Annexes - European Commission - Europa
Annexes - European Commission - Europa
Annexes - European Commission - Europa
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN<br />
COMMISSION’S SUPPORT TO THE<br />
REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
Final Report<br />
Volume II – <strong>Annexes</strong><br />
September 2008<br />
Evaluation for the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>
Hildastrasse, 66<br />
D-79102 Freiburg<br />
Germany<br />
This evaluation was commissioned by:<br />
the Evaluation Unit common to:<br />
Aide à la Décision<br />
Economique<br />
Belgium<br />
EuropeAid Co-operation Office,<br />
Directorate General for Development and<br />
External Relations Directorate-General<br />
France<br />
Germany<br />
This evaluation was carried out by EGEVAL<br />
The evaluation was managed by the evaluation unit who also chaired the reference group composed by members of the<br />
services EuropeAid, Relex, DG Budget and the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Delegation in Ghana<br />
The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors’ points of view which are not<br />
necessarily shared by the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> or by the authorities of Guyana.
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Table of contents<br />
ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE<br />
ANNEX 2 – INFORMANTS MET BEFORE THE FIELD MISSION<br />
ANNEX 3 – FIELD MISSION PLANNING & INFORMANTS MET<br />
ANNEX 4 – BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS<br />
ANNEX 5 – INTERNATIONAL DONOR COOPERATION<br />
ANNEX 6 – PRESENTATION OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS<br />
ANNEX 7 – INFORMATION MATRIX<br />
ANNEX 8 – LIST OF INTERVENTIONS<br />
ANNEX 9 – BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008<br />
Table of contents
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Annex 1 - Terms of Reference<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 1
EUROPEAN COMMISSION<br />
EuropeAid Co-operation Office<br />
Evaluation<br />
I:\1. Evaluations - ON-GOING\Guyana\1.ToR\draft ToR 15nov06a.doc<br />
Evaluation of the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>’s support to<br />
the Republic of Guyana<br />
DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE<br />
November 2006<br />
o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o
Table of contents<br />
1. MANDATE...............................................................................................................................3<br />
2. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................3<br />
3. SCOPE ......................................................................................................................................5<br />
4. THE EVALUATION’S BASIC METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH............................6<br />
4.1. PREPARATION PHASE .............................................................................................................7<br />
4.2. DESK PHASE ...........................................................................................................................7<br />
4.3. FIELD PHASE ..........................................................................................................................9<br />
4.4. FINAL REPORT-WRITING PHASE ..............................................................................................9<br />
4.5. DISSEMINATION AND FOLLOW-UP ........................................................................................10<br />
5. IDENTIFICATION OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS............................................10<br />
6. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND THE MONITORING OF THE<br />
EVALUATION.....................................................................................................................................11<br />
7. THE EVALUATION TEAM ................................................................................................11<br />
8. TIMING ..................................................................................................................................12<br />
9. COST OF THE EVALUATION...........................................................................................12<br />
10. PAYMENT MODALITIES...................................................................................................12<br />
ANNEX 1: KEY DOCUMENTS FOR THE EVALUATION ..........................................................13<br />
ANNEX 2: OUTLINE STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL REPORT..................................................15<br />
ANNEX 3 - QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID ..................................................................................16<br />
ANNEX 4 - COUNTRY OVERVIEW................................................................................................17<br />
2
1. MANDATE<br />
Systematic and timely evaluation of its expenditure programmes is a priority of the<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> (EC), as a means of accounting for the management of the<br />
allocated funds and of promoting a lesson-learning culture throughout the<br />
organisation. Of great importance also, particularly in the context of the programmes<br />
of the so-called Relex Family of Directorates-General 1 , is the increased focus on<br />
impact against a background of greater concentration of external co-operation and<br />
increasing emphasis on result-oriented approaches.<br />
The evaluation of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s co-operation with the Republic of Guyana in its<br />
2006 is part of the 2006 evaluation programme as approved by External Relations and<br />
Development <strong>Commission</strong>ers.<br />
The main objectives of the evaluation are:<br />
− to provide the relevant external co-operation services of the EC and the wider<br />
public with an overall independent assessment of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s past and<br />
current cooperation relations with the Republic of Guyana<br />
− to identify key lessons in order to help improve the current and future<br />
strategies and programmes of the <strong>Commission</strong>.<br />
2. BACKGROUND<br />
1) The <strong>European</strong> Union's co-operation policy is based on Article 177 of the Treaty<br />
establishing the <strong>European</strong> Community (EC). It determines that the sphere of<br />
development co-operation shall have three objectives namely: fostering<br />
sustainable development of developing countries 2 ; assisting the smooth and<br />
gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy and<br />
campaigning against poverty in the developing countries.<br />
2) In November 2000, the Council and the <strong>Commission</strong> endorsed a Development<br />
Policy Declaration 3 that identifies six priority themes/areas. These are: Trade and<br />
Development; Regional Integration and Co-operation; Support to Macroeconomic<br />
Policies linked to Social Sector Programmes; Transport; Sustainable<br />
Rural Development and Food Security; and Institutional Capacity Building, Good<br />
Governance and the Rule of Law. Environment and Gender are considered as<br />
crosscutting issues, which needs to be integrated into all these six themes in order<br />
to make development sustainable.<br />
3) The EC has made Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs) the point of departure<br />
for its Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) in all countries that have/produce a PRSP.<br />
The PRSP approach, with its six principles: (1) national ownership, (2) results<br />
focus, (3) comprehensive, (4) prioritised, (5) long-term, and (6) partnershiporiented,<br />
forms the core for donor support, and the common framework within<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
Directorates General of External Relations (RELEX), Development (DEV), Enlargement (ELARG),<br />
Trade (TRADE) and the EuropeAid Co-operation Office (AIDCO).<br />
Sustainable Development is defined as the improvement of the standard of living and welfare of the<br />
relevant populations within the limits of the capacity of the ecosystems by maintaining natural<br />
assets and their biological diversity for the benefit of present and future generations.<br />
Council document 13458/00.<br />
3
which all stakeholders supporting poverty reduction in a country expect to work 4 .<br />
Furthermore CSPs are the culmination of a joint programming process, which<br />
started with the launching of the Cotonou Agreement in January 2001 and<br />
involved many actors (the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>, EU Member States, the<br />
Government, civil society and the private sector).<br />
4) Guyana's CSP 5 2002-2007 is the current framework for EC/Guyana cooperation<br />
which combines all relevant resources and instruments. This CSP takes Guyana’s<br />
development agenda as its starting point together with EC’s co-operation<br />
objectives. Accordingly the overall aim of the CSP is to reduce poverty through<br />
accelerating the process of sustainable economic and social development. Support<br />
is focused on infrastructure (flood protection of major population area with main<br />
economic activities), as well on macro-economic support for the social sector,<br />
especially low-income housing and the health sector.<br />
5) The 9th <strong>European</strong> Development Fund (EDF), makes available up to €48 million<br />
(€34M for envelope A and €14M for envelop B to cover emergencies and<br />
unforeseen needs, international debt relief initiatives, instability of export<br />
earnings). (see also Country overview in Annex 1) .<br />
6) In November 2000, the IMF and the World Bank approved the Interim Poverty<br />
reduction strategy paper (PRSP) and agreed to support a comprehensive debt<br />
reduction package for Guyana under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor<br />
Countries Initiative (HIPC). This deal will save Guyana about USD 590 Million<br />
in debt service over the coming years. Among the requirements for the release of<br />
the funds are the completion of a PRSP and the implementation of a set of social<br />
and public sector reforms and the maintenance of financial stability.<br />
7) In October 2002, the IMF agreed to a credit of USD 73 million under the PRSP.<br />
8) In December 2003, IMF and World Bank agreed that Guyana had reached the<br />
completion point under the enhanced HIPC. Debt relief on this account amounts<br />
to USD 334.5. This comes in addition to the USD 256.4 that Guyana received<br />
when it reached the completion point under the original HIPC framework in May<br />
1999.<br />
9) Guyana's position on the UN's Human Development Index went further down<br />
from 104 in 2004 to 107 in 2005.<br />
10) Regional context<br />
Guyana is among others, a member of the UN, ACP (Guyana is full Member),<br />
ACS, CARICOM and CARIFORUM.<br />
The Headquarters of the Caribbean Community, Caricom, is in Georgetown;<br />
new HQ offices at Liliendaal were opened in February 2005. Also the Caribbean<br />
4<br />
PRSP review: key issues<br />
http://www.cc.cec/home/dgserv/dev/body/theme/docs/B2/PRSP_review_key_issues.pdf#zoom=100<br />
5<br />
Country Strategy Paper for Guyana<br />
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/csp_rsp/csp_en.cfm<br />
4
Forum of ACP States, Cariforum is headquartered in Georgetown. Relations<br />
with Brazil are quite good and occasionally common regional projects are put<br />
forward. Relations with Venezuela maintaining a significant territorial claim on<br />
Guyana are improving.<br />
A Guyana-Suriname border dispute re-ignited in 2000, following exploratory<br />
drilling for oil off the coast of the disputed area. Guyana in February 2004<br />
referred this long-standing maritime boundary dispute the United Nations for a<br />
legally binding resolution under article 287 of the UN Convention on the Law of<br />
the Sea. The legal representatives of the two governments met at the end of May<br />
2004 to continue their discussions about the arbitration panel to adjudicate the<br />
maritime boundary dispute. A final ruling is expected in 2006.<br />
11) Relations with EU Member States<br />
The UK is the only EU Member State with a permanent representation in the<br />
country: EC Delegation and British High <strong>Commission</strong> have regularly contacts.<br />
12) Guyana is a high cost producer of both sugar and rice. Both these commodities<br />
have enjoyed preferential access to the lucrative EC market through special<br />
Lome/Cotonou protocols. However, these preferences will change by 2009, and<br />
already from 2006 the "Everything but Arms initiative" will allow free access to<br />
EC for sugar and rice originating from least developed countries, thus creating<br />
competition for Guyanese exports. To facilitate the transition, funds have been<br />
allocated from the EDF for the rice sector under the CARICOM Rice Project.<br />
(EUR 24 million for Guyana, Suriname and regional).<br />
13) Guyana is highly dependent on trade because of its small economic base. The<br />
major exports are sugar, rice, gold and bauxite. The pattern of Guyana's trade has<br />
changed very little in recent years. The country's main trading partner remains the<br />
United States (22% of exports and 25% of imports), the EU - mainly the United<br />
Kingdom - (30% of exports and 19 % of imports) and Canada (24% of exports<br />
and negligible imports).<br />
Please also refer to Country overview in Annex 4.<br />
3. SCOPE<br />
The scope of the evaluation is the <strong>Commission</strong>’s co-operation strategies with the<br />
Republic of Guyana and their implementation for the period 1995-2006.<br />
The Consultant should assess:<br />
- the relevance, coherence and complementarity of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s co-operation<br />
strategies for the period 1995-2006;<br />
- ,the consistency between programming and implementation for the same period;<br />
- the implementation of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s co-operation, focusing on effectiveness<br />
and efficiency for the period 1995-2002 and on intended effects for the period<br />
under the current programming cycle 2002-2006;<br />
5
– the following co-operation areas in particular:<br />
(a) macro-economic framework and economic reforms,<br />
(b) social reforms and human resources development,<br />
(c) infrastructures.<br />
- the cooperation framework with the country, including the main agreements and<br />
other official commitments between EU and the Republic of Guyana.<br />
NB: Previous relevant evaluations, at country level and at regional level as well as<br />
global thematic evaluations relating to the country and evaluations of instruments are<br />
important reference material to be taken into account. The Consultant should not deal<br />
with the points already covered by these evaluations but use them and carry out<br />
further analyses. Result Oriented Monitoring of Projects (ROM) related to Republic<br />
of Guyana should also be taken into consideration (see CRIS database) on the<br />
assessment of the country programme.<br />
4. THE EVALUATION’S BASIC METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH<br />
The evaluation basic approach will consist of five phases in the course of which<br />
several methodological stages will be developed. The Consultant’s contribution is<br />
essentially the area marked grey in the table below, to which the launch note should<br />
be added.<br />
Phases of the evaluation: Methodological Stages 6 :<br />
1. Preparation Phase • Reference group constitution<br />
• ToR’s drafting<br />
• Launch Note (Consultant)<br />
2. Desk Phase 7<br />
3. Field Phase<br />
4. Synthesis phase (seminar in the<br />
country)<br />
• Structuring of the evaluation<br />
• Data Collection 8 , verification of<br />
hypotheses<br />
• Analysis<br />
• Judgements on findings<br />
5. Feedback and Dissemination • Quality Grid<br />
• Summary for the <strong>Commission</strong>ers<br />
concerned<br />
• Evinfo (summary for OECD and<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> databases)<br />
• Fiche contradictoire (a statement<br />
of key recommendations followed<br />
by the <strong>Commission</strong>’s response)<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
These components are not entirely sequential.<br />
It includes interviews in Brussels and could include a short mission to the country<br />
The study will draw on the contents of (i) all relevant documentation supplied by the <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Services, and (ii) documentation from other sources (to be detailed).<br />
6
4.1. Preparation Phase<br />
The evaluation manager identifies the <strong>Commission</strong> services to be invited to be part of<br />
the reference group, taking care that the objectives are met: an input of expertise and<br />
information, the expression of a range of pertinent opinions from the <strong>Commission</strong> and<br />
the legitimacy of the evaluation process.<br />
The reference group acts as the main professional interface between the Consultant<br />
and the <strong>Commission</strong> services. The group's principal functions will be:<br />
• to provide an opinion on the draft Terms of Reference ;<br />
• to provide the Consultant with all available information and<br />
documentation about the subjects of the evaluation;<br />
• to examine the inception note and subsequent reports produced by the<br />
Consultant;<br />
• to provide a judgement on the quality of the work of the Consultant;<br />
• to assist in assuring feedback and the update of the findings and<br />
recommendations from the evaluation into future programme design and<br />
delivery.<br />
The evaluation manager prepares the draft ToR for the evaluation and sends these to<br />
the Consultant.<br />
The Consultant will present a Launch note 9 which should contain: (i) his<br />
understanding of the ToR; (ii) the provisional composition of the evaluation team with<br />
CVs; (iii) a budget proposal. The launch note will be referred to the reference group<br />
for comments.<br />
4.2. Desk phase<br />
4.2.1. Inception report<br />
Upon approval of the launch note by the Evaluation Unit, the Consultant proceeds to<br />
the structuring stage, which leads to the production of an inception report.<br />
The main part of the work consists in the analysis of all key documents which are to<br />
the <strong>Commission</strong>’s co-operation (past and present) with the Republic of Guyana (in<br />
particular the strategy and programming documents).The Consultant will also take<br />
account of the documentation produced by other donors and international agencies.<br />
On the basis of the information collected and analysed, the Consultant will:<br />
9 In the case of a tender procedure, the launch note will be replaced by the financial and technical<br />
proposal of the tender<br />
7
a) reconstruct the intervention logic of the EC in the framework of its co-operation<br />
with the Republic of Guyana.The reconstructed logic of the intervention will be<br />
shaped into one or more logical diagrams of effects which must be based<br />
strictly on official texts. Prior to the elaboration of the effects diagram(s), the<br />
Consultant will have (i) identified and prioritized the co-operation objectives as<br />
observed in official texts;(ii) translated these specific objectives into intended<br />
effects. These intended effects will form the “boxes” of the diagram(s). Possible<br />
“gaps” in the intervention logic should be indicated and filled on the basis of<br />
assumptions to be validated by the reference group. The logical diagram(s) of<br />
effects will help to identify the main evaluation questions;<br />
b) propose evaluation questions and prepare explanatory comments for each. The<br />
choice of the questions determines the subsequent phases of information and<br />
data collection, elaboration of the methods of analysis, and elaboration of final<br />
judgements;<br />
A first meeting will be held with the Reference group to explain and approve the<br />
logical diagram(s) and the evaluation questions.<br />
c) identify appropriate judgement criteria and preliminary indicators for each<br />
evaluation questions selected. For each question, at least one judgement<br />
criterion should be identified, and for each such criterion appropriate a limited<br />
number of quantitative and qualitative indicators should be identified;<br />
d) include a description of the development/co-operation context of the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> with [country];<br />
e) propose suitable working methods to collect data and information in the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong>’s headquarters and in the country and present appropriate methods<br />
to analyse the collected data and information, indicating any limitations.<br />
The report will also confirm if necessary, (i) the final composition of the evaluation<br />
team and (ii) the final calendar. These two latter points will be agreed and confirmed<br />
through a formal exchange of letters between the Consultant and the <strong>Commission</strong>.<br />
This phase may include a short preparatory and exploratory visit in the field by the<br />
Consultant and/or a representative of the Evaluation Unit.<br />
4.2.2. Desk phase report<br />
Upon approval of the inception report, the Consultant proceeds to the final stage of<br />
the desk phase during which he will:<br />
• present the finalised quantitative and qualitative indicators;<br />
• present the first elements of responses to the evaluation questions and the<br />
first hypotheses to be tested in the field;<br />
• present suitable methods of data and information collection in the country<br />
indicating any limitations and describing how the data should be crosschecked<br />
;<br />
• propose appropriate methods of analysis of the information and data<br />
collected, again indicating any limitations of those methods in [country];<br />
8
• propose a list of activities, projects and programmes for in-depth analysis in<br />
the field.<br />
At the conclusion of this work, the Consultant will present a draft desk phase report<br />
setting out the results of this first phase of the evaluation including all the above listed<br />
tasks (the major part of the Inception report will be put as an annex of the desk phase<br />
report).The field mission may not start until the proposed methodology will be<br />
approved by the evaluation manager.<br />
4.3. Field phase<br />
Following acceptance of the desk phase report, the Consultant undertakes the field<br />
mission. The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the desk phase<br />
report and approved by the Reference group in accordance with the Delegation. If<br />
during the course of the fieldwork any significant deviations from the agreed<br />
methodology and/or schedule are perceived necessary, the Consultant must have<br />
received the approval of the Evaluation Unit before they can be applied. At the<br />
conclusion of the field study, the Consultant presents the preliminary findings of<br />
evaluation:<br />
(1) during a de-briefing meeting with the Delegation;<br />
(2) to the Reference group, shortly after his return from the field.<br />
4.4. Final report-writing phase<br />
The Consultant will submit the draft final report in conformity with the structure set<br />
out in annex 2 with account being taken of comments received during de-briefing<br />
meetings with the Delegation and the Reference group (cf.4.3).<br />
If the evaluation manager considers the report of sufficient quality (cf. annex 3), he<br />
will circulate it for comments to the reference group, which will convene to discuss it<br />
in the presence of the evaluation team.<br />
On the basis of comments expressed by the Reference group and the Evaluation Unit,<br />
the Consultant will make the appropriate amendments. The revised draft final report<br />
will be presented at a seminar in the Republic of Guyana. The purpose of the<br />
seminar is to present the results the conclusions and the preliminary recommendations<br />
of the evaluation to the National Authorities, to the Delegation as well as to all the<br />
main stakeholders concerned by the co-operation (representatives of civil society<br />
organisations, other donors, etc.).<br />
The Consultant should prepare a presentation (power point) for the seminar. This<br />
presentation shall be considered as a product of the evaluation in the same way as the<br />
reports.<br />
On the basis of the comments expressed at the seminar and on the basis of further<br />
comments from the Reference group, the Delegation and/or the evaluation manager,<br />
the Consultant will prepare the final report. The Consultant may either accept or reject<br />
the comments but in case of rejection he must motivate (in writing) his reasons (the<br />
comments and the Consultant’s responses are annexed to the report).<br />
The presentation (power point) will be revised in accordance to the final report.<br />
9
4.5. Dissemination and follow-up<br />
After approval of the final report, the Evaluation Unit proceeds with the dissemination<br />
of the results (conclusions and recommendations) of the evaluation. The Evaluation<br />
Unit (i) makes a formal judgement on the quality of the evaluation (cf. annex 3);<br />
(ii) prepares an evaluation summary following the standard DAC format (EvInfo);<br />
(iii) prepares and circulates a “Fiche contradictoire”. The final report, the quality<br />
assessment grid, the EvInfo and the “Fiche contradictoire” will be published on the<br />
Website of the Evaluation Unit.<br />
5. IDENTIFICATION OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS<br />
The evaluation will be based on the five criteria endorsed by the OECD-DAC:<br />
relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The criteria will be<br />
given different weight according to the precise evaluation questions.<br />
In general, questions will refer to the following main areas:<br />
• Relevance of the strategy/programme: this includes both relevance to the general<br />
objectives of the EC and relevance to the needs and priorities of the Republic of<br />
Guyana (including the choice of target groups).<br />
• Design of the intervention strategy/programme: this mainly concerns the extent<br />
to which the resources foreseen are adequate in relation to the objectives set out in<br />
the programming documents. The Consultant will also verify the extent to which<br />
the intervention modalities (instruments, aid delivery channels, etc.) are<br />
appropriate to the objectives.<br />
• Consistency of the implementation in relation to the strategy: the Consultant<br />
shall verify the extent to which the calendar and implementation of the<br />
intervention programming (type of interventions, geographical and sectoral<br />
distribution, instruments, aid delivery channels, etc.) are consistent with the<br />
strategy. He shall demonstrate who are the real beneficiaries, direct or indirect, of<br />
the intervention and compare them to the target population(s) in the programming<br />
documents.<br />
• Achievement of main objectives: the Consultant shall identify all recorded results<br />
and impacts, including any unintended ones, and compare these to the intended.<br />
The Consultant will also identify the changes with occurred in the areas on which<br />
EC programmes were supposed to produce an impact.<br />
• Efficiency of the implementation: for the activities which were effective, it will be<br />
necessary to question to what extent funding, human, resources, regulatory, and/or<br />
administrative resources contributed to, or hindered, the achievement of the<br />
objectives and results.<br />
• Sustainability of the effects: an analysis of the extent to which the results and<br />
impact are being, or are likely to be, maintained over time.<br />
10
• Key cross-cutting issues: for example gender, environment human rights,<br />
HIV/AIDS, institutional capacity building, etc. Verification should be undertaken,<br />
on the one hand, of the extent that account has been taken of these priorities in the<br />
programming documents and, on the other hand, to what extent these issues have<br />
been reflected in the implementation modalities and in the effects of the<br />
intervention.<br />
• The 3Cs (co-ordination, complementarity and coherence):<br />
co-ordination and complementarity with EU Members States, and other donors;<br />
coherence with EU policies (including the Member State own policies).<br />
6. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND THE MONITORING OF THE<br />
EVALUATION<br />
The Evaluation Unit (AIDCO 03) is responsible for the management and monitoring<br />
of the evaluation with the assistance of the Reference group (cf.4.1).<br />
7. THE EVALUATION TEAM<br />
The evaluation team should possess a sound level of knowledge and experience in:<br />
− evaluation methods and techniques in general and, if possible of evaluation in the<br />
field of development and cooperation;<br />
− the country and/or the region;<br />
− the following fields:<br />
1) trade and economic cooperation;<br />
2) social sector and human resources development<br />
3) infrastructures (water sector, in particular);<br />
4) good governance and human rights.<br />
Additional expertise could be requested after the drafting of the specific<br />
evaluation questions.<br />
−<br />
the following language(s): English<br />
The Evaluation Unit strongly recommends that the evaluation team should include<br />
local consultants (notably, but not only, during the field phase) with in-depth<br />
knowledge of key areas of the evaluation<br />
The team composition will initially be agreed between the contractor<br />
and the Evaluation Unit but may be adjusted subsequently, if<br />
necessary, on the basis of the findings of the desk phase.<br />
Regarding conflict of interest, experts who have been involved in the<br />
design or implementation of programmes or projects that are covered<br />
by this evaluation, are excluded from this assignment.<br />
A declaration of absence of conflict of interest shall be signed by each<br />
consultant proposed for the study team, and annexed to the launch<br />
note.<br />
11
8. TIMING<br />
The dates mentioned in the following section are indicative<br />
Evaluation Phases<br />
and Stages<br />
Notes and Reports Dates Meetings<br />
RG Composition Notes November 2006<br />
ToR Draft November<br />
Starting Stage Launch Note December<br />
Desk Phase<br />
Structuring Stage Short presentation (logical<br />
diagram and EQ)<br />
January 2007<br />
RG Meeting<br />
(kick off meeting)<br />
Draft Inception Note<br />
February<br />
Final Inception Note<br />
March<br />
Desk Study Draft Desk Report March RG Meeting<br />
Final Desk Report<br />
April<br />
Field Phase<br />
Final Phase<br />
(report-writing)<br />
Presentation May RG Meeting<br />
Draft Final Report<br />
1rs draft Final June RG Meeting<br />
2 nd draft Final July<br />
Seminar<br />
September<br />
Final Report<br />
October<br />
9. COST OF THE EVALUATION<br />
The overall cost of the evaluation is expected to be around € 180.000<br />
This amount includes a provision (reimbursable costs) of € 7.000 for the organisation<br />
of the seminar in the country.<br />
10. PAYMENT MODALITIES<br />
The payments modalities shall be as follows:<br />
30% on acceptance of the inception note;<br />
50% on acceptance of draft final report;<br />
20% on acceptance of final report.<br />
Seminar related costs are to be invoiced, and paid, separately.<br />
12
ANNEX 1: KEY DOCUMENTS FOR THE EVALUATION<br />
NB: the following list is indicative and by no means exhaustive. The consultants are<br />
requested to take into account any other documents relevant to the present evaluation.<br />
− Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & National Indicative Programme 2002-2004<br />
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/csp_rsp/print/gy_csp_en.pdf#zoom=100<br />
− Addendum to the CSP and National Indicative Programme:<br />
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/csp_rsp/addentum/Add_CSP_GY.pdf#zoo<br />
m=100<br />
− Regional Lomé 4 (1997-2002))<br />
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/region/docs/rb_en.pdf#zoom=100<br />
− Regional Sheet<br />
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/publications/rep98/pdf/en/rb.pdf#zoom=100<br />
− Regional for 2003-2007:<br />
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/csp_rsp/print/r9_rsp_en.pdf#zoom=100<br />
− Annual reports and mid-term reviews<br />
− Evaluation regional cooperation Caribbean (2005)<br />
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/evaluation/document_index/2005/951663_docs.htm<br />
− Previous Project/programme Evaluations Guyana:<br />
Caribbean Regional Tourism<br />
Sector programme (99810)<br />
7 ACP RPR<br />
443/444<br />
final<br />
(draft)<br />
dec-02<br />
Guyana Training Agency<br />
Project<br />
8 ACP GUA<br />
008<br />
mid-term<br />
Feb-03<br />
Strengthening the Institutional<br />
Response to HIV/AIDS/STI in<br />
the Caribbean (SIRHASC)<br />
8 ACP TPS<br />
018<br />
mid-term Feb 2004<br />
Linden<br />
Advancement<br />
(LEAP)<br />
Economic<br />
Programme<br />
8 ACP GUA<br />
009<br />
final Aug 2004<br />
Strengthening of Medical<br />
Laboratory Services in the<br />
Caribbean<br />
8 ACP RCA<br />
020<br />
final Dec 2004<br />
13
Urban development projects,<br />
phase2, Guyana. Final report<br />
Small business credit initiative -<br />
Guyana final report<br />
(GUA/7001)<br />
Small business credit initiative<br />
(Guyana) final report<br />
Rehabilitation of the bauxite<br />
industry of Guyana - final<br />
report - Global evaluation of the<br />
cooperation between ACP and<br />
EU in the mining sector and<br />
Sysmin<br />
950968 01/01/1995<br />
951054 01/01/1995<br />
951319 13/07/1997<br />
951339 01/06/1998<br />
Coopération nord-sud en<br />
matiere de lutte contre<br />
l'expansion de l'epidemie du<br />
vih/sida et aide aux politiques<br />
et programmes démographiques<br />
dans les pays en developpement<br />
951552<br />
01/11/2000<br />
- Monitoring Reports on EC (co-financed) actions in Guyana (ROM Database)<br />
- Relevant documentation from other donors<br />
14
ANNEX 2: OUTLINE STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL REPORT<br />
The overall layout of the report is as follows:<br />
- Summary<br />
- Context of the evaluation<br />
- Replies to the evaluation questions<br />
- Conclusions (1)<br />
- Recommendations (2)<br />
Length: the final report must be kept short (75 pages maximum excluding annexes).<br />
Additional information on the context, the programme or the comprehensive aspects<br />
of the methodology and of the analysis will be put in the annexes.<br />
(1)<br />
The conclusions have to be assembled by homogeneous "clusters" (groups). The<br />
setting out of the conclusions according to the 5 DAC criteria is not required.<br />
The chapter on "Conclusions" has to contain a paragraph or a sub-chapter with the 3<br />
to 4 principal presented in order of importance.<br />
The chapter on "Conclusions" must also make it possible to identify subjects for<br />
which there are good practices and the subjects for which it is necessary to think<br />
about modifications or re-orientations.<br />
(2)<br />
– Recommendations have to be linked to the conclusions without being a direct<br />
copy.<br />
– Recommendations have to be treated on a hierarchical basis and prioritised<br />
within the various clusters (groups) of presentation selected.<br />
– Recommendations have to be realistic, operational and feasible. As far as is<br />
practicable, the possible conditions of implementation have to be specified.<br />
– The chapter on "Recommendations" has to contain a sub-chapter or a specific<br />
paragraph corresponding to the paragraph with the 3 to 4 principal conclusions.<br />
Therefore, for each conclusion, options for action and the conditions linked to<br />
each action as well as the likely consequences should set out.<br />
15
ANNEX 3 - QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID<br />
Concerning these criteria, the evaluation<br />
report is:<br />
1. Meeting needs: Does the evaluation<br />
adequately address the information needs of the<br />
commissioning body and fit the terms of<br />
reference?<br />
2. Relevant scope: Is the rationale of the<br />
policy examined and its set of outputs, results<br />
and outcomes/impacts examined fully,<br />
including both intended and unexpected policy<br />
interactions and consequences?<br />
3. Defensible design: Is the evaluation design<br />
appropriate and adequate to ensure that the full<br />
set of findings, along with methodological<br />
limitations, is made accessible for answering<br />
the main evaluation questions?<br />
4. Reliable data: To what extent are the<br />
primary and secondary data selected adequate.<br />
Are they sufficiently reliable for their intended<br />
use?<br />
5. Sound analysis: Is quantitative information<br />
appropriately and systematically analysed<br />
according to the state of the art so that<br />
evaluation questions are answered in a valid<br />
way?<br />
6. Credible findings: Do findings follow<br />
logically from, and are they justified by, the<br />
data analysis and interpretations based on<br />
carefully described assumptions and rationale?<br />
7. Validity of the conclusions: Does the<br />
report provide clear conclusions? Are<br />
conclusions based on credible results?<br />
8. Usefulness of the recommendations: Are<br />
recommendations fair, unbiased by personnel<br />
or shareholders’ views, and sufficiently<br />
detailed to be operationally applicable?<br />
9. Clearly reported: Does the report clearly<br />
describe the policy being evaluated, including<br />
its context and purpose, together with the<br />
procedures and findings of the evaluation, so<br />
that information provided can easily be<br />
understood?<br />
Taking into account the contextual<br />
constraints on the evaluation, the overall<br />
quality rating of the report is considered.<br />
Unacc<br />
eptabl<br />
e<br />
Poor Good Very<br />
Good<br />
Excelle<br />
nt<br />
16
ANNEX 4<br />
COUNTRY OVERVIEW<br />
General Background<br />
Guyana, located at the point where the Caribbean meets South America on its North Atlantic<br />
seaboard, is historically and culturally a part of the Caribbean region. Georgetown hosts the<br />
Secretariat of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).<br />
Guyana is a country with a small population 751,000 ( (2002 census) living in a large area of<br />
214 969 km 2 . With a per capita income of+/- 850 USD, Guyana is also one of the poorest<br />
countries in the Caribbean and the Western Hemisphere. Ethnic 9 %, others and mixed 17%.<br />
Guyana has three distinct geographical areas: the coastal zone, the tropical forest zone, and<br />
the savannahs, in the south. Close to 90 % of the population lives and works in the coastal<br />
plain, an area around 10 000 km 2 , roughly 5% of the country's total land mass. Over 80% of<br />
GDP, including the entire agricultural production and the vast majority of all non-mining<br />
industrial activities are concentrated in this area, which is located below sea level, and needs<br />
constant protection from the sea.<br />
Guyana's economy is based on exporting bauxite, sugar, rice, and more recently gold and<br />
forestry products. In spite of some acute ethnic polarisation problems, the overall political<br />
situation of the country had been improving at a satisfactory rate until recently. GDP<br />
fluctuated from - 0.7% in 2003 to + 1.6 % in 2004 and to - 2.5% in 2005, the latter figure<br />
relating to the floods in January 2005 (source EIU).<br />
In November 2000, the IMF and the World Bank approved the Interim Poverty reduction<br />
strategy paper (PRSP) and agreed to support a comprehensive debt reduction package for<br />
Guyana under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). This deal will<br />
save Guyana about USD 590 Million in debt service over the coming years. Among the<br />
requirements for the release of the funds are the completion of a PRSP and the<br />
implementation of a set of social and public sector reforms and the maintenance of financial<br />
stability.<br />
In October 2002, the IMF agreed to a credit of USD 73 million under the PRSP.<br />
In December 2003, IMF and World Bank agreed that Guyana has reached the completion<br />
point under the enhanced HIPC. Debt relief under the enhanced HIPC amounts to USD 334.5.<br />
This comes in addition to the USD 256.4 that Guyana received when it reached the<br />
completion point under the original HIPC framework in May 1999. The HDI continued to<br />
drop from 104 in 2004 to 107 in 2005.<br />
Political situation<br />
Guyana's political scene is dominated by two main parties, the People's Progressive Party<br />
(PPP) and the Peoples National Congress (PNC). Each represents one of the two main<br />
ethnicities of the country, the PPP electorate being mostly indo-Guyanese and the PNC's<br />
mainly afro-Guyanese.<br />
After 28 years of undemocratic rule, the first internationally recognised fair and free elections<br />
took place in 1992 and Dr Cheddi Jagan (PPP) was elected President. The following general<br />
elections were held in December 1997 and were once again won by the PPP.<br />
The elections of March 2001 which returned the government of President Jagdeo and the<br />
PPP/C to power were considered by most observers to have been fair and open. But as it was<br />
the case after the 1997 elections which were also won by the PPP, civil disturbances erupted<br />
17
again after the election.<br />
Progress in the political reconciliation process has been slow and the process as a whole is<br />
still rather unstable. Currently government and opposition are not on real speaking terms. The<br />
country is gearing up for the next elections on 28 August 2006.<br />
Concerning the human rights situation freedom of press and opinion are respected. However,<br />
the police force has been criticised locally and internationally (Amnesty International) for<br />
alleged extra-judicial killings.<br />
Regional framework<br />
Guyana is among others, a member of the UN, ACP, ACS, CARICOM and CARIFORUM.<br />
The Headquarters of the Caribbean Community, Caricom, is in Georgetown and a new<br />
Caricom headquarters at Liliendaal was opened in February 2005. The Caribbean Forum of<br />
ACP States, Cariforum is headquartered in Georgetown. Relations with Brazil are quite good<br />
and occasionally common regional projects are put forward. Relations with Venezuela<br />
maintaining a significant territorial claim on Guyana are improving. A Guyana-Suriname<br />
border dispute re-ignited in 2000, following exploratory drilling for oil off the coast of the<br />
disputed area. Guyana in February 2004 referred their long-standing maritime boundary<br />
dispute with Suriname to the United Nations for a legally binding resolution under article 287<br />
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The legal representatives of the two<br />
governments met at the end of May 2004 to continue their discussions about the arbitration<br />
panel to adjudicate the maritime boundary dispute. A final ruling is expected in 2006.<br />
Relations with the EU<br />
The UK is the only EU Member State with a permanent representation in Guyana and the EU<br />
Delegation and the British High <strong>Commission</strong> have contacts on a regular basis.<br />
Guyana is highly dependent on trade because of its small economic base. The major exports<br />
are sugar, rice, gold and bauxite. The pattern of Guyana's trade has changed very little in<br />
recent years. The country's main trading partner remains the United States (22% of exports<br />
and 25% of imports), the EU - mainly the United Kingdom - (30% of exports and 19 % of<br />
imports) and Canada (24% of exports and negligible imports).<br />
Guyana is a high cost producer of both sugar and rice. Both these commodities have enjoyed<br />
preferential access to the lucrative EC market through special Lome/Cotonou protocols.<br />
However, these preferences will change by 2009, and already from 2006 the Everything but<br />
Arms initiative will allow free access to EC for sugar and rice originating from least<br />
developed countries, thus creating competition for Guyanese exports. To facilitate the<br />
transition funds have been allocated from the EDF for the rice sector under the CARICOM<br />
Rice Project. (EUR 24 million for Guyana, Suriname and regional).<br />
Country Strategy<br />
Top of page<br />
The objectives of the EC assistance program to Guyana are the reduction of poverty and the<br />
promotion of sustainable development.<br />
The two areas of concentration proposed for the 9 th EDF are:<br />
• Infrastructure: Sea Defences and coastal management and<br />
18
• Macro-economic support to social sectors (health and housing)<br />
Both of these programs would receive project and/or budgetary sector support.<br />
Outside these areas of concentration assistance is proposed for:<br />
• Transport sector planning<br />
• Support to Economic Actors : Strengthening the NAO office / Micro-project<br />
programme<br />
Priorities for co-operation<br />
Top of page<br />
The EC Country Support Strategy for Guyana will be financed through different instruments<br />
under the 9 th EDF, which amounts to a total of EURO 48 million.<br />
9 th EDF A-allocation (EUR 34 million). From the B-allocation EUR 4,9 million concerning<br />
Sysmin resources will be used to support the focal and non-focal sectors, bringing the total<br />
resources allocated to EUR 38,9 million for the following purposes.<br />
Focal sector 1. Infrastructure: sea defences and coastal management. Total amount EUR 19<br />
million or 49% of the programmable resources.<br />
Focal sector 2. Macro economic support. Total amount EUR 14,9 million or 38% of the<br />
programmable resources.<br />
Other programmes outside the focal sectors Total amount EUR 5 million or 13% of the<br />
programmable resources.<br />
Balances from previous EDFs at the date of entry into force of the Financial Protocol as well<br />
as decommitments made at a later stage, have been added to the above mentioned indicative<br />
allocation. These funds will be used for projects and programmes already identified under<br />
Indicative Programmes of preceding EDFs, for which no financing decision was taken before<br />
the entry into force of the 9 th EDF.<br />
In May 2004, the Guyanese Government and the EC signed a five-year agreement to fund the<br />
establishment of a micro projects programme for vulnerable groups and NGOs. This initiative<br />
is part of a larger commitment to eradicate poverty.<br />
The Macro-economic support programme was approved in July 2004.<br />
9 th EDF B-allocation (EUR 14 million) This envelope includes EUR 4,9 million from 8 th<br />
EDF Sysmin resources allocated to the focal and non-focal sectors above. These funds are<br />
used under the programmed activities as listed above. From the remainder of the B-envelope<br />
under the flex procedures, 8,4 million has been allocated in January 2002 to be programmed<br />
as part of the budget support, bringing it to 23,3 million. The last EUR 0.7 million has been<br />
allocated by ECHO for relief after floods which hit Guyana in January 2005.<br />
Apart from the above-mentioned financial instruments, of which the A-envelope is the main<br />
programmable basis for the Indicative Programme, the 9 th EDF also includes the "Investment<br />
Facility" as a financing instrument managed by the <strong>European</strong> Investment bank. The<br />
Investment Facility does not form part of the Indicative Programme.<br />
Specific actions could be financed via budget lines, inter alia, in the areas of decentralised co-<br />
19
operation, NGO financing, human rights and democracy, disaster prevention and<br />
humanitarian and emergency assistance. These are subject to specific rules and regulations<br />
and depend on availability of funds. Guyana can also benefit from the Regional Indicative<br />
Programme or from trade specific operations, according to needs and availability of funds.<br />
Specific activities may be supported through the Centre for the Development of Enterprise<br />
(CDE).<br />
9th EDF Financial Data<br />
Top of page<br />
Focal areas<br />
Infrastructure: Sea defences and costal management 19 M EUR 49 %<br />
Macro economic support 14.9M EUR 38 %<br />
Non- focal areas<br />
Transport Sector Study & Support to Economic Actors 5 M EUR 13%<br />
Total 38.9 M EUR* 100 %<br />
The amount shown above accounts solely for EDF allocations - programmable aid<br />
* From the B-allocation EUR 4,9 million concerning Sysmin resources will be used to<br />
support the focal and non-focal sectors, bringing the total resources allocated to EUR 38,9<br />
million for the indicated purposes.<br />
Previous EDF financial data<br />
Top of page<br />
(All EDF in MEUR (million EUR)s<br />
(8th EDF)<br />
National Indicative Progr. 12.8 14.6 22.1 32.8 32<br />
EIB loans: Risk capital 3.2 4 4 1 12.5<br />
EIB loans - - - 7.8 -<br />
Structural adjustment support - - - 8.5 11<br />
Sysmin - 34.5 - 5 -<br />
debt relief - - - 6.4 -<br />
Food aid 0.7 3.8 4.3 - -<br />
Other (emergency aid, AIDS, damage compensation) - 0.5 0.30.1 -<br />
Environment and NGO budget lines - - - - 4.1<br />
From regional funds - - 1.2 12.3 0.8<br />
Total 16.7 57.4 31.9 73.9 60.4<br />
20
Main Development Projects<br />
Top of page<br />
Major project activities presently undertaken are:<br />
• 8 th EDF Sea Defences Programme (EUR 20 million)<br />
• 8th EDF Economic Diversification Project in Linden . (12, 5 million )<br />
• 8 th EDF Low-income housing 9, 1 million<br />
• 9 th EDF budget support programme (EUR 23.3 million)<br />
21
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Annex 2 – Informants met before the<br />
field mission<br />
ABDUL Yusuf Guyana Sugar Corporation inc.<br />
General Manager, Technical<br />
services<br />
ALLI Ronald Guyana Sugar Corporation inc. Chief Executive Manager<br />
BALGOBIN Tarachand Ministry of Finance Head of NAO office<br />
BARROWS Lunch Guyana Micro-projects programme<br />
Head of association of timber<br />
producers<br />
BOGUSZ<br />
Grazyna<br />
DG EcFin Unit 4 Horizontal<br />
issues and co-ordination of<br />
financial assistance. Development<br />
policy. Links with multilateral<br />
banks.<br />
Economic and financial assistant<br />
for development policy<br />
BRANDT Manfred EC AIDCO Administrator<br />
BURBAN Florence Elections process evaluation / EC Head of mission<br />
CHAMPANHET Bernard<br />
Bio-ethanol study / ACP countries<br />
/ EC<br />
Energy economist<br />
CHAND Komal<br />
Guyana Agri.&General Workers<br />
Union<br />
President<br />
FRASER Neil LEAP PMU<br />
Manager, Business Development<br />
Unit<br />
GAFOOR-CHIN Zorina Ministry of Housing & Water Expert<br />
GARCIA<br />
EuropeAid Unit E.7 Responsable thématique dans le<br />
Manuel<br />
PUERTA<br />
Macro-economic support<br />
secteur des transports<br />
GIRARD Felix NAO Task Force Team Leader<br />
HERLANT Patrick<br />
EuropeAid Unit E.6 Natural Senior officer for operations<br />
ressources<br />
quality support and coordination<br />
HESPEL Evelyne<br />
Programme Manager - Assistant<br />
EuropeAid Unit E.1<br />
Officer - Quality Management<br />
Macro-economic support<br />
Officer<br />
HORN Kevin Guyana Water incorporated Team Leader<br />
JACKSON Nick Guyana Sugar Corporation inc. Chief Executive<br />
LOPEZ Patricia World Bank Country representative<br />
Mc CORMACK Mike Guyana Human Rights association Team Leader<br />
MINASYAN<br />
Charlotte<br />
EuropeAid Unit C2 Geographical<br />
coordination and supervision for<br />
ACPs<br />
Assistant programme manager<br />
MUCI Giampiero<br />
Delegation of the <strong>European</strong><br />
<strong>Commission</strong><br />
Economic section<br />
NORTON Shawn LEAP incubator Tenant<br />
PERMAUL Dindyal Ministry of Agriculture Permanent Secretary<br />
PERSAUD Robert Ministry of Agriculture Minister of Agriculture<br />
SALLMÉN Ritva<br />
Delegation of the <strong>European</strong> Programme manager, Head of<br />
<strong>Commission</strong><br />
economic section<br />
SANKAR Beni Kayman Sankar Group Chief Executive Manager<br />
SHARPE Valérie LEAP PMU Manager, LEAF unit<br />
SIMMONS Coralie Guyana Micro-projects programme Team Leader<br />
SINGH Ashni Ministry of Finance Minister of Finance<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 2 /page 1
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
SURUJBALLY Nisa Guyana Sugar Corporation inc. Marketing director<br />
TERNOY Jacques<br />
Bio-ethanol study / ACP countries<br />
/ EC<br />
Head of mission<br />
VANHELDEN<br />
Bast<br />
DG Dev Unit 1 Relations with the<br />
countries and the region of the<br />
Caribbean and the OCTs<br />
International Relations Officer -<br />
Desk Officer: Jamaica, Belize,<br />
Bahamas, Guyana, Suriname,<br />
Trinidad & Tobago<br />
VARAS OLEA Sergio<br />
Inter-American Development<br />
Bank<br />
WHALEN Kathleen LEAP PMU Team Leader<br />
ZEPHYR Patrick SMEs association President<br />
Country representative<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 2 /page 2
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Annex 3 – Field mission planning &<br />
Informants met<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 3 /page 1
Evaluation of the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>'s<br />
Support to the Republic of Guyana<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Team with<br />
Clem Duncan<br />
Michel Nadon Karolyn Thunissen Virginie Morillon Wim Klaassen<br />
1 - Relevance / 6 - Efficiency 8 - 3C's / 4 - Budget support 7 - CCI / 3 - Private sector support 2 - Sea defences / 5 - MPP<br />
Wed. 10 DEC/DNAO Joint Briefing 9:00 DEC/DNAO Joint Briefing 9:00 DEC/DNAO Joint Briefing 9:00 DEC/DNAO Joint Briefing 9:00<br />
NAO Task Force 11:00 NAO Task Force 11:00 NAO Task Force 11:00 NAO Task Force 11:00<br />
DEC 14:00 DEC 14:00 DEC 14:00 DEC 14:00<br />
Thurs. 11 Mr. Bal Persaud, Director, PSC 11:00 Budget Office 10:00 Mr. Bal Persaud, Director, PSC 11:00<br />
Gail Texira, Acting Presidential Secretariat 14:00 Gail Texira, Acting Presidential Secretariat 14:00 Gail Texira, Acting Presidential Secretariat 14:00 Gail Texira, Acting Presidential Secretariat 14:00<br />
Fri.12<br />
Hon. Mr. Henry Jeffrey, Minister of Foreign<br />
Trade and Int'l Cooperation<br />
Hon. Mr. Harry Narine Nawbatt, Minister of<br />
10.30<br />
Housing & water<br />
Hon. Mr. Henry Jeffrey, Minister of Foreign Trade<br />
11:00<br />
and Int'l Cooperation<br />
Hon. Mr. Harry Narine Nawbatt, Minister of<br />
10.30<br />
Housing & water<br />
Ms. Denise Bereforrd, Prog. Manager, GTA<br />
Mr. George Howard, Sea & River Division 14:00 Ms. Tamara Whalen, World Bank 15:30<br />
Programme<br />
12:00 Mr. George Howard, Sea & River Division 14:00<br />
Mr Amsterdam, SRD 15.00 Felix Girard - Adèle Clark / LEAP 15.00 Mr Amsterdam, SRD 15.00<br />
Bernhard Weihs, TLPMU Housing 16.00 Bernhard Weihs, TLPMU Housing 16.00<br />
Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00<br />
11:00<br />
Saturday 13 Field visit / Sea Defences 7.00-18.00 Hon. Dr. Leslie Ramsammy, Minister of Health 11:00 Field visit / Sea Defences 7.00-18.00 Field visit / Sea Defences 7.00-18.00<br />
Sunday 14 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00<br />
Team with<br />
Clem Duncan<br />
Michel Nadon<br />
1 - Relevance / 6 - Efficiency<br />
Karolyn Thunissen<br />
8 - 3C's / 4 - Budget support<br />
Virginie Morillon<br />
7 - CCI / 3 - Private sector support<br />
Wim Klaassen<br />
2 - Sea defences / 5 - MPP<br />
Hon. Mr. Robeson Benn, Minister of Public<br />
Hon. Mr. Robeson Benn, Minister of Public<br />
Hon. Mr. Robeson Benn, Minister of Public<br />
Hon. Mr. Robeson Benn, Minister of Public<br />
8:00 8:00 8:00<br />
Works<br />
Works<br />
Works<br />
Works<br />
8:00<br />
Monday 15 Adèle Clarke, NAO TF 9.00<br />
Collin Lord, NAO / Rice 10.00 Collin Lord, NAO / Rice 10.00<br />
Mr. Abubarcy Tal, UNDP 14:00 Mr. Abubarcy Tal, UNDP 14:00 Roel Ubbink, TLPMU Sea Defences 11.00<br />
Team meeting 17.00 Team meeting 17.00 Team meeting 17.02 Team meeting 17.00<br />
Tuesday 16<br />
Mrs Whalen, programme Manager, LEAP<br />
Programme<br />
Mrs Whalen, programme Manager, LEAP<br />
10.00 DFID 9.00<br />
Programme<br />
10.00 Mr. Amsterdam, Sea Defences 8.00<br />
Irène Bacchus, Linden Arts & Craft 12.30 Pauline Cummings EC Delegation 10.00 Irène Bacchus, Linden Arts & Craft 12.30 Mr. J. Bhojedat, PMU MPP 9:30<br />
National Drainage Irrigation Authority, Min. of<br />
R. Glasgow, Regional Devlopment Unit 1.30 R. Glasgow, Regional Devlopment Unit 1.30<br />
Agriculture<br />
Farmers Association, Region 10 3.00 Farmers Association, Region 10 3.00<br />
Sebrai Woods 4.00 Sebrai Woods 4.00<br />
Hon. Miss Priya Manickchand, Minister of<br />
Wed. 17 Mayor & Town Council 8.00<br />
Labour,<br />
13:30 Mayor & Town Council 8.00 Mr Ravi Marine, Nat. Drain. & Irr. Auth. 9.00<br />
Hon. Mr. Priya Manickchand, Minister of Labour,<br />
Linden Chamber of Commerce 9.00 ECD Head of Economic section 15.00 Linden Chamber of Commerce 9.00<br />
Human Services and Social Security<br />
13:30<br />
Tourism Association, Region 10 10.00<br />
LEAF Executive officer 11.00 LEAF Executive officer 11.00<br />
Mrs Whalen, programme Manager, LEAF<br />
Mrs Whalen, programme Manager, LEAF<br />
12.00<br />
Programme<br />
Programme<br />
12.00<br />
Toucan Call Centre 14.00 Toucan Call Centre 14.00<br />
Balgit's Demonstration farm 15.00 Balgit's Demonstration farm 15.00<br />
Team meeting 17.00 Team meeting 17.00 Team meeting 17.00 Team meeting 17.00<br />
Briefing meetings preparation 18.00 Briefing meetings preparation 18.00 Briefing meetings preparation 18.00 Briefing meetings preparation 18.00<br />
Team with<br />
Michel Nadon Karolyn Thunissen Virginie Morillon Wim Klaassen<br />
Clem Duncan<br />
1 - Relevance / 6 - Efficiency 8 - 3C's / 4 - Budget support 7 - CCI / 3 - Private sector support 2 - Sea defences / 5 - MPP<br />
Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00 8.00 Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00 Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00<br />
Thursday 18 Mr. Tarachand Balgobin, work meet. 9:00 Mr. Tarachand Balgobin, work meet. 9:00 Mr. Tarachand Balgobin, work meet. 9:00 Mr. Tarachand Balgobin, work meet. 9:00<br />
Hon. Mr. Permaul, PS, Minister of Agriculture 14.00 USAID 13.30 MPP Beneficiaries (Salv. Army & ..) 12.00 Hon. Mr. Permaul, PS, Minister of Agriculture 14.00<br />
Mr. Sergio Varas-Olea, IDB 11.30<br />
EC Delegation, work meeting 15.30 EC Delegation, work meeting 15.30 EC Delegation, work meeting 15.30 EC Delegation, work meeting 15.30<br />
Sonya Roopnauth, Budget office 17.30<br />
Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00 Team meeting 18.00<br />
Debriefing meeting preparation 19.00 Debriefing meeting preparation 19.00 Debriefing meeting preparation 19.00 Debriefing meeting preparation 19.00<br />
Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00 Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00 Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00 Team meeting / Br. meet. Final prep. 8.00<br />
Friday 19 DNAO / ECD De-briefing 9:00 DNAO / ECD De-briefing 9:00 DNAO / ECD De-briefing 9:00 DNAO / ECD De-briefing 9:00<br />
Bureau of Statistics 11;30 Mr Amsterdam, SRDD 11.00<br />
Mr Vaugh, SRDD 13.00<br />
ECD, Head of Delegation 16.00 ECD, Head of Delegation 16.00 ECD, Head of Delegation 16.00 ECD, Head of Delegation 16.00<br />
Mr Roel Ubbels, Monitoring Sea Def. 18.00<br />
10.00<br />
Final Report - September 2008
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Annex 4 – Basic economic indicators<br />
Population<br />
Population<br />
(thousands)<br />
Population growth<br />
(%)<br />
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />
747 746 748 752 755 757 759 761 763 765 NA<br />
-0.3 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3<br />
Production and prices<br />
Nominal GDP<br />
(G$M)<br />
99.0 106.7 108.0 120.7 130 130.4 137.7 143.8 154.6 157.4 166.2<br />
Annual percentage changes<br />
Real GDP 7.9 6.2 -1.7 3.0 -1.4 2.3 1.1 -0.7 1.6 -2.6 0.7<br />
Real GDP per capita 6.6 5.5 -1.7 1.9 -1.7 1.9 0.8 -1.2 1.3 -2.9 0.4<br />
GDP deflator 3.1 2.7 2.6 12.8 4.3 1.5 3.7 5.4 5.8 4.5 4.9<br />
Consumer prices 7.1 3.6 4.6 7.5 6.1 2.7 5.3 6 4.7 5.0 5.0<br />
(average)<br />
Origin of GDP<br />
As percentage of GDP<br />
Agriculture and 57.8 52.7 50.6 48.7 NA NA NA NA 31.3 NA NA<br />
mining<br />
Manufacturing and 14.9 16.4 14.8 14.8 NA NA NA NA 27.0 NA NA<br />
construction<br />
Services 27.3 30.8 34.6 36.5 NA NA NA NA 41.7 NA NA<br />
National<br />
As percentage of GDP<br />
accounts<br />
Investment 30.0 30.3 28.8 23.4 22.6 20.8 21.6 21.5 22.1 33.2 34.8<br />
Private sector 10.9 12.2 13.4 11.8 8.8 6.8 8.3 6.5 5.7 6.3 6.3<br />
Public sector 19.1 18.1 15.4 11.6 13.8 14 12.6 14.5 16.4 26.9 28.5<br />
National saving 22.3 16.2 15.0 12.6 7.3 2.3 6.2 8.9 10.1 6.7 8.0<br />
Public finances<br />
As percentage of GDP<br />
Revenue 34.6 31.9 30.6 29.9 34.6 32.6 33.4 34.9 37.6 37.2 37.5<br />
Expenditure 39.6 42.6 39.1 36.6 48.4 49.1 52.5 48.4 48.6 62.0 62.4<br />
Overall balance (after<br />
grants, including<br />
HIPC)<br />
1.2 -3.0 -4.8 -1.0 -6.0 -7.1 -8.2 -8.7 -4.4 -15.1 -16.9<br />
Balance of<br />
In millions of US dollars<br />
payments<br />
Current account -33 -63 -56 -50 -82 -96 -66 -47 -30 NA NA<br />
balance<br />
Exports, fob 572 591 545 522 503 485 490 508 584 NA NA<br />
Imports 550 591 553 519 550 541 514 525 598 NA NA<br />
Trade balance 23 0 -8 4 -47 -56 -24 -17 -14 NA NA<br />
Capital account<br />
balance<br />
Financial account<br />
balance<br />
618 24 13 16 16 32 31 44 46 NA NA<br />
-563 100 89 43 94 68 50 34 -39 NA NA<br />
External debt<br />
1352 1329 1198 1130 1124 1095 1145 1217 1140 NA NA<br />
Public debt<br />
outstanding (US$m)<br />
Debt service / 14.1 17.0 18.8 12.4 9.7 6.6 8.9 7.5 5.8 NA NA<br />
exports (%)<br />
Sources: IMF, Guyana Statistical Annex, 2001, PRSP 2002, PRSP Progress report 2005, 2006, World Bank, World<br />
Development Indicators, 2006.<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 4 /page 1
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Annex 5 – International Donor<br />
Cooperation<br />
Table - Donors main sectors of Intervention, 1996-2005<br />
In ms of dollars In per cent<br />
VI.0 Action Relating To Debt 330,49 256,38<br />
United Kingdom 276 84<br />
Germany 26 8<br />
Denmark 6 2<br />
I.5 Government & Civil Society 133,19 10,23<br />
IDB Special Fund 66 50<br />
United States 17 13<br />
United Kingdom 17 13<br />
II.3 Energy 114.33 8.78<br />
IDB Special Fund 73 64<br />
United Kingdom 23 20<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> 18 16<br />
II.1 Transport & Storage 105,73 7.83<br />
IDB Special Fund 104 98<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> 2 2<br />
I.1 Education, Total 101.89 7.83<br />
Canada 36 35<br />
IDB Special Fund 30 29<br />
United Kingdom 15 17<br />
IV.3 Other Multisector 68,94 5,29<br />
IDB Special Fund 48 69<br />
IFAD 10 15<br />
United States 7 9<br />
III.1 Agriculture - Forestry - Fishing, Total 64,99 4.99<br />
IDB Special Fund 60.6 93<br />
V.2 Developmental Food Aid/Food Security 58,50 4,49<br />
Assistance<br />
United States 58 99<br />
V.1 General Budget Support 57.09 4,38<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> 41 72<br />
IDA 12 21<br />
Japan 4 7<br />
I.6 Other Social Infrastructure & Services 54.06 4,15<br />
IDB Special Fund 40.45 75<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> 9 16<br />
Canada 3 6<br />
I.4 Water Supply & Sanitation 45,25 3,47<br />
United Kingdom 40 91<br />
Canada 3 7<br />
I.3 Population Programmes 39,46 3,03<br />
United States 18 47<br />
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
IDA 10 26<br />
GFATM 9 23<br />
IV.1 General Environment Protection 29.42 2,26<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> 25 85<br />
Germany 3 11<br />
I.2 Health, Total 28,90 2,22<br />
Japan 12 42<br />
Canada 7 23<br />
IDB Special Fund 6.5 22<br />
III.2 Industry - Mining - Construction, Total 17,53 1,35<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> 11.8 67<br />
Canada 5.7 33<br />
Other 56.59 3,73<br />
Total 1301.36 100,00<br />
Source: OECD, CRS online database on aid activities.<br />
Note: The numbers in front of the codes are a reference to OECD codes.<br />
IDB<br />
Fund<br />
United<br />
Kingdom<br />
Table - Breakdown of the support of principal donors<br />
to Guyana by DAC sector, 1996-2005<br />
Special<br />
<strong>European</strong><br />
<strong>Commission</strong><br />
Transport Storage (28%), Energy (20%), Government & Civil<br />
Society (18%), Other social Infrastructure and Services (11%),<br />
Other Multi-sector (13%), Education (8%), Health (2%)<br />
Action relating to debt (73%), Water Supply & Sanitation (11%),<br />
Energy (6%), Government & Civil Society (5%), Education<br />
(4%), Other Emergency & Distress Relief (1%)<br />
General Budget Support (33%), General Environment<br />
Protection (20%), Energy (15%), Industry Mining –<br />
Construction (10%), Infrastructure and Services (7%),<br />
Unallocated/Unspecified (6%), Other social Government &<br />
Civil Society (6%), Education (1%), Transport & Storage (1%),<br />
Other Emergency & Distress Relief (1%)<br />
United States Development al Food Aid/Food Security Assistance (52%),<br />
Population Programmes (16%), Government & Civil Society<br />
(15%), Other Multi-sector (6%), Business & Other Services<br />
(4%), Action relating to debt (3%), Banking & Financial Services<br />
(2%), Other social Infrastructure and Services (1%)<br />
Canada<br />
Education (42%), Government & Civil Society (20%), Industry<br />
Mining – Construction (7%), Action relating to debt (7%),<br />
Other social Infrastructure and Services (4%), Water Supply &<br />
Sanitation (4%), Banking & Financial Services (2%), Multisector<br />
(2%), Other Multi-sector (2%), Business & Other<br />
Services (1%), Agriculture – Forestry – Fishing (1%)<br />
IDA General Budget Support (24%), Population Programmes (20%),<br />
Other Emergency & Distress Relief (18%), Business & Other<br />
Services (18%), Action relating to debt (10%), Government &<br />
Civil Society (10%)<br />
Germany<br />
Japan<br />
Action relating to debt (89%), General Environment Protection<br />
(11%)<br />
Health (44%), Unallocated/Unspecified (30%), General Budget<br />
Support (15%)<br />
GFATM Population Programmes (76%), Health (24%)<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 5 /page 2
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
IFAD Other Multi-sector (100%)<br />
Netherlands<br />
Agriculture – Forestry – Fishing (43%), Action relating to debt<br />
(57%)<br />
Denmark Action relating to debt (100%),<br />
UNICEF Population Programmes (61%), Unallocated/Unspecified (39%)<br />
France Education (48%), Action relating to debt (52%)<br />
Norway Action relating to debt (100%)<br />
UNDP Other Multi-sector (100%)<br />
Source: OECD, CRS online database on aid activities.<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 5 /page 3
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Annex 6 - Presentation of the Evaluation<br />
Questions<br />
Within the set of eight Evaluation Questions, one question relates to the overall relevance<br />
of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s interventions (EQ 1), four to their effectiveness, impact and<br />
sustainability in specific areas (EQs 2-3-4-5), one to the overall efficiency of the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong>’s interventions (EQ 6) and the remaining two to wider issues relating to crosscutting<br />
issues (EQ 7) and to Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence<br />
(the "3Cs": EQ 8).<br />
EQ 1 - Relevance of the Strategy – This Question concerns the appropriateness of the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy design to the priorities set by the GoG in its development policy.<br />
The criteria of effectiveness, sustainability and impact of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support to<br />
Guyana’s economic and social sectors will be considered through the four main focal<br />
sectors of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s intervention. These questions are closely related to the<br />
expected effects of the 8 th EDF NIP and the 9 th EDF CSP as identified in the intervention<br />
logic.<br />
EQ 2 – Effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the support to economic and<br />
social infrastructure for the protection of coastal belt population – This EQ assesses<br />
how the <strong>Commission</strong>’s activities have contributed to supporting the rehabilitation of sea<br />
defences as a key sector of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy and interventions. The other<br />
infrastructures relating to water and transport are not included since no resources have<br />
been allocated to their rehabilitation. The rationale or otherwise of this situation is<br />
addressed through EQ 1.<br />
Thus sea defences will be regarded as a major sector of <strong>Commission</strong> support, and special<br />
attention will be given to the strategy developed for this sector and to institutional aspects<br />
bearing on investment in, and sustainable management of, sea defence hardware and<br />
software. Ultimately the extent of attainment of the intended specific impact “Livelihoods<br />
and dwellings of coastal belt population are protected” will be assessed.<br />
EQ 3 – Effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the support to the private sector<br />
for restoration of and increase in production capacity – This EQ assesses how far<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> support to SME development has effectively enhanced the competitiveness of<br />
private sector firms and contributed to sustainable private sector strengthening. Ultimately<br />
the question analyses the specific impact of these interventions on increasing production<br />
capacity.<br />
EQ 4 - Effectiveness, impact and sustainability of interventions for improvement to<br />
social conditions – This EQ aims at estimating the extent to which (general or sector)<br />
Budget support contributed to achieving the PRSP objectives, in particular in terms of<br />
improving social and economic conditions.<br />
EQ 5 - Effectiveness and sustainability of the support to Civil Society organisations<br />
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
for the provision of social benefits to local communities – This EQ assesses the extent<br />
to which interventions through the micro-projects programme have contributed to<br />
empowering Civil Society organisations and to improving the socio-economic conditions<br />
of local communities.<br />
EQ 6 - Efficiency of the overall <strong>Commission</strong> Country Strategy – This EQ assesses<br />
the extent to which the cooperation instruments and the financial, human and technical<br />
resources and processes have been used to achieve the required objectives in a timely and<br />
cost-effective manner. The question also addresses the role and commitment of the NAO<br />
Task Force in this respect. Institutional aspects of Strategy implementation will be<br />
considered in the context of the organisational structures of the GoG, the <strong>Commission</strong> and<br />
the project stakeholders. Issues related to institutional development and strengthening of<br />
capacity to overcome the brain drain problem will also be considered in this section.<br />
EQ 7 - Cross-cutting issues – This EQ seeks to address how far cross-cutting issues<br />
related to good governance and human rights, gender, protection of the environment,<br />
institutional development, capacity building and HIV/AIDS have been taken into account<br />
in the design and implementation of the programmes.<br />
EQ 8 – Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence – This EQ aims at<br />
appraising the extent to which the design and implementation of the <strong>Commission</strong> Strategy<br />
in Guyana has been fostered by appropriate application of the "3Cs" principles. Coherence<br />
applies both between <strong>Commission</strong> policies (in particular trade and CAP) and also in<br />
relation to the programmable (NIP, RIP) vis-à-vis non-programmable instruments (Sysmin,<br />
SAF, Budget Lines). Coordination between the <strong>Commission</strong>, the GoG and the donor<br />
community in designing and implementing its Country Strategy is also considered in the<br />
context of enhancing complementarity between the various programmes. In particular,<br />
coordination mechanisms with the IMF, IDB and WB will be considered.<br />
Given the diversity and financial weight of other instruments in the <strong>Commission</strong>’s<br />
interventions in Guyana, after deeper investigation the evaluation team slightly revised the<br />
intervention logic presented in the Inception Report so as to incorporate instruments<br />
unrelated to the planned strategy but designed to set the <strong>Commission</strong> intervention within<br />
the budget of the indicative programme. These other instruments have been taken into<br />
consideration in EQ 8 for their coherence with the identified strategy, and in EQ 6 to<br />
assess their contribution to the overall efficiency of programme implementation.<br />
Furthermore, interventions funded through these ‘non-programmable’ instruments can<br />
also be considered under EQs (3 and 5) concerned with the intervention sectors which<br />
they are specifically supporting, respectively the private sector and the general or sectoral<br />
budget.<br />
Where in-depth investigation of the documentation was found to necessitate unavoidable<br />
revision of the indicators, their replacement or adaptation is mentioned in the following<br />
section.<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 6/ page 2
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Alignment of EQ with Evaluation Criteria<br />
Relevance<br />
Effectiveness<br />
Impact<br />
Sustainability<br />
Efficiency<br />
Cross-cutting<br />
Issues<br />
3Cs<br />
EQ 1<br />
Relevance<br />
EQ 2<br />
Protection of coastal belt population<br />
EQ 3<br />
Production capacity<br />
EQ 4<br />
Social conditions<br />
EQ 5<br />
Social benefits to local communities<br />
EQ 6<br />
Efficiency of implementation<br />
EQ 7<br />
Cross Cutting Issues<br />
EQ 8<br />
Coordination, Complementarity and<br />
Coherence with other donors<br />
The Evaluation Questions in brief<br />
EQ1:<br />
EQ2:<br />
EQ3:<br />
EQ4:<br />
EQ5:<br />
EQ6:<br />
EQ7:<br />
EQ8:<br />
To what extent is the <strong>Commission</strong> Country Strategy in Guyana consistent with the<br />
priorities set by the GoG in its development policy?<br />
To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to the rehabilitation of<br />
Guyana’s sea defences and ultimately to sustainably protecting the livelihoods and<br />
dwellings of the coastal belt population?<br />
To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to private sector strengthening<br />
and ultimately to sustainably restoring and increasing Guyana’s production capacity?<br />
To what extent has <strong>Commission</strong> budget support contributed to the improvement of social<br />
conditions?<br />
To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to empowering Civil Society<br />
Organisations and ultimately to improving the socio-economic conditions of local<br />
communities?<br />
To what extent have the financial, human and technical resources been used to reach<br />
objectives in a timely and cost-effective manner and was the regulatory and administrative<br />
framework appropriate for doing this? To what extent has the support to the NAO Task<br />
Force contributed to reaching objectives in a timely and cost-effective manner?<br />
To what extent were cross-cutting issues related to good governance and human rights,<br />
gender, environment, institutional development, capacity-building and HIV/AIDS taken<br />
into account in the design and implementation of the programmes?<br />
To what extent has the <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana been fostered by the consideration<br />
of the “3Cs” principles?<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 6/ page 3
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
EQ1 : Relevance<br />
To what extent is the <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana consistent with the priorities set by<br />
the GoG in its development policy?<br />
Justification and coverage of the question: This question firstly aims at understanding if and how the<br />
overall and specific objectives and the design of the <strong>Commission</strong> co-operation with Guyana reflect the<br />
priorities of the partner country and adequately addresses the constraints of the country in order for it to<br />
achieve its national objectives. It also examines to what extent the evolution from the 8 th EDF NIP to the 9 th<br />
EDF CSP is consistent with the evolution of the National Strategy from the medium term Policy Framework<br />
Papers geared towards macroeconomic stabilisation, adjustment and consolidation during the first period<br />
under observation, to the focus on poverty reduction in the PRSP during the second period.<br />
Utility: This question on relevance will assess the extent to which the right strategic choices were made at<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> level regarding the priorities expressed in the National Strategy.<br />
Criterion: Relevance.<br />
Feasibility: The question will be answered mostly on the basis of written material. The Question is<br />
challenging as it encompasses different elements of <strong>Commission</strong> support, NIP, RIP, compensation schemes<br />
(esp. Sysmin) and specific Budget Lines, over a ten-year period (with important recent changes in the design<br />
and implementation modalities of some of these instruments).<br />
Judgment criteria<br />
• JC 1.1 - The<br />
<strong>Commission</strong>’s Strategy<br />
objectives are coherent<br />
with those of the GoG’s<br />
medium term policy<br />
strategies<br />
• JC 1.2 – The<br />
<strong>Commission</strong>’s<br />
intervention logic,<br />
programming and choice<br />
of beneficiaries are<br />
coherent with the GoG<br />
priorities in its<br />
development strategy<br />
Sources of information:<br />
• 8 th EDF NIP<br />
• 9 th EDF CSP<br />
• Policy Framework Papers (1996-1998; 1998-2002)<br />
• National Development Strategy (NDS)<br />
• PRSP (2002-2005)<br />
• Sectoral policy documents<br />
• Diagnostic studies<br />
Indicators<br />
• I 1.1.1 – Degree of alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> objectives<br />
(NIP/CSP) to Guyana’s development policy objectives as expressed in<br />
its NDS, the 1996-1998 Policy Framework Paper and the 2002 PRSP<br />
at general level<br />
• I 1.1.2 – Degree of alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> objectives<br />
(NIP/CSP) and Guyana’s sector policy objectives as expressed in<br />
sector policy documents (infrastructure, health, housing, private<br />
sector).<br />
• I 1.2.1 – Degree of alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> priorities (NIP/CSP<br />
and non-programmable tools) and Guyana’s development strategy<br />
priorities as expressed in sector policy documents (infrastructure,<br />
health, housing, private sector)<br />
• I.1.2.2 – Explicit reference in the <strong>Commission</strong> strategic documents<br />
(NIP/CSP and non-programmable tools) to their adherence to the<br />
prioritised public expenditure identified in the medium term<br />
expenditure framework (MTEF) and to the prioritised donor support<br />
identified as required in the medium term.<br />
• I.1.2.3 – Explicit reference in the <strong>Commission</strong> strategic documents<br />
(NIP/CSP and non-programmable tools) to their adherence to<br />
prioritised investment programming<br />
• I 1.2.4 – Explicit reference in the <strong>Commission</strong> strategic documents<br />
(NIP/CSP and non-programmable tools) to their adherence to target<br />
the beneficiaries identified as the target population in Guyana’s<br />
development strategy.<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 6/ page 4
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
EQ2 : Protection of coastal belt population<br />
To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to the rehabilitation of<br />
Guyana’s sea defences and ultimately to sustainably protecting the livelihoods and<br />
dwellings of the coastal belt population?<br />
Justification and coverage of the question: Support to sea defences has been a major feature of the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong>’s cooperation programmes with Guyana since the 4 th EDF and most resources have been<br />
directed towards this in the 8 th and 9 th EDFs. The NIP and CSP justify the large investments in sea defence<br />
structures by the fact that the coastal area (much of which is situated below sea level) houses the majority of<br />
Guyana’s population and sustains much economic activity, in particular rice and sugar cane culture. The main<br />
question pertaining to this highly capital-intensive support relates to the sustainability of the rehabilitated<br />
infrastructures, with particular regard to institutional and financial aspects.<br />
Utility: The question focuses on the effectiveness of the support to sea defence infrastructure and the<br />
sustainability and impact of these infrastructures in the longer term, and also in terms of institutional<br />
improvements.<br />
Criteria: effectiveness, impact, sustainability.<br />
Feasibility: Existing documentation will facilitate adequate coverage of the question relating to sea defences,<br />
including aspects of impact and measures adopted to ensure sustainability. This information will be<br />
complemented by interviews.<br />
Judgment criteria<br />
• JC 2.1 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />
interventions were in line<br />
with the CSP/NIP strategy<br />
• JC 2.2 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />
intervention has contributed<br />
to the rehabilitation of<br />
Guyana’s sea defences<br />
• JC 2.3 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />
intervention has contributed<br />
to the setting up of a<br />
sustainable sea defence<br />
management<br />
and<br />
maintenance system<br />
• JC 2.4 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />
support to infrastructure has<br />
enabled the protection of<br />
livelihoods and dwellings of<br />
the coastal belt population<br />
Indicators<br />
• I 2.1.1 – Degree of alignment of the programme’s IL with the IL of<br />
the NIP/CSP<br />
• I 2.1.2 – Discrepancies between the programmes and the strategy<br />
are explicitly justified<br />
• I 2.1.3 – ‘Impact on livelihoods’ of sea defence programmes has<br />
been well formulated and placed in the IL<br />
• I 2.2.1 – Km of sea defences in critical condition rehabilitated by<br />
the <strong>Commission</strong> interventions as a share of the total no. of km<br />
rehabilitated during the period<br />
• I 2.2.2 – Km of prioritised tranches of sea defences in critical<br />
condition rehabilitated by the <strong>Commission</strong> interventions as a share<br />
of the total no. of km of prioritised tranches rehabilitated during the<br />
period<br />
• I 2.2.3 – The sea defence infrastructure has been constructed in<br />
accordance to the approved design and technical specifications<br />
• I 2.3.1 – The capacity to monitor water levels in view of flood risks<br />
and conditions at the seafront by local stakeholders.<br />
• I 2.3.2 – Number of contingency plans for higher tide levels<br />
• I 2.3.3 – Sea defence management systems and related staff capacity<br />
have been established and are effective<br />
• I 2.3.4 – Sea defence routine maintenance and repair staff capacity<br />
has been established and is effective<br />
• I 2.3.5 – National budget provision for maintenance and operation<br />
of the sea defence systems<br />
• I 2.3.6 – Evidence of beneficiary - in particular household -<br />
involvement in management and maintenance of the established<br />
structures.<br />
• I 2.4.1 – Evidence that the pursuit of maximum impact on the<br />
livelihoods and dwellings of the coastal belt population has been a<br />
selection criteria in identifying the infrastructures rehabilitated<br />
(studies, public consultations)<br />
• I 2.4.2 – Acreage under cultivation in coastal areas protected<br />
• I 2.4.3 – Number of dwellings in coastal areas protected<br />
• I 2.4.4 - Number of very small enterprises or estimated size of<br />
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informal productive activities in coastal areas protected<br />
• I 2.4.5 - Evidence that the value of property and land in the coastal<br />
belt has increased due to greater flood control<br />
Sources of information:<br />
• NIP/CSP<br />
• GoG sectoral strategies<br />
• Programme documents: FA<br />
• Feasibility studies, project documents (financing proposals), project monitoring and completion reports,<br />
project evaluation reports.<br />
• Transport sector strategy<br />
• Transport maintenance plan<br />
• National Sector Policy on sea defences<br />
• Water supply and sanitation strategy<br />
• Water tariff studies<br />
• National budget allocations for infrastructure sector (operating and investment expenditure) 1995-2005<br />
• National Sector Policy on sea defences<br />
• Project completion reports and project evaluation reports<br />
• Living conditions surveys<br />
• Agricultural surveys<br />
• Housing surveys<br />
• Beneficiary surveys<br />
• Interviews with <strong>Commission</strong>, NAO Task Force, GoG, national institutions and companies, private<br />
organisations and entrepreneurs, representatives of the civil society, technical assistance and PMUs<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
EQ3: Production capacity<br />
To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to private sector strengthening<br />
and ultimately to sustainably restoring and increasing Guyana’s production capacity?<br />
Justification and coverage of the question: Under the 8 th EDF, in line with the GoG’s priority of<br />
facilitating private-sector-led growth, the <strong>Commission</strong> proposed support for SME development, in particular<br />
enhancement of SMEs’ ability to face competition in internal and external markets. Implementation focused<br />
on establishment of business advisory services and financial services (funded from Sysmin resources in the<br />
Linden area) and on the setting up and running of a training agency. The evaluation will assess to what extent<br />
these initiatives contributed to strengthening the private sector, taking account of the best practices identified<br />
in PSD Evaluation, what impact they might have had on restoring and increasing Guyana’s productive<br />
capacity, and to what extent the effects achieved (are likely to) last after the intervention 1 .<br />
Utility: The question will seek to assess the effectiveness of the support provided, its impact in the context of<br />
the objective pursued and the actual or likely sustainability of the effects achieved.<br />
Criteria: Effectiveness, impact and sustainability.<br />
Feasibility: The assessment will to a large extent depend on the availability of indicators that allow<br />
measurement of improvements in terms of private sector development.<br />
Judgment criteria<br />
• JC 3.1 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />
interventions were in line<br />
with the CSP/NIP strategy<br />
• JC 3.2 – Interventions in<br />
Guyana are in line with the<br />
best practices identified in<br />
PSD Evaluation<br />
• JC 3.3 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />
support to private sector<br />
development in Business<br />
Development Services (BDS)<br />
has been conducive to<br />
enhanced SME activity<br />
• JC 3.4 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />
support to private sector<br />
development in financial<br />
services has been conducive<br />
to increased SME activity<br />
• JC 3.5 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />
support to private sector<br />
development in training has<br />
been conducive to increased<br />
SME competitiveness<br />
Indicators<br />
• I 3.1.1 – Degree of alignment of the programmes IL with the IL of<br />
the NIP/CSP<br />
• I 3.1.2 – Discrepancies between the programmes and the strategy<br />
are explicitly justified<br />
• I 3.1.3 - Degree of alignment of <strong>Commission</strong> interventions with the<br />
NDS and the National Competitiveness Strategy for Guyana<br />
• I 3.2.1 – Evidence that a methodological procedure has been<br />
adopted to select the areas of intervention to support PSD in<br />
Guyana<br />
• I 3.2.2 – Evidence that the key constraints conditioning success in<br />
the areas of intervention have been addressed<br />
• I 3.2.3 – Evidence that coherence & complementarities between<br />
areas of intervention has been maximized<br />
• I 3.3.1 – Market for business services increased<br />
• I 3.3.2 – Number of local market SME beneficiaries<br />
• I.3.3.3 – Evidence of encouragement of know-how and<br />
technologies & support to cooperation between industry and<br />
scientific research<br />
• I 3.3.4 – Evidence of the impact of BDS on SME competitiveness<br />
• I 3.4.1 – Number of beneficiary SME<br />
• I 3.4.2 – Volume of financing<br />
• I 3.4.3 – Quality of the financing (recovery rate)<br />
• I 3.4.4 – Economic activities targeted by LEAF<br />
• I 3.4.5 – Evidence of the impact of financial services on SME<br />
competitiveness<br />
• I 3.5.1 – Number of beneficiary enterprises<br />
• I 3.5.2 – Number of trained people<br />
• I3.5.3 – Evidence of the impact of training on SME<br />
competitiveness<br />
1 The Desk and Field Phases and the review of the findings of the PSD evaluation led the team to revise some of the<br />
JC and I of EQ 3. The new JC and I will allow the team to better assess the enhancement of private sector<br />
competitiveness through EC interventions as they focus on three areas of interventions evaluated in the PSD<br />
evaluation: business development services, financial services, and training.<br />
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• JC 3.6 – Results achieved by<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> support are<br />
maintained after the end of<br />
its direct support<br />
• JC 3.7 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />
support to private sector<br />
strengthening has<br />
contributed to restoring and<br />
increasing Guyana’s<br />
productive capacity<br />
• I 3.6.1 – Explicit reference in the FA to measures to ensure<br />
sustainability<br />
• I 3.6.2 – Evidence that the benefits continue to be used after the<br />
end of the intervention<br />
• I 3.7.1 – Evidence of increased production capacity and private<br />
sector activity:<br />
- increased number of new firms, including SMEs<br />
- higher employment levels<br />
- higher production levels<br />
- increased volume and value of non-traditional exports<br />
• I 3.7.2 - Evidence of increased private sector investments relative to<br />
public investments<br />
• I 3.7.3 – Evidence of increased private capital inflows (foreign<br />
direct investment and remittances)<br />
• I 3.7.4 – Number of bankruptcy filings and number of new SMEs<br />
per year.<br />
• I 3.7.5 - Existence of new SME-friendly regulations and specific<br />
measures to enhance private sector investments in the productive<br />
sectors<br />
• I.3.7.6 – Testimonies of Guyanese officials on the impacts of<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> support on Guyana’s productive capacity<br />
Sources of information:<br />
• NIP/CSP<br />
• GoG sectoral strategies<br />
• Programme documents: FA<br />
• Sector strategy<br />
• National accounts<br />
• Balance of payments<br />
• Surveys and studies of private sector activities<br />
• Chamber of Commerce and Industry<br />
• Employment data per sector<br />
• Emigration data<br />
• Evaluation of <strong>Commission</strong> support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries, December 2005<br />
• Interviews with beneficiary enterprises & Guyanese officials<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
EQ4: Social conditions<br />
To what extent has <strong>Commission</strong> Budget Support contributed to the improvement of public<br />
finance management and to the improvement of social conditions?<br />
Justification and coverage of the question: The <strong>Commission</strong> extended Budget Support to Guyana under<br />
the 8 th and 9 th EDFs, and whilst implementation modalities evolved from targeted Budget Support to general<br />
Budget Support, all programmes focused on improving public finance management and securing levels of<br />
budget expenditure facilitating improvements in Guyana’s social conditions, especially in health and housing.<br />
The question will assess the extent to which the <strong>Commission</strong>’s Budget Support has succeeded in improving<br />
Guyana’s budgeting planning, systems and scope and whether this has been translated into increased and<br />
sustainable public expenditure levels in the social sectors which have in turn led to improved use of social<br />
services and improved social conditions. The use of Budget Support is also an important tool for<br />
<strong>Commission</strong>-partner dialogue and the evolution of the quality of this dialogue will also be assessed.<br />
Utility: This question addresses the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of Budget Support in attaining<br />
the PRSP objectives.<br />
Criteria: Effectiveness, impact and sustainability.<br />
Feasibility: The effectiveness criteria can be verified at the hand of existing documentation and data;<br />
however, the assessment of impact criteria will depend upon availability of appropriate data. The issue of the<br />
quality of policy dialogue might be difficult to verify for the earlier period because of staff turn-over and<br />
depends very much on the willingness of interlocutors to provide their views on the subject.<br />
Judgment criteria<br />
• JC 4.1 – The use of Budget<br />
Support has enabled the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> to engage in a<br />
dialogue with the GoG<br />
regarding PRSP design and<br />
implementation.<br />
Indicators<br />
• I 4.1.1 – Frequency and quality of meetings between GoG and<br />
DEC on macro-economic, fiscal and poverty reduction strategy<br />
issues<br />
• I 4.1.2 – Evidence of changes in GoG strategy following policy<br />
dialogue with <strong>Commission</strong><br />
• I 4.1.3 – Participation and role of <strong>Commission</strong> in donor-wide<br />
discussions on public finance management issues and PRSP<br />
• JC 4.2 - The use of BS has<br />
contributed to improving the<br />
government’s planning and<br />
budgetary system including<br />
its public finance<br />
management capacity.<br />
• I.4.2.1 - Budget planning has improved and the budget is more<br />
realistic<br />
• I.4.2.2 - The budget is prepared with due regard to government<br />
policy<br />
• I.4.2.3 - The predictability of the budget has improved<br />
• JC 4.3 – BS has contributed<br />
to establishing sustainable<br />
levels of public expenditure<br />
in the social sectors<br />
• JC 4.4 – The GoG is carrying<br />
out planned expenditures.<br />
• I 4.3.1 – Trends in budgeted and realised expenditure in social<br />
sectors<br />
• I.4.3.2 – Funding mechanisms are in place for maintenance and<br />
operation of social infrastructure<br />
• I 4.4.1 – Evolution of external account balance and budget balance<br />
as share of GDP<br />
• I 4.4.2 – Public expenditure outcomes: budget execution in the<br />
social sectors, in particular pro-poor expenditure<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
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• JC 4.5 – Social conditions<br />
have improved<br />
Sources of information:<br />
• GoG Budget and budget execution<br />
• National accounts and financial data<br />
• Central Bank<br />
• Social sector reviews<br />
• PRSP joint donor assessments<br />
• PRSP annual monitoring reports<br />
• Minutes of meetings<br />
• Cost recovery mechanisms in health and education sectors<br />
• Living conditions surveys<br />
• IDD and Associates, Evaluation of GBS, May 2006<br />
• Interviews (<strong>Commission</strong>, GoG-NAO and donors)<br />
• I 4.5.1 – Performance of PRSP indicators measuring access to<br />
health, housing and water such as infant immunisation rates<br />
(measles and DPT), % of population with access to health services,<br />
% of population with access to adequate sanitation, house lots<br />
distributed, land/house titles distributed.<br />
• I 4.5.2 – Quality of available social services<br />
• I 4.5.3 – Living conditions<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
EQ5: Social benefits to local communities<br />
To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to empowering Civil Society<br />
organisations and ultimately to improving the socio-economic conditions of local<br />
communities?<br />
Justification and coverage of the question:<br />
The 9 th EDF CSP identifies MPP as one of the three activities to be financed outside the areas of<br />
concentration. During the period under evaluation, one MPP (9 ACP 1) has been financed and is currently<br />
under implementation. The financing agreement was signed in May 2004 for an amount of €4m for a<br />
duration of 5 years.<br />
The question is closely linked with the intervention logic that stipulates that MPP should first contribute to<br />
empowering Civil Society and subsequently improve the socio-economic conditions of local communities.<br />
The question will examine to what extent the programme is likely to yield the expected results and the role it<br />
has played in providing social benefits to communities.<br />
Utility: MPP is part of the intervention logic of <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana but as the programme<br />
started only recently the assessment will focus mostly on the design and the programming. Effectiveness,<br />
impact and sustainability would only be assessed in respect of their potential.<br />
Criteria: Effectiveness, impact and sustainability<br />
Feasibility: Because the implementation of the MPP is so recent, it is assumed that documentation and<br />
institutional memory are easily accessible. Nevertheless the programme having only started in 2005, only its<br />
potential effectiveness and impact would probably be assessed as it is possible that only small effects will yet be<br />
visible.<br />
Judgment criteria<br />
• JC 5.1 – <strong>Commission</strong> intervention was in<br />
line with the CSP/NIP provision and with<br />
the GoG policy<br />
• JC 5.2 – Local communities have better<br />
access to socio-economic infrastructure<br />
• JC 5.3 – The capacity for self-help of local<br />
communities has increased<br />
• JC 5.4 – Civil Society organisations<br />
participate more in the development<br />
process<br />
Indicators<br />
• I 5.1.1 – Degree of alignment of the programmes IL<br />
with the IL of the NIP/CSP<br />
• I 5.1.2 – Discrepancies between the programmes and<br />
the strategy are explicitly justified<br />
• I 5.1.3 - Degree of alignment of the programme with<br />
the GoG policy<br />
• I 5.4.1 – Clear reference in the programming<br />
document to the promotion of socio-economic<br />
development of local communities<br />
• I 5.4.2 - New socio-economic services are available in<br />
the communities supported<br />
• I 5.3.1 – Evidence that MPP is conceived to be<br />
undertaken at the request of local communities<br />
• I 5.3.2 – Clear reference to participation of local<br />
communities in the programming documents<br />
• I 5.3.3 – Evidence that MPP is based on needs<br />
assessment undertaken by local communities<br />
• I 5.3.4 – Evidence that an adequate level of capacity<br />
building investment has been foreseen in the<br />
programme<br />
• I 5.3.5 – Evidence that local communities benefited<br />
from capacity-building<br />
• I 5.4.1 – Evidence of local development process<br />
weaknesses in policy papers<br />
• I 5.4.2 – Clear reference to this objective in the<br />
programming documents<br />
• I 5.4.3 – Measures to ensure the strengthening of civil<br />
society are in place<br />
• I 5.4.4 - Extent to which the MP-Office/Board<br />
implemented and facilitated MP development and<br />
cooperation with civil society<br />
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• JC 5.5 - Results achieved by <strong>Commission</strong><br />
support are maintained after the end of its<br />
direct support<br />
• I 5.5.1 – Explicit reference in the FA to measures to<br />
ensure sustainability<br />
• I 5.5.2 – Evidence that the benefits continue to be<br />
used after the end of the intervention<br />
Sources of information:<br />
• NIP & CSP<br />
• Project documents (FA, MR, Annual Reports, Internal Monitoring, Evaluation…)<br />
• Interviews with local communities/organisations supported<br />
• Interviews with beneficiaries (population)<br />
• Evaluation of <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> support to Micro-Project Programmes under the <strong>European</strong><br />
Development Fund in ACP countries, August 2006<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
EQ6: Efficiency of implementation<br />
To what extent have the financial, human and technical resources been used to reach<br />
objectives in a timely and cost-effective manner and was the regulatory and administrative<br />
framework appropriate for doing this? To what extent has the support to the NAO Task<br />
Force contributed to reaching objectives in a timely and cost-effective manner?<br />
Justification and coverage of the question: The question aims at assessing to what extent deadlines were<br />
respected and resources used in an optimal manner when implementing the interventions. It also aims at<br />
examining whether the regulatory and administrative framework has been conducive to timely and costeffective<br />
programme implementation. Specific attention will be dedicated to the support to the NAO, as<br />
specific interventions were planned in this respect and the planned activities also aimed at increasing<br />
efficiency.<br />
Utility: The present question is complementary to the questions on effectiveness. Indeed, it is important not<br />
only to determine to what extent objectives have been reached, but also to examine whether or not objectives<br />
were reached at a reasonable cost and within reasonable deadlines. The question is also useful for determining<br />
the role the support for the NAO has played in this respect.<br />
Criterion: Efficiency<br />
Feasibility: Measuring cost-effectiveness is challenging in the absence of precise data. There might be some<br />
difficulties in collecting sufficient reliable data especially for the period 1996-2002. Where quantitative data<br />
are lacking, assessments will be based on qualitative approaches based on evaluations, monitoring reports or<br />
interviews.<br />
Judgment criteria<br />
• JC 6.1 – The institutional<br />
set-up foresees a clear<br />
distribution of roles at each<br />
level of project<br />
implementation,<br />
design to closure<br />
from<br />
• JC 6.2 – The financial<br />
instruments used for<br />
implementation contribute<br />
to reaching objectives in a<br />
timely manner<br />
• JC 6.3 – The institutional<br />
support to <strong>Commission</strong><br />
projects is improved<br />
through the NAO Task<br />
Force<br />
• JC 6.4 – Programme and<br />
projects are implemented in<br />
a timely manner and at<br />
planned cost<br />
Indicators<br />
• I 6.1.1 – Evidence of organizational structure and management<br />
culture through well-defined procedures and job roles in particular at<br />
NAO Task Force level, at DEC level and at project level<br />
• I 6.1.2 – Degree of appropriateness of the organizational structure (in<br />
particular at NAO, DEC and project level) to (i) the country’s<br />
capacity and constraints, (ii) to the <strong>Commission</strong>’s available resources<br />
and (iii) the scope and size of the programmes and projects<br />
• I 6.1.3 – Evidence of emphasis on conformity in the whole<br />
organization in particular at NAO, DEC and project level<br />
• I 6.1.4 – Emphasis on timely and cost-effective management in<br />
particular at NAO and DEC levels.<br />
• I 6.1.5 – Existence of co-ordination mechanisms among<br />
implementation actors (consultations, coordination working groups)<br />
• I 6.2.1 – Number and amount of global commitments and financing<br />
agreements by sector<br />
• I 6.2.2 – Types of financing agreements: number and amounts of<br />
contracts, grants, programme estimates by direct labour operations or<br />
externalised direct labour operations<br />
• I 6.2.3 – Types of procedures laid down in the financing agreements<br />
(i.e. according to financing thresholds)<br />
• I 6.2.4 – Delays and rates of disbursements by financing agreement<br />
• I 6.3.1 – List of new management tools in place in the NAO task<br />
force (retro-planning, support to projects…)<br />
• I 6.3.2 – Perception of NAO Task Force, <strong>Commission</strong> task managers<br />
and programme managers on the effects of the support to the NAO<br />
and on the overall efficiency of interventions, in terms of time<br />
management and cost-effectiveness.<br />
• I 6.4.1 - Average MR efficiency rate<br />
• I 6.4.2 – Project evaluation conclusions on efficiency<br />
• I.6.4.3 – Identification of implementation difficulties that are not due<br />
to deficiencies in financial, human and technical resources or to the<br />
regulatory and administrative set-up<br />
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EGEVAL<br />
Sources of information:<br />
• GoG financial, technical and administrative procedures<br />
• EDF procedures<br />
• Monitoring Reports<br />
• Mid-term, final evaluation reports<br />
• CRIS database<br />
• National counterparts<br />
• Documents from and interviews with the NAO<br />
• Documents from and interviews with the DCE representatives<br />
• Interviews with <strong>Commission</strong> staff (HQ, DEC), NAO Task Force, ministries, projects team leaders<br />
• Interviews with:<br />
- NAO task force<br />
- <strong>Commission</strong> task managers<br />
- <strong>Commission</strong> financial and contract unit of the DEC<br />
- Programme staff<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
EQ7: Cross-Cutting Issues<br />
To what extent were cross-cutting issues (CCIs) relating to good governance and human<br />
rights, gender, environment, institutional development, capacity building and HIV/AIDS<br />
taken into account for the design and implementation of the programmes?<br />
Justification and coverage of the question: The question will cover five issues that the <strong>Commission</strong> has<br />
committed to take systematically into account in its different areas of cooperation. Good governance entails,<br />
according to the Cotonou agreement (art 9.3), “clear decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities,<br />
transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources and capacity<br />
building for elaborating and implementing measures aiming in particular at prevention and combating corruption”. Respect for<br />
human rights is a clear condition of good governance. Gender issues will be considered “as the elimination of<br />
inequalities and the promotion of equality between men and women” (Treaty establishing the EC (Part 1 – Art. 3.2).<br />
Environment issues are related to sustainable development. Institutional development and capacity-building<br />
is clearly recognised as a CCI in the Cotonou Agreement. HIV/AIDS is not a classical CCI but in recent<br />
years mainstreaming of this issue has been taken into account in countries with high prevalence of<br />
HIV/AIDS. (Guyana HIV/AIDS prevalence is relatively high-medium (Population 17-49: 2.4%- 2005<br />
UNDP).<br />
Utility: This question aims to verify the application of CCI in <strong>Commission</strong> interventions in Guyana. The<br />
utility of this question goes further than the Guyanese context given the high potential of the question to<br />
draw out transferable lessons regarding the manner in which CCI have been taken into account during<br />
implementation.<br />
Criteria: Cross-cutting issues<br />
Feasibility: JC 7.1 depends on the availability of programme documentation. As previously mentioned, the<br />
1996-2002 documentation might be not available. JC 7.2 will use information from the ROM obtained<br />
through a specific request to the ROM contractors, as this information appears to be not readily available in<br />
the <strong>Commission</strong>.<br />
Judgment criteria<br />
• JC 7.1 – CCI have been taken into account in the<br />
CSP and the NIP and in the design of<br />
programmes (non-specific interventions)<br />
Indicators<br />
• I 7.1.1 – Extent to which the CSP and the NIP<br />
explicitly promote CCI<br />
• I 7.1.2 – Number of projects per CCI that<br />
explicitly identify measures on CCI at the<br />
project design stage<br />
• I 7.1.3 – Number and list of specific<br />
interventions planned by CCI<br />
• JC 7.2 – Measures identified during design for<br />
inclusion of CCI in non-specific interventions are<br />
in place<br />
• JC 7.3 – Cross-cutting issues have also been<br />
supported by specific interventions<br />
• JC 7.4 – <strong>Commission</strong> interventions have<br />
contributed to advancement of the CCIs in the<br />
country<br />
• I 7.2.1 – Percentage of measures in place as<br />
planned<br />
• I 7.2.2 – Perception of direct beneficiaries of<br />
the CCI<br />
• I 7.3.1 – Number of specific interventions on<br />
CCIs out of all the interventions of the period<br />
• I 7.4.1 – Evolution of respect for human rights<br />
• I 7.4.2 – Corruption rates<br />
• I 7.4.3 – Evolution of gender-friendly policies<br />
and laws<br />
• I 7.4.4 – Evolution of gender-sensitive<br />
indicators (education, health, employment)<br />
• I 7.4.5 – Evolution of environment-friendly<br />
policies and laws<br />
• I 7.4.6 – Evolution of percentage of technical<br />
assistants<br />
• I 7.4.7 – Evolution of HIV/AIDS prevalence<br />
rates<br />
• I 7.4.8 - Testimonies of Guyanese officials on<br />
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Sources of information:<br />
• Treaty establishing the EC (Title XX, art 177, Part 1 art. 3.2)<br />
• Lomé IV Convention (art.4)<br />
• <strong>European</strong> Consensus on Development (3.3 - 101)<br />
• Programme documents (FA, MR, Annual Reports, Monitoring reports)<br />
• Interviews with project managers and staff<br />
• Interviews with Guyanese officials<br />
the linkage of the evolution of the CCI in the<br />
country with <strong>Commission</strong> interventions<br />
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EQ8: Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence with other donors<br />
To what extent has <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana been fostered by consideration of the<br />
3Cs?<br />
Justification and coverage of the question:<br />
This question seeks to verify how far the “3Cs” – Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence - have<br />
been taken into account and what have been the effects of their application or non-application.<br />
On the question of coherence, this question seeks to investigate to what extent the individual elements of<br />
the policy mix implemented in Guyana have been coherent and mutually reinforcing in terms of attaining the<br />
stated objectives of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support to Guyana and to what extent they have affected this Strategy.<br />
This question will investigate the trade agreements (sugar, rice, rum), the CAP policies, the programmable<br />
national and regional financial instruments and the non-programmable financial instruments (Sysmin, SAF<br />
and Budget Lines).<br />
As regards coordination and complementarity, this question seeks to determine whether the <strong>Commission</strong><br />
has used coordination mechanisms (government-donor, government-<strong>Commission</strong> and <strong>Commission</strong>-other<br />
donors) in Guyana to develop a coordinated approach to its interventions at country and sector levels and<br />
whether this has led to complementarity of actions undertaken.<br />
The question covers both programming and implementation (including alignment of procedures, monitoring<br />
and evaluation of the <strong>Commission</strong> interventions).<br />
Utility: The answer to this question will provide insights into the extent to which coherence between<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> policies, and coordination and complementarity with other multi-donor support, have<br />
contributed to improving the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support.<br />
Criteria: Coordination, Complementarity, Coherence<br />
Feasibility: The question is challenging. First it encompasses different elements of the <strong>Commission</strong> policy<br />
mix, including foremost the CAP, trade agreements (sugar, rice, rum), compensation schemes (esp. Sysmin)<br />
and specific Budget Lines, over a ten-year period (with important recent changes in the design and<br />
implementation modalities of some of these instruments). Therefore it is essential to specify clearly the scope<br />
of the question as expressed in the JC and I below. Second, obtaining answers to questions related to<br />
coordination during the design phase relies partly on institutional memory which might be jeopardised by<br />
unavailability of written documentation and high turnover of staff in the earlier period (1996-2000).<br />
Implementation questions will be answered on the basis of written materials (meeting notes, DEC files, MR)<br />
and on interviews.<br />
Judgment criteria<br />
• JC 8.1 – The <strong>Commission</strong><br />
has designed its NIP/CSP<br />
taking full account of other<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> policies and<br />
trade<br />
potentially<br />
Guyana<br />
agreements<br />
affecting<br />
• JC 8.2 - The <strong>Commission</strong><br />
has designed its NIP/CSP<br />
taking full account of the<br />
resources potentially<br />
available under nonprogrammable<br />
support<br />
(namely Sysmin and<br />
Budget Lines) and the RIP<br />
Indicators<br />
• I 8.1.1 – Extent to which the design takes into account the results of<br />
specific analyses of resources available to Guyana under the trade<br />
agreements (sugar, rice, rum) and of their potential uses<br />
• I 8.1.2 – Integration of these potential resources in the GoG balance<br />
of payments projections and financing gap projections<br />
• I 8.2.1 – Extent to which the design takes into account the results of<br />
specific analyses of resources available to Guyana under Sysmin,<br />
specific Budget Lines and the RIP, and their potential use.<br />
• I 8.2.2 – Integration of potential resources available under the<br />
compensation schemes and under <strong>Commission</strong> interventions in the<br />
GoG’s balance of payments projections and financing gap<br />
projections.<br />
• I 8.2.3 – Existence of a dialogue within the different <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Services on the expected impact of the various elements of the policy<br />
mix on implementation of activities and achievement of NIP/CSP<br />
objectives.<br />
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• JC 8.3 – Activities<br />
programmed under the<br />
CSP/NIP have been<br />
redesigned to remain<br />
coherent with actions<br />
implemented under other<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> policies and<br />
instruments.<br />
• JC 8.4 – The <strong>Commission</strong><br />
has built its intervention<br />
strategy in close<br />
coordination with the<br />
GoG and other donors<br />
• JC 8.5 – <strong>Commission</strong><br />
activities are implemented<br />
in full coordination with<br />
GoG and other donors on<br />
interventions in the same<br />
area<br />
• I 8.3.1 – Existence of a dialogue within the different <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Services on the impact of the various elements of the policy mix on<br />
implementation of activities and achievement of NIP/CSP objectives<br />
• I 8.3.2 – Evidence of changes in planned activities and/or scope of<br />
financial intervention under the NIP/CSP following unforeseen<br />
changes in resources or implementation modalities linked to other<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> policies and instruments<br />
• I 8.4.1 – Modalities and quality of <strong>Commission</strong>-GoG dialogue<br />
through the NAO’s office<br />
• I 8.4.2 – Evidence of common understanding of Guyana’s needs<br />
(general and sector) by the <strong>Commission</strong> and other donors, and<br />
particularly of participation in common needs assessment studies<br />
• I 8.4.3 – DEC participation and role in government/multi-donor<br />
consultation processes (general and sector) and in coordination<br />
committees or working groups (government/donor and<br />
donor/donor) at general (macro or PRSP) and sector levels dealing<br />
with programming of donor interventions<br />
• I 8.4.4 – NIP/CSP explicitly refers to other donor strategies<br />
• I 8.5.1 – Evidence of synergies or conflicts between activities<br />
implemented by the <strong>Commission</strong> and those implemented by other<br />
donors and GoG<br />
• I 8.5.2 – Modalities of coordination mechanisms between the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong>, GoG and other donors at implementation level<br />
(meetings, coordination groups, task forces…)<br />
Sources of information:<br />
• Sector strategies: agriculture, mining<br />
• Diagnostic studies of the agricultural sector, esp. sugar, rice and rum production<br />
• Study of projections of resources stemming from trade agreements during the period 1995-2005<br />
• Diagnostic study of the mining sector and projections of Sysmin resources and their use<br />
• Balance of payment projections 1995-2005<br />
• CSP mid-term reviews and addendum to CSP/NIP<br />
• PRSP and MTEF (or budget proposals), sector strategies<br />
• Needs assessments and diagnostic studies<br />
• Programming documents of the <strong>Commission</strong> (NIP/CSP) and other donors<br />
• Minutes of meetings of working groups<br />
• Programme documents (FA, MR, Annual Reports…)<br />
• Interviews with representatives of:<br />
- DG DEV<br />
- Ministries of Finance - Relations with donors<br />
- NAO task force<br />
- Sectoral ministries: Finances, Public Works, Housing and Water Supply…<br />
- Other donors (IDB, WB, UK, Canada, USA)<br />
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Annex 7 – Information matrix<br />
P Nber Source<br />
- - EQ1 To what extent is the <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana consistent with the priorities set by the<br />
GoG in its development policy?<br />
- - JC 1.1 The <strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy objectives are coherent with those of the GoGs medium term policy<br />
strategies<br />
- - I 1.1.1 Degree of alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> objectives (NIP/CSP) to Guyana’s development policy<br />
objectives as expressed in its NDS, the 1996-1998 Policy Framework Paper and the 2002 PRSP at<br />
general level<br />
I 1.1.1<br />
1 - The Guyana Development strategy<br />
The Guyana Development strategy is designed through five main documents: (i) the National<br />
Development Strategy (NDS), (ii) the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), (iii) the National<br />
Competitiveness Strategy (NCS) and (iv) the Guyana Action Plan (GAP) for the sugar sector and the (v)<br />
Public sector Investment Programme (PSIP). The common rationale of these documents in defining the<br />
Guyana Development strategy aiming at the Poverty alleviation in the long-term is to focus on two main<br />
orientations: economic growth on one hand, enhancement of social services on the other hand.<br />
The economic development objectives are both targeted the macroeconomic level through incentive<br />
policies including macroeconomic policy, competition, taxes, and trade policies and the microeconomic<br />
level in fostering the private sector to reach higher productivity, to expand the traditional economic<br />
sectors and to diversify activities to non traditional sectors. Macro-economic support and private sector<br />
development are the two main pillars of the Guyana economic strategy.<br />
The social development objectives are the second main orientation of the global development of<br />
Guyana. These objectives encompass the governance of the country in ensuring that all segments of<br />
society feel that they have an equal stake in the political process. Re-examination of the educational system<br />
and development of the country’s human resources are emphasized as conditions of the economic<br />
development. The PRSP highlights the need to sustain economic expansion within the context of<br />
deepening participatory democracy and access to social services including health, water and housing,<br />
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strengthening and where necessary expansion of social safety nets. The use of resources supporting the<br />
PRSP objectives is ranging from €255m in 2000 to €340m in 2010. The NCS includes policy measures<br />
with respect to education and training, business development services, finance investment and promotion.<br />
The GAP for the sugar sector aims at providing infrastructural and human resources development support<br />
to achieve the regeneration programmes planned in the sugarcane and non-traditional agriculture subsectors<br />
(projects funded up to €23m).<br />
2 - The <strong>Commission</strong> co-operation strategy<br />
The overall objective of the 8 th EDF (1995-2000) was to improve Guyana's production capacity so as to<br />
generate income in a sustainable way and to improve its competitiveness on external markets. The purpose<br />
was to foster Guyana's gradual integration in the regional and world economy. EC funded actions were<br />
concentrated on two focal sectors: economic and social infrastructure and private sector development.<br />
These were the same sectors of concentration as those of the 6th and 7th EDFs.<br />
The overall objective of the 9 th EDF (2002 – 2007) is the reduction of poverty and the promotion of<br />
sustainable development. The two focal sectors are infrastructure (i.e. sea defences and coastal<br />
management) and macroeconomic support. Outside these areas of concentration assistance was<br />
committed to a transport sector study; strengthening the NAO office; a Technical Cooperation Facility<br />
and a micro-projects programme. In addition the EC supported the holding of General and Regional<br />
elections in 2006.<br />
Eventually over the ten year period 1997-2007 of the current evaluation, the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support to<br />
Guyana trough bilateral agreement s was focused on five sectors for a total budget €71m.<br />
1997-2002 2003-2007<br />
STRATEGY<br />
Ū (million)<br />
Ū (million)<br />
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19<br />
1 INFRASTRUCTURES<br />
SEA DEFENCES<br />
21 19<br />
TRANSPORT 8<br />
1<br />
HOUSING<br />
2 PRIVATE SECTOR<br />
3<br />
3 BUDGETARY support<br />
14,9<br />
4 CIVIL SOCIETY support<br />
3<br />
5 PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 1<br />
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1 – Rehabilitation of Social and Economic infrastructure: € 49 million (69%)<br />
Sea defences is the main programme of the <strong>Commission</strong> support; the initial budget allocation defined in<br />
the strategy is €40m, 56% of the total budget. The project objective is, in the long-term, the improvement<br />
of the security of the coastal belt against the dangers of sea incursion and flooding. Two key points are to<br />
be considered for the funds mobilisation. (i) The financial support of this program is highly demanding: as<br />
average one kilometre of sea defences costs approximately €2,8m. Thus 5 km of sea defences<br />
rehabilitation are planned in the 8 ACP GUA 5 programme under the 8 th EDF, compared to the 160 km<br />
of the whole infrastructure and the 40 km recognised to be repaired. (ii) The results of this financial<br />
support are depending on the management capacity of the public institutions involved in the sea defences<br />
investment and maintenance.<br />
Regarding also the social and economic infrastructure, water supply and transportation programmes and<br />
projects were planned in the second instalment of the NIP with a budget of € 9 million.<br />
2 – Private sector and business development: € 3 million (4%)<br />
The <strong>Commission</strong> strategy aimed at two objectives: (i) strengthen competitiveness of private enterprises; (ii)<br />
increase economic growth through development of SMEs and job creation.<br />
3 – Budgetary support: € 15 million (21%)<br />
Poverty Reduction Budgetary support is the second focal sector under the 9 th ED <strong>Commission</strong>-CSP with<br />
an original budget of €14,9m. This PRBS support was provided as non-targeted budgetary support which<br />
in the future could form the basic support mechanism in the social sectors provided Guyana’s continued<br />
eligibility to this aid instrument. The objective is twofold: on the one hand, it is well embedded in the<br />
Poverty Reduction Strategy of Guyana; on the other hand, the front loaded fixed tranches have helped the<br />
Government in covering the budget deficit, decreasing need for external lending and thus facilitating the<br />
GoG to release budgetary means for overall objectives of the development of the country.<br />
4 – Support to civil society organisations: € 3 million (4%)<br />
The CSP objective refers to the social benefits provided to communities with the result to increase<br />
empowerment of civil society organisation to carry out programmes that reduce poverty.<br />
5 – Programme management: support to the NAO office: € 1 million (1,4 %)<br />
The Institutional strengthening of the NAO’s office, initially funded through SASP IV counterpart funds<br />
from the 8 th EDF, was put in place to set up a comprehensive task force team to help the NAO handle his<br />
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increased responsibilities with emphasis on institutional building and local ownership of projects. The<br />
view is to contribute to transparency and improvement of the <strong>Commission</strong> programme design and<br />
implementation. The allocated budget for 5 years is € 1 million.<br />
Guyana’s development strategy<br />
Economic development<br />
<strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy<br />
Economic development<br />
€ million %<br />
> Macro-economic support > Budgetary support 15<br />
> Micro-economic support > Private sector support 3<br />
Social development<br />
Economic and social<br />
infrastrucures<br />
> Sea Defences 40<br />
> Water & transport 9<br />
Social development<br />
> Civil society org. 3<br />
> EC programme impl. 1<br />
71<br />
25%<br />
69%<br />
6%<br />
3 - Synthesis: alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> objectives (NIP/CSP) to Guyana’s development<br />
policy objectives<br />
The <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana, as designed in the NIP 8 th EDF and the CSP 9 th EDF meets the<br />
Guyana’s development policy objectives as expressed in the NDS (2000), PRSP (2002), NCS (2006) and<br />
GAP (2006) to the following extent: :<br />
Economic development<br />
The relevance of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy with the GoG policy development strategy is established<br />
through the budgetary support (macro-economic support of the GoG policy) and the Private sector<br />
support (micro-economic support of the GoG policy) at the extent of 25% of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support.<br />
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I 1.1.2<br />
I 1.1.2<br />
Social development<br />
As far as Sea defences and Transport are infrastructures conducive to social development, 69 % of the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy budget is concerned.<br />
Degree of alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> objectives (NIP/CSP) and Guyana’s sector policy<br />
objectives as expressed in sector policy documents (infrastructure, health, housing, private<br />
sector)<br />
Coherence between <strong>Commission</strong> objectives and Guyana’s sector policy objectives:<br />
The GoG objectives are outlined in the NDS through the listing of 28 intervention sectors.<br />
Two main objectives of the Guyana’s sector policy are met by the <strong>Commission</strong> intervention objectives:<br />
a. The objective n° 2: macro-economic support. First budget of the <strong>Commission</strong> intervention :<br />
€42,5m (43 % of the total committed budget);<br />
b. The objective n° 5: eradication of poverty entailing improvement of productivity and<br />
enhancement of social services. Three sectors of <strong>Commission</strong> intervention cover this<br />
objective and totalise €27,2m (28% of the total <strong>Commission</strong> budget);<br />
Common objectives without significant <strong>Commission</strong> funding concern: Good governance, Environment, Transport<br />
and Development Programme implementation. 6 other GoG objectives are not funded:<br />
JC 1.2<br />
I 1.2.1<br />
I 1.2.1<br />
The <strong>Commission</strong>’s intervention logic, programming and choice of beneficiaries are coherent with<br />
the GoG priorities in its development strategy<br />
Degree of alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> priorities (NIP/CSP and non-programmable tools) and<br />
Guyana’s development strategy priorities as expressed in sector policy documents (infrastructure,<br />
health, housing, private sector)<br />
Coherence between <strong>Commission</strong> interventions and Guyana’s sector policy priorities:<br />
1 The GoG’s development strategy priorities<br />
The Guyana’s National Development Strategy 2001-2010 defines the following priorities:<br />
1. Sound macroeconomic policies and economic management, coupled with creation of incentives<br />
for private sector development;<br />
2. Improvements in transport infrastructure;<br />
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3. Enhancing the role of ICT in the modernization of Guyana:;<br />
4. Strengthening social services through which poverty can be eradicated and productivity improved,<br />
to be achieved through education, health and low-income housing programmes;<br />
5. Reform of public sector institutions.<br />
6. Conservation of Guyana’s environment. Prescriptions are being made for the environmental<br />
monitoring and control of all of social and economic endeavours. The importance of utilising<br />
resources sustainably is also emphasised;<br />
7. Investments in drainage and irrigation systems and sea defences.<br />
8. Development assistance to a specially-disadvantaged group, the Amerindians;<br />
9. Improving inclusiveness, accountability and transparency of central, regional and local<br />
governments.<br />
The main goals of Guyana’s poverty reduction strategy 2 focus on:<br />
• Sustained economic expansion;<br />
• Access to social services including education, health, water and housing;<br />
• Expansion of social safety nets.<br />
To achieve these goals, the strategy rests on seven pillars 3 :<br />
1. Broad-based economic growth;<br />
2. Environmental protection;<br />
3. Stronger institutions and better governance;<br />
4. Investment in human capital, with emphasis on basic education and primary health;<br />
5. Investment in physical capital, with emphasis on better and broader provision of safe water and<br />
sanitation services, farm-to-market roads, drainage and irrigation systems, and housing;<br />
6. Improved safety nets;<br />
7. Special intervention programmes to address regional pockets of poverty.<br />
The National Competitiveness Strategy to Guyana (NCS)<br />
GoG has defined in 2006 the core policies to improve competitiveness through :<br />
1. Incentive policies including macroeconomic policy, competition policy, taxation policy, trade<br />
policy;<br />
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2. Supply side policies, mainly including policy measures with respect to education and training,<br />
business development services, finance, investment and export promotion.<br />
The Guyana Action Plan for the sugar sector (GAP)<br />
The Guyana Action Plan for the sugar sector seeks to generate economic growth by bringing sustainable<br />
improvements in the competitiveness of the sugarcane industry and the non-traditional agricultural subsector.<br />
Its specific objectives are threefold:<br />
1. Expansion and diversification of the sugar cane industry (80% of the funding);<br />
2. Growth and development of specific non-traditional agricultural sub-sectors (6%);<br />
3. Infrastructural and human resource development support to achieve the regeneration<br />
programmes planned in the sugarcane and non-traditional agriculture sub-sectors (4%);<br />
In addition, the GoG’s contribution to the Skeldon project amounts to 10%.<br />
2 - The <strong>Commission</strong>’s support priorities trough interventions and non programmable instruments<br />
The strategy has been subject of evolutions modifying significantly the original design. The use of non<br />
programmable instruments was conducive to important changes even if the general orientations were<br />
maintained.<br />
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STRATEGY S 1997-2002 2003-2007<br />
71 146<br />
INTERVENTIONS I Ū (million)<br />
Ū (million)<br />
93<br />
Non Programmable Instrume NPI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 53<br />
1 INFRASTRUCTURES<br />
SEA DEFENCES S 21<br />
19<br />
40<br />
I 20,53 18,13 39<br />
TRANSPORT S 8<br />
1 9<br />
I 1 1<br />
NPI 0 7th EDF 0<br />
HOUSING<br />
S<br />
I 9,17<br />
9<br />
2 PRIVATE SECTOR S 3<br />
3<br />
I 1,54<br />
2<br />
NPI Sysmin<br />
12,6<br />
13<br />
3 BUDGETARY support S 14,9<br />
15<br />
I<br />
35,18<br />
35<br />
NPI Structural adjustment - Debt relief 19,19<br />
19<br />
4 CIVIL SOCIETY support S 3<br />
3<br />
& good gov. - environment I 0 6,3<br />
6<br />
NPI 2,21 Budget lines 2<br />
5 PROGRAMME manag. S 1 1<br />
I 0 1 1<br />
RICE SECTOR NPI 9¸me RIP<br />
12,93<br />
13<br />
SUGAR SECTOR NPI Budget lin 5,66<br />
6<br />
As a whole € 146m were decided under the NIP/CSP 8 th and 9 th EDF, including the RIP (€ 13m) for the<br />
Rice sector to Guyana and the allocation for the sugar sector at the end of 2006 (€6m). This is twice the<br />
budget designed €71m.<br />
By focal sector, the main changes are the following:<br />
1 – Rehabilitation of Social and Economic infrastructure: € 49m<br />
Sea defences: with the commitment decided at the end of 2007, the whole budget defined in the NIP /<br />
CSP is promised to be used with €38,66m committed.<br />
Otherwise the water supply and transportation programmes planned in the 8 th EDF NIP were not<br />
implemented afterwards. Only a transport study € 0,95m was committed under the 9 th EDF CSP.<br />
But despite the NIP did not mention the housing as a sector to be supported, the low-income housing<br />
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programme under the 8 th EDF –– was decided in October 2002 for a total budget of €9,17m plus €0,12m<br />
from the 7 th EDF. This programme clearly fits into the GoG policy in the social sector in improving<br />
access to affordable housing for low-income groups in Guyana as well as improving quality of settlements<br />
through community participation.<br />
2 – Private sector and business development: € 14,14m<br />
Beyond the 8 th EDF support to the Guyana Training Agency (€1,54m), the private sector received support<br />
under the SYSMIN instrument for the Linden Economic Advancement Programme (LEAP) in Region 10,<br />
approved in 2000 with a budget of €12,6m. LEAP’s objectives are to create conditions likely to attract<br />
new businesses, as an alternative to the bauxite industry in order to increase employment. As a whole,<br />
€14,1m were allocated to the private sector and business development.<br />
Additionally, it has to be mentioned that the <strong>European</strong> Investment Bank also provided support : a €11m<br />
loan for the financing of the Institute of Private Enterprise Development (IPED) for on-lending to small<br />
businesses; a €40m loan allocated to the Caribbean Development Bank; and €32m to other economic<br />
entities (DFL, CLICO, GRENLEC).<br />
3 – Macro-economic support: € 54,37 million<br />
Total commitments for financial aid in the form of budget support (BS) over the period under review<br />
have reached € 39,9 million (including HIPC), of which € 10.2 million originated from the 8 th EDF<br />
Structural Adjustment Facility , € 6.4 million came from the special HIPC fund and the remainder (€ 23.3<br />
million) was programmed as BS under the 9 th EDF (initially € 14.9 million were foreseen under the A<br />
envelope which was increased with € 8.4 million from the B envelope using the FLEX resources for the<br />
2000 and 2001 shortfalls in export earnings). Since end 2006, another € 12 million have been committed<br />
under the 9 th EDF (stemming from the 25% top-up of funds allocated to Guyana on grounds of its<br />
positive mid-term review and positive governance profile), bringing total commitments to budget support<br />
to Guyana under the 8 th and 9 th EDFs to a total of nearly € 52 million, including HIPC. The latest<br />
commitment will serve to bridge the budget support gap in 2007, between the end of the PRBS of 2004-<br />
2006 and the beginning of the new budget support programme to be designed under the 10 th EDF.<br />
Over the period, three BS programmes were implemented, the SAS IV (1998), SAS V (foreseen for 1999<br />
and 2000 but implemented in 2000 and 2001) and the PRBS (2004 to 2006). A sixth SAS programme was<br />
being designed in late 2000/2001 to follow-up from SAS V but it never left the drawing board as<br />
Guyana’s macro-economic situation deteriorated, its reform programme went off track thus precluding<br />
new budget support. Currently a new ‘bridging programme’ is being designed for support to the 2007<br />
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EGEVAL<br />
budget.<br />
The earlier as well as the latest budget support programmes all supported the Government’s budget by<br />
either providing funding for specific budget lines (SAS IV and V) or providing non targeted direct budget<br />
support (PRBS). This change from the earlier Balance of Payments approach (with the use of counterpart<br />
funds for projects) was made possible by the improvements in public service management and<br />
accountability such as the introduction of programme budgeting. By funding specific lines of the budget<br />
and later supporting the budget as a whole, the EC’s budget support programmes thus totally espoused<br />
Guyana’s development objectives as translated into the budget. In conformity with the policy objectives<br />
expressed in the 1998-2001 PFP and the HIPC documents, the <strong>Commission</strong>’s SAS IV and V supported<br />
Guyana’s entire reform agenda, including policies to enhance service delivery in education and health, civil<br />
service reform, public enterprise restructuring, financial and insurance sector modernisation, land reform<br />
and improvements in budget management. In line with overall government policy which emphasized the<br />
implementation of a second generation of reforms after successful stabilisation of the economy, the<br />
priority of SAS IV and V (and later of PRBS) was to contribute to enhancing the efficiency and<br />
effectiveness of public spending by facilitating further reallocation of fiscal resources to priority activities<br />
in the social sectors. The SAS programmes gave particular emphasis to support to the social sectors<br />
(health, education and housing) by :<br />
• targeting the use of counterpart funds to specific budget lines in these ministries’ budgets (mainly<br />
on the maintenance costs of existing infrastructure and on operational costs enabling improved<br />
service delivery) and<br />
• using disbursement conditionalities from the programme agreed with the BWI (PFP) which were<br />
linked to improved budget management, in particular improved budget allocation to education and<br />
health and improved execution of HIPC expenditure.<br />
The PRBS abandoned the targeting of specific budget lines in favour of direct and untargeted budget<br />
support underpinned by the close monitoring of outcome indicators in the health and social housing<br />
sectors as well as in the area of public finance management.<br />
Overall, with the new generation of budget support starting from SAS IV in 1998, the EC thus placed<br />
total confidence in the soundness of the GoG’s public finance management system and in the spending<br />
priorities set by the Government in its public expenditure programme: the EC’s strategic objectives using<br />
the instrument of BS were thus not only coherent with the GoG’s medium term policy objectives but<br />
totally aligned to them<br />
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4 – Support to civil society organisations: € 8,7 million<br />
The purpose of the main programme, the Micro-Projects Programme (MPP), is to improve the socioeconomic<br />
conditions of vulnerable groups through the development of sustainable and participatory selfhelp<br />
schemes; 75 micro-projects at the community level on the area of employment/income generation;<br />
training/education; communication and good governance, strengthening of non-state actors and<br />
establishment of regular and structured dialogue between the government. For duration of five years, the<br />
total amount is € 4.5 million of which € 4,05m from EDF.<br />
Other interventions concern good governance, democracy enhancement and humanitarian assistance for a<br />
total € 2,40m plus actions with budget lines €2,21m for good governance (€0,37m) and environment<br />
(€1,84m) .<br />
5 - Support to the NAO office: € 1 million (1,4 %)<br />
This support is implemented as per the allocated budget for 5 years.<br />
Other actions involving non programmable instruments are the following:<br />
Regional cooperation: Under the 8 th EDF, the Caribbean Regional Indicative Programme (CRIP) is<br />
relevant to Guyana through the Caribbean Tourism approved in 2002, the €70m grant to support rum<br />
producers with the 4-year project started in June 2002, and the Caribbean component of the all-ACP<br />
HIV/AIDS/STIs Programme with CARICOM as implementing agency.<br />
Under the 9 th EDF, the CRIP is mainly supporting the competitiveness of the Caribbean Rice sector. A<br />
diagnostic study and feasibility study of the Caribbean rice industry were carried out in 2002 in view of<br />
increasing the trade competitiveness of rice production, primarily in Guyana and Surinam, and thereby to<br />
contribute to the region’s social and economic development and to prevent socio/economic deterioration<br />
which might occur as a result of the ongoing process of trade liberalisation. The total envelope of the<br />
programme is €23,6m including a financial facility of €10m. The amount to the direct benefits of Guyana<br />
is €12,93m.<br />
Sugar sector: The Government strategy is defined within the ‘National Action Plan on Accompanying<br />
Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries Affected by the Reform of the EU Sugar Regime’. The DG Dev<br />
has prepared the EC Response strategy in support of the Guyana Action plan for the period 2007-2013 :<br />
‘Implementation of accompanying measures for sugar protocol countries’ (27/07/2006).<br />
It contains four objectives:<br />
1. Structural support to production;<br />
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2. Support to diversification, research and development (bio-ethanol, energy saving and other new<br />
technology);<br />
3. Support to infrastructure and human resources and training;<br />
4. Mitigation of harmful consequences from the sugar industry restructuring on the social sector.<br />
The State company GUYSUCO employs over 18K persons and influences the welfare of nearly 120K<br />
persons including employees’ families, Contractors, Suppliers, etc.<br />
The <strong>Commission</strong> response strategy in support of the Guyana National Action Plan for the period 2007-<br />
2013 is to define the onward planning of the accompanying measures and assistance by the <strong>Commission</strong><br />
to the alleviation of the impact of the EU sugar reform. The delivery mechanism will be mainly sector<br />
budget support to the four areas: Structural adjustment of the sugarcane industry; Diversification to nontraditional<br />
agriculture; Training and infrastructure; Mitigation of social impact. A first financing for the<br />
2006 allocation was submitted at € 5.66 m covering the first support to the above four areas.<br />
The emergency needs caused by the January 2005 floods have been addressed by the remaining<br />
€0.7m from the B-envelope (after allocation of €8.4m to budgetary support). These funds were drawn<br />
upon by ECHO and, as such, have not been included in the <strong>Commission</strong> ‘strategic’ support.<br />
3 - Synthesis of the <strong>Commission</strong> interventions regarding the Guyana’s development strategy<br />
The evolution of the <strong>Commission</strong> intervention over the two main programming periods is the following:<br />
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
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GoG' strategy<br />
Economic development<br />
EC strategy (€ million)<br />
Economic development<br />
EC interventions (with Non Pr. Instr.)<br />
1997-2007 1997-2002 2003-2007 1997-2007 %<br />
> Macro-economic support > Macro-economic support 15 19,19 35,18 54,37<br />
> Micro-economic support > Micro-economic support 3 14,14 14,14<br />
> Rice sector 12,93 12,93<br />
> Sugar sector 5,66 5,66<br />
Economic and social<br />
infrastrucures<br />
> Sea Defences 40 20,53 18,13 38,66<br />
> Housing & transport 9 9,29 0,95 10,24<br />
Social development<br />
Social development<br />
> Civil society org. 3 2,3 6,4 8,7<br />
> EC programme impl. 1 0,2 0,9 1,1<br />
71 65,65 80,15 145,8<br />
60%<br />
33%<br />
7%<br />
EC interventions have been completed with non programmable instruments have been geared to meet the<br />
GoG development strategy over the two periods of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support implementation.<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> interventions for the support of the macro-economy, to the private sector and in favour of<br />
social services provided to the civil society are in line with the priorities defined in the NDS and the PRSP.<br />
Other priorities have not been taken into account to the same extent: Good governance, Environment,<br />
Transport, Development Programme support. Nevertheless the rationale of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s strategy is<br />
justified by the size of the financial envelope for EC-Guyana cooperation which entails to focus on 2-3<br />
focal areas in order to avoid a dispersion of funding.<br />
Eventually the <strong>Commission</strong>’s priorities can be compared to the GoG’s priorities defined in the<br />
NDS, the PRSP and also directly expressed to the evaluation team during the field mission:<br />
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
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EGEVAL<br />
<strong>Commission</strong>'s support Ū million Priority GoG development sectors NDS PRSP NCS GAP GoG / Field visit<br />
Budgetary Support 54 1 Macro-economic support 1 1 1 +++<br />
Sea defences 39 2 Infrastructures (eco & social) 7 5 Flooding<br />
Linden-IPED 13 3 Micro-economic support 1 & 9 1 2 2 +++<br />
Regional co-operation progr. 13 4 Rice sector 1 1 ++<br />
Housing 9 5 Infrastructures (social) 4 5 +/-<br />
Accompagnying measures 6 6 Sugar - diversification 1 1 1 ++<br />
MPP 4 7 Civil society support/jobs creation 4 4 -<br />
8&9 NIP projects - Budget lines 3 8 Governance 5 3 ++<br />
Budget lines 2 9 Environnement 6 2 +<br />
Guyana Training Agency 2 10 Education & vocational training 4 4 2 3 Brain drain<br />
Feasibility studies 1 11 Transport 2 5 +<br />
Support to the NAO 1 12 Programmme implementation ++<br />
0 ICT 3 6<br />
0 Assistance to Amerindians 8<br />
Total 146<br />
At large, the alignment of the <strong>Commission</strong> priorities (NIP/CSP and non programmable tools) to Guyana’s<br />
development strategy priorities defined through the NDS and PRSP is effective on three sectors:<br />
Budgetary support, Private sector support, Rice sector support, cumulating 56% of the total EC<br />
interventions. Inversely, the rehabilitation of sea defences is not mentioned as a strategic priority in the<br />
GoG orientations.<br />
During the field mission the following priorities were highlighted<br />
Budgetary support : The PRSP is a very controversial subject in Guyana. PRSP II was supposed to be<br />
produced in 2006 but no outcome in 2007. The same priorities given by the GoG and the <strong>Commission</strong> to<br />
the budgetary support do not infer policy dialogue even if there are communication with sector ministries<br />
(Sugar, Housing and Health). Policy dialogue is not very extensive apart from the health sector where<br />
technical staff, donors, other ministries participate in the thematic group meeting and they can discuss<br />
strategic options because there is a long term plan.<br />
Other element reducing the evidence of the relevance of the <strong>Commission</strong>’s support is the lack of<br />
cooperation regarding the choice of indicators, the choice of TA and the lack of PFM sequenced action<br />
plan.<br />
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Infrastructures : There is a great need for filling the physical gap in infrastructure in roads, sea defences,<br />
harbours, etc.<br />
Flooding<br />
Water management includes flooding from upcountry and storm water as well as inundation from the<br />
ocean. Flooding has been a common feature in Guyana but in areas where population density was low so<br />
flooding from upcountry featured less than inundation from ocean. But floods in 2005 had dramatic<br />
economic and social consequences. It appeared that water management and regulation was needed. The<br />
establishment of the Water management Council was decided and set in motion in the Ministry of Water<br />
and housing in view of instalment by the end of 2007. This Council emerged from the amalgamation of<br />
Guyana Water and Sewer <strong>Commission</strong> and Guyana Water Authority in May 2002.<br />
Sea Defences : EC main focus on sea defences only does not meet GoG interests and priority. The GoG<br />
is carrying on a shift from Sea defences programme to Shore development programme. The issue is to<br />
shift from the management of the Sea Defences line to development of the Costal zone taking into<br />
account all dimensions of the economic, social and environmental aspects of the sustainable development,<br />
including biologic and ecologic solutions. For instance, mangrove replacing sea defences walls and<br />
mangrove as substitute of human activity in the coastal belt. Furthermore the coastal zone development<br />
entails the sustainability of actions in the long run. But this approach appears to be a new orientation<br />
which is not yet finalized.<br />
Brain drain problem : the Guyanese population is decreasing because of brain drain. Human resources<br />
in Guyana are a serious challenge due to massive migration and lack of qualified workers (lack of<br />
vocational and technical training). There is a strong need in Guyana for vocational and technical training.<br />
The GTA project was a well-conceived programme in this respect. But the country is loosing qualified<br />
locals after training, as salaries are often lower than other international agents can pay in the country.<br />
Negative effects are that trained people are leaving the country. Positive effects could be considered when<br />
emigrants support the economy with remittances, investments from abroad and after coming back later.<br />
The Private Sector <strong>Commission</strong> is – in 2007 - putting in place a strategic plan to reverse the brain drain<br />
problem. Without such a strategy, it seems meaningless to finance projects dealing with vocational and<br />
technical training. Within this strategy, the institutional strengthening is in all sectors and especially for<br />
socio-economic infrastructures and the agriculture sector.<br />
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Rice sector<br />
The Rice sector has to be regarded from a social point of view in focusing on consequences of the sector<br />
decline especially for small holders; Four components of the Ec support to Guyana through CRIP : (i) TA<br />
: €1,8m; (ii) water rehabilitation : €3,2m ; (iii) Financial facility : €6,5m; (iv) training €190,000 ;<br />
The Water rehabilitation is a public sector issue connected to the overall water management issues in<br />
Guyana. The primary areas identified for technical assistance involved Research & development and<br />
Marketing. The principal external markets identified for penetration were in the Caribbean region.<br />
Poverty Alleviation was a primary social factor identified for resuscitation in the rice sector especially<br />
through financial injection among the small farmers. But the Government approach to Poverty Alleviation<br />
was being questioned. The larger Farmers/Millers seem to believe that the bulk of the financing should be<br />
given to them for fuller utilization of existing acreage and for them to provide satellite farming support to<br />
the outputs of the small farmers.<br />
I.1.2.2<br />
I.1.2.2<br />
I.1.2.3<br />
Sugar Sector: the GoG priority is highly political and justified for social considerations.<br />
The relevance of the GoG strategy relies on institutional feasibility and of Government capacities to have<br />
the full command of reforms with due consideration of internal constraints/potentialities and external<br />
threats/opportunities. The Sugar sector contributes to 18% of the GDP and 55% of the agricultural<br />
GDP,has direct consequences on the social sector and infrastructure.<br />
Restructuring and privatizing Guysuco is impossible to circumvent to foster the private investment in the<br />
sugar sector and to increase productivity and profitability. Restructuring is also needed to overcome the<br />
drastic cut pricing: 5% reduction price has already being supported. The EU ‘compensation’ (€160 )<br />
represents 36% of the total estimate of the cut pricing consequences (€440m)<br />
Explicit reference in the <strong>Commission</strong> strategic documents (NIP/CSP and non-programmable<br />
tools) to their adherence to the prioritised set of public expenditure identified in the medium term<br />
expenditure framework (MTEF) and to the prioritised required donor support identified as<br />
required in the medium term<br />
The BS FAs do not explicitly refer to prioritised set of public expenditure but BS is implicitly focusing on<br />
nothing else but the prioritised set of expenditure, especially as from the PRBS 2004-2007 onwards. BS<br />
provides supplementary funds for the budget in the medium-term with the aim of facilitating the<br />
reallocation of fiscal resources to priority activities; even in the earlier BS programmes where particular<br />
priority budget line items were targeted for support, fungibility of funds allows for improved room of<br />
manoeuvre for GoG’s reallocation of funds to priority areas<br />
Explicit reference in the <strong>Commission</strong> strategic documents (NIP/CSP and non-programmable<br />
tools) to their adherence to prioritised investment programming<br />
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I.1.2.3<br />
I 1.2.4<br />
I.1.2.4<br />
The NIP refers to the GoG programming in general wording which does not express specific<br />
adherence to prioritised investment programming. The CSP is clearly designed with due<br />
consideration of the NDS and of the PRSP and special reference to the HIPC. The sections<br />
related to ‘Economic situation’, Trade policies and Trade relations’, ‘Social situation’,<br />
‘Sustainability of current policies’ and ‘Medium term challenges’ provide analysis giving evidence<br />
of adherence to prioritised investment programming.<br />
Explicit reference in the <strong>Commission</strong> strategic documents (NIP/CSP and non-programmable<br />
tools) to their adherence to target the beneficiaries identified as the target population in Guyana’s<br />
development strategy<br />
In all the Structural Adjustment Support programmes (SAS) as well as in the later Poverty<br />
Reduction Budget Support Programme, the beneficiaries are very clearly targeted as the poor,<br />
most vulnerable population. Whereas the first SAS target improved access to and delivery of<br />
basic social services in education, health and social housing, the more recent PRBS focuses<br />
attention on health and social housing.<br />
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8ACP<br />
GUA 005,<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA 11<br />
FA,<br />
Evaluation<br />
report, NIP<br />
EQ2<br />
JC 2.1<br />
I 2.1.1<br />
I 2.1.1<br />
To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to the rehabilitation of Guyana’s<br />
sea defences and ultimately to sustainably protecting the livelihoods and dwellings of the<br />
coastal belt population?<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> interventions were in line with the CSP/NIP strategy<br />
Degree of alignment of the programmes’ IL with the IL of the NIP/CSP<br />
The <strong>Commission</strong> carried out one main programme in the sea defences field under the 8 th EDF NIP: the<br />
8 ACP GUA 5. The <strong>Commission</strong> programme IL is congruent with the IL of the CSP/NIP strategy.<br />
The overall objective of the 8 ACP GUA 5 programme is i) the improvement of living conditions of<br />
coastal zone population, ii) the stimulation of economic growth and iii) the reduction of poverty. It<br />
contributes to the overall impact of the 8 th EDF NIP: the enhancement of a sustainable economic and<br />
social development.<br />
The purpose of the programme is the improvement of long term security prospects of the coastal zone<br />
against sea water incursion and is and is in line with the outputs of the 8 th EDF NIP (sea defences<br />
rehabilitated).<br />
The results of the programme consist in the re-establishment of structural integrity of sea defences<br />
(reconstruction of 5km of sea defences), the improved capacity of the SRDD, the increased involvement<br />
of the coastal belt population in the sea defences sector and are therefore in line with the activities of the<br />
8 th EDF NIP (renovation of essential coastal equipment).<br />
Under the 9 th EDF, a new sea defences programme decided in 2007 will pursue the 8 th EDF NIP<br />
orientations. The results of the programme focus on : Reduction of the length of the sea wall which is<br />
classified as ‘in critical condition’ (estimated 20 km) by approximately 40 % thus providing protection to<br />
housing and agricultural land and the setting-up of a sustainable (Sea defence) management system<br />
(Institutional Capacity Building), and on the development of contingency plans for higher tide levels due<br />
to global warming.<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
CSP/NIP,<br />
FAs, reports<br />
I 2.1.2<br />
I 2.1.2<br />
Discrepancies between the programmes and the strategy are explicitly justified<br />
There are no discrepancies between the programmes and the <strong>Commission</strong> strategy.<br />
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9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
I 2.1.3 ‘Impact on livelihoods’ of Sea defence programmes has been well formulated and placed in the<br />
IL<br />
FAs I 2.1.3 ‘Impact on livelihood’ is identified in the IL at the level of OO, not at the level of Purpose or Result. As<br />
a consequence ‘Impact on livelihood’ is not specified and only used as a general condition without<br />
reference to beneficiary and resource base.<br />
FAs,<br />
CSP/NIP,<br />
Haskoningevaluation<br />
Training<br />
programme,<br />
JC 2.2<br />
I 2.2.1<br />
I 2.2.1<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> intervention has contributed to the rehabilitation of Guyana’s sea defences<br />
Km of sea defences in critical condition rehabilitated by the <strong>Commission</strong> interventions as a<br />
share of the total km rehabilitated during the period<br />
Sea defence and coastal management is a priority area in Infrastructural development. From desk work<br />
at SRDD during the mission an overview was composed over the past 10 years regarding all works done<br />
(EDF 8,9-Euro 20 million)<br />
Nature of<br />
Work<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
of 6.2km sea<br />
defence<br />
Structures at<br />
Region 2 & 3<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
of Sea Defence<br />
Structure<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
of Sea Defence<br />
Structure<br />
Construction<br />
of Sea Defence<br />
Structure<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
of Sea Defence<br />
Structure<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
of Sea Defence<br />
Structure<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
of Sea Defence<br />
Structure<br />
Remedial<br />
works to Sea<br />
Location Year Sea<br />
Defence<br />
District<br />
• Anna<br />
Regina/Henrietta<br />
• Land of Plenty<br />
• Le Destin/Ruby<br />
• Barnwell/Vergenoegen<br />
• La Jalousie/Windsor<br />
Forest<br />
No. 76/77 Village<br />
Corentyne, Berbice<br />
No. 78 Village Corentyne,<br />
Berbice<br />
Mon Repos East Coast<br />
Demerara<br />
1996 No.1<br />
No. 1<br />
No. 4<br />
No. 4<br />
No. 4<br />
Length Cost G$ Contractor Donor<br />
Agency<br />
1.4km<br />
1.3km<br />
1.1km<br />
1.3km<br />
1.1km<br />
1,655,541,078 Pac - Gelfi EU<br />
1996 No. 8 400m 137,585,055 Gyu Co IDB<br />
1997 No. 8 640m 176,758,979 Guy Co IDB<br />
1997 No. 5 375m 124,216,432 BK Int. IDB<br />
Aberdeen Essequibo Coast 1998 No. 1 200m 52,596,980 Sammic Civil<br />
Work<br />
Taymouth Manor<br />
Essequibo Coast<br />
Devonshire Castle –<br />
Essequibo Coast<br />
IDB<br />
1999 No. 1 350m 116,807,117 Falcom IDB<br />
2000 No. 1 100m 83,459,740 Guy Co IDB<br />
Henrietta Essequibo Coast 2000 No. 1 200m 51,098,410 Guy Co EU<br />
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Defence<br />
Structures<br />
Remedial<br />
works to Sea<br />
Defence<br />
Structures<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
of 1.7km of<br />
Sea Defence<br />
Structure<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
of Sea Defence<br />
Structure<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
works<br />
Sea Defence<br />
Construction<br />
Works<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
works to Sea<br />
Defence<br />
Structure<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
works to Sea<br />
Defence<br />
Structure<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
works to Sea<br />
Defence<br />
Structure<br />
Construction<br />
of Sea Defence<br />
Structures<br />
Institutional<br />
Capacity<br />
Building<br />
Activities<br />
- Surveys,<br />
Data,<br />
Management,<br />
Modelling,<br />
Structural<br />
Analysis,<br />
Mangrove<br />
Management,<br />
Strategy &<br />
Master Plan<br />
Aberdeen Essequibo Coast 2000 No. 1 200m 65,358,153 BK Int IDB<br />
• Good Hope<br />
• Reliance<br />
Montrose East Coast<br />
Demerara<br />
Cornelia Ida – West Bank<br />
Demerara<br />
Mon Repos – East Coast<br />
Demerara<br />
Stanleytown – West Bank<br />
Demerara<br />
Hague – West Bank<br />
Demerara<br />
Veregenoegen – West<br />
Bank Demerara<br />
Bel Air Mon Chosi – West<br />
Coast Berbice<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
No. 1<br />
Georgetown 2005 Head<br />
Office<br />
600m<br />
1,100m<br />
658,003,239 BK Int. IDB<br />
2001 No. 5 40m 19,483,575 BK Int. IDB<br />
2001 No. 4 220m 91,818,821 BK Int. Inc. IDB<br />
2001 No. 5 290m 118,910,812 BK Int. Inc. IDB<br />
2002 No. 4 290m 175,010,819 BK Int. Inc IDB<br />
2002 No. 4 310m 164,030,468 BK Int. Inc IDB<br />
2002 No. 4 330m 165,901,673 BK Int. Inc IDB<br />
2002 No. 7 2.1km 955,792,061 BK Int. Inc CDB/WB<br />
To-date<br />
payment<br />
393,708,377<br />
Royal Haskoning<br />
(Netherlands)<br />
EU<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 3
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Quality<br />
Control for<br />
Main ICBA<br />
Contract<br />
2005 Head<br />
Office<br />
To –date<br />
Payment<br />
16,901,626<br />
Rogan Associates<br />
Ltd - Niras<br />
EU<br />
Construction<br />
of Sea Defence<br />
Rip Rap<br />
Profit Foulis Belladrum –<br />
West Coast Berbice<br />
2006 No. 7 1.8km To – date<br />
Payment<br />
828,488,994<br />
BK International<br />
CDB/WB<br />
Supervision of<br />
Sea Defence<br />
Construction<br />
Works<br />
Profit Foulis Belladrum –<br />
West Coast Berbice<br />
2006 No. 7 1.8km To – date<br />
Payment<br />
98,388,000<br />
CEMCO<br />
CDB/WB<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
of 4km Sea<br />
Defence rip<br />
rap structure<br />
• Capoey/Columbia-<br />
Region 2<br />
• Tuschen – Region 3<br />
• Menten – Meer<br />
Zorg/De Kindren<br />
Region 3<br />
• Hague – Region 3<br />
Ongoing No. 1<br />
No. 4<br />
No. 4<br />
No. 4<br />
2,030m<br />
619m<br />
950m<br />
1,005m<br />
To –date<br />
Payment<br />
1,896,413,477<br />
BK<br />
International/Gelfi<br />
Transportation.<br />
EU<br />
Supervision of<br />
Sea Defence<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
Works<br />
• Capoey/Columbia-<br />
Region 2<br />
• Tuschen – Region 3<br />
• Menten – Meer<br />
Zorg/De Kindren<br />
Region 3<br />
• Hague – Region<br />
Ongoing No. 1<br />
No. 4<br />
No. 4<br />
No. 4<br />
2,030m<br />
619m<br />
950m<br />
1,005m<br />
To –date<br />
Payment<br />
95,725,514<br />
E&A<br />
Consultant/DHV<br />
Environment<br />
EU<br />
Institutional<br />
Capacity<br />
Building<br />
Activity –<br />
Bridging<br />
Phase<br />
Ongoing<br />
Head<br />
Office<br />
To date<br />
Payment<br />
41,759,604<br />
EU<br />
The above information covering 1996 to 2005, was obtained from SRDD but could not be verified with<br />
other internal sources in SRDD and/EC Delegation. It may be summarised as follows:<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 4
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Donor agency Sea defence works Organisational capacity<br />
development<br />
EC 11,004 metres 2005: ICD Haskoning<br />
2005: Quality control Rogan<br />
Ass.<br />
2004: ICB ongoing<br />
CDB 5,700 metres<br />
IDB 5,445 metres<br />
The EC funded ICB components, including training of staff has been well implemented. However, the<br />
newly qualified staff, and or new skills could not be retained in the SRDD organisation as other<br />
employers were able to offer better working conditions and literally all trained and capacitated left the<br />
organisation. As a consequence the capacity of SRDD has not been strengthened.<br />
Although efforts were made to obtain information about the spending by GoG itself on construction of<br />
sea defence works no figures could be obtained in the end. In the SRDD 4-year budget 2004-’08 no<br />
figures could be found on new works. On maintenance it was derived that G$ 943.770.608 (or Euro<br />
3,390,771) was reserved.<br />
I 2.2.2<br />
Km of prioritised tranches of sea defences in critical condition rehabilitated by the <strong>Commission</strong><br />
interventions as a share of the total km of prioritised tranches rehabilitated during the period<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
FAs, CSP-<br />
NIP, MRs,<br />
JAR’05(draft),<br />
Agrifor-C,<br />
I 2.2.2<br />
Works component is planned to cover the lengths of sea wall which is classified as in critical condition<br />
will be reduced with 5 kms. The total length of sea defence structure, either natural or constructed is<br />
quoted as extending to approx. 425 kms (Waine River to Corentyne River). The total length of sea wall<br />
in critical condition is quoted different in different reports. In the appraisal studies for the 8 th EDF<br />
(1998) it is mentioned 30 to 40 kms and confirmed by verbal information in SRDD.<br />
Despite foreign funded reconstruction works over the last decade and a half the critical lengths has<br />
remained the same. This may be explained by the limited routine repair and maintenance works which<br />
has found place by SRDD. With reference to section I. 2.2.1, there is evidence that the objective to<br />
rehabilitate 5 kms of sea defence has been achieved.<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 5
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
Final Design<br />
Report,<br />
Detailed Design<br />
and Preparation<br />
of Tender<br />
Documents of<br />
the Works,<br />
Supervision and<br />
supply on the<br />
Guyana’s Sea<br />
Defence (8 th<br />
EDF)<br />
November<br />
2004, Field<br />
mission<br />
I 2.2.3<br />
I 2.2.3<br />
The sea defence infrastructure has been constructed in accordance to the approved design and<br />
technical specifications<br />
The design work for EDF 8 has been approved by SRDD and DHV. The current design is locally<br />
known as ‘rip-rap’ whereby the embankment body dimensions are determined after soil stability analysis.<br />
The embankment sloops are covered with natural rocks (boulders) which reduce the impact of dynamic<br />
energy of the waves on the banks. Drawings are adequately detailed and available. According to the<br />
design the crest level of the embankments has been fixed to 18.80 metres. At the time of the field trip it<br />
was suggested that at the completed sections the current crest level was 18,80 metres. At several places<br />
visited, e.g. near Den Amstel, at Richmond, it was observed that during high tide considerable<br />
overtopping occurs which lead to erosion at the land side of the embankment.<br />
According to the final design report (2004) “with regard to the crest level, due to the partially unfavourable soil<br />
characteristics and the danger of collapse of the structure, it has been suggested that the effective crest level should be initially<br />
kept at a lower level, until at a later stage, the conditions allow to be raised to the appropriate level. With this concept in<br />
mind, the initial design life of the crest level shall be lower than the service life time in the structure. It was suggested to<br />
adopt an initial 10 year design life for the crest level and wave overtopping and then extend it to the 30-years.”<br />
In follow up discussions the following information was obtained from DHV, the monitoring firm:<br />
Current crest levels:<br />
‐ Region 2: (Essequibo Coast) Crest level at +18.60 mGD; embankment at 18.30 mGD. Slope<br />
1:3, no berm)<br />
‐ Region 3: Tuschen: crest level at 18.80 mGD, embankment at 18.55 mGD, slope 1:3, no berm;<br />
‐ Region 3: DeKinderen: near fishing village): West of sluice: low crest construction in the zone<br />
in front of the mocha mocha bush and balck sand. Crest level of low crest structure 17.00m-<br />
17.40mDG, embankment: 17,40 mGD. East of Sluice primary sea defence crest levelat<br />
18.00mGD. Secondary dea defence structure crest level at 18.00 m<br />
‐ Hague: crest level at 18.80 mGD, embankment at 18.55 meter, slope 1:3, berm of 4 meters at<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 1
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
4.00 mGD<br />
‐ Blankenburg at 18.70 mGD, embankment at 18,70mGD slope 1:4, berm of 5 meters at 16,40<br />
meters;<br />
‐ According to the information the current crest levels include an expected sea water rise of 20<br />
centimeters over the next 15-20 years.<br />
‐ The above indicates that the current crest level is the final crest level at this stage and if needed<br />
additional workswill have to be done in the years to come to reduce or stop the overtopping of<br />
the waves and hence erosion. There is however no information about availability of additional<br />
funds to increase the level of the crest;<br />
‐ DHV states that the current erosion results from the lack of vegetation of the embankment<br />
structure and the limited setting of the surface and due prone to erosion;<br />
‐ All repairs will be done before the contractors completes the works;<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
AGRIFOR:<br />
Elaboration<br />
study: final<br />
propject<br />
proposal<br />
0104<br />
MMcDonald:<br />
Feasiblity<br />
study, Final,<br />
0806<br />
JC 2.3<br />
I 2.3.1<br />
I 2.3.1<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> intervention has contributed to the setting up of a sustainable sea defence<br />
management and maintenance system<br />
The capacity to monitor water levels in view of flood risks and conditions at the seafront by<br />
local stakeholders.<br />
According to GoG/<strong>Commission</strong> planning there is room for stakeholders to be involved in the planning<br />
and also implementation of the functions of the sea defence.<br />
At Sea defences policy level priorities are expressed in the NDS, PRSP, MDG, PSIP. Each document,<br />
at the basis of flood protection, has in a varying degree a focus on the involvement and on the<br />
functioning of the local –beneficiary- structure. The NDS (1993-2000) places great emphasis on<br />
maintenance capacity, management of mangrove forests and establishment of sea defence maintenance<br />
tax. PRSP does by nature is focussed at the social and economical domain of the beneficiaries and needs<br />
further development to bring it to the local structures for instance building maintenance and/or<br />
observer capacity to participate in the programme.<br />
The Sea defences legislative framework incl. the Sea Defences Act (2), the Environmental Protection<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 2
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Act and the Drainage and Irrigation Act. The SDA -1998 version- enables the government to create Sea<br />
defences districts, develop central and decentralised maintenance capacity, regulate offences and<br />
imposition of penalties, etc. The EPA provides the establishment of semi-autonomous bodies, including<br />
local level, and coordinates an integrated coastal zone management programme. A number of reports<br />
mentions the overexploitation of the mangrove vegetation, by the government, local communities and<br />
external players and the role local communities could play to prevent for overexploitation.<br />
Key institutions are the Ministry of Public Works and Communication, Sea Defence Board, SRDD,<br />
Environmental Protection Agency and others.<br />
In the field few local dwellers were met. It appeared that neither the Neighbourhood Democratic<br />
Council nor the locally based SRDD office have been involved with the project cycle of the project. In a<br />
statement of the Minister of Public Works and Communication it was also foreseen that the<br />
beneficiaries would be involved in monitoring of the sea defence infrastructures in terms of basic<br />
maintenance and the measuring of water levels. This has not yet been followed up.<br />
Experience in other developing countries has shown that local communities, provided their leaders have<br />
access to formal structures and the programmes are of benefit to them, are interested to participate in<br />
flood control programmes, proper usage of flood prevention systems through local CBOs/structures. It<br />
should be noted that in documents available, including the latest planning documents (MMDonald),<br />
linkage of the formal and informal structures has not been worked out in detail.<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
MMcDonald,<br />
9 th EDF,<br />
CSP ’02-’07,<br />
Haskoning<br />
ICB<br />
evaluation<br />
2005<br />
MRs,<br />
Haskoning,<br />
ICB<br />
I 2.3.2<br />
I 2.3.2<br />
I.2.3.3<br />
I 2.3.3<br />
Number of contingency plans for higher tide levels<br />
Floods Contingency planning is mentioned in the CSP ’02-’07 as a ‘major intervention’. It has been<br />
included in different training programmes. At the level of SRDD there was no information of<br />
Contingency planning updated or applied from the input provided in the EDF 7,8 capacity development<br />
programme.<br />
Sea defence management systems and related staff capacity have been established and are<br />
effective<br />
The national policy and legislative framework are adequate. But the institutional framework is not<br />
supportive and hampers the efforts of the Sea Defence Board and of the SRDD to carry out their<br />
functions adequately.<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 3
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
GUA 005<br />
evaluation<br />
2005, Agrifor,<br />
0104,<br />
MMcDonald<br />
0806, FA<br />
EDF IX,<br />
Sea defences management hinges on two major components, which are, firstly, the organisational<br />
structure and required functions and secondly the availability of human resources to fulfil the tasks.<br />
Currently the Sea Defence Board has a number of recognised weaknesses (e.g. unclear allocation of<br />
responsibilities and duplication with the Min.PW & Comm, too large and a diverse membership, no<br />
direct access to funding and bank accounts, no internal annual planning and reporting, lack of a<br />
permanent secretariat, etc.) The SRDD, which is supposed to be the operations arm from SDB shows a<br />
large number of weaknesses (MMcDonald) which prevent it from being to a reasonable extend<br />
operational. Over and above there is a consensus in the documentation that the department gained little<br />
from the extensive training programmes under 8 th , 9 th EDF as most documents indicate that trained<br />
staff left the department for other lucrative employment outside government quite soon after being<br />
trained.<br />
In the sequence of 5 MR over the period 2001-’06 the above is confirmed and there is a general trend in<br />
the area of ICB of limited delivery at Result and OO level. In the MR the project scores well in<br />
Relevance but increasing low in Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability.<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
Guyana National Water Board<br />
Currently, a National Water Board is being established within the Ministry of Water and Housing. It is<br />
composed of experts in the water sector. This is an advisory group and it was due to be appointed by<br />
the minister in December 2007. The first mandate of Board will be to to draft a national water policy.<br />
The key question will be whether this Board will also be equipped with an executive secretariat.<br />
Following the National Water policy it is most likely that the Board will be tasked with the restructuring<br />
of the water and sanitation sector in Guyana.<br />
I 2.3.4 Sea defence routine-maintenance and repair staff capacity has been established and is effective<br />
CSP/9 th EDF I 2.3.4 Actual procedures and conduct of maintenance work at the sea defence structures is in the<br />
documentation limited reported or virtually absent. Funding of routine maintenance is from a GoG<br />
allocation for emergency works included in the annual budget estimates. Most of these funds are used<br />
for repair stead of –sustainable- maintenance.<br />
The concept of sustainable maintenance is not –yet- applied although stressed in all documents. As the<br />
maintenance requirement of most of the new structures is limited GoG has insufficiently provided<br />
procedures, budget and HR as note above. The lack of Maintenance is facilitated by a –natural?-<br />
reduction of sea water incursions and inundations over the past period. In the medium and longer term<br />
it must be expected however that serious periodic inundation will occur if long term maintenance policy,<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 4
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
9 ACP<br />
GUA<br />
005/8ACP<br />
GUA 005<br />
MMcDonald,<br />
CSP/NIP<br />
8 th EDF<br />
NIP,<br />
MMcDonald<br />
MMcDonald,<br />
CSP/NIP,<br />
FA<br />
I 2.3.5<br />
I 2.3.5<br />
I 2.3.6<br />
I 2.3.6<br />
JC 2.4<br />
I 2.4.1<br />
I 2.4.1<br />
annual funding and financial reservation form internal and external sources and sustainable technical<br />
maintenance capacity is developed in the organisation is not put in place. Effective sustainable<br />
maintenance will reduce also frequent and sizeable repairs.<br />
National budget provision for maintenance and operation of the sea-defence systems<br />
Currently budgeting for sustainable maintenance, whereby local structures and beneficiaries play a role is<br />
extremely limited. With the development of sustainable maintenance capacity on the short/long term<br />
considerable expenditure resulting from inundations will be prevented. Against these savings for damage<br />
repair and rehabilitation it may be expected GoG to provide for reservations from internal as well as<br />
external sources and a medium to long term maintenance plan.<br />
Evidence of beneficiary - in particular household - involvement in management and<br />
maintenance of the established structures<br />
The 8 th EDF NIP explicitly mentions that it will “foster active participation of the coastal belt<br />
population to the maintenance of the coastal equipments and to the protection of the sea coast. There is<br />
however no participation of the local decentralised government structures in the operation and<br />
maintenance of the sea defences works.<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> support to infrastructure has enabled the protection of livelihoods and dwellings<br />
of the coastal belt population<br />
Evidence that the pursuit of maximum impact on the livelihoods and dwellings of the coastal<br />
belt population has been a selection criteria in identifying the infrastructures rehabilitated<br />
(studies, public consultations)<br />
None of the documents consulted reported that the population targeted by the sea defences<br />
interventions has been a criterion in identifying the sea defences to be rehabilitated.<br />
I 2.4.2 Acreage under cultivation in coastal areas protected<br />
- I 2.4.2 This indicator could not be completed due to a lack of data. In July 2007 a Socio-Economic Survey and<br />
Public Awareness Programme (SESPAP) has been set in motion. It will develop key socio-economic<br />
information from the geographical area and the beneficiaries from the sea defence works. The results of<br />
this study are however not been made public so far.<br />
I 2.4.3 Number of dwellings in coastal areas protected<br />
- I 2.4.3 This indicator could not be completed due to a lack of data. In July 2007 a Socio-Economic Survey and<br />
Public Awareness Programme (SESPAP) has been set in motion. Itwill develop key socio-economic<br />
information from the geographical area and the beneficiaries from the sea defence works. The results of<br />
this study are however not been made public so far.<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 5
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
I 2.4.4<br />
I 2.4.4<br />
I 2.4.5<br />
I 2.4.5<br />
Number of very small enterprises or estimated size of informal productive activities in coastal<br />
areas protected<br />
This indicator could not be completed due to a lack of data. In July 2007 a Socio-Economic Survey and<br />
Public Awareness Programme (SESPAP) has been set in motion and will develop key socio-economic<br />
information from the geographical area and the beneficiaries from the sea defence works. The results of<br />
this study are however not been made public so far.<br />
Evidence that the value of property and land in the coastal belt has increased due to greater<br />
flood control<br />
This indicator could not be completed due to a lack of data. In July 2007 a Socio-Economic Survey and<br />
Public Awareness Programme (SESPAP) has been set in motion. It will develop key socio-economic<br />
information from the geographical area and the beneficiaries from the sea defence works. The results of<br />
this study are however not been made public so far.<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 6
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 9<br />
FA, Evaluation<br />
report, 8 th EDF<br />
NIP<br />
EQ3<br />
JC 3.1<br />
I 3.1.1<br />
I 3.1.1<br />
To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to private sector strengthening and<br />
ultimately to sustainably restoring and increasing Guyana’s production capacity?<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> interventions were in line with the CSP/NIP strategy<br />
Degree of alignment of the programmes IL with the IL of the NIP/CSP<br />
The initial logical framework of the LEAP programme is in line with the 8 th EDF NIP.<br />
- The results of the programme consist in business support services, vocational training and financial services<br />
and are therefore in line with the activities of the 8 th EDF NIP.<br />
- The purpose of the programme is the development of the local market for business advisory services to attract<br />
new national and foreign investment and is in line with the outputs of the 8 th EDF NIP.<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 9<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 8<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 8<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 9<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 8<br />
Evaluation<br />
report<br />
Mid-term<br />
evaluation, 8 th<br />
EDF NIP<br />
Mid-term<br />
evaluation, 8 th<br />
EDF NIP<br />
I 3.1.1<br />
I 3.1.1<br />
I 3.1.1<br />
The revised logical framework (January 2005) is also in line with the 8 th EDF NIP.<br />
- The results of the programmes focus on the availability of business services, the creation of new SMEs,<br />
and on the strengthening of new private enterprises.<br />
- The purpose of the programme aims at increasing sustainable employment opportunities.<br />
The LEAP programme is aligned to the national priorities and answers to the problems identified both in the<br />
NDS and the PRSP. LEAP is one of the PRSP’s special intervention programs.<br />
The logical framework of the GTA programme is in line with the 8 th EDF NIP.<br />
- The results of the programme mainly consist in training.<br />
- The purpose of the programme is the enhancement of the competence of work force and is in line with<br />
the outputs of the 8 th EDF NIP.<br />
The GTA is committed to support the objectives of the PRSP and the NDS, focussing on the restoration and<br />
improvement of the productive capacity through upgrading and training.<br />
I 3.1.2 Discrepancies between the programmes and the strategy are explicitly justified<br />
FA I 3.1.2 There are no discrepancies between the programmes and the strategy<br />
Mid-term<br />
evaluation<br />
I 3.1.2<br />
I 3.1.3<br />
There are no discrepancies between the programmes and the strategy<br />
Degree of alignment of <strong>Commission</strong> interventions with the NDS and the National Competitiveness<br />
Strategy for Guyana<br />
NDS, NCS I 3.1.3 The NDS underlines that the role of the private sector in the growth and development of Guyana’s economy is<br />
of strong importance. During the 1980s and the 1990s, the private sector suffered from a declining economy<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 1
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
and the absence of a national policy on private sector development. The NDS identified several challenges that<br />
the Private sector development suffers from. Industrial development concentrated on the export of a few<br />
primary commodities and manufacturing has been neglected. The marketing capacity is poor: the domestic<br />
market size is too small and Guyana’s exports are mostly earmarked for CARICOM markets. Access to financial<br />
assistance to invest is also difficult. Moreover enterprises fail to retain skilled labour force who have been<br />
trained at their expense.<br />
The GoG drafted a National Competitiveness Strategy to deal with these issues. It identified the core supplyside<br />
impediments to competitiveness: a workforce with low productivity and narrow skill base, a weak<br />
vocational and technical training system, an insufficient access to affordable finance for investment and working<br />
capital, etc. The core elements of the competitiveness policy focus on: an incentive structure, investment,<br />
human resources, BDS, Infrastructure, Finance, the legal system and the export information and marketing.<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> interventions, which focused on BDS, training and financial services, are therefore in line with the<br />
GoG priorities in private sector development.<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 9<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 8<br />
JC 3.2 Interventions in Guyana are in line with the best practices identified in PSD Evaluation<br />
I 3.2.1 Evidence that a methodological procedure has been adopted to select the areas of intervention to<br />
support PSD in Guyana<br />
Identification I 3.2.1 The LEAP programme has been designed following an identification study for the economic diversification of<br />
study for the<br />
Linden realised in October 1999. An analysis and diagnosis of the Linden region has been realised to formulate<br />
economic<br />
the project. The study recommends that the project should support the future diversification of the economic<br />
diversification<br />
base in the Linden area, helping it to move from reliance on the bauxite industry to alternative sources of<br />
of Linden<br />
economic growth. Indeed, the future of the bauxite mining in Linden is uncertain. The study highlights that the<br />
(1999)<br />
insufficient employment opportunities in Linden are due to a poorly developed private sector, an unskilled<br />
labour pool, weak local institutions and a lack of infrastructure that enhances business development. The private<br />
sector of Linden is poorly developed because of a poor access to capital and credit, enterprise skills are poorly<br />
developed, a lack of incentives to promote manufacturing, and a small local market. The study recommends that<br />
the focus of the project is almost entirely on support to micro, small and medium start-up or existing enterprises<br />
in Linden in the private sector. The support measures proposed mainly focus on 3 areas of intervention:<br />
business development services, financial services, and vocational training.<br />
FA, MR I 3.2.1 The GTA programme has been designed following a pre-feasibility study and a “Training Programme Guyana –<br />
Inception report”. The area of intervention –training- has been chosen after an analysis of Guyana PSD and<br />
training sectors main features. Indeed, the private sector organisations in Guyana have identified the dearth of<br />
skilled human resources as one of the main factors hindering improvement of the country’s productive capacity<br />
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and still insufficiently addressed by GoG’s or donor activities. The vocational training sector in Guyana is<br />
characterized by a lack of capacity to produce skilled workers adapted to the needs of modern production units.<br />
The GoG’s Education Policy encourages the involvement of private sector in vocational training. Therefore, the<br />
project’s main component is the creation of a Training Agency which will identify and enable training<br />
companies, facilitate qualification of instructional personnel, design courses based on identified needs and<br />
improve in-plant training facilities. According to the 2001 MR, the project is very relevant in view of the limited<br />
possibilities in the country for vocational training and the project design is based on a good situation analysis<br />
and covers the need industry has for good in-company training.<br />
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8 ACP<br />
GUA 9<br />
Identification<br />
study for the<br />
economic<br />
diversification<br />
of Linden<br />
(1999)<br />
I 3.2.2<br />
I 3.2.2<br />
Evidence that the key constraints conditioning success in the areas of intervention have been<br />
addressed<br />
The identification study of the LEAP programme identified the key constraints of the areas of<br />
intervention selected for the project.<br />
- Business Development Services: due to the long term dependency on Linmine, little or no<br />
manufacturing tradition has developed in the area. The business community identified the main<br />
factors to account for the difficulties Linden has faced in diversifying its economy: the adding of<br />
value through processing of primary commodities is hardly practised, the step from producing<br />
for a local market to export markets is large, lack of readily available credit or long term<br />
financing, no organisation specifically geared towards business promotion within the Linden<br />
area.<br />
- Financial services: the formal banking institutions provide no specific facilities for small scale<br />
credit and no business support facilities in Linden. The Institute of Private Enterprise<br />
Development IPED is active in Linden providing financial services to small scale productive<br />
enterprises but its portfolio in Linden has gone down over the years due to a lack of demand.<br />
- Training: Accompanying the decline in the bauxite industry, there has been considerable outmigration<br />
of educated and skilled personnel from the town. The Linden Technical Institute has<br />
only little capacity to provide technical and vocational training in those areas where new<br />
employment opportunities exist.<br />
Moreover, the identification study followed a participatory approach to the identification of the<br />
opportunities and constraints and to the development of an economic diversification programme in<br />
Linden. Consultations have been held with all the parties involved: DEC, other donors, public sector<br />
officials, private sector representatives and members of the financial community. A number of<br />
stakeholder and beneficiary meetings were held in Linden to interact on potential interventions,<br />
implementation issues including their sustainability.<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 8<br />
Mid-Term<br />
evaluation<br />
I 3.2.2<br />
Guyana’s dearth of skilled human resources as a major impediment to the improvement of the country’s<br />
productive capacity has been correctly assessed. The last MR indeed points out that the design of the<br />
project does not need to be adapted since professional training is desperately needed. But, one key<br />
constraint has not been addressed in the design of the project: the migration of skilled technical and key<br />
management personnel. In addition to the problem of insufficient qualification of workers, company<br />
managers stressed the problem of high emigration rates. The unfavourable changes in the economy have<br />
increased the migration of skilled workers and professional workers and this is posing a risk for<br />
employers considering training.<br />
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GUA 9<br />
FA,<br />
Evaluation<br />
report<br />
I 3.2.3<br />
I 3.2.3<br />
The Guyana Training Agency – Inception report followed a participatory approach: briefing meetings<br />
with the DEC and the Private Sector <strong>Commission</strong> were held; some of the major stakeholders both in<br />
the training sector as well as from the donor community were consulted. Several companies expressed<br />
their willingness to accommodate training on their premises using their facilities and to send trainees to<br />
other companies for training and pay for it.<br />
Evidence that the coherence & complementarities between areas of intervention have been<br />
maximized<br />
The LEAP programme focuses on 3 main complementary areas of interventions: business development<br />
services, financial services and training.<br />
It has seven different components: Business development Unit, Business incubator, LEAF, Inward<br />
Investment Facility, Training, development of local capacity for economic planning and project design,<br />
and identification of infrastructure constraints to economic development.<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 8<br />
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GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
Annual<br />
Report 2006<br />
I 3.2.3<br />
JC 3.3<br />
I.3.3.1<br />
I.3.3.1<br />
The Consultative Association of Guyanese Industry (CAGI) is a training centre that already exists. There<br />
is therefore a risk of overlapping of training activities.<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> support to private sector development in Business Development Services (BDS)<br />
has been conducive to enhanced SME activity<br />
Market for business services increased<br />
LEAP aimed at increasing the availability of market for business services and successfully met its targets.<br />
It is indeed essential to keep in mind that the market for BAS in Linden is very small.<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
Annual<br />
Report 2006<br />
I 3.3.2<br />
I 3.3.2<br />
Aim of the LEAP by 2009 Until 2006 Cumulative (%)<br />
2 privately run business advisory services (BAS) 4 200%<br />
agencies established and utilised<br />
10 BAS businesses established 1 10%<br />
Number of local market SME beneficiaries<br />
Until 2006, 25 small enterprises benefited form the incubator created by LEAP. The targets in terms of<br />
BAS provided and BAS workshops executed are also met.<br />
Aim of the LEAP by 2009 Until 2006 Cumulative (%)<br />
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GUA 9<br />
> 35 BAS workshops executed 43 123%<br />
200 BAS provided per year 574 114%<br />
300 active clients per year 2002-06: 1500 693 46%<br />
30 entrepreneurs benefit from the Incubator 25 83%<br />
I.3.3.3 Evidence of encouragement of know-how and technologies & support to cooperation between<br />
industry and scientific research<br />
I.3.3.3 There is definitely no such evidence. LEAP is mainly providing support to the agricultural sector, and<br />
apart from the exchanges of experience between farmers of different regions in Guyana or countries in<br />
the Caribbean, one can not state that LEAP facilitates cooperation between industry and scientific<br />
research.<br />
I 3.3.4 Evidence of the impact of BDS on SME competitiveness<br />
Field Mission I 3.3.4 The NCS stresses that many Guyanese enterprises suffer from a number of deficiencies in BDS which<br />
affect their ability to effectively compete. The BDS market in Guyana is deficient in both quality and<br />
quantity in a number of critical areas. There are not many BDS suppliers operating in Guyana and their<br />
range of services is limited.<br />
LEAP is providing support to private sector development in BDS through 2 main components: the<br />
Business Development Unit and the Business Incubator. The BDU provides BAS dealing with<br />
management and organisation issues whereas the BI provides support for start-up businesses.<br />
The MTR already stressed the beneficiaries’ satisfaction with LEAP services. Several interviews with the<br />
beneficiaries conducted during the field mission allowed the evaluation team to appreciate the impacts<br />
of the BDS provided by LEAP on SME competitiveness in Linden.<br />
The BAS component helped to build the capacity of the community. It created or supported already<br />
existing associations in the region (the national craft association, the tourism association, the logging<br />
association, the farmers association – the last one being created through LEAP). The associations<br />
provide services to their members and the LEAP provides physical capacities to these associations.<br />
The incubator (beyond the schedule for 2 years) is nowadays providing support to around 10 small<br />
enterprises in Linden through provision of subsidized facilities, training and advice and allows the<br />
enterprises to grow. One beneficiary has criticized the lack of practicality of the approach of the LEAP<br />
and the lack of skills of the PMU staff in terms of accounting and HRD. The establishment of a second<br />
incubator for industrial enterprises is planned.<br />
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Moreover, a business centre has been created whereas it was not foreseen at the design of the<br />
programme. This is the only facility of this kind in the country.<br />
Finally, a call centre has been established in Linden: it employs 50 people and plans to hire until 120<br />
employees. LEAP helped to recruit the employees and provides advice.<br />
Focus on the Farmers’ Association<br />
This association has been created through the assistance of LEAP and is nowadays the most important<br />
farmers’ association of the Caribbean. LEAP provided several BDS:<br />
- technological transfers through exchanges of experience with farmers from Trinidad and<br />
Jamaica<br />
- training in commercial management<br />
- training in accounting, farm management, poultry etc<br />
- financing of their website<br />
- visits to other farmers’ associations in Guyana<br />
- Registration of the association<br />
- Helping the farmers to get access to land<br />
Since the creation of the association in 2005, the farmers’ production has significantly improved due to<br />
the transfers of technologies from Trinidad regarding tomatoes’ production for example. This allowed<br />
them to produce for commercial purposes and to improve their incomes.<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 9<br />
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GUA 9<br />
LEAF<br />
reports and<br />
Field mission<br />
LEAP<br />
Annual<br />
report 2006<br />
and Field<br />
mission<br />
JC 3.4<br />
I 3.4.1<br />
I 3.4.1<br />
I 3.4.2<br />
I 3.4.2<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> support to private sector development in financial services has been conducive to<br />
increased SME activity<br />
Number of beneficiary SME<br />
509 loans have been disbursed as at end of September 2007, but it is impossible to know how many<br />
enterprises benefited from the loans. This data is not provided in the LEAF reports.<br />
Volume of financing<br />
1. The aim was that LEAF money was fully disbursed by early 2006 (€m1.9). This goal is achieved at<br />
66.7% at the end of 2006. This is a very positive result due to the crisis LEAF had to go through in<br />
between October 2005-August 2007.<br />
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Aim of LEAF by<br />
2006<br />
LEAF money fully<br />
disbursed : 1.9€m<br />
(=518.1$m)<br />
Until 2006 Achieved<br />
(Percentage)<br />
345.1$m 66.7%<br />
On October 2005, the Office of <strong>Commission</strong>er of Insurance (OCI) issued a statement which stated that<br />
the GUYFLAG (insurance company in charge of the management of LEAF funds) was to cease its<br />
operations due to alleged irregularities committed by GUYFLAG in conducting its insurance business.<br />
In 2005 and 2006, the matter was largely unresolved. Consequently, no new funds were made available<br />
and loans could only be made out of repayments received. In August 2007, the EC delegation judged<br />
that the 4 criteria required to continue the contract were met and decided that the EU will continue with<br />
funding.<br />
2. The initial aim of LEAF was to provide credits to micro-enterprises (12 employees). LEAF has achieved its<br />
goals as far as micro-enterprises are concerned but has not met its targets regarding small and<br />
medium enterprises.<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
Annual<br />
report 2006<br />
and Field<br />
mission<br />
I 3.4.3<br />
I 3.4.3<br />
Aim of LEAF by<br />
2009<br />
Until 2006 Achieved<br />
(Percentage)<br />
300 micro-credits 347 115%<br />
disbursed<br />
200 sm./medium<br />
credits disbursed<br />
98 49%<br />
Quality of the financing (recovery rate)<br />
It is difficult to assess the performance of the funds because LEAF has only been operating for 2 years.<br />
At the end of 2006, micro-credits have been recollected at 28% and small and medium credits have been<br />
recollected at 4%. The recovery rate is therefore not satisfying at this stage. However, Guyflag has still<br />
some time ahead (until 2009) to recollect the credits. Moreover, this situation is mainly due to the crisis<br />
encountered by LEAF since October 2005. Some clients still have the perception that they might soon<br />
not be liable to GUYFLAG for the loans received. This situation is resulting in numerous cases of nonperforming<br />
clients.<br />
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LEAF<br />
reports<br />
I 3.4.4<br />
I 3.4.4<br />
Aim of LEAF by<br />
2009<br />
Until 2006 Achieved<br />
(Percentage)<br />
300 micro-credits 85 28%<br />
recollected<br />
200 sm./medium<br />
credits recollected<br />
8 4%<br />
Economic activities targeted by LEAF<br />
1. As a whole, LEAF mainly targeted the primary sector (forestry and agriculture). It also supported the<br />
development of the tertiary sector (vending and services). LEAF has however not supported the growth<br />
of the manufacturing sector.<br />
Main sectors targeted by LEAF<br />
Share<br />
Forestry 31%<br />
Agriculture 16%<br />
Services 21%<br />
Vending 16%<br />
Manufacturing 3%<br />
Agriculture, Forestry, Manufacturing and Tourism are indeed the 4 growth sectors identified by the<br />
Regional Development Strategy for Region 10 and one could therefore note the alignment of LEAF<br />
with the future priorities of the Region but also criticize LEAF for not having supported the<br />
manufacturing sector.<br />
2. The tertiary sector mainly benefited from micro-loans whereas the primary sector mainly benefited<br />
from small and medium loans.<br />
LEAF Micro-loans per sector (3 main sectors presented)<br />
Share<br />
Vending 45%<br />
Agriculture 20%<br />
Services 18%<br />
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LEAF Small loans per sector (3 main sectors presented)<br />
Share<br />
Services 31%<br />
Forestry 27%<br />
Agriculture 18%<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 9<br />
LEAF Medium loans per sector<br />
Share<br />
Forestry 81%<br />
Agriculture 12%<br />
Manufacturing 7%<br />
I 3.4.5 Evidence of the impact of financial services on SME competitiveness<br />
Field mission I 3.4.4 We do not have sufficient data to complete this indicator.<br />
The NCS identified the challenges faced by enterprises in Guyana in accessing finance:<br />
- Limited range of financial institutions limiting the supply of loans: the range of financial<br />
institutions in Guyana is fairly limited and Banks do not offer financial services. The relative<br />
importance of investments of the banking system in the enterprise sector has been on a<br />
decrease.<br />
- Relatively high interest rates which affect the competitiveness of Guyana’s products. Interest<br />
rates for lending to enterprises range between 8% and 18%. Annual micro-finance rates<br />
fluctuate around 15% flat.<br />
- Limited capacity of the banks to appraise long-term projects<br />
The interviews conducted in the field also clearly stressed the lack of access to financial resources as an<br />
impediment to the growth of the economic activity. There is indeed a strong demand for credit in<br />
Linden but only one commercial bank; the remaining ones being in Georgetown. Moreover, the interest<br />
rates offered by banks prevent people from borrowing funds. Therefore, the existence of LEAF on the<br />
one hand and the 15% interest rate proposed on the other hand allow potential investors to borrow<br />
funds in order to start or expand a business. One should however keep in mind that the PSD evaluation<br />
stressed that the EC should avoid programmes aimed just at the provision of credit lines.<br />
LEAF had strong impacts: it stimulated economic activities and fostered the entrepreneurship spirit of<br />
Region 10. Most of the funds allocated are micro-loans and it has not been possible to supply medium-<br />
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GUA 8<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 8<br />
Final<br />
Evaluation<br />
report, 2005<br />
Final<br />
Evaluation<br />
Report, 2005<br />
JC 3.5<br />
I 3.5.1<br />
I 3.5.1<br />
size enterprises. The impacts have however been constrained by the problems encountered by Guyflag<br />
and could have been greater.<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> support to private sector development in training has been conducive to increased<br />
SME competitiveness<br />
Number of beneficiary enterprises<br />
The project successfully passed performance indicators. Training needs were assessed in 208 companies<br />
and institutions.<br />
Original Planning Initial Project<br />
Overall Achievements<br />
according to Planning<br />
Core Activities<br />
by July 31, 2004 (3<br />
Feasibility Study (3 until April 30, 2003 4<br />
years)<br />
years)<br />
(2 years)<br />
Assessment of<br />
done in 208 companies<br />
not quantified 30 companies<br />
training needs<br />
and institutions<br />
I 3.5.2 Number of trained people<br />
I 3.5.2 The GTA programme has successfully met its targets. A total of 50 short-term courses with 498<br />
participants were delivered. In addition, 66 trainees participated in 7 long-term courses. Finally, a total of<br />
159 certified assessors and instructors were in the system at end of project.<br />
Core Activities<br />
Delivery of Short<br />
Term Training<br />
Delivery of Long<br />
Term Training<br />
Assessment of<br />
Training Courses<br />
and Students<br />
Certification of<br />
Students<br />
Original Planning<br />
according to<br />
Feasibility Study (3<br />
years)<br />
84 courses<br />
1,260 participants<br />
6 long term courses (12<br />
months)<br />
120 participants<br />
not quantified<br />
Initial Project<br />
Planning<br />
until April 30, 2003 5<br />
(2 years)<br />
20 training courses<br />
240 participants<br />
3 long term courses<br />
(no # of participants<br />
stated)<br />
no indicator<br />
Overall Achievements<br />
by July 31, 2004 (3<br />
years)<br />
50 training courses<br />
498 participants<br />
7 traineeships (6<br />
months)<br />
66 participants<br />
50 courses / 478<br />
students assessed<br />
not quantified no indicator 339 participants<br />
certified<br />
Upgrading of 62 person months 45 Instructors 159 Instructors and<br />
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Instructors and<br />
Assessors<br />
(corresponding to a one<br />
week training of 248<br />
participants)<br />
Assessors upgraded<br />
The crime situation in Guyana has always been an impediment to evening courses.<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
Annual<br />
Report 2006<br />
I 3.5.2<br />
LEAP training activities, in terms of number of people trained, are satisfactorily meeting the goals.<br />
Aim of LEAP by 2009<br />
Until<br />
2006<br />
Cumulative<br />
(Percentage)<br />
300 young people trained in business literacy 125 42%<br />
150 young people benefit from in-service employment 330 220%<br />
training<br />
Specialised training for 100 people/year 368 368%<br />
LEAP trained 1,079 people over the period 2002-2006.<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 8<br />
Number of people trained by LEAP per year:<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total<br />
132 195 320 195 237 1,079<br />
I 3.5.3 Evidence of the impact of training on SME competitiveness<br />
NCS I 3.5.3 The NCS identifies investments in skills as a vital pre-condition for improved national competitiveness.<br />
The strategy also seeks to ensure that these skills can be retained in the country and not simply exported<br />
via the brain drain. The main challenges in education relate to vocational and technical training where<br />
there are large gaps in provision and a resulting shortage of skilled, technical labour force.<br />
Approximately 3,500 people are trained annually in Guyana. The GTA project is indeed recognized as a<br />
recent success by the strategy. High levels of migration, especially of skilled people, are also continuing<br />
to create a huge gap in the supply of labour. The NCS stresses that it will be a long-term process to<br />
address the brain drain issue and also explores strategies to mitigate the impact of the loss of skills from<br />
Guyana through migration policies.<br />
Final<br />
Evaluation<br />
I 3.5.3<br />
At micro level, the involved companies acknowledge the impact of focussed individual-designed<br />
training. The involved companies have been satisfied with the training and it is expected that results will<br />
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report, 2005<br />
have a positive impact on employee performance and production.<br />
Customer satisfaction exercises and impact assessments were carried out on a regular basis as part of the<br />
monitoring exercise. The overall reaction to GTA training was clearly favourable with about 80% of<br />
responses replying that the service came up to their expectations.<br />
The overall impact of the project was however limited due to the small size of the organisation, the<br />
limited number of clients, the general state of the economy and the availability of alternative training.<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
Annual<br />
Report 2006<br />
I 3.5.3<br />
LEAP, through its training component, clearly has a strategy to improve technical vocational and<br />
management skills. LEAP conducted training programmes in specific sectors such as agriculture,<br />
forestry, sewing, fabric and garment design, craft, etc which would allow the participants to generate<br />
income from the skills imparted. LEAP also designed and conducted training programmes to assist the<br />
entrepreneurs to improve the management of their businesses, in the areas of book keeping &<br />
accountancy, and in computer applications for small business. Finally, LEAP conducted training in<br />
Portuguese, job readiness, capacity building and project management. All these trainings increase the<br />
skills of the participants and implicitly contribute to the improvement of the competitiveness of their<br />
business.<br />
8 ACP<br />
GUA 8<br />
Final<br />
evaluation<br />
report, 2005<br />
I 3.5.3<br />
On a macro lever, the GTA project caused no significant change. Although the GTA provision of<br />
technical training has disappeared, the need for technical training, which was at the origin of the GTA,<br />
remains. Nothing has filled the vacuum left by the GTA, and nothing looks likely to do so. There is<br />
currently no consensus within the private sector on what the training needs are and how they can be<br />
met. There is little dialogue between the public and private sectors on training issues. The TVET<br />
Council will come into existence as a result of the TVET Act, but whether it will have the money or the<br />
will to make the necessary innovations remains to be seen. The private sector is still not able to retain<br />
skilled workforce from migration. Guyana lacks a national policy on migration of its skilled workforce.<br />
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8<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
9<br />
8<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
8<br />
8<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
9<br />
JC 3.6 Results achieved by <strong>Commission</strong> support are maintained after the end of its direct support<br />
I 3.6.1 Explicit reference in the FA to measures to ensure sustainability<br />
FA I 3.6.1 There is no explicit reference in the FA to measures to ensure sustainability. We can however suppose that 2 out of the 7<br />
activities of the programme might contribute to ensure sustainability: technical and management training, and<br />
development of local capacity for economic planning, project design and implementation.<br />
FA I 3.6.1 There is an explicit reference in the FA to measures to ensure sustainability: “The beneficiary companies provide<br />
resources for the training and contribute to the running cost of the agency itself. In year 3, the cost of the training agency<br />
can nearly be financed out of the user fees.”<br />
Evaluation<br />
report,<br />
MR, Field<br />
mission<br />
I<br />
3.6.2<br />
I 3.6.2<br />
Evidence that the benefits continue to be used after the end of the intervention<br />
The end date of the LEAP programme is January 2009. At the time of the design of the programme, no exit strategy has<br />
been foreseen. The LEAP 2 nd Mid-Term review did not provide any exit issue. There are ongoing discussions on the<br />
sustainability of the programme but key stakeholders think that these discussions should have taken place before.<br />
On the EC Delegation side, an extension of the programme is not foreseen. The LEAP belongs in the end to the GoG<br />
and the local authorities must own the project.<br />
National support for the programme is strong but eventual sustainability of the LEAP relies on the existence of<br />
strengthened local institutions able to take over the programme. The financial allocations for institutional strengthening<br />
represent 2.4% of the LEAP budget and do not appear sufficient enough to strengthen properly local institutions. Until<br />
now, public and private organisations do not have sufficient capacity to undertake LEAP’s activities.<br />
In terms of institutional strengthening, LEAP focused on key stakeholder institutions having a direct impact on the<br />
economic development of the Region such as the Regional Democratic Council and the Linden Chamber of Commerce,<br />
Industry and Development. Support to the LCICD (hiring of an executive coordinator for 17 months, rewriting of the<br />
Chamber’s constitution, etc) has been disappointing and the capacities of the LCICD are still very weak.<br />
Aim of LEAP by 2009 Until 2006 Cumulative (%)<br />
The Linden Chamber of Industry<br />
Commerce & development<br />
comprises 100 members<br />
33 33%<br />
Support to the RDC has been much more fruitful: a junior economic planner has been recruited to assist in the writing of<br />
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
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EGEVAL<br />
8<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
8<br />
MR, Midterm<br />
evaluation,<br />
Final<br />
Evaluation,<br />
LEAP<br />
Evaluation<br />
report,<br />
Field visit<br />
the Regional Development Strategy and work is currently undergoing with the RDC to increase their capacity for<br />
investment and promotion. The RDC is also the local institution which has been conceptually attached to LEAP at the<br />
design stage. This local institution seems the most likely to take over the programme. However, the beneficiaries of the<br />
programme do not have the same viewpoint. Indeed, the RDC is a local political body and it therefore does not seem<br />
quite appropriate that a political body take over the programme.<br />
As far as the LEAF is concerned, the insurance company would like to maintain it. It has until June 2009 to repay the<br />
funds to the GoG.. The sustainability of the LEAF will depend on the willingness of the company.<br />
In the end, local authorities will probably have to look for other funding (GoG, donors) to maintain LEAP.<br />
The national GoG is envisaging a replication of LEAP in Regions 2, 3 and 6, which are heavily dependant on sugar. This<br />
eventual replication is somehow a kind of sustainability of the LEAP but does not guarantee that the benefits brought in<br />
Region 10 will continue after the end of the <strong>Commission</strong> intervention.<br />
I 3.6.2 The project was not sustainable institutionally. It closed when the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> ended funding on 31 July 2004.<br />
It was not possible to become self-sufficient within the planned timeframe. Insufficient private sector investment<br />
precluded it from becoming financially self-sufficient. The active participation of stakeholders especially of the PSC was<br />
insufficient in planning, implementation and financing. This was mentioned in all monitoring reports, but no corrective<br />
action was taken.<br />
Being a new institution created for the project, GTA was not sustainable without further donor support. Moreover,<br />
neither the Private Sector <strong>Commission</strong> as the implementing agency nor the Government of Guyana were in a position to<br />
guarantee GTA’s survival. No other donor appeared to want to continue investing. Despite the GTA’s own efforts to<br />
generate income, significant external support was lacking to achieve sustainability over the time.<br />
Beneficiaries without exception attest to continuously applying the new competencies in their workplace. Thus, the<br />
benefits of the project continue to remain in the target group.<br />
The project has indeed been based on three wrong assumptions:<br />
1- the country will go on enjoying a positive economical and stable political climate<br />
2-the beneficiary companies will pay for the training of their employees, make available their premises and contribute to<br />
the running costs of the Training Agency itself<br />
3- In year 3, the Training Agency will be self-sufficient<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
What happened in reality was:<br />
1- Unfavourable changes in the economy have hampered project effectiveness because employers have been less willing<br />
to invest in training.<br />
2-There has not been the private sector investment that the GTA requires to finance itself and there was a problem in<br />
finding training sites to conduct the training because companies are averse to the risks of liability and company privacy.<br />
3-GTA was expected to become self-financing from course fees and membership subscriptions, and although it raised<br />
considerable amounts of revenue, it failed to become self-sufficient. This was the official reason for the closure, but other<br />
factors contributed as well. There was no ownership of the newly created agency despite the intensive consultation of the<br />
PSC when analysing the feasibility of the project. The PSC had already been involved with the Consultative Association of<br />
Guyanese Industry (CAGI) as a training centre and ultimately made the choice to exclude GTA and retain CAGI.<br />
The failure of the project is more disappointing since it achieved a number of successes in the number of courses, number<br />
of participants and development of training methodology.<br />
The field visit confirmed these findings. There is a strong need in Guyana for vocational and technical training. The GTA<br />
project was a well-conceived programme however based on a wrong assumption: the enterprises will pay for the training<br />
of their employees. The enterprises were more willing to pay for training at management level and the GTA got in<br />
conflict with an already exiting training agency (CAGI) which was providing this kind of training. As a result, the GTA<br />
has been closed. This project was therefore not sustainable. This is unfortunate as the project achieved positive impacts<br />
and as there are strong needs in Guyana for this kind of training. The ex-programme manager of this project has indeed<br />
been mandated to realize an assessment of the Guyanese situation in terms of vocational and technical training and to<br />
redesign it to make it more relevant to the needs.<br />
The Private Sector <strong>Commission</strong> is putting in place a strategic plan to reverse the brain drain problem. Without such a<br />
strategy, it seems meaningless to finance projects dealing with vocational and technical training.<br />
JC 3.7<br />
I 3.7.1<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> support to private sector strengthening has contributed to restoring and increasing Guyana’s<br />
productive capacity<br />
Evidence of increased production capacity and private sector activity:<br />
- increased number of new firms, including SMEs<br />
- higher employment levels<br />
- higher production levels<br />
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EGEVAL<br />
- increased volume and value of non-traditional exports<br />
I 3.7.1<br />
This indicator is only partially completed due to a lack of data.<br />
- Production levels have increased over the period 1996-2006: GDP at current factor cost increased from G$ 82m to $G<br />
139m<br />
Evolution of GDP at current factor cost (1996-2006)<br />
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />
GDP at<br />
current<br />
factor<br />
costs 82,258 89,744 90,471 102,098 NA NA NA 123,263 130,701 133,914 139,773<br />
Source: IMF, Guyana: Statistical Annex, 2001 & IMF, Guyana PRSP Progress Report, 2006<br />
I<br />
3.7.2<br />
I 3.7.2<br />
Evidence of increased private sector investments relative to public investments<br />
Over the period 1996-2006, the share of private sector investments relative to public sector investments decreases: from<br />
57.5% to 22.1%. The ratio increased from 1996 to 1999 -and culminated at 106.7% in 1999- before decreasing to 44.8%<br />
in 2003 to 22.1% in 2006.<br />
Evolution of Private & Public sector investments in Guyana, 1996-2006 (in millions of Guyana dollars)<br />
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />
Private investment 10,843 13,101 14,480 15,242 NA NA NA 9,342 8,872 9,904 10,468<br />
Public investment 18,867 19,271 16,666 14,285 NA NA NA 20,865 25,300 42,291 47,351<br />
Private<br />
57.5% 68.0% 86.9% 106.7% 44.8% 35.1% 23.4% 22.1%<br />
Investment/Public<br />
Investment<br />
Source: IMF, Guyana: Statistical Annex, 2001 & IMF, Guyana PRSP Progress Report, 2006<br />
I<br />
3.7.3<br />
I 3.7.3<br />
Evidence of increased private capital inflows (foreign direct investment and remittances)<br />
The tables hereunder indicate first that Guyana receives considerable FDI compared to its GDP. The trend over the<br />
period 1996-2006 also shows that Guyana is receiving less FDI. Moreover, Guyana’s FDI is representing a very small<br />
share of the total FDI received by the Caribbean countries: 0.5% in between 2003 and 2005.<br />
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Inward Foreign Direct Investment Performance Index ranking for Guyana (1996-2005) a)<br />
1996-1998 1997-99 1998- 1999- 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />
2000 2001<br />
Guyana 8 21 21 17 18 28 41 31<br />
ranking<br />
a)The Index covers 141 countries<br />
Source: United Nations, World Investment Report, 2003 and 2006<br />
This index ranks countries by the Foreign Direct Investment they receive relative to their economic size; it is calculated as<br />
the ratio of a country’s share in global FDI inflows to its share in global GDP.<br />
FDI flows (in millions of dollars), 2003-2005<br />
2003 2004 2005<br />
Guyana 26 30 77<br />
Caribbean countries 5893 41550 38235<br />
Guyana (in % of 0.4% 0.7% 0.2%<br />
Caribbean countries)<br />
Source: United Nations, World Investment Report, 2006<br />
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EGEVAL<br />
LEAP 2 nd<br />
Mid-Term<br />
Evaluation,<br />
GoInvest<br />
I 3.7.4 Number of bankruptcy filings and number of new SMEs per year.<br />
I 3.7.4 This information is not available.<br />
I.3.7.5 Existence of new SME-friendly regulations and specific measures to enhance private sector investments in the<br />
productive sectors<br />
I.3.7.5 The GoG has taken initiatives to provide a more business-friendly environment and improve investment ranking on the<br />
foreign direct performance index. to improve the regulatory climate, the Government has taken steps recently including<br />
reducing the number of necessary trade licenses, passing a Value-added Tax bill in 2005, the Investment Act of 2004, the<br />
Small Business Act of 2004, and a Competition and Fair Trading Bill (due to be passed by May 2006). Furthermore, as part of<br />
the recent NCS process, the Government is strengthening regulatory and administrative processes as well as improving the<br />
environment for public-private dialogue through the establishment of a National Competitiveness Council.<br />
8<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
8 &<br />
8<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
9<br />
The Investment Act of 2004 is the principal legislation governing investment in Guyana and is intended to play a reassuring<br />
role for investors by providing legal protection for investment, increasing the predictability, stability and transparency of the<br />
legal regime for investment, promoting the development of international best practices regarding investment, and streamlining<br />
the existing procedures for investment. Moreover, a Small Business Bureau and Small Business Council have been set up<br />
within MinTIC as a direct result of the Small Business Act 2004.<br />
I 3.7.6 Testimonies of Guyanese officials on the impacts of <strong>Commission</strong> support on Guyana’s productive capacity<br />
Field Visit I 3.7.6 <strong>Commission</strong> support to PSD in Guyana is weak. Over the past ten years, only two projects dealt with this issue. The LEAP<br />
mainly enhances the production capacity of the primary sector and only targets Region 10. The impacts of <strong>Commission</strong><br />
interventions in PSD on Guyana’s productive capacity are therefore limited.<br />
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
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EGEVAL<br />
P<br />
Nber<br />
8<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
4<br />
&<br />
9<br />
AC<br />
P<br />
GU<br />
A<br />
6&7<br />
Source<br />
EC Guidelines<br />
for designing<br />
Budget Support<br />
Programmes<br />
(2002)<br />
Nomade<br />
presentation on<br />
BS Evaluation<br />
of 29 th of March<br />
2007<br />
FA, MR, PS,<br />
File notes<br />
FA<br />
EQ 4<br />
To what extent has <strong>Commission</strong> budget support contributed to the improvement of the social<br />
conditions?<br />
The Budget Support (BS) provided by the EU has helped the GoG to pursue its global policy objectives<br />
expressed in the 1998-2001 PFP, the HIPC documents and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (2002-2005) (see<br />
EQ1). The entire reform programme (see I.1.1.1) has thus been supported but special attention has been paid<br />
by the <strong>Commission</strong> to: (i) the fiduciary context of budget support through the monitoring of the global<br />
performance and of selected elements of the public finance management system and (ii) to the achievement of<br />
the GoG’s ultimate objective of poverty reduction via the monitoring of a limited number of service delivery<br />
indicators in education (SASP programmes only), health and social housing. In order to assess the extent to<br />
which BS has contributed to the improvement of social conditions, the evaluation uses a two-pronged<br />
approach:<br />
• Firstly, the design of the BS programmes (SAS IV, SAS V and PRBS) and in particular the general<br />
conditions adopted by the PRBS for the release of both fixed and variable tranche show that the provision<br />
of BS aimed to positively influence the framework for public policy and public expenditures in Guyana<br />
through: (i) the EC’s participation in policy discussions regarding macro-economic management and<br />
sector policies (including the overall PRSP) and (ii) the monitoring of the general qualitative performance<br />
of PFM. These process issues which are essential (if not sufficient) to ensure that policies can be<br />
satisfactorily implemented so that conditions are favourable for attaining the desired impact, have clearly<br />
been as important in the Guyana BS as the reaching of the ultimate objective of poverty reduction itself.<br />
Judging by the choice of disbursement criteria, it is noted that general conditions linked to these two<br />
process issues condition the totality of the fixed tranches of the PRBS disbursement (50% of BS) and<br />
specific PFM output indicators condition another 40% of the variable tranches thus linking overall<br />
process indicators to 70% of BS release. The progress made in these two process areas thus needs to be<br />
ascertained to measure their potential contribution to the improvement of the overall fiscal and public<br />
policy framework. The evaluation of the process is undertaken through Judgment Criteria 4.1 to 4.4.<br />
• Secondly the EC’s BS aimed to contribute to the overall objective of poverty reduction and economic<br />
growth where access and use of basic social services was of particular importance. The focus of BS on the<br />
improvement of social conditions was made by linking 60% of the amounts to be released under the<br />
variable tranches of SAS-V and PRBS to performance indicators in the education (SAS-V), health and<br />
social housing sectors. The design of the BS programmes thus implicitly makes the link between the use<br />
of the budget support, the improved delivery of social services and the final outcome of selected social<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
indicators. The assessment of the extent to which EC’s BS may have contributed to reach the overall<br />
social impact is carried out under Judgement criteria 4.5.<br />
8<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
4<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
FA, MR, PS<br />
FA<br />
Field mission<br />
interviews<br />
JC 4.1<br />
The use of budget support has enabled the <strong>Commission</strong> to engage in a dialogue with the GoG<br />
regarding PRSP design and implementation.<br />
Due to the fact that budget support provides by definition support to the programme chosen by the<br />
Government and implemented through the execution of its budget, the EC’s choice of using the BS<br />
instrument and its decision on the amounts to be allocated to BS rely inter alia on considerations of the general<br />
policy orientations and of the structural adjustment and reform programmes adopted by the GoG. However,<br />
it is not until the latest BS programme (PRBS) that EC-GoG policy discussions have been put at the heart of<br />
the BS programme design in Guyana.<br />
Indeed the earlier General Import Programmes (GIP I to III respectively covering 1993, 1994 and 1995) were<br />
provided as balance of payment support. Only the latest GIP used counterpart funds to finance specific lines<br />
of the GoG budget rather than to finance projects, thus introducing some element of discussion with the<br />
authorities on priority budget lines (specifically, civil service reform and maintenance costs in education and<br />
health were targeted). The ‘new generation’ BS with SAS IV (1998) and V (programmed for 1999-2000 but<br />
effectively implemented in 2000 and 2001) both offered support targeted to specific expenditure items and<br />
budget lines within selected ministries’ budgets (education, health, housing). Little is known about the<br />
conditions under which these earlier programmes were drawn up, files being no longer available and staff<br />
having changed in the meantime, but it is supposed that discussions must have been had with the authorities<br />
on the choice of budget lines targeted by BS and thus on what both parties considered to be priority spending<br />
that could be secured through BS.<br />
The PRBS 2004-2007 formalised the need for broad and sector policy discussions by introducing regular<br />
policy dialogue as one of three preconditions to the release of BS funds: “The Government shall associate the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> in the dialogue on macro-economic (in particular IMF) and sectoral policies”. The introduction of this issue as<br />
a conditionality for the release of fixed and variable tranche BS underlines the emphasis given by the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> to the importance of remaining fully informed about macro-economic and fiscal developments in<br />
the context of a non-targeted, general BS. The issue is evaluated at the hand of three indicators, as follows.<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> file<br />
notes<br />
Correspondence<br />
I 4.1.1<br />
I 4.1.1<br />
Frequency and quality of meetings between GoG and DEC on macro-economic, fiscal and poverty<br />
reduction strategy issues<br />
From the documentation pertaining to the assessment of the conditions for tranche releases, the dialogue<br />
between the GoG and the <strong>Commission</strong> appears not to have responded to expectations: the lack of<br />
participation of the <strong>Commission</strong> in the macro and fiscal dialogue was underlined specifically as being of great<br />
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between EC<br />
HQ- Delegation<br />
and GoG<br />
Field mission<br />
interviews<br />
concern to the <strong>Commission</strong> HQ (less so at Delegation level) but did nevertheless not represent an issue of<br />
such importance as to be an impediment to the disbursement of the tranches. The main reason for this<br />
unsatisfactory dialogue is twofold.<br />
Firstly, it appears that the EC expected to participate in the yearly IMF reviews; but discussions of progress on<br />
IMF programmes are a bilateral matter between the government and the IMF where no third party is allowed<br />
to participate, even as an observer. In Guyana, this would be even more the case than elsewhere since the<br />
GoG does not even allow the IMF to publish the results of its Article IV consultations (contrary to most<br />
other countries). Whether to close the information gap by directly attending the meetings or to participate<br />
more closely in high level policy discussions, it is felt that the EC’s disbursement condition was unrealistic and<br />
that GoG’s eventual (2005/2006) response to allow the IMF to share its results verbally with the group of<br />
main donors at the end of the review was appropriate. In the meantime, the condition of a macro-economic<br />
and fiscal policy dialogue taking place has thus never been fully satisfied, with the earlier period (2004 and<br />
2005) being particularly poor. On the macro and fiscal policy dialogue, it is thus interesting to note that the<br />
EC, as only provider of untargeted and direct BS to Guyana6 (and excluding debt relief which cannot stricto<br />
sensu be considered as a provision of external financing) has been treated just like any other donor in terms of<br />
the information (not) being released to it.<br />
Secondly, it is generally recognised that GoG-donor dialogue in Guyana is very much limited to (i) bilateral<br />
discussions and (ii) to project level discussions (see EQ8). It is only in the second half of the period reviewed<br />
that GoG-donor working groups have been formed in priority sectors and although donors participated in the<br />
national discussions of the PRSP when the PRSP was drafted (2001-2002) there does not seem to have been<br />
any general policy orientations discussions or specific donor contributions to the PRSP’s design and contents.<br />
The EC has been involved in whatever GoG-dialogue has taken place at general or sector level, but no more<br />
than any other donor.<br />
The leverage usually associated with the provision of BS to discuss general policy orientations and progress in<br />
the implementation of reforms has thus not materialised in Guyana.<br />
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EGEVAL<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
<strong>Commission</strong><br />
file notes<br />
Field mission<br />
interviews<br />
I 4.1.1<br />
On the other hand, specific discussions related to the implementation of ongoing programmes seem to have<br />
taken place, either in the context of thematic groups (see EQ8) or specifically within the context of reviewing<br />
conditions for BS tranche release. No documents were found concerning the earlier SAS IV programme but<br />
for SAS V and PRBS tranche release, sufficient documentation was reviewed to conclude that at least fiscal<br />
management has been a continuous topic of scrutiny and discussion over the period. For the SASP, missions<br />
from HQ were deployed to assist the DCE in assessing conditions for tranche release; under the PRBS,<br />
consultants were recruited to undertake 2 missions a year, one for reviewing the conditions for the release of<br />
the fixed tranche focusing on the progress of the PFM systems and one for reviewing conditions for the<br />
release of the variable tranche focusing on the public finance, health and housing indicators.<br />
These reviews call for several comments. Firstly the choice of indicators retained for variable tranche release<br />
has not been conducive to developing policy dialogue: in PFM, out of seven indicators, three measured<br />
performance of TAs funded by the EC (and thus also measured the EC’s performance in providing timely and<br />
quality TA) and one measured the performance of activities funded by the IDB (and again quite independent<br />
from the GoG itself). Two other indicators were output and time-bound indicators that could, if taken within<br />
a broader context, represent reform efforts of the GoG but their narrow interpretation by the EC precluded<br />
any policy discussion whilst the third indicator was an input indicator. In the social sectors, only 3 indicators<br />
were retained for health, all three depending on donor funded programmes, whilst only 2 output indicators<br />
were chosen for social housing: these five social indicators could hardly form the grounds for a dialogue on<br />
sector policy and strategy. Secondly, partly because of the nature of the indicators, the reviews appear not to<br />
have given rise to in-depth sector analysis but to have been limited to a rather narrow assessment of the value<br />
of the indicators. As a consequence, and possibly because the review of the indicators was carried out by<br />
external consultants, the link between performance indicator assessment and policy discussions was not made.<br />
Finally the evaluation system did not allow for much flexibility (whether because of external circumstances or<br />
because targets were set unrealistic) thus sometimes leading to unnecessarily harsh conclusions on targets<br />
achieved.<br />
What is interesting to note here is that fiscal management has sometimes 7 been deemed unsatisfactory by the<br />
EC (HQ mainly) but that this has never impeded full disbursement of the fixed tranches of BS; on the other<br />
hand, when PFM performance indicators for variable tranche release of PRBS did not reach their targets, they<br />
have led to the effective reduction of the amount disbursed 8 .<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
Consultants<br />
reports on<br />
performance<br />
indicator for<br />
I 4.1.2<br />
I 4.1.2<br />
Evidence of changes in GoG strategy following policy dialogue with <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Due to the unavailability of institutional memory both at the Delegation and the NAO’s office (the NAO’s<br />
task force having only been operational from 2005 onwards), no evidence has been found that any policy or<br />
other discussions between the GoG and the EC might have led to strategy changes by GoG. Taking the<br />
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variable tranche<br />
release<br />
indicator at the level of sector or tranche release discussions, it is very likely, as will be seen below in JC 4.2,<br />
that the repeated discussions on PFM issues (twice a year, once on general progress and once on specific<br />
indicators) have helped to raise awareness of the authorities on the importance of improving the soundness<br />
and transparency of the PFM systems and have thus contributed (even if indirectly) to current developments<br />
towards a well defined, prioritised and sequenced PFM reform programme. Similarly, in the health sector, the<br />
TA support to develop professional codes of practice funded by the EC eventually led the Ministry of Health<br />
to initiate a number of new bills on nursing practitioners, nursing standards and quality, health protection and<br />
promotion etc.<br />
In addition, the linkage of the amounts of the variable tranches to performance indicators might have<br />
influenced at least one of the government’s activities: the implementation of BS using the timely presentation<br />
of the budget to Parliament as one of the variable tranche indicators has coincided with the fact that budget<br />
presentation was brought forward from an average of end of March in the years 1998 to 2004 to end of<br />
January in 2005 and in 2006. It is to be noted incidentally that this important improvement did not benefit<br />
GoG in terms of the amount of variable tranche release since the EC considered this indicator as not having<br />
been reached, falling short of the end of December target. Whether or not it is the incentive of this particular<br />
indicator which has prompted GoG to improve the timeliness of its budget presentation thus remains<br />
equivocal.<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
FA<br />
PFM half yearly<br />
reports<br />
I 4.1.3<br />
I 4.1.3<br />
Participation and role of <strong>Commission</strong> in donor wide discussions on public finance management<br />
issues and PRSP<br />
Until recently (2007) no forum for discussions specifically dedicated to PFM issues existed even though many<br />
donors have been or are active in the PFM area: the IDB, the World Bank, the IMF and CIDA. Inter alia,<br />
these donors have been active in introducing integrated computerised financial and accounting management<br />
systems (IFMAS under CIDA and IDB funding); strengthening of audit and accounting functions (IMF,<br />
CIDA); legal environment, regulations and procedures (many donors); external debt management (IDB,<br />
DFiD, EC); tax reforms (IMF). The <strong>Commission</strong> has promoted improved public finance management in<br />
Guyana by using the progress in PFM as a general condition for fixed and variable tranche release and by<br />
introducing PFM performance criteria to leverage its disbursement of variable tranches (with PFM indicators<br />
weighing 40% of the total tranche). The <strong>Commission</strong> also financed TA in PFM areas such as fiscal<br />
projections, the elaboration of MTEF in the ministries of health, education, housing and public works. In this<br />
context, under the PRBS, the EC has also conducted six-monthly PFM reviews.<br />
It appears that each donor has traditionally assisted the GoG on specific issues, neither overlapping nor<br />
duplicating the efforts of other donors but not coordinating either within an overall mutually agreed and<br />
prioritised framework 9 . The basis for the interventions was mainly the diagnostic provided in 2002 by the<br />
CFAA (IMF) and the ROSC (WB). Donor-GoG coordination within a common framework has only recently<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 2
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
started with the joint undertaking in 2007 of a PEFA (including participation of the EU) which is intended to<br />
provide the basis for development of a global, prioritised and sequenced PFM reform programme and action<br />
plan.<br />
Similarly regarding PRSP discussions, as noted above, the EU has had no other role than the participation,<br />
likewise to other donors, in the national presentations and discussions of the PRSP during the review period.<br />
Again, this is currently changing: as the second PRSP is being prepared, donors have pulled together and have<br />
even issued a common statement with regards to funding of the PRSP preparation (see EQ8).<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 3
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
PRSP<br />
PRS 2004<br />
report<br />
JC 4.2<br />
The use of BS has contributed to improving the government’s planning and budgetary system<br />
including its public finance management capacity.<br />
One of the areas targeted by the Poverty Reduction Strategy concerned the fiscal policies. They aimed at:<br />
(i)<br />
increasing public sector savings via revenue generation (based on a broadening of the tax base, a<br />
reduction of rates and improvement of tax collection and administration) and expenditure control (based<br />
on improved recurrent/capital allocations, computerization of the public sector payroll and<br />
rationalization and streamlining of the public sector)<br />
(ii) reducing domestic indebtedness and<br />
(iii) improving the public accounting process through the strengthening of the Office of the Accountant<br />
General and the implementation of program budgeting in Government ministries and agencies by 2004.<br />
The 2004 and 2005 PRSP Progress Reports report considerable progress on the fronts of tax policy<br />
(broadening of the tax base, reducing marginal tax rates, tax payers identification registration, harmonising<br />
custom duties), tax administration and expenditure controls (an organic budget law was enacted, progress<br />
made towards joined recurrent/capital budgeting, wage bill computerised and integrated into the human<br />
resource data base).<br />
Programme budgeting was introduced in all ministries during 2004 but Expenditure Programming<br />
Management Units (EPMUs) were only functioning in the ministries of health and education due to capacity<br />
constraints. Some first steps were made to integrate the recurrent and capital budgets (issuance of a single<br />
budget circular; joint budget meetings) 10 . Progress was made on the implementation of the Fiscal Management<br />
and Accountability Act (FMAA), the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMAS, January 2004 and in<br />
strengthening the Project Cycle Management System and the prioritisation of public investment projects.<br />
PRS 2005<br />
report<br />
The EC’s PRBS was aiming to support these fiscal policies through the provision of TA in the areas of (i)<br />
medium term macro-fiscal projections, (ii) strengthening public debt management and (iii) introduction of<br />
MTEFs in the ministries of health, housing, public works and education (this latter TA was not initially<br />
foreseen in the financing agreement). In addition, the BS linked 40% of its variable tranche release to<br />
performance indicators in the area of PFM.<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 1
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
GoG/ MoF,<br />
PRBS 2004-<br />
2006, Six<br />
month Progress<br />
Reports,<br />
Technical<br />
reports on PFM<br />
and TA reports<br />
on MTEF,<br />
fiscal<br />
projections.<br />
I.4.2.1<br />
I.4.2.1<br />
Budget planning has improved and the budget is more realistic<br />
The PRBS financed TA 11 to help the Government in making fiscal projections and introducing MTEFs in the<br />
ministries of health and housing with the aim to improve budget planning. After some initial delays TA was<br />
recruited and the exercises were undertaken and completed in June 2006 (and even extended in the case of the<br />
MTEF to the ministries of education and public works).<br />
The Medium Term Fiscal Forecasting model and manual was developed by the EC funded TA but its effective<br />
use by the Budget Office has been constrained by staffing availability at the Budget Office and the lack of data<br />
required to run the model. In addition, as identified by the TA, the sustainability of the macroeconomic<br />
modelling function in the Budget Office required formal mechanisms of coordination, communication and<br />
reporting to be consolidated between the various institutions involved.<br />
In the case of MTEFs, the models were developed, manuals for preparing MTEFs were prepared and<br />
ministerial staff was trained. However, it appears that the success of this component has been jeopardised by<br />
the lack of appropriation of the model by the respective ministries, problem compounded by the fact that<br />
trained staff subsequently left the ministries. The MTEFs have not been updated since the TAs completed<br />
their tasks in 2006. This experience reflects both (i) an insufficient grasp of the constraints to be met for<br />
introducing MTEF which requires efforts sustained over a number of years (rather than flying visits of<br />
consultants over the period of a year) as well as a favourable environment which was not yet in place in<br />
Guyana (such as the need for a medium term strategic sector plan, program costing etc. which were correctly<br />
identified by the TA as being lacking in the ministries concerned) and (ii) the lack of leadership from the<br />
Ministry of Finance in conducting the MTEF exercise which is itself related to the lack of a coordinated, timed<br />
and sequenced PFM reform programme.<br />
The PRBS also linked seven PFM performance indicators to the release of 40% of its variable tranches in 2005<br />
and 2006. The impact that these performance indicators could have had on the advancement of the PFM<br />
system’s quality has however been severely limited by the fact that three of the indicators were directly linked<br />
to the provision of EC funded TA to the Ministry of Finance (in the fields of medium term fiscal projections,<br />
MTEFs and debt management) and one of the indicators was directly linked to the activities of an IDB funded<br />
project (IFMAS), thus linking 4 out of 7 indicators to the efficiency and effectiveness of donor activities rather<br />
than to GoG activities! In addition, the choice of the seventh indicator relating to the rate of budget execution<br />
of non salary operational expenditure in health and education relative to the rate for the same expenditure in<br />
the overall budget was probably not very judicious as the cash-based management of public expenditure in<br />
Guyana precludes by procedure any large variations between budgeted expenditure and realised expenditure<br />
(see I.4.2.1).<br />
In terms of improved budget planning, the contribution of the EC seems thus to have been limited on both<br />
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
accounts of the macro-fiscal projections and on the expenditure planning aspects, models having been<br />
produced but remaining (as yet) unused and performance indicators offering no great incentive for GoG to<br />
advance PFM reforms.<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
PRS 2005<br />
report<br />
MN 3<br />
MN 34<br />
MN 13<br />
MN 7<br />
Budgets 1996-<br />
2007<br />
Improvement of budget planning is a real preoccupation of the GoG and measures were announced in the<br />
2005 PRS report aiming to improve upon the monitoring of public expenditure effectiveness, that being an<br />
essential input into the improvement of budget planning. Systems based M&E databases were to be set up in<br />
line ministries to track poverty expenditure by region and the availability of statistics on social sector outputs<br />
and outcomes was to be reinforced through the Social Statistics Projects. These seem indeed to be essential<br />
components of a successful MTEF which could have received donor support before focusing on the<br />
development of the MTEF models themselves. In 2007, no substantial progress has yet been made on these<br />
two accounts but activities have started on the improvement of the social statistics (with IDB support). It is<br />
surprising that the EC, as only provider of BS and thus having the greatest stake in obtaining a clear view of<br />
budget priorities and budget effectiveness in attaining the policy objectives of the PRSP, has offered no<br />
assistance (other than the medium term modelisation of expenditure in 4 ministries) in setting up the enabling<br />
environment for better budget planning and monitoring (on statistics, support has been limited to some short<br />
term TA to the ministry of housing).<br />
The realism of the budget was checked during the field visit by comparing planned and realised levels of<br />
revenue and expenditure. In terms of revenue, the forecasts rely on that of the IMF and are relatively reliable.<br />
In terms of expenditure, since the budget is managed on a cash basis, budget expenditure outturns are almost<br />
always exactly identical to budget expenditure estimates. The table and graph below illustrate the budget<br />
expenditure outcomes against the budget estimates over the period 1997-2006 and show that budget<br />
expenditure plans have been relatively accurate and there has been no noticeable improvement of this accuracy<br />
since 1999.<br />
Table - Budget expenditure realised against budget estimates, in %, 1996 to 2006.<br />
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />
Recurrent budget 102% 126% 133% 102% 107% 98% 110% 106% 109% 108%<br />
Capital budget 101% 88% 97% 117% 100% 84% 83% 94% 111% 100%<br />
Total budget 102% 87% 104% 108% 100% 93% 99% 101% 110% 104%<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 2
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Budget outcomes: deviations from budget estimates<br />
0.40<br />
0.30<br />
% deviation<br />
0.20<br />
0.10<br />
-<br />
Recurrent budget<br />
Capital budget<br />
Total budget<br />
-0.10<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
2002<br />
2003<br />
2004<br />
2005<br />
2006<br />
-0.20<br />
Source: Calculated on the basis of realised budgets versus budget estimates: data provided in the Guyana<br />
Estimates of the Public Sector Current and Capital Revenue and Expenditure for the year 1996 to 2007 as<br />
presented to the National Assembly<br />
Overall, the EC having focussed on supporting specific aspects of the PFM system which have not been<br />
particularly successful as yet (or at least of which the benefits have not yet been reaped), its role in improving<br />
budget planning and budget realism cannot be ascertained: the most that can be said at this stage is that the<br />
EC support may have contributed to raising the awareness for the need of improved planning tools within the<br />
ministries of finance and the targeted sector ministries.<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
MN3<br />
Budget Speech<br />
2007<br />
Budgets 1996<br />
to 2007<br />
I.4.2.2<br />
I.4.2.2<br />
The budget is prepared with due regard to government policy<br />
In order to verify whether the budget is a true reflection of the GoG strategy and policy, some quantitative<br />
and qualitative analysis of the budget allocations across ministries and within ministries to priority areas and<br />
activities and of budget trends should be undertaken to check whether policy priorities are reflected in<br />
spending priorities. In this respect it is interesting to note that qualitative budget analysis and monitoring (see<br />
also I 4.3.1) is not routinely undertaken in Guyana and that little publicly available information exists outside<br />
the Public Expenditure Review undertaken by the WB in 1999 (published in 2002). Whether budgetary<br />
allocations have been made according to policy priorities is the harder to ascertain that recurrent and capital<br />
budget preparation and hearings have so far (until 2007) been totally separate processes; this, compounded by<br />
the lack of strategic plan and of programme costing in many sectors, may have seriously constrained budgetary<br />
analysis as a tool for budget allocation decisions. However, as will be shown in JC 4.3, trends in social<br />
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
8<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
4<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
8<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
4<br />
FAs, NAO<br />
Task Force,<br />
Guyana<br />
Budgets<br />
I.4.2.3<br />
I.4.2.3<br />
J.C 4.2<br />
conclusion<br />
JC 4.3<br />
I 4.3.1<br />
I 4.3.1<br />
spending have shown increased budget allocations to the social ministries thus reflecting the orientations taken<br />
in the PRSP.<br />
The predictability of the budget has improved<br />
This question could not be verified during the field mission. It may however be noted that the predictability of<br />
the budget may have been enhanced further if the variable tranches were disbursed earlier in the budgetary<br />
year. Under PRBS, because of the choice of performance indicators, evaluations of variable tranche<br />
disbursement could only take place during the last quarter of the year (awaiting available statistics) thus<br />
effectively leading to the release of funds only in early December at the best.<br />
On the whole, the PFM did generally improve over the ten year period under consideration. Donors having<br />
undertaken the PEFA in 2007 agree that most PEFA indicators which were also covered in the World Bank<br />
CFAA of 2002 did improve. However, the contribution of the EC’s BS to this development is difficult to<br />
assess: the appropriateness, effectiveness and sustainability of work performed by the TA in the two PFM<br />
areas remains doubtful and performance indicators chosen in the PFM area did not really measure GoG’s<br />
efforts at undertaking PFM reforms thus providing little incentive for GoG to improve the PFM systems.<br />
This evaluation also expresses concern over the effectiveness and sustainability of the PFM strengthening<br />
initiatives taken in the past by the EC as they have been implemented in the void of a general PFM reform<br />
programme with a prioritised, timed and costed action plan and thus neither piloted by nor actively supported<br />
by the Ministry of Finance.<br />
Finally, in absence of information as to the initial reasons for choosing TA to design the MTEFs in the four<br />
social ministries, it appears with hindsight that TA support could have been better used, for example to<br />
prepare the grounds for later introduction of MTEFs (such as may be required in the fields of access to<br />
reliable statistical data, strengthening of M&E functions, strengthening of the programme budgeting, notably<br />
by assisting in developing programme and activities costs, etc.).<br />
BS has contributed to establishing sustainable levels of public expenditure in the social sectors<br />
Trends in budgeted and realised expenditure in social sectors<br />
Because execution levels of execution of budget estimates are very good (see I 4.2.1) the indicator has<br />
considered exclusively the executed expenditures in social sectors. The BS provided by the EC under the ten<br />
year period has represented a total of just over €30 million which have been disbursed as follows:<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
1998 2000 2001 2004 2005 2006<br />
EC BS in million of Euros 5,3 2,1 3,3 6,0 8,7 5,9<br />
EC BS as % of social public expenditure 6,5% 1,4% 2,7% 6,7% 8,6% 4,4%<br />
EC BS as % of total budget expenditure 2,6% 0,7% 1,1% 2,4% 2,7% 1,4%<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 4
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Source: EC files, NAO information and Budget Estimates and realisations.<br />
Over the same period, social sector ministries have seen both a rise in their respective shares of total public<br />
expenditure and in their expenditure as a share of GDP as follows 12 :<br />
Table - Evolution of social sector budget realisations relative to GDP and to total realised public expenditure.<br />
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
revised budget<br />
Social expenditure as % of GDP<br />
Housing 0.2% 0.8% 1.0% 0.8% 1.0% 1.0% 1.2% 1.3% 2.0% 1.6% 1.4% 1.3%<br />
Education 3.9% 6.4% 7.6% 7.4% 16.0% 10.4% 10.1% 9.0% 9.3% 9.5% 9.2% 8.7%<br />
Health 2.7% 3.8% 4.3% 4.5% 4.0% 3.4% 4.5% 5.3% 5.0% 5.0% 5.5% 6.0%<br />
Social Welfare 4.4% 3.1% 2.3% 2.1% 2.1% 3.5% 6.1% 1.7% 2.0% 2.8% 3.6% 3.1%<br />
Total social sectors as % of GDP 11.1% 14.2% 15.3% 14.8% 23.1% 18.4% 21.9% 17.2% 18.2% 18.8% 19.8% 19.2%<br />
Total social sectors as % of total expenditure 26.5% 34.7% 39.9% 36.1% 50.1% 38.5% 49.7% 33.9% 36.2% 31.0% 31.2% 35.1%<br />
Source: Calculated on the basis of data provided in the Guyana Estimates of the Public Sector Current and<br />
Capital Revenue and Expenditure for the year 1996 to 2007 as presented to the National Assembly<br />
Social sector expenditure as % of GDP, 1996-2007<br />
% of GDP<br />
25,0%<br />
20,0%<br />
15,0%<br />
10,0%<br />
5,0%<br />
0,0%<br />
Housing<br />
Education<br />
Health<br />
Social Welfare<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
2002<br />
2003<br />
2004<br />
2005<br />
2006 revised<br />
2007 budget<br />
Total social sector public<br />
expenditure as % of GDP<br />
During the period, the weight of public expenditure in the social sectors has increased from about 11% of<br />
GDP in 1996 to more than 23% in 2000 and seems settled around 19% of GDP since 2005 thus showing a<br />
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
definite positive trend in line with PRSP objectives. The change in the trend occurred around 2000 when<br />
HIPC debt relief kicked in with its associated condition of spending debt relief on social sectors; according to<br />
the WB public expenditure review (2002) social sector spending in the beginning of the 1990’s represented<br />
only 6,5% of GDP whilst it continued hovering around 10% of GDP during the 1990s.<br />
In terms of GoG’s effort to increase the relative shares of expenditures for social sector activities compared to<br />
overall public expenditure, the trend is less marked: social expenditure increased from 26.5% of total<br />
expenditure in 1996 to just over 35% of total expenditure budgeted for 2007, with peaks of 50% and 49.7% in<br />
2000 and 2002 but there is no overall trend over the ten year period as shown in the graph below.<br />
Total social sector public expenditure as % of total public expenditure<br />
% of total public expenditure<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
years<br />
2002<br />
2003<br />
2004<br />
2005<br />
2006 revised<br />
2007 budget<br />
8<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
4<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
MN 3<br />
MN 34<br />
MN 10<br />
I 4.3.1<br />
On the whole, and whilst it is recognised that social sector expenditure as a share of GDP has risen strongly<br />
over the period, this is in a general context of rising public expenditure as a share of GDP, thus dampening<br />
the extent to which resources have actually been re-allocated within the budget. It would have been interesting<br />
to check whether pro-poor expenditures within the social expenditure have been favoured over the last 10<br />
years; unfortunately this type of qualitative analysis is not routinely performed in Guyana. The GoG was to<br />
undertake an analysis of poverty related expenditure in priority poverty programmes but in fact, since the<br />
public expenditure review of 1999 (undertaken with World Bank support), nothing has been done (no analysis<br />
of public spending, no expenditure tracking surveys, etc) apart from the informal budget assessments done<br />
quarterly by spending agencies to review their work programmes. In 2007, for the first time, the 2006 budget<br />
outturn was analysed and will be looked at in Parliament. This remains however a far cry from the budget<br />
analysis which would provide evidence to verify that increased spending has been effective in providing<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 6
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
MN 3<br />
MN 13<br />
I.4.3.2<br />
I.4.3.2<br />
MN 13 JC 4.3<br />
conclusion<br />
PRS 2004<br />
report<br />
JC 4.4<br />
I 4.4.1<br />
I 4.4.1<br />
improved social service delivery in line with poverty reduction objectives as stated in the PRSP. The<br />
professional expertise required for this type of qualitative analyses is lacking in the Ministry of Finance: there is<br />
a need to strengthen the Ministry’s capacity for policy analysis.<br />
Funding mechanisms are in place for maintenance and operation of social infrastructure<br />
There appear to be no other funding mechanisms for the maintenance and operation of social infrastructure<br />
than the normal state budget. In the health sector, some partnership/collaboration exists between the private<br />
and the public sectors in specialised areas such as CTNMRI, operation of the cardiac unit, cancer treatment<br />
(radiology): in these partnerships, the public sector provides the infrastructure and the equipment whilst the<br />
private sector provides the expertise. Private sector treatment is subject to user charges which are agreed with<br />
the public sector for public sector referral patients. The private sector covers 10% to 15% of the health sector<br />
(including dialysis where patients get direct subsidies from public sector).<br />
Finally, the extent to which EC BS may have contributed to maintaining the shares of public expenditure to<br />
the social sectors in total expenditure cannot be established, funds being fungible 13 . The least that can be<br />
ascertained is that BS has eased the financing gap of the GoG thus enabling it to increase its room for<br />
manoeuvre in budget allocation decisions. The conditions for disbursement of BS by partly focussing on<br />
increasing budget allocations to social sectors and in particular on securing adequate levels of (non-salary)<br />
operating costs may also have helped. Both the SASP and the PRBS used such input indicators. In SAS-V , the<br />
condition for release of the second tranche pertained to the attainment of expenditure targets in the social<br />
sectors and for poverty alleviation agreed in the HIPC and in particular of the attainment of expenditure<br />
allocations towards the education, health and housing and water sectors and within those specifically<br />
expenditure allocations towards works, supplies and maintenance 14 . In the PRBS, the outturn of non-salary<br />
operating expenditure in the health and education sectors relative to that of the same expenditure in the<br />
overall budget was a performance indicator used for variable tranche release in 2005 and 2006.<br />
In addition, it has been recognised that the good performance on health indicators monitored by the EC has<br />
led to more secure budget allocations for the programmes which outcomes are monitored for BS tranche<br />
release (HIV child-mother, immunisation rates and TB DOTS), thus putting a direct link between the BS<br />
provided and the budget allocation decisions of the GoG.<br />
What remains lacking is the monitoring and analysis of public expenditure quality which is essential to verify<br />
the effectiveness of the undertaken expenditure in achieving the objectives of the PRSP.<br />
The GoG is carrying out planned expenditures<br />
Evolution of external account balance and budget balance as share of GDP<br />
Due to the macro-economic instability and the temporary suspension of the IMF programme, donor inflows<br />
at the end of 2002 and during 2003 were much lower than originally anticipated in the PRSP thus jeopardising<br />
planned expenditure levels. In 2002, requirements for the PRSP implementation had been estimated at<br />
US$223 million but only US$139 million materialised (of which official transfers 33 million and programme<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 7
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
9<br />
ACP<br />
GUA<br />
6&7<br />
PRSP 2004<br />
annual review<br />
IBM report<br />
Nomade<br />
presentation of<br />
29 th of March<br />
2007<br />
I 4.4.2<br />
I 4.4.2<br />
JC 4.5<br />
loans 7 million). In 2003 however, the financing requirements for the PRSP were of US$ 257 million of which<br />
only US$ 97 million materialised (official transfers fell to US$30 million and programme loans contributed<br />
US$12 million). No figures were published in the PRS 2005 report to ascertain whether external financing<br />
levels materialised as foreseen or not in 2005. In the absence of detailed and coherent balance of payments<br />
data 15 for 2005 and beyond, it has not been possible to verify whether - and if yes to what extent – expected<br />
external support levels did materialise and whether or not the expenditure levels initially foreseen to be<br />
undertaken under the PRSP were indeed implemented.<br />
Public expenditure outcomes: budget execution in the social sectors, in particular pro-poor<br />
expenditure<br />
The PRBS includes one single indicator on the outturn of health and education expenditure (health/education<br />
non salary recurrent budget execution rate versus overall non salary recurrent expenditure execution) and the<br />
target of this indicator has been achieved in both 2004 and 2005. However, this indicator is extremely narrow<br />
as it measures only the execution rate, not the relative budget allocations to the social sectors which are also of<br />
interest in the context of BS. This information was collected during the field visit and has shown (see above in<br />
JC 4.3 and I 4.3.1) that although social sector expenditure as a share of GDP has risen steadily over the period,<br />
the actual share of social expenditure within total expenditure has remained more or less constant over the<br />
period. As seen in I 4.3.1, the crucial question that remains to be answered is that of the quality of the social<br />
sector expenditure about which no information is available (the last public expenditure review was that<br />
undertaken by the World Bank in 1999 published in 2002).<br />
Social conditions have improved<br />
Assessing whether BS may have had an impact upon the overarching objective of improving social conditions<br />
and reducing poverty levels in Guyana raises methodological issues which are the greater that the BS is<br />
proportionately small compared to the country’s total budget. The assumption is that BS provides (i) greater<br />
fiscal space (see JC 4.4) and (ii) an incentive for budgetary allocations to be better aligned with PRSP policies<br />
and priorities (see JC 4.3) which would lead to an improved services delivery and finally a stronger<br />
achievement of the country’s PRSP objectives. In order to verify whether BS may have contributed to the<br />
impact of the PRSP implementation on social conditions, the approach is twofold. Firstly the evaluation<br />
reviews whether the policies and priorities outlined in the PRSP have indeed been implemented; secondly<br />
whether this has had an impact upon the population’s living conditions, in particular on the most<br />
disadvantaged groups.<br />
The main goals of Guyana’s poverty reduction strategy PRSP 2002-2005 (November 2001) focus on:<br />
PRSP 2002-<br />
2005<br />
• Sustained economic expansion;<br />
• Access to social services including education, health, water and housing;<br />
• Expansion of social safety nets.<br />
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PRS report<br />
2004<br />
PRS report<br />
2005<br />
To achieve these goals, the strategy rests on seven pillars:<br />
(i) Creating the environment for broad-based, jobs generating economic growth;<br />
(ii) Environmental protection;<br />
(iii) Strengthening institutions and improving governance;<br />
(iv) Accelerating investment in human capital, with emphasis on basic education and primary health;<br />
(v) Increasing investment in physical capital, with emphasis on better and broader provision of safe water<br />
and sanitation services, farm-to-market roads, drainage and irrigation systems, and housing;<br />
(vi) Improving safety nets;<br />
(vii) Designing special intervention programmes to address regional pockets of poverty.<br />
PRSP implementation was slower than initially foreseen. Until end 2003, implementation was jeopardised by<br />
social and political unrest, lower than expected inflows of donor support and foreign direct investment and the<br />
inability to reach a political consensus required for advancement of the PRS process. Guyana’s macroeconomic<br />
programme was judged off-track by the IMF in 2002: the main donors interrupted their BS and the<br />
enhanced HIPC completion point was not reached until December 2003. Slippages on the macro-economic<br />
front resulted in the need to update the PRSP with economic growth and government revenue collection both<br />
much lower than anticipated 16 .<br />
Nevertheless, it is estimated that in 2004 the government accomplished more than 80% of its planned actions<br />
under the PRSP Progress Report 2004 17 . Progress was made in enacting laws on transparency and<br />
accountability, in giving local government greater autonomy in raising revenues and in implementing social<br />
sector policies. In education, the Education Strategic Plan was started (it aims for reduced repetition and dropout<br />
rates, increased secondary enrolment, reduced overcrowding, absenteeism, teacher training and increased<br />
non salary recurrent expenditures). In health, the National Health Plan was implemented focusing on<br />
HIV/AIDs, training of health staff, upgrading of health facilities, delivery of drugs and medical supplies and<br />
reduction of infant and maternal mortality rates. Improved water and sanitation was facilitated through<br />
reforms in the water sector which also address tariffs to eventually fully cover maintenance and depreciation<br />
costs of water & sewerage provision. A master plan for social housing, in particular for squatters, was also<br />
developed as were specific safety net programmes in the Linden area (see EQ3) and the hinterland areas<br />
(regions 1, 8 and 9).<br />
Unfortunately, the improvement of the coverage, timeliness, quantity, quality and use of survey data which was<br />
recognised as a key item in the PRS and the PRS 2004 report, has still not been implemented in 2007. The<br />
strengthening of the Bureau of Statistics, without which this exercise would be very difficult, has only just<br />
started with IDB support. As a result, there have been no new poverty data available since the PRSP was<br />
launched in 2001 (it used the 1992 HICS data) and currently available social data rely on the collection of data<br />
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at sector level of which the reliability is not guaranteed by the Bureau of Statistics which has no oversight on<br />
these ministerial statistics divisions.<br />
I 4.5.1<br />
I 4.5.1<br />
Performance of PRSP indicators measuring access to health, housing and water such as infant<br />
immunisation rates (measles and DPT), % of population with access to health services, % of<br />
population with access to adequate sanitation, house lots distributed, land/house titles distributed.<br />
Despite the setting up of the PRS M&E Unit in the Policy Coordination and Programme Management Unit<br />
(PCPMU) of the Office of the President, the M&E functions for the PRS have been slow in becoming<br />
effective. The household income and expenditure survey (HIES) was supposed to be carried out in 2003, then<br />
in 2005 but was finally launched in 2006: its results are expected to be published in November 2007 after<br />
clearing by the Cabinet. There are thus no updated statistical data on poverty or living conditions since the<br />
publication of the results of the 1992 HICS; a poverty mapping exercise was undertaken in 2007 on the basis<br />
of the results of the 2002 Census and this is useful for determining regional incidences of poverty. In the<br />
absence of quantitative poverty data, the PRS reports have relied on sector indicators capturing the access to<br />
basic services as a way to measure the evolution of living standards.<br />
On these bases, the PRSP indicators presented in the 2004 PRS report show mixed results. In education, most<br />
indicators but those for secondary education achieved levels exceeding their targets; in health four out of<br />
seven indicators were however not achieved, in particular those related to HIV and the infant mortality rate.<br />
Achievements in the access to potable water, housing and land were also mixed. The tables below are<br />
reproduced from the 2005 PRS Progress Report and show the main indicators with their targets and<br />
achievements.<br />
Table- PRSP indicators, targets ad achievements, 2000 to 2004.<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br />
Population below the national poverty line 35,1 34,9 34 33,1 32,2<br />
Actual - - - - -<br />
Total pro-poor spending (%GDP) 11,7 13,8 14,4 14,5 14,7<br />
Actual 18,4 19,2 18,5 17,1 17,1<br />
% primary school entrants reaching Grade 6 83,5 84 84,6 85,7 86,9<br />
Actual 83,4 83,5 88,3 88,3 88,7<br />
Repetition rate (secondary) 12,9 12,6 12,3 11,2 10,1<br />
Actual 12,9 12,9 12,6 11,8 10,6<br />
Student/trained teacher ratio (primary) 54:1 53:1 53:1 52:1 50:1<br />
Actual 54:1 50:1 50:1 51:1 50:1<br />
Student/trained teacher ratio (secondary) 37:1 36:1 35:1 34:1 33:1<br />
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Actual 37:1 38:1 38:1 39:1 40:1<br />
Gross nursery school enrolment 87 87 88 90 91<br />
Actual 87 87 88 91 92<br />
Gross primary school enrolment 110 107 105 102 100<br />
Actual 110 107 105 104 102<br />
Gross secondary school enrolment 62 65 68 70 72<br />
Actual 62 65 65 65 73<br />
% trained teachers in secondary schools 55 56 57 60 62<br />
Actual 57,5 58,5 58,5 57,1 54,2<br />
% trained teachers in primary schools 49 49 52 55 58<br />
Actual 50 53 54 56 59,4<br />
Number of CXC passes 46,7 51,4 52,5 55,5 58<br />
Actual 73,3 74,5 77,1 75,8 76,3<br />
Infant mortality rate (per 10,000) 57 56 50 47 45<br />
Actual 57 56 54 54 53<br />
Maternal mortality rate (per 10,000) 188 187 170 160 145<br />
Actual 188 187 126 124 122<br />
1 year olds immunized against measles 88,9 90,2 93,3 95,5 97,1<br />
Actual 88,9 90,4 93,5 95,8 97,5<br />
1 year olds immunized against DPT 85,6 88,2 90,2 90,8 91,3<br />
Actual 85,6 88,2 91 91 92,8<br />
% with access to health services 90,4 90,5 92,5 93,7 93,8<br />
Actual 90,4 90,5 90,7 91,3 92,8<br />
Number of reported cases of AIDS 248 227 225 220 210<br />
Actual 248 435 450 475 480<br />
Reported cases of AIDS among women (15-45<br />
cohort) 95 112 100 98 95<br />
Actual 95 123 128 131 133<br />
% with access to treated water 35,4 36,2 44,7 45,1 48,9<br />
Actual 35,4 36,2 44,7 45,1 46,9<br />
Domestic household connected to water system 65 000 68 200 71 500 73 400 75 000<br />
Actual 65 000 95 180 114 266 120 072 125 763<br />
Distribution network constructed (km) 230 250 263 275 278<br />
Actual 230 250 255 265 280<br />
% with access to adequate sanitation 88 89 90 90 90<br />
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PRS report<br />
2004<br />
I 4.5.2<br />
I 4.5.2<br />
I 4.5.3<br />
I 4.5.3<br />
Actual 52 52 53 55 56<br />
House lots distributed 22 795 3 500 4 750 6 200 6 000<br />
Actual 22 735 975 4 195 4 739 4 916<br />
Land/house titles distributed 1 750 2 015 5 200 10 200 12 000<br />
Actual 1 750 2 416 7 474 6 020 5 003<br />
Based on a comparison between the 1999 census data, the intermediary data from the Living Conditions<br />
Survey of 1999 (which gave only very partial seasonal and geographic cover of the population) and the 2002<br />
census data, the PRS 2005 shows that:<br />
(i) on housing, the proportion of households owning or renting their homes decreased during the 1990’s<br />
whilst the incidence of squatting and free rent accommodation increased steeply;<br />
(ii) access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation facilities increased strongly (respectively from 50% in<br />
1990 to 74% of households in 2002 and for sanitation from 31% in 1991 to 40% of households in 2002)<br />
despite regional disparities remaining;<br />
(iii) education enrolment increased, especially in secondary education (from 52% in 1980 to 54% in 1991 and<br />
65% in 2002) and educational attainment also increased (whilst in 1990 only 6,217 students went through<br />
higher education, they were 22,967 in 2002);<br />
(iv) in health all access indicators improved dramatically (number of doctors, nurses, beds etc per patient) with<br />
a consequent lowering of infant and maternal mortality rates.<br />
These results confirm that social statistical data in Guyana should be treated with some caution since different<br />
sources provide not only differing absolute results but sometimes even contradictory results such as is the case<br />
for infant mortality rates for example.<br />
Quality of available social services<br />
The M&E structures that were meant to monitor the implementation of the PRS (the joint civil society-GoG<br />
Steering Committee and the PRS regional M&E committees) were established late and did not fully become<br />
effective. There has thus been only very limited and indirect feedback from the population on the<br />
improvement of social services delivery (through newspaper articles or letters to the press). At the same this<br />
information gap has not been filled by the collection of statistical data: one qualitative survey (other than the<br />
HICS of 2006 of which the results are still awaited) has been undertaken during the period by the Bureau of<br />
Statistics with IDB and Unicef funding but again the data are not yet available. There are thus no data available<br />
on the quality of social services delivered under the PRSP.<br />
Living conditions<br />
Again, as above, the information will only become available with publication of the results of the HICS<br />
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undertaken in 2006, possibly complemented by the results of the IDB/Unicef survey of 2006 which was a<br />
more qualitative survey.<br />
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P Nber Source<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 MR, midterm<br />
evaluation of<br />
the GMPP<br />
(2007), 9 th<br />
EDF CSP<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 MR, midterm<br />
evaluation of<br />
the GMPP<br />
(2007), 9 th<br />
EDF CSP<br />
EQ 5 To what extent have <strong>Commission</strong> interventions contributed to empowering civil society<br />
organisations and ultimately to improving the socio-economic conditions of local<br />
communities?<br />
JC 5.1 <strong>Commission</strong> intervention was in line with the CSP/NIP strategy and with the GoG policy<br />
I 5.1.1 Degree of alignment of the programme IL with the IL of the NIP/CSP<br />
I 5.1.1 The GMPP accords with EC strategy for co-operation in Guyana and the 9 th EDF NIP for 2002-2007<br />
which made specific provision for a micro-projects programme. The NIP specifically mentions microprojects<br />
as part of the renewed developmental approach. The project purpose of the GMPP seeks to<br />
improve the socio-economic conditions of vulnerable groups of the Guyanese population through the<br />
development of sustainable and participatory self-help schemes: i.e 75 micro-projects at the community<br />
level focusing on the areas of: employment / income generation, training/education, communication<br />
and good governance, and other socioeconomic sectors. In the 9 th EDF CSP, poverty reduction is the<br />
main objective and the significance of the support to economic actors and civil society is emphasised.<br />
I 5.1.2 Discrepancies between the programme and the strategy are explicitly justified<br />
I 5.1.2 There are no discrepancies<br />
I 5.1.3<br />
Degree of alignment of the programme with the GoG policy<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 Mid-term<br />
evaluation of<br />
the GMPP<br />
(2007)<br />
I 5.1.3<br />
JC 5.2<br />
I 5.2.1<br />
The GMPP is aligned with the government policy and the PRSP as it seeks to improve the socioeconomic<br />
conditions o vulnerable groups of the Guyanese population. Moreover, the programme is<br />
consistent with government policy to increase community participation in poverty programmes.<br />
Local communities have better access to socio-economic infrastructure<br />
Clear reference in the programming document to the promotion of socio-economic<br />
development of local communities<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 5.2.1 The GMPP clearly targets the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of vulnerable groups of<br />
the Guyanese population. The completion of 75 micro-projects at the community level focusing on the<br />
areas of employment/income generation, training/education, communication and good governance,<br />
other socio-economic sectors aims at achieving the project purpose.<br />
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9 ACP GUA 1 FA, MR,<br />
mid-term<br />
evaluation of<br />
the GMPP<br />
(2007)<br />
I 5.2.2<br />
I 5.2.2<br />
New socio-economic services are available in the communities supported<br />
The GMPP has only been operational since September 2005 owing to delays in start-up and<br />
implementation. The first 35 micro-projects have only been completed at the end of 2006 or in the early<br />
2007. It is therefore too early to assess the overall impact of the GMPP. Even if all projects are<br />
implemented successfully, due to the small sample of micro-projects, it is difficult to measure their<br />
overall impact. It should be noted that MPP investments only meet a small part of the country’s needs<br />
due to the limited number of projects financed.<br />
When assessing the impact of the projects already completed, it is undeniable that a number of<br />
communities which received support for a micro-project have better access to socio-economic services.<br />
Communities also placed a high value on the contribution the GMPP support made to meet their<br />
specific needs for socio-economic improvement. Examples include:<br />
- construction of bridges which link separate areas of an Amerindian community<br />
- improved access to school and health centres as well as to cultivate land and transport the<br />
produce<br />
- construction of community buildings where social and skills training will take place<br />
- women with marginal incomes given equipment and knowledge to set up food processing<br />
facilities<br />
- etc.<br />
According to the MTR, few micro-projects address directly the needs for employment and income<br />
generating activities in a substantive way that can have direct impact whereas the distribution of funds<br />
foreseen at the design favored this type of activities. Indeed, only 21% of micro-projects are for income<br />
generation/employment (compared to 50% planned in the FA). 50% of micro-projects are for other<br />
socio-economic sectors or social infrastructure (instead of 25% initially planned) and 29% in training /<br />
education (instead of 25% planned). This imbalance reduces the effectiveness of the GMPP to address<br />
the real socio-economic problems felt by the community groups. This raises concern as to whether<br />
projects selected by the GMPB really address the most effective means whereby poverty can be tackled.<br />
More projects in income generation/employment generation especially in the rural interior would have a<br />
more direct impact on poverty reduction for vulnerable groups.<br />
JC 5.3 The capacity for self-help of local communities has increased<br />
I 5.3.1 Evidence that MPP is conceived to be undertaken at the request of local communities<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 5.3.1 The FA foresees implementation measures that ensure the demand-driven character of the programme.<br />
The local communities prepare micro-projects proposal and submit them to the GMPO. The GMPO or<br />
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contracted intermediate organisations assist the communities in formulating and writing the proposals<br />
when needed. The GMPO is then screening and scoring the proposals. The GMPO sends to the GMPB<br />
all the proposals for micro-projects and the latter either accepts or rejects them.<br />
I 5.3.2 Clear reference to participation of local communities in the programming documents<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 5.3.2 Community participation is stated as a major element in the design of the MPP. Local communities will<br />
be required to contribute to 25% of project costs in order to ensure ownership of the micro-projects.<br />
The empowerment of local communities is however not a purpose in itself but a means to reach the<br />
project purpose: improve the socio-economic conditions of vulnerable groups of the Guyanese<br />
population through the development of participatory self-help schemes.<br />
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I 5.3.3 Evidence that MPP is based on needs assessment undertaken by local communities<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 5.3.3 The realisation of needs assessments are not foreseen in the FA. However, the projects proposals, most<br />
of the time prepared by the NGOs or CBOs themselves, present clear ideas and needs of the<br />
community.<br />
I 5.3.4 Evidence that an adequate level of capacity-building investment has been foreseen in the<br />
programme<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 FA, MPP<br />
evaluation<br />
I 5.3.4 6.8% of the total GMPP has been allocated to the strengthening of civil society in the FA. The MPP<br />
evaluation highlighted that on average 7% of total activities during the 7 th , 8 th and 9 th EDF and 8,5% for<br />
the 9 th EDF were allocated to capacity building and reported that capacity-building investment has been<br />
low. As a consequence, the share of capacity building investment in the total budget for the GMPP is<br />
considered as low. The MPP evaluation also stated that capacity-building investments require sufficient<br />
time and resource allocation to have an effect on the local communities. We can therefore foresee that<br />
the impact of the GMPP on local communities will be limited.<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 FA, Midterm<br />
evaluation of<br />
the GMPP<br />
(2007)<br />
I 5.3.5<br />
I 5.3.5<br />
Evidence that local communities benefited from capacity-building<br />
2 critical assumptions have been made at the design stage of the programme:<br />
- communities have the capacity to identify and implement viable micro-projects<br />
- existence and capacity of local non-state actors to assist local communities in meeting the<br />
requirements for preparing and in executing projects under a call or proposals mechanism<br />
But these assumptions proved to be wrong:<br />
- the capacity of the communities has proved to be weak<br />
- 25 NGOs have been registered with the GMMPO; the actual number with the required capacity<br />
is much less<br />
Design did not pay sufficient attention to the need to build the capacity of community organisations.<br />
The GMPP is indeed primarily focused on the delivery of micro-projects and strengthening of NSAs –<br />
through training in rapid participatory analysis of poverty problems- to achieve that purpose. The<br />
GMPP indeed trained CBOs and NGOs in problem and need analysis, EU grant management and<br />
Project cycle management.<br />
But more attention could have been paid in the design to allow more time and resources to the need for<br />
capacity building and systematic training of CBOs and NGOs in project preparation, application as well<br />
as training in grant management before the start of the implementation.<br />
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National<br />
Development<br />
Strategy<br />
JC 5.4<br />
I 5.4.1<br />
I 5.4.1<br />
I 5.4.2<br />
Moreover, strengthening of civil society would need in itself a substantive programme of activities.<br />
Other complementary training could include association management, meeting techniques, democratic<br />
rules and attitudes, training in human rights, legal rights, civil rights, advocacy policy etc.<br />
If institutional strengthening was the major purpose of the GMPP, then MPs would be a means to<br />
achieve that objective through the building of local capacity to deliver projects. Rather than designing<br />
the programme with micro-projects as a means to build community level capacity and civil society<br />
strengthening, the design has a focus whereby the means of MPs to reduce poverty is the end in itself.<br />
Civil society organisations participate more in the development process<br />
Evidence of local development process weaknesses in policy papers<br />
Given the nature of the country’s history and its current constitution, there is little participation by<br />
Guyanese non-governmental groups and other sections of civil society, in the formulation of public<br />
policies and in their implementation. Opposition parties, as always in the country’s political history, are<br />
not routinely and formally consulted on legislative matters, nor are the trades unions and the private<br />
sector. It seems to be the rule that such organisations are asked to participate in the decision-making<br />
processes only in times of crisis, particularly when there is industrial strife and political violence. Often,<br />
the only objective of the political exercise is to confound the opposing political party. In such<br />
circumstances, opacity in government is seen as a virtue, and transparency an impediment in the exercise<br />
of power.<br />
The current systems of local and regional government also do not lend themselves to meaningful<br />
participation. Indeed, in many respects, they accentuate the imperfections of the central government, by<br />
replicating both the winner-take-all syndrome, and the absence of statutory and formal procedures for<br />
consultation. If anything, because the power to make decisions which impinge upon regional and village<br />
life rests almost entirely with the Centre, the peripheral systems impede, rather than assist, the<br />
development of local democracy. For example, budgetary allocations and expenditure are controlled by<br />
the Centre; the most senior regional public servant is employed by the central government and reports<br />
directly to the minister responsible for regional and local government; and the laws which the regional<br />
and local authorities administer are initiated, enacted, and imposed by the Centre. It follows, therefore,<br />
that no matter what the political allegiance and complexion of the regional and local governments, the<br />
economic and social decisions which influence and control the lives of their citizens are made by the<br />
Centre.<br />
Clear reference to this objective in the programming documents<br />
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9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 5.4.2 The FA makes a clear reference to this objective. The 4th result of the GMPP is a “Regular and<br />
structured dialogue between government and civil society”. Activities such as joint statements on sector<br />
approaches and participation on PRSP sector issues are explicitly mentioned in the FA.<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 Mid-term<br />
evaluation of<br />
the GMPP<br />
(2007)<br />
I 5.4.3<br />
I 5.4.3<br />
Measures to ensure the strengthening of civil society are in place<br />
Only one activity out of the four foreseen in the FA was due to be held. The annual workshop planned<br />
in late 2006 was not held as the new Board, responsible for organising it, has not been constituted.<br />
The measures in place to assist civil society in participation in the dialogue with the government related<br />
to poverty reduction strategy are not strong and broad enough to strengthen civil society. A support is<br />
indeed needed in human development training, advocacy techniques, media training, debates, etc.<br />
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9 ACP GUA 1 FA, Midterm<br />
evaluation of<br />
the GMPP<br />
(2007)<br />
I 5.4.4<br />
I 5.4.4<br />
Extent to which the MP-Office/Board implemented and facilitated MP development and<br />
cooperation with civil society<br />
The implementation procedures of the programme are defined in the FA. The FA describes the<br />
respective roles and functions between the EC Delegation, NAO, GMPB and GMPO in the<br />
organisational structure for GMPP. The project implementation will be supervised and co-ordinated by<br />
the GMPB. The NAO is responsible for the implementation of the MPP, with the EC as an observer.<br />
The GMPO will be responsible for the day-to-day management of the programme. But clarification<br />
upon these roles has been needed, mainly between NAO and EC. Regular meetings have been held to<br />
facilitate greater understanding of these roles and responsibilities for management of GMPP.<br />
More specifically, there are some difficulties of interpretation as to the overall role of the GMPB in<br />
respect of their functions vis-à-vis the GMPO. The Chairperson has somehow interfered in the<br />
management of the operations of the GMPO. The MTR stressed that the Chairperson has to<br />
understand the organizational management structure and roles defined in the FA with regard to the<br />
delegation of the supervisory role for day-to-day management of GMPP to the GMPO.<br />
Moreover, there have been some disagreements between the EC Delegation and the government on the<br />
composition of the MPPB and between the EC delegation and the TA on the implementation<br />
modalities of the programme. The setting-up of a new Board –foreseen for the end of 2006- has been<br />
delayed to 2007 due to EC concerns as to the validity of the election process at the workshop held for<br />
that purpose end of 2006. The MTR raised concern as to the extent of the pool of people in civil society<br />
from which new Board members can be drawn.<br />
These difficulties somehow prevented the GMPB and GMPO to facilitate MP development in an<br />
effective way.<br />
JC 5.5 Results achieved by <strong>Commission</strong> support are maintained after the end of its direct support<br />
I 5.5.1 Explicit reference in the FA to measures to ensure sustainability<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 5.5.1 The FA does presuppose that economic sustainability of the MPP should not be expected as the<br />
programme will have to provide grants, not credits, to the beneficiaries. Moreover, the design does not<br />
foresee any exit strategy.<br />
2 factors are mentioned for the achievement of sustainability at the level of the individual microprojects:<br />
- the strong emphasis on community participation at all stages of the project<br />
- the contribution of the communities to the project (25% of project costs)<br />
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EGEVAL<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 MR, midterm<br />
evaluation of<br />
the GMPP<br />
(2007)<br />
I.5.5.2<br />
I 5.5.2<br />
Evidence that the benefits continue to be used after the end of the intervention<br />
The outputs achieved so far are not substantial enough to allow a full assessment of the GMMP. Even if<br />
the sustainability of the programme is embedded in the concept of participatory self-help schemes, the<br />
low capacity of the communities will significantly constrain the overall sustainability of the programme.<br />
In that regard, the few time and support provided by the MPP in building capacity of NGOs and CBOs<br />
is an impediment to the sustainability of the programme. Anyhow, the programme will close after 28<br />
months of implementation instead of the 5 years initially planned .<br />
In relation to the sustainability of the 35 micro-projects completed under the first call of proposals, field<br />
visits conducted during the MTR allowed the evaluators a degree of optimism that many will be<br />
sustained. This is particularly the case when there is a high degree of project ownership by the<br />
beneficiaries and when the projects build on existing capacities of community bodies.<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
9 ACP GUA 3<br />
Support to the<br />
NAO<br />
8 ACP GUA 5<br />
Sea Defences<br />
8 ACP GUA 15<br />
Low Income<br />
Housing<br />
<strong>Commission</strong><br />
and GoG<br />
informants<br />
EQ 6<br />
JC 6.1<br />
I 6.1.1<br />
I 6.1.1<br />
To what extent have the financial, human and technical resources been used to reach objectives in a<br />
timely and cost effective manner and was the regulatory and administrative framework appropriate<br />
for doing this? To what extent has the support to the NAO task force contributed to reaching<br />
objectives in a timely and cost effective manner?<br />
The institutional set-up foresees a clear distribution of roles at each level of project implementation,<br />
from design to closure<br />
Evidence of organizational structure and management culture through well-defined procedures and<br />
job roles in particular at NAO task force level, DEC level and project level<br />
The Financing Agreement (FA) dated May 2004 and related to the Institutional Strengthening of the NAO’s<br />
office did not define the organizational structure needed for the programme preparation and implementation.<br />
The document is listing the problems to be resolved as identified by the Consultant in its ‘Elaboration Study<br />
for support to the NAO’ (August 2003) among which: ‘the need to clarify the roles, responsibilities and<br />
authority of the NAO Task force”.<br />
But the initial 5-month Technical Assistance did not contribute to the clarification mainly for the reasons of<br />
the short duration of its intervention and of the Terms of Reference whose overall objectives, project<br />
purpose and results only duplicating those mentioned in the FA regarding the NAO.<br />
8 ACP GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
8 ACP GUA 4<br />
SAS V and VI<br />
I 6.1.1<br />
BUDGET SUPPORT (BS). The issue is to consider adequacy and efficiency of the Budget support processes<br />
and management principles by objectives to meet the tranche realease conditions.<br />
9ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
Budget<br />
support<br />
Concerning organisational structure and procedures<br />
Administrative arrangements and auditing procedures were outlined in the TAP. The ministries of health and<br />
education were in charge of submitting copies of justifying documents for eligible expenditure to a private<br />
sector accountant whom after verification would prepare a monthly summary statement submitted for<br />
payment from the double NAO and DEC signature CPF account.. Documents could be audited on a regular<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
basis for accuracy, eligibility, and authenticity; the double signature CPF account was also subject to external<br />
audit.<br />
The SAS V was a precursor to the new generation of budget support and included as such agreement for<br />
starting the gathering of data for performance indicators to facilitate monitoring of performance in the social<br />
sectors.<br />
8 ACP GUA 4<br />
SAS V and VI<br />
9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
Budget<br />
support<br />
Kea features<br />
- Under PRBS, performance monitoring of outcome indicators in the social sectors and PFM areas is<br />
the base for decision-making of variable tranche release.<br />
- It appears that the process called upon TA both with the view to attain set targets and with the view<br />
to monitor and evaluate performance indicators.<br />
- It is also noted that the process of setting up and implementing a monitoring system for PRSP<br />
implementation appears to have been slow and that the production of monitoring indicators for<br />
PRSP implementation has posed some initial problems to GoG.<br />
- The question of the country’s and the DEC’s capacity to undertake the required tasks seems thus to<br />
be still valid under PRBS.<br />
Other observations regarding the Budget support procedures :<br />
- Due to the lack of institutional memory, no information on the actual organisational structure of the<br />
SAS programmes has been found other than the administrative arrangements and auditing<br />
procedures outlined in the TAP. The ministries of health and education were in charge of submitting<br />
copies of justifying documents for eligible expenditure to a private sector accountant whom after<br />
verification would prepare a monthly summary statement submitted for payment from the double<br />
NAO and DEC signature CPF account. Documents could be audited on a regular basis for accuracy,<br />
eligibility, and authenticity; the double signature CPF account was also subject to external audit. The<br />
existence of actual procedures and job descriptions and roles of the various players (the NAO and<br />
the DEC, the Ministries of Finance, Education and Health, Bank of Guyana, Auditor General’s,<br />
Accountant General’s Offices, the private sector appointed accountant and the external auditor.) to<br />
deal with these issues could not be verified in the field.<br />
- The SAS V was a precursor to the new generation of budget support and included as such agreement<br />
for starting the gathering of data for performance indicators to facilitate monitoring of performance<br />
in the social sectors. This had been a specific recommendation of the evaluation of GIP III realised<br />
in 1999 which advocated the setup of a 'monitoring and evaluation system specifying clear objectives<br />
and performance and impact indicators, for the programme as a whole and for each project,<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
including the preparation of a complete follow-up data sheet for each project' (…) and 'Strict and ongoing<br />
monitoring and follow-up of projects, based on clear specifications and rules'. This was<br />
however not realised.<br />
- With the PRBS, there are no requirements for administrative and financial procedures linked to the<br />
actual disbursement of the funds other than a NAO request for payment to the Delegation and a<br />
transmission of this request from the Delegation to the <strong>Commission</strong> HQ. Importantly, however, the<br />
level of the disbursement now depends on the fulfilment of a number of targets in the areas of PFM,<br />
health and social housing. The organisational structure required for the evaluation of the level of<br />
disbursement (evaluation of conditions for tranche release which involved the evaluation of a set of<br />
performance indicators in the 3 sectors) is of a different nature and scope since it involves many<br />
actors: the NAO, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Housing, assistance<br />
from several TAs and on the <strong>Commission</strong> side, both the DEC and HQ intervene.<br />
- From file notes at the Delegation it appears that the organisational structure and the respective roles<br />
of these different actors had been insufficiently defined at the outset of the programme to allow for a<br />
smooth process of tranche release evaluation. The start of the PRBS (2005) coincided with the<br />
setting up of the NAO Task Force and the appointment of 2 new staff in the Economic Section of<br />
the Delegation who apparently were not familiar with the requirements for Budget Support. As a<br />
result, the initial 2005 Fixed Tranche release of €6 million which should have been disbursed straight<br />
after signature of the FA at end of September 2004 was eventually disbursed in December 2004 after<br />
many exchanges of letters and information between the Delegation and the <strong>Commission</strong>. The main<br />
issue of delay was the unsatisfactory information provided by the DEC to the <strong>Commission</strong> on the<br />
second general disbursement condition pertaining to a review of the PFM situation. The initial<br />
information provided was based on reviews provided by the IDB and CIDA which, at the time, were<br />
supporting the implementation of the PFM reform with the Guyana Economic Management<br />
Programme (GEMP); after this information was found unsatisfactory by the <strong>Commission</strong> (lack of<br />
independent assessment of the PFM situation), it was completed in November 2004 with the results<br />
of the IMF mission which eventually allowed the disbursement of the fixed tranche in December<br />
2004 (and to the acceptance by the <strong>Commission</strong> to postpone a full PFM review to 2005).<br />
- Correspondence about later tranche disbursements confirms the lack of clarity of respective roles, in<br />
particular between the DEC and the EC HQ with the HQ micro-managing at a distance the BS<br />
programme (see I 6.1.2 below).<br />
- Interviews also stressed the tensions created by the lack of well defined roles between the NAO Task<br />
Force and the Delegation: because staff of the NAO Task Force are paid by the EC, the Delegation<br />
appears to consider them as their employees even though they clearly fall under the NAO’s line<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
management and report to the NAO.<br />
- Finally as far as the management culture of the beneficiaries is concerned, discussions with the<br />
ministries of housing and health have shown that the new approach to BS based on management by<br />
objectives has been well understood by these administrations: it is clear that everything is done to<br />
ensure that EC social sector targets are reached but it is less certain that this truly reflects a<br />
management by objectives culture within these ministries. Indeed, it is to be noted that (i)<br />
performance in both sectors has generally been mixed when considering all PRSP indicators for<br />
these respective sectors but that EC indicators consistently attained their target levels 18 (see EQ4)<br />
and (ii) although budget programmes are used within the ministries, there are so in name rather than<br />
in content, the recurrent and capital budgets are still separated, no detailed programme costing exist,<br />
no output, outcome and impact indicators are defined, measured and monitored and linked to the<br />
human and financial means engaged, etc. On the whole, although the principles of BS are well<br />
understood, the approach is not one that fits well within the Guyanese culture of public monies<br />
management.<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 6.1.1 An organizational structure has been foreseen in the FA for the MPP:<br />
- The overall responsibility for the implementation of the project lies with the NAO who is the contracting<br />
authority of the programme.<br />
- The supervisor of the programme is the chairman of the MP Board, who is answerable and accountable to<br />
the NAO and to the EC, with the technical assistance of the International adviser.<br />
- The MP Office is in charge of the day-to day management of the MPP. The PM will be answerable vis-à-vis<br />
the MP Board, the NAO, and the EC Delegation.<br />
I 6.1.2 Degree of appropriateness of the organizational structure (in particular at NAO, DEC and project<br />
level) to (i) the country’s capacity and constraints, (ii) to the <strong>Commission</strong>’s available resources and<br />
(iii) the scope and size of the programmes and projects<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 MPP Midterm<br />
evaluation<br />
I 6.1.2 The organizational structure of the MPP does not seem appropriate. Clarification upon the roles of the<br />
different stakeholders has been needed, mainly between NAO and EC. Regular meetings have been held to<br />
facilitate greater understanding of these roles and responsibilities for management of GMPP.<br />
More specifically, there are some difficulties of interpretation as to the overall role of the GMPB in respect of<br />
their functions vis-à-vis the GMPO. The Chairperson has somehow interfered in the management of the<br />
operations of the GMPO. The MTR stressed that the Chairperson has to understand the organizational<br />
management structure and roles defined in the FA with regard to the delegation of the supervisory role for<br />
day-to-day management of GMPP to the GMPO.<br />
Moreover, there have been some disagreements between the EC Delegation and the government on the<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
composition of the MPPB and between the EC delegation and the TA on the implementation modalities of<br />
the programme. The setting-up of a new Board –foreseen for the end of 2006- has been delayed to 2007 due<br />
to EC concerns as to the validity of the election process at the workshop held for that purpose end of 2006.<br />
The MTR raised concern as to the extent of the pool of people in civil society from which new Board<br />
members can be drawn.<br />
9 ACP GUA 1<br />
MPP<br />
9 ACP GUA 3<br />
Support to the<br />
NAO<br />
Field visit<br />
interviews<br />
<strong>Commission</strong><br />
and GoG<br />
informants<br />
I 6.1.2<br />
Key point from the GoG point of view:<br />
- MPP should be a community driven programme. MPP procedures should be flexible (the 75 pages<br />
application form is irrelevant to most of Guyanese associations). But the boundary impossible to<br />
breach is the GoG policy in balancing helps and contributions to the various ethnic entities,<br />
communities, civil or religious associations in the different (urban, rural) areas of the country. In this<br />
context the only intangible rule is the ‘no objection’ of the Government for the fund allocation<br />
whatever the board considerations and the EC procedures.<br />
The <strong>Commission</strong> resources for the support to the NAO (€ 1 million) amounts to 1.4 % of whole the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> interventions budget (€ 146m over the evaluation period, said € 73 million over the 5-year<br />
duration of the NAO support Financing Agreement.<br />
Tables on the following section I.6.2.1 identifies that the NAO Task Force has to deal with :<br />
- 12 interventions counting € 133m and 91% of the total committed (intervention average € 11m)<br />
Sector Number Average m€ (*)<br />
Sea Defences 2 18,5<br />
Transport 0<br />
Housing (LIS) 1 9,1<br />
Private sector (LEAP) 1 12,5<br />
Budget support 5 10,3<br />
Civil society (MPP) 1 4<br />
Rice 1 12,9<br />
Sugar 1 5,7<br />
Total 12 132,7<br />
- 37 interventions counting € 13m and 9% of the total committed (intervention average € 0,35m)<br />
Sector Number Average m€ (*)<br />
Sea Defences 5 0,07<br />
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Transport 2 0;51<br />
Housing 1 0,07<br />
Private sector 7 0,23<br />
Budget support 5 0,76<br />
Civil society 5 0,42<br />
Programme<br />
10 0,22<br />
agement<br />
Environment 2 0,92<br />
Total 37 13<br />
So the NAO Task Force with a programme coordinator and two programme officers appears to be<br />
adequately dimensioned to the scope and size of the programme and projects.<br />
But the Monitoring report observed in 2004 difficult working environment and limited office space<br />
(observation confirmed three years after during the evaluation exploratory mission). The mid term evaluation<br />
provide also indicators confirming that the appropriateness of the organizational structure could be enhanced<br />
(‘cramped working conditions such as less than optimum communication and transportation facilities’). The<br />
evaluation team confirmed the rightfulness of these observations during the field mission. No change has<br />
been observed since the initial settlement to remedy these management constraints.<br />
8 ACP GUA 8<br />
Guyana<br />
Training<br />
Agency<br />
8 ACP GUA 4<br />
SAS V and VI<br />
9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
Mid-term<br />
evaluation<br />
Synopsis<br />
sheet SAS V<br />
<strong>Commission</strong><br />
file notes<br />
PRSP<br />
annual<br />
reviews<br />
I 6.1.2<br />
I 6.1.2<br />
I 6.1.2<br />
According to the Mid-Term evaluation, the day-t-day management of the project was good. The team was<br />
well informed and well-coordinated. However, the day-to-day management was made complicated by the<br />
organisational arrangements involving the project management team, the NAO and the <strong>Commission</strong>. The<br />
style of management was a bit rigid in a situation that demands some flexibility.<br />
The synopsis sheet for SAS V states that: ‘the Performance Indicators Cell which should have been set up<br />
with the help of a TA in the Ministry of Finance was not established because ‘the government considered<br />
that it already had the competence and capacity to carry out the required activities’’. Whether or not the<br />
absence of this cell was partly in cause, it is further noted that: ‘the lack of clear definition of indicators and<br />
target measurements and interpretation of data led to differences of view between the Govt, the Delegation<br />
and Brussels on what amount to disburse.’<br />
Under PRBS, performance monitoring of outcome indicators in the social sectors and PFM areas is the base<br />
for decision-making of variable tranche release. From available documents it appears that the Delegation in<br />
particular had insufficient resources available to undertake the tasks required from it by the <strong>Commission</strong> to<br />
substantiate the requests for tranche releases. The DEC rapidly hired international consultants to prepare the<br />
information required for fixed and variable tranche disbursement. This has functioned for the 3 years (2005 –<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
8 ACP GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
P ACP GUA 3<br />
Support to the<br />
NAO<br />
Delegation<br />
File Notes<br />
Evaluation<br />
report<br />
I 6.1.3<br />
I 6.1.3<br />
I 6.1.3<br />
2007) with one yearly mission to undertake an independent PFM review (prior to the fixed tranche<br />
disbursements of 2005, 2006) and one yearly mission to carry out the independent evaluation of performance<br />
indicators for the variable tranche release.<br />
GoG’s limited capacity to improve PFM systems (and in particular to achieve the targets retained for the<br />
performance indicators of the PRBS) also called for TA with the view to assist the GoG in attaining 3 of the<br />
7 PFM indicators. This particularly refers to TA provided to the Ministry of Finance for the development of<br />
fiscal projections (indicator 1), the Ministry of Housing and Water for the development of an MTEF<br />
(indicator 3) and a strengthening of statistics and the Ministry of Health for the development of and MTEF<br />
(indicator 3) and a TA for strengthening the external debt management capacity (Indicator 4). The TAs<br />
working on the MTEFs were later extended to encompass the ministries of education, public works and<br />
finance. Similarly, Indicator 2 was actually dependent upon progress made under an IDB funded project. Out<br />
of the seven indicators of PFM, GoG had only in-house capacity for fulfilling 3 of them.<br />
Similarly, in health, the outcome of all three indicators depended heavily on continued external financing<br />
remaining available for the three programmes monitored.<br />
It is also noted that the process of setting up and implementing a monitoring system for PRSP<br />
implementation appears to have been slow and that the production of monitoring indicators for PRSP<br />
implementation has posed some initial problems to GoG. Unfortunately, during the field mission the PRSP<br />
M&E unit was unavailable for meetings but it is understood from discussions with DEC staff and other<br />
donors and from the PRSP annual reviews, that PRSP monitoring has remained weak and receives<br />
considerable donor attention under the current preparation of the PRSP II.<br />
Evidence of emphasis on conformity in the whole organization in particular at NAO, DEC and<br />
project level<br />
According to the LEAP Monitoring system (2005), the whole organization at project level has been quite<br />
conform:<br />
- 7 advisory group per year has been achieved at 71%<br />
- 5 advisory group task force meeting per year has been achieved at 60%<br />
- 2 steering Committee Meetings per year has been achieved at 100%<br />
- 10 Portfolio meetings per year has been achieved at 70%<br />
- 15 occurrences of the Motivational system for staff members has been achieved at 47%<br />
Key point<br />
- No specific rules and organization principles have been presented at the request of the evaluation<br />
team during the field visit. These management tools should have been elaborated with the view to<br />
defining the relations between stakeholders so as to determine ‘who is doing what’ at each stage of<br />
the programming and implementation process (see annexes 6.1-6.2-6.3 and above section 1.6.1.1).<br />
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The Monitoring report (MR) dated 07/04/06 mentioned that ‘the NAO TF could be more pro-active in engendering<br />
better management across the portfolio’. But a monthly Portfolio meeting is headed by the DNAO with the direct<br />
involvement of the <strong>Commission</strong> Delegation, Line Ministries and project managements representatives.<br />
Further emphasis on conformity in the whole organization is depending on the clear understanding of the<br />
partition of responsibilities between the programme stakeholders. These monthly portfolio meetings<br />
demonstrate great utility in coordinating project activities and in following up closely intervention<br />
achievements.<br />
9 ACP GUA 3<br />
Support to the<br />
NAO<br />
8 ACP GUA 5<br />
Sea Defences<br />
8 ACP GUA 15<br />
Low Income<br />
Housing<br />
8 ACP GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
I 6.1.4 Emphasis on timely and cost-effective management in particular at NAO and DEC levels.<br />
I 6.1.4 - The DNAO is clearly emphasizing the needed timely and cost effective management through the<br />
monthly portfolio meetings, entailing clear instructions to the project actors (Line Ministries,<br />
consultants and to the NAO Task Force in coordinating/supporting/monitoring the actions<br />
implemented in respect of the projects planning and budgets.<br />
But the MR quoted that there is still significant room to improvement, which was (in 2006) iterated by the<br />
DNAO.<br />
The field mission has been opportunity to fill-up this indicator though comparison of project results before<br />
and after 2002 (when the NAO Task force was set up).<br />
Table– Monitoring reports scoring – Delays & rates of disbursements<br />
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EGEVAL<br />
Legend<br />
1997-2002 2003-2007 11/07<br />
Delay Decision>Start 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 % %<br />
Extension after Contract end date 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Time Paid<br />
INFRASTRUCTURES Relevance a b a a b<br />
Sea Defences Efficiency b c c c d 82% 75%<br />
8ACPGUA 5 Effectiveness b b b b d<br />
Impact b b c c c<br />
Sustainability c c c c c<br />
Housing<br />
Relevance<br />
8ACPGUA 15 Efficiency Ev. 100% 17%<br />
Effectiveness<br />
Impact<br />
Sustainability<br />
PRIVATE SECTOR support Relevance b b b<br />
GTA Efficiency c b b 100% 100%<br />
8ACPGUA 8 Effectiveness c b b<br />
Impact b b b<br />
Sustainability b b c<br />
Relevance b b b<br />
LEAP Efficiency c c b 80% 55%<br />
8ACPGUA 9 Effectiveness c b b<br />
Impact c b b<br />
Sustainability c c c<br />
Civil society support Relevance c<br />
MPP Efficiency c 66% 40%<br />
9ACPGUA 1 Effectiveness c<br />
Impact<br />
c<br />
Sustainability<br />
c<br />
Programme management Relevance b<br />
NAO support Efficiency a 60% 74%<br />
9ACPGUA 3 Effectiveness b<br />
Impact<br />
c<br />
Sustainability<br />
c<br />
Relevance b b<br />
Rice sector Efficiency d c 46% 40%<br />
9ACPRPR 6 Effectiveness c b<br />
Impact c c<br />
Sustainability d c<br />
Key observations<br />
- Actually, the support to the NAO is recent over the period under observation. So its effective impact<br />
cannot be observed since its settlement at the end of 2004.<br />
- The NAO TF was not accountable of the long delays and problems to set up the two interventions<br />
related to Low Income Housing and to the Rice sector support under the 9 th RIP and also to solve<br />
the initial serious problems of the LEAP project.<br />
- As well the serious technical difficulties encountered by the Sea Defences activites with the 8ACP<br />
GUA 5 intervention were not under the only command of the NAO TF. Other actors identified at<br />
decision and coordination levels in the organisation and management chart (Annexe XX) were also<br />
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directly concerned.<br />
- Nevertheless surprisingly no ROM mission has been arranged since the the early 2006 despite it was<br />
necessary for 8 ACP GUA 5 (Sea Defences after the bad scoring of the last MR), 8 ACP GUA 15<br />
(Housing) which should have benefits of a monitoring mission at the very begiinig ot the project<br />
start up and before the late evaluation in 2007, 8 ACP GUA 9 (LEAP) due to the exceptional<br />
difficult context of the LEAF component and also due to the need to enforce the LEAP and LEAF<br />
sustainability, 9 ACP GUA 3 (MPP) to prevent risk of mismanagement of this highly politically<br />
sensible intervention, 9 ACP RPR 6 (Rice Sector) to ensure a close follow-up of this important<br />
intervention for Guyana but through a Regional programme; and eventually 9 ACP GUA 1 (NAO<br />
support) to get confirmation of the initial positive assessment from the MR in the early 2006.<br />
- Comparing rate of disbursements and time advancement, the situation remains critical for 8 ACP<br />
GUA 5 (Sea Defences), highly questionable for 8 ACP GUA 5 (Housing), understandable for 8 ACP<br />
GUA 9 (LEAP) due to the specific problems faced by the LEAF component, quasi normal for the<br />
other interventions (MP, NAO support and Rice sector support).<br />
8 ACP GUA 4<br />
(SAS V and VI)<br />
9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
9 ACP GUA 3<br />
Support to the<br />
NAO<br />
I 6.1.4<br />
I 6.1.5<br />
Despite the assistance from an international expert to prepare all background documentation for tranche<br />
release of the PRBS (see I 6.1.2), the extent to which the DEC should additionally (i) provide an independent<br />
full PFM review (ie even independent from the work provided by an EU funded consultant) and (ii) have at<br />
its fingertips all background justifying documents on which the evaluations are based, seems to have been an<br />
important point of contention/discussion between the DEC and the <strong>Commission</strong>.<br />
Existence of co-ordination mechanisms among implementation actors (consultations, coordination<br />
working groups)<br />
Coordination mechanisms exist at Donors programme implementation within the Project Cycle Division of<br />
the MoF and headed by the DNAO. The <strong>Commission</strong> programme activities are subject of coordination<br />
during the monthly Portfolio meeting (see above). The NAO task force is in charge of the projects<br />
coordination on a day by day basis. A steering committee was installed and headed by the NAO during the 5-<br />
month TA in 2005.<br />
8 ACP GUA 4<br />
(SAS V and VI)<br />
9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
I 6.1.5<br />
In terms of budget support it appears that the whole process of design, implementation, monitoring of the<br />
programme and evaluation of indicators for tranche release is performed quite independently of any sector<br />
working groups, PRSP reviews or other platforms of GoG-donor consultations. Obviously all relevant parties<br />
are consulted but this is done on bilateral basis rather than as a concerted effort, thus losing the opportunity<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 31
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
to use budget support as a lever for improved GoG-donor and EC-donor coordination.<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 I 6.1.5 No explicit reference to coordination mechanisms in the documents available<br />
JC 6.2 The financial instruments, management tools and processes used for implementation contribute to<br />
reaching objectives in a timely and cost effective manner<br />
I 6.2.1 Number and amount of global commitments and financing agreements by sector.<br />
Program/Project Title N Sector Committed Cumul %cumul<br />
8 ACP GUA 5 Guyana sea defencesŹ 1 Sea Defences 20 000 000 20 000 000 14%<br />
9 ACP GUA 9th EDF Sea Defences Programme 2 Sea Defences 17 018 000 37 018 000 25%<br />
8 ACP GUA 15 Support To The Low-Income Housing Sector 3 Housing 9 100 000 46 118 000 32%<br />
8 ACP GUA 9 Linden economic advancement programmeŹ 4 Private sector 12 500 000 58 618 000 40%<br />
9 ACP GUA 6 Poverty reduction budget support to GuyanaŹ 5 Budget Support 26 666 379 85 284 379 59%<br />
9 ACP GUA 7 Poverty reduction budget support to GuyanaŹ 6 Budget Support 8 400 000 93 684 379 64%<br />
7 ACP GUA 26<br />
Participation communautaire a l'initiative d'allegement de la dette des pays pauvres<br />
tres endettesŹ<br />
7 Budget Support 6 440 000 100 124 379 69%<br />
8 ACP GUA 4 Support programme for economic reforms (sas v : 1999)Ź 8 Budget Support 5 400 000 105 524 379 72%<br />
8 ACP GUA 1 Support programme for econmic reforms (sas iv : 1998)Ź 9 Budget Support 4 600 000 110 124 379 76%<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 Micro-projects programmeŹ 10 Civil Society 4 000 000 114 124 379 78%<br />
9 ACP RPR 006 Support to the Competitiveness of the Rice sector in the Caribbean 11 Rice 12 930 240 127 054 619 87%<br />
SUCRE/2006/018-<br />
530<br />
Accompanying measures 2006 for Sugar Protocol Countries 12 Sugar 5 663 000 132 717 619 91%<br />
Sub total 12 132 717 619 132 717 619 91%<br />
Other projects 37 13 029 370 13 029 370 9%<br />
Total 49 145 746 989 145 746 989 100%<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 32
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Other porjects (details) N Ū Cumul Average<br />
9 ACP GUA 2 Design & tender procedure Guyana sea defencesŹ 1 Sea Defences 151 742 151 742<br />
6 ACP GUA 28 Sea defences - appraisal of progr.& prep. Financial proposalŹ 2 Sea Defences 66 836 218 578<br />
6 ACP GUA 30 Elaboration study for the sea defence project to be financed under the 9th EDFŹ 3 Sea Defences 59 319 277 897<br />
6 ACP GUA 24 Provision for investigation of sea defense slip failuresŹ 4 Sea Defences 36 571 314 468<br />
7 ACP GUA 25 Guyana's sea defences - econ. & financial analyses - 8 EDF 5 Sea Defences 20 779 335 247 67 049<br />
9 ACP GUA 4 Transport sector studyŹ 1 Transport 900 000 900 000<br />
7 ACP GUA 13 Feasibility study for Guyana-Brazil roadŹ 2 Transport 124 457 1 024 457 512 229<br />
6 ACP GUA 29 Low income housing programmeŹ 1 Housing 73 289 73 289 73 289<br />
8 ACP GUA 8 Guyana training agencyŹ 1 Private sector 1 328 342 1 328 342<br />
7 ACP GUA 23 Study economic diversification LindenŹ 2 Private sector 101 225 1 429 567<br />
6 ACP GUA 18 TA for establish. of private sector center (see also 7 GUA 14)Ź 3 Private sector 100 000 1 529 567<br />
8 ACP GUA 3 Identification study human resource dvlpmt programmeŹ 4 Private sector 73 056 1 602 623<br />
6 ACP GUA 26 Mid-term evaluation small business credit initiative-phase II 5 Private sector 42 015 1 644 638<br />
6 ACP GUA 27 Study of HRD needs for the private sectorŹ 6 Private sector 4 610 1 649 248<br />
8 ACP GUA 6 TA for feasibility study for private sector developmentŹ 7 Private sector 1 160 1 650 408 235 773<br />
7 ACP GUA 20 Support Structural Adjustment Programme (GIP-III) 1 Budget support 1 264 997 1 264 997<br />
9 ACP GUA 10 9 EDF sea defences infrastructure design programmeŹ 2 Budget support 900 000 2 164 997<br />
9 ACP GUA 3 Institutional strenghtening of the NAO's officeŹ 3 Budget support 820 000 2 984 997<br />
8 ACP GUA 2 Support programme for economics reforms (sas iv : 1998)Ź 4 Budget support 690 000 3 674 997<br />
8 ACP GUA 17 Feasibility study for a budgetary support programme to Guyana / 9th EDF 5 Budget support 114 988 3 789 985 757 997<br />
9 ACP GUA 8 Emergency assistance to the victims of floods in Guyana 1 Humanitarian ass. 700 000 700 000<br />
9 ACP GUA 9 Consolidation of the democratic process (codep) in a polari political situation 2 Good governance 940 000 1 640 000<br />
DDH/1997/113 Proposal for financing the production of voter identification cards 3 Democracy enh. 362 433 2 002 433<br />
7 ACP GUA 27 General elections 2001-financial needs assessmentŹ 4 Democracy enh. 49 997 2 052 430<br />
8 ACP GUA 16 Ta - formulation microprojects programmeŹ 5 Civil society 46 457 2 098 887 419 777<br />
7 ACP GUA 19 Support Structural Adjustment Programme (GIP-III) 1 Progr. manag. 800 000 800 000<br />
9 ACP GUA 5 Technical cooperation facility (tcf)Ź 2 Progr. manag. 605 400 1 405 400<br />
8 ACP GUA 7 Technical study-preparation of the tender dossier-evaluation of the tender bidsŹ 3 Progr. manag. 406 706 1 812 106<br />
6 ACP GUA 25 Technical assistance to the NAO's officeŹ 4 Progr. manag. 166 132 1 978 238<br />
8 ACP GUA 10 Identification-preparation of the CSS for the 9th EDF 5 Progr. manag. 79 990 2 058 228<br />
8 ACP GUA 19 Prep t.o.r. + tender documents - transport sector studyŹ 6 Progr. manag. 47 077 2 105 305<br />
8 ACP GUA 18 Elaboration study for support to the NAO 7 Progr. manag. 38 846 2 144 151<br />
7 ACP GUA 24 Technical assistance to the NAO's officeŹ 8 Progr. manag. 31 504 2 175 655<br />
8 ACP GUA 13 Identification - preparation of the CSS for the 9th EDF phase IIŹ 9 Progr. manag. 19 562 2 195 217<br />
7 ACP GUA 22 TA for the purpose of examining the government of sysmin reqŹ 10 Progr. manag. 17 342 2 212 559 221 256<br />
ENV/1998/004-320 Conservation and utilization of biodiversity in the Iwokrama forest 1 Environment 1 350 142 1 350 142<br />
ENV/1998/003-684 Conservation and sustainable use of botanical diversity in Guyana 2 Environment 494 396 1 844 538 922 269<br />
TOTAL 37 13 029 370 13 029 370 352 145<br />
12 commitments amount 91% of the total but 25 other commitments (the 5 of the Budget Support being<br />
deducted) mobilise a great amount of management energy to deal with the various procedures of 8 different<br />
financing mechanisms (see just below section I.6.2.2).<br />
Budget support is implemented though 10 interventions counting €55<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 33
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
I 6.2.2<br />
I 6.2.2<br />
Types of financing agreements: number and amounts of contracts, grants, programme estimates by<br />
direct labour operations or externalised direct labour operations<br />
Origin<br />
Number of<br />
interventio<br />
ns<br />
Committed<br />
(Euros)<br />
Contracted<br />
(Euros)<br />
Paid (Euros) Paid/Contr<br />
acted<br />
Paid/Com<br />
mitted<br />
8 NIP<br />
Traditional projects 12 31,256,184 26,407,451 18,340,258 69% 59%<br />
9 NIP 12 61,101,521 43,326,284 26,351,116 61% 43%<br />
Traditional projects 10 26,035,142 8,459,905 5,000,593 59% 19%<br />
Budget Support 2 35,066,379 34,866,379 21,350,523 61% 61%<br />
8 Non Programmable 4 23,190,000 22,955,390 17,396,365 76% 75%<br />
Traditional projects 1 12,500,000 12,265,390 6,706,365 55% 54%<br />
Budget Support 3 10,690,000 10,690,000 10,690,000 100% 100%<br />
9 RIP 1 12,930,240 12,930,240 5,238,902 41% 41%<br />
9 Non Programmable 1 5,663,000 3,563,300 3,437,259 96% 61%<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 34
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
I 6.2.3 Types of procedures laid down in the financing agreements (i.e.: according to financing<br />
thresholds)<br />
8 ACP GUA 9 FA I 6.2.3 The PMU is recruited following a restricted procedure.<br />
Annual Work Programmes (prepared by the PMU and approved by the Project Steering Committee and<br />
the <strong>Commission</strong>) constitute the basis on which funds are committed and released. The principle of<br />
competitive tendering applies to all contracts to be awarded under such work programmes.<br />
9 ACP GUA 3<br />
Support to<br />
the NAO<br />
And other<br />
interventions<br />
I 6.2.4<br />
I 6.2.4<br />
Delays and rates of disbursements by financing agreement<br />
Information is provided with the table in the above section I.6.1.4. Comparing rate of disbursements and<br />
time advancement, the situation remains critical for 8 ACP GUA 5 (Sea Defences), highly questionable<br />
for 8 ACP GUA 5 (Housing), understandable for 8 ACP GUA 9 (LEAP) due to the specific problems<br />
faced by the LEAF component, quasi normal for the other interventions (MP, NAO support and Rice<br />
sector support).<br />
8 ACP GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
Evaluation<br />
report<br />
I 6.2.4<br />
Problematic start up period of about 2 years with a lot of personnel changes.<br />
9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
File Notes<br />
DEC<br />
Discussions<br />
NAO TF<br />
I 6.2.4<br />
The disbursement procedures for BS are simple and designed to produce fast payments. The dates of<br />
disbursement for the fixed and variable tranches of the PRBS are as follows:<br />
Tranche Date due Request Request Date of payment Delays<br />
NAO DEC<br />
Fixed tranche 2 nd semester 2004 27/10/2004 04/11/04 Dec. 2004 1,5 month<br />
2004<br />
Fixed tranche 1 st semester 2005 24/05/2005 06/06/05 11/07/05 1,5 month<br />
2005<br />
Variable tranche 2 nd semester 2005 16/11/2005 30/11/05 07/12/05 but < 1 month<br />
2005<br />
received 12/01/06<br />
Fixed tranche 1 st semester 2006 19/02/2006 21/02/06 23/03/06 1 month<br />
2006<br />
Variable tranche 2 nd semester 2006 21/11/06 27/11/06 19/12/06 1 month<br />
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
2006 28/05/07 10/08/07 9 months<br />
9 ACP GUA 3<br />
Support to<br />
the NAO<br />
JC 6.3<br />
I 6.3.1<br />
I 6.3.1<br />
Over the period, only the last payments relative to the variable tranche of 2006 has suffered undue<br />
delays. This was because the DEC, in agreement with the <strong>Commission</strong>, questioned the validity of data<br />
underlying one of the indicators. In order not to unduly delay disbursement, only the amount relative to<br />
that indicator was temporarily suspended, awaiting the results of an audit. In the event as data did not<br />
corroborate an attainment of the set target, only 50% of the suspended amount was eventually paid.<br />
In fact, whatever delays have been experienced in BS disbursement these have been due to scrutinising of<br />
disbursement conditions by the <strong>Commission</strong> followed by requests for further information or<br />
clarification. This has been the case for the first fixed tranche which was eventually released without<br />
having scored full satisfaction on indicator 2 (supply of a full PFM review) and for the variable tranches<br />
of both 2005 and 2006. Despite these questionings, disbursements have been very fast. From the<br />
correspondence between the DEC and the <strong>Commission</strong>, it is clear that in the case of budget support,<br />
every effort is made by both parties to avoid any delays in disbursement. The importance of speedy<br />
disbursement of BS can be illustrated by the incident linked to the payment of the 2005 variable tranche:<br />
payment was made by the <strong>Commission</strong> on 07/12/05 but an internal error at the Bank of England<br />
holding the GoG account meant the money was credited to the GoG’s account only on 12/01/2006.<br />
This meant that the fiscal deficit for 2005 was 0.9% of GDP higher than it should have been, with all the<br />
consequences for Guyana’s international credit rating and its programme indicators with the BWI.<br />
However, it is to be noted that due to the choice of indicators, they can only be assessed at year’s end<br />
when appropriate statistics become available; as a result, variable tranche disbursement takes place at the<br />
very end of the financial year (in December), thus lowering predictability of budgetary funds and<br />
contributing to treasury cash flow tensions.<br />
The institutional support to the <strong>Commission</strong> projects is improved through the NAO task force<br />
List of new management tools in place in the NAO task force (retro-planning, support to<br />
projects…)<br />
According to the FA, the NAO task force has put in place, apart from the usual logical framework,<br />
planning and budget, required in the FA :<br />
Communication tool to the programme actors on the broad range of <strong>Commission</strong> aid instruments<br />
(Result 1)<br />
Information system for programming of <strong>Commission</strong> assistance to the relevant stakeholders (Result 2)<br />
Monitoring/management tools designed for the NAO Task force support to the projects actors (Result<br />
3)<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 36
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
9 ACP GUA 3<br />
Support to<br />
the NAO<br />
I 6.3.2<br />
I 6.3.2<br />
JC 6.4<br />
I 6.4.1<br />
Actually, the support to the NAO is recent over the period under observation. So its impact cannot be<br />
observed since its settlement at the end of 2004. Thus the NAO TF is not accountable of the long delays<br />
and problems to set up the Low Income Housing and Rice sector supports and also to solve the initial<br />
serious problems of the LEAP project.<br />
Perception of NAO task force, <strong>Commission</strong> task managers and program managers on the effects<br />
of the support to the NAO and on the overall efficiency of interventions, in terms of time<br />
management and cost-effectiveness.<br />
The MR provides positive conclusions in April 2006 with quite good scoring (‘a’ for efficiency and ‘b’ for<br />
effectiveness. The informants met at decision level (GoG, <strong>Commission</strong> Delegation) on the overall<br />
efficiency during the exploratory and field missions expressed pro-active appraisal on the perception of<br />
NAO task force. But some projects management’s representatives identified some of the major concerns<br />
to them which included Time delays between Project formulation and bidding and limited number of<br />
qualified contractors with capacity to bid. Consequence upon the occurrence of project delays was a<br />
reduction in the quantitative target (housing).<br />
From the GoG point of view, the TF felt often paralyzed due to bureaucratic regulations, red tape and issues being<br />
politicized between the ministries or the GoG and EC.<br />
Programme and projects are implemented in a timely manner and at planned cost<br />
Average MR efficiency rate<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 37
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
9 ACP GUA 3<br />
Support to<br />
the NAO<br />
8 ACP GUA 5<br />
Sea Defences<br />
8 ACP GUA<br />
15<br />
Low Income<br />
Housing<br />
8 ACP GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
9 ACP GUA 3<br />
MPP<br />
9 ACP GUA 1<br />
NAO support<br />
9 ACP RPR 6<br />
Rice sector<br />
8 ACP GUA<br />
15<br />
Housing<br />
I 6.4.1<br />
I 6.4.1<br />
Monitoring reports<br />
Scoring<br />
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />
1 INFRASTRUCTURES Relevance a b a a b<br />
Sea Defences Efficiency b c c c d<br />
Effectiveness b b b b d<br />
Impact b b c c c<br />
Sustainability c c c c c<br />
2 PRIVATE SECTOR support Relevance b b b<br />
GTA Efficiency c b b<br />
Effectiveness c b b<br />
Impact b b b<br />
Sustainability b b c<br />
Relevance b b b<br />
LEAP Efficiency c c b<br />
Effectiveness c b b<br />
Impact c b b<br />
Sustainability c c c<br />
4 Civil society support Relevance c<br />
MPP Efficiency c<br />
Effectiveness<br />
c<br />
Impact<br />
c<br />
Sustainability<br />
c<br />
5 Programme management Relevance b<br />
NAO support Efficiency a<br />
Effectiveness<br />
b<br />
Impact<br />
c<br />
Sustainability<br />
c<br />
Relevance b b<br />
Rice sector Efficiency d c<br />
Effectiveness c b<br />
Impact c c<br />
Sustainability d c<br />
Key points<br />
1. decreasing performances on Sea defences since 2004;<br />
2. No monitoring of the Low Income Housing project;<br />
3. positive outcomes with GTA and LEAP (despite the hardship settlement and awkward situation<br />
of the LEAF component);<br />
4. insufficient monitoring missions for MPP and NAO support;<br />
5. follow up to be maintained on Rice interventions with regular monitoring;<br />
Surprisingly, the settlement of the NAO Task Force did not induce regular monitoring missions as this<br />
was needed for Sea Defences, LEAP & LEAF, MPP and the NAO support itself.<br />
The problems faced by the Housing project illustrate concrete difficulties in implementing such a project<br />
in a timely manner and at planned cost: :<br />
- The project started two years after the financial agreement, entailing severe consequences about<br />
the project financing due to price changes. Thus revision should have been planned. The project<br />
suffered from inflexibility of procedures and of too short time frame. The final short cut is about<br />
2,5 million € versus 9 millions budgeted.<br />
- The project implementation faced also the problem of selecting contractor: few applicants by<br />
unavailability, lack of interest for the low housing sector or possibly fear to face the EC<br />
2007<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 38
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
9 ACP RPR 6<br />
Rice sector<br />
I 6.4.1<br />
procedures.<br />
- Other reasons of delays are connected with the changing programme officer in the EC<br />
Delegation and the changing EC procedures. As example, obligation was imposed to re-tender<br />
due to the change of templates for the tender process.<br />
- There is a need of controlling the overhead-cost variance : the difference between the estimated<br />
overhead cost of the project components and their actual overhead costs due to delays and price<br />
changes.<br />
- The selection process is not based on the estimate of the global cost efficiency: the cheapest<br />
financing proposal is not the cheapest one at the end of implementation in considering criteria<br />
such as quality, delays, maintenance and overheads costs entailed by various contractor technical<br />
and management weaknesses, shortages and insufficiency.<br />
- The current implementation is submitted to and delayed by the complicated Government<br />
decision process for instance with regards to the attribution of lots.<br />
Great concern is expressed by the Project TL regarding the overall cost efficiency of this project by<br />
limited budget and time frame plus moving and inflexible procedures especially for the tender process.<br />
As second example, implementing this project in a timely manner and at planned cost: entails to address<br />
the following context :<br />
- Programme ruled by the Regional Authorizing Officer (RAO), Executive Secretary of<br />
CARICOM, in Trinidad;<br />
- The Deputy RAO is the Minister of Agriculture;<br />
- 11,7 million € are allocated to Guyana (out off 24 million)<br />
- Programme funded under the 9 th EDF, FA signed in 2003 and running up to 2008;<br />
- Four components : (i) TA : 1,8 million €; (ii) water rehabilitation : 3,2 million €; (iii) Financial<br />
facility : 6,5 million ; (iv) training 190 000 €;<br />
- Two years were needed to launch the project with a fully fledged PMU;<br />
- TA: difficult set up in terms of institutional arrangements regarding the programme<br />
management; Two Team Leaders resigned for various reasons including misunderstanding with<br />
the EC Delegation; the take over of the programme activities by the new TL was insufficient; no<br />
work plan was set up one year after the programme start. To date the TL is now mainly<br />
coordinating the project activities.<br />
- Water rehabilitation : a DAO is on going;<br />
- Financial facility: this component is aiming at providing financial resources for inputs<br />
suppliers; this facility is depending on existing local arrangements between farmers and millers in<br />
financing the farmers’ working capital; the banking sector failing in financing this working<br />
capital. The study carried out by HTSPE on the financing support to the competitiveness of the<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 39
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
8 ACP GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
8 ACP GUA 8<br />
GTA<br />
Evaluation<br />
report<br />
Mid-term<br />
evaluation<br />
Rice sector in the Caribbean was not satisfying and the final report dated 20/05/2005 has not<br />
been approved.. The achievement of the tender process for services contract to manage the<br />
facility was also difficult through two tenders with only one offer. Other difficult issues<br />
concerned guaranty by the Government, taxes, exemption of deposit reserves, collaterals from<br />
farmers, etc. Eventually a credit development expert has been assigned with the view is to<br />
facilitate emergence and achievements of solutions to these various problems.<br />
- Training component : significant in terms of outputs regarding the quality management and<br />
the financial management;<br />
Key observations<br />
- Who is taking the leading role in designing the whole programme: the RAO or the DNAO on<br />
behalf of the GoG ?<br />
- How rationale is the decision to finance a declining sector?<br />
- Other comments:<br />
- The Rice sector has to be regarded from a social point of view in focusing on consequences of<br />
the sector decline especially for small holders;<br />
- Restructuring the Rice sector should be under the responsibility of the only private sector<br />
stakeholders (great farmers, millers, banking sector).<br />
- The Water rehabilitation is a public sector issue connected to the overall water management<br />
issues in Guyana.<br />
- PMU instalment is a recurrent problem : delays between FA signature and project start is two<br />
years;<br />
I 6.4.2 Project evaluations conclusions on efficiency<br />
I 6.4.2 - The programme has experienced many problems in the starting-up phase (frequent changes in<br />
personnel). Stability of local and international staff involvement is now maintained.<br />
- Not enough involvement of the local staff members in the overall management<br />
- The functioning of the Project Steering Committee (<strong>Commission</strong> Del, NAO, LEAP Pm and<br />
LEAP BDU Manager) is efficient<br />
- The role of the Advisory Group is not enough important<br />
- LEAP & LEAF have raised outstanding expectations with the population in Region 10.<br />
I 6.4.2 - The project design was efficient.<br />
- Problems in efficiency relate to delays (in implementation at the inception of project activities<br />
due to the elections in 2001 and following civil disturbances) and slippages in targets (enabling<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 7/page 40
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
Budget<br />
support<br />
I 6.4.2<br />
training environment for competency based training, conducting training programmes according<br />
to needs, improving training facilities).<br />
- The delay experienced in the first year is now being overcome and progress is satisfactory.<br />
- The TA supplied by the project has been successful.<br />
Surprisingly the semi annual report (January-June 2005) did not provide specific conclusion and<br />
recommendation on efficiency conclusions.<br />
The Draft Mid-Term Review concluded in November 2004 that, regarding the PRSP,<br />
there is still work to be done. But the Government remains firmly committed to its objectives. Thus the<br />
overall assessment is adequate. The human rights record is generally positive although there are concerns<br />
about some causes of extra-judicial killings and the deteriorated security situation<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 MPP Midterm<br />
evaluation<br />
I 6.4.2<br />
- The roles in the organisational and management structure for the GMPP between the EC Delegation,<br />
NAO, GMPB and GMPO are defined in the FA but greater communication and understanding of these<br />
roles and responsibilities for management of the GMPP has been needed on occasions. The Chairperson<br />
and some members of the former Board have faced difficulties of interpretation of the role of the GMPB<br />
vis-à-vis the GMPO, which appears on occasions to have affected efficient management of GMPP.<br />
- Long-term TA was provided by the TA Contractor but faced problems with the first two persons and<br />
the third was only in post from September 2005 six months after the contract started. He only stayed<br />
13 out of the 18 months until October 2006.<br />
- The third ITA was regarded by the GMPO as having made a positive contribution to the efficient<br />
management and implementation of the GMPP with training and production of appropriate materials<br />
and operational manuals to guide implementation and follow EDF grant procedures or calls for<br />
proposals under decentralised management.<br />
- The PM and project staff provide efficient management of the GMPO but are constrained by lack of<br />
capacity to work at with NGOs and CBOs at the regional community level.<br />
- There is a basic constraint into the GMPP in terms of what can be achieved with the resources and<br />
capacity that has been foreseen in the FA and subsequent implementation arrangements.<br />
8 ACP GUA 5 MR I 6.4.2 - Delays due to disagreements about the design of the project<br />
- Shortage of technical advisory staff at the EC Delegation<br />
- Staff turnover at SRDD due to precarious conditions of services<br />
8 ACP GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
Evaluation<br />
report,<br />
Meeting<br />
I.6.4.3<br />
I.6.4.3<br />
Identification of implementation difficulties that are not due to deficiencies of financial, human<br />
and technical resources or to the regulatory and administrative set-up<br />
Apart from a problematic start up due to personnel changes, the programme is running well.<br />
The difficult situation of LEAF the component (micro-credit loans) was due to awkward and intricate<br />
business and media context. Nevertheless it was established and currently recognised that this context<br />
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notes<br />
was disconnected from the LEAP & LEAF management itself. So the impact of the positive and<br />
significant outcomes of the LEAP & LEAF complementary components has been limited by the<br />
negative effects of this situation: EC funding restricted; LEAF management disturbed, etc.<br />
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EQ7<br />
JC 7.1<br />
I 7.1.1<br />
NIP & CSP I 7.1.1<br />
To what extent were cross-cutting issues related to good governance and human rights, gender,<br />
environment, institutional development, capacity building and HIV/AIDS taken into account for the<br />
design and implementation of the programmes?<br />
CCI have been taken into account in the CSP and the NIP and in the design of programmes (nonspecific<br />
interventions)<br />
Extent to which the CSP and the NIP explicitly promote CCI<br />
In the general framework of the 8 th EDF NIP, the <strong>Commission</strong> highlighted its priority cooperation areas.<br />
Good governance and human rights, and a sustainable economic and social development –including gender<br />
and environment- are clearly mentioned as priorities. The NIP also mentions that the <strong>Commission</strong> could<br />
provide funds to Guyana through specific budget lines to promote good governance, democracy,<br />
environment, and HIV/AIDS.<br />
In the first focal area –Rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure-, the NIP explicitly mentions that<br />
environment issues are going to be taken into account in all the programmes and that the active involvement<br />
of women in the maintenance of coastal equipments will be stimulated.<br />
In the second focal area –Private sector development-, the NIP mentions that measures will be taken to<br />
stimulate women involvement in the SME development and that enterprises benefiting from these<br />
programmes should be sensitive to environmental protection.<br />
Actions outside focal areas mention actions to promote environmental protection.<br />
Whereas good governance and human rights is presented as a priority cooperation area, it is not translated into<br />
specific actions in focal or non focal sectors.<br />
The 9 th EDF CSP does not make any explicit reference to the CCI apart from the reference to the <strong>European</strong><br />
Community’ Development Policy of 10 November 2000. Focal and non-focal sectors do not include any CCI<br />
project. The 9th EDF NIP mentions that specific actions could be financed via budget lines in the areas of<br />
human rights and democracy.<br />
I 7.1.2<br />
All Projects Compilation I 7.1.2<br />
Number of projects per CCI that explicitly identify measures on CCI at the stage of the project<br />
design<br />
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Measures on CCI at the stage of the design of the project<br />
Number of Projects Name of the Project<br />
Good governance and Human Rights 0<br />
Gender 0<br />
Environment 0<br />
Institutional development 2 LEAP, BS<br />
Capacity Building 3 Sea defences, MPP and LEAP<br />
HIV/AIDS 0<br />
Reference to CCI at the stage of the design of the project<br />
Number of Name of the Project<br />
Projects<br />
Good governance and Human 1 Sugar<br />
Rights<br />
Gender 7 Sea Defences, Low-Income Housing, MPP, NAO<br />
TF, BS, Sugar<br />
Environment 5 Sea Defences, NAO TF, BS, Rice, Sugar<br />
Institutional development 1 LEAP<br />
Capacity Building 5 Sea Defences, MPP, BS, Rice, LEAP<br />
HIV/AIDS 0<br />
8 ACP GUA 9 FA I 7.1.2 The LEAP FA mentions 2 CCI in the design of the project:<br />
- institutional development is one of the 7 components of the project<br />
- capacity building = training is one of the 7 components of the project<br />
Capacity building is also mentioned in component 4 (LEAF).<br />
8 ACP GUA 8 FA, Mid-term<br />
evaluation<br />
I 7.1.2<br />
The GTA FA does not mention any CCI in the design of the project.<br />
The Mid-term evaluation stipulates that the project has not been designed with deliberate considerations of<br />
gender nor environmental issues. GTA’s areas of training fall mostly within those that are non-traditional for<br />
women (technical skills training) and that less than 30% of women were participating in GTA’s training<br />
courses. The evaluation also mentions that the project direct impact on the preservation of natural resources is<br />
rather limited.<br />
8 ACP GUA 5 FA I 7.1.2 The Sea Defences FA mentions environmental protection, gender and institutional capacity.<br />
- The project should have an overall positive impact on the environment.<br />
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- The project foresees the realization of a study which will enhance the awareness of the local<br />
population of the project. This study is based on gender disaggregated data.<br />
- The project aims at strengthening the Sea and River Division of the Ministry of Works through the<br />
development and implementation of tools to rationalise the monitoring, planning and maintenance<br />
operations of the division.<br />
8 ACP GUA 15 FA I 7.1.2 The Low-Income Housing FA makes an explicit reference to gender. Gender issues are addressed in the<br />
community work and the Community Development Fund proposed guidelines give priority to women and<br />
children.<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 7.1.2 The MPP FA mentions 2 CCI:<br />
- Gender: preference will be given to micro-projects that benefit women.<br />
- Institutional capacity: a series of activities will contribute to the creation of a vibrant civil society<br />
9 ACP GUA 3 FA I 7.1.2 By strengthening the NAO, the project ensures that sufficient attention is paid to environment and gender.<br />
9 ACP GUA 6 &<br />
7<br />
FA, MoU I 7.1.2 3 CCI mentioned in the FA:<br />
- Institutional capacity: 2 TA interventions in PFM, one in health and one in the social housing sectors in view<br />
of building national capacity.<br />
- Gender: gender objectives are supported in the health sector by the use of indicators concerning mother and<br />
child health.<br />
- Environment: the construction of serviced plots in the housing sector is positive for the environment<br />
because it addresses the water, sanitation and waste disposal aspects of habitation.<br />
The Memorandum of understanding also mentioned institutional development. Several TAs to foster the<br />
capacity of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Housing and Ministry of Health have been planned.<br />
8 ACP GUA 4 FA I 7.1.2 The SAS V FA does not mention any CCI in the design of the project.<br />
9 ACP RPR 6 FA I 7.1.2 2 CCI mentioned in the FA:<br />
- The project will address environmental issues especially in the research of alternative practise to the excessive<br />
use of chemicals in agriculture and of the destination of industrial waste.<br />
- Institutional capacity: the programme will be implemented in direct collaboration with the Caribbean Rice<br />
Association and the 2 Ministries of Agriculture in Guyana and Suriname.<br />
Sucre/2006/018-<br />
530<br />
FA I 7.1.2 CCI mentioned in the FA:<br />
- Environment: an environmental management plan has been completed for the new factory in Skeldon<br />
(cf conversion of land to sugar cane production and agreement of GUYSUCO to the long-term<br />
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I 7.1.3<br />
All projects Compilation I 7.1.3<br />
conservation of 7,500 ha)<br />
- Gender: women’s role in sugar production is limited<br />
- Good governance and human rights: the two major unions look after the best interests of their<br />
workers (sugar industry: role of emancipation from slavery)<br />
Number and list of specific interventions planned by CCI<br />
CCI<br />
Institutional<br />
development<br />
Number<br />
of specific<br />
interventions<br />
planned<br />
List of specific measures planned per project/programme<br />
7 LEAP:<br />
- TA and support provided to IMC, RDC, LCICD & LTI<br />
- Assist LCICD to assume a leading role in private sector development<br />
Budget Support:<br />
- TA to assist the Ministries of Housing and Water, of Health, of<br />
Public Works and of Education to elaborate Medium Term<br />
Expenditure Frameworks<br />
- TA to assist the Ministry of Finance in the development of a<br />
Medium Term Fiscal Forecasting model<br />
- TA to assist the debt office to develop a debt management model<br />
- TA to assist the Ministry of Housing and Water in strengthening its<br />
statistical systems<br />
- TA to assist the Ministry of Health in developing professional codes<br />
for three types of medical staff.<br />
Capacity building 8 LEAP:<br />
- provide training and hands-on assistance to the financial institution<br />
managing the fund (LEAF component)<br />
- provide recruitment and training services for business (Component<br />
6)<br />
- organize training in economic development planning and<br />
management (Component 7)<br />
Sea defences:<br />
- TA and training to the SRDD<br />
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- Establishment of analytical methods and tools, databases and maps<br />
for the SRDD<br />
MPP:<br />
- MPO to provide assistance and to GROs and CBOs in formulating<br />
and writing micro-projects proposals<br />
- MPO to train GROs and CBOs and intermediary organisations in<br />
rapid participatory analysis of poverty problems.<br />
- MPO and international TA to provide assistance to the MP Board in<br />
EC project cycle management, training on the roles and<br />
responsibilities of a project steering committee<br />
8 ACP GUA 9 LEAP revised<br />
Logical<br />
framework<br />
January 2005<br />
I 7.1.3<br />
3 measures on capacity building and 2 measures on institutional development planned:<br />
Capacity building:<br />
- provide training and hands-on assistance to the financial institution managing the fund (LEAF component)<br />
- provide recruitment and training services for business (Component 6)<br />
- organize training in economic development planning and management (Component 7)<br />
Institutional development:<br />
- TA and support provided to IMC, RDC, LCICD & LTI<br />
- Assist LCICD to assume a leading role in private sector development<br />
8 ACP GUA 8 FA I 7.1.3 No specific interventions under the GTA project on CCI<br />
8 ACP GUA 5 FA I 7.1.3 2 activities are foreseen in the FA to deal with the institutional capacity component:<br />
- TA and training to the SRDD<br />
- Establishment of analytical methods and tools, databases and maps for the SRDD<br />
8 ACP GUA 15 FA I 7.1.3 No specific interventions under the Low-Income Housing project on CCI<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 FA I 7.1.3 3 Activities focus on institutional capacity:<br />
- MPO to provide assistance and to GROs and CBOs in formulating and writing micro-projects proposals<br />
- MPO to train GROs and CBOs and intermediary organisations in rapid participatory analysis of poverty<br />
problems.<br />
- MPO and international TA to provide assistance to the MP Board in EC project cycle management, training<br />
on the roles and responsibilities of a project steering committee<br />
9 ACP GUA 3 FA I 7.1.3 No specific interventions under the NAO TF project on CCI<br />
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9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
8 ACP GUA 4<br />
9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
FA, MoU I.7.1.3 5 activities focus on institutional development:<br />
- TA to assist the Ministries of Housing and Water, of Health, of Public Works and of Education to<br />
elaborate Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks<br />
- TA to assist the Ministry of Finance in the development of a Medium Term Fiscal Forecasting model<br />
- TA to assist the debt office to develop a debt management model<br />
- TA to assist the Ministry of Housing and Water in strengthening its statistical systems<br />
- TA to assist the Ministry of Health in developing professional codes for three types of medical staff.<br />
I.7.1.3 Although there were no special interventions on CCI under the budget support programmes, the BS relied on<br />
the monitoring of a number of indicators of which two are of particular interest in the context of CCIs:<br />
• Amongst the indicators of progress made in the soundness of the management of public finance, indicator<br />
5 was a measure of public sector transparency (requiring that a memorandum from the Treasury should be<br />
submitted within a to month delay to the Parliament following the Public Account Committee Report)<br />
which was ultimately meant to ensure greater budget transparency and accountability to the public.<br />
• Amongst the social indicators, the coverage of prevention of mother to child HIV transmission was<br />
retained as one of the three health indicators.<br />
9 ACP RPR 6 FA I 7.1.3 No specific interventions under the Regional Rice programme on CCI<br />
Sucre/2006/018- FA I 7.1.3 No specific interventions under the Sugar programme on CCI<br />
530<br />
JC 7.2 Measures identified during the design for inclusion of CCI in non-specific interventions are in place<br />
I 7.2.1 Percentage of measures in place as planned<br />
Field mission I 7.2.1 3 projects foresaw measures for inclusion of CCI: LEAP, MPP and sea defences. All the measures foreseen at<br />
the design stage are in place.<br />
- 5 measures foreseen in the LEAP put in place (2 institutional development, 3 capacity building)<br />
- 3 capacity building measures foreseen in the MPP put in place<br />
- 2 capacity building measures in the Sea defences project put in place.<br />
All interventions<br />
I 7.2.5 Perception of direct beneficiaries of the CCI<br />
Field mission I 7.2.5 According to the beneficiaries’ viewpoint, <strong>Commission</strong> interventions are taking into account gender,<br />
environment and capacity building. The institutional development component has not met its target as far as<br />
the LEAP is concerned.<br />
JC 7.3 Cross-cutting issues have been also supported by specific interventions<br />
I 7.3.1 Number of specific interventions on CCI out of all the interventions of the period<br />
List of projects, I 7.3.1 7 projects focus on CCI out of all the interventions (47): 5 on good governance and 2 on environment. (15%<br />
Final report for of the interventions)<br />
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the second<br />
external<br />
evaluation<br />
“Strengthening<br />
the institutional<br />
response to<br />
HIV/AIDS/STI<br />
in<br />
the Caribbean<br />
(SIRHASC)”<br />
(2007).<br />
Projects on good governance (1,1% of the total commitments):<br />
- Proposal for financing the production of voter identification cards<br />
- General elections 2001-financial needs assessment<br />
- Identification-preparation of the CSS for the 9th EDF<br />
- Identification - preparation of the CSS for the 9th EDF phase II<br />
- Consolidation of the democratic process (codep) in a polari political situation involving support to<br />
nat.& reg.elections<br />
Projects on environment (1,4% of the total commitments):<br />
- Conservation and sustainable use of botanical diversity in Guyana<br />
- Conservation and utilization of biodiversity in the Iwokrama forest<br />
UNDP, Human<br />
Development<br />
Report (2006)<br />
JC 7.4<br />
I 7.4.1<br />
I 7.4.1<br />
As far as HIV/AIDS is concerned, there is no specific national <strong>Commission</strong> intervention which addresses this<br />
issue in Guyana but the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> provided funding to expand the regional response to<br />
HIV/AIDS, through the “Strengthening the Institutional Response to HIV/AIDS/STIs in the Caribbean”<br />
(SIRHASC) Project (budgeted at € 6,9m, and to be implemented by June 2004). The project purpose was to<br />
strengthen the regional institutional capacity to plan and coordinate an effective response to the<br />
STI/HIV/AIDS epidemic, particularly in the worst affected countries (Haiti, Guyana, and Dominican<br />
Republic). Regarding the outcome of the activities, SIRHASC has provided a platform for information sharing<br />
on HIV/AIDS by stakeholders, which has facilitated policymakers in their fight against HIV/AIDS. It has<br />
also contributed to an increase in the pool of skilled personnel at national level and has provided relevant<br />
information for the establishment of appropriate programmes and sensitised countries on the relevance of<br />
operational research and M&E. SIRHASC also contributed to improve and increase the prevention efforts,<br />
indirectly by improving the capacity of human Resources. There was still much room for further improvement<br />
and increase of the prevention efforts. SIRHASC has also provided the regional institutions with the<br />
opportunity to broaden their scope and intensify their efforts to control HIV/AIDS, thereby increasing the<br />
regional and national capacity to respond.<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> interventions have contributed to the advancement of this CCI in the country<br />
Evolution of respect for human rights<br />
Guyana has ratified most of the major international human rights instruments:<br />
- The International Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (1965)<br />
- The International covenant on civil and political rights (1966)<br />
- The International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights (1966)<br />
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Transparency<br />
international<br />
web site<br />
I 7.4.2<br />
I 7.4.2<br />
- The Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (1979)<br />
- The convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment<br />
(1984)<br />
- The Convention of the rights of the child (1989)<br />
Guyana has not signed the International convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of<br />
genocide (1948)<br />
Corruption rates<br />
According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) established by Transparency International, Guyana is a<br />
corrupted country. The data relating to the CPI score published by Transparency International do not exist for<br />
Guyana before 2005 and it is therefore difficult to analyse the evolution of corruption rates over the period<br />
1996-2006.<br />
2005 2006<br />
CPI score(1) 2.5 2.5<br />
Rank 117 /158 121 / 163<br />
(1) CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country<br />
analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).<br />
9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
I 7.4.2 Although this CCI is important for the budget support programmes in terms of public accountability and<br />
transparency of public finance, it has not been followed under the PFM reviews.<br />
I 7.4.3 Evolution of gender-friendly policies and laws<br />
Field mission I 7.4.3 There are no gender-friendly laws in Guyana. According to the interviews conducted in the field, gender<br />
discrimination does not seem to be an issue in Guyana.<br />
I 7.4.4 Evolution of gender-sensitive indicators (education, health, employment)<br />
UNDP, Human I 7.4.4<br />
Gender indicators have globally improved in Guyana over the period 1997-2004. The Gender-related<br />
development<br />
development index has evolved from 0.691 in 1997 to 0.715 in 2004. The adult literacy rate has improved for<br />
report 1998-<br />
women over the period (from 97.8% to 98.2%) but is still inferior to that of men. The female economic<br />
2006<br />
activity rate has strongly improved over the period (from 28.1% to 43.3%) but is still inferior to that of men.<br />
1997 1998 HDR 2001 HDR 2004 HDR 2006<br />
Gender-related development index (GDI) 0.691 0.698 0.693 0.715 …<br />
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Rank 83 80 88/162 81 …<br />
Education:<br />
1998 1999 2001 2002 2004<br />
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and above) -Female 97.8 97.9 98.2 98.2 …<br />
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and above) - Male 98.8 98.2 99.0 99.0 …<br />
Environmental<br />
Protection Act,<br />
Forests Act,<br />
Water and<br />
Sewerage Act<br />
8 ACP GUA 4<br />
(SAS V and VI)<br />
9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
8 ACP GUA 8 Final Evaluation<br />
report<br />
I 7.4.5<br />
I 7.4.5<br />
I 7.4.6<br />
I 7.4.6<br />
I 7.4.6<br />
Employment:<br />
1997 1999 2001 2002 2004<br />
Female economic activity rate (age 15 and above) 28.1 41.3 41.1 41.5 43.3<br />
Female economic activity rate (age 15 and above) (as a percentage of 48.9 49 50 50 53<br />
male rate)<br />
Evolution of environment-friendly policies and laws<br />
The environmental law mainly consists in 3 Acts:<br />
- The Environmental Protection Act (1996) established the Environmental Protection Agency. The main<br />
functions of this Agency are to the ensure effective management of the natural environment, to promote the<br />
participation of the public in the process of integrating environmental concerns, to establish and enforce<br />
environmental regulations, to coordinate an integrated coastal zone management system. The Act foresees the<br />
realization of environmental impact assessment and the issuance of an environmental permit by the Agency<br />
for any project which may affect the environment. The Act also guarantees the prevention and control of<br />
pollution.<br />
- The Forest Act: consolidates the laws regarding forests, timber sales agreement and permits for forest<br />
produce, and the protection of forests.<br />
- The Water and Sewerage Act established the National Water Council to provide advice to the Minister on<br />
national water policy. The Act provides for the ownership, management, control, protection and conservation<br />
of water resources, the provision of safe water and water sewerage.<br />
Evolution of percentage of technical assistants<br />
Budget support was supposed to contribute to lessen requirements for administrative TA by using national<br />
procedures. Whilst this has been done with the general BS, at the same time the PRBS appears to have<br />
brought many TA to the country in order to advance progress in selected PFM issues. The effectiveness and<br />
sustainability of actions performed by these TA has been uneven and is discussed under EQ4.<br />
Both local/regional and international technical assistance consultants were attached to the project. 11 short<br />
term local and regional consultants worked for a total of 12.79 person months and 9 international short term<br />
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9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
UNDP, Human<br />
development<br />
report 1998-<br />
2006<br />
PRS reports<br />
2004 and 2005<br />
consultants for a total of 11.22 person months making a total of 24.01 months of short term TA. Most shortterm<br />
inputs lasted an average of between 10 - 20 working days at any one time. A long-term consultant,<br />
effectively the counterpart to the GTA Director and known as the Coordinator, advised the project<br />
throughout its lifetime.<br />
I 7.4.7 Evolution of HIV/AIDS prevalence rates<br />
I 7.4.7 The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Guyana has decreased aver the period 1999-2005: from 3.01 to 2.4.<br />
1999 2001 2003 2005<br />
HIV Prevalence rate (% 15-49) 3.01 2.7 2.5 2.4<br />
NB: HIV worldwide prevalence rates range between 0.1 and 27.6 in 2005<br />
These UN data are in contradiction with the data provided by the Guyanese health services which show<br />
negative trends of HIV over the years 200 to 2004 as follows:<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br />
Number of reported cases of AIDS (target of the<br />
PRSP) 248 227 225 220 210<br />
Actual 248 435 450 475 480<br />
Reported cases of AIDS among women (15-45<br />
cohort) (target of the PRSP) 95 112 100 98 95<br />
Actual 95 123 128 131 133<br />
I 7.4.8 Testimonies of Guyana officials on the linkage of the evolution of the CCI in the country with<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> interventions<br />
All projects Field visit I 7.4.8 As far as non specific interventions are concerned, some FAs mention some CCI but there were no specific<br />
measures dealing with CCI neither included at the design of the project nor implemented.<br />
The <strong>Commission</strong> has supported environment and good governance through specific interventions which have<br />
a positive impact on the advancement of CCI in the country. But the <strong>Commission</strong>, as one donor among<br />
others, is only contributing to the evolution of CCI in the country. The donors dealing with environment and<br />
good governance are UNDP, DFID, CIDA and EU. The UNDP is the main donor as far as good governance<br />
and environment are concerned and has a major impact on the evolution of CCI in the country.<br />
Projects dealing with CCI are pushed by the donors but there is no will from the part of the GoG to address<br />
these issues.<br />
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The standards of living in Guyana have deteriorated over the past 10 years and there is first a real need for the<br />
economy to grow before addressing CCI.<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Proj. Nber Source<br />
EQ8 To what extent has <strong>Commission</strong> support to Guyana been fostered by the consideration of the<br />
3C’s principle?<br />
JC 8.1 The <strong>Commission</strong> has designed its NIP/CSP taking full account of other <strong>Commission</strong> policies<br />
and trade agreements potentially affecting Guyana<br />
I 8.1.1 Extent to which the design takes into account the results of specific analyses of resources<br />
available to Guyana under the trade agreements (sugar, rice, rum) and of their potential uses<br />
8 th and 9 th<br />
EDFs<br />
Field mission I.8.1.1 No evidence has been found in country that resources available under the trade agreements were taken<br />
into account when designing the 8 th and 9 th EDFs.<br />
CSP 9 th EDF Section 5.2 I 8.1.1 In the 9 th EDF, these sources of funds are not cited as decision making factors in the framework for<br />
selecting the areas of concentration of the 9 th EDF. It is however mentioned that coherence with other<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> policies will be monitored on a permanent basis and that NIP funds could complement<br />
other funds for specific trade related operations. It is also to be noted that some Sysmin and flex<br />
resources which were not used under the 8 th EDF are programmed in the 9 th EDF (B envelope).<br />
I 8.1.2 Integration of these potential resources in the GoG balance of payments projections and<br />
financing gap projections<br />
I 8.1.2 The balance of payments and fiscal projections are carried out by the IMF which was unavailable to<br />
meet the team.<br />
JC 8.2 The <strong>Commission</strong> has designed its NIP/CSP taking full account of the resources potentially<br />
available under non-programmable support (namely Sysmin and budget lines) and the RIP<br />
I 8.2.1 Extent to which the design takes into account the results of specific analyses of resources<br />
NIP 8 th EDF<br />
Para I.6;<br />
section II.4;<br />
I 8.2.1<br />
I 8.2.2<br />
I 8.2.2<br />
available to Guyana under Sysmin, specific budget lines and the RIP, and their potential use<br />
Both the NIP 8 th EDF and CSP 9 th EDF mention that the NIP has taken account of the coherence<br />
required between programmable NIP resources and potential resources provided by other financing<br />
instruments<br />
( FAS, Sysmin, Stabex, special budget lines devoted to democracy, good public management,<br />
environment, anti-drug campaigns, HIV etc.) and from the RIP. In the NIP 8 th EDF, indications are<br />
given as to the possible use of funds from these different financing mechanisms and the preferential<br />
treatment of Guyana’s sugar, rice and rum exports are reiterated.<br />
Integration of potential resources available under the compensation schemes and under<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> interventions in the GoG’s balance of payments projections and financing gap<br />
projections<br />
As mentioned above, the balance of payments and fiscal projections are carried out by the IMF which<br />
was unavailable to meet the team.<br />
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EGEVAL<br />
CSP 9 th EDF Section 3.3 I 8.2.2 The preferential access for sugar and rice is mentioned in the CSP. Changes expected from the<br />
extension of this preferential access to other developing countries and from the EPA are also mentioned<br />
(and in particular the need to improve the productivity of the rice and sugar sectors) but the NIP itself<br />
does not offer any follow-up of this in terms of proposed interventions.<br />
I.8.2.3 Existence of a dialogue within the different <strong>Commission</strong> Services on the expected impact of the<br />
various elements of the policy mix on implementation of activities and achievement of<br />
NIP/CSP objectives<br />
I.8.2.3 This information is not available.<br />
JC 8.3 Activities programmed under the CSP/NIP have been redesigned to remain coherent with<br />
actions implemented under other <strong>Commission</strong> policies and instruments.<br />
I 8.3.1 Existence of a dialogue within the different <strong>Commission</strong> Services on the impact of the various<br />
elements of the policy mix on implementation of activities and achievement of NIP/CSP<br />
objectives<br />
9 th EDF Interview<br />
<strong>Commission</strong><br />
HQ<br />
8 ACP GUA 9<br />
8 ACP GUA 4<br />
9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
I 8.3.1<br />
It appears that there is very little if no exchange of information between the different units in the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> dealing with the country, the commodity trade protocols (sugar, rice, rum) or the<br />
compensation schemes (Stabex, Sysmin). It seems that at country level there is better general overview<br />
and information flows between the different sector desks, but there still seem to be contradictory<br />
statements made by different staff from the EU on the same issue (on sugar for example which is<br />
currently the most burning issue in Guyana). It also seems that issues are compartmentalised thus<br />
foregoing possible synergies or complementarities between the use of the different financing and trade<br />
instruments.<br />
MN16 I 8.3.1 For example, in the health sector the EC has intervened through the RIP (strengthening of the regional<br />
laboratory CARIC), through a special budget line (EC/WHO partnership supporting safe child and<br />
motherhood) and under its budget support programme where it has provided TA to the Ministry of<br />
Health and used health performance indicators for its variable tranche disbursement. It seems that the<br />
design and implementation of the regional intervention did not capitalise on the knowledge of the health<br />
sector that may have been gained at country level and that the three supports have been undertaken in<br />
total isolation.<br />
CSP<br />
documents,<br />
FAs,<br />
2007 Budget<br />
Speech<br />
I 8.3.1<br />
Similarly, the LEAP programme is singled out in the 2007 Budget Speech as one of three important<br />
contributors to poverty reduction and relief for vulnerable groups and communities. Achievements of<br />
the LEAP such as the infrastructural rehabilitation works, the tourism infrastructure, water supply and<br />
technical/vocational management training are cited alongside the benefits of other projects such as the<br />
Poor Rural Community Support Services Project and the Basic Needs Trust Fund as specific<br />
programmes focussed on improving social conditions and reducing poverty. Although this project was<br />
thus working specifically towards the same objective as that of the budget support programmes, no<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
mention was made in the CSP or in either of the financing agreements of possible links or<br />
complementarity between the two programmes.<br />
I 8.3.2 Evidence of changes in planned activities and/or scope of financial intervention under the<br />
NIP/CSP following unforeseen changes in resources or implementation modalities linked to<br />
other <strong>Commission</strong> policies and instruments<br />
8 ACP GUA 9 NIP, FA I 8.3.2 Under the 8 th EDF, the private sector development was a focal sector area and 8 to 10% of the<br />
programmable resources (€m32) should be allocated to PSD projects. However, the LEAP programme<br />
has been financed under 8 th EDF SYSMIN resources.<br />
8 ACP GUA 4 In the Structural Adjustment Support Programme SAS V which was foreseen for € 4.7 million, a rider<br />
was agreed for using on additional € 0.8 million specifically linked to the social housing sector. The<br />
9 ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
JC 8.4<br />
I.8.4.1<br />
I 8.4.1<br />
I 8.4.2<br />
I 8.4.2<br />
origins of the supplementary funds allocate to this are not known.<br />
Under the 9 th EDF the support initially foreseen for budget support was of € 14.9 million under the A<br />
envelope; this amount was increased with € 8.4 million from the B envelope using the FLEX resources<br />
for the 2000 and 2001 shortfalls in export earnings.<br />
On a totally different track, a small amount of the second tranche of the PRBS 2006 (an amount of €<br />
88 080.49) was retained by the EU in 2007 to cover for project expenditure claims on equipment for<br />
two water supply projects funded under the 7 th EDF which had no justifying documents and which<br />
were thus supposed to be reimbursed by the Government to the EC.<br />
The <strong>Commission</strong> has built its intervention strategy in close coordination with the GoG and<br />
other donors<br />
Modalities and quality of <strong>Commission</strong>-GoG dialogue through the NAO’s office<br />
The EC Delegation and the GoG meet once a month for the EC portfolio review. This is a standard<br />
procedure in Guyana where each donor’s programme and project implementation is routinely reviewed<br />
in detail once a month with the Ministry of Finance. There are no special and formalised platforms for<br />
EC-GoG discussions at higher policy level.<br />
The quality of the dialogue through the NAO’s office is cordial although some tensions seem to arise<br />
due to the different interpretations of the role of the NAO Task Force (see also EQ6) and due to a<br />
paternalistic attitude of the Delegation staff.<br />
Evidence of common understanding of Guyana’s needs (general and sector) by the<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> and other donors, and particularly of participation in common needs assessment<br />
studies<br />
Guyana is a small country where relatively few donors intervene and even fewer donors are present on<br />
the ground. It is generally recognised that because of this, there is no lack of information flows about<br />
“who is doing what where”. Each donor is careful not to duplicate or overlap another donor’s activities<br />
and the exchange of information might lead to one donor cooperating on a one-off basis with another<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
PRS 2004<br />
report<br />
Field<br />
interviews<br />
I 8.4.3<br />
donor on a specific issue. However, donor coordination is not well developed in Guyana: donors do not<br />
undertake common sector diagnostic reviews, do not work together in common frameworks of<br />
understanding of the needs of the sector, do not design common programmes of intervention, etc.<br />
Although donors may be active in a same area (whether thematic such as public finance or sector work),<br />
each intervention remains a stand alone effort. Those sectors where the Government itself is actively<br />
pursuing the implementation of sector reforms (such as in health for example) may show signs of closer<br />
cooperation between donors. The lack of sector strategic plans is a major hindrance to donor<br />
cooperation but the constraint can be overcome as three recently undertaken donor cooperation<br />
initiatives have shown:<br />
• In governance where several donors (IDB, CIDA and DFiD) have funded and participated in the<br />
undertaking of the democracy and governance institutional assessment (DGIA). The EU,<br />
although a member of the governance working group, did not participate because it did its own<br />
governance profile for the 10th EDF preparation.<br />
• In public finance management, several donors (IDB, World Bank, EU) jointly assisted the<br />
Government in undertaking a Public Expenditure and Fiduciary Accountability (PEFA) and a<br />
national procurement systems assessment.<br />
• With the view to assist the Government to prepare its second PRSP, the major donors worked<br />
together to develop a funding plan of this preparatory phase and informed the Government of its<br />
outcome by a common letter.<br />
DEC participation and role in government/multi-donor consultation processes (general and<br />
sector) and in coordination committees or working groups (government/donor and<br />
donor/donor) at general (macro or PRSP) and sector levels dealing with programming of donor<br />
interventions<br />
Within the framework of the PRSP M&E system, GoG invited representatives of line ministries and<br />
donor agencies to participate in a number of thematic groups with the following functions:<br />
• reviewing sectoral strategies that target PRSP goals<br />
• addressing resource gaps in sectoral programmes<br />
• monitoring performance against sectoral targets, and<br />
• increasing efficiency of donor interventions through better donor coordination.<br />
The thematic groups are responsible for contributing to the examination of the work programme to<br />
support donor coordination and alignment with the PRSP. In 2001/2002, thematic groups were set up<br />
in health, education, governance, water and infrastructure (including housing). The meetings of the<br />
sectoral groups are scheduled twice a year but most of them were interrupted during 2004/2005 and<br />
only those which have actively interested ministers have recently (2007) started again. In preparation of<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
8 ACP GUA 9<br />
LEAP<br />
Evaluation<br />
report and<br />
Field mission<br />
I 8.4.3<br />
the PRSP II, a group on the national competitiveness strategy was added. Although the government<br />
subsequently abandoned this group, the donors continued attending and its scope has gradually<br />
extended beyond the original competitiveness theme to encompass wider macro-economic,<br />
development and trade issues. This group seems to be the one having gone furthest in trying to<br />
harmonise donor interventions.<br />
It seems that these working groups are much appreciated by the donors for information sharing.<br />
However it also seems that they mainly deal with implementation issues and do not touch upon strategic<br />
or policy issues.<br />
Harmonisation of donor efforts takes place through a high level committee consisting of representatives<br />
of donor agencies, mission heads, and line ministers: the Donor Coordination Unit (DCU) or National<br />
Donor Coordination Committee. This committee is in charge of:<br />
- the establishment of thematic groups involving donors and line ministries to review and<br />
develop project pipelines so as to minimise duplication of donor programmes,<br />
- to review the participation Action Plan and provide continuous advice for its successful<br />
implementation,<br />
- to strengthen the capacity of line ministries to formulate policies and improve their data<br />
collection capabilities.<br />
There has been good sectoral donor coordination in the water and education sector and with regard to<br />
sea defences. Through joint efforts and consultations over the PRSP process, donors are achieving more<br />
effective co-ordination.<br />
With respect to harmonisation of donor efforts in Private Sector Development, CIDA plays the<br />
coordinating role of the PSD Donor Group. In principle, they meet quarterly.<br />
I.8.4.4 NIP/CSP explicitly refers to other donor strategies<br />
CSP 9 th EDF I.8.4.4 The 9th CSP specifically mentions other donor interventions as being one of the four factors of its<br />
decision making process in selecting intervention areas. The strategies of other donors are however not<br />
defined in the CSP but may be part of the preparatory process to the CSP elaboration.<br />
When developing sector projects or programmes (as opposed to country strategies) it appears that full<br />
account is taken of the existing and/or planned interventions of other donors in the same area so as to<br />
avoid duplication or overlap of activities. However, the interventions are not specifically designed to<br />
complement or reinforce the activities of other donors.<br />
For budget support, although the EC is the only provider of direct budget support to Guyana, it did not<br />
seek to develop synergies with the IDB who is a major provider of balance of payments support and<br />
equally active in the macro-fiscal and social areas. No mention is made in any of the financing<br />
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
8 ACP GUA 4<br />
9ACP GUA<br />
6&7<br />
8 ACP GUA 9 Evaluation<br />
report<br />
8 ACP GUA 8 GTA Midterm<br />
evaluation<br />
report, GTA<br />
Final<br />
evaluation<br />
report<br />
JC 8.5<br />
I 8.5.1<br />
I.8.5.1<br />
I 8.5.1<br />
I 8.5.1<br />
agreements of IDB or BWI strategies with regard to overall support to the PRSP implementation.<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> activities are implemented in full coordination with GoG and other donors for<br />
interventions in the same area<br />
Evidence of synergies or conflicts between activities implemented by the <strong>Commission</strong> and<br />
those implemented by other donors and GoG<br />
The EC is the only donor providing budget support to Guyana. However, in the fields of particular<br />
interest to the EC in this context (the quality of the public finance management systems, the health and<br />
social housing sectors), other donors are active. Cooperation between donors seems good. In PFM, the<br />
BWI, CIDA, DFiD, USAID, IDB and possibly other donors have all at one point intervened to<br />
strengthen or support various functions of the Ministry of Finance or of the Auditor General. All<br />
interventions seem to have been based (loosely or not) on the CFAA diagnostic of 2002 but have not<br />
formed part of an overall sequenced intervention plan. As a result, opportunities for creating synergies<br />
and achieving greater results by undertaking complementary and mutually reinforcing interventions have<br />
not been taken. Close cooperation, when applied, seems to have stemmed mainly from a practical need<br />
to move things forward: an example is the funding by the IDB of the continuation of the IFMAS<br />
implementation after CIDA funding ended or the funding by the IDB of the hardware aspects of debt<br />
management that the EU could not provide for as originally planned under the PRBS.<br />
For the LEAP programme, there are synergies between activities implemented by the <strong>Commission</strong> and<br />
other donors:<br />
- EMPRETEC is a UNDP, GoG and Private Sector project: it’s a capacity-building programme<br />
promoting SME development. It has many linkages with LEAP.<br />
- The Guyana Trade and Investment Support (GITS) is a joint GoG-US government project. It is<br />
targeting more the larger companies when compared to the target groups of LEAP.<br />
- CIDA’s programme supports human resource development in agro-processing, forestry & wood<br />
products. It came to en end in 2005.<br />
For the GTA programme, there has been favourable cooperation with other donor projects:<br />
- The GTA assisted the Guyana Volunteer Consultancy (supported by IDB) in defining accreditation<br />
requirements for training providers<br />
- Moreover, various projects used the services of GTA: the Caribbean Programme for Economic<br />
Competitiveness (CPEC) and CIDA. The GTA also worked with the UNDP sponsored entrepreneur<br />
development project EMPRETEC.<br />
Regarding the TA component, through cooperation with the CARICOM/GTZ project (Strengthening<br />
TVET in the Caribbean Region), there have been additional TA inputs in areas such as<br />
assessment/evaluation of training programmes and Logical Framework analysis.<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
9 ACP GUA 1 FA, MPP<br />
Mid-term<br />
evaluation<br />
Governance<br />
Field mission<br />
interviews<br />
I 8.5.1<br />
I.8.5.1<br />
Some synergies are observed between activities implemented by other donors and GoG and the GMPP.<br />
- The Building Community Capacity Project (BCCP) is funded by CIdA. This project, launched<br />
in 1996, aims to build the capacity of Guyanese NGOs and CBOs in order to make them more<br />
effective in their delivery of development projects. Cooperation has been explored with Guyana<br />
MPP.<br />
- Social Impact Amelioration Programme (SIMAP) is an IDB-financed programme with the<br />
Ministry of Human Services which aims to improve the conditions of lower-income households<br />
through financing of small-scale community-generated projects. Communication has been<br />
established with GMPP.<br />
- GMPP directly supports the school feeding programme mounted under the Education for All<br />
initiative of the Ministry of Education and funded by the WB. There is co-ordination between<br />
Guyana Micro Project Office and the Ministry.<br />
Although there are thus several cases of synergies between particular donors in particular sectors, three<br />
examples have been cited of multi-donor close cooperation:<br />
• the elections which has been the only instance in Guyana where donors pulled together to finance a<br />
common fund (managed by the UN);<br />
• the governance study (see below), and<br />
• the PEFA study (see above).<br />
Apart from these three cases, cooperation is mainly done on a bilateral basis. One could additionally cite<br />
the case of the sugar sector where the EU, the World Bank and DFiD are closely cooperating within the<br />
same framework.<br />
There appears to have been one occurrence of conflict between the EC and other donors’ intervention<br />
in the area of governance: whereas the EC needed a governance profile to be carried out in the context<br />
of the preparation of its 10 th EDF, the working group on governance was preparing to carry out a<br />
Democracy and Governance Institutional Assessment at the same time. For procedural reasons the EC<br />
proceeded with its exercise; it concluded on a positive governance profile and this, incidentally, allowed<br />
Guyana to benefit from a 25% top-up on its 9 th EDF funds which €12 million will be used as budget<br />
support to fill the gap between the PRSB (which finished in 2006) and the new BS programme to be<br />
designed under the 10th EDF. This incremental financing decision was communicated to the donor<br />
community just as the DGIA concluded on a less than satisfactory governance profile for Guyana and<br />
as donors suspended aid in the water sector on suspicions of fraud and corruption within the sector.<br />
The lack of unified views and of coordination of this kind potentially undermines the efforts of the<br />
group of donors to make governance issues progress in the country.<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
I 8.5.2<br />
I 8.5.2<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Modalities of coordination mechanisms between the <strong>Commission</strong>, GoG and other donors at<br />
implementation level (meetings, coordination groups, task forces…)<br />
Apart from the sector working groups which meet twice a year and which bring together donors and the<br />
Government, donors individually meet the Ministry of Finance once every month for the review of their<br />
portfolio implementation. These meetings are essentially geared towards discussing progress in project<br />
implementation. The EC and the IDB have recently agreed on mutual attendance of these reviews but<br />
this has not yet materialised.<br />
Apart from this, donors meet together very regularly: there are weekly meetings of the ambassadors of<br />
the G8 group, weekly G8 meetings of the heads of aid missions and working groups on specific issues<br />
depending on what is important at that moment (there have been working groups on statistics, PRSP<br />
and M&E for example) or where there might be potential collaboration.<br />
Whilst it does thus seem that collaboration is good between the Government and donors and between<br />
donors themselves and progress is being made on several fronts towards closer coordination and<br />
cooperation, much room for improvement remains:<br />
• The Government-donor dialogue could graduate from discussing project implementation to<br />
discussing policy and strategy issues.<br />
• The donor-donor dialogue relies on information sharing rather than on a sharing of<br />
responsibilities and reliance on each others strengths. It is symptomatic that when working<br />
groups are formed, all donors attend instead of designating a limited number of key resource<br />
persons who could work on the behalf of the whole group.<br />
• The information sharing culture between donors could develop towards a sharing of missions to<br />
unburden both the donors and the Government.<br />
• The donor group currently restricted to Western donors (EC, World Bank, IMF, IDB, DFiD,<br />
CIDA, USAID, Japan) could integrate the ‘new’ donors also active in Guyana (India, Brazil,<br />
China).<br />
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SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Annex 8 – List of Interventions<br />
This list of interventions comprises all the <strong>Commission</strong> interventions in Guyana decided between 1996 and 2006. The data have<br />
been revised in November 2007 and the list therefore also includes the “9th EDF sea defences programme” (€17M) decided in<br />
2007.<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 8/page 1
Evaluation of the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>'s<br />
Support to the Republic of Guyana<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Instruments Areas Year Origin Program/Project Title Committed Contracted Paid<br />
Date<br />
Decided<br />
Date Start Date end Date closed Source<br />
Programmable Instruments 1997-2002<br />
NIP 1. Sea defences 1996 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 24<br />
Provision for investigation of sea<br />
defense slip failures 36,571 36,571 36,571 19-Sep-96 19-Sep-96 19-Oct-96 24-Mar-98 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 1. Sea defences 1998 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 28<br />
Sea defences - appraisal of progr.&<br />
prep. Financial proposal 66,836 66,836 66,836 6-Jan-98 1-Mar-98 30-Jun-98 7-Jun-99 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 1. Sea defences 1999 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 5 Guyana sea defences 20,000,000 19,528,130 14,719,614 21-Dec-99 1-Apr-00 31-Dec-08 CRIS Consultation<br />
Guyana's sea defences - econ. &<br />
NIP 1. Sea defences 1999 7 NIP 7 ACP GUA 25 financial analyses - 8 edf 20,779 20,779 20,779 11-Mar-99 16-Mar-99 15-May-99 24-Jan-01 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 1. Sea defences 2000 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 7<br />
Technical study-preparation of the<br />
tender dossier-evaluation of the<br />
tender bids 406,706 406,706 406,706 1-Jan-00 1-Jun-00 28-Feb-01 8-Apr-03 CRIS Consultation<br />
Total Sea Defences 20,530,892 20,059,022 15,250,506<br />
NIP 1. Housing 2000 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 29 Low income housing programme 73,289 73,289 73,289 3-Jul-00 10-Jul-00 9-Oct-00 31-Mar-03 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 1. Housing 2002 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 15<br />
Support To The Low-Income Housing<br />
Sector 9,100,000 4,723,137 1,464,460 12-Oct-02 29-Oct-10 CRIS Production<br />
Total Housing 9,173,289 4,796,426 1,537,749<br />
NIP 2. Private sector 1996 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 18<br />
TA for establish. of private sector<br />
center (see also 7 GUA 14) 100,000 100,000 100,000 3-May-96 3-May-96 3-May-98 25-Feb-99 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 2. Private sector 1997 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 26<br />
Mid-term evaluation small business<br />
credit initiative-phase II 42,015 42,015 42,015 20-Jun-97 20-Jun-97 19-Aug-97 19-Feb-99 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 2. Private sector 1997 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 27<br />
Study of HRD needs for the private<br />
sector 4,610 4,610 4,610 25-Nov-97 7-Dec-97 6-Jan-98 19-Feb-99 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 2. Private sector 1998 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 3<br />
Identification study human resource<br />
dvlpmt programme 73,056 73,056 73,056 15-Jul-98 15-Jul-98 14-Oct-98 24-Jan-01 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 2. Private sector 1999 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 6<br />
TA for feasibility study for private<br />
sector development 1,160 1,160 1,160 21-Sep-99 18-Oct-99 17-Jan-00 13-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 2. Private sector 2000 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 8 Guyana training agency 1,328,342 1,328,342 1,328,342 1-Jan-00 1-Jan-01 31-Jan-05 17-Jan-07 CRIS Consultation<br />
Total Private sector 1,549,183 1,549,183 1,549,183<br />
NIP 4. Good governance 2000 7 NIP 7 ACP GUA 27<br />
General elections 2001-financial<br />
needs assessment 49,997 49,997 49,997 25-Jan-00 1-Feb-00 30-Apr-00 30-Apr-02 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 4. Good governance 2000 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 10<br />
Identification-preparation of the CSS<br />
for the 9th edf 79,990 79,990 79,990 30-Nov-00 10-Jan-01 9-Jun-01 9-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 4. Good governance 2001 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 13<br />
Identification - preparation of the CSS<br />
for the 9th EDF phase II 19,562 19,562 19,562 27-Nov-01 15-Dec-01 14-Feb-02 13-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />
Total Good Governance 149,549 149,549 149,549<br />
NIP 5. Support to the NAO 1996 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 25<br />
Technical assistance to the nao's<br />
office 166,132 166,132 166,132 16-Dec-96 1-Jan-97 30-Jun-99 4-Oct-04 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 5. Support to the NAO 1999 7 NIP 7 ACP GUA 24<br />
Technical assistance to the nao's<br />
office 31,504 31,504 31,504 16-Dec-96 1-Jan-97 30-Jun-99 24-Jan-01 CRIS Consultation<br />
Total Support to the NAO 197,636 197,636 197,636<br />
TOTAL NIP 1997-2002 31,600,549 26,751,816 18,684,623<br />
Programmable Instruments 2003-2007<br />
NIP 1. Sea defences 2003 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 2<br />
NIP 1. Sea defences 2003 6 NIP 6 ACP GUA 30<br />
NIP 1. Sea defences 2006 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 10<br />
Design & tender procedure guyana<br />
sea defences 151,742 151,742 151,742 22-Dec-03 NA 31-Dec-06 31-Jan-06 CRIS Consultation<br />
Elaboration study for the sea defence<br />
project to be financed under the 9th<br />
edf 59,319 59,319 59,319 1-Jan-03 1-Jan-03 31-Dec-03 1-Sep-05 CRIS Consultation<br />
9 EDF sea defences infrastructure<br />
design programme 900,000 622,620 0 1-Jan-06 31-Aug-11 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 1. Sea defences 2007 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 11 9th EDF Sea Defences Programme 17,018,000 0 0 30-May-07 1-Dec-07 28-Feb-14 CRIS Consultation<br />
Total Sea Defences 18,129,061 833,681 211,061<br />
NIP 1. Transport 2003 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 19<br />
Prep t.o.r. + tender documents -<br />
transport sector study 47,077 47,077 47,077 17-Mar-03 1-Jun-03 31-Dec-03 9-Dec-05 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 1. Transport 2004 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 4 Transport sector study 900,000 899,105 854,732 1-Apr-04 NA 31-Dec-08 CRIS Consultation<br />
Total Transport 947,077 946,182 901,809<br />
Final Report - September 2008
Evaluation of the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>'s<br />
Support to the Republic of Guyana<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Instruments Areas Year Origin Program/Project Title Committed Contracted Paid<br />
Date<br />
Decided<br />
Date Start Date end Date closed Source<br />
NIP 3. Budgetary support 2003 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 17<br />
Feasibility study for a budgetary<br />
support programme to Guyana under<br />
the 9th EDF 114,988 114,988 114,988 24-Feb-03 1-May-03 1-Sep-03 1-Jun-04 CRIS Consultation<br />
Poverty reduction budget support to<br />
NIP 3. Budgetary support 2004 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 6 Guyana 26,666,379 26,466,379 12,950,523 23-Aug-04 23-Aug-04 31-Dec-10 CRIS Consultation<br />
Poverty reduction budget support to<br />
NIP 3. Budgetary support 2004 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 7 Guyana 8,400,000 8,400,000 8,400,000 23-Aug-04 23-Aug-04 31-Dec-10 27-Mar-06 CRIS Consultation<br />
Total Budgetary Support 35,181,367 34,981,367 21,465,511<br />
NIP 4. Micro-projects 2002 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 16<br />
Ta - formulation microprojects<br />
programme 46,457 46,457 46,457 4-Oct-02 15-Dec-02 31-May-03 27-May-04 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 4. Micro-projects 2003 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 1 Micro-projects programme 4,000,000 3,886,530 1,539,229 17-Feb-04 NA 31-May-11 CRIS Consultation<br />
Total MPP 4,046,457 3,932,987 1,585,686<br />
NIP 4. Good governance 2005 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 9<br />
Consolidation of the democratic<br />
process (codep) in a polari political<br />
situation involving support to nat.&<br />
reg.elections 940,000 940,000 740,000 1-Jan-05 1-Jan-05 1-Oct-09 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 4. TCF 2004 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 5 Technical cooperation facility (tcf) 605,400 582,649 524,976 31-Mar-04 NA 31-Oct-10 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 4. Humanitarian assistance 2005 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 8<br />
Emergency assistance to the victims<br />
of floods in Guyana 700,000 688,135 688,135 1-Feb-05 31-Dec-07 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 5. Support to the NAO 2004 9 NIP 9 ACP GUA 3<br />
Institutional strenghtening of the<br />
NAO's office 820,000 689,124 501,779 2-Apr-2004 NA 30-Jun-11 CRIS Consultation<br />
NIP 5. Support to the NAO 2003 8 NIP 8 ACP GUA 18<br />
Elaboration study for support to the<br />
NAO 38,846 38,846 38,846 18-Mar-03 15-Jun-03 30-Sep-03 20-Apr-04 CRIS Consultation<br />
Total Support to NAO 858,846 727,970 540,625<br />
TOTAL NIP 2003-2007 61,408,208 42,362,187 25,444,692<br />
TOTAL NIP 93,008,757 69,114,003 44,129,315<br />
Non Programmable Instruments 1997-2002<br />
7 Non<br />
Non Prog Transport 1998 Prog 7 ACP GUA 13<br />
Feasibility study for Guyana-Brazil<br />
road 124,457 124,457 124,457 1-Jul-98 1-Oct-98 31-Aug-00 30-Jul-01 CRIS Consultation<br />
Non Prog Private sector 1998<br />
7 Non<br />
Prog 7 ACP GUA 23 Study economic diversification Linden 101,225 101,225 101,225 1-Jan-98 15-Sep-98 14-Feb-99 13-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />
Non Prog Private sector 2000<br />
8 Non<br />
Prog 8 ACP GUA 9<br />
Linden economic advancement<br />
programme 12,500,000 12,265,390 6,706,365 27-Oct-00 31-Oct-01 30-Jun-09 CRIS Consultation<br />
Total Private sector 12,601,225 12,366,615 6,807,590<br />
NIP Structural adjustment 1995<br />
7 Non<br />
Prog 7 ACP GUA 19<br />
Support Structural Adjustment<br />
Programme (GIP-III) 800,000 800,000 800,000 27-Oct-95 1-Dec-95 23-Oct-96 CRIS Production<br />
Non Prog Structural adjustment 1995<br />
7 Non<br />
Prog 7 ACP GUA 20<br />
Support Structural Adjustment<br />
Programme (GIP-III) 1,264,997 1,264,997 1,264,997 27-Oct-95 1-Dec-95 17-Apr-00 CRIS Production<br />
Non Prog Structural adjustment 1998<br />
8 Non<br />
Prog 8 ACP GUA 1<br />
Support programme for econmic<br />
reforms (sas iv : 1998) 4,600,000 4,600,000 4,600,000 30-Jun-98 1-Aug-98 30-Jun-99 22-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />
Non Prog Structural adjustment 1998<br />
8 Non<br />
Prog 8 ACP GUA 2<br />
Support programme for economics<br />
reforms (sas iv : 1998) 690,000 690,000 690,000 30-Jun-98 1-Aug-98 30-Jun-99 22-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />
Non Prog Structural adjustment 1999<br />
8 Non<br />
Prog 8 ACP GUA 4<br />
Support programme for economic<br />
reforms (sas v : 1999) 5,400,000 5,400,000 5,400,000 31-Dec-99 31-Dec-00 24-Jan-03 24-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />
Total Structural Adjustment 12,754,997 12,754,997 12,754,997<br />
Non prog Debt relief 1999<br />
7 Non<br />
Prog 7 ACP GUA 26<br />
Non Prog Good governance 1997 BL DDH/1997/113<br />
7 Non<br />
Non Prog Sysmin 1996 Prog 7 ACP GUA 22<br />
Non Prog Environment 1998 BL ENV/1998/003-684<br />
Participation communautaire a<br />
l'initiative d'allegement de la dette des<br />
pays pauvres tres endettes 6,440,000 6,440,000 6,440,000 16-Dec-99 1-Jul-00 30-Jun-01 10-Jan-03 CRIS Consultation<br />
Proposal for financing the production<br />
of voter identification cards (decision<br />
du 2 mai 1997) 362,433 362,433 345,174 6-Jun-97 24-Jun-97 1-Mar-98 1-Mar-98 CRIS Consultation<br />
TA for the purpose of examining the<br />
government of sysmin req 17,342 17,342 17,342 15-May-96 15-May-96 15-Aug-96 25-May-98 CRIS Consultation<br />
Conservation and sustainable use of<br />
botanical diversity in Guyana 494,396 494,396 494,396 9-Dec-98 26-Jan-99 25-Jan-03 25-Jan-03<br />
CRIS<br />
Production/dates<br />
CRIS Consultation<br />
Final Report - September 2008
Evaluation of the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>'s<br />
Support to the Republic of Guyana<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Instruments Areas Year Origin Program/Project Title Committed Contracted Paid<br />
Date<br />
Decided<br />
Date Start Date end Date closed Source<br />
Conservation and utilization of<br />
Non Prog Environment 1998 BL ENV/1998/004-320 biodiversity in the Iwokrama forest 1,350,142 1,350,142 1,350,142 10-Oct-98 20-Jan-99 19-Apr-03 9-Mar-04 CRIS Production<br />
Total Environment 1,844,538 1,844,538 1,844,538<br />
TOTAL Non Programmable 1997-2002 34,144,992 33,910,382 28,334,098<br />
Non Programmable Instruments 2003-2007<br />
Non Prog Food Crop production 2003 9 RIP 9 ACP RPR 006<br />
Support to the Competitiveness of the<br />
Rice sector in the Caribbean 12,930,240 12,930,240 5,238,902 31-Oct-03 30-Sep-13<br />
Accompanying measures 2006 for<br />
Non Prog Sugar 2006 BL SUCRE/2006/018-530 Sugar Protocol Countries 5,663,000 3,563,300 3,437,259 25-Dec-06 31-Dec-11 CRIS Production<br />
TOTAL Non Programmable 2002-2007 18,593,240 16,493,540 8,676,161<br />
TOTAL Non Programmable Instruments 52,738,232 50,403,922 37,010,259<br />
TOTAL 145,746,989 119,517,924 81,139,573<br />
Final Report - September 2008
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Annex 9 – Bibliography<br />
1. General<br />
ADE<br />
ADE<br />
ADE<br />
ADE<br />
Author Title Date<br />
Council and <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
EC-ACP States<br />
EC-ACP States<br />
Economist Intelligence Unit<br />
EGEVAL<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Evaluation of the EC Interventions in<br />
the Transport Sector in Third Countries -<br />
Final Report Vol 1<br />
Evaluation of <strong>European</strong> Community<br />
Support to Private Sector Development<br />
in Third Countries - Final Report<br />
Evaluation of <strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Support to Micro-Project Programmes<br />
under the <strong>European</strong> Development Fund<br />
in ACP countries<br />
Revue du Programme d'Appui<br />
Budgétaire Conjoint pour la Réduction<br />
de la Pauvreté (2004-2006) de la<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> Européenne au Bénin - Vol<br />
1<br />
The <strong>European</strong> Community's<br />
Development Policy - Statement by the<br />
Council and the <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Annexe V à l'Accord de Cotonou<br />
<strong>Annexes</strong> à l'Accord de Cotonou<br />
Country Report Guyana (sample)<br />
Evaluation EC s. / Tanzania - Final<br />
Report<br />
Evaluation EC s. / Bolivie Rapport Final<br />
2004<br />
2005<br />
2006<br />
2006<br />
2001<br />
2005<br />
2006<br />
2007<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1986 1986<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1987 1987<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1989 1989<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1990 1990<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1991 1991<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1992 1992<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1993 1993<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1994 1994<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1995 1995<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Annual report 1996 1996<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Cooperation framework between the<br />
Cooperative Republic of Guyana and the<br />
<strong>European</strong> Community - National<br />
Indicative Programme 8th EDF, Lomé<br />
Convention IV, 2nd financial protocol)<br />
1997<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9 /page 1
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Regional Indicative Programme for the 1997<br />
Caribbean Region - Fourth Lomé<br />
Convention - Second Financial Protocol<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Country Strategy Paper and National 2002<br />
Indicative Programme for the period<br />
2002-2007<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Joint Annual Review - December 2002 - 2002<br />
Executive summary<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Joint Annual Review - July 2002 - 2002<br />
Executive summary<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Guyana – <strong>European</strong> Community, 2003<br />
Country Strategy Paper and National<br />
Indicative Programme for the period<br />
2002-2007” (hereafter referred as CSP<br />
9th EDF)<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Joint Annual Review - 2002 - 2003<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Draft Mid-Term Review conclusions - 2004<br />
Guyana<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Joint Annual Review - 2003 - 2004<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Proposal for a Council Decision on the 2004<br />
position to be adopted by the<br />
Community within the ACP-EC Council<br />
of Ministers regarding the revision of the<br />
terms and conditions of financing for<br />
short term fluctuations in export earnings<br />
(Annex II of the ACP-EU Partnership<br />
Agreement signed in Cotonou<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Addendum to the Country Strategy Paper 2005<br />
and Indicative Program<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
<strong>Commission</strong> staff working paper : Action 2005<br />
plan on accompanying measures or Sugar<br />
Protocol countries affected by the reform<br />
of the EU sugar regime<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Co-operation between the <strong>European</strong> 2005<br />
<strong>Commission</strong> and the co-operative<br />
Republic of Guyana - Joint Annual<br />
Review 2004<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Joint Annual Review - Year 2004 2005<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Report on progress made in Public<br />
Finance Management in Guyana (July- 2005<br />
December 2005)<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
EC response strategy in support of the 2006<br />
Guyana National Action Plan for the<br />
period 2007-2013 - Implementation of<br />
accompanying measures for sugar<br />
protocol countries<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Financing Proposal: Implementation of<br />
the Guyana National Action Plan on<br />
Accompanying Measures for Sugar<br />
Protocol Countries affected by the<br />
Reform of EU Sugar Regime, 2006<br />
2006<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9 /page 2
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Financing (GNAP 2006)<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Guyana Poverty Reduction Budget<br />
Support: Report on Public Finance 2006<br />
Management<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Joint Annual Review for 2005 2006<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Draft Country Strategy Paper and 2007<br />
National Indicative Programme for the<br />
period 2008-2013<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Annex A Standard Format : External<br />
assistance Management Report<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Directorate General for Development<br />
website<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Final ETR Conclusions Guyana<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Mid Term Review: Macroeconomic<br />
support assessment Guyana<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
The EU & Cariforum<br />
<strong>European</strong> <strong>Commission</strong><br />
Typology o the Sugar Protocol Countries<br />
<strong>European</strong> Community<br />
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the 1997<br />
Treaty on <strong>European</strong> Union, the Treaties<br />
establishing the <strong>European</strong> Communities<br />
and related acts (Official Journal C 340)<br />
Guyana Government National Development Strategy 2001- 2000<br />
2010<br />
Guyana Government<br />
National Action Plan on accompanying 2006<br />
measures for Sugar Protocol countries<br />
affected by the reform of the EU sugar<br />
regime<br />
Guyana Government<br />
Enhancing National Competitiveness - A 2007<br />
national Competitiveness strategy for<br />
Guyana<br />
Guyana Government - Ministry of Finance Treasury Memorandum 2005<br />
Guyana Government - Ministry of Finance<br />
Treatment of rice levy outturns<br />
computation 2005<br />
Guyana Office for Investment<br />
General website: www.goinvest.gov.gy<br />
IBM Belgium<br />
IBM Belgium<br />
Draft Report of the Third Assessment<br />
Mission on Poverty Reduction Budget<br />
Support Grant by the <strong>European</strong><br />
<strong>Commission</strong> to the Government of<br />
Guyana (October 17-November 4, 2005)<br />
Draft Variable Tranches Of Budget<br />
Support For Guyana Performance<br />
Indicators Review<br />
2005<br />
2005<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9 /page 3
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
IBM Belgium<br />
Last Assessment Mission to Guyana for<br />
Evaluating Performance Indicators<br />
Under Poverty Reduction Budgetary 2006<br />
Support Grant to the Government of<br />
Guyana (October- November 2006)<br />
IDD and Associates Evaluation of General Budget Support : 2006<br />
Synthesis Report - executive summary<br />
IDD and Associates Evaluation of General Budget Support : 2006<br />
Synthesis Report<br />
IMF<br />
Sixth Review Under the Three-Year<br />
Arrangement Under the Poverty<br />
Reduction Growth Facility -<br />
2006<br />
Supplementary Information<br />
Inter-American Development Bank Country Program Evaluation 1989-2001 2002<br />
Inter-American Development Bank IDB Country Strategy with Guyana 2002<br />
International development Association Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Poverty 2006<br />
and International Monetary Fund Reduction Strategy Paper - Second<br />
annual progress report<br />
International Monetary Fund Guyana: Statistical appendix 1998<br />
International Monetary Fund Guyana: Recent economic developments 1999<br />
International Monetary Fund Guyana: Statistical Annex 2001<br />
International Monetary Fund<br />
Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002<br />
Paper 2003<br />
International Monetary Fund<br />
Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002<br />
Paper Joint Staff Assessment<br />
International Monetary Fund<br />
Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2004<br />
Paper Progress Report 2004<br />
International Monetary Fund<br />
Guyana: Enhanced Initiative for Heavily 2004<br />
Indebted Poor Countries – Completion<br />
Point Document<br />
International Monetary Fund<br />
Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2006<br />
Paper Progress Report 2005<br />
Organisation for Economic Co-operation CRS online database on aid activities<br />
and Development<br />
Parliament of Guyana<br />
PARTICIP<br />
SOFRECO-ECORYS<br />
SOFRECO-ECORYS<br />
SOFRECO-ECORYS<br />
SOFRECO-ECORYS<br />
Report of the Public Accounts<br />
Committee of the National Assembly on<br />
the public accounts of Guyana for the<br />
year 1999<br />
Thematic Evaluation of the Water and<br />
Sanitation sector<br />
Medium Term Expenditure Framework<br />
(MTEF) Manual<br />
Medium Term Expenditure Framework<br />
(MTEF) of the Ministry of Education<br />
and the Education sector<br />
Medium Term Expenditure Framework<br />
for Public Works Sector<br />
Report on Modeling and Forecasting<br />
Budgetary Fiscal Indicators<br />
2003<br />
2006<br />
2006<br />
2006<br />
2006<br />
2006<br />
SOFRECO-ECORYS Report on Training in Econometrics 2006<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9 /page 4
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
SOFRECO-ECORYS<br />
UNDP<br />
Technical Assistance to the Ministry of<br />
Health on Medium Term Expenditure<br />
Framework, Draft Inception Report<br />
Human Development Reports 1998-2006<br />
2006<br />
United Nations<br />
Common Country Assessment of 2005<br />
Development Challenges - Part 1<br />
United Nations World Development Report 2003<br />
United Nations World Development Report 2006<br />
United Nations<br />
Common Country Assessment of 2005<br />
Development Challenges - Part 2<br />
United Nations Development Programme Draft Country Programme Document 2005<br />
for Guyana (2006-2010)<br />
United States Agency for International Latin America and the Caribbean 2006<br />
Development<br />
Selected Economic and Social Data 2006<br />
World Bank<br />
Project Appraisal Document on a 2007<br />
Proposed Grant from the Global<br />
Environment Facility Special Climate<br />
Change Fund in the amount of US$3.8<br />
million to the Republic of Guyana for a<br />
conservancy adaptation project<br />
World Bank Guyana Public Expenditure Review 2002<br />
World Bank<br />
Memorandum of the President of the 2002<br />
International Development Association<br />
to the Executive Directors on a Country<br />
Assistance Strategy of the World Bank<br />
Group for the Cooperative Republic of<br />
Guyana<br />
World Bank<br />
The Role and Effectiveness of<br />
Development Assistance - Lessons from<br />
World Bank Experience<br />
World Trade Organisation<br />
Trade Policy Review Guyana, Minutes of 2003<br />
the meeting<br />
World Trade Organisation<br />
Trade Policy Review Guyana: Report by 2003<br />
the Government<br />
World Trade Organisation<br />
Trade Policy Review Guyana: Report by 2003<br />
the secretariat<br />
Guyana Estimates of the Public Sector<br />
Current and Capital Revenue and<br />
1996-<br />
2006<br />
Expenditure for the year 2007 as<br />
presented to the National Assembly<br />
(Budget Speech and Volume 1).<br />
Technical Assistance to the Ministry of<br />
Health to Facilitate the Introduction of a<br />
Code of Professional Practice in Guyana,<br />
Final Report (Letter of Contract<br />
N°2005/ 101522 signed on 28/04/2005,<br />
Framework Contract AMS/451)<br />
2005<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9 /page 5
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
2. Project Documents<br />
Audited<br />
financial Annual<br />
Mid-<br />
Term Final Terms of Mission<br />
Quarterly<br />
Progress<br />
Other<br />
relevant<br />
Project Number Title FA MR PS RS FR statements report review evaluation Reference Report Report documents<br />
8 ACP GUA 004 Support x x x x<br />
Programme For<br />
Economic<br />
Reforms<br />
(SAS V)<br />
8 ACP GUA 005 Guyana Sea x x x x x<br />
Defences<br />
8 ACP GUA 008 Guyana x x x x x x<br />
Training<br />
Agency<br />
8 ACP GUA 009 Linden<br />
Economic<br />
x x x x x x x x<br />
Advancement<br />
Programme<br />
(LEAP)<br />
8 ACP GUA 015 Support to the<br />
low-income<br />
Housing Sector<br />
9 ACP GUA 001 Micro-projects<br />
Programme<br />
9 ACP GUA 003 Institutional<br />
Strengthening<br />
of the NAO's<br />
Office in<br />
Guyana<br />
x x (Mid<br />
Term)<br />
x x x x<br />
(inception<br />
and draft<br />
Ccl)<br />
x x x x x x (semiannual)<br />
x x<br />
x<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9/page 6
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S<br />
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA<br />
EGEVAL<br />
Project Number Title FA MR PS RS FR<br />
9 ACP GUA 006 &<br />
007<br />
Poverty<br />
Reduction<br />
Budget Support<br />
to Guyana<br />
9 ACP RPR 6 Support to the<br />
competitiveness<br />
of the rice<br />
sector in the<br />
Caribbean,<br />
Guyana<br />
Accompanying<br />
measures 2006<br />
SUCRE/2006/018-<br />
530<br />
for<br />
Protocol<br />
Countries<br />
Sugar<br />
Audited<br />
financial<br />
statements<br />
Mid-<br />
Term<br />
review<br />
Annual<br />
report<br />
Final<br />
evaluation<br />
Terms<br />
Reference<br />
of<br />
x x (for TA to<br />
PFM; for<br />
TA to MoH;<br />
for TA to<br />
MTFP;for<br />
TA<br />
MoH&W;<br />
x x x<br />
x<br />
TA Debt<br />
Management)<br />
Mission<br />
Report<br />
x (Final<br />
1st<br />
mission<br />
report TA<br />
MoH&W;<br />
Final 2nd<br />
mission<br />
report TA<br />
MoH&W;<br />
Final 3rd<br />
mission<br />
report TA<br />
MoH&W;<br />
Final 4th<br />
mission<br />
report TA<br />
MoH&W)<br />
Quarterly<br />
Progress<br />
Report<br />
x (January to<br />
June 2005;<br />
July to<br />
September<br />
2005;<br />
October 2005<br />
to March<br />
2006)<br />
Other<br />
relevant<br />
documents<br />
x<br />
Final Report – Volume II - <strong>Annexes</strong> – September 2008 Annex 9/page 7