 120<br />

employees. LEAP helped to recruit the employees and provides advice.<br />

Focus on the Farmers’ Association<br />

This association has been created through the assistance of LEAP and is nowadays the most important<br />

farmers’ association of the Caribbean. LEAP provided several BDS:<br />

- technological transfers through exchanges of experience with farmers from Trinidad and<br />

Jamaica<br />

- training in commercial management<br />

- training in accounting, farm management, poultry etc<br />

- financing of their website<br />

- visits to other farmers’ associations in Guyana<br />

- Registration of the association<br />

- Helping the farmers to get access to land<br />

Since the creation of the association in 2005, the farmers’ production has significantly improved due to<br />

the transfers of technologies from Trinidad regarding tomatoes’ production for example. This allowed<br />

them to produce for commercial purposes and to improve their incomes.<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

LEAF<br />

reports and<br />

Field mission<br />

LEAP<br />

Annual<br />

report 2006<br />

and Field<br />

mission<br />

JC 3.4<br />

I 3.4.1<br />

I 3.4.1<br />

I 3.4.2<br />

I 3.4.2<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> support to private sector development in financial services has been conducive to<br />

increased SME activity<br />

Number of beneficiary SME<br />

509 loans have been disbursed as at end of September 2007, but it is impossible to know how many<br />

enterprises benefited from the loans. This data is not provided in the LEAF reports.<br />

Volume of financing<br />

1. The aim was that LEAF money was fully disbursed by early 2006 (€m1.9). This goal is achieved at<br />

66.7% at the end of 2006. This is a very positive result due to the crisis LEAF had to go through in<br />

between October 2005-August 2007.<br />

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EGEVAL<br />

Aim of LEAF by<br />

2006<br />

LEAF money fully<br />

disbursed : 1.9€m<br />

(=518.1$m)<br />

Until 2006 Achieved<br />

(Percentage)<br />

345.1$m 66.7%<br />

On October 2005, the Office of <strong>Commission</strong>er of Insurance (OCI) issued a statement which stated that<br />

the GUYFLAG (insurance company in charge of the management of LEAF funds) was to cease its<br />

operations due to alleged irregularities committed by GUYFLAG in conducting its insurance business.<br />

In 2005 and 2006, the matter was largely unresolved. Consequently, no new funds were made available<br />

and loans could only be made out of repayments received. In August 2007, the EC delegation judged<br />

that the 4 criteria required to continue the contract were met and decided that the EU will continue with<br />

funding.<br />

2. The initial aim of LEAF was to provide credits to micro-enterprises (12 employees). LEAF has achieved its<br />

goals as far as micro-enterprises are concerned but has not met its targets regarding small and<br />

medium enterprises.<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

Annual<br />

report 2006<br />

and Field<br />

mission<br />

I 3.4.3<br />

I 3.4.3<br />

Aim of LEAF by<br />

2009<br />

Until 2006 Achieved<br />

(Percentage)<br />

300 micro-credits 347 115%<br />

disbursed<br />

200 sm./medium<br />

credits disbursed<br />

98 49%<br />

Quality of the financing (recovery rate)<br />

It is difficult to assess the performance of the funds because LEAF has only been operating for 2 years.<br />

At the end of 2006, micro-credits have been recollected at 28% and small and medium credits have been<br />

recollected at 4%. The recovery rate is therefore not satisfying at this stage. However, Guyflag has still<br />

some time ahead (until 2009) to recollect the credits. Moreover, this situation is mainly due to the crisis<br />

encountered by LEAF since October 2005. Some clients still have the perception that they might soon<br />

not be liable to GUYFLAG for the loans received. This situation is resulting in numerous cases of nonperforming<br />

clients.<br />

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8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

LEAF<br />

reports<br />

I 3.4.4<br />

I 3.4.4<br />

Aim of LEAF by<br />

2009<br />

Until 2006 Achieved<br />

(Percentage)<br />

300 micro-credits 85 28%<br />

recollected<br />

200 sm./medium<br />

credits recollected<br />

8 4%<br />

Economic activities targeted by LEAF<br />

1. As a whole, LEAF mainly targeted the primary sector (forestry and agriculture). It also supported the<br />

development of the tertiary sector (vending and services). LEAF has however not supported the growth<br />

of the manufacturing sector.<br />

Main sectors targeted by LEAF<br />

Share<br />

Forestry 31%<br />

Agriculture 16%<br />

Services 21%<br />

Vending 16%<br />

Manufacturing 3%<br />

Agriculture, Forestry, Manufacturing and Tourism are indeed the 4 growth sectors identified by the<br />

Regional Development Strategy for Region 10 and one could therefore note the alignment of LEAF<br />

with the future priorities of the Region but also criticize LEAF for not having supported the<br />

manufacturing sector.<br />

2. The tertiary sector mainly benefited from micro-loans whereas the primary sector mainly benefited<br />

from small and medium loans.<br />

LEAF Micro-loans per sector (3 main sectors presented)<br />

Share<br />

Vending 45%<br />

Agriculture 20%<br />

Services 18%<br />

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LEAF Small loans per sector (3 main sectors presented)<br />

Share<br />

Services 31%<br />

Forestry 27%<br />

Agriculture 18%<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

LEAF Medium loans per sector<br />

Share<br />

Forestry 81%<br />

Agriculture 12%<br />

Manufacturing 7%<br />

I 3.4.5 Evidence of the impact of financial services on SME competitiveness<br />

Field mission I 3.4.4 We do not have sufficient data to complete this indicator.<br />

The NCS identified the challenges faced by enterprises in Guyana in accessing finance:<br />

- Limited range of financial institutions limiting the supply of loans: the range of financial<br />

institutions in Guyana is fairly limited and Banks do not offer financial services. The relative<br />

importance of investments of the banking system in the enterprise sector has been on a<br />

decrease.<br />

- Relatively high interest rates which affect the competitiveness of Guyana’s products. Interest<br />

rates for lending to enterprises range between 8% and 18%. Annual micro-finance rates<br />

fluctuate around 15% flat.<br />

- Limited capacity of the banks to appraise long-term projects<br />

The interviews conducted in the field also clearly stressed the lack of access to financial resources as an<br />

impediment to the growth of the economic activity. There is indeed a strong demand for credit in<br />

Linden but only one commercial bank; the remaining ones being in Georgetown. Moreover, the interest<br />

rates offered by banks prevent people from borrowing funds. Therefore, the existence of LEAF on the<br />

one hand and the 15% interest rate proposed on the other hand allow potential investors to borrow<br />

funds in order to start or expand a business. One should however keep in mind that the PSD evaluation<br />

stressed that the EC should avoid programmes aimed just at the provision of credit lines.<br />

LEAF had strong impacts: it stimulated economic activities and fostered the entrepreneurship spirit of<br />

Region 10. Most of the funds allocated are micro-loans and it has not been possible to supply medium-<br />

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EGEVAL<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 8<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 8<br />

Final<br />

Evaluation<br />

report, 2005<br />

Final<br />

Evaluation<br />

Report, 2005<br />

JC 3.5<br />

I 3.5.1<br />

I 3.5.1<br />

size enterprises. The impacts have however been constrained by the problems encountered by Guyflag<br />

and could have been greater.<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> support to private sector development in training has been conducive to increased<br />

SME competitiveness<br />

Number of beneficiary enterprises<br />

The project successfully passed performance indicators. Training needs were assessed in 208 companies<br />

and institutions.<br />

Original Planning Initial Project<br />

Overall Achievements<br />

according to Planning<br />

Core Activities<br />

by July 31, 2004 (3<br />

Feasibility Study (3 until April 30, 2003 4<br />

years)<br />

years)<br />

(2 years)<br />

Assessment of<br />

done in 208 companies<br />

not quantified 30 companies<br />

training needs<br />

and institutions<br />

I 3.5.2 Number of trained people<br />

I 3.5.2 The GTA programme has successfully met its targets. A total of 50 short-term courses with 498<br />

participants were delivered. In addition, 66 trainees participated in 7 long-term courses. Finally, a total of<br />

159 certified assessors and instructors were in the system at end of project.<br />

Core Activities<br />

Delivery of Short<br />

Term Training<br />

Delivery of Long<br />

Term Training<br />

Assessment of<br />

Training Courses<br />

and Students<br />

Certification of<br />

Students<br />

Original Planning<br />

according to<br />

Feasibility Study (3<br />

years)<br />

84 courses<br />

1,260 participants<br />

6 long term courses (12<br />

months)<br />

120 participants<br />

not quantified<br />

Initial Project<br />

Planning<br />

until April 30, 2003 5<br />

(2 years)<br />

20 training courses<br />

240 participants<br />

3 long term courses<br />

(no # of participants<br />

stated)<br />

no indicator<br />

Overall Achievements<br />

by July 31, 2004 (3<br />

years)<br />

50 training courses<br />

498 participants<br />

7 traineeships (6<br />

months)<br />

66 participants<br />

50 courses / 478<br />

students assessed<br />

not quantified no indicator 339 participants<br />

certified<br />

Upgrading of 62 person months 45 Instructors 159 Instructors and<br />

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Instructors and<br />

Assessors<br />

(corresponding to a one<br />

week training of 248<br />

participants)<br />

Assessors upgraded<br />

The crime situation in Guyana has always been an impediment to evening courses.<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

Annual<br />

Report 2006<br />

I 3.5.2<br />

LEAP training activities, in terms of number of people trained, are satisfactorily meeting the goals.<br />

Aim of LEAP by 2009<br />

Until<br />

2006<br />

Cumulative<br />

(Percentage)<br />

300 young people trained in business literacy 125 42%<br />

150 young people benefit from in-service employment 330 220%<br />

training<br />

Specialised training for 100 people/year 368 368%<br />

LEAP trained 1,079 people over the period 2002-2006.<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 8<br />

Number of people trained by LEAP per year:<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total<br />

132 195 320 195 237 1,079<br />

I 3.5.3 Evidence of the impact of training on SME competitiveness<br />

NCS I 3.5.3 The NCS identifies investments in skills as a vital pre-condition for improved national competitiveness.<br />

The strategy also seeks to ensure that these skills can be retained in the country and not simply exported<br />

via the brain drain. The main challenges in education relate to vocational and technical training where<br />

there are large gaps in provision and a resulting shortage of skilled, technical labour force.<br />

Approximately 3,500 people are trained annually in Guyana. The GTA project is indeed recognized as a<br />

recent success by the strategy. High levels of migration, especially of skilled people, are also continuing<br />

to create a huge gap in the supply of labour. The NCS stresses that it will be a long-term process to<br />

address the brain drain issue and also explores strategies to mitigate the impact of the loss of skills from<br />

Guyana through migration policies.<br />

Final<br />

Evaluation<br />

I 3.5.3<br />

At micro level, the involved companies acknowledge the impact of focussed individual-designed<br />

training. The involved companies have been satisfied with the training and it is expected that results will<br />

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report, 2005<br />

have a positive impact on employee performance and production.<br />

Customer satisfaction exercises and impact assessments were carried out on a regular basis as part of the<br />

monitoring exercise. The overall reaction to GTA training was clearly favourable with about 80% of<br />

responses replying that the service came up to their expectations.<br />

The overall impact of the project was however limited due to the small size of the organisation, the<br />

limited number of clients, the general state of the economy and the availability of alternative training.<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

Annual<br />

Report 2006<br />

I 3.5.3<br />

LEAP, through its training component, clearly has a strategy to improve technical vocational and<br />

management skills. LEAP conducted training programmes in specific sectors such as agriculture,<br />

forestry, sewing, fabric and garment design, craft, etc which would allow the participants to generate<br />

income from the skills imparted. LEAP also designed and conducted training programmes to assist the<br />

entrepreneurs to improve the management of their businesses, in the areas of book keeping &<br />

accountancy, and in computer applications for small business. Finally, LEAP conducted training in<br />

Portuguese, job readiness, capacity building and project management. All these trainings increase the<br />

skills of the participants and implicitly contribute to the improvement of the competitiveness of their<br />

business.<br />

8 ACP<br />

GUA 8<br />

Final<br />

evaluation<br />

report, 2005<br />

I 3.5.3<br />

On a macro lever, the GTA project caused no significant change. Although the GTA provision of<br />

technical training has disappeared, the need for technical training, which was at the origin of the GTA,<br />

remains. Nothing has filled the vacuum left by the GTA, and nothing looks likely to do so. There is<br />

currently no consensus within the private sector on what the training needs are and how they can be<br />

met. There is little dialogue between the public and private sectors on training issues. The TVET<br />

Council will come into existence as a result of the TVET Act, but whether it will have the money or the<br />

will to make the necessary innovations remains to be seen. The private sector is still not able to retain<br />

skilled workforce from migration. Guyana lacks a national policy on migration of its skilled workforce.<br />

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8<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

9<br />

8<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

8<br />

8<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

9<br />

JC 3.6 Results achieved by <strong>Commission</strong> support are maintained after the end of its direct support<br />

I 3.6.1 Explicit reference in the FA to measures to ensure sustainability<br />

FA I 3.6.1 There is no explicit reference in the FA to measures to ensure sustainability. We can however suppose that 2 out of the 7<br />

activities of the programme might contribute to ensure sustainability: technical and management training, and<br />

development of local capacity for economic planning, project design and implementation.<br />

FA I 3.6.1 There is an explicit reference in the FA to measures to ensure sustainability: “The beneficiary companies provide<br />

resources for the training and contribute to the running cost of the agency itself. In year 3, the cost of the training agency<br />

can nearly be financed out of the user fees.”<br />

Evaluation<br />

report,<br />

MR, Field<br />

mission<br />

I<br />

3.6.2<br />

I 3.6.2<br />

Evidence that the benefits continue to be used after the end of the intervention<br />

The end date of the LEAP programme is January 2009. At the time of the design of the programme, no exit strategy has<br />

been foreseen. The LEAP 2 nd Mid-Term review did not provide any exit issue. There are ongoing discussions on the<br />

sustainability of the programme but key stakeholders think that these discussions should have taken place before.<br />

On the EC Delegation side, an extension of the programme is not foreseen. The LEAP belongs in the end to the GoG<br />

and the local authorities must own the project.<br />

National support for the programme is strong but eventual sustainability of the LEAP relies on the existence of<br />

strengthened local institutions able to take over the programme. The financial allocations for institutional strengthening<br />

represent 2.4% of the LEAP budget and do not appear sufficient enough to strengthen properly local institutions. Until<br />

now, public and private organisations do not have sufficient capacity to undertake LEAP’s activities.<br />

In terms of institutional strengthening, LEAP focused on key stakeholder institutions having a direct impact on the<br />

economic development of the Region such as the Regional Democratic Council and the Linden Chamber of Commerce,<br />

Industry and Development. Support to the LCICD (hiring of an executive coordinator for 17 months, rewriting of the<br />

Chamber’s constitution, etc) has been disappointing and the capacities of the LCICD are still very weak.<br />

Aim of LEAP by 2009 Until 2006 Cumulative (%)<br />

The Linden Chamber of Industry<br />

Commerce & development<br />

comprises 100 members<br />

33 33%<br />

Support to the RDC has been much more fruitful: a junior economic planner has been recruited to assist in the writing of<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 1


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

8<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

8<br />

MR, Midterm<br />

evaluation,<br />

Final<br />

Evaluation,<br />

LEAP<br />

Evaluation<br />

report,<br />

Field visit<br />

the Regional Development Strategy and work is currently undergoing with the RDC to increase their capacity for<br />

investment and promotion. The RDC is also the local institution which has been conceptually attached to LEAP at the<br />

design stage. This local institution seems the most likely to take over the programme. However, the beneficiaries of the<br />

programme do not have the same viewpoint. Indeed, the RDC is a local political body and it therefore does not seem<br />

quite appropriate that a political body take over the programme.<br />

As far as the LEAF is concerned, the insurance company would like to maintain it. It has until June 2009 to repay the<br />

funds to the GoG.. The sustainability of the LEAF will depend on the willingness of the company.<br />

In the end, local authorities will probably have to look for other funding (GoG, donors) to maintain LEAP.<br />

The national GoG is envisaging a replication of LEAP in Regions 2, 3 and 6, which are heavily dependant on sugar. This<br />

eventual replication is somehow a kind of sustainability of the LEAP but does not guarantee that the benefits brought in<br />

Region 10 will continue after the end of the <strong>Commission</strong> intervention.<br />

I 3.6.2 The project was not sustainable institutionally. It closed when the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> ended funding on 31 July 2004.<br />

It was not possible to become self-sufficient within the planned timeframe. Insufficient private sector investment<br />

precluded it from becoming financially self-sufficient. The active participation of stakeholders especially of the PSC was<br />

insufficient in planning, implementation and financing. This was mentioned in all monitoring reports, but no corrective<br />

action was taken.<br />

Being a new institution created for the project, GTA was not sustainable without further donor support. Moreover,<br />

neither the Private Sector <strong>Commission</strong> as the implementing agency nor the Government of Guyana were in a position to<br />

guarantee GTA’s survival. No other donor appeared to want to continue investing. Despite the GTA’s own efforts to<br />

generate income, significant external support was lacking to achieve sustainability over the time.<br />

Beneficiaries without exception attest to continuously applying the new competencies in their workplace. Thus, the<br />

benefits of the project continue to remain in the target group.<br />

The project has indeed been based on three wrong assumptions:<br />

1- the country will go on enjoying a positive economical and stable political climate<br />

2-the beneficiary companies will pay for the training of their employees, make available their premises and contribute to<br />

the running costs of the Training Agency itself<br />

3- In year 3, the Training Agency will be self-sufficient<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

What happened in reality was:<br />

1- Unfavourable changes in the economy have hampered project effectiveness because employers have been less willing<br />

to invest in training.<br />

2-There has not been the private sector investment that the GTA requires to finance itself and there was a problem in<br />

finding training sites to conduct the training because companies are averse to the risks of liability and company privacy.<br />

3-GTA was expected to become self-financing from course fees and membership subscriptions, and although it raised<br />

considerable amounts of revenue, it failed to become self-sufficient. This was the official reason for the closure, but other<br />

factors contributed as well. There was no ownership of the newly created agency despite the intensive consultation of the<br />

PSC when analysing the feasibility of the project. The PSC had already been involved with the Consultative Association of<br />

Guyanese Industry (CAGI) as a training centre and ultimately made the choice to exclude GTA and retain CAGI.<br />

The failure of the project is more disappointing since it achieved a number of successes in the number of courses, number<br />

of participants and development of training methodology.<br />

The field visit confirmed these findings. There is a strong need in Guyana for vocational and technical training. The GTA<br />

project was a well-conceived programme however based on a wrong assumption: the enterprises will pay for the training<br />

of their employees. The enterprises were more willing to pay for training at management level and the GTA got in<br />

conflict with an already exiting training agency (CAGI) which was providing this kind of training. As a result, the GTA<br />

has been closed. This project was therefore not sustainable. This is unfortunate as the project achieved positive impacts<br />

and as there are strong needs in Guyana for this kind of training. The ex-programme manager of this project has indeed<br />

been mandated to realize an assessment of the Guyanese situation in terms of vocational and technical training and to<br />

redesign it to make it more relevant to the needs.<br />

The Private Sector <strong>Commission</strong> is putting in place a strategic plan to reverse the brain drain problem. Without such a<br />

strategy, it seems meaningless to finance projects dealing with vocational and technical training.<br />

JC 3.7<br />

I 3.7.1<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> support to private sector strengthening has contributed to restoring and increasing Guyana’s<br />

productive capacity<br />

Evidence of increased production capacity and private sector activity:<br />

- increased number of new firms, including SMEs<br />

- higher employment levels<br />

- higher production levels<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

- increased volume and value of non-traditional exports<br />

I 3.7.1<br />

This indicator is only partially completed due to a lack of data.<br />

- Production levels have increased over the period 1996-2006: GDP at current factor cost increased from G$ 82m to $G<br />

139m<br />

Evolution of GDP at current factor cost (1996-2006)<br />

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

GDP at<br />

current<br />

factor<br />

costs 82,258 89,744 90,471 102,098 NA NA NA 123,263 130,701 133,914 139,773<br />

Source: IMF, Guyana: Statistical Annex, 2001 & IMF, Guyana PRSP Progress Report, 2006<br />

I<br />

3.7.2<br />

I 3.7.2<br />

Evidence of increased private sector investments relative to public investments<br />

Over the period 1996-2006, the share of private sector investments relative to public sector investments decreases: from<br />

57.5% to 22.1%. The ratio increased from 1996 to 1999 -and culminated at 106.7% in 1999- before decreasing to 44.8%<br />

in 2003 to 22.1% in 2006.<br />

Evolution of Private & Public sector investments in Guyana, 1996-2006 (in millions of Guyana dollars)<br />

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

Private investment 10,843 13,101 14,480 15,242 NA NA NA 9,342 8,872 9,904 10,468<br />

Public investment 18,867 19,271 16,666 14,285 NA NA NA 20,865 25,300 42,291 47,351<br />

Private<br />

57.5% 68.0% 86.9% 106.7% 44.8% 35.1% 23.4% 22.1%<br />

Investment/Public<br />

Investment<br />

Source: IMF, Guyana: Statistical Annex, 2001 & IMF, Guyana PRSP Progress Report, 2006<br />

I<br />

3.7.3<br />

I 3.7.3<br />

Evidence of increased private capital inflows (foreign direct investment and remittances)<br />

The tables hereunder indicate first that Guyana receives considerable FDI compared to its GDP. The trend over the<br />

period 1996-2006 also shows that Guyana is receiving less FDI. Moreover, Guyana’s FDI is representing a very small<br />

share of the total FDI received by the Caribbean countries: 0.5% in between 2003 and 2005.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Inward Foreign Direct Investment Performance Index ranking for Guyana (1996-2005) a)<br />

1996-1998 1997-99 1998- 1999- 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

2000 2001<br />

Guyana 8 21 21 17 18 28 41 31<br />

ranking<br />

a)The Index covers 141 countries<br />

Source: United Nations, World Investment Report, 2003 and 2006<br />

This index ranks countries by the Foreign Direct Investment they receive relative to their economic size; it is calculated as<br />

the ratio of a country’s share in global FDI inflows to its share in global GDP.<br />

FDI flows (in millions of dollars), 2003-2005<br />

2003 2004 2005<br />

Guyana 26 30 77<br />

Caribbean countries 5893 41550 38235<br />

Guyana (in % of 0.4% 0.7% 0.2%<br />

Caribbean countries)<br />

Source: United Nations, World Investment Report, 2006<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

LEAP 2 nd<br />

Mid-Term<br />

Evaluation,<br />

GoInvest<br />

I 3.7.4 Number of bankruptcy filings and number of new SMEs per year.<br />

I 3.7.4 This information is not available.<br />

I.3.7.5 Existence of new SME-friendly regulations and specific measures to enhance private sector investments in the<br />

productive sectors<br />

I.3.7.5 The GoG has taken initiatives to provide a more business-friendly environment and improve investment ranking on the<br />

foreign direct performance index. to improve the regulatory climate, the Government has taken steps recently including<br />

reducing the number of necessary trade licenses, passing a Value-added Tax bill in 2005, the Investment Act of 2004, the<br />

Small Business Act of 2004, and a Competition and Fair Trading Bill (due to be passed by May 2006). Furthermore, as part of<br />

the recent NCS process, the Government is strengthening regulatory and administrative processes as well as improving the<br />

environment for public-private dialogue through the establishment of a National Competitiveness Council.<br />

8<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

8 &<br />

8<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

9<br />

The Investment Act of 2004 is the principal legislation governing investment in Guyana and is intended to play a reassuring<br />

role for investors by providing legal protection for investment, increasing the predictability, stability and transparency of the<br />

legal regime for investment, promoting the development of international best practices regarding investment, and streamlining<br />

the existing procedures for investment. Moreover, a Small Business Bureau and Small Business Council have been set up<br />

within MinTIC as a direct result of the Small Business Act 2004.<br />

I 3.7.6 Testimonies of Guyanese officials on the impacts of <strong>Commission</strong> support on Guyana’s productive capacity<br />

Field Visit I 3.7.6 <strong>Commission</strong> support to PSD in Guyana is weak. Over the past ten years, only two projects dealt with this issue. The LEAP<br />

mainly enhances the production capacity of the primary sector and only targets Region 10. The impacts of <strong>Commission</strong><br />

interventions in PSD on Guyana’s productive capacity are therefore limited.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

P<br />

Nber<br />

8<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

4<br />

&<br />

9<br />

AC<br />

P<br />

GU<br />

A<br />

6&7<br />

Source<br />

EC Guidelines<br />

for designing<br />

Budget Support<br />

Programmes<br />

(2002)<br />

Nomade<br />

presentation on<br />

BS Evaluation<br />

of 29 th of March<br />

2007<br />

FA, MR, PS,<br />

File notes<br />

FA<br />

EQ 4<br />

To what extent has <strong>Commission</strong> budget support contributed to the improvement of the social<br />

conditions?<br />

The Budget Support (BS) provided by the EU has helped the GoG to pursue its global policy objectives<br />

expressed in the 1998-2001 PFP, the HIPC documents and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (2002-2005) (see<br />

EQ1). The entire reform programme (see I.1.1.1) has thus been supported but special attention has been paid<br />

by the <strong>Commission</strong> to: (i) the fiduciary context of budget support through the monitoring of the global<br />

performance and of selected elements of the public finance management system and (ii) to the achievement of<br />

the GoG’s ultimate objective of poverty reduction via the monitoring of a limited number of service delivery<br />

indicators in education (SASP programmes only), health and social housing. In order to assess the extent to<br />

which BS has contributed to the improvement of social conditions, the evaluation uses a two-pronged<br />

approach:<br />

• Firstly, the design of the BS programmes (SAS IV, SAS V and PRBS) and in particular the general<br />

conditions adopted by the PRBS for the release of both fixed and variable tranche show that the provision<br />

of BS aimed to positively influence the framework for public policy and public expenditures in Guyana<br />

through: (i) the EC’s participation in policy discussions regarding macro-economic management and<br />

sector policies (including the overall PRSP) and (ii) the monitoring of the general qualitative performance<br />

of PFM. These process issues which are essential (if not sufficient) to ensure that policies can be<br />

satisfactorily implemented so that conditions are favourable for attaining the desired impact, have clearly<br />

been as important in the Guyana BS as the reaching of the ultimate objective of poverty reduction itself.<br />

Judging by the choice of disbursement criteria, it is noted that general conditions linked to these two<br />

process issues condition the totality of the fixed tranches of the PRBS disbursement (50% of BS) and<br />

specific PFM output indicators condition another 40% of the variable tranches thus linking overall<br />

process indicators to 70% of BS release. The progress made in these two process areas thus needs to be<br />

ascertained to measure their potential contribution to the improvement of the overall fiscal and public<br />

policy framework. The evaluation of the process is undertaken through Judgment Criteria 4.1 to 4.4.<br />

• Secondly the EC’s BS aimed to contribute to the overall objective of poverty reduction and economic<br />

growth where access and use of basic social services was of particular importance. The focus of BS on the<br />

improvement of social conditions was made by linking 60% of the amounts to be released under the<br />

variable tranches of SAS-V and PRBS to performance indicators in the education (SAS-V), health and<br />

social housing sectors. The design of the BS programmes thus implicitly makes the link between the use<br />

of the budget support, the improved delivery of social services and the final outcome of selected social<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

indicators. The assessment of the extent to which EC’s BS may have contributed to reach the overall<br />

social impact is carried out under Judgement criteria 4.5.<br />

8<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

4<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

FA, MR, PS<br />

FA<br />

Field mission<br />

interviews<br />

JC 4.1<br />

The use of budget support has enabled the <strong>Commission</strong> to engage in a dialogue with the GoG<br />

regarding PRSP design and implementation.<br />

Due to the fact that budget support provides by definition support to the programme chosen by the<br />

Government and implemented through the execution of its budget, the EC’s choice of using the BS<br />

instrument and its decision on the amounts to be allocated to BS rely inter alia on considerations of the general<br />

policy orientations and of the structural adjustment and reform programmes adopted by the GoG. However,<br />

it is not until the latest BS programme (PRBS) that EC-GoG policy discussions have been put at the heart of<br />

the BS programme design in Guyana.<br />

Indeed the earlier General Import Programmes (GIP I to III respectively covering 1993, 1994 and 1995) were<br />

provided as balance of payment support. Only the latest GIP used counterpart funds to finance specific lines<br />

of the GoG budget rather than to finance projects, thus introducing some element of discussion with the<br />

authorities on priority budget lines (specifically, civil service reform and maintenance costs in education and<br />

health were targeted). The ‘new generation’ BS with SAS IV (1998) and V (programmed for 1999-2000 but<br />

effectively implemented in 2000 and 2001) both offered support targeted to specific expenditure items and<br />

budget lines within selected ministries’ budgets (education, health, housing). Little is known about the<br />

conditions under which these earlier programmes were drawn up, files being no longer available and staff<br />

having changed in the meantime, but it is supposed that discussions must have been had with the authorities<br />

on the choice of budget lines targeted by BS and thus on what both parties considered to be priority spending<br />

that could be secured through BS.<br />

The PRBS 2004-2007 formalised the need for broad and sector policy discussions by introducing regular<br />

policy dialogue as one of three preconditions to the release of BS funds: “The Government shall associate the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> in the dialogue on macro-economic (in particular IMF) and sectoral policies”. The introduction of this issue as<br />

a conditionality for the release of fixed and variable tranche BS underlines the emphasis given by the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> to the importance of remaining fully informed about macro-economic and fiscal developments in<br />

the context of a non-targeted, general BS. The issue is evaluated at the hand of three indicators, as follows.<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> file<br />

notes<br />

Correspondence<br />

I 4.1.1<br />

I 4.1.1<br />

Frequency and quality of meetings between GoG and DEC on macro-economic, fiscal and poverty<br />

reduction strategy issues<br />

From the documentation pertaining to the assessment of the conditions for tranche releases, the dialogue<br />

between the GoG and the <strong>Commission</strong> appears not to have responded to expectations: the lack of<br />

participation of the <strong>Commission</strong> in the macro and fiscal dialogue was underlined specifically as being of great<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

between EC<br />

HQ- Delegation<br />

and GoG<br />

Field mission<br />

interviews<br />

concern to the <strong>Commission</strong> HQ (less so at Delegation level) but did nevertheless not represent an issue of<br />

such importance as to be an impediment to the disbursement of the tranches. The main reason for this<br />

unsatisfactory dialogue is twofold.<br />

Firstly, it appears that the EC expected to participate in the yearly IMF reviews; but discussions of progress on<br />

IMF programmes are a bilateral matter between the government and the IMF where no third party is allowed<br />

to participate, even as an observer. In Guyana, this would be even more the case than elsewhere since the<br />

GoG does not even allow the IMF to publish the results of its Article IV consultations (contrary to most<br />

other countries). Whether to close the information gap by directly attending the meetings or to participate<br />

more closely in high level policy discussions, it is felt that the EC’s disbursement condition was unrealistic and<br />

that GoG’s eventual (2005/2006) response to allow the IMF to share its results verbally with the group of<br />

main donors at the end of the review was appropriate. In the meantime, the condition of a macro-economic<br />

and fiscal policy dialogue taking place has thus never been fully satisfied, with the earlier period (2004 and<br />

2005) being particularly poor. On the macro and fiscal policy dialogue, it is thus interesting to note that the<br />

EC, as only provider of untargeted and direct BS to Guyana6 (and excluding debt relief which cannot stricto<br />

sensu be considered as a provision of external financing) has been treated just like any other donor in terms of<br />

the information (not) being released to it.<br />

Secondly, it is generally recognised that GoG-donor dialogue in Guyana is very much limited to (i) bilateral<br />

discussions and (ii) to project level discussions (see EQ8). It is only in the second half of the period reviewed<br />

that GoG-donor working groups have been formed in priority sectors and although donors participated in the<br />

national discussions of the PRSP when the PRSP was drafted (2001-2002) there does not seem to have been<br />

any general policy orientations discussions or specific donor contributions to the PRSP’s design and contents.<br />

The EC has been involved in whatever GoG-dialogue has taken place at general or sector level, but no more<br />

than any other donor.<br />

The leverage usually associated with the provision of BS to discuss general policy orientations and progress in<br />

the implementation of reforms has thus not materialised in Guyana.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

<strong>Commission</strong><br />

file notes<br />

Field mission<br />

interviews<br />

I 4.1.1<br />

On the other hand, specific discussions related to the implementation of ongoing programmes seem to have<br />

taken place, either in the context of thematic groups (see EQ8) or specifically within the context of reviewing<br />

conditions for BS tranche release. No documents were found concerning the earlier SAS IV programme but<br />

for SAS V and PRBS tranche release, sufficient documentation was reviewed to conclude that at least fiscal<br />

management has been a continuous topic of scrutiny and discussion over the period. For the SASP, missions<br />

from HQ were deployed to assist the DCE in assessing conditions for tranche release; under the PRBS,<br />

consultants were recruited to undertake 2 missions a year, one for reviewing the conditions for the release of<br />

the fixed tranche focusing on the progress of the PFM systems and one for reviewing conditions for the<br />

release of the variable tranche focusing on the public finance, health and housing indicators.<br />

These reviews call for several comments. Firstly the choice of indicators retained for variable tranche release<br />

has not been conducive to developing policy dialogue: in PFM, out of seven indicators, three measured<br />

performance of TAs funded by the EC (and thus also measured the EC’s performance in providing timely and<br />

quality TA) and one measured the performance of activities funded by the IDB (and again quite independent<br />

from the GoG itself). Two other indicators were output and time-bound indicators that could, if taken within<br />

a broader context, represent reform efforts of the GoG but their narrow interpretation by the EC precluded<br />

any policy discussion whilst the third indicator was an input indicator. In the social sectors, only 3 indicators<br />

were retained for health, all three depending on donor funded programmes, whilst only 2 output indicators<br />

were chosen for social housing: these five social indicators could hardly form the grounds for a dialogue on<br />

sector policy and strategy. Secondly, partly because of the nature of the indicators, the reviews appear not to<br />

have given rise to in-depth sector analysis but to have been limited to a rather narrow assessment of the value<br />

of the indicators. As a consequence, and possibly because the review of the indicators was carried out by<br />

external consultants, the link between performance indicator assessment and policy discussions was not made.<br />

Finally the evaluation system did not allow for much flexibility (whether because of external circumstances or<br />

because targets were set unrealistic) thus sometimes leading to unnecessarily harsh conclusions on targets<br />

achieved.<br />

What is interesting to note here is that fiscal management has sometimes 7 been deemed unsatisfactory by the<br />

EC (HQ mainly) but that this has never impeded full disbursement of the fixed tranches of BS; on the other<br />

hand, when PFM performance indicators for variable tranche release of PRBS did not reach their targets, they<br />

have led to the effective reduction of the amount disbursed 8 .<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

Consultants<br />

reports on<br />

performance<br />

indicator for<br />

I 4.1.2<br />

I 4.1.2<br />

Evidence of changes in GoG strategy following policy dialogue with <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Due to the unavailability of institutional memory both at the Delegation and the NAO’s office (the NAO’s<br />

task force having only been operational from 2005 onwards), no evidence has been found that any policy or<br />

other discussions between the GoG and the EC might have led to strategy changes by GoG. Taking the<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

variable tranche<br />

release<br />

indicator at the level of sector or tranche release discussions, it is very likely, as will be seen below in JC 4.2,<br />

that the repeated discussions on PFM issues (twice a year, once on general progress and once on specific<br />

indicators) have helped to raise awareness of the authorities on the importance of improving the soundness<br />

and transparency of the PFM systems and have thus contributed (even if indirectly) to current developments<br />

towards a well defined, prioritised and sequenced PFM reform programme. Similarly, in the health sector, the<br />

TA support to develop professional codes of practice funded by the EC eventually led the Ministry of Health<br />

to initiate a number of new bills on nursing practitioners, nursing standards and quality, health protection and<br />

promotion etc.<br />

In addition, the linkage of the amounts of the variable tranches to performance indicators might have<br />

influenced at least one of the government’s activities: the implementation of BS using the timely presentation<br />

of the budget to Parliament as one of the variable tranche indicators has coincided with the fact that budget<br />

presentation was brought forward from an average of end of March in the years 1998 to 2004 to end of<br />

January in 2005 and in 2006. It is to be noted incidentally that this important improvement did not benefit<br />

GoG in terms of the amount of variable tranche release since the EC considered this indicator as not having<br />

been reached, falling short of the end of December target. Whether or not it is the incentive of this particular<br />

indicator which has prompted GoG to improve the timeliness of its budget presentation thus remains<br />

equivocal.<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

FA<br />

PFM half yearly<br />

reports<br />

I 4.1.3<br />

I 4.1.3<br />

Participation and role of <strong>Commission</strong> in donor wide discussions on public finance management<br />

issues and PRSP<br />

Until recently (2007) no forum for discussions specifically dedicated to PFM issues existed even though many<br />

donors have been or are active in the PFM area: the IDB, the World Bank, the IMF and CIDA. Inter alia,<br />

these donors have been active in introducing integrated computerised financial and accounting management<br />

systems (IFMAS under CIDA and IDB funding); strengthening of audit and accounting functions (IMF,<br />

CIDA); legal environment, regulations and procedures (many donors); external debt management (IDB,<br />

DFiD, EC); tax reforms (IMF). The <strong>Commission</strong> has promoted improved public finance management in<br />

Guyana by using the progress in PFM as a general condition for fixed and variable tranche release and by<br />

introducing PFM performance criteria to leverage its disbursement of variable tranches (with PFM indicators<br />

weighing 40% of the total tranche). The <strong>Commission</strong> also financed TA in PFM areas such as fiscal<br />

projections, the elaboration of MTEF in the ministries of health, education, housing and public works. In this<br />

context, under the PRBS, the EC has also conducted six-monthly PFM reviews.<br />

It appears that each donor has traditionally assisted the GoG on specific issues, neither overlapping nor<br />

duplicating the efforts of other donors but not coordinating either within an overall mutually agreed and<br />

prioritised framework 9 . The basis for the interventions was mainly the diagnostic provided in 2002 by the<br />

CFAA (IMF) and the ROSC (WB). Donor-GoG coordination within a common framework has only recently<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 2


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

started with the joint undertaking in 2007 of a PEFA (including participation of the EU) which is intended to<br />

provide the basis for development of a global, prioritised and sequenced PFM reform programme and action<br />

plan.<br />

Similarly regarding PRSP discussions, as noted above, the EU has had no other role than the participation,<br />

likewise to other donors, in the national presentations and discussions of the PRSP during the review period.<br />

Again, this is currently changing: as the second PRSP is being prepared, donors have pulled together and have<br />

even issued a common statement with regards to funding of the PRSP preparation (see EQ8).<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 3


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

PRSP<br />

PRS 2004<br />

report<br />

JC 4.2<br />

The use of BS has contributed to improving the government’s planning and budgetary system<br />

including its public finance management capacity.<br />

One of the areas targeted by the Poverty Reduction Strategy concerned the fiscal policies. They aimed at:<br />

(i)<br />

increasing public sector savings via revenue generation (based on a broadening of the tax base, a<br />

reduction of rates and improvement of tax collection and administration) and expenditure control (based<br />

on improved recurrent/capital allocations, computerization of the public sector payroll and<br />

rationalization and streamlining of the public sector)<br />

(ii) reducing domestic indebtedness and<br />

(iii) improving the public accounting process through the strengthening of the Office of the Accountant<br />

General and the implementation of program budgeting in Government ministries and agencies by 2004.<br />

The 2004 and 2005 PRSP Progress Reports report considerable progress on the fronts of tax policy<br />

(broadening of the tax base, reducing marginal tax rates, tax payers identification registration, harmonising<br />

custom duties), tax administration and expenditure controls (an organic budget law was enacted, progress<br />

made towards joined recurrent/capital budgeting, wage bill computerised and integrated into the human<br />

resource data base).<br />

Programme budgeting was introduced in all ministries during 2004 but Expenditure Programming<br />

Management Units (EPMUs) were only functioning in the ministries of health and education due to capacity<br />

constraints. Some first steps were made to integrate the recurrent and capital budgets (issuance of a single<br />

budget circular; joint budget meetings) 10 . Progress was made on the implementation of the Fiscal Management<br />

and Accountability Act (FMAA), the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMAS, January 2004 and in<br />

strengthening the Project Cycle Management System and the prioritisation of public investment projects.<br />

PRS 2005<br />

report<br />

The EC’s PRBS was aiming to support these fiscal policies through the provision of TA in the areas of (i)<br />

medium term macro-fiscal projections, (ii) strengthening public debt management and (iii) introduction of<br />

MTEFs in the ministries of health, housing, public works and education (this latter TA was not initially<br />

foreseen in the financing agreement). In addition, the BS linked 40% of its variable tranche release to<br />

performance indicators in the area of PFM.<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 1


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

GoG/ MoF,<br />

PRBS 2004-<br />

2006, Six<br />

month Progress<br />

Reports,<br />

Technical<br />

reports on PFM<br />

and TA reports<br />

on MTEF,<br />

fiscal<br />

projections.<br />

I.4.2.1<br />

I.4.2.1<br />

Budget planning has improved and the budget is more realistic<br />

The PRBS financed TA 11 to help the Government in making fiscal projections and introducing MTEFs in the<br />

ministries of health and housing with the aim to improve budget planning. After some initial delays TA was<br />

recruited and the exercises were undertaken and completed in June 2006 (and even extended in the case of the<br />

MTEF to the ministries of education and public works).<br />

The Medium Term Fiscal Forecasting model and manual was developed by the EC funded TA but its effective<br />

use by the Budget Office has been constrained by staffing availability at the Budget Office and the lack of data<br />

required to run the model. In addition, as identified by the TA, the sustainability of the macroeconomic<br />

modelling function in the Budget Office required formal mechanisms of coordination, communication and<br />

reporting to be consolidated between the various institutions involved.<br />

In the case of MTEFs, the models were developed, manuals for preparing MTEFs were prepared and<br />

ministerial staff was trained. However, it appears that the success of this component has been jeopardised by<br />

the lack of appropriation of the model by the respective ministries, problem compounded by the fact that<br />

trained staff subsequently left the ministries. The MTEFs have not been updated since the TAs completed<br />

their tasks in 2006. This experience reflects both (i) an insufficient grasp of the constraints to be met for<br />

introducing MTEF which requires efforts sustained over a number of years (rather than flying visits of<br />

consultants over the period of a year) as well as a favourable environment which was not yet in place in<br />

Guyana (such as the need for a medium term strategic sector plan, program costing etc. which were correctly<br />

identified by the TA as being lacking in the ministries concerned) and (ii) the lack of leadership from the<br />

Ministry of Finance in conducting the MTEF exercise which is itself related to the lack of a coordinated, timed<br />

and sequenced PFM reform programme.<br />

The PRBS also linked seven PFM performance indicators to the release of 40% of its variable tranches in 2005<br />

and 2006. The impact that these performance indicators could have had on the advancement of the PFM<br />

system’s quality has however been severely limited by the fact that three of the indicators were directly linked<br />

to the provision of EC funded TA to the Ministry of Finance (in the fields of medium term fiscal projections,<br />

MTEFs and debt management) and one of the indicators was directly linked to the activities of an IDB funded<br />

project (IFMAS), thus linking 4 out of 7 indicators to the efficiency and effectiveness of donor activities rather<br />

than to GoG activities! In addition, the choice of the seventh indicator relating to the rate of budget execution<br />

of non salary operational expenditure in health and education relative to the rate for the same expenditure in<br />

the overall budget was probably not very judicious as the cash-based management of public expenditure in<br />

Guyana precludes by procedure any large variations between budgeted expenditure and realised expenditure<br />

(see I.4.2.1).<br />

In terms of improved budget planning, the contribution of the EC seems thus to have been limited on both<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 1


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

accounts of the macro-fiscal projections and on the expenditure planning aspects, models having been<br />

produced but remaining (as yet) unused and performance indicators offering no great incentive for GoG to<br />

advance PFM reforms.<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

PRS 2005<br />

report<br />

MN 3<br />

MN 34<br />

MN 13<br />

MN 7<br />

Budgets 1996-<br />

2007<br />

Improvement of budget planning is a real preoccupation of the GoG and measures were announced in the<br />

2005 PRS report aiming to improve upon the monitoring of public expenditure effectiveness, that being an<br />

essential input into the improvement of budget planning. Systems based M&E databases were to be set up in<br />

line ministries to track poverty expenditure by region and the availability of statistics on social sector outputs<br />

and outcomes was to be reinforced through the Social Statistics Projects. These seem indeed to be essential<br />

components of a successful MTEF which could have received donor support before focusing on the<br />

development of the MTEF models themselves. In 2007, no substantial progress has yet been made on these<br />

two accounts but activities have started on the improvement of the social statistics (with IDB support). It is<br />

surprising that the EC, as only provider of BS and thus having the greatest stake in obtaining a clear view of<br />

budget priorities and budget effectiveness in attaining the policy objectives of the PRSP, has offered no<br />

assistance (other than the medium term modelisation of expenditure in 4 ministries) in setting up the enabling<br />

environment for better budget planning and monitoring (on statistics, support has been limited to some short<br />

term TA to the ministry of housing).<br />

The realism of the budget was checked during the field visit by comparing planned and realised levels of<br />

revenue and expenditure. In terms of revenue, the forecasts rely on that of the IMF and are relatively reliable.<br />

In terms of expenditure, since the budget is managed on a cash basis, budget expenditure outturns are almost<br />

always exactly identical to budget expenditure estimates. The table and graph below illustrate the budget<br />

expenditure outcomes against the budget estimates over the period 1997-2006 and show that budget<br />

expenditure plans have been relatively accurate and there has been no noticeable improvement of this accuracy<br />

since 1999.<br />

Table - Budget expenditure realised against budget estimates, in %, 1996 to 2006.<br />

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

Recurrent budget 102% 126% 133% 102% 107% 98% 110% 106% 109% 108%<br />

Capital budget 101% 88% 97% 117% 100% 84% 83% 94% 111% 100%<br />

Total budget 102% 87% 104% 108% 100% 93% 99% 101% 110% 104%<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 2


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Budget outcomes: deviations from budget estimates<br />

0.40<br />

0.30<br />

% deviation<br />

0.20<br />

0.10<br />

-<br />

Recurrent budget<br />

Capital budget<br />

Total budget<br />

-0.10<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

-0.20<br />

Source: Calculated on the basis of realised budgets versus budget estimates: data provided in the Guyana<br />

Estimates of the Public Sector Current and Capital Revenue and Expenditure for the year 1996 to 2007 as<br />

presented to the National Assembly<br />

Overall, the EC having focussed on supporting specific aspects of the PFM system which have not been<br />

particularly successful as yet (or at least of which the benefits have not yet been reaped), its role in improving<br />

budget planning and budget realism cannot be ascertained: the most that can be said at this stage is that the<br />

EC support may have contributed to raising the awareness for the need of improved planning tools within the<br />

ministries of finance and the targeted sector ministries.<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

MN3<br />

Budget Speech<br />

2007<br />

Budgets 1996<br />

to 2007<br />

I.4.2.2<br />

I.4.2.2<br />

The budget is prepared with due regard to government policy<br />

In order to verify whether the budget is a true reflection of the GoG strategy and policy, some quantitative<br />

and qualitative analysis of the budget allocations across ministries and within ministries to priority areas and<br />

activities and of budget trends should be undertaken to check whether policy priorities are reflected in<br />

spending priorities. In this respect it is interesting to note that qualitative budget analysis and monitoring (see<br />

also I 4.3.1) is not routinely undertaken in Guyana and that little publicly available information exists outside<br />

the Public Expenditure Review undertaken by the WB in 1999 (published in 2002). Whether budgetary<br />

allocations have been made according to policy priorities is the harder to ascertain that recurrent and capital<br />

budget preparation and hearings have so far (until 2007) been totally separate processes; this, compounded by<br />

the lack of strategic plan and of programme costing in many sectors, may have seriously constrained budgetary<br />

analysis as a tool for budget allocation decisions. However, as will be shown in JC 4.3, trends in social<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 3


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

8<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

4<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

8<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

4<br />

FAs, NAO<br />

Task Force,<br />

Guyana<br />

Budgets<br />

I.4.2.3<br />

I.4.2.3<br />

J.C 4.2<br />

conclusion<br />

JC 4.3<br />

I 4.3.1<br />

I 4.3.1<br />

spending have shown increased budget allocations to the social ministries thus reflecting the orientations taken<br />

in the PRSP.<br />

The predictability of the budget has improved<br />

This question could not be verified during the field mission. It may however be noted that the predictability of<br />

the budget may have been enhanced further if the variable tranches were disbursed earlier in the budgetary<br />

year. Under PRBS, because of the choice of performance indicators, evaluations of variable tranche<br />

disbursement could only take place during the last quarter of the year (awaiting available statistics) thus<br />

effectively leading to the release of funds only in early December at the best.<br />

On the whole, the PFM did generally improve over the ten year period under consideration. Donors having<br />

undertaken the PEFA in 2007 agree that most PEFA indicators which were also covered in the World Bank<br />

CFAA of 2002 did improve. However, the contribution of the EC’s BS to this development is difficult to<br />

assess: the appropriateness, effectiveness and sustainability of work performed by the TA in the two PFM<br />

areas remains doubtful and performance indicators chosen in the PFM area did not really measure GoG’s<br />

efforts at undertaking PFM reforms thus providing little incentive for GoG to improve the PFM systems.<br />

This evaluation also expresses concern over the effectiveness and sustainability of the PFM strengthening<br />

initiatives taken in the past by the EC as they have been implemented in the void of a general PFM reform<br />

programme with a prioritised, timed and costed action plan and thus neither piloted by nor actively supported<br />

by the Ministry of Finance.<br />

Finally, in absence of information as to the initial reasons for choosing TA to design the MTEFs in the four<br />

social ministries, it appears with hindsight that TA support could have been better used, for example to<br />

prepare the grounds for later introduction of MTEFs (such as may be required in the fields of access to<br />

reliable statistical data, strengthening of M&E functions, strengthening of the programme budgeting, notably<br />

by assisting in developing programme and activities costs, etc.).<br />

BS has contributed to establishing sustainable levels of public expenditure in the social sectors<br />

Trends in budgeted and realised expenditure in social sectors<br />

Because execution levels of execution of budget estimates are very good (see I 4.2.1) the indicator has<br />

considered exclusively the executed expenditures in social sectors. The BS provided by the EC under the ten<br />

year period has represented a total of just over €30 million which have been disbursed as follows:<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

1998 2000 2001 2004 2005 2006<br />

EC BS in million of Euros 5,3 2,1 3,3 6,0 8,7 5,9<br />

EC BS as % of social public expenditure 6,5% 1,4% 2,7% 6,7% 8,6% 4,4%<br />

EC BS as % of total budget expenditure 2,6% 0,7% 1,1% 2,4% 2,7% 1,4%<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 4


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Source: EC files, NAO information and Budget Estimates and realisations.<br />

Over the same period, social sector ministries have seen both a rise in their respective shares of total public<br />

expenditure and in their expenditure as a share of GDP as follows 12 :<br />

Table - Evolution of social sector budget realisations relative to GDP and to total realised public expenditure.<br />

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />

revised budget<br />

Social expenditure as % of GDP<br />

Housing 0.2% 0.8% 1.0% 0.8% 1.0% 1.0% 1.2% 1.3% 2.0% 1.6% 1.4% 1.3%<br />

Education 3.9% 6.4% 7.6% 7.4% 16.0% 10.4% 10.1% 9.0% 9.3% 9.5% 9.2% 8.7%<br />

Health 2.7% 3.8% 4.3% 4.5% 4.0% 3.4% 4.5% 5.3% 5.0% 5.0% 5.5% 6.0%<br />

Social Welfare 4.4% 3.1% 2.3% 2.1% 2.1% 3.5% 6.1% 1.7% 2.0% 2.8% 3.6% 3.1%<br />

Total social sectors as % of GDP 11.1% 14.2% 15.3% 14.8% 23.1% 18.4% 21.9% 17.2% 18.2% 18.8% 19.8% 19.2%<br />

Total social sectors as % of total expenditure 26.5% 34.7% 39.9% 36.1% 50.1% 38.5% 49.7% 33.9% 36.2% 31.0% 31.2% 35.1%<br />

Source: Calculated on the basis of data provided in the Guyana Estimates of the Public Sector Current and<br />

Capital Revenue and Expenditure for the year 1996 to 2007 as presented to the National Assembly<br />

Social sector expenditure as % of GDP, 1996-2007<br />

% of GDP<br />

25,0%<br />

20,0%<br />

15,0%<br />

10,0%<br />

5,0%<br />

0,0%<br />

Housing<br />

Education<br />

Health<br />

Social Welfare<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006 revised<br />

2007 budget<br />

Total social sector public<br />

expenditure as % of GDP<br />

During the period, the weight of public expenditure in the social sectors has increased from about 11% of<br />

GDP in 1996 to more than 23% in 2000 and seems settled around 19% of GDP since 2005 thus showing a<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 5


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

definite positive trend in line with PRSP objectives. The change in the trend occurred around 2000 when<br />

HIPC debt relief kicked in with its associated condition of spending debt relief on social sectors; according to<br />

the WB public expenditure review (2002) social sector spending in the beginning of the 1990’s represented<br />

only 6,5% of GDP whilst it continued hovering around 10% of GDP during the 1990s.<br />

In terms of GoG’s effort to increase the relative shares of expenditures for social sector activities compared to<br />

overall public expenditure, the trend is less marked: social expenditure increased from 26.5% of total<br />

expenditure in 1996 to just over 35% of total expenditure budgeted for 2007, with peaks of 50% and 49.7% in<br />

2000 and 2002 but there is no overall trend over the ten year period as shown in the graph below.<br />

Total social sector public expenditure as % of total public expenditure<br />

% of total public expenditure<br />

60%<br />

50%<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

years<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006 revised<br />

2007 budget<br />

8<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

4<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

MN 3<br />

MN 34<br />

MN 10<br />

I 4.3.1<br />

On the whole, and whilst it is recognised that social sector expenditure as a share of GDP has risen strongly<br />

over the period, this is in a general context of rising public expenditure as a share of GDP, thus dampening<br />

the extent to which resources have actually been re-allocated within the budget. It would have been interesting<br />

to check whether pro-poor expenditures within the social expenditure have been favoured over the last 10<br />

years; unfortunately this type of qualitative analysis is not routinely performed in Guyana. The GoG was to<br />

undertake an analysis of poverty related expenditure in priority poverty programmes but in fact, since the<br />

public expenditure review of 1999 (undertaken with World Bank support), nothing has been done (no analysis<br />

of public spending, no expenditure tracking surveys, etc) apart from the informal budget assessments done<br />

quarterly by spending agencies to review their work programmes. In 2007, for the first time, the 2006 budget<br />

outturn was analysed and will be looked at in Parliament. This remains however a far cry from the budget<br />

analysis which would provide evidence to verify that increased spending has been effective in providing<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 6


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

MN 3<br />

MN 13<br />

I.4.3.2<br />

I.4.3.2<br />

MN 13 JC 4.3<br />

conclusion<br />

PRS 2004<br />

report<br />

JC 4.4<br />

I 4.4.1<br />

I 4.4.1<br />

improved social service delivery in line with poverty reduction objectives as stated in the PRSP. The<br />

professional expertise required for this type of qualitative analyses is lacking in the Ministry of Finance: there is<br />

a need to strengthen the Ministry’s capacity for policy analysis.<br />

Funding mechanisms are in place for maintenance and operation of social infrastructure<br />

There appear to be no other funding mechanisms for the maintenance and operation of social infrastructure<br />

than the normal state budget. In the health sector, some partnership/collaboration exists between the private<br />

and the public sectors in specialised areas such as CTNMRI, operation of the cardiac unit, cancer treatment<br />

(radiology): in these partnerships, the public sector provides the infrastructure and the equipment whilst the<br />

private sector provides the expertise. Private sector treatment is subject to user charges which are agreed with<br />

the public sector for public sector referral patients. The private sector covers 10% to 15% of the health sector<br />

(including dialysis where patients get direct subsidies from public sector).<br />

Finally, the extent to which EC BS may have contributed to maintaining the shares of public expenditure to<br />

the social sectors in total expenditure cannot be established, funds being fungible 13 . The least that can be<br />

ascertained is that BS has eased the financing gap of the GoG thus enabling it to increase its room for<br />

manoeuvre in budget allocation decisions. The conditions for disbursement of BS by partly focussing on<br />

increasing budget allocations to social sectors and in particular on securing adequate levels of (non-salary)<br />

operating costs may also have helped. Both the SASP and the PRBS used such input indicators. In SAS-V , the<br />

condition for release of the second tranche pertained to the attainment of expenditure targets in the social<br />

sectors and for poverty alleviation agreed in the HIPC and in particular of the attainment of expenditure<br />

allocations towards the education, health and housing and water sectors and within those specifically<br />

expenditure allocations towards works, supplies and maintenance 14 . In the PRBS, the outturn of non-salary<br />

operating expenditure in the health and education sectors relative to that of the same expenditure in the<br />

overall budget was a performance indicator used for variable tranche release in 2005 and 2006.<br />

In addition, it has been recognised that the good performance on health indicators monitored by the EC has<br />

led to more secure budget allocations for the programmes which outcomes are monitored for BS tranche<br />

release (HIV child-mother, immunisation rates and TB DOTS), thus putting a direct link between the BS<br />

provided and the budget allocation decisions of the GoG.<br />

What remains lacking is the monitoring and analysis of public expenditure quality which is essential to verify<br />

the effectiveness of the undertaken expenditure in achieving the objectives of the PRSP.<br />

The GoG is carrying out planned expenditures<br />

Evolution of external account balance and budget balance as share of GDP<br />

Due to the macro-economic instability and the temporary suspension of the IMF programme, donor inflows<br />

at the end of 2002 and during 2003 were much lower than originally anticipated in the PRSP thus jeopardising<br />

planned expenditure levels. In 2002, requirements for the PRSP implementation had been estimated at<br />

US$223 million but only US$139 million materialised (of which official transfers 33 million and programme<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 7


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9<br />

ACP<br />

GUA<br />

6&7<br />

PRSP 2004<br />

annual review<br />

IBM report<br />

Nomade<br />

presentation of<br />

29 th of March<br />

2007<br />

I 4.4.2<br />

I 4.4.2<br />

JC 4.5<br />

loans 7 million). In 2003 however, the financing requirements for the PRSP were of US$ 257 million of which<br />

only US$ 97 million materialised (official transfers fell to US$30 million and programme loans contributed<br />

US$12 million). No figures were published in the PRS 2005 report to ascertain whether external financing<br />

levels materialised as foreseen or not in 2005. In the absence of detailed and coherent balance of payments<br />

data 15 for 2005 and beyond, it has not been possible to verify whether - and if yes to what extent – expected<br />

external support levels did materialise and whether or not the expenditure levels initially foreseen to be<br />

undertaken under the PRSP were indeed implemented.<br />

Public expenditure outcomes: budget execution in the social sectors, in particular pro-poor<br />

expenditure<br />

The PRBS includes one single indicator on the outturn of health and education expenditure (health/education<br />

non salary recurrent budget execution rate versus overall non salary recurrent expenditure execution) and the<br />

target of this indicator has been achieved in both 2004 and 2005. However, this indicator is extremely narrow<br />

as it measures only the execution rate, not the relative budget allocations to the social sectors which are also of<br />

interest in the context of BS. This information was collected during the field visit and has shown (see above in<br />

JC 4.3 and I 4.3.1) that although social sector expenditure as a share of GDP has risen steadily over the period,<br />

the actual share of social expenditure within total expenditure has remained more or less constant over the<br />

period. As seen in I 4.3.1, the crucial question that remains to be answered is that of the quality of the social<br />

sector expenditure about which no information is available (the last public expenditure review was that<br />

undertaken by the World Bank in 1999 published in 2002).<br />

Social conditions have improved<br />

Assessing whether BS may have had an impact upon the overarching objective of improving social conditions<br />

and reducing poverty levels in Guyana raises methodological issues which are the greater that the BS is<br />

proportionately small compared to the country’s total budget. The assumption is that BS provides (i) greater<br />

fiscal space (see JC 4.4) and (ii) an incentive for budgetary allocations to be better aligned with PRSP policies<br />

and priorities (see JC 4.3) which would lead to an improved services delivery and finally a stronger<br />

achievement of the country’s PRSP objectives. In order to verify whether BS may have contributed to the<br />

impact of the PRSP implementation on social conditions, the approach is twofold. Firstly the evaluation<br />

reviews whether the policies and priorities outlined in the PRSP have indeed been implemented; secondly<br />

whether this has had an impact upon the population’s living conditions, in particular on the most<br />

disadvantaged groups.<br />

The main goals of Guyana’s poverty reduction strategy PRSP 2002-2005 (November 2001) focus on:<br />

PRSP 2002-<br />

2005<br />

• Sustained economic expansion;<br />

• Access to social services including education, health, water and housing;<br />

• Expansion of social safety nets.<br />

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PRS report<br />

2004<br />

PRS report<br />

2005<br />

To achieve these goals, the strategy rests on seven pillars:<br />

(i) Creating the environment for broad-based, jobs generating economic growth;<br />

(ii) Environmental protection;<br />

(iii) Strengthening institutions and improving governance;<br />

(iv) Accelerating investment in human capital, with emphasis on basic education and primary health;<br />

(v) Increasing investment in physical capital, with emphasis on better and broader provision of safe water<br />

and sanitation services, farm-to-market roads, drainage and irrigation systems, and housing;<br />

(vi) Improving safety nets;<br />

(vii) Designing special intervention programmes to address regional pockets of poverty.<br />

PRSP implementation was slower than initially foreseen. Until end 2003, implementation was jeopardised by<br />

social and political unrest, lower than expected inflows of donor support and foreign direct investment and the<br />

inability to reach a political consensus required for advancement of the PRS process. Guyana’s macroeconomic<br />

programme was judged off-track by the IMF in 2002: the main donors interrupted their BS and the<br />

enhanced HIPC completion point was not reached until December 2003. Slippages on the macro-economic<br />

front resulted in the need to update the PRSP with economic growth and government revenue collection both<br />

much lower than anticipated 16 .<br />

Nevertheless, it is estimated that in 2004 the government accomplished more than 80% of its planned actions<br />

under the PRSP Progress Report 2004 17 . Progress was made in enacting laws on transparency and<br />

accountability, in giving local government greater autonomy in raising revenues and in implementing social<br />

sector policies. In education, the Education Strategic Plan was started (it aims for reduced repetition and dropout<br />

rates, increased secondary enrolment, reduced overcrowding, absenteeism, teacher training and increased<br />

non salary recurrent expenditures). In health, the National Health Plan was implemented focusing on<br />

HIV/AIDs, training of health staff, upgrading of health facilities, delivery of drugs and medical supplies and<br />

reduction of infant and maternal mortality rates. Improved water and sanitation was facilitated through<br />

reforms in the water sector which also address tariffs to eventually fully cover maintenance and depreciation<br />

costs of water & sewerage provision. A master plan for social housing, in particular for squatters, was also<br />

developed as were specific safety net programmes in the Linden area (see EQ3) and the hinterland areas<br />

(regions 1, 8 and 9).<br />

Unfortunately, the improvement of the coverage, timeliness, quantity, quality and use of survey data which was<br />

recognised as a key item in the PRS and the PRS 2004 report, has still not been implemented in 2007. The<br />

strengthening of the Bureau of Statistics, without which this exercise would be very difficult, has only just<br />

started with IDB support. As a result, there have been no new poverty data available since the PRSP was<br />

launched in 2001 (it used the 1992 HICS data) and currently available social data rely on the collection of data<br />

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at sector level of which the reliability is not guaranteed by the Bureau of Statistics which has no oversight on<br />

these ministerial statistics divisions.<br />

I 4.5.1<br />

I 4.5.1<br />

Performance of PRSP indicators measuring access to health, housing and water such as infant<br />

immunisation rates (measles and DPT), % of population with access to health services, % of<br />

population with access to adequate sanitation, house lots distributed, land/house titles distributed.<br />

Despite the setting up of the PRS M&E Unit in the Policy Coordination and Programme Management Unit<br />

(PCPMU) of the Office of the President, the M&E functions for the PRS have been slow in becoming<br />

effective. The household income and expenditure survey (HIES) was supposed to be carried out in 2003, then<br />

in 2005 but was finally launched in 2006: its results are expected to be published in November 2007 after<br />

clearing by the Cabinet. There are thus no updated statistical data on poverty or living conditions since the<br />

publication of the results of the 1992 HICS; a poverty mapping exercise was undertaken in 2007 on the basis<br />

of the results of the 2002 Census and this is useful for determining regional incidences of poverty. In the<br />

absence of quantitative poverty data, the PRS reports have relied on sector indicators capturing the access to<br />

basic services as a way to measure the evolution of living standards.<br />

On these bases, the PRSP indicators presented in the 2004 PRS report show mixed results. In education, most<br />

indicators but those for secondary education achieved levels exceeding their targets; in health four out of<br />

seven indicators were however not achieved, in particular those related to HIV and the infant mortality rate.<br />

Achievements in the access to potable water, housing and land were also mixed. The tables below are<br />

reproduced from the 2005 PRS Progress Report and show the main indicators with their targets and<br />

achievements.<br />

Table- PRSP indicators, targets ad achievements, 2000 to 2004.<br />

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br />

Population below the national poverty line 35,1 34,9 34 33,1 32,2<br />

Actual - - - - -<br />

Total pro-poor spending (%GDP) 11,7 13,8 14,4 14,5 14,7<br />

Actual 18,4 19,2 18,5 17,1 17,1<br />

% primary school entrants reaching Grade 6 83,5 84 84,6 85,7 86,9<br />

Actual 83,4 83,5 88,3 88,3 88,7<br />

Repetition rate (secondary) 12,9 12,6 12,3 11,2 10,1<br />

Actual 12,9 12,9 12,6 11,8 10,6<br />

Student/trained teacher ratio (primary) 54:1 53:1 53:1 52:1 50:1<br />

Actual 54:1 50:1 50:1 51:1 50:1<br />

Student/trained teacher ratio (secondary) 37:1 36:1 35:1 34:1 33:1<br />

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Actual 37:1 38:1 38:1 39:1 40:1<br />

Gross nursery school enrolment 87 87 88 90 91<br />

Actual 87 87 88 91 92<br />

Gross primary school enrolment 110 107 105 102 100<br />

Actual 110 107 105 104 102<br />

Gross secondary school enrolment 62 65 68 70 72<br />

Actual 62 65 65 65 73<br />

% trained teachers in secondary schools 55 56 57 60 62<br />

Actual 57,5 58,5 58,5 57,1 54,2<br />

% trained teachers in primary schools 49 49 52 55 58<br />

Actual 50 53 54 56 59,4<br />

Number of CXC passes 46,7 51,4 52,5 55,5 58<br />

Actual 73,3 74,5 77,1 75,8 76,3<br />

Infant mortality rate (per 10,000) 57 56 50 47 45<br />

Actual 57 56 54 54 53<br />

Maternal mortality rate (per 10,000) 188 187 170 160 145<br />

Actual 188 187 126 124 122<br />

1 year olds immunized against measles 88,9 90,2 93,3 95,5 97,1<br />

Actual 88,9 90,4 93,5 95,8 97,5<br />

1 year olds immunized against DPT 85,6 88,2 90,2 90,8 91,3<br />

Actual 85,6 88,2 91 91 92,8<br />

% with access to health services 90,4 90,5 92,5 93,7 93,8<br />

Actual 90,4 90,5 90,7 91,3 92,8<br />

Number of reported cases of AIDS 248 227 225 220 210<br />

Actual 248 435 450 475 480<br />

Reported cases of AIDS among women (15-45<br />

cohort) 95 112 100 98 95<br />

Actual 95 123 128 131 133<br />

% with access to treated water 35,4 36,2 44,7 45,1 48,9<br />

Actual 35,4 36,2 44,7 45,1 46,9<br />

Domestic household connected to water system 65 000 68 200 71 500 73 400 75 000<br />

Actual 65 000 95 180 114 266 120 072 125 763<br />

Distribution network constructed (km) 230 250 263 275 278<br />

Actual 230 250 255 265 280<br />

% with access to adequate sanitation 88 89 90 90 90<br />

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PRS report<br />

2004<br />

I 4.5.2<br />

I 4.5.2<br />

I 4.5.3<br />

I 4.5.3<br />

Actual 52 52 53 55 56<br />

House lots distributed 22 795 3 500 4 750 6 200 6 000<br />

Actual 22 735 975 4 195 4 739 4 916<br />

Land/house titles distributed 1 750 2 015 5 200 10 200 12 000<br />

Actual 1 750 2 416 7 474 6 020 5 003<br />

Based on a comparison between the 1999 census data, the intermediary data from the Living Conditions<br />

Survey of 1999 (which gave only very partial seasonal and geographic cover of the population) and the 2002<br />

census data, the PRS 2005 shows that:<br />

(i) on housing, the proportion of households owning or renting their homes decreased during the 1990’s<br />

whilst the incidence of squatting and free rent accommodation increased steeply;<br />

(ii) access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation facilities increased strongly (respectively from 50% in<br />

1990 to 74% of households in 2002 and for sanitation from 31% in 1991 to 40% of households in 2002)<br />

despite regional disparities remaining;<br />

(iii) education enrolment increased, especially in secondary education (from 52% in 1980 to 54% in 1991 and<br />

65% in 2002) and educational attainment also increased (whilst in 1990 only 6,217 students went through<br />

higher education, they were 22,967 in 2002);<br />

(iv) in health all access indicators improved dramatically (number of doctors, nurses, beds etc per patient) with<br />

a consequent lowering of infant and maternal mortality rates.<br />

These results confirm that social statistical data in Guyana should be treated with some caution since different<br />

sources provide not only differing absolute results but sometimes even contradictory results such as is the case<br />

for infant mortality rates for example.<br />

Quality of available social services<br />

The M&E structures that were meant to monitor the implementation of the PRS (the joint civil society-GoG<br />

Steering Committee and the PRS regional M&E committees) were established late and did not fully become<br />

effective. There has thus been only very limited and indirect feedback from the population on the<br />

improvement of social services delivery (through newspaper articles or letters to the press). At the same this<br />

information gap has not been filled by the collection of statistical data: one qualitative survey (other than the<br />

HICS of 2006 of which the results are still awaited) has been undertaken during the period by the Bureau of<br />

Statistics with IDB and Unicef funding but again the data are not yet available. There are thus no data available<br />

on the quality of social services delivered under the PRSP.<br />

Living conditions<br />

Again, as above, the information will only become available with publication of the results of the HICS<br />

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undertaken in 2006, possibly complemented by the results of the IDB/Unicef survey of 2006 which was a<br />

more qualitative survey.<br />

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P Nber Source<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 MR, midterm<br />

evaluation of<br />

the GMPP<br />

(2007), 9 th<br />

EDF CSP<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 MR, midterm<br />

evaluation of<br />

the GMPP<br />

(2007), 9 th<br />

EDF CSP<br />

EQ 5 To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to empowering civil society<br />

organisations and ultimately to improving the socio-economic conditions of local<br />

communities?<br />

JC 5.1 <strong>Commission</strong> intervention was in line with the CSP/NIP strategy and with the GoG policy<br />

I 5.1.1 Degree of alignment of the programme IL with the IL of the NIP/CSP<br />

I 5.1.1 The GMPP accords with EC strategy for co-operation in Guyana and the 9 th EDF NIP for 2002-2007<br />

which made specific provision for a micro-projects programme. The NIP specifically mentions microprojects<br />

as part of the renewed developmental approach. The project purpose of the GMPP seeks to<br />

improve the socio-economic conditions of vulnerable groups of the Guyanese population through the<br />

development of sustainable and participatory self-help schemes: i.e 75 micro-projects at the community<br />

level focusing on the areas of: employment / income generation, training/education, communication<br />

and good governance, and other socioeconomic sectors. In the 9 th EDF CSP, poverty reduction is the<br />

main objective and the significance of the support to economic actors and civil society is emphasised.<br />

I 5.1.2 Discrepancies between the programme and the strategy are explicitly justified<br />

I 5.1.2 There are no discrepancies<br />

I 5.1.3<br />

Degree of alignment of the programme with the GoG policy<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 Mid-term<br />

evaluation of<br />

the GMPP<br />

(2007)<br />

I 5.1.3<br />

JC 5.2<br />

I 5.2.1<br />

The GMPP is aligned with the government policy and the PRSP as it seeks to improve the socioeconomic<br />

conditions o vulnerable groups of the Guyanese population. Moreover, the programme is<br />

consistent with government policy to increase community participation in poverty programmes.<br />

Local communities have better access to socio-economic infrastructure<br />

Clear reference in the programming document to the promotion of socio-economic<br />

development of local communities<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 5.2.1 The GMPP clearly targets the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of vulnerable groups of<br />

the Guyanese population. The completion of 75 micro-projects at the community level focusing on the<br />

areas of employment/income generation, training/education, communication and good governance,<br />

other socio-economic sectors aims at achieving the project purpose.<br />

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9 ACP GUA 1 FA, MR,<br />

mid-term<br />

evaluation of<br />

the GMPP<br />

(2007)<br />

I 5.2.2<br />

I 5.2.2<br />

New socio-economic services are available in the communities supported<br />

The GMPP has only been operational since September 2005 owing to delays in start-up and<br />

implementation. The first 35 micro-projects have only been completed at the end of 2006 or in the early<br />

2007. It is therefore too early to assess the overall impact of the GMPP. Even if all projects are<br />

implemented successfully, due to the small sample of micro-projects, it is difficult to measure their<br />

overall impact. It should be noted that MPP investments only meet a small part of the country’s needs<br />

due to the limited number of projects financed.<br />

When assessing the impact of the projects already completed, it is undeniable that a number of<br />

communities which received support for a micro-project have better access to socio-economic services.<br />

Communities also placed a high value on the contribution the GMPP support made to meet their<br />

specific needs for socio-economic improvement. Examples include:<br />

- construction of bridges which link separate areas of an Amerindian community<br />

- improved access to school and health centres as well as to cultivate land and transport the<br />

produce<br />

- construction of community buildings where social and skills training will take place<br />

- women with marginal incomes given equipment and knowledge to set up food processing<br />

facilities<br />

- etc.<br />

According to the MTR, few micro-projects address directly the needs for employment and income<br />

generating activities in a substantive way that can have direct impact whereas the distribution of funds<br />

foreseen at the design favored this type of activities. Indeed, only 21% of micro-projects are for income<br />

generation/employment (compared to 50% planned in the FA). 50% of micro-projects are for other<br />

socio-economic sectors or social infrastructure (instead of 25% initially planned) and 29% in training /<br />

education (instead of 25% planned). This imbalance reduces the effectiveness of the GMPP to address<br />

the real socio-economic problems felt by the community groups. This raises concern as to whether<br />

projects selected by the GMPB really address the most effective means whereby poverty can be tackled.<br />

More projects in income generation/employment generation especially in the rural interior would have a<br />

more direct impact on poverty reduction for vulnerable groups.<br />

JC 5.3 The capacity for self-help of local communities has increased<br />

I 5.3.1 Evidence that MPP is conceived to be undertaken at the request of local communities<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 5.3.1 The FA foresees implementation measures that ensure the demand-driven character of the programme.<br />

The local communities prepare micro-projects proposal and submit them to the GMPO. The GMPO or<br />

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contracted intermediate organisations assist the communities in formulating and writing the proposals<br />

when needed. The GMPO is then screening and scoring the proposals. The GMPO sends to the GMPB<br />

all the proposals for micro-projects and the latter either accepts or rejects them.<br />

I 5.3.2 Clear reference to participation of local communities in the programming documents<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 5.3.2 Community participation is stated as a major element in the design of the MPP. Local communities will<br />

be required to contribute to 25% of project costs in order to ensure ownership of the micro-projects.<br />

The empowerment of local communities is however not a purpose in itself but a means to reach the<br />

project purpose: improve the socio-economic conditions of vulnerable groups of the Guyanese<br />

population through the development of participatory self-help schemes.<br />

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I 5.3.3 Evidence that MPP is based on needs assessment undertaken by local communities<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 5.3.3 The realisation of needs assessments are not foreseen in the FA. However, the projects proposals, most<br />

of the time prepared by the NGOs or CBOs themselves, present clear ideas and needs of the<br />

community.<br />

I 5.3.4 Evidence that an adequate level of capacity-building investment has been foreseen in the<br />

programme<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 FA, MPP<br />

evaluation<br />

I 5.3.4 6.8% of the total GMPP has been allocated to the strengthening of civil society in the FA. The MPP<br />

evaluation highlighted that on average 7% of total activities during the 7 th , 8 th and 9 th EDF and 8,5% for<br />

the 9 th EDF were allocated to capacity building and reported that capacity-building investment has been<br />

low. As a consequence, the share of capacity building investment in the total budget for the GMPP is<br />

considered as low. The MPP evaluation also stated that capacity-building investments require sufficient<br />

time and resource allocation to have an effect on the local communities. We can therefore foresee that<br />

the impact of the GMPP on local communities will be limited.<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 FA, Midterm<br />

evaluation of<br />

the GMPP<br />

(2007)<br />

I 5.3.5<br />

I 5.3.5<br />

Evidence that local communities benefited from capacity-building<br />

2 critical assumptions have been made at the design stage of the programme:<br />

- communities have the capacity to identify and implement viable micro-projects<br />

- existence and capacity of local non-state actors to assist local communities in meeting the<br />

requirements for preparing and in executing projects under a call or proposals mechanism<br />

But these assumptions proved to be wrong:<br />

- the capacity of the communities has proved to be weak<br />

- 25 NGOs have been registered with the GMMPO; the actual number with the required capacity<br />

is much less<br />

Design did not pay sufficient attention to the need to build the capacity of community organisations.<br />

The GMPP is indeed primarily focused on the delivery of micro-projects and strengthening of NSAs –<br />

through training in rapid participatory analysis of poverty problems- to achieve that purpose. The<br />

GMPP indeed trained CBOs and NGOs in problem and need analysis, EU grant management and<br />

Project cycle management.<br />

But more attention could have been paid in the design to allow more time and resources to the need for<br />

capacity building and systematic training of CBOs and NGOs in project preparation, application as well<br />

as training in grant management before the start of the implementation.<br />

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National<br />

Development<br />

Strategy<br />

JC 5.4<br />

I 5.4.1<br />

I 5.4.1<br />

I 5.4.2<br />

Moreover, strengthening of civil society would need in itself a substantive programme of activities.<br />

Other complementary training could include association management, meeting techniques, democratic<br />

rules and attitudes, training in human rights, legal rights, civil rights, advocacy policy etc.<br />

If institutional strengthening was the major purpose of the GMPP, then MPs would be a means to<br />

achieve that objective through the building of local capacity to deliver projects. Rather than designing<br />

the programme with micro-projects as a means to build community level capacity and civil society<br />

strengthening, the design has a focus whereby the means of MPs to reduce poverty is the end in itself.<br />

Civil society organisations participate more in the development process<br />

Evidence of local development process weaknesses in policy papers<br />

Given the nature of the country’s history and its current constitution, there is little participation by<br />

Guyanese non-governmental groups and other sections of civil society, in the formulation of public<br />

policies and in their implementation. Opposition parties, as always in the country’s political history, are<br />

not routinely and formally consulted on legislative matters, nor are the trades unions and the private<br />

sector. It seems to be the rule that such organisations are asked to participate in the decision-making<br />

processes only in times of crisis, particularly when there is industrial strife and political violence. Often,<br />

the only objective of the political exercise is to confound the opposing political party. In such<br />

circumstances, opacity in government is seen as a virtue, and transparency an impediment in the exercise<br />

of power.<br />

The current systems of local and regional government also do not lend themselves to meaningful<br />

participation. Indeed, in many respects, they accentuate the imperfections of the central government, by<br />

replicating both the winner-take-all syndrome, and the absence of statutory and formal procedures for<br />

consultation. If anything, because the power to make decisions which impinge upon regional and village<br />

life rests almost entirely with the Centre, the peripheral systems impede, rather than assist, the<br />

development of local democracy. For example, budgetary allocations and expenditure are controlled by<br />

the Centre; the most senior regional public servant is employed by the central government and reports<br />

directly to the minister responsible for regional and local government; and the laws which the regional<br />

and local authorities administer are initiated, enacted, and imposed by the Centre. It follows, therefore,<br />

that no matter what the political allegiance and complexion of the regional and local governments, the<br />

economic and social decisions which influence and control the lives of their citizens are made by the<br />

Centre.<br />

Clear reference to this objective in the programming documents<br />

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9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 5.4.2 The FA makes a clear reference to this objective. The 4th result of the GMPP is a “Regular and<br />

structured dialogue between government and civil society”. Activities such as joint statements on sector<br />

approaches and participation on PRSP sector issues are explicitly mentioned in the FA.<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 Mid-term<br />

evaluation of<br />

the GMPP<br />

(2007)<br />

I 5.4.3<br />

I 5.4.3<br />

Measures to ensure the strengthening of civil society are in place<br />

Only one activity out of the four foreseen in the FA was due to be held. The annual workshop planned<br />

in late 2006 was not held as the new Board, responsible for organising it, has not been constituted.<br />

The measures in place to assist civil society in participation in the dialogue with the government related<br />

to poverty reduction strategy are not strong and broad enough to strengthen civil society. A support is<br />

indeed needed in human development training, advocacy techniques, media training, debates, etc.<br />

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9 ACP GUA 1 FA, Midterm<br />

evaluation of<br />

the GMPP<br />

(2007)<br />

I 5.4.4<br />

I 5.4.4<br />

Extent to which the MP-Office/Board implemented and facilitated MP development and<br />

cooperation with civil society<br />

The implementation procedures of the programme are defined in the FA. The FA describes the<br />

respective roles and functions between the EC Delegation, NAO, GMPB and GMPO in the<br />

organisational structure for GMPP. The project implementation will be supervised and co-ordinated by<br />

the GMPB. The NAO is responsible for the implementation of the MPP, with the EC as an observer.<br />

The GMPO will be responsible for the day-to-day management of the programme. But clarification<br />

upon these roles has been needed, mainly between NAO and EC. Regular meetings have been held to<br />

facilitate greater understanding of these roles and responsibilities for management of GMPP.<br />

More specifically, there are some difficulties of interpretation as to the overall role of the GMPB in<br />

respect of their functions vis-à-vis the GMPO. The Chairperson has somehow interfered in the<br />

management of the operations of the GMPO. The MTR stressed that the Chairperson has to<br />

understand the organizational management structure and roles defined in the FA with regard to the<br />

delegation of the supervisory role for day-to-day management of GMPP to the GMPO.<br />

Moreover, there have been some disagreements between the EC Delegation and the government on the<br />

composition of the MPPB and between the EC delegation and the TA on the implementation<br />

modalities of the programme. The setting-up of a new Board –foreseen for the end of 2006- has been<br />

delayed to 2007 due to EC concerns as to the validity of the election process at the workshop held for<br />

that purpose end of 2006. The MTR raised concern as to the extent of the pool of people in civil society<br />

from which new Board members can be drawn.<br />

These difficulties somehow prevented the GMPB and GMPO to facilitate MP development in an<br />

effective way.<br />

JC 5.5 Results achieved by <strong>Commission</strong> support are maintained after the end of its direct support<br />

I 5.5.1 Explicit reference in the FA to measures to ensure sustainability<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 5.5.1 The FA does presuppose that economic sustainability of the MPP should not be expected as the<br />

programme will have to provide grants, not credits, to the beneficiaries. Moreover, the design does not<br />

foresee any exit strategy.<br />

2 factors are mentioned for the achievement of sustainability at the level of the individual microprojects:<br />

- the strong emphasis on community participation at all stages of the project<br />

- the contribution of the communities to the project (25% of project costs)<br />

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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

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9 ACP GUA 1 MR, midterm<br />

evaluation of<br />

the GMPP<br />

(2007)<br />

I.5.5.2<br />

I 5.5.2<br />

Evidence that the benefits continue to be used after the end of the intervention<br />

The outputs achieved so far are not substantial enough to allow a full assessment of the GMMP. Even if<br />

the sustainability of the programme is embedded in the concept of participatory self-help schemes, the<br />

low capacity of the communities will significantly constrain the overall sustainability of the programme.<br />

In that regard, the few time and support provided by the MPP in building capacity of NGOs and CBOs<br />

is an impediment to the sustainability of the programme. Anyhow, the programme will close after 28<br />

months of implementation instead of the 5 years initially planned .<br />

In relation to the sustainability of the 35 micro-projects completed under the first call of proposals, field<br />

visits conducted during the MTR allowed the evaluators a degree of optimism that many will be<br />

sustained. This is particularly the case when there is a high degree of project ownership by the<br />

beneficiaries and when the projects build on existing capacities of community bodies.<br />

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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9 ACP GUA 3<br />

Support to the<br />

NAO<br />

8 ACP GUA 5<br />

Sea Defences<br />

8 ACP GUA 15<br />

Low Income<br />

Housing<br />

<strong>Commission</strong><br />

and GoG<br />

informants<br />

EQ 6<br />

JC 6.1<br />

I 6.1.1<br />

I 6.1.1<br />

To what extent have the financial, human and technical resources been used to reach objectives in a<br />

timely and cost effective manner and was the regulatory and administrative framework appropriate<br />

for doing this? To what extent has the support to the NAO task force contributed to reaching<br />

objectives in a timely and cost effective manner?<br />

The institutional set-up foresees a clear distribution of roles at each level of project implementation,<br />

from design to closure<br />

Evidence of organizational structure and management culture through well-defined procedures and<br />

job roles in particular at NAO task force level, DEC level and project level<br />

The Financing Agreement (FA) dated May 2004 and related to the Institutional Strengthening of the NAO’s<br />

office did not define the organizational structure needed for the programme preparation and implementation.<br />

The document is listing the problems to be resolved as identified by the Consultant in its ‘Elaboration Study<br />

for support to the NAO’ (August 2003) among which: ‘the need to clarify the roles, responsibilities and<br />

authority of the NAO Task force”.<br />

But the initial 5-month Technical Assistance did not contribute to the clarification mainly for the reasons of<br />

the short duration of its intervention and of the Terms of Reference whose overall objectives, project<br />

purpose and results only duplicating those mentioned in the FA regarding the NAO.<br />

8 ACP GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

8 ACP GUA 4<br />

SAS V and VI<br />

I 6.1.1<br />

BUDGET SUPPORT (BS). The issue is to consider adequacy and efficiency of the Budget support processes<br />

and management principles by objectives to meet the tranche realease conditions.<br />

9ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

Budget<br />

support<br />

Concerning organisational structure and procedures<br />

Administrative arrangements and auditing procedures were outlined in the TAP. The ministries of health and<br />

education were in charge of submitting copies of justifying documents for eligible expenditure to a private<br />

sector accountant whom after verification would prepare a monthly summary statement submitted for<br />

payment from the double NAO and DEC signature CPF account.. Documents could be audited on a regular<br />

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EGEVAL<br />

basis for accuracy, eligibility, and authenticity; the double signature CPF account was also subject to external<br />

audit.<br />

The SAS V was a precursor to the new generation of budget support and included as such agreement for<br />

starting the gathering of data for performance indicators to facilitate monitoring of performance in the social<br />

sectors.<br />

8 ACP GUA 4<br />

SAS V and VI<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

Budget<br />

support<br />

Kea features<br />

- Under PRBS, performance monitoring of outcome indicators in the social sectors and PFM areas is<br />

the base for decision-making of variable tranche release.<br />

- It appears that the process called upon TA both with the view to attain set targets and with the view<br />

to monitor and evaluate performance indicators.<br />

- It is also noted that the process of setting up and implementing a monitoring system for PRSP<br />

implementation appears to have been slow and that the production of monitoring indicators for<br />

PRSP implementation has posed some initial problems to GoG.<br />

- The question of the country’s and the DEC’s capacity to undertake the required tasks seems thus to<br />

be still valid under PRBS.<br />

Other observations regarding the Budget support procedures :<br />

- Due to the lack of institutional memory, no information on the actual organisational structure of the<br />

SAS programmes has been found other than the administrative arrangements and auditing<br />

procedures outlined in the TAP. The ministries of health and education were in charge of submitting<br />

copies of justifying documents for eligible expenditure to a private sector accountant whom after<br />

verification would prepare a monthly summary statement submitted for payment from the double<br />

NAO and DEC signature CPF account. Documents could be audited on a regular basis for accuracy,<br />

eligibility, and authenticity; the double signature CPF account was also subject to external audit. The<br />

existence of actual procedures and job descriptions and roles of the various players (the NAO and<br />

the DEC, the Ministries of Finance, Education and Health, Bank of Guyana, Auditor General’s,<br />

Accountant General’s Offices, the private sector appointed accountant and the external auditor.) to<br />

deal with these issues could not be verified in the field.<br />

- The SAS V was a precursor to the new generation of budget support and included as such agreement<br />

for starting the gathering of data for performance indicators to facilitate monitoring of performance<br />

in the social sectors. This had been a specific recommendation of the evaluation of GIP III realised<br />

in 1999 which advocated the setup of a 'monitoring and evaluation system specifying clear objectives<br />

and performance and impact indicators, for the programme as a whole and for each project,<br />

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including the preparation of a complete follow-up data sheet for each project' (…) and 'Strict and ongoing<br />

monitoring and follow-up of projects, based on clear specifications and rules'. This was<br />

however not realised.<br />

- With the PRBS, there are no requirements for administrative and financial procedures linked to the<br />

actual disbursement of the funds other than a NAO request for payment to the Delegation and a<br />

transmission of this request from the Delegation to the <strong>Commission</strong> HQ. Importantly, however, the<br />

level of the disbursement now depends on the fulfilment of a number of targets in the areas of PFM,<br />

health and social housing. The organisational structure required for the evaluation of the level of<br />

disbursement (evaluation of conditions for tranche release which involved the evaluation of a set of<br />

performance indicators in the 3 sectors) is of a different nature and scope since it involves many<br />

actors: the NAO, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Housing, assistance<br />

from several TAs and on the <strong>Commission</strong> side, both the DEC and HQ intervene.<br />

- From file notes at the Delegation it appears that the organisational structure and the respective roles<br />

of these different actors had been insufficiently defined at the outset of the programme to allow for a<br />

smooth process of tranche release evaluation. The start of the PRBS (2005) coincided with the<br />

setting up of the NAO Task Force and the appointment of 2 new staff in the Economic Section of<br />

the Delegation who apparently were not familiar with the requirements for Budget Support. As a<br />

result, the initial 2005 Fixed Tranche release of €6 million which should have been disbursed straight<br />

after signature of the FA at end of September 2004 was eventually disbursed in December 2004 after<br />

many exchanges of letters and information between the Delegation and the <strong>Commission</strong>. The main<br />

issue of delay was the unsatisfactory information provided by the DEC to the <strong>Commission</strong> on the<br />

second general disbursement condition pertaining to a review of the PFM situation. The initial<br />

information provided was based on reviews provided by the IDB and CIDA which, at the time, were<br />

supporting the implementation of the PFM reform with the Guyana Economic Management<br />

Programme (GEMP); after this information was found unsatisfactory by the <strong>Commission</strong> (lack of<br />

independent assessment of the PFM situation), it was completed in November 2004 with the results<br />

of the IMF mission which eventually allowed the disbursement of the fixed tranche in December<br />

2004 (and to the acceptance by the <strong>Commission</strong> to postpone a full PFM review to 2005).<br />

- Correspondence about later tranche disbursements confirms the lack of clarity of respective roles, in<br />

particular between the DEC and the EC HQ with the HQ micro-managing at a distance the BS<br />

programme (see I 6.1.2 below).<br />

- Interviews also stressed the tensions created by the lack of well defined roles between the NAO Task<br />

Force and the Delegation: because staff of the NAO Task Force are paid by the EC, the Delegation<br />

appears to consider them as their employees even though they clearly fall under the NAO’s line<br />

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management and report to the NAO.<br />

- Finally as far as the management culture of the beneficiaries is concerned, discussions with the<br />

ministries of housing and health have shown that the new approach to BS based on management by<br />

objectives has been well understood by these administrations: it is clear that everything is done to<br />

ensure that EC social sector targets are reached but it is less certain that this truly reflects a<br />

management by objectives culture within these ministries. Indeed, it is to be noted that (i)<br />

performance in both sectors has generally been mixed when considering all PRSP indicators for<br />

these respective sectors but that EC indicators consistently attained their target levels 18 (see EQ4)<br />

and (ii) although budget programmes are used within the ministries, there are so in name rather than<br />

in content, the recurrent and capital budgets are still separated, no detailed programme costing exist,<br />

no output, outcome and impact indicators are defined, measured and monitored and linked to the<br />

human and financial means engaged, etc. On the whole, although the principles of BS are well<br />

understood, the approach is not one that fits well within the Guyanese culture of public monies<br />

management.<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 6.1.1 An organizational structure has been foreseen in the FA for the MPP:<br />

- The overall responsibility for the implementation of the project lies with the NAO who is the contracting<br />

authority of the programme.<br />

- The supervisor of the programme is the chairman of the MP Board, who is answerable and accountable to<br />

the NAO and to the EC, with the technical assistance of the International adviser.<br />

- The MP Office is in charge of the day-to day management of the MPP. The PM will be answerable vis-à-vis<br />

the MP Board, the NAO, and the EC Delegation.<br />

I 6.1.2 Degree of appropriateness of the organizational structure (in particular at NAO, DEC and project<br />

level) to (i) the country’s capacity and constraints, (ii) to the <strong>Commission</strong>’s available resources and<br />

(iii) the scope and size of the programmes and projects<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 MPP Midterm<br />

evaluation<br />

I 6.1.2 The organizational structure of the MPP does not seem appropriate. Clarification upon the roles of the<br />

different stakeholders has been needed, mainly between NAO and EC. Regular meetings have been held to<br />

facilitate greater understanding of these roles and responsibilities for management of GMPP.<br />

More specifically, there are some difficulties of interpretation as to the overall role of the GMPB in respect of<br />

their functions vis-à-vis the GMPO. The Chairperson has somehow interfered in the management of the<br />

operations of the GMPO. The MTR stressed that the Chairperson has to understand the organizational<br />

management structure and roles defined in the FA with regard to the delegation of the supervisory role for<br />

day-to-day management of GMPP to the GMPO.<br />

Moreover, there have been some disagreements between the EC Delegation and the government on the<br />

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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

composition of the MPPB and between the EC delegation and the TA on the implementation modalities of<br />

the programme. The setting-up of a new Board –foreseen for the end of 2006- has been delayed to 2007 due<br />

to EC concerns as to the validity of the election process at the workshop held for that purpose end of 2006.<br />

The MTR raised concern as to the extent of the pool of people in civil society from which new Board<br />

members can be drawn.<br />

9 ACP GUA 1<br />

MPP<br />

9 ACP GUA 3<br />

Support to the<br />

NAO<br />

Field visit<br />

interviews<br />

<strong>Commission</strong><br />

and GoG<br />

informants<br />

I 6.1.2<br />

Key point from the GoG point of view:<br />

- MPP should be a community driven programme. MPP procedures should be flexible (the 75 pages<br />

application form is irrelevant to most of Guyanese associations). But the boundary impossible to<br />

breach is the GoG policy in balancing helps and contributions to the various ethnic entities,<br />

communities, civil or religious associations in the different (urban, rural) areas of the country. In this<br />

context the only intangible rule is the ‘no objection’ of the Government for the fund allocation<br />

whatever the board considerations and the EC procedures.<br />

The <strong>Commission</strong> resources for the support to the NAO (€ 1 million) amounts to 1.4 % of whole the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> interventions budget (€ 146m over the evaluation period, said € 73 million over the 5-year<br />

duration of the NAO support Financing Agreement.<br />

Tables on the following section I.6.2.1 identifies that the NAO Task Force has to deal with :<br />

- 12 interventions counting € 133m and 91% of the total committed (intervention average € 11m)<br />

Sector Number Average m€ (*)<br />

Sea Defences 2 18,5<br />

Transport 0<br />

Housing (LIS) 1 9,1<br />

Private sector (LEAP) 1 12,5<br />

Budget support 5 10,3<br />

Civil society (MPP) 1 4<br />

Rice 1 12,9<br />

Sugar 1 5,7<br />

Total 12 132,7<br />

- 37 interventions counting € 13m and 9% of the total committed (intervention average € 0,35m)<br />

Sector Number Average m€ (*)<br />

Sea Defences 5 0,07<br />

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Transport 2 0;51<br />

Housing 1 0,07<br />

Private sector 7 0,23<br />

Budget support 5 0,76<br />

Civil society 5 0,42<br />

Programme<br />

10 0,22<br />

agement<br />

Environment 2 0,92<br />

Total 37 13<br />

So the NAO Task Force with a programme coordinator and two programme officers appears to be<br />

adequately dimensioned to the scope and size of the programme and projects.<br />

But the Monitoring report observed in 2004 difficult working environment and limited office space<br />

(observation confirmed three years after during the evaluation exploratory mission). The mid term evaluation<br />

provide also indicators confirming that the appropriateness of the organizational structure could be enhanced<br />

(‘cramped working conditions such as less than optimum communication and transportation facilities’). The<br />

evaluation team confirmed the rightfulness of these observations during the field mission. No change has<br />

been observed since the initial settlement to remedy these management constraints.<br />

8 ACP GUA 8<br />

Guyana<br />

Training<br />

Agency<br />

8 ACP GUA 4<br />

SAS V and VI<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

Mid-term<br />

evaluation<br />

Synopsis<br />

sheet SAS V<br />

<strong>Commission</strong><br />

file notes<br />

PRSP<br />

annual<br />

reviews<br />

I 6.1.2<br />

I 6.1.2<br />

I 6.1.2<br />

According to the Mid-Term evaluation, the day-t-day management of the project was good. The team was<br />

well informed and well-coordinated. However, the day-to-day management was made complicated by the<br />

organisational arrangements involving the project management team, the NAO and the <strong>Commission</strong>. The<br />

style of management was a bit rigid in a situation that demands some flexibility.<br />

The synopsis sheet for SAS V states that: ‘the Performance Indicators Cell which should have been set up<br />

with the help of a TA in the Ministry of Finance was not established because ‘the government considered<br />

that it already had the competence and capacity to carry out the required activities’’. Whether or not the<br />

absence of this cell was partly in cause, it is further noted that: ‘the lack of clear definition of indicators and<br />

target measurements and interpretation of data led to differences of view between the Govt, the Delegation<br />

and Brussels on what amount to disburse.’<br />

Under PRBS, performance monitoring of outcome indicators in the social sectors and PFM areas is the base<br />

for decision-making of variable tranche release. From available documents it appears that the Delegation in<br />

particular had insufficient resources available to undertake the tasks required from it by the <strong>Commission</strong> to<br />

substantiate the requests for tranche releases. The DEC rapidly hired international consultants to prepare the<br />

information required for fixed and variable tranche disbursement. This has functioned for the 3 years (2005 –<br />

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8 ACP GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

P ACP GUA 3<br />

Support to the<br />

NAO<br />

Delegation<br />

File Notes<br />

Evaluation<br />

report<br />

I 6.1.3<br />

I 6.1.3<br />

I 6.1.3<br />

2007) with one yearly mission to undertake an independent PFM review (prior to the fixed tranche<br />

disbursements of 2005, 2006) and one yearly mission to carry out the independent evaluation of performance<br />

indicators for the variable tranche release.<br />

GoG’s limited capacity to improve PFM systems (and in particular to achieve the targets retained for the<br />

performance indicators of the PRBS) also called for TA with the view to assist the GoG in attaining 3 of the<br />

7 PFM indicators. This particularly refers to TA provided to the Ministry of Finance for the development of<br />

fiscal projections (indicator 1), the Ministry of Housing and Water for the development of an MTEF<br />

(indicator 3) and a strengthening of statistics and the Ministry of Health for the development of and MTEF<br />

(indicator 3) and a TA for strengthening the external debt management capacity (Indicator 4). The TAs<br />

working on the MTEFs were later extended to encompass the ministries of education, public works and<br />

finance. Similarly, Indicator 2 was actually dependent upon progress made under an IDB funded project. Out<br />

of the seven indicators of PFM, GoG had only in-house capacity for fulfilling 3 of them.<br />

Similarly, in health, the outcome of all three indicators depended heavily on continued external financing<br />

remaining available for the three programmes monitored.<br />

It is also noted that the process of setting up and implementing a monitoring system for PRSP<br />

implementation appears to have been slow and that the production of monitoring indicators for PRSP<br />

implementation has posed some initial problems to GoG. Unfortunately, during the field mission the PRSP<br />

M&E unit was unavailable for meetings but it is understood from discussions with DEC staff and other<br />

donors and from the PRSP annual reviews, that PRSP monitoring has remained weak and receives<br />

considerable donor attention under the current preparation of the PRSP II.<br />

Evidence of emphasis on conformity in the whole organization in particular at NAO, DEC and<br />

project level<br />

According to the LEAP Monitoring system (2005), the whole organization at project level has been quite<br />

conform:<br />

- 7 advisory group per year has been achieved at 71%<br />

- 5 advisory group task force meeting per year has been achieved at 60%<br />

- 2 steering Committee Meetings per year has been achieved at 100%<br />

- 10 Portfolio meetings per year has been achieved at 70%<br />

- 15 occurrences of the Motivational system for staff members has been achieved at 47%<br />

Key point<br />

- No specific rules and organization principles have been presented at the request of the evaluation<br />

team during the field visit. These management tools should have been elaborated with the view to<br />

defining the relations between stakeholders so as to determine ‘who is doing what’ at each stage of<br />

the programming and implementation process (see annexes 6.1-6.2-6.3 and above section 1.6.1.1).<br />

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The Monitoring report (MR) dated 07/04/06 mentioned that ‘the NAO TF could be more pro-active in engendering<br />

better management across the portfolio’. But a monthly Portfolio meeting is headed by the DNAO with the direct<br />

involvement of the <strong>Commission</strong> Delegation, Line Ministries and project managements representatives.<br />

Further emphasis on conformity in the whole organization is depending on the clear understanding of the<br />

partition of responsibilities between the programme stakeholders. These monthly portfolio meetings<br />

demonstrate great utility in coordinating project activities and in following up closely intervention<br />

achievements.<br />

9 ACP GUA 3<br />

Support to the<br />

NAO<br />

8 ACP GUA 5<br />

Sea Defences<br />

8 ACP GUA 15<br />

Low Income<br />

Housing<br />

8 ACP GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

I 6.1.4 Emphasis on timely and cost-effective management in particular at NAO and DEC levels.<br />

I 6.1.4 - The DNAO is clearly emphasizing the needed timely and cost effective management through the<br />

monthly portfolio meetings, entailing clear instructions to the project actors (Line Ministries,<br />

consultants and to the NAO Task Force in coordinating/supporting/monitoring the actions<br />

implemented in respect of the projects planning and budgets.<br />

But the MR quoted that there is still significant room to improvement, which was (in 2006) iterated by the<br />

DNAO.<br />

The field mission has been opportunity to fill-up this indicator though comparison of project results before<br />

and after 2002 (when the NAO Task force was set up).<br />

Table– Monitoring reports scoring – Delays & rates of disbursements<br />

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Legend<br />

1997-2002 2003-2007 11/07<br />

Delay Decision>Start 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 % %<br />

Extension after Contract end date 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Time Paid<br />

INFRASTRUCTURES Relevance a b a a b<br />

Sea Defences Efficiency b c c c d 82% 75%<br />

8ACPGUA 5 Effectiveness b b b b d<br />

Impact b b c c c<br />

Sustainability c c c c c<br />

Housing<br />

Relevance<br />

8ACPGUA 15 Efficiency Ev. 100% 17%<br />

Effectiveness<br />

Impact<br />

Sustainability<br />

PRIVATE SECTOR support Relevance b b b<br />

GTA Efficiency c b b 100% 100%<br />

8ACPGUA 8 Effectiveness c b b<br />

Impact b b b<br />

Sustainability b b c<br />

Relevance b b b<br />

LEAP Efficiency c c b 80% 55%<br />

8ACPGUA 9 Effectiveness c b b<br />

Impact c b b<br />

Sustainability c c c<br />

Civil society support Relevance c<br />

MPP Efficiency c 66% 40%<br />

9ACPGUA 1 Effectiveness c<br />

Impact<br />

c<br />

Sustainability<br />

c<br />

Programme management Relevance b<br />

NAO support Efficiency a 60% 74%<br />

9ACPGUA 3 Effectiveness b<br />

Impact<br />

c<br />

Sustainability<br />

c<br />

Relevance b b<br />

Rice sector Efficiency d c 46% 40%<br />

9ACPRPR 6 Effectiveness c b<br />

Impact c c<br />

Sustainability d c<br />

Key observations<br />

- Actually, the support to the NAO is recent over the period under observation. So its effective impact<br />

cannot be observed since its settlement at the end of 2004.<br />

- The NAO TF was not accountable of the long delays and problems to set up the two interventions<br />

related to Low Income Housing and to the Rice sector support under the 9 th RIP and also to solve<br />

the initial serious problems of the LEAP project.<br />

- As well the serious technical difficulties encountered by the Sea Defences activites with the 8ACP<br />

GUA 5 intervention were not under the only command of the NAO TF. Other actors identified at<br />

decision and coordination levels in the organisation and management chart (Annexe XX) were also<br />

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directly concerned.<br />

- Nevertheless surprisingly no ROM mission has been arranged since the the early 2006 despite it was<br />

necessary for 8 ACP GUA 5 (Sea Defences after the bad scoring of the last MR), 8 ACP GUA 15<br />

(Housing) which should have benefits of a monitoring mission at the very begiinig ot the project<br />

start up and before the late evaluation in 2007, 8 ACP GUA 9 (LEAP) due to the exceptional<br />

difficult context of the LEAF component and also due to the need to enforce the LEAP and LEAF<br />

sustainability, 9 ACP GUA 3 (MPP) to prevent risk of mismanagement of this highly politically<br />

sensible intervention, 9 ACP RPR 6 (Rice Sector) to ensure a close follow-up of this important<br />

intervention for Guyana but through a Regional programme; and eventually 9 ACP GUA 1 (NAO<br />

support) to get confirmation of the initial positive assessment from the MR in the early 2006.<br />

- Comparing rate of disbursements and time advancement, the situation remains critical for 8 ACP<br />

GUA 5 (Sea Defences), highly questionable for 8 ACP GUA 5 (Housing), understandable for 8 ACP<br />

GUA 9 (LEAP) due to the specific problems faced by the LEAF component, quasi normal for the<br />

other interventions (MP, NAO support and Rice sector support).<br />

8 ACP GUA 4<br />

(SAS V and VI)<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

9 ACP GUA 3<br />

Support to the<br />

NAO<br />

I 6.1.4<br />

I 6.1.5<br />

Despite the assistance from an international expert to prepare all background documentation for tranche<br />

release of the PRBS (see I 6.1.2), the extent to which the DEC should additionally (i) provide an independent<br />

full PFM review (ie even independent from the work provided by an EU funded consultant) and (ii) have at<br />

its fingertips all background justifying documents on which the evaluations are based, seems to have been an<br />

important point of contention/discussion between the DEC and the <strong>Commission</strong>.<br />

Existence of co-ordination mechanisms among implementation actors (consultations, coordination<br />

working groups)<br />

Coordination mechanisms exist at Donors programme implementation within the Project Cycle Division of<br />

the MoF and headed by the DNAO. The <strong>Commission</strong> programme activities are subject of coordination<br />

during the monthly Portfolio meeting (see above). The NAO task force is in charge of the projects<br />

coordination on a day by day basis. A steering committee was installed and headed by the NAO during the 5-<br />

month TA in 2005.<br />

8 ACP GUA 4<br />

(SAS V and VI)<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

I 6.1.5<br />

In terms of budget support it appears that the whole process of design, implementation, monitoring of the<br />

programme and evaluation of indicators for tranche release is performed quite independently of any sector<br />

working groups, PRSP reviews or other platforms of GoG-donor consultations. Obviously all relevant parties<br />

are consulted but this is done on bilateral basis rather than as a concerted effort, thus losing the opportunity<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 31


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

to use budget support as a lever for improved GoG-donor and EC-donor coordination.<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 I 6.1.5 No explicit reference to coordination mechanisms in the documents available<br />

JC 6.2 The financial instruments, management tools and processes used for implementation contribute to<br />

reaching objectives in a timely and cost effective manner<br />

I 6.2.1 Number and amount of global commitments and financing agreements by sector.<br />

Program/Project Title N Sector Committed Cumul %cumul<br />

8 ACP GUA 5 Guyana sea defencesŹ 1 Sea Defences 20 000 000 20 000 000 14%<br />

9 ACP GUA 9th EDF Sea Defences Programme 2 Sea Defences 17 018 000 37 018 000 25%<br />

8 ACP GUA 15 Support To The Low-Income Housing Sector 3 Housing 9 100 000 46 118 000 32%<br />

8 ACP GUA 9 Linden economic advancement programmeŹ 4 Private sector 12 500 000 58 618 000 40%<br />

9 ACP GUA 6 Poverty reduction budget support to GuyanaŹ 5 Budget Support 26 666 379 85 284 379 59%<br />

9 ACP GUA 7 Poverty reduction budget support to GuyanaŹ 6 Budget Support 8 400 000 93 684 379 64%<br />

7 ACP GUA 26<br />

Participation communautaire a l'initiative d'allegement de la dette des pays pauvres<br />

tres endettesŹ<br />

7 Budget Support 6 440 000 100 124 379 69%<br />

8 ACP GUA 4 Support programme for economic reforms (sas v : 1999)Ź 8 Budget Support 5 400 000 105 524 379 72%<br />

8 ACP GUA 1 Support programme for econmic reforms (sas iv : 1998)Ź 9 Budget Support 4 600 000 110 124 379 76%<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 Micro-projects programmeŹ 10 Civil Society 4 000 000 114 124 379 78%<br />

9 ACP RPR 006 Support to the Competitiveness of the Rice sector in the Caribbean 11 Rice 12 930 240 127 054 619 87%<br />

SUCRE/2006/018-<br />

530<br />

Accompanying measures 2006 for Sugar Protocol Countries 12 Sugar 5 663 000 132 717 619 91%<br />

Sub total 12 132 717 619 132 717 619 91%<br />

Other projects 37 13 029 370 13 029 370 9%<br />

Total 49 145 746 989 145 746 989 100%<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 32


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Other porjects (details) N Ū Cumul Average<br />

9 ACP GUA 2 Design & tender procedure Guyana sea defencesŹ 1 Sea Defences 151 742 151 742<br />

6 ACP GUA 28 Sea defences - appraisal of progr.& prep. Financial proposalŹ 2 Sea Defences 66 836 218 578<br />

6 ACP GUA 30 Elaboration study for the sea defence project to be financed under the 9th EDFŹ 3 Sea Defences 59 319 277 897<br />

6 ACP GUA 24 Provision for investigation of sea defense slip failuresŹ 4 Sea Defences 36 571 314 468<br />

7 ACP GUA 25 Guyana's sea defences - econ. & financial analyses - 8 EDF 5 Sea Defences 20 779 335 247 67 049<br />

9 ACP GUA 4 Transport sector studyŹ 1 Transport 900 000 900 000<br />

7 ACP GUA 13 Feasibility study for Guyana-Brazil roadŹ 2 Transport 124 457 1 024 457 512 229<br />

6 ACP GUA 29 Low income housing programmeŹ 1 Housing 73 289 73 289 73 289<br />

8 ACP GUA 8 Guyana training agencyŹ 1 Private sector 1 328 342 1 328 342<br />

7 ACP GUA 23 Study economic diversification LindenŹ 2 Private sector 101 225 1 429 567<br />

6 ACP GUA 18 TA for establish. of private sector center (see also 7 GUA 14)Ź 3 Private sector 100 000 1 529 567<br />

8 ACP GUA 3 Identification study human resource dvlpmt programmeŹ 4 Private sector 73 056 1 602 623<br />

6 ACP GUA 26 Mid-term evaluation small business credit initiative-phase II 5 Private sector 42 015 1 644 638<br />

6 ACP GUA 27 Study of HRD needs for the private sectorŹ 6 Private sector 4 610 1 649 248<br />

8 ACP GUA 6 TA for feasibility study for private sector developmentŹ 7 Private sector 1 160 1 650 408 235 773<br />

7 ACP GUA 20 Support Structural Adjustment Programme (GIP-III) 1 Budget support 1 264 997 1 264 997<br />

9 ACP GUA 10 9 EDF sea defences infrastructure design programmeŹ 2 Budget support 900 000 2 164 997<br />

9 ACP GUA 3 Institutional strenghtening of the NAO's officeŹ 3 Budget support 820 000 2 984 997<br />

8 ACP GUA 2 Support programme for economics reforms (sas iv : 1998)Ź 4 Budget support 690 000 3 674 997<br />

8 ACP GUA 17 Feasibility study for a budgetary support programme to Guyana / 9th EDF 5 Budget support 114 988 3 789 985 757 997<br />

9 ACP GUA 8 Emergency assistance to the victims of floods in Guyana 1 Humanitarian ass. 700 000 700 000<br />

9 ACP GUA 9 Consolidation of the democratic process (codep) in a polari political situation 2 Good governance 940 000 1 640 000<br />

DDH/1997/113 Proposal for financing the production of voter identification cards 3 Democracy enh. 362 433 2 002 433<br />

7 ACP GUA 27 General elections 2001-financial needs assessmentŹ 4 Democracy enh. 49 997 2 052 430<br />

8 ACP GUA 16 Ta - formulation microprojects programmeŹ 5 Civil society 46 457 2 098 887 419 777<br />

7 ACP GUA 19 Support Structural Adjustment Programme (GIP-III) 1 Progr. manag. 800 000 800 000<br />

9 ACP GUA 5 Technical cooperation facility (tcf)Ź 2 Progr. manag. 605 400 1 405 400<br />

8 ACP GUA 7 Technical study-preparation of the tender dossier-evaluation of the tender bidsŹ 3 Progr. manag. 406 706 1 812 106<br />

6 ACP GUA 25 Technical assistance to the NAO's officeŹ 4 Progr. manag. 166 132 1 978 238<br />

8 ACP GUA 10 Identification-preparation of the CSS for the 9th EDF 5 Progr. manag. 79 990 2 058 228<br />

8 ACP GUA 19 Prep t.o.r. + tender documents - transport sector studyŹ 6 Progr. manag. 47 077 2 105 305<br />

8 ACP GUA 18 Elaboration study for support to the NAO 7 Progr. manag. 38 846 2 144 151<br />

7 ACP GUA 24 Technical assistance to the NAO's officeŹ 8 Progr. manag. 31 504 2 175 655<br />

8 ACP GUA 13 Identification - preparation of the CSS for the 9th EDF phase IIŹ 9 Progr. manag. 19 562 2 195 217<br />

7 ACP GUA 22 TA for the purpose of examining the government of sysmin reqŹ 10 Progr. manag. 17 342 2 212 559 221 256<br />

ENV/1998/004-320 Conservation and utilization of biodiversity in the Iwokrama forest 1 Environment 1 350 142 1 350 142<br />

ENV/1998/003-684 Conservation and sustainable use of botanical diversity in Guyana 2 Environment 494 396 1 844 538 922 269<br />

TOTAL 37 13 029 370 13 029 370 352 145<br />

12 commitments amount 91% of the total but 25 other commitments (the 5 of the Budget Support being<br />

deducted) mobilise a great amount of management energy to deal with the various procedures of 8 different<br />

financing mechanisms (see just below section I.6.2.2).<br />

Budget support is implemented though 10 interventions counting €55<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 33


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

I 6.2.2<br />

I 6.2.2<br />

Types of financing agreements: number and amounts of contracts, grants, programme estimates by<br />

direct labour operations or externalised direct labour operations<br />

Origin<br />

Number of<br />

interventio<br />

ns<br />

Committed<br />

(Euros)<br />

Contracted<br />

(Euros)<br />

Paid (Euros) Paid/Contr<br />

acted<br />

Paid/Com<br />

mitted<br />

8 NIP<br />

Traditional projects 12 31,256,184 26,407,451 18,340,258 69% 59%<br />

9 NIP 12 61,101,521 43,326,284 26,351,116 61% 43%<br />

Traditional projects 10 26,035,142 8,459,905 5,000,593 59% 19%<br />

Budget Support 2 35,066,379 34,866,379 21,350,523 61% 61%<br />

8 Non Programmable 4 23,190,000 22,955,390 17,396,365 76% 75%<br />

Traditional projects 1 12,500,000 12,265,390 6,706,365 55% 54%<br />

Budget Support 3 10,690,000 10,690,000 10,690,000 100% 100%<br />

9 RIP 1 12,930,240 12,930,240 5,238,902 41% 41%<br />

9 Non Programmable 1 5,663,000 3,563,300 3,437,259 96% 61%<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 34


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

I 6.2.3 Types of procedures laid down in the financing agreements (i.e.: according to financing<br />

thresholds)<br />

8 ACP GUA 9 FA I 6.2.3 The PMU is recruited following a restricted procedure.<br />

Annual Work Programmes (prepared by the PMU and approved by the Project Steering Committee and<br />

the <strong>Commission</strong>) constitute the basis on which funds are committed and released. The principle of<br />

competitive tendering applies to all contracts to be awarded under such work programmes.<br />

9 ACP GUA 3<br />

Support to<br />

the NAO<br />

And other<br />

interventions<br />

I 6.2.4<br />

I 6.2.4<br />

Delays and rates of disbursements by financing agreement<br />

Information is provided with the table in the above section I.6.1.4. Comparing rate of disbursements and<br />

time advancement, the situation remains critical for 8 ACP GUA 5 (Sea Defences), highly questionable<br />

for 8 ACP GUA 5 (Housing), understandable for 8 ACP GUA 9 (LEAP) due to the specific problems<br />

faced by the LEAF component, quasi normal for the other interventions (MP, NAO support and Rice<br />

sector support).<br />

8 ACP GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

Evaluation<br />

report<br />

I 6.2.4<br />

Problematic start up period of about 2 years with a lot of personnel changes.<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

File Notes<br />

DEC<br />

Discussions<br />

NAO TF<br />

I 6.2.4<br />

The disbursement procedures for BS are simple and designed to produce fast payments. The dates of<br />

disbursement for the fixed and variable tranches of the PRBS are as follows:<br />

Tranche Date due Request Request Date of payment Delays<br />

NAO DEC<br />

Fixed tranche 2 nd semester 2004 27/10/2004 04/11/04 Dec. 2004 1,5 month<br />

2004<br />

Fixed tranche 1 st semester 2005 24/05/2005 06/06/05 11/07/05 1,5 month<br />

2005<br />

Variable tranche 2 nd semester 2005 16/11/2005 30/11/05 07/12/05 but < 1 month<br />

2005<br />

received 12/01/06<br />

Fixed tranche 1 st semester 2006 19/02/2006 21/02/06 23/03/06 1 month<br />

2006<br />

Variable tranche 2 nd semester 2006 21/11/06 27/11/06 19/12/06 1 month<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 35


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

2006 28/05/07 10/08/07 9 months<br />

9 ACP GUA 3<br />

Support to<br />

the NAO<br />

JC 6.3<br />

I 6.3.1<br />

I 6.3.1<br />

Over the period, only the last payments relative to the variable tranche of 2006 has suffered undue<br />

delays. This was because the DEC, in agreement with the <strong>Commission</strong>, questioned the validity of data<br />

underlying one of the indicators. In order not to unduly delay disbursement, only the amount relative to<br />

that indicator was temporarily suspended, awaiting the results of an audit. In the event as data did not<br />

corroborate an attainment of the set target, only 50% of the suspended amount was eventually paid.<br />

In fact, whatever delays have been experienced in BS disbursement these have been due to scrutinising of<br />

disbursement conditions by the <strong>Commission</strong> followed by requests for further information or<br />

clarification. This has been the case for the first fixed tranche which was eventually released without<br />

having scored full satisfaction on indicator 2 (supply of a full PFM review) and for the variable tranches<br />

of both 2005 and 2006. Despite these questionings, disbursements have been very fast. From the<br />

correspondence between the DEC and the <strong>Commission</strong>, it is clear that in the case of budget support,<br />

every effort is made by both parties to avoid any delays in disbursement. The importance of speedy<br />

disbursement of BS can be illustrated by the incident linked to the payment of the 2005 variable tranche:<br />

payment was made by the <strong>Commission</strong> on 07/12/05 but an internal error at the Bank of England<br />

holding the GoG account meant the money was credited to the GoG’s account only on 12/01/2006.<br />

This meant that the fiscal deficit for 2005 was 0.9% of GDP higher than it should have been, with all the<br />

consequences for Guyana’s international credit rating and its programme indicators with the BWI.<br />

However, it is to be noted that due to the choice of indicators, they can only be assessed at year’s end<br />

when appropriate statistics become available; as a result, variable tranche disbursement takes place at the<br />

very end of the financial year (in December), thus lowering predictability of budgetary funds and<br />

contributing to treasury cash flow tensions.<br />

The institutional support to the <strong>Commission</strong> projects is improved through the NAO task force<br />

List of new management tools in place in the NAO task force (retro-planning, support to<br />

projects…)<br />

According to the FA, the NAO task force has put in place, apart from the usual logical framework,<br />

planning and budget, required in the FA :<br />

Communication tool to the programme actors on the broad range of <strong>Commission</strong> aid instruments<br />

(Result 1)<br />

Information system for programming of <strong>Commission</strong> assistance to the relevant stakeholders (Result 2)<br />

Monitoring/management tools designed for the NAO Task force support to the projects actors (Result<br />

3)<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 36


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9 ACP GUA 3<br />

Support to<br />

the NAO<br />

I 6.3.2<br />

I 6.3.2<br />

JC 6.4<br />

I 6.4.1<br />

Actually, the support to the NAO is recent over the period under observation. So its impact cannot be<br />

observed since its settlement at the end of 2004. Thus the NAO TF is not accountable of the long delays<br />

and problems to set up the Low Income Housing and Rice sector supports and also to solve the initial<br />

serious problems of the LEAP project.<br />

Perception of NAO task force, <strong>Commission</strong> task managers and program managers on the effects<br />

of the support to the NAO and on the overall efficiency of interventions, in terms of time<br />

management and cost-effectiveness.<br />

The MR provides positive conclusions in April 2006 with quite good scoring (‘a’ for efficiency and ‘b’ for<br />

effectiveness. The informants met at decision level (GoG, <strong>Commission</strong> Delegation) on the overall<br />

efficiency during the exploratory and field missions expressed pro-active appraisal on the perception of<br />

NAO task force. But some projects management’s representatives identified some of the major concerns<br />

to them which included Time delays between Project formulation and bidding and limited number of<br />

qualified contractors with capacity to bid. Consequence upon the occurrence of project delays was a<br />

reduction in the quantitative target (housing).<br />

From the GoG point of view, the TF felt often paralyzed due to bureaucratic regulations, red tape and issues being<br />

politicized between the ministries or the GoG and EC.<br />

Programme and projects are implemented in a timely manner and at planned cost<br />

Average MR efficiency rate<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 37


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9 ACP GUA 3<br />

Support to<br />

the NAO<br />

8 ACP GUA 5<br />

Sea Defences<br />

8 ACP GUA<br />

15<br />

Low Income<br />

Housing<br />

8 ACP GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

9 ACP GUA 3<br />

MPP<br />

9 ACP GUA 1<br />

NAO support<br />

9 ACP RPR 6<br />

Rice sector<br />

8 ACP GUA<br />

15<br />

Housing<br />

I 6.4.1<br />

I 6.4.1<br />

Monitoring reports<br />

Scoring<br />

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

1 INFRASTRUCTURES Relevance a b a a b<br />

Sea Defences Efficiency b c c c d<br />

Effectiveness b b b b d<br />

Impact b b c c c<br />

Sustainability c c c c c<br />

2 PRIVATE SECTOR support Relevance b b b<br />

GTA Efficiency c b b<br />

Effectiveness c b b<br />

Impact b b b<br />

Sustainability b b c<br />

Relevance b b b<br />

LEAP Efficiency c c b<br />

Effectiveness c b b<br />

Impact c b b<br />

Sustainability c c c<br />

4 Civil society support Relevance c<br />

MPP Efficiency c<br />

Effectiveness<br />

c<br />

Impact<br />

c<br />

Sustainability<br />

c<br />

5 Programme management Relevance b<br />

NAO support Efficiency a<br />

Effectiveness<br />

b<br />

Impact<br />

c<br />

Sustainability<br />

c<br />

Relevance b b<br />

Rice sector Efficiency d c<br />

Effectiveness c b<br />

Impact c c<br />

Sustainability d c<br />

Key points<br />

1. decreasing performances on Sea defences since 2004;<br />

2. No monitoring of the Low Income Housing project;<br />

3. positive outcomes with GTA and LEAP (despite the hardship settlement and awkward situation<br />

of the LEAF component);<br />

4. insufficient monitoring missions for MPP and NAO support;<br />

5. follow up to be maintained on Rice interventions with regular monitoring;<br />

Surprisingly, the settlement of the NAO Task Force did not induce regular monitoring missions as this<br />

was needed for Sea Defences, LEAP & LEAF, MPP and the NAO support itself.<br />

The problems faced by the Housing project illustrate concrete difficulties in implementing such a project<br />

in a timely manner and at planned cost: :<br />

- The project started two years after the financial agreement, entailing severe consequences about<br />

the project financing due to price changes. Thus revision should have been planned. The project<br />

suffered from inflexibility of procedures and of too short time frame. The final short cut is about<br />

2,5 million € versus 9 millions budgeted.<br />

- The project implementation faced also the problem of selecting contractor: few applicants by<br />

unavailability, lack of interest for the low housing sector or possibly fear to face the EC<br />

2007<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 38


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9 ACP RPR 6<br />

Rice sector<br />

I 6.4.1<br />

procedures.<br />

- Other reasons of delays are connected with the changing programme officer in the EC<br />

Delegation and the changing EC procedures. As example, obligation was imposed to re-tender<br />

due to the change of templates for the tender process.<br />

- There is a need of controlling the overhead-cost variance : the difference between the estimated<br />

overhead cost of the project components and their actual overhead costs due to delays and price<br />

changes.<br />

- The selection process is not based on the estimate of the global cost efficiency: the cheapest<br />

financing proposal is not the cheapest one at the end of implementation in considering criteria<br />

such as quality, delays, maintenance and overheads costs entailed by various contractor technical<br />

and management weaknesses, shortages and insufficiency.<br />

- The current implementation is submitted to and delayed by the complicated Government<br />

decision process for instance with regards to the attribution of lots.<br />

Great concern is expressed by the Project TL regarding the overall cost efficiency of this project by<br />

limited budget and time frame plus moving and inflexible procedures especially for the tender process.<br />

As second example, implementing this project in a timely manner and at planned cost: entails to address<br />

the following context :<br />

- Programme ruled by the Regional Authorizing Officer (RAO), Executive Secretary of<br />

CARICOM, in Trinidad;<br />

- The Deputy RAO is the Minister of Agriculture;<br />

- 11,7 million € are allocated to Guyana (out off 24 million)<br />

- Programme funded under the 9 th EDF, FA signed in 2003 and running up to 2008;<br />

- Four components : (i) TA : 1,8 million €; (ii) water rehabilitation : 3,2 million €; (iii) Financial<br />

facility : 6,5 million ; (iv) training 190 000 €;<br />

- Two years were needed to launch the project with a fully fledged PMU;<br />

- TA: difficult set up in terms of institutional arrangements regarding the programme<br />

management; Two Team Leaders resigned for various reasons including misunderstanding with<br />

the EC Delegation; the take over of the programme activities by the new TL was insufficient; no<br />

work plan was set up one year after the programme start. To date the TL is now mainly<br />

coordinating the project activities.<br />

- Water rehabilitation : a DAO is on going;<br />

- Financial facility: this component is aiming at providing financial resources for inputs<br />

suppliers; this facility is depending on existing local arrangements between farmers and millers in<br />

financing the farmers’ working capital; the banking sector failing in financing this working<br />

capital. The study carried out by HTSPE on the financing support to the competitiveness of the<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 39


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

8 ACP GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

8 ACP GUA 8<br />

GTA<br />

Evaluation<br />

report<br />

Mid-term<br />

evaluation<br />

Rice sector in the Caribbean was not satisfying and the final report dated 20/05/2005 has not<br />

been approved.. The achievement of the tender process for services contract to manage the<br />

facility was also difficult through two tenders with only one offer. Other difficult issues<br />

concerned guaranty by the Government, taxes, exemption of deposit reserves, collaterals from<br />

farmers, etc. Eventually a credit development expert has been assigned with the view is to<br />

facilitate emergence and achievements of solutions to these various problems.<br />

- Training component : significant in terms of outputs regarding the quality management and<br />

the financial management;<br />

Key observations<br />

- Who is taking the leading role in designing the whole programme: the RAO or the DNAO on<br />

behalf of the GoG ?<br />

- How rationale is the decision to finance a declining sector?<br />

- Other comments:<br />

- The Rice sector has to be regarded from a social point of view in focusing on consequences of<br />

the sector decline especially for small holders;<br />

- Restructuring the Rice sector should be under the responsibility of the only private sector<br />

stakeholders (great farmers, millers, banking sector).<br />

- The Water rehabilitation is a public sector issue connected to the overall water management<br />

issues in Guyana.<br />

- PMU instalment is a recurrent problem : delays between FA signature and project start is two<br />

years;<br />

I 6.4.2 Project evaluations conclusions on efficiency<br />

I 6.4.2 - The programme has experienced many problems in the starting-up phase (frequent changes in<br />

personnel). Stability of local and international staff involvement is now maintained.<br />

- Not enough involvement of the local staff members in the overall management<br />

- The functioning of the Project Steering Committee (<strong>Commission</strong> Del, NAO, LEAP Pm and<br />

LEAP BDU Manager) is efficient<br />

- The role of the Advisory Group is not enough important<br />

- LEAP & LEAF have raised outstanding expectations with the population in Region 10.<br />

I 6.4.2 - The project design was efficient.<br />

- Problems in efficiency relate to delays (in implementation at the inception of project activities<br />

due to the elections in 2001 and following civil disturbances) and slippages in targets (enabling<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 40


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

Budget<br />

support<br />

I 6.4.2<br />

training environment for competency based training, conducting training programmes according<br />

to needs, improving training facilities).<br />

- The delay experienced in the first year is now being overcome and progress is satisfactory.<br />

- The TA supplied by the project has been successful.<br />

Surprisingly the semi annual report (January-June 2005) did not provide specific conclusion and<br />

recommendation on efficiency conclusions.<br />

The Draft Mid-Term Review concluded in November 2004 that, regarding the PRSP,<br />

there is still work to be done. But the Government remains firmly committed to its objectives. Thus the<br />

overall assessment is adequate. The human rights record is generally positive although there are concerns<br />

about some causes of extra-judicial killings and the deteriorated security situation<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 MPP Midterm<br />

evaluation<br />

I 6.4.2<br />

- The roles in the organisational and management structure for the GMPP between the EC Delegation,<br />

NAO, GMPB and GMPO are defined in the FA but greater communication and understanding of these<br />

roles and responsibilities for management of the GMPP has been needed on occasions. The Chairperson<br />

and some members of the former Board have faced difficulties of interpretation of the role of the GMPB<br />

vis-à-vis the GMPO, which appears on occasions to have affected efficient management of GMPP.<br />

- Long-term TA was provided by the TA Contractor but faced problems with the first two persons and<br />

the third was only in post from September 2005 six months after the contract started. He only stayed<br />

13 out of the 18 months until October 2006.<br />

- The third ITA was regarded by the GMPO as having made a positive contribution to the efficient<br />

management and implementation of the GMPP with training and production of appropriate materials<br />

and operational manuals to guide implementation and follow EDF grant procedures or calls for<br />

proposals under decentralised management.<br />

- The PM and project staff provide efficient management of the GMPO but are constrained by lack of<br />

capacity to work at with NGOs and CBOs at the regional community level.<br />

- There is a basic constraint into the GMPP in terms of what can be achieved with the resources and<br />

capacity that has been foreseen in the FA and subsequent implementation arrangements.<br />

8 ACP GUA 5 MR I 6.4.2 - Delays due to disagreements about the design of the project<br />

- Shortage of technical advisory staff at the EC Delegation<br />

- Staff turnover at SRDD due to precarious conditions of services<br />

8 ACP GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

Evaluation<br />

report,<br />

Meeting<br />

I.6.4.3<br />

I.6.4.3<br />

Identification of implementation difficulties that are not due to deficiencies of financial, human<br />

and technical resources or to the regulatory and administrative set-up<br />

Apart from a problematic start up due to personnel changes, the programme is running well.<br />

The difficult situation of LEAF the component (micro-credit loans) was due to awkward and intricate<br />

business and media context. Nevertheless it was established and currently recognised that this context<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

notes<br />

was disconnected from the LEAP & LEAF management itself. So the impact of the positive and<br />

significant outcomes of the LEAP & LEAF complementary components has been limited by the<br />

negative effects of this situation: EC funding restricted; LEAF management disturbed, etc.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

EQ7<br />

JC 7.1<br />

I 7.1.1<br />

NIP & CSP I 7.1.1<br />

To what extent were cross-cutting issues related to good governance and human rights, gender,<br />

environment, institutional development, capacity building and HIV/AIDS taken into account for the<br />

design and implementation of the programmes?<br />

CCI have been taken into account in the CSP and the NIP and in the design of programmes (nonspecific<br />

interventions)<br />

Extent to which the CSP and the NIP explicitly promote CCI<br />

In the general framework of the 8 th EDF NIP, the <strong>Commission</strong> highlighted its priority cooperation areas.<br />

Good governance and human rights, and a sustainable economic and social development –including gender<br />

and environment- are clearly mentioned as priorities. The NIP also mentions that the <strong>Commission</strong> could<br />

provide funds to Guyana through specific budget lines to promote good governance, democracy,<br />

environment, and HIV/AIDS.<br />

In the first focal area –Rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure-, the NIP explicitly mentions that<br />

environment issues are going to be taken into account in all the programmes and that the active involvement<br />

of women in the maintenance of coastal equipments will be stimulated.<br />

In the second focal area –Private sector development-, the NIP mentions that measures will be taken to<br />

stimulate women involvement in the SME development and that enterprises benefiting from these<br />

programmes should be sensitive to environmental protection.<br />

Actions outside focal areas mention actions to promote environmental protection.<br />

Whereas good governance and human rights is presented as a priority cooperation area, it is not translated into<br />

specific actions in focal or non focal sectors.<br />

The 9 th EDF CSP does not make any explicit reference to the CCI apart from the reference to the <strong>European</strong><br />

Community’ Development Policy of 10 November 2000. Focal and non-focal sectors do not include any CCI<br />

project. The 9th EDF NIP mentions that specific actions could be financed via budget lines in the areas of<br />

human rights and democracy.<br />

I 7.1.2<br />

All Projects Compilation I 7.1.2<br />

Number of projects per CCI that explicitly identify measures on CCI at the stage of the project<br />

design<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

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EGEVAL<br />

Measures on CCI at the stage of the design of the project<br />

Number of Projects Name of the Project<br />

Good governance and Human Rights 0<br />

Gender 0<br />

Environment 0<br />

Institutional development 2 LEAP, BS<br />

Capacity Building 3 Sea defences, MPP and LEAP<br />

HIV/AIDS 0<br />

Reference to CCI at the stage of the design of the project<br />

Number of Name of the Project<br />

Projects<br />

Good governance and Human 1 Sugar<br />

Rights<br />

Gender 7 Sea Defences, Low-Income Housing, MPP, NAO<br />

TF, BS, Sugar<br />

Environment 5 Sea Defences, NAO TF, BS, Rice, Sugar<br />

Institutional development 1 LEAP<br />

Capacity Building 5 Sea Defences, MPP, BS, Rice, LEAP<br />

HIV/AIDS 0<br />

8 ACP GUA 9 FA I 7.1.2 The LEAP FA mentions 2 CCI in the design of the project:<br />

- institutional development is one of the 7 components of the project<br />

- capacity building = training is one of the 7 components of the project<br />

Capacity building is also mentioned in component 4 (LEAF).<br />

8 ACP GUA 8 FA, Mid-term<br />

evaluation<br />

I 7.1.2<br />

The GTA FA does not mention any CCI in the design of the project.<br />

The Mid-term evaluation stipulates that the project has not been designed with deliberate considerations of<br />

gender nor environmental issues. GTA’s areas of training fall mostly within those that are non-traditional for<br />

women (technical skills training) and that less than 30% of women were participating in GTA’s training<br />

courses. The evaluation also mentions that the project direct impact on the preservation of natural resources is<br />

rather limited.<br />

8 ACP GUA 5 FA I 7.1.2 The Sea Defences FA mentions environmental protection, gender and institutional capacity.<br />

- The project should have an overall positive impact on the environment.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

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EGEVAL<br />

- The project foresees the realization of a study which will enhance the awareness of the local<br />

population of the project. This study is based on gender disaggregated data.<br />

- The project aims at strengthening the Sea and River Division of the Ministry of Works through the<br />

development and implementation of tools to rationalise the monitoring, planning and maintenance<br />

operations of the division.<br />

8 ACP GUA 15 FA I 7.1.2 The Low-Income Housing FA makes an explicit reference to gender. Gender issues are addressed in the<br />

community work and the Community Development Fund proposed guidelines give priority to women and<br />

children.<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 7.1.2 The MPP FA mentions 2 CCI:<br />

- Gender: preference will be given to micro-projects that benefit women.<br />

- Institutional capacity: a series of activities will contribute to the creation of a vibrant civil society<br />

9 ACP GUA 3 FA I 7.1.2 By strengthening the NAO, the project ensures that sufficient attention is paid to environment and gender.<br />

9 ACP GUA 6 &<br />

7<br />

FA, MoU I 7.1.2 3 CCI mentioned in the FA:<br />

- Institutional capacity: 2 TA interventions in PFM, one in health and one in the social housing sectors in view<br />

of building national capacity.<br />

- Gender: gender objectives are supported in the health sector by the use of indicators concerning mother and<br />

child health.<br />

- Environment: the construction of serviced plots in the housing sector is positive for the environment<br />

because it addresses the water, sanitation and waste disposal aspects of habitation.<br />

The Memorandum of understanding also mentioned institutional development. Several TAs to foster the<br />

capacity of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Housing and Ministry of Health have been planned.<br />

8 ACP GUA 4 FA I 7.1.2 The SAS V FA does not mention any CCI in the design of the project.<br />

9 ACP RPR 6 FA I 7.1.2 2 CCI mentioned in the FA:<br />

- The project will address environmental issues especially in the research of alternative practise to the excessive<br />

use of chemicals in agriculture and of the destination of industrial waste.<br />

- Institutional capacity: the programme will be implemented in direct collaboration with the Caribbean Rice<br />

Association and the 2 Ministries of Agriculture in Guyana and Suriname.<br />

Sucre/2006/018-<br />

530<br />

FA I 7.1.2 CCI mentioned in the FA:<br />

- Environment: an environmental management plan has been completed for the new factory in Skeldon<br />

(cf conversion of land to sugar cane production and agreement of GUYSUCO to the long-term<br />

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EGEVAL<br />

I 7.1.3<br />

All projects Compilation I 7.1.3<br />

conservation of 7,500 ha)<br />

- Gender: women’s role in sugar production is limited<br />

- Good governance and human rights: the two major unions look after the best interests of their<br />

workers (sugar industry: role of emancipation from slavery)<br />

Number and list of specific interventions planned by CCI<br />

CCI<br />

Institutional<br />

development<br />

Number<br />

of specific<br />

interventions<br />

planned<br />

List of specific measures planned per project/programme<br />

7 LEAP:<br />

- TA and support provided to IMC, RDC, LCICD & LTI<br />

- Assist LCICD to assume a leading role in private sector development<br />

Budget Support:<br />

- TA to assist the Ministries of Housing and Water, of Health, of<br />

Public Works and of Education to elaborate Medium Term<br />

Expenditure Frameworks<br />

- TA to assist the Ministry of Finance in the development of a<br />

Medium Term Fiscal Forecasting model<br />

- TA to assist the debt office to develop a debt management model<br />

- TA to assist the Ministry of Housing and Water in strengthening its<br />

statistical systems<br />

- TA to assist the Ministry of Health in developing professional codes<br />

for three types of medical staff.<br />

Capacity building 8 LEAP:<br />

- provide training and hands-on assistance to the financial institution<br />

managing the fund (LEAF component)<br />

- provide recruitment and training services for business (Component<br />

6)<br />

- organize training in economic development planning and<br />

management (Component 7)<br />

Sea defences:<br />

- TA and training to the SRDD<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

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EGEVAL<br />

- Establishment of analytical methods and tools, databases and maps<br />

for the SRDD<br />

MPP:<br />

- MPO to provide assistance and to GROs and CBOs in formulating<br />

and writing micro-projects proposals<br />

- MPO to train GROs and CBOs and intermediary organisations in<br />

rapid participatory analysis of poverty problems.<br />

- MPO and international TA to provide assistance to the MP Board in<br />

EC project cycle management, training on the roles and<br />

responsibilities of a project steering committee<br />

8 ACP GUA 9 LEAP revised<br />

Logical<br />

framework<br />

January 2005<br />

I 7.1.3<br />

3 measures on capacity building and 2 measures on institutional development planned:<br />

Capacity building:<br />

- provide training and hands-on assistance to the financial institution managing the fund (LEAF component)<br />

- provide recruitment and training services for business (Component 6)<br />

- organize training in economic development planning and management (Component 7)<br />

Institutional development:<br />

- TA and support provided to IMC, RDC, LCICD & LTI<br />

- Assist LCICD to assume a leading role in private sector development<br />

8 ACP GUA 8 FA I 7.1.3 No specific interventions under the GTA project on CCI<br />

8 ACP GUA 5 FA I 7.1.3 2 activities are foreseen in the FA to deal with the institutional capacity component:<br />

- TA and training to the SRDD<br />

- Establishment of analytical methods and tools, databases and maps for the SRDD<br />

8 ACP GUA 15 FA I 7.1.3 No specific interventions under the Low-Income Housing project on CCI<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 7.1.3 3 Activities focus on institutional capacity:<br />

- MPO to provide assistance and to GROs and CBOs in formulating and writing micro-projects proposals<br />

- MPO to train GROs and CBOs and intermediary organisations in rapid participatory analysis of poverty<br />

problems.<br />

- MPO and international TA to provide assistance to the MP Board in EC project cycle management, training<br />

on the roles and responsibilities of a project steering committee<br />

9 ACP GUA 3 FA I 7.1.3 No specific interventions under the NAO TF project on CCI<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

8 ACP GUA 4<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

FA, MoU I.7.1.3 5 activities focus on institutional development:<br />

- TA to assist the Ministries of Housing and Water, of Health, of Public Works and of Education to<br />

elaborate Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks<br />

- TA to assist the Ministry of Finance in the development of a Medium Term Fiscal Forecasting model<br />

- TA to assist the debt office to develop a debt management model<br />

- TA to assist the Ministry of Housing and Water in strengthening its statistical systems<br />

- TA to assist the Ministry of Health in developing professional codes for three types of medical staff.<br />

I.7.1.3 Although there were no special interventions on CCI under the budget support programmes, the BS relied on<br />

the monitoring of a number of indicators of which two are of particular interest in the context of CCIs:<br />

• Amongst the indicators of progress made in the soundness of the management of public finance, indicator<br />

5 was a measure of public sector transparency (requiring that a memorandum from the Treasury should be<br />

submitted within a to month delay to the Parliament following the Public Account Committee Report)<br />

which was ultimately meant to ensure greater budget transparency and accountability to the public.<br />

• Amongst the social indicators, the coverage of prevention of mother to child HIV transmission was<br />

retained as one of the three health indicators.<br />

9 ACP RPR 6 FA I 7.1.3 No specific interventions under the Regional Rice programme on CCI<br />

Sucre/2006/018- FA I 7.1.3 No specific interventions under the Sugar programme on CCI<br />

530<br />

JC 7.2 Measures identified during the design for inclusion of CCI in non-specific interventions are in place<br />

I 7.2.1 Percentage of measures in place as planned<br />

Field mission I 7.2.1 3 projects foresaw measures for inclusion of CCI: LEAP, MPP and sea defences. All the measures foreseen at<br />

the design stage are in place.<br />

- 5 measures foreseen in the LEAP put in place (2 institutional development, 3 capacity building)<br />

- 3 capacity building measures foreseen in the MPP put in place<br />

- 2 capacity building measures in the Sea defences project put in place.<br />

All interventions<br />

I 7.2.5 Perception of direct beneficiaries of the CCI<br />

Field mission I 7.2.5 According to the beneficiaries’ viewpoint, <strong>Commission</strong> interventions are taking into account gender,<br />

environment and capacity building. The institutional development component has not met its target as far as<br />

the LEAP is concerned.<br />

JC 7.3 Cross-cutting issues have been also supported by specific interventions<br />

I 7.3.1 Number of specific interventions on CCI out of all the interventions of the period<br />

List of projects, I 7.3.1 7 projects focus on CCI out of all the interventions (47): 5 on good governance and 2 on environment. (15%<br />

Final report for of the interventions)<br />

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EGEVAL<br />

the second<br />

external<br />

evaluation<br />

“Strengthening<br />

the institutional<br />

response to<br />

HIV/AIDS/STI<br />

in<br />

the Caribbean<br />

(SIRHASC)”<br />

(2007).<br />

Projects on good governance (1,1% of the total commitments):<br />

- Proposal for financing the production of voter identification cards<br />

- General elections 2001-financial needs assessment<br />

- Identification-preparation of the CSS for the 9th EDF<br />

- Identification - preparation of the CSS for the 9th EDF phase II<br />

- Consolidation of the democratic process (codep) in a polari political situation involving support to<br />

nat.& reg.elections<br />

Projects on environment (1,4% of the total commitments):<br />

- Conservation and sustainable use of botanical diversity in Guyana<br />

- Conservation and utilization of biodiversity in the Iwokrama forest<br />

UNDP, Human<br />

Development<br />

Report (2006)<br />

JC 7.4<br />

I 7.4.1<br />

I 7.4.1<br />

As far as HIV/AIDS is concerned, there is no specific national <strong>Commission</strong> intervention which addresses this<br />

issue in Guyana but the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> provided funding to expand the regional response to<br />

HIV/AIDS, through the “Strengthening the Institutional Response to HIV/AIDS/STIs in the Caribbean”<br />

(SIRHASC) Project (budgeted at € 6,9m, and to be implemented by June 2004). The project purpose was to<br />

strengthen the regional institutional capacity to plan and coordinate an effective response to the<br />

STI/HIV/AIDS epidemic, particularly in the worst affected countries (Haiti, Guyana, and Dominican<br />

Republic). Regarding the outcome of the activities, SIRHASC has provided a platform for information sharing<br />

on HIV/AIDS by stakeholders, which has facilitated policymakers in their fight against HIV/AIDS. It has<br />

also contributed to an increase in the pool of skilled personnel at national level and has provided relevant<br />

information for the establishment of appropriate programmes and sensitised countries on the relevance of<br />

operational research and M&E. SIRHASC also contributed to improve and increase the prevention efforts,<br />

indirectly by improving the capacity of human Resources. There was still much room for further improvement<br />

and increase of the prevention efforts. SIRHASC has also provided the regional institutions with the<br />

opportunity to broaden their scope and intensify their efforts to control HIV/AIDS, thereby increasing the<br />

regional and national capacity to respond.<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> interventions have contributed to the advancement of this CCI in the country<br />

Evolution of respect for human rights<br />

Guyana has ratified most of the major international human rights instruments:<br />

- The International Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (1965)<br />

- The International covenant on civil and political rights (1966)<br />

- The International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights (1966)<br />

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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Transparency<br />

international<br />

web site<br />

I 7.4.2<br />

I 7.4.2<br />

- The Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (1979)<br />

- The convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment<br />

(1984)<br />

- The Convention of the rights of the child (1989)<br />

Guyana has not signed the International convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of<br />

genocide (1948)<br />

Corruption rates<br />

According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) established by Transparency International, Guyana is a<br />

corrupted country. The data relating to the CPI score published by Transparency International do not exist for<br />

Guyana before 2005 and it is therefore difficult to analyse the evolution of corruption rates over the period<br />

1996-2006.<br />

2005 2006<br />

CPI score(1) 2.5 2.5<br />

Rank 117 /158 121 / 163<br />

(1) CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country<br />

analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

I 7.4.2 Although this CCI is important for the budget support programmes in terms of public accountability and<br />

transparency of public finance, it has not been followed under the PFM reviews.<br />

I 7.4.3 Evolution of gender-friendly policies and laws<br />

Field mission I 7.4.3 There are no gender-friendly laws in Guyana. According to the interviews conducted in the field, gender<br />

discrimination does not seem to be an issue in Guyana.<br />

I 7.4.4 Evolution of gender-sensitive indicators (education, health, employment)<br />

UNDP, Human I 7.4.4<br />

Gender indicators have globally improved in Guyana over the period 1997-2004. The Gender-related<br />

development<br />

development index has evolved from 0.691 in 1997 to 0.715 in 2004. The adult literacy rate has improved for<br />

report 1998-<br />

women over the period (from 97.8% to 98.2%) but is still inferior to that of men. The female economic<br />

2006<br />

activity rate has strongly improved over the period (from 28.1% to 43.3%) but is still inferior to that of men.<br />

1997 1998 HDR 2001 HDR 2004 HDR 2006<br />

Gender-related development index (GDI) 0.691 0.698 0.693 0.715 …<br />

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EGEVAL<br />

Rank 83 80 88/162 81 …<br />

Education:<br />

1998 1999 2001 2002 2004<br />

Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and above) -Female 97.8 97.9 98.2 98.2 …<br />

Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and above) - Male 98.8 98.2 99.0 99.0 …<br />

Environmental<br />

Protection Act,<br />

Forests Act,<br />

Water and<br />

Sewerage Act<br />

8 ACP GUA 4<br />

(SAS V and VI)<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

8 ACP GUA 8 Final Evaluation<br />

report<br />

I 7.4.5<br />

I 7.4.5<br />

I 7.4.6<br />

I 7.4.6<br />

I 7.4.6<br />

Employment:<br />

1997 1999 2001 2002 2004<br />

Female economic activity rate (age 15 and above) 28.1 41.3 41.1 41.5 43.3<br />

Female economic activity rate (age 15 and above) (as a percentage of 48.9 49 50 50 53<br />

male rate)<br />

Evolution of environment-friendly policies and laws<br />

The environmental law mainly consists in 3 Acts:<br />

- The Environmental Protection Act (1996) established the Environmental Protection Agency. The main<br />

functions of this Agency are to the ensure effective management of the natural environment, to promote the<br />

participation of the public in the process of integrating environmental concerns, to establish and enforce<br />

environmental regulations, to coordinate an integrated coastal zone management system. The Act foresees the<br />

realization of environmental impact assessment and the issuance of an environmental permit by the Agency<br />

for any project which may affect the environment. The Act also guarantees the prevention and control of<br />

pollution.<br />

- The Forest Act: consolidates the laws regarding forests, timber sales agreement and permits for forest<br />

produce, and the protection of forests.<br />

- The Water and Sewerage Act established the National Water Council to provide advice to the Minister on<br />

national water policy. The Act provides for the ownership, management, control, protection and conservation<br />

of water resources, the provision of safe water and water sewerage.<br />

Evolution of percentage of technical assistants<br />

Budget support was supposed to contribute to lessen requirements for administrative TA by using national<br />

procedures. Whilst this has been done with the general BS, at the same time the PRBS appears to have<br />

brought many TA to the country in order to advance progress in selected PFM issues. The effectiveness and<br />

sustainability of actions performed by these TA has been uneven and is discussed under EQ4.<br />

Both local/regional and international technical assistance consultants were attached to the project. 11 short<br />

term local and regional consultants worked for a total of 12.79 person months and 9 international short term<br />

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EGEVAL<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

UNDP, Human<br />

development<br />

report 1998-<br />

2006<br />

PRS reports<br />

2004 and 2005<br />

consultants for a total of 11.22 person months making a total of 24.01 months of short term TA. Most shortterm<br />

inputs lasted an average of between 10 - 20 working days at any one time. A long-term consultant,<br />

effectively the counterpart to the GTA Director and known as the Coordinator, advised the project<br />

throughout its lifetime.<br />

I 7.4.7 Evolution of HIV/AIDS prevalence rates<br />

I 7.4.7 The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Guyana has decreased aver the period 1999-2005: from 3.01 to 2.4.<br />

1999 2001 2003 2005<br />

HIV Prevalence rate (% 15-49) 3.01 2.7 2.5 2.4<br />

NB: HIV worldwide prevalence rates range between 0.1 and 27.6 in 2005<br />

These UN data are in contradiction with the data provided by the Guyanese health services which show<br />

negative trends of HIV over the years 200 to 2004 as follows:<br />

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br />

Number of reported cases of AIDS (target of the<br />

PRSP) 248 227 225 220 210<br />

Actual 248 435 450 475 480<br />

Reported cases of AIDS among women (15-45<br />

cohort) (target of the PRSP) 95 112 100 98 95<br />

Actual 95 123 128 131 133<br />

I 7.4.8 Testimonies of Guyana officials on the linkage of the evolution of the CCI in the country with<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> interventions<br />

All projects Field visit I 7.4.8 As far as non specific interventions are concerned, some FAs mention some CCI but there were no specific<br />

measures dealing with CCI neither included at the design of the project nor implemented.<br />

The <strong>Commission</strong> has supported environment and good governance through specific interventions which have<br />

a positive impact on the advancement of CCI in the country. But the <strong>Commission</strong>, as one donor among<br />

others, is only contributing to the evolution of CCI in the country. The donors dealing with environment and<br />

good governance are UNDP, DFID, CIDA and EU. The UNDP is the main donor as far as good governance<br />

and environment are concerned and has a major impact on the evolution of CCI in the country.<br />

Projects dealing with CCI are pushed by the donors but there is no will from the part of the GoG to address<br />

these issues.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

The standards of living in Guyana have deteriorated over the past 10 years and there is first a real need for the<br />

economy to grow before addressing CCI.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Proj. Nber Source<br />

EQ8 To what extent has <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana been fostered by the consideration of the<br />

3C’s principle?<br />

JC 8.1 The <strong>Commission</strong> has designed its NIP/CSP taking full account of other <strong>Commission</strong> policies<br />

and trade agreements potentially affecting Guyana<br />

I 8.1.1 Extent to which the design takes into account the results of specific analyses of resources<br />

available to Guyana under the trade agreements (sugar, rice, rum) and of their potential uses<br />

8 th and 9 th<br />

EDFs<br />

Field mission I.8.1.1 No evidence has been found in country that resources available under the trade agreements were taken<br />

into account when designing the 8 th and 9 th EDFs.<br />

CSP 9 th EDF Section 5.2 I 8.1.1 In the 9 th EDF, these sources of funds are not cited as decision making factors in the framework for<br />

selecting the areas of concentration of the 9 th EDF. It is however mentioned that coherence with other<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> policies will be monitored on a permanent basis and that NIP funds could complement<br />

other funds for specific trade related operations. It is also to be noted that some Sysmin and flex<br />

resources which were not used under the 8 th EDF are programmed in the 9 th EDF (B envelope).<br />

I 8.1.2 Integration of these potential resources in the GoG balance of payments projections and<br />

financing gap projections<br />

I 8.1.2 The balance of payments and fiscal projections are carried out by the IMF which was unavailable to<br />

meet the team.<br />

JC 8.2 The <strong>Commission</strong> has designed its NIP/CSP taking full account of the resources potentially<br />

available under non-programmable support (namely Sysmin and budget lines) and the RIP<br />

I 8.2.1 Extent to which the design takes into account the results of specific analyses of resources<br />

NIP 8 th EDF<br />

Para I.6;<br />

section II.4;<br />

I 8.2.1<br />

I 8.2.2<br />

I 8.2.2<br />

available to Guyana under Sysmin, specific budget lines and the RIP, and their potential use<br />

Both the NIP 8 th EDF and CSP 9 th EDF mention that the NIP has taken account of the coherence<br />

required between programmable NIP resources and potential resources provided by other financing<br />

instruments<br />

( FAS, Sysmin, Stabex, special budget lines devoted to democracy, good public management,<br />

environment, anti-drug campaigns, HIV etc.) and from the RIP. In the NIP 8 th EDF, indications are<br />

given as to the possible use of funds from these different financing mechanisms and the preferential<br />

treatment of Guyana’s sugar, rice and rum exports are reiterated.<br />

Integration of potential resources available under the compensation schemes and under<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> interventions in the GoG’s balance of payments projections and financing gap<br />

projections<br />

As mentioned above, the balance of payments and fiscal projections are carried out by the IMF which<br />

was unavailable to meet the team.<br />

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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

CSP 9 th EDF Section 3.3 I 8.2.2 The preferential access for sugar and rice is mentioned in the CSP. Changes expected from the<br />

extension of this preferential access to other developing countries and from the EPA are also mentioned<br />

(and in particular the need to improve the productivity of the rice and sugar sectors) but the NIP itself<br />

does not offer any follow-up of this in terms of proposed interventions.<br />

I.8.2.3 Existence of a dialogue within the different <strong>Commission</strong> Services on the expected impact of the<br />

various elements of the policy mix on implementation of activities and achievement of<br />

NIP/CSP objectives<br />

I.8.2.3 This information is not available.<br />

JC 8.3 Activities programmed under the CSP/NIP have been redesigned to remain coherent with<br />

actions implemented under other <strong>Commission</strong> policies and instruments.<br />

I 8.3.1 Existence of a dialogue within the different <strong>Commission</strong> Services on the impact of the various<br />

elements of the policy mix on implementation of activities and achievement of NIP/CSP<br />

objectives<br />

9 th EDF Interview<br />

<strong>Commission</strong><br />

HQ<br />

8 ACP GUA 9<br />

8 ACP GUA 4<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

I 8.3.1<br />

It appears that there is very little if no exchange of information between the different units in the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> dealing with the country, the commodity trade protocols (sugar, rice, rum) or the<br />

compensation schemes (Stabex, Sysmin). It seems that at country level there is better general overview<br />

and information flows between the different sector desks, but there still seem to be contradictory<br />

statements made by different staff from the EU on the same issue (on sugar for example which is<br />

currently the most burning issue in Guyana). It also seems that issues are compartmentalised thus<br />

foregoing possible synergies or complementarities between the use of the different financing and trade<br />

instruments.<br />

MN16 I 8.3.1 For example, in the health sector the EC has intervened through the RIP (strengthening of the regional<br />

laboratory CARIC), through a special budget line (EC/WHO partnership supporting safe child and<br />

motherhood) and under its budget support programme where it has provided TA to the Ministry of<br />

Health and used health performance indicators for its variable tranche disbursement. It seems that the<br />

design and implementation of the regional intervention did not capitalise on the knowledge of the health<br />

sector that may have been gained at country level and that the three supports have been undertaken in<br />

total isolation.<br />

CSP<br />

documents,<br />

FAs,<br />

2007 Budget<br />

Speech<br />

I 8.3.1<br />

Similarly, the LEAP programme is singled out in the 2007 Budget Speech as one of three important<br />

contributors to poverty reduction and relief for vulnerable groups and communities. Achievements of<br />

the LEAP such as the infrastructural rehabilitation works, the tourism infrastructure, water supply and<br />

technical/vocational management training are cited alongside the benefits of other projects such as the<br />

Poor Rural Community Support Services Project and the Basic Needs Trust Fund as specific<br />

programmes focussed on improving social conditions and reducing poverty. Although this project was<br />

thus working specifically towards the same objective as that of the budget support programmes, no<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

mention was made in the CSP or in either of the financing agreements of possible links or<br />

complementarity between the two programmes.<br />

I 8.3.2 Evidence of changes in planned activities and/or scope of financial intervention under the<br />

NIP/CSP following unforeseen changes in resources or implementation modalities linked to<br />

other <strong>Commission</strong> policies and instruments<br />

8 ACP GUA 9 NIP, FA I 8.3.2 Under the 8 th EDF, the private sector development was a focal sector area and 8 to 10% of the<br />

programmable resources (€m32) should be allocated to PSD projects. However, the LEAP programme<br />

has been financed under 8 th EDF SYSMIN resources.<br />

8 ACP GUA 4 In the Structural Adjustment Support Programme SAS V which was foreseen for € 4.7 million, a rider<br />

was agreed for using on additional € 0.8 million specifically linked to the social housing sector. The<br />

9 ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

JC 8.4<br />

I.8.4.1<br />

I 8.4.1<br />

I 8.4.2<br />

I 8.4.2<br />

origins of the supplementary funds allocate to this are not known.<br />

Under the 9 th EDF the support initially foreseen for budget support was of € 14.9 million under the A<br />

envelope; this amount was increased with € 8.4 million from the B envelope using the FLEX resources<br />

for the 2000 and 2001 shortfalls in export earnings.<br />

On a totally different track, a small amount of the second tranche of the PRBS 2006 (an amount of €<br />

88 080.49) was retained by the EU in 2007 to cover for project expenditure claims on equipment for<br />

two water supply projects funded under the 7 th EDF which had no justifying documents and which<br />

were thus supposed to be reimbursed by the Government to the EC.<br />

The <strong>Commission</strong> has built its intervention strategy in close coordination with the GoG and<br />

other donors<br />

Modalities and quality of <strong>Commission</strong>-GoG dialogue through the NAO’s office<br />

The EC Delegation and the GoG meet once a month for the EC portfolio review. This is a standard<br />

procedure in Guyana where each donor’s programme and project implementation is routinely reviewed<br />

in detail once a month with the Ministry of Finance. There are no special and formalised platforms for<br />

EC-GoG discussions at higher policy level.<br />

The quality of the dialogue through the NAO’s office is cordial although some tensions seem to arise<br />

due to the different interpretations of the role of the NAO Task Force (see also EQ6) and due to a<br />

paternalistic attitude of the Delegation staff.<br />

Evidence of common understanding of Guyana’s needs (general and sector) by the<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> and other donors, and particularly of participation in common needs assessment<br />

studies<br />

Guyana is a small country where relatively few donors intervene and even fewer donors are present on<br />

the ground. It is generally recognised that because of this, there is no lack of information flows about<br />

“who is doing what where”. Each donor is careful not to duplicate or overlap another donor’s activities<br />

and the exchange of information might lead to one donor cooperating on a one-off basis with another<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

PRS 2004<br />

report<br />

Field<br />

interviews<br />

I 8.4.3<br />

donor on a specific issue. However, donor coordination is not well developed in Guyana: donors do not<br />

undertake common sector diagnostic reviews, do not work together in common frameworks of<br />

understanding of the needs of the sector, do not design common programmes of intervention, etc.<br />

Although donors may be active in a same area (whether thematic such as public finance or sector work),<br />

each intervention remains a stand alone effort. Those sectors where the Government itself is actively<br />

pursuing the implementation of sector reforms (such as in health for example) may show signs of closer<br />

cooperation between donors. The lack of sector strategic plans is a major hindrance to donor<br />

cooperation but the constraint can be overcome as three recently undertaken donor cooperation<br />

initiatives have shown:<br />

• In governance where several donors (IDB, CIDA and DFiD) have funded and participated in the<br />

undertaking of the democracy and governance institutional assessment (DGIA). The EU,<br />

although a member of the governance working group, did not participate because it did its own<br />

governance profile for the 10th EDF preparation.<br />

• In public finance management, several donors (IDB, World Bank, EU) jointly assisted the<br />

Government in undertaking a Public Expenditure and Fiduciary Accountability (PEFA) and a<br />

national procurement systems assessment.<br />

• With the view to assist the Government to prepare its second PRSP, the major donors worked<br />

together to develop a funding plan of this preparatory phase and informed the Government of its<br />

outcome by a common letter.<br />

DEC participation and role in government/multi-donor consultation processes (general and<br />

sector) and in coordination committees or working groups (government/donor and<br />

donor/donor) at general (macro or PRSP) and sector levels dealing with programming of donor<br />

interventions<br />

Within the framework of the PRSP M&E system, GoG invited representatives of line ministries and<br />

donor agencies to participate in a number of thematic groups with the following functions:<br />

• reviewing sectoral strategies that target PRSP goals<br />

• addressing resource gaps in sectoral programmes<br />

• monitoring performance against sectoral targets, and<br />

• increasing efficiency of donor interventions through better donor coordination.<br />

The thematic groups are responsible for contributing to the examination of the work programme to<br />

support donor coordination and alignment with the PRSP. In 2001/2002, thematic groups were set up<br />

in health, education, governance, water and infrastructure (including housing). The meetings of the<br />

sectoral groups are scheduled twice a year but most of them were interrupted during 2004/2005 and<br />

only those which have actively interested ministers have recently (2007) started again. In preparation of<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

8 ACP GUA 9<br />

LEAP<br />

Evaluation<br />

report and<br />

Field mission<br />

I 8.4.3<br />

the PRSP II, a group on the national competitiveness strategy was added. Although the government<br />

subsequently abandoned this group, the donors continued attending and its scope has gradually<br />

extended beyond the original competitiveness theme to encompass wider macro-economic,<br />

development and trade issues. This group seems to be the one having gone furthest in trying to<br />

harmonise donor interventions.<br />

It seems that these working groups are much appreciated by the donors for information sharing.<br />

However it also seems that they mainly deal with implementation issues and do not touch upon strategic<br />

or policy issues.<br />

Harmonisation of donor efforts takes place through a high level committee consisting of representatives<br />

of donor agencies, mission heads, and line ministers: the Donor Coordination Unit (DCU) or National<br />

Donor Coordination Committee. This committee is in charge of:<br />

- the establishment of thematic groups involving donors and line ministries to review and<br />

develop project pipelines so as to minimise duplication of donor programmes,<br />

- to review the participation Action Plan and provide continuous advice for its successful<br />

implementation,<br />

- to strengthen the capacity of line ministries to formulate policies and improve their data<br />

collection capabilities.<br />

There has been good sectoral donor coordination in the water and education sector and with regard to<br />

sea defences. Through joint efforts and consultations over the PRSP process, donors are achieving more<br />

effective co-ordination.<br />

With respect to harmonisation of donor efforts in Private Sector Development, CIDA plays the<br />

coordinating role of the PSD Donor Group. In principle, they meet quarterly.<br />

I.8.4.4 NIP/CSP explicitly refers to other donor strategies<br />

CSP 9 th EDF I.8.4.4 The 9th CSP specifically mentions other donor interventions as being one of the four factors of its<br />

decision making process in selecting intervention areas. The strategies of other donors are however not<br />

defined in the CSP but may be part of the preparatory process to the CSP elaboration.<br />

When developing sector projects or programmes (as opposed to country strategies) it appears that full<br />

account is taken of the existing and/or planned interventions of other donors in the same area so as to<br />

avoid duplication or overlap of activities. However, the interventions are not specifically designed to<br />

complement or reinforce the activities of other donors.<br />

For budget support, although the EC is the only provider of direct budget support to Guyana, it did not<br />

seek to develop synergies with the IDB who is a major provider of balance of payments support and<br />

equally active in the macro-fiscal and social areas. No mention is made in any of the financing<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

8 ACP GUA 4<br />

9ACP GUA<br />

6&7<br />

8 ACP GUA 9 Evaluation<br />

report<br />

8 ACP GUA 8 GTA Midterm<br />

evaluation<br />

report, GTA<br />

Final<br />

evaluation<br />

report<br />

JC 8.5<br />

I 8.5.1<br />

I.8.5.1<br />

I 8.5.1<br />

I 8.5.1<br />

agreements of IDB or BWI strategies with regard to overall support to the PRSP implementation.<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> activities are implemented in full coordination with GoG and other donors for<br />

interventions in the same area<br />

Evidence of synergies or conflicts between activities implemented by the <strong>Commission</strong> and<br />

those implemented by other donors and GoG<br />

The EC is the only donor providing budget support to Guyana. However, in the fields of particular<br />

interest to the EC in this context (the quality of the public finance management systems, the health and<br />

social housing sectors), other donors are active. Cooperation between donors seems good. In PFM, the<br />

BWI, CIDA, DFiD, USAID, IDB and possibly other donors have all at one point intervened to<br />

strengthen or support various functions of the Ministry of Finance or of the Auditor General. All<br />

interventions seem to have been based (loosely or not) on the CFAA diagnostic of 2002 but have not<br />

formed part of an overall sequenced intervention plan. As a result, opportunities for creating synergies<br />

and achieving greater results by undertaking complementary and mutually reinforcing interventions have<br />

not been taken. Close cooperation, when applied, seems to have stemmed mainly from a practical need<br />

to move things forward: an example is the funding by the IDB of the continuation of the IFMAS<br />

implementation after CIDA funding ended or the funding by the IDB of the hardware aspects of debt<br />

management that the EU could not provide for as originally planned under the PRBS.<br />

For the LEAP programme, there are synergies between activities implemented by the <strong>Commission</strong> and<br />

other donors:<br />

- EMPRETEC is a UNDP, GoG and Private Sector project: it’s a capacity-building programme<br />

promoting SME development. It has many linkages with LEAP.<br />

- The Guyana Trade and Investment Support (GITS) is a joint GoG-US government project. It is<br />

targeting more the larger companies when compared to the target groups of LEAP.<br />

- CIDA’s programme supports human resource development in agro-processing, forestry & wood<br />

products. It came to en end in 2005.<br />

For the GTA programme, there has been favourable cooperation with other donor projects:<br />

- The GTA assisted the Guyana Volunteer Consultancy (supported by IDB) in defining accreditation<br />

requirements for training providers<br />

- Moreover, various projects used the services of GTA: the Caribbean Programme for Economic<br />

Competitiveness (CPEC) and CIDA. The GTA also worked with the UNDP sponsored entrepreneur<br />

development project EMPRETEC.<br />

Regarding the TA component, through cooperation with the CARICOM/GTZ project (Strengthening<br />

TVET in the Caribbean Region), there have been additional TA inputs in areas such as<br />

assessment/evaluation of training programmes and Logical Framework analysis.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

9 ACP GUA 1 FA, MPP<br />

Mid-term<br />

evaluation<br />

Governance<br />

Field mission<br />

interviews<br />

I 8.5.1<br />

I.8.5.1<br />

Some synergies are observed between activities implemented by other donors and GoG and the GMPP.<br />

- The Building Community Capacity Project (BCCP) is funded by CIdA. This project, launched<br />

in 1996, aims to build the capacity of Guyanese NGOs and CBOs in order to make them more<br />

effective in their delivery of development projects. Cooperation has been explored with Guyana<br />

MPP.<br />

- Social Impact Amelioration Programme (SIMAP) is an IDB-financed programme with the<br />

Ministry of Human Services which aims to improve the conditions of lower-income households<br />

through financing of small-scale community-generated projects. Communication has been<br />

established with GMPP.<br />

- GMPP directly supports the school feeding programme mounted under the Education for All<br />

initiative of the Ministry of Education and funded by the WB. There is co-ordination between<br />

Guyana Micro Project Office and the Ministry.<br />

Although there are thus several cases of synergies between particular donors in particular sectors, three<br />

examples have been cited of multi-donor close cooperation:<br />

• the elections which has been the only instance in Guyana where donors pulled together to finance a<br />

common fund (managed by the UN);<br />

• the governance study (see below), and<br />

• the PEFA study (see above).<br />

Apart from these three cases, cooperation is mainly done on a bilateral basis. One could additionally cite<br />

the case of the sugar sector where the EU, the World Bank and DFiD are closely cooperating within the<br />

same framework.<br />

There appears to have been one occurrence of conflict between the EC and other donors’ intervention<br />

in the area of governance: whereas the EC needed a governance profile to be carried out in the context<br />

of the preparation of its 10 th EDF, the working group on governance was preparing to carry out a<br />

Democracy and Governance Institutional Assessment at the same time. For procedural reasons the EC<br />

proceeded with its exercise; it concluded on a positive governance profile and this, incidentally, allowed<br />

Guyana to benefit from a 25% top-up on its 9 th EDF funds which €12 million will be used as budget<br />

support to fill the gap between the PRSB (which finished in 2006) and the new BS programme to be<br />

designed under the 10th EDF. This incremental financing decision was communicated to the donor<br />

community just as the DGIA concluded on a less than satisfactory governance profile for Guyana and<br />

as donors suspended aid in the water sector on suspicions of fraud and corruption within the sector.<br />

The lack of unified views and of coordination of this kind potentially undermines the efforts of the<br />

group of donors to make governance issues progress in the country.<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

I 8.5.2<br />

I 8.5.2<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Modalities of coordination mechanisms between the <strong>Commission</strong>, GoG and other donors at<br />

implementation level (meetings, coordination groups, task forces…)<br />

Apart from the sector working groups which meet twice a year and which bring together donors and the<br />

Government, donors individually meet the Ministry of Finance once every month for the review of their<br />

portfolio implementation. These meetings are essentially geared towards discussing progress in project<br />

implementation. The EC and the IDB have recently agreed on mutual attendance of these reviews but<br />

this has not yet materialised.<br />

Apart from this, donors meet together very regularly: there are weekly meetings of the ambassadors of<br />

the G8 group, weekly G8 meetings of the heads of aid missions and working groups on specific issues<br />

depending on what is important at that moment (there have been working groups on statistics, PRSP<br />

and M&E for example) or where there might be potential collaboration.<br />

Whilst it does thus seem that collaboration is good between the Government and donors and between<br />

donors themselves and progress is being made on several fronts towards closer coordination and<br />

cooperation, much room for improvement remains:<br />

• The Government-donor dialogue could graduate from discussing project implementation to<br />

discussing policy and strategy issues.<br />

• The donor-donor dialogue relies on information sharing rather than on a sharing of<br />

responsibilities and reliance on each others strengths. It is symptomatic that when working<br />

groups are formed, all donors attend instead of designating a limited number of key resource<br />

persons who could work on the behalf of the whole group.<br />

• The information sharing culture between donors could develop towards a sharing of missions to<br />

unburden both the donors and the Government.<br />

• The donor group currently restricted to Western donors (EC, World Bank, IMF, IDB, DFiD,<br />

CIDA, USAID, Japan) could integrate the ‘new’ donors also active in Guyana (India, Brazil,<br />

China).<br />

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Annex 8 – List of Interventions<br />

This list of interventions comprises all the <strong>Commission</strong> interventions in Guyana decided between 1996 and 2006. The data have<br />

been revised in November 2007 and the list therefore also includes the “9th EDF sea defences programme” (€17M) decided in<br />

2007.<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 8/page 1


Evaluation of the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>'s<br />

Support to the Republic of Guyana<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Instruments Areas Year Origin Program/Project Title Committed Contracted Paid<br />

Date<br />

Decided<br />

Date Start Date end Date closed Source<br />

Programmable Instruments 1997-2002<br />

NIP 1. Sea defences 1996 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 24<br />

Provision for investigation of sea<br />

defense slip failures 36,571 36,571 36,571 19-Sep-96 19-Sep-96 19-Oct-96 24-Mar-98 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 1. Sea defences 1998 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 28<br />

Sea defences - appraisal of progr.&<br />

prep. Financial proposal 66,836 66,836 66,836 6-Jan-98 1-Mar-98 30-Jun-98 7-Jun-99 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 1. Sea defences 1999 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 5 Guyana sea defences 20,000,000 19,528,130 14,719,614 21-Dec-99 1-Apr-00 31-Dec-08 CRIS Consultation<br />

Guyana's sea defences - econ. &<br />

NIP 1. Sea defences 1999 7 NIP 7 ACP GUA 25 financial analyses - 8 edf 20,779 20,779 20,779 11-Mar-99 16-Mar-99 15-May-99 24-Jan-01 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 1. Sea defences 2000 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 7<br />

Technical study-preparation of the<br />

tender dossier-evaluation of the<br />

tender bids 406,706 406,706 406,706 1-Jan-00 1-Jun-00 28-Feb-01 8-Apr-03 CRIS Consultation<br />

Total Sea Defences 20,530,892 20,059,022 15,250,506<br />

NIP 1. Housing 2000 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 29 Low income housing programme 73,289 73,289 73,289 3-Jul-00 10-Jul-00 9-Oct-00 31-Mar-03 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 1. Housing 2002 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 15<br />

Support To The Low-Income Housing<br />

Sector 9,100,000 4,723,137 1,464,460 12-Oct-02 29-Oct-10 CRIS Production<br />

Total Housing 9,173,289 4,796,426 1,537,749<br />

NIP 2. Private sector 1996 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 18<br />

TA for establish. of private sector<br />

center (see also 7 GUA 14) 100,000 100,000 100,000 3-May-96 3-May-96 3-May-98 25-Feb-99 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 2. Private sector 1997 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 26<br />

Mid-term evaluation small business<br />

credit initiative-phase II 42,015 42,015 42,015 20-Jun-97 20-Jun-97 19-Aug-97 19-Feb-99 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 2. Private sector 1997 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 27<br />

Study of HRD needs for the private<br />

sector 4,610 4,610 4,610 25-Nov-97 7-Dec-97 6-Jan-98 19-Feb-99 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 2. Private sector 1998 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 3<br />

Identification study human resource<br />

dvlpmt programme 73,056 73,056 73,056 15-Jul-98 15-Jul-98 14-Oct-98 24-Jan-01 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 2. Private sector 1999 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 6<br />

TA for feasibility study for private<br />

sector development 1,160 1,160 1,160 21-Sep-99 18-Oct-99 17-Jan-00 13-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 2. Private sector 2000 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 8 Guyana training agency 1,328,342 1,328,342 1,328,342 1-Jan-00 1-Jan-01 31-Jan-05 17-Jan-07 CRIS Consultation<br />

Total Private sector 1,549,183 1,549,183 1,549,183<br />

NIP 4. Good governance 2000 7 NIP 7 ACP GUA 27<br />

General elections 2001-financial<br />

needs assessment 49,997 49,997 49,997 25-Jan-00 1-Feb-00 30-Apr-00 30-Apr-02 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 4. Good governance 2000 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 10<br />

Identification-preparation of the CSS<br />

for the 9th edf 79,990 79,990 79,990 30-Nov-00 10-Jan-01 9-Jun-01 9-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 4. Good governance 2001 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 13<br />

Identification - preparation of the CSS<br />

for the 9th EDF phase II 19,562 19,562 19,562 27-Nov-01 15-Dec-01 14-Feb-02 13-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />

Total Good Governance 149,549 149,549 149,549<br />

NIP 5. Support to the NAO 1996 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 25<br />

Technical assistance to the nao's<br />

office 166,132 166,132 166,132 16-Dec-96 1-Jan-97 30-Jun-99 4-Oct-04 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 5. Support to the NAO 1999 7 NIP 7 ACP GUA 24<br />

Technical assistance to the nao's<br />

office 31,504 31,504 31,504 16-Dec-96 1-Jan-97 30-Jun-99 24-Jan-01 CRIS Consultation<br />

Total Support to the NAO 197,636 197,636 197,636<br />

TOTAL NIP 1997-2002 31,600,549 26,751,816 18,684,623<br />

Programmable Instruments 2003-2007<br />

NIP 1. Sea defences 2003 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 2<br />

NIP 1. Sea defences 2003 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 30<br />

NIP 1. Sea defences 2006 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 10<br />

Design & tender procedure guyana<br />

sea defences 151,742 151,742 151,742 22-Dec-03 NA 31-Dec-06 31-Jan-06 CRIS Consultation<br />

Elaboration study for the sea defence<br />

project to be financed under the 9th<br />

edf 59,319 59,319 59,319 1-Jan-03 1-Jan-03 31-Dec-03 1-Sep-05 CRIS Consultation<br />

9 EDF sea defences infrastructure<br />

design programme 900,000 622,620 0 1-Jan-06 31-Aug-11 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 1. Sea defences 2007 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 11 9th EDF Sea Defences Programme 17,018,000 0 0 30-May-07 1-Dec-07 28-Feb-14 CRIS Consultation<br />

Total Sea Defences 18,129,061 833,681 211,061<br />

NIP 1. Transport 2003 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 19<br />

Prep t.o.r. + tender documents -<br />

transport sector study 47,077 47,077 47,077 17-Mar-03 1-Jun-03 31-Dec-03 9-Dec-05 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 1. Transport 2004 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 4 Transport sector study 900,000 899,105 854,732 1-Apr-04 NA 31-Dec-08 CRIS Consultation<br />

Total Transport 947,077 946,182 901,809<br />

Final Report - September 2008


Evaluation of the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>'s<br />

Support to the Republic of Guyana<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Instruments Areas Year Origin Program/Project Title Committed Contracted Paid<br />

Date<br />

Decided<br />

Date Start Date end Date closed Source<br />

NIP 3. Budgetary support 2003 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 17<br />

Feasibility study for a budgetary<br />

support programme to Guyana under<br />

the 9th EDF 114,988 114,988 114,988 24-Feb-03 1-May-03 1-Sep-03 1-Jun-04 CRIS Consultation<br />

Poverty reduction budget support to<br />

NIP 3. Budgetary support 2004 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 6 Guyana 26,666,379 26,466,379 12,950,523 23-Aug-04 23-Aug-04 31-Dec-10 CRIS Consultation<br />

Poverty reduction budget support to<br />

NIP 3. Budgetary support 2004 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 7 Guyana 8,400,000 8,400,000 8,400,000 23-Aug-04 23-Aug-04 31-Dec-10 27-Mar-06 CRIS Consultation<br />

Total Budgetary Support 35,181,367 34,981,367 21,465,511<br />

NIP 4. Micro-projects 2002 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 16<br />

Ta - formulation microprojects<br />

programme 46,457 46,457 46,457 4-Oct-02 15-Dec-02 31-May-03 27-May-04 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 4. Micro-projects 2003 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 1 Micro-projects programme 4,000,000 3,886,530 1,539,229 17-Feb-04 NA 31-May-11 CRIS Consultation<br />

Total MPP 4,046,457 3,932,987 1,585,686<br />

NIP 4. Good governance 2005 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 9<br />

Consolidation of the democratic<br />

process (codep) in a polari political<br />

situation involving support to nat.&<br />

reg.elections 940,000 940,000 740,000 1-Jan-05 1-Jan-05 1-Oct-09 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 4. TCF 2004 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 5 Technical cooperation facility (tcf) 605,400 582,649 524,976 31-Mar-04 NA 31-Oct-10 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 4. Humanitarian assistance 2005 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 8<br />

Emergency assistance to the victims<br />

of floods in Guyana 700,000 688,135 688,135 1-Feb-05 31-Dec-07 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 5. Support to the NAO 2004 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 3<br />

Institutional strenghtening of the<br />

NAO's office 820,000 689,124 501,779 2-Apr-2004 NA 30-Jun-11 CRIS Consultation<br />

NIP 5. Support to the NAO 2003 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 18<br />

Elaboration study for support to the<br />

NAO 38,846 38,846 38,846 18-Mar-03 15-Jun-03 30-Sep-03 20-Apr-04 CRIS Consultation<br />

Total Support to NAO 858,846 727,970 540,625<br />

TOTAL NIP 2003-2007 61,408,208 42,362,187 25,444,692<br />

TOTAL NIP 93,008,757 69,114,003 44,129,315<br />

Non Programmable Instruments 1997-2002<br />

7 Non<br />

Non Prog Transport 1998 Prog 7 ACP GUA 13<br />

Feasibility study for Guyana-Brazil<br />

road 124,457 124,457 124,457 1-Jul-98 1-Oct-98 31-Aug-00 30-Jul-01 CRIS Consultation<br />

Non Prog Private sector 1998<br />

7 Non<br />

Prog 7 ACP GUA 23 Study economic diversification Linden 101,225 101,225 101,225 1-Jan-98 15-Sep-98 14-Feb-99 13-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />

Non Prog Private sector 2000<br />

8 Non<br />

Prog 8 ACP GUA 9<br />

Linden economic advancement<br />

programme 12,500,000 12,265,390 6,706,365 27-Oct-00 31-Oct-01 30-Jun-09 CRIS Consultation<br />

Total Private sector 12,601,225 12,366,615 6,807,590<br />

NIP Structural adjustment 1995<br />

7 Non<br />

Prog 7 ACP GUA 19<br />

Support Structural Adjustment<br />

Programme (GIP-III) 800,000 800,000 800,000 27-Oct-95 1-Dec-95 23-Oct-96 CRIS Production<br />

Non Prog Structural adjustment 1995<br />

7 Non<br />

Prog 7 ACP GUA 20<br />

Support Structural Adjustment<br />

Programme (GIP-III) 1,264,997 1,264,997 1,264,997 27-Oct-95 1-Dec-95 17-Apr-00 CRIS Production<br />

Non Prog Structural adjustment 1998<br />

8 Non<br />

Prog 8 ACP GUA 1<br />

Support programme for econmic<br />

reforms (sas iv : 1998) 4,600,000 4,600,000 4,600,000 30-Jun-98 1-Aug-98 30-Jun-99 22-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />

Non Prog Structural adjustment 1998<br />

8 Non<br />

Prog 8 ACP GUA 2<br />

Support programme for economics<br />

reforms (sas iv : 1998) 690,000 690,000 690,000 30-Jun-98 1-Aug-98 30-Jun-99 22-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />

Non Prog Structural adjustment 1999<br />

8 Non<br />

Prog 8 ACP GUA 4<br />

Support programme for economic<br />

reforms (sas v : 1999) 5,400,000 5,400,000 5,400,000 31-Dec-99 31-Dec-00 24-Jan-03 24-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />

Total Structural Adjustment 12,754,997 12,754,997 12,754,997<br />

Non prog Debt relief 1999<br />

7 Non<br />

Prog 7 ACP GUA 26<br />

Non Prog Good governance 1997 BL DDH/1997/113<br />

7 Non<br />

Non Prog Sysmin 1996 Prog 7 ACP GUA 22<br />

Non Prog Environment 1998 BL ENV/1998/003-684<br />

Participation communautaire a<br />

l'initiative d'allegement de la dette des<br />

pays pauvres tres endettes 6,440,000 6,440,000 6,440,000 16-Dec-99 1-Jul-00 30-Jun-01 10-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />

Proposal for financing the production<br />

of voter identification cards (decision<br />

du 2 mai 1997) 362,433 362,433 345,174 6-Jun-97 24-Jun-97 1-Mar-98 1-Mar-98 CRIS Consultation<br />

TA for the purpose of examining the<br />

government of sysmin req 17,342 17,342 17,342 15-May-96 15-May-96 15-Aug-96 25-May-98 CRIS Consultation<br />

Conservation and sustainable use of<br />

botanical diversity in Guyana 494,396 494,396 494,396 9-Dec-98 26-Jan-99 25-Jan-03 25-Jan-03<br />

CRIS<br />

Production/dates<br />

CRIS Consultation<br />

Final Report - September 2008


Evaluation of the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>'s<br />

Support to the Republic of Guyana<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Instruments Areas Year Origin Program/Project Title Committed Contracted Paid<br />

Date<br />

Decided<br />

Date Start Date end Date closed Source<br />

Conservation and utilization of<br />

Non Prog Environment 1998 BL ENV/1998/004-320 biodiversity in the Iwokrama forest 1,350,142 1,350,142 1,350,142 10-Oct-98 20-Jan-99 19-Apr-03 9-Mar-04 CRIS Production<br />

Total Environment 1,844,538 1,844,538 1,844,538<br />

TOTAL Non Programmable 1997-2002 34,144,992 33,910,382 28,334,098<br />

Non Programmable Instruments 2003-2007<br />

Non Prog Food Crop production 2003 9 RIP 9 ACP RPR 006<br />

Support to the Competitiveness of the<br />

Rice sector in the Caribbean 12,930,240 12,930,240 5,238,902 31-Oct-03 30-Sep-13<br />

Accompanying measures 2006 for<br />

Non Prog Sugar 2006 BL SUCRE/2006/018-530 Sugar Protocol Countries 5,663,000 3,563,300 3,437,259 25-Dec-06 31-Dec-11 CRIS Production<br />

TOTAL Non Programmable 2002-2007 18,593,240 16,493,540 8,676,161<br />

TOTAL Non Programmable Instruments 52,738,232 50,403,922 37,010,259<br />

TOTAL 145,746,989 119,517,924 81,139,573<br />

Final Report - September 2008


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Annex 9 – Bibliography<br />

1. General<br />

ADE<br />

ADE<br />

ADE<br />

ADE<br />

Author Title Date<br />

Council and <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

EC-ACP States<br />

EC-ACP States<br />

Economist Intelligence Unit<br />

EGEVAL<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Evaluation of the EC Interventions in<br />

the Transport Sector in Third Countries -<br />

Final Report Vol 1<br />

Evaluation of <strong>European</strong> Community<br />

Support to Private Sector Development<br />

in Third Countries - Final Report<br />

Evaluation of <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Support to Micro-Project Programmes<br />

under the <strong>European</strong> Development Fund<br />

in ACP countries<br />

Revue du Programme d'Appui<br />

Budgétaire Conjoint pour la Réduction<br />

de la Pauvreté (2004-2006) de la<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> Européenne au Bénin - Vol<br />

1<br />

The <strong>European</strong> Community's<br />

Development Policy - Statement by the<br />

Council and the <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Annexe V à l'Accord de Cotonou<br />

<strong>Annexes</strong> à l'Accord de Cotonou<br />

Country Report Guyana (sample)<br />

Evaluation EC s. / Tanzania - Final<br />

Report<br />

Evaluation EC s. / Bolivie Rapport Final<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2006<br />

2001<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1986 1986<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1987 1987<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1989 1989<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1990 1990<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1991 1991<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1992 1992<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1993 1993<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1994 1994<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1995 1995<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1996 1996<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Cooperation framework between the<br />

Cooperative Republic of Guyana and the<br />

<strong>European</strong> Community - National<br />

Indicative Programme 8th EDF, Lomé<br />

Convention IV, 2nd financial protocol)<br />

1997<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9 /page 1


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Regional Indicative Programme for the 1997<br />

Caribbean Region - Fourth Lomé<br />

Convention - Second Financial Protocol<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Country Strategy Paper and National 2002<br />

Indicative Programme for the period<br />

2002-2007<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Joint Annual Review - December 2002 - 2002<br />

Executive summary<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Joint Annual Review - July 2002 - 2002<br />

Executive summary<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Guyana – <strong>European</strong> Community, 2003<br />

Country Strategy Paper and National<br />

Indicative Programme for the period<br />

2002-2007” (hereafter referred as CSP<br />

9th EDF)<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Joint Annual Review - 2002 - 2003<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Draft Mid-Term Review conclusions - 2004<br />

Guyana<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Joint Annual Review - 2003 - 2004<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Proposal for a Council Decision on the 2004<br />

position to be adopted by the<br />

Community within the ACP-EC Council<br />

of Ministers regarding the revision of the<br />

terms and conditions of financing for<br />

short term fluctuations in export earnings<br />

(Annex II of the ACP-EU Partnership<br />

Agreement signed in Cotonou<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Addendum to the Country Strategy Paper 2005<br />

and Indicative Program<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

<strong>Commission</strong> staff working paper : Action 2005<br />

plan on accompanying measures or Sugar<br />

Protocol countries affected by the reform<br />

of the EU sugar regime<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Co-operation between the <strong>European</strong> 2005<br />

<strong>Commission</strong> and the co-operative<br />

Republic of Guyana - Joint Annual<br />

Review 2004<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Joint Annual Review - Year 2004 2005<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Report on progress made in Public<br />

Finance Management in Guyana (July- 2005<br />

December 2005)<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

EC response strategy in support of the 2006<br />

Guyana National Action Plan for the<br />

period 2007-2013 - Implementation of<br />

accompanying measures for sugar<br />

protocol countries<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Financing Proposal: Implementation of<br />

the Guyana National Action Plan on<br />

Accompanying Measures for Sugar<br />

Protocol Countries affected by the<br />

Reform of EU Sugar Regime, 2006<br />

2006<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9 /page 2


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Financing (GNAP 2006)<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Guyana Poverty Reduction Budget<br />

Support: Report on Public Finance 2006<br />

Management<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Joint Annual Review for 2005 2006<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Draft Country Strategy Paper and 2007<br />

National Indicative Programme for the<br />

period 2008-2013<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Annex A Standard Format : External<br />

assistance Management Report<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Directorate General for Development<br />

website<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Final ETR Conclusions Guyana<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Mid Term Review: Macroeconomic<br />

support assessment Guyana<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

The EU & Cariforum<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />

Typology o the Sugar Protocol Countries<br />

<strong>European</strong> Community<br />

Treaty of Amsterdam amending the 1997<br />

Treaty on <strong>European</strong> Union, the Treaties<br />

establishing the <strong>European</strong> Communities<br />

and related acts (Official Journal C 340)<br />

Guyana Government National Development Strategy 2001- 2000<br />

2010<br />

Guyana Government<br />

National Action Plan on accompanying 2006<br />

measures for Sugar Protocol countries<br />

affected by the reform of the EU sugar<br />

regime<br />

Guyana Government<br />

Enhancing National Competitiveness - A 2007<br />

national Competitiveness strategy for<br />

Guyana<br />

Guyana Government - Ministry of Finance Treasury Memorandum 2005<br />

Guyana Government - Ministry of Finance<br />

Treatment of rice levy outturns<br />

computation 2005<br />

Guyana Office for Investment<br />

General website: www.goinvest.gov.gy<br />

IBM Belgium<br />

IBM Belgium<br />

Draft Report of the Third Assessment<br />

Mission on Poverty Reduction Budget<br />

Support Grant by the <strong>European</strong><br />

<strong>Commission</strong> to the Government of<br />

Guyana (October 17-November 4, 2005)<br />

Draft Variable Tranches Of Budget<br />

Support For Guyana Performance<br />

Indicators Review<br />

2005<br />

2005<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9 /page 3


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

IBM Belgium<br />

Last Assessment Mission to Guyana for<br />

Evaluating Performance Indicators<br />

Under Poverty Reduction Budgetary 2006<br />

Support Grant to the Government of<br />

Guyana (October- November 2006)<br />

IDD and Associates Evaluation of General Budget Support : 2006<br />

Synthesis Report - executive summary<br />

IDD and Associates Evaluation of General Budget Support : 2006<br />

Synthesis Report<br />

IMF<br />

Sixth Review Under the Three-Year<br />

Arrangement Under the Poverty<br />

Reduction Growth Facility -<br />

2006<br />

Supplementary Information<br />

Inter-American Development Bank Country Program Evaluation 1989-2001 2002<br />

Inter-American Development Bank IDB Country Strategy with Guyana 2002<br />

International development Association Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Poverty 2006<br />

and International Monetary Fund Reduction Strategy Paper - Second<br />

annual progress report<br />

International Monetary Fund Guyana: Statistical appendix 1998<br />

International Monetary Fund Guyana: Recent economic developments 1999<br />

International Monetary Fund Guyana: Statistical Annex 2001<br />

International Monetary Fund<br />

Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002<br />

Paper 2003<br />

International Monetary Fund<br />

Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002<br />

Paper Joint Staff Assessment<br />

International Monetary Fund<br />

Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2004<br />

Paper Progress Report 2004<br />

International Monetary Fund<br />

Guyana: Enhanced Initiative for Heavily 2004<br />

Indebted Poor Countries – Completion<br />

Point Document<br />

International Monetary Fund<br />

Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2006<br />

Paper Progress Report 2005<br />

Organisation for Economic Co-operation CRS online database on aid activities<br />

and Development<br />

Parliament of Guyana<br />

PARTICIP<br />

SOFRECO-ECORYS<br />

SOFRECO-ECORYS<br />

SOFRECO-ECORYS<br />

SOFRECO-ECORYS<br />

Report of the Public Accounts<br />

Committee of the National Assembly on<br />

the public accounts of Guyana for the<br />

year 1999<br />

Thematic Evaluation of the Water and<br />

Sanitation sector<br />

Medium Term Expenditure Framework<br />

(MTEF) Manual<br />

Medium Term Expenditure Framework<br />

(MTEF) of the Ministry of Education<br />

and the Education sector<br />

Medium Term Expenditure Framework<br />

for Public Works Sector<br />

Report on Modeling and Forecasting<br />

Budgetary Fiscal Indicators<br />

2003<br />

2006<br />

2006<br />

2006<br />

2006<br />

2006<br />

SOFRECO-ECORYS Report on Training in Econometrics 2006<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9 /page 4


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

SOFRECO-ECORYS<br />

UNDP<br />

Technical Assistance to the Ministry of<br />

Health on Medium Term Expenditure<br />

Framework, Draft Inception Report<br />

Human Development Reports 1998-2006<br />

2006<br />

United Nations<br />

Common Country Assessment of 2005<br />

Development Challenges - Part 1<br />

United Nations World Development Report 2003<br />

United Nations World Development Report 2006<br />

United Nations<br />

Common Country Assessment of 2005<br />

Development Challenges - Part 2<br />

United Nations Development Programme Draft Country Programme Document 2005<br />

for Guyana (2006-2010)<br />

United States Agency for International Latin America and the Caribbean 2006<br />

Development<br />

Selected Economic and Social Data 2006<br />

World Bank<br />

Project Appraisal Document on a 2007<br />

Proposed Grant from the Global<br />

Environment Facility Special Climate<br />

Change Fund in the amount of US$3.8<br />

million to the Republic of Guyana for a<br />

conservancy adaptation project<br />

World Bank Guyana Public Expenditure Review 2002<br />

World Bank<br />

Memorandum of the President of the 2002<br />

International Development Association<br />

to the Executive Directors on a Country<br />

Assistance Strategy of the World Bank<br />

Group for the Cooperative Republic of<br />

Guyana<br />

World Bank<br />

The Role and Effectiveness of<br />

Development Assistance - Lessons from<br />

World Bank Experience<br />

World Trade Organisation<br />

Trade Policy Review Guyana, Minutes of 2003<br />

the meeting<br />

World Trade Organisation<br />

Trade Policy Review Guyana: Report by 2003<br />

the Government<br />

World Trade Organisation<br />

Trade Policy Review Guyana: Report by 2003<br />

the secretariat<br />

Guyana Estimates of the Public Sector<br />

Current and Capital Revenue and<br />

1996-<br />

2006<br />

Expenditure for the year 2007 as<br />

presented to the National Assembly<br />

(Budget Speech and Volume 1).<br />

Technical Assistance to the Ministry of<br />

Health to Facilitate the Introduction of a<br />

Code of Professional Practice in Guyana,<br />

Final Report (Letter of Contract<br />

N°2005/ 101522 signed on 28/04/2005,<br />

Framework Contract AMS/451)<br />

2005<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9 /page 5


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

2. Project Documents<br />

Audited<br />

financial Annual<br />

Mid-<br />

Term Final Terms of Mission<br />

Quarterly<br />

Progress<br />

Other<br />

relevant<br />

Project Number Title FA MR PS RS FR statements report review evaluation Reference Report Report documents<br />

8 ACP GUA 004 Support x x x x<br />

Programme For<br />

Economic<br />

Reforms<br />

(SAS V)<br />

8 ACP GUA 005 Guyana Sea x x x x x<br />

Defences<br />

8 ACP GUA 008 Guyana x x x x x x<br />

Training<br />

Agency<br />

8 ACP GUA 009 Linden<br />

Economic<br />

x x x x x x x x<br />

Advancement<br />

Programme<br />

(LEAP)<br />

8 ACP GUA 015 Support to the<br />

low-income<br />

Housing Sector<br />

9 ACP GUA 001 Micro-projects<br />

Programme<br />

9 ACP GUA 003 Institutional<br />

Strengthening<br />

of the NAO's<br />

Office in<br />

Guyana<br />

x x (Mid<br />

Term)<br />

x x x x<br />

(inception<br />

and draft<br />

Ccl)<br />

x x x x x x (semiannual)<br />

x x<br />

x<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9/page 6


EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />

SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />

EGEVAL<br />

Project Number Title FA MR PS RS FR<br />

9 ACP GUA 006 &<br />

007<br />

Poverty<br />

Reduction<br />

Budget Support<br />

to Guyana<br />

9 ACP RPR 6 Support to the<br />

competitiveness<br />

of the rice<br />

sector in the<br />

Caribbean,<br />

Guyana<br />

Accompanying<br />

measures 2006<br />

SUCRE/2006/018-<br />

530<br />

for<br />

Protocol<br />

Countries<br />

Sugar<br />

Audited<br />

financial<br />

statements<br />

Mid-<br />

Term<br />

review<br />

Annual<br />

report<br />

Final<br />

evaluation<br />

Terms<br />

Reference<br />

of<br />

x x (for TA to<br />

PFM; for<br />

TA to MoH;<br />

for TA to<br />

MTFP;for<br />

TA<br />

MoH&W;<br />

x x x<br />

x<br />

TA Debt<br />

Management)<br />

Mission<br />

Report<br />

x (Final<br />

1st<br />

mission<br />

report TA<br />

MoH&W;<br />

Final 2nd<br />

mission<br />

report TA<br />

MoH&W;<br />

Final 3rd<br />

mission<br />

report TA<br />

MoH&W;<br />

Final 4th<br />

mission<br />

report TA<br />

MoH&W)<br />

Quarterly<br />

Progress<br />

Report<br />

x (January to<br />

June 2005;<br />

July to<br />

September<br />

2005;<br />

October 2005<br />

to March<br />

2006)<br />

Other<br />

relevant<br />

documents<br />

x<br />

Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9/page 7

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