04.06.2014 Views

here - United Kingdom Parliament

here - United Kingdom Parliament

here - United Kingdom Parliament

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

1755 Pollinators and Pesticides<br />

6 JUNE 2013 Pollinators and Pesticides 1756<br />

Martin Caton: I completely agree, and I am coming<br />

to the Government’s pesticides action plan, which is<br />

actually an “inaction plan”—to be quite honest, it is a<br />

disgraceful document.<br />

We looked at the pesticide approvals regime at EU<br />

and UK levels, and found a system flawed at both. Put<br />

simply, it works like this. The chemical company puts<br />

together the scientific data to support its application<br />

and submits a dossier to the regulatory authority in any<br />

EU member state. That authority’s experts make their<br />

own assessment, which is set out in a draft assessment<br />

report. That is then reported to the European Food<br />

Safety Authority, which conducts a peer review by<br />

experts from other EU countries. Its conclusions are<br />

sent to the Commission, which makes a proposal—for<br />

approval or not—to the Council of Ministers. After<br />

approval, companies can apply to the regulatory authority<br />

in any member state for permission to market their<br />

product. The regulatory authority in the UK is the<br />

chemicals regulation directorate of the Health and Safety<br />

Executive. The CRD prepares a scientific evaluation,<br />

which is considered by the Advisory Committee on<br />

Pesticides, which is a statutory, independent body that<br />

advises Ministers on whether approval should be given.<br />

On the face of it, the whole thing sounds quite<br />

rigorous, but we found significant flaws. First, as our<br />

Chair said, the pesticide manufacturers that commission<br />

the research to submit to the regulators keep control of<br />

that research. In practice, that means that the data on<br />

safety under which a chemical is licensed are not put<br />

into the public domain, denying effective academic<br />

access and, t<strong>here</strong>fore, independent criticism. In contrast,<br />

some of the academics who gave evidence to us reported<br />

that their research was openly published, which meant<br />

that w<strong>here</strong> it showed a link between pesticide use and<br />

pollinator decline, defenders of the agrichemical industry<br />

would go through their work with a fine-toothed comb<br />

looking for a way to rubbish it, sometimes deliberately<br />

misinterpreting it to do so. We believe that it should not<br />

be beyond the wit of humankind to ensure maximum<br />

transparency without threatening genuine commercial<br />

sensitivity.<br />

Another problem with the process is that, up to now,<br />

the EU approval system has explicitly addressed only<br />

the risk to honey bees. That probably would not be too<br />

bad if the honey bee were one of the more fragile and<br />

sensitive pollinators. If that were the case, and it survived<br />

exposure to a product, it would be likely that other,<br />

tougher pollinator species would be fine. In fact, we<br />

heard evidence that the honey bee is probably the most<br />

robust of the pollinators when it comes to pesticide<br />

exposure. Bumble bee research, for instance, shows the<br />

clear detrimental impact of neonicotinoid use. Some<br />

pollinators, such as hoverflies, have very different life<br />

cycles from any bees, and t<strong>here</strong>fore have different exposure<br />

routes. Such pollinators remain unconsidered at present.<br />

We urge DEFRA to introduce a representative range of<br />

sentinel pollinator species in UK pesticide risk assessments,<br />

and to work for the same arrangements across the EU.<br />

We also came across an example that showed that,<br />

however good the approval system might be in theory, it<br />

can fall down badly in practice. The neonicotinoid<br />

imidacloprid had to be re-evaluated in 2006. Germany’s<br />

regulatory authority produced the draft assessment report.<br />

One of the properties to be assessed was the propensity<br />

of the pesticide to accumulate in soil and water, and the<br />

assessments were carried out in two trials <strong>here</strong> in the<br />

UK. The results of the tests were misreported in the<br />

draft assessment report, however. It concluded that<br />

“the compound has no potential for accumulation in soil”.<br />

That is exactly the opposite of what the trial evidence<br />

showed. When the European Food Safety Authority<br />

conducted its peer review of the German assessment, it<br />

identified the pesticide’s apparent tendency to accumulate,<br />

and concluded:<br />

“The risk assessment to soil dwelling organisms cannot be<br />

finalised because the assessment of soil accumulation is not<br />

finalised.”<br />

This formed part of the text of the EFSA peer review<br />

sent to the Commission, so one might have expected<br />

that body to refuse approval until the accumulation<br />

question had been answered.<br />

The European Commission Standing Committee on<br />

the Food Chain and Animal Health considered EFSA’s<br />

report and, astonishingly, gave imidacloprid its approval,<br />

stating that it presented<br />

“no unacceptable risks to the environment”.<br />

T<strong>here</strong> was no mention of accumulation in soil. That<br />

was a clear and dangerous failure of the assessment<br />

process. We argued that the process needed to be tightened<br />

up by empowering EFSA to include in future peer<br />

reviews action points that the Commission must address.<br />

We looked at the growing body of evidence linking<br />

neonicotinoid use with pollinator decline. This was<br />

taken seriously by a considerable number of academics,<br />

but dismissed by the agrichemical companies, mainly<br />

for two reasons. First, they claimed that the trial doses<br />

were higher than would be used in practice. Secondly,<br />

they stated that the experiments had been carried out in<br />

the laboratory or only partly in the field, and claimed<br />

that they could trust only field trials. That Orwellian<br />

mantra, “Field trials good, laboratory trials bad”, was<br />

repeated often during our inquiry.<br />

DEFRA’s real underlying attitude to assessing the<br />

risks of pesticide use was inadvertently given away in a<br />

2012 document, “Neonicotinoid insecticides and bees:<br />

the state of the science and the regulatory response”. As<br />

our Committee Chair has said, the Department stated<br />

that it needed unequivocal proof in order to support a<br />

moratorium.<br />

Joan Walley: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for<br />

making these points. This sums up the flawed basis on<br />

which permissions were being given throughout the<br />

whole regulatory procedure. We are now presenting the<br />

Government with the opportunity to take a leadership<br />

role, and we want them to follow up exactly on the<br />

recommendations in our report.<br />

Martin Caton: My hon. Friend is absolutely right.<br />

I will now conclude my speech, as I have gone over the<br />

10 minutes you suggested, Mr Deputy Speaker.<br />

3.59 pm<br />

Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab): It is<br />

true to say that very little of what is discussed in this<br />

Chamber is beyond dispute. Indeed, only on Tuesday, a<br />

scientific hypothesis that has been shown to be supported<br />

by 97% of scientists writing about it in a review of<br />

12,000 papers—namely, anthropogenic global warming—<br />

was nevertheless merrily being debated by hon. Members<br />

as though that near certainty did not exist. Questions

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!