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1755 Pollinators and Pesticides<br />
6 JUNE 2013 Pollinators and Pesticides 1756<br />
Martin Caton: I completely agree, and I am coming<br />
to the Government’s pesticides action plan, which is<br />
actually an “inaction plan”—to be quite honest, it is a<br />
disgraceful document.<br />
We looked at the pesticide approvals regime at EU<br />
and UK levels, and found a system flawed at both. Put<br />
simply, it works like this. The chemical company puts<br />
together the scientific data to support its application<br />
and submits a dossier to the regulatory authority in any<br />
EU member state. That authority’s experts make their<br />
own assessment, which is set out in a draft assessment<br />
report. That is then reported to the European Food<br />
Safety Authority, which conducts a peer review by<br />
experts from other EU countries. Its conclusions are<br />
sent to the Commission, which makes a proposal—for<br />
approval or not—to the Council of Ministers. After<br />
approval, companies can apply to the regulatory authority<br />
in any member state for permission to market their<br />
product. The regulatory authority in the UK is the<br />
chemicals regulation directorate of the Health and Safety<br />
Executive. The CRD prepares a scientific evaluation,<br />
which is considered by the Advisory Committee on<br />
Pesticides, which is a statutory, independent body that<br />
advises Ministers on whether approval should be given.<br />
On the face of it, the whole thing sounds quite<br />
rigorous, but we found significant flaws. First, as our<br />
Chair said, the pesticide manufacturers that commission<br />
the research to submit to the regulators keep control of<br />
that research. In practice, that means that the data on<br />
safety under which a chemical is licensed are not put<br />
into the public domain, denying effective academic<br />
access and, t<strong>here</strong>fore, independent criticism. In contrast,<br />
some of the academics who gave evidence to us reported<br />
that their research was openly published, which meant<br />
that w<strong>here</strong> it showed a link between pesticide use and<br />
pollinator decline, defenders of the agrichemical industry<br />
would go through their work with a fine-toothed comb<br />
looking for a way to rubbish it, sometimes deliberately<br />
misinterpreting it to do so. We believe that it should not<br />
be beyond the wit of humankind to ensure maximum<br />
transparency without threatening genuine commercial<br />
sensitivity.<br />
Another problem with the process is that, up to now,<br />
the EU approval system has explicitly addressed only<br />
the risk to honey bees. That probably would not be too<br />
bad if the honey bee were one of the more fragile and<br />
sensitive pollinators. If that were the case, and it survived<br />
exposure to a product, it would be likely that other,<br />
tougher pollinator species would be fine. In fact, we<br />
heard evidence that the honey bee is probably the most<br />
robust of the pollinators when it comes to pesticide<br />
exposure. Bumble bee research, for instance, shows the<br />
clear detrimental impact of neonicotinoid use. Some<br />
pollinators, such as hoverflies, have very different life<br />
cycles from any bees, and t<strong>here</strong>fore have different exposure<br />
routes. Such pollinators remain unconsidered at present.<br />
We urge DEFRA to introduce a representative range of<br />
sentinel pollinator species in UK pesticide risk assessments,<br />
and to work for the same arrangements across the EU.<br />
We also came across an example that showed that,<br />
however good the approval system might be in theory, it<br />
can fall down badly in practice. The neonicotinoid<br />
imidacloprid had to be re-evaluated in 2006. Germany’s<br />
regulatory authority produced the draft assessment report.<br />
One of the properties to be assessed was the propensity<br />
of the pesticide to accumulate in soil and water, and the<br />
assessments were carried out in two trials <strong>here</strong> in the<br />
UK. The results of the tests were misreported in the<br />
draft assessment report, however. It concluded that<br />
“the compound has no potential for accumulation in soil”.<br />
That is exactly the opposite of what the trial evidence<br />
showed. When the European Food Safety Authority<br />
conducted its peer review of the German assessment, it<br />
identified the pesticide’s apparent tendency to accumulate,<br />
and concluded:<br />
“The risk assessment to soil dwelling organisms cannot be<br />
finalised because the assessment of soil accumulation is not<br />
finalised.”<br />
This formed part of the text of the EFSA peer review<br />
sent to the Commission, so one might have expected<br />
that body to refuse approval until the accumulation<br />
question had been answered.<br />
The European Commission Standing Committee on<br />
the Food Chain and Animal Health considered EFSA’s<br />
report and, astonishingly, gave imidacloprid its approval,<br />
stating that it presented<br />
“no unacceptable risks to the environment”.<br />
T<strong>here</strong> was no mention of accumulation in soil. That<br />
was a clear and dangerous failure of the assessment<br />
process. We argued that the process needed to be tightened<br />
up by empowering EFSA to include in future peer<br />
reviews action points that the Commission must address.<br />
We looked at the growing body of evidence linking<br />
neonicotinoid use with pollinator decline. This was<br />
taken seriously by a considerable number of academics,<br />
but dismissed by the agrichemical companies, mainly<br />
for two reasons. First, they claimed that the trial doses<br />
were higher than would be used in practice. Secondly,<br />
they stated that the experiments had been carried out in<br />
the laboratory or only partly in the field, and claimed<br />
that they could trust only field trials. That Orwellian<br />
mantra, “Field trials good, laboratory trials bad”, was<br />
repeated often during our inquiry.<br />
DEFRA’s real underlying attitude to assessing the<br />
risks of pesticide use was inadvertently given away in a<br />
2012 document, “Neonicotinoid insecticides and bees:<br />
the state of the science and the regulatory response”. As<br />
our Committee Chair has said, the Department stated<br />
that it needed unequivocal proof in order to support a<br />
moratorium.<br />
Joan Walley: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for<br />
making these points. This sums up the flawed basis on<br />
which permissions were being given throughout the<br />
whole regulatory procedure. We are now presenting the<br />
Government with the opportunity to take a leadership<br />
role, and we want them to follow up exactly on the<br />
recommendations in our report.<br />
Martin Caton: My hon. Friend is absolutely right.<br />
I will now conclude my speech, as I have gone over the<br />
10 minutes you suggested, Mr Deputy Speaker.<br />
3.59 pm<br />
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab): It is<br />
true to say that very little of what is discussed in this<br />
Chamber is beyond dispute. Indeed, only on Tuesday, a<br />
scientific hypothesis that has been shown to be supported<br />
by 97% of scientists writing about it in a review of<br />
12,000 papers—namely, anthropogenic global warming—<br />
was nevertheless merrily being debated by hon. Members<br />
as though that near certainty did not exist. Questions