the february 2009 fires - 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

THE FEBRUARY 2009 FIRES 

1

2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report 

1 

THE FEBRUARY 2009 FIRES 

Box 1.1: Terminology to describe fire events 

Area of fire – the area of burnt ground, measured in hectares, that a fire covers on the ground surface. 

Blacking out – the process of ensuring that all stumps, branches and burning items are extinguished. 

Contained – indicates that the spread of the fire is halted even though it may still be burning within the perimeter or control lines. 

Control line – a natural or constructed barrier, or treated fire edge, used in fire suppression and prescribed burning processes to 

limit/prevent the spread of fire. 

Crowning – occurs when the fire reaches the canopies of the trees; the fire may then jump, or run, from one crown to the next. 

Direct attack – a method of fire attack where wet or dry firefighting techniques are used. 

Dozer – an earth-moving vehicle with a large blade used to construct control lines. 

Fire ground – the area in the vicinity of the wildfire and fire suppression operations, and the area immediately threatened by the fire. 

Fire line – see control line (above). 

Going – an assessment that a fire exists and is expanding. 

Graders – an earth-moving vehicle with a small blade used to assist in the construction of control lines. 

Indirect attack – the use of backburning as a method of suppressing and confining a fire. 

Intensity – the heat output per length of fire line. Intensity is primarily influenced by the rate of spread of the fire and the quantity 

of fuel consumed. 

Pumper – generally a 2WD firefighting vehicle, designed for urban operations, equipped with a large capacity pump and a limited 

capacity water tank. It requires reticulated water for firefighting operations. 

Rappel crew – firefighting teams that abseil onto a fire ground via helicopter and ropes. 

Rate of Spread – the forward progress of the head fire or another specified part of the fire perimeter (usually reported in 

kilometres per hour). 

Red flag warning – critical warning for the fire group that necessitates an acknowledgment. 

Safe – an assessment that no further suppression action or patrols are considered necessary. 

Slip-on unit – equipment comprising a small water tank, a hose reel, a pump, and an engine that can be slipped onto a Land 

Cruiser or patrol-sized vehicle. 

Spotting – the sparks and embers that are carried by wind and convective activity and that start fires outside the main firefront. 

Spotting and the development of spot fires most commonly occur in front of and around the lead edge of fires, but can also occur 

along the sides. 

Strike team – usually five or six firefighting vehicles and crews deployed to operate as a cohesive unit on the fire ground. 

Tanker – generally a 4WD firefighting vehicle, designed for rural operations. 

Under Control 1 – a fire assessment that the complete perimeter of the fire is secured, no breakaway is expected, but continuous 

patrolling and mopping up is still required. 

Under Control 2 – a fire assessment that the complete perimeter of the fire is secured and no breakaway is expected. 

34

The February 2009 Fires 

Source: AAP Image 

35


1 THE FEBRUARY 2009 FIRES 

This chapter presents a description of the main fires, their ignition and subsequent passage. The description of 

the Kilmore East fire is more extensive than others as it is the only fire that has been examined in depth during the 

public hearings, although there is still further evidence to be heard even in respect of that fire. The Commission 

will complete its examination of the Kilmore East fire and the other fires in the next block of hearings. 

Introduction 

1.1 

1.2 

1.3 

1.4 

1.5 

This chapter provides the context for matters discussed in the interim report. The description of the fires is 

sourced principally from the evidence of Mr Russell Rees, Chief Officer of the Country Fire Authority (CFA), 

Mr Ewan Waller, Chief Fire Officer of the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE), together with 

evidence received from expert and lay witnesses. It focuses on fire ignition, its subsequent movement, and 

the broad fire agency response. Fire warnings are discussed in Chapter 4, although an outline of warnings 

for each fire is given below. 

Accounts of the fires vary, as material was provided to the Commission in a range of formats. The narrative 

is incomplete since the Commission has yet to hear from many of the operational personnel who directly 

managed the fires. They will be able to provide further information to the Commission, as will other lay 

witnesses during future hearings. Once this additional information is received, this narrative of the fires 

will be updated for the final report. 

A more comprehensive narrative of the Kilmore East fire is provided in the interim report, because the 

Commission has heard greater detail on this event. 

Where timings have been provided in statements and evidence, they are outlined below. For the purposes 

of this chapter only, timings have been described using the 24-hour clock. Witnesses have drawn these 

from their own recollections or records, or from details on the CFA Incident Management System (IMS) 

and the DSE FireWeb. 1 Where timings were not specified, they are absent. Fires are listed according to 

the time they were reported. Discussion on the fires is separated into: 

■■ fire activity before 7 February 

■■ 

■■ 

fire activity on 7 February 

fire activity after 7 February. 

To put this narrative of the fires in perspective, a summary of weather information provided by the Bureau 

of Meteorology (BoM) is set out first, followed by observations on fire behaviour. 

The Weather 

1.6 

Weather conditions are invariably an important factor in all fire analysis, but a fuller understanding of the 

abnormal weather conditions leading up to, and on, 7 February is crucial to considering the subsequent 

impact of the fires. Weather information outlined below is largely drawn from the evidence of Dr Mark 

Williams, Regional Director of the Victorian Office of the BoM. 

2 

1.7 Central Australia has warmed 1.5–2.0°C over the last century. Over the last 12 years, Victoria has 

experienced warmer than average temperatures, and the last decade has been the warmest on record, 

breaking records going back 154 years. 3 During the same period, there has been very little above average 

rainfall and most of Victoria received either below or well below average rainfall. A large portion of southern 

Victoria, notably the area that surrounds Melbourne, received the lowest rainfall on record. The same has 

been experienced in western Victoria. 4 Dr Williams stated that: 

The whole of south-east Australia has suffered a severe and protracted drought which is without 

historical precedent. In central Victoria the 12-year rainfall totals have been around 10 to 20 % below 

the 1961–90 average and 10 to 13 % below the lowest on record for any 12-year period prior to 1997. 5 

36 

1.8 

Across Victoria the average annual rainfall during this drought has been 555 mm, compared with 

a long-term average (1961–1990) of 653 mm. 6


Figure 1.1: Victorian rainfall deciles 

January 2009 

Mildura 

Hay 

Goulburn 

Ouyen 

Swan Hill 

Deniliquin 

Wagga Wagga 

Canberra 

Horsham 

Bendigo 

Echuca 

Benalla 

Albury 

Perisher Valley Cooma 

Omeo 

Casterton 

Ballarat 

Melbourne 

Bairnsdale 

Portland 

Warrnambool 

Geelong 

Wonthaggi 

Latrobe Valley 

Cape Otway 

Wilsons Prom. 

February 2009 

Mildura 

Hay 

Goulburn 

Ouyen 

Swan Hill 

Deniliquin 

Wagga Wagga 

Canberra 

Horsham 

Bendigo 

Echuca 

Benalla 

Albury 

Perisher Valley Cooma 

Omeo 

Casterton 

Ballarat 

Melbourne 

Bairnsdale 

Portland 

Warrnambool 

Geelong 

Wonthaggi 

Latrobe Valley 

Cape Otway 

Wilsons Prom. 

Source: Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0032 and 0034 7 

Note: Rainfall deciles for January and February 2009 indicate that 

both months are ‘very much below average’. 8 Across central and 

eastern Victoria, there is a strong association between drought 

and the occurrence of major bushfires. 9 

Lowest on record 

Very much below average 

Below average 

Average 

37



Figure 1.2: Victorian annual mean temperature, 1910–2008, standardised against the 1961–1990 average 

2 

Australian Bureau of Meteorology 

1 

Mean T Anomaly (ºC) 

–1 

–2 

1910 

1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 

Year 

Source: Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0030 10 

Note: The annually averaged mean temperature for Victoria has deviated from the 1961–1990 average. The solid line represents an 11 year moving 

average. 11 The grey areas indicate below average temperatures and the red areas indicate above average temperatures. 12 

2008–09 bushfire season 

1.9 During the three months from October to December 2008, most of Victoria received near-average to above 

average rainfall. 13 In contrast, the early part of 2009 was exceptionally dry, with below average to record 

low rainfall for January, particularly in central and western parts of Victoria. Melbourne had its second driest 

January on record. The dry weather continued during February 2009, with most of the western half of 

Victoria experiencing well below average rainfall. 14 In fact, there was ‘dipole activity’, with wet monsoonal 

activity in northern Australia and very hot, dry conditions further south. 15 

1.10 

1.11 

After a relatively mild start to 2009, exceptional heatwave conditions developed across south-east Australia 

in late January. The last week of January witnessed one of the most severe, prolonged heatwaves in southeast 

Australia’s recorded history. 16 Dr Williams noted that ‘very, very hot air and very, very high temperatures 

[were] experienced in Victoria during that period’. 17 In southern South Australia, and much of central, 

southern and western Victoria, maximum temperatures widely reached their highest levels since at least 

1939. 18 Melbourne experienced three consecutive days over 43°C — a new record. 19 

The week leading up to 7 February was characterised by a series of high-pressure systems to the south of 

Victoria, which moved eastwards from the Great Australian Bight into the Tasman Sea. The air heated over 

land throughout this period, and this continued until 7 February. The set of charts in Figure 1.3, from 23:00 

on 6 February to 05:00 on 8 February, demonstrate, in six-hourly intervals, the static high-pressure cell in 

the Tasman Sea on 7 February and the passage of the pressure trough across Victoria. 20 

38


Figure 1.3: The 6-hourly passage of the pressure trough across Australia on 7 February 2009 

National Meteorological Oceanographic Centre 

11:00am EDT Friday 6 February 2009 


5:00am EDT Saturday 7 February 2009 

TC “Freddy” 

1004 

L 

x 

996 

L 

x 

1001 

L 

x 

997 

1004 

L 

x 

998 

5 Kt 

990 

Check latest 

cyclone warnings 

L 

x 

998 

L 

x 

1000 

L 

x 

998 

1020 1012 

1004 

H 

x 

1012 

1012 

1004 

35 Kt 

1004 

1012 

L 

x 

986 

996 

1011 H 

x 

1012 

1004 

25 Kt 

1020 

L 

x 

981 

988 

996 

H 

x 

1014 

H 

x 

1018 


11:00am EDT Saturday 7 February 2009 


5:00pm EDT Saturday 7 February 2009 

5 Kt 


Check latest 


988 

L 

x 

1002 

L 

x 

1000 

L 

x 

1002 

L 

x 

1007 


Check latest 


2 Kt 

989 

1004 

L 

x 

999 

L 

x 

998 

L 

x 

1005 

1008 

L 

x 

1020 1012 

1024 

1016 

1008 

1000 

998 1016 H 

x 

30 Kt 

1018 

1004 

996 

L x 

996 

H 

x 

1019 

L 

x 

976 

988 

L 

35 Kt 


11:00pm EDT Saturday 7 February 2009 


5:00am EDT Sunday 8 February 2009 

2 Kt 

1004 


989 

Check latest 


999 

L 

x 

L 

x 

1000 

6 Kt 


1004 

988 

Check latest 


L 

x 

L 

x 

1000 

1000 

1012 

L 

x 

1012 

1020 

L 

x 

1005 

1020 

1012 

1012 

1012 

H 

x 

1026 

1004 

996 

988 

H x 

1020 

Hx 

1004 

H 

x 

996 

1019 

1027 

988 

35 Kt 

45 Kt 

Map source: Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0042 21 

39



1.12 

As a result of these conditions, the BoM issued numerous forecasts and warnings of severe fire weather 

conditions in the week leading up to 7 February. The BoM also issued 205 public and fire weather 

publications (products) between 11:00 Friday 6 February and 05:00 Sunday 8 February. 22 

Weather conditions on Saturday 7 February 

1.13 On the evening of 6 February, a high-pressure system located in the Tasman Sea was directing very hot air 

over much of Victoria. A cold front was located across southern Western Australia extending to the south 

of the Bight, and was moving eastwards towards Victoria. 23 

1.14 

1.15 

1.16 

1.17 

On 7 February temperatures rose quickly, and strong gale-force north-westerly winds began to reach ground 

level. 24 By 11:00, temperatures were near 40°C, with relative humidity already below 20 per cent in many 

parts of the state. Both forest and grass fire danger indices were well into the extreme category by 11:00 

in western and central Victoria. Fire danger indices (FDI) were approaching Extreme in the rest of Victoria. 25 

Many all-time site records were set in Victoria on 7 February, including Melbourne (154 years of records), 

where the temperature reached 46.4°C, far exceeding its previous all-time record of 45.6°C set on Black 

Friday (13 January 1939). It was also 3.2°C above the previous February record, which was set in 1983. 26 

During the day, temperatures reached mid 40°C in many parts of the state and relative humidity was mostly 

below 10 per cent. North-westerly winds had either maintained or increased in strength during the morning. 

Mount Gellibrand Automatic Weather Station (AWS) was by then recording storm-force winds (90 kilometres 

per hour), while winds of 40–60 kilometres per hour were recorded over much of the state. Forest and Grass 

Fire Danger Indices were significantly into the Extreme category in nearly all of the state. 27 

In the far south-west, a strong, gusty, south-westerly wind change entered the state at about 12:30, 

dropping temperatures and increasing relative humidity. At this stage no shower activity was associated 

with the change. 28 Many places had now reported, if not their hottest day on record, then their hottest for 

February. Wind gusts to 115 kilometres per hour were reported at Mount William and Mount Gellibrand, 

while gusts over 90 kilometres per hour were recorded at a number of other sites. 29 The strong and gusty 

south-westerly wind change moved eastwards at a rate of about 30 kilometres per hour. Fire danger ratings 

remained well into the Extreme category ahead of the wind change, and in central parts of the state these 

did not drop below Extreme until up to an hour after the change. 30 

40 

Source: AAP Image


Figure 1.4: A post event analysis of the hourly surface positions of the wind change on 7 February 2009 

Mildura Mildura 

Robinvale 

Murrayville 

Ouyen 

Walpeup 

Swan Hill Hill 

Hopetoun 

Kerang 

12am 

Yarrawonga 

Albury 

Echuca 

Rutherglen Wodonga 

Hunters Corryong Hill 

Charlton 

Nhill Nhill Ap 

Donald 

Shepparton Wangaratta 

Shepperton Wangaratta 

Benalla 

Horsham 

Horsham 

Ap 

Bendigo 

Euroa 

Bright 

Mangalore 

Longerenong 

Falls Creek 

Redesdale 

Avoca Castlemaine Seymour 

Mt Hotham 

Mansfield 

Edenhope Edenhope 

Stawell 

VICI 

Mt Buller 

Omeo 

Yea Eildon 

Mt Hotham Gelantipy 

Ararat 

Kanagulk 

Mt William 

Kilmore Gap 

Ap 

Combienbar 

Ballarat 

Marysville 

Dargo 

Ballarat 

Casterton 

Melbourne Ap 

Cann River 

Westmere 

Coldstream 

Orbost 

Mallacoota 

Hamilton 

Mt Baw Baw 

Mt Nowa Nowa 

Laverton 

Melbourne Mt Moornape 

Hamilton 

Bairnsdale 

Mallacoota 

Sheoakes 

Mt Dandenong 

Bairnsdale Orbost 

Avalon Dandenong VICF 

Mortlake 

VACH 

East 

Geelong Frankston Warragul 

Sale Sale 

Geelong Ap Frankston Latrobe Traralgon Valley 

Warrnambool 

Portland Mt Gellibrand 

Portland Ap 

Colac 

South Channel Is 

Warrnambool 

Anglesea 

VICD 

9pm 

Aireys Inlet Cowes 

Lorne 

Cerberus 

Port Fairy 

Yarram 

Wonthaggi 

Ap 

Cape Nelson 

Rhyll 

VICJ 

Apollo Bay 

Pound Creek 

Cape Otway 

Noon 

3pm 

Wilsons Promontory 

6pm 

Hogan Is 

Source: Exhibit 3 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0043 31 

Note: Fixed and portable Automatic Weather Station (AWS) locations are indicated by place names. Stylised arrows indicate the north-westerly winds 

ahead of the wind change and south-westerly winds behind the wind change. 32 

41



33 

1.18 Mr Rees described in his statement the weather features common to bushfire disasters in Victoria: 

… Wind direction propels the growth of a fire. Changes in wind direction can rapidly increase the size of 

fire, and the risks to fire firefighters and the general community. In Victoria hot dry winds often come from 

the north and northwest and are often followed by a southwest wind change. In this situation … the side 

of a fire can quickly become a much larger fire front (head of the fire). 34 

1.19 

1.20 

The passage of the south-westerly front was a feature of the ferocity and destruction of the 

Ash Wednesday fires. 35 

On 7 February the western district fires [albeit on a smaller scale] provided an indication of what was 

to come with the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires: 

■■ 

■■ 

■■ 

At Coleraine the eastern flank of the fire was not contained before the wind change at 13:23. There was 

concern for the township of Coleraine and fire behaviour was at its worst upon arrival of the change. 36 

The Pomborneit fire initially threatened Swan Marsh township. The arrival of the south-westerly change 

at approximately 4:15 relieved the situation and turned the fire towards Lake Corangamite. 37 

At Horsham the fire on the eastern flank was largely contained by the time of the arrival of the 

south-westerly change at 16:28 but it was recognised that, had the flank of this fire not been secured, 

the township of Horsham may have been threatened. 38 

The diagram below, taken from the statement of Mr Rees, depicts the impact of the south-westerly change on the 

fireground and the subsequent enlargement of the fire front. 

Figure 1.5: Common fire behaviour in Victorian weather conditions 

Point of origin 

New fire head 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

a) fire being blown by a northerly wind 

b) southwesterly wind change 

c) the eastern flank has become 

a much larger fire front 

North 

Head 

Source: Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0053 39 

42 

1.21 

In the south, it took only minutes for the wind to change from north or north-west to south-west, while at 

some locations north of the ranges the change in wind direction took an hour or more. 40 The thunderstorms 

forming in the smoke plumes above fires east and north east of Melbourne (known as pyrocumulonimbus) 

began to produce lightning (photo 1.1 and diagram 1.1). 41 Due to the heat that is generated from 

the condensation, the pyrocumulonimbus cloud is likely to have doubled the intensity of the fires. 42 

Pyrocumulonimbi were formed because of the particular extreme weather and fire conditions on 7 February. 

The air mass was very hot and almost dry, although it did contain small amounts of water vapour. While the 

general direction of the surface fire was in a southerly direction, spotting also occurred to the east, due to 

differences in wind direction at various levels of the atmosphere within the pyrocumulonimbus cloud. 43


Photo 1.1: Massive convective plume on northern flank of the Kilmore East Fire at 15:25 

Diagram 1.1: Pyrocumulonimbus cloud development 

Cloud forms when moisture in rising air starts to condense 

Mid-level winds 

Air heated by fire carrying 

moisture and soot from 

burnt fuel. 

Soot 

Hot Air 

Hot Air 

Photo source: Richard Alder 

Source: Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0067 44 

Source: Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.002.0001) at 0068 45 

1.22 

1.23 

To support the fire agencies, in 2007–08 the BoM placed a meteorologist in the then Emergency 

Coordination Centre for that fire season, and again in 2008–09 in the Integrated Emergency Coordination 

Centre (iECC). 46 In addition, in 2009, it deployed 4 portable weather stations before 7 February, a fifth 

on 7 February, and 8 overall during the fire emergency. 47 

Ash Wednesday on 16 February 1983 is used by fire agencies as a benchmark for subsequent major 

fire events. Table 1.1, provided to the Commission by Mr Rees, indicates the forecast temperatures on 

15 and 16 February 1983 compared with 7 February 2009. The more severe forecasts generally eventuated 

on 7 February 2009, highlighting their severity. 

43



Table 1.1: Comparison of fire weather estimates for 15 and 16 February 1983 and 7 February 2009 

Forest location 

Temp 

Relative 

Humidity % Wind Dir Wind speed Wind change 

Swan Hill 42 10 N 15 

Swan Hill 42 10 N 25 

Swan Hill 46 5 NW 40–65 SW 35 18–22 

Hamilton 35 15 N 20 

Hamilton 40 10 N 45 

Hamilton 40 13 WNW 45–70 W 40 11–15 

Bendigo 37 15 N 15 

Bendigo 37 15 N 30 

Bendigo 37 15 N 45–75 WSW 35 17–21 

Ballarat 34 15 N 20 

Ballarat 38 10 N 45 

Ballarat 41 6 WNW 50–80 W 40 15–19 

Shepparton 39 10 N 15 

Shepparton 39 10 N 30 

Shepparton 42 4 NW 45–75 SSW 30 20–00 

Mangalore 38 15 N 15 

Mangalore 39 15 N 30 

Mangalore 43 5 NW 45–70 S 30 19–23 

Melbourne 34 15 N 15 Sea breezes pm 

Melbourne 39 10 N 45 

Melbourne (Tullamarine) 44 7 NNW 55–85 W 35 16–20 

Orbost 34 20 NNW 15 Sea breezes pm 

Orbost 38 15 NNW 30 

Orbost 40 14 NNW 20–40 SSW 35 20–00 

Forecast issued at 17:00 hrs on 15/02/83 for 16/02/83 




44


Fire Behaviour 

1.24 

1.25 

1.26 

1.27 

Fire behaviour results from the interaction of fuel, weather, topography and the fire itself. Overlaying this 

basic framework is a direct link between drought, increased fire activity and more intense fire behaviour. 49 

This summary of the fire behaviour on 7 February is drawn largely from the evidence of Dr Kevin Tolhurst, 

senior lecturer and researcher at the University of Melbourne. 

The weather conditions leading up to 7 February, and the combination of the drought and the heatwave, 

led to increased combustibility and volatile fire behaviour because many of Victoria’s normally moist forests 

were dry. 50 These forest fuels carried the fire more easily than ordinarily expected. In turn, this led to fires of 

exceptional severity. So the conditions leading up to 7 February not only dried out Mountain Ash forests, 

which ordinarily would have been too moist to burn, but also added additional fuel loads to these forests. 51 

Areas of bush had also died due to the cumulative effects of the drought over preceding years. Mr David 

McGahy, the Arthurs Creek-Strathewen CFA Brigade Captain who has lived in the area for 40 years, 

observed: 

… [the bush] was dying because of the cumulative effect of all the dry years. It was in a lot of trouble, 

the bush. I remember talking to one of the DSE chaps and he said, ‘If we cop a fire through here, it’s had 

it, this bush. It’s not going to regenerate because it is under too much stress now.’ So it was extreme. 

The week before we had had two or three days of 45 and it was just extreme. We knew if it came, it was 

going to be something special. 52 

1.28 

1.29 

1.30 

The fine fuels were desiccated by the conditions and they added again to the fuel load. Fine fuels respond 

much more to the short-term conditions such as the temperature, relative humidity and local wind 

conditions. Woody fuels — twigs, branches and fallen leaves — add to the heat coming off the burnt 

area. They also add considerably to the heat in the main convection column which, in turn, drives the fire. 

Normally those woody fuels burn behind the firefront and do not contribute much to the nature of the fire. 

However, when there is a large fire, under these dry conditions, they can add considerably to the convection 

column, which influences the whole firefront. 53 

The fires of 7 February did not progress in a single, easily distinguishable line — there was a ‘fire zone’ 

that extended kilometres ahead of the firefront. 54 As described in the paragraphs below, this zone 

contained spotting that started further fires, which in turn burnt some areas well ahead of the main 

firefront. Subsequently, the main firefront passed over the same areas, further burning any remaining 

fuel. This process expedited the progress of the fires. 

The fires varied in description and behaviour: 

■■ 

■■ 

■■ 

■■ 

classic grass and scrub fires in western Victoria 

conventional bushfires progressing from ground fires to flame heights of 30(+) metres 

55 

extensive spotting directly sighted 13–14 kilometres ahead of firefronts and estimated up to 35 kilometres 

ahead of firefronts, with greater spotting over shorter distances, causing additional fires to ignite 57 

spot fires further from the firefront, burning in the direction of the prevailing wind, while spot fires closer 

to the main firefront burnt back towards the fire. 58 

56 

45



Photo 1.2: Spot fire activity on the southern escarpment of the Hume Range, north east of Whittlesea, at 16:27, 7 February 2009 

Photo source: Richard Alder 


1.31 

1.32 

The fires did not progress in a neat linear movement across the countryside. It was a chaotic series of 

surging fires, with spontaneous spotting kilometres ahead of the firefronts. 60 While flanks of the fires could 

be identified and in some cases secured, the heads of the fires were largely hidden in smoke and generated 

a deafening roar. Their location was not readily known until the fires were observed affecting houses, 

properties and other locations. From the Kangaroo Ground fire tower, Mr Gavin McCormack described the 

fire behaviour as: ‘the fire continued to spot in front of itself, but the fire kept catching up with the spotting. 

It looked liked waves of fire’. 61 

In summary, Dr Tolhurst advised the Commission that ‘the conditions that we saw on 7 February were as 

extreme as we have ever seen them’. 62 7 February was anticipated to be, and in every respect turned out 

to be, a day of extreme fire conditions. 

63 

1.33 The fires and the conditions have been characterised in evidence before us as unprecedented. 

1.34 

The volunteer Captain of the Kinglake CFA Brigade, Mr Paul Hendrie, provided the Commission with a 

memorandum distributed in his CFA region in preparation for 7 February. The memorandum referred to fire 

conditions including potential flame heights of 35 metres, spotting of 8 kilometres, a head fire rate speed of 

2.5 kilometres per hour. 64 In relation to fire tactics the memorandum stated ‘Crews should expect first attack 

to be ineffective unless the fire is small’. 65 

46


1.35 Dr Tolhurst thought these figures were based upon a fuel load of about 12 tonne per hectare, half the likely 

average in the Yarra Ranges and a long way short of the fuel loads observed in January by CFA personnel. 

Dr Tolhurst indicated the calculations contained in the memorandum were an underestimation of the likely 

conditions. 66 Nevertheless, the information contained in the memorandum, and the flame height figure in 

particular, is important. The safe distance, because of heat radiation, from flame is calculated at four times 

flame height. Thus with a 35 metre flame height the safe distance from the fire is 120 –150 metres. 67 Flame 

height of 35 metres indicates a crown fire — a fire driven by open wind leading to an increased rate of speed 

of the fire. 68 

1.36 Mr Waller provided the Commission with a chart that demonstrates the intensity of fires that burned on 

7 February against other significant fire events. 

Figure 1.6: The intensity of fires that burned on 7 February 

Average Fireline Intensity (on flat ground) 

Based on max weather observations near to fire and existing models 

– assumes 25 t/ha fuel load – 

kW/m 

80,000 

FFDI 

70,000 

189 Black Saturday 

7 Feb 2009 

Ash Wednesday actual 

fire behaviour was as 

high if not higher. 

60,000 

171 

Ash Wednesday 

16 Feb 1983 

Fire behaviour spectrum 

that we are unlikely to 

bridge with conventional 

control techniques. 

50,000 

100 

Black Friday 

13 Jan 1939 

40,000 

87 

Tatong Fire 

16 Jan 2007 

30,000 

20,000 

10,000 

25 

Active crown fire possible 

4,000 10 



Fires Examined 

1.39 

1.40 

1.41 

1.42 

The CFA indicated there were a total of 1386 incidents reported on 7 February — 592 grass and bushfires, 

263 structure fires and 156 reported incidents that were false alarms. 72 The CFA identified 47 fires that had 

the potential to become ‘very severe fires’. 73 A number of fires managed by DSE developed into large fires 

on public land but involved no threat to life or private property. Many of these fires were contained and 

extinguished. Of the fires that were not readily contained on or before 7 February, 14 of those 47 became 

‘major fires’. 74 

The Commission has chosen to examine 12 fires where lives were lost or significant damage occurred. 

These are Kilmore East; Murrindindi; Churchill; Delburn; Bunyip; Narre Warren; Beechworth-Mudgegonga; 

Bendigo; Redesdale; Coleraine; Horsham; and Pomborneit–Weerite. 

The Commission has recorded some detail in this interim report on each of these fires. More detailed 

evidence has only been received on the Kilmore East fire and is reflected in this report, though that evidence 

is also not complete. 

In reporting these fire events and the response of the fire agencies, it is necessary to include technical terms 

used by the fire agencies. These terms are defined in the box at the beginning of this chapter (Box 1.1). 

Naming of Fires 

1.43 It became evident that the naming of fires was an issue on 7 February and it has remained an issue for the 

Commission. Fires were known by their point of origin, or by a name used early in the fire’s development. 

This became problematic on the day, as fires that began in one location spread rapidly; the continued 

reference to their point of origin confused many. This report refers to the fires by the names adopted by 

the Commission during evidence. 

Warnings 

1.44 This chapter provides limited information on warnings. Information was initially drawn from statements 

made by Mr Rees. The Commission received more information on warnings from 774 ABC Radio and its 

regional stations in Ballarat, Bendigo, Horsham, Mildura, Sale, Shepparton, Warrnambool and Wodonga. 75 

A short section on warnings is included for each fire to identify initial and critical warnings. However, this 

information is incomplete, and will be dealt with more comprehensively in later chapters. There is a more 

detailed discussion of warnings in Chapter 4 and some further analysis of warnings for the Kilmore East 

fire in Chapter 9. 

Firefighting Resources 

1.45 Significant state resources were mustered to fight the fires on 7 February and for weeks thereafter. 

The CFA comprises 59,000 volunteers supported by over 1100 career staff, firefighters and administrative 

personnel. 76 The CFA indicated that on the day it engaged approximately 12,000 CFA firefighters, including 

those at Incident Control Centres (ICCs), and over 1000 operational vehicles. This reflects a considerable 

surge capacity. The State had close to 50 aircraft at its disposal but flying conditions on the day limited the 

use of fixed-wing aircraft. 77 

1.46 

In comparison, Mr Waller indicated that DSE had 2347 public land firefighters available, with 569 ready for 

immediate deployment on 7 February. 78 They maintained over 1000 firefighters on firegrounds in the week 

leading up to 7 February and over the subsequent four weeks. 79 The firefighters are often referred to as 

DSE personnel but are more correctly identified as Networked Emergency Organisation (NEO) personnel. 80 

The Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (MFB) also contributed crews to the fires, although 

specific numbers were not provided to the Commission. 81 

48


Fire Activity Prior to 7 February 

1.47 

There was considerable fire activity prior to 7 February and the account below is drawn from evidence to the 

Commission by Mr Waller. 

2 February 

1.48 

On 2 February DSE firefighters were deployed at 64 fires: 20 were going, 21 were contained and 26 were 

considered under control. Most of these fires were caused by lightning. The NEO committed 1295 people 

to firefighting. 82 (As noted above, technical fire terms are defined in the box at the beginning of this chapter.) 

3 February 

1.49 On 3 February DSE firefighters were deployed at 67 fires: 20 were going, 21 were contained and 26 were 

considered under control. Most of these fires were caused by lightning. The NEO also committed 1050 

people to firefighting. 83 

1.50 

1.51 

Lightning overnight ignited Bunyip State Park (two fires) and lightning ignited another fire (Nariel Ski Hut Fire), 

7 kilometres south-east of Nariel in north-east Victoria. 84 

All sectors of the Delburn fire were contained at 16:00 on 3 February but, as it was in difficult and heavily 

forested terrain, significant patrolling and blacking out was required on 4 February. 85 

4 February 


considered under control. The NEO committed 1045 people to firefighting. 86 

1.53 

The fire at Nariel Ski Hut in north-east Victoria continued to cause concern for firefighters. The fire was 

located in remote, inaccessible country, making containment difficult. Ground crew and aircraft were 

deployed to the fire. 87 

88 

1.54 The Bunyip fire was reported to have started at 17:00 on 4 February. 

5 February 


considered under control. The NEO committed 1051 people to firefighting. 89 

1.56 

The Bunyip fire continued to pose a significant risk, with the potential to spread rapidly if not contained. 

In anticipation that this fire would not be safe by 7 February, an integrated CFA/DSE Incident Management 

Team (IMT) was established at the Pakenham ICC. Further strategies were developed to contain movement 

of the fire, and crews constructed mineral earth control lines around its perimeter. 90 

6 February 


considered under control. The NEO committed 1365 people to firefighting. 91 Of the going fires, the following 

were considered significant at that time and were being managed by DSE: 

1.58 

1.59 

1.60 

■■ 

■■ 

■■ 

Bunyip fires (going) — 123 hectares 

Nariel Ski Hut (contained at 10:00 on 5 February but still active) 

Dargo — White Timber Spur (going), started during the day from lightning. 

For the Dargo fire, rappel crews were sent in as initial attack, with retardant laid by aerial support, but 

feedback was that the fire was ‘too hot’ to contain. 93 Additional crews from Dargo and heavy machinery 

were dispatched to assist. 94 

It was not expected that the Dargo fire and Nariel fires would cause ‘significant concern’ during the day of 

7 February, nor that the Bunyip fire would affect the power line easement through the Bunyip State Forest. 95 

Given that the Bunyip fire did prove to be more significant than first thought, it is explained in more detail 

below. The Dargo fire is not examined further in this interim report. 

92 

49



Bunyip 

Figure 1.7: Bunyip Ridge Track fire progression map 


Nar Nar Goon 

Garfield 

Bunyip 

0 2 4 Kilometres 

Drouin 

Warragul 

Source: Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller, Attachment 46 (WIT.002.001.0895) at 0895 96 

Interim Final Fire Perimeter 

Built Up Areas 

Roads 

Waterways 

Fire Origin 

Parkland 

Summary information 

Fire Danger Index 

The maximum fire danger index (FDI) was 81 at Coldstream AWS at 16:34 and an FDI of 

111 was recorded at Latrobe Valley AWS at 13:30. 97 

Fatalities No fatalities 98 

House losses 24 houses 99 

50 

Overall area burnt 26,200 hectares 100 

Firefighting resources 

At its peak, the fire was attended by 82 NEO personnel, in addition to tankers, dozers and 

68 slip-on units. 101 Also deployed were 900 CFA personnel and 159 appliances; 2 air cranes 

(up to 7 February); and 2 water-bombing aircraft (these were assigned concurrently as crews 

were deployed). 102


1.61 

1.62 

1.63 

1.64 

1.65 

1.66 

The township of Drouin, on the edge of this fire area, has a population of 8000 people. The fire area 

encompasses the rural area of Labertouche, with a population of 1000. 103 

At 17:21 on 4 February, a fire at Bunyip State Park — the Bunyip Ridge Track — was reported to DSE. 

The point of origin was 5 kilometres north-east of Tonimbuk, in native forest. As the fire was on public 

land, DSE was identified as the control agency. A joint DSE/CFA IMT was established at Belgrave on 

4 February. 104 When it became apparent that the fire would not be readily controlled and when more 

severe weather was forecast, the IMT relocated to Pakenham ICC on 5 February. During 5–6 February, 

the fire grew to approximately 170 hectares. 105 

As the fire had not been extinguished beforehand, planning for 7 February was carried out for a ‘worst 

case’ outcome. It was anticipated that, under strong northerly winds, the fire could escape and run 

towards private property and other assets. Fire spread predictions were prepared on 6 February for the 

period 12:00–23:00 on 7 February. These gave an indication that the fire would, without control measures, 

extend to at least Warragul and southerly to Drouin. 106 

At around 03:00 on 7 February, the fire breached control lines on the eastern flank, burning through 

Mountain Ash and mixed species forest, with considerable spotting. The fire could be seen clearly from 

the Mount Gordon fire tower near Marysville. 107 Crews were withdrawn because of safety concerns. 

Fire behaviour was erratic for around 3 hours before it moderated around daybreak. It had travelled 

about 7 kilometres in a south-easterly direction into adjoining farmland. 108 

From daybreak, aircraft bombed the fire using water and retardant to hold, for as along as possible, the 

southern movement of the firefront. Major runs occurred after midday, ultimately burning out of the forest 

area into cleared land. 109 The fire spotted and ran extensively through the farmlands but the southern edge 

was largely controlled into the night of 7 February. With the wind change it moved extensively in the forest 

to the east. 110 

The fire was contained at 17:30 on 4 March, having burnt approximately 26,000 hectares, including nearly 

19,000 hectares of forest and park. It was declared Under Control at 14:00 on 15 March. 111 

Warnings 

1.67 

Key emergency and infrastructure managers were briefed on the afternoon of 6 February. Community 

meetings were held in towns in the predicted path of a fire escape, including Tonimbuk, Labertouche and 

Jindivick. All meetings were well attended by residents. 112 

The first external update to the community was at 20:30 on 5 February. 

1.68 

113 

The first urgent threat message 

for Garfield North, Tonimbuk, Labertouche, Robin Hood, Drouin West, Buln Buln, Tarago, Jindivick, Jindivick 

North, Longwarry, Longwarry North and Bunyip was issued at 13:30 on 7 February. 114 

51



Delburn 

Figure 1.8: Delburn fire progression map 

Thorpdale South 

Yinnar 

Allambee East 

Delburn 

Darlimurla 

Dickies Hill 

Junction 

Boolarra 

Mirboo North 


Budgeree 

Source: Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 1 (WIT.005.001.0049) at 0111 115 



Roads 

Waterways 

Parkland 



Evidence not yet before the Commission 



Overall area burnt 

Evidence not yet before the Commission 

Firefighting resources Evidence not yet before the Commission 

52


1.69 

1.70 

1.71 

1.72 

1.73 

The Delburn fires were a group of three fires (Creamery Road, Ashfords Road and Delburn) that burnt in 

late January until they ultimately joined together. 118 The Ashfords Road fire was reported at 07:00 on 28 

January, the Creamery Road and Delburn fires were reported on the afternoon of 29 January. 119 The fire was 

initially managed by CFA as the points of origin were on private land and the initial ICC Point was at the Fish 

Farm, north of Boolarra. Later on 29 January, the ICC was moved to the DSE offices in Traralgon, with DSE 

managing the fire. 120 Overnight on 29 January the ICC was moved to Churchill. 121 

Poor communications between fire operations on the ground and the various ICCs (some distance away) 

hampered coordination of the firefighting effort. Communications around Boolarra were problematic and fire 

operations were assisted by the use of a Mobile Communication Van. 122 Firefighters resorted to the use of 

their mobile phones with limited success. 123 In addition, Victoria Police roadblocks prevented an ambulance, 

water carriers, and firefighters (without identification) from proceeding to where they were needed. 124 

On 29 January, the IMT Operations Officer (the local CFA Group Officer) instructed Victoria Police to 

evacuate residents of McIntoshes Road, north of Boolarra. 125 

At 10:30 on 30 January, a town meeting was held in Boolarra where local community members were briefed 

on the fire by CFA representatives. 126 During this meeting, at the suggestion of the CFA Captain, the local 

CFA Group Officer indicated he would sound the CFA siren when the town came under ember attack. 127 

This occurred at about 13:30 and is further described in Chapter 4. 128 

The fires were declared contained at 16:00 on 3 February, but because it was in difficult and heavily forested 

terrain, significant patrolling and blacking out was required subsequent to 3 February. 129 The Churchill fire 

was originally considered a division of the Delburn fires before it was independently managed. 130 

Source: Courtesy of The Herald & Weekly Times 

53



Fire Activity on 7 February 

1.74 

The 7 February fires that ultimately proved difficult to contain and the times when they were reported are: 

(going — 4 February) Bunyip 131 

(going — 28 to 29 January) Delburn 132 

11:49 Kilmore East 133 

12:26 Horsham 134 

12:36 Coleraine 135 

13:17 Pomborneit–Weerite 136 

13:33 Churchill 137 

15:00 Murrindindi 138 

15:11 Redesdale 139 

15:32 Narre Warren 140 

16:34 Bendigo 141 

18:09 Beechworth–Mudgegonga 142 

Figure 1.9: Fires adjacent to Melbourne on 7 February 

Bendigo 

Maiden Gully 

Seymour 

Mansfield 

Redesdale 

Kilmore East Complex 

Murrindindi Complex 

Melbourne 

Bunyip 

Geelong 

Morwell 

Delburn 

Churchill / Jeeralang 


54 

Note: The fires around Melbourne depicted on this map 

produced by the Bushfire CRC, caused many of the deaths, 

house destruction and burnt areas on 7 February. 144 

Interim Final Fire Perimeter


Kilmore East 

Figure 1.10: Kilmore East interim fire progression map 


at 11:47 hrs 

Strath Creek 

Kilmore 

Flowerdale 

Clonbinane 

Glenburn 

Kinglake West 

Whittlesea 

Kinglake 

Marysville 

Narbethong 

St Andrews 

Dixons Creek 

Chum Creek 

Healesville 





Roads 

Approx Point of Origin 


Fire Danger Index The maximum FDI was greater than 100 at Kilmore Gap AWS at 14:42, and an FDI of 97.3 

was reached at Viewbank AWS at 16:30. 146 

Fatalities 121 fatalities 147 


Overall area burnt The combined total size of the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires was 255,300 hectares. 149 

Firefighting resources The peak CFA resource commitment over the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires was 514 

appliances and 2750 people (the figures were not presented separately). 150 At the time the 

fire crossed the Hume Highway at 14:00, 32 NEO tankers, 7 slip-on units, 8 dozers and 

9 support vehicles were on the fireground. 151 One air crane and 2 other helicopters were 

working the Kilmore East fire. 152 An unknown number of MFB appliances were deployed 

to the Kilmore East fire by mid-afternoon. 153 

55



1.75 

1.76 

1.77 

Towns in the heart of the fire area were Kinglake, Kinglake West, St Andrews and Wandong, all with 

a population of about 1500. Smaller towns affected included Toolangi, Dixons Creek, Chum Creek, 

Hazeldene and Clonbinane, each with a population between 500 and 900. The fires came close to 

Yarra Glen (population 2600) and Whittlesea (population 4500). 154 

At 11:49 the Emergency Services Telecommunications Agency (ESTA) took a call for a fire at Saunders 

Road, Kilmore East, in undulating pasture country interspersed with native vegetation alongside cleared 

and standing plantations. Initial reports were from the Mount Hickey fire tower, together with reporting on 

the ground through Triple Zero calls. 155 At 12:08 the Kangaroo Ground fire tower operator sighted the fire and 

reported it to the Kangaroo Ground ICC. 156 As the point of origin was on private land, the CFA was identified 

as the control agency for this fire. 157 The Kilmore East fire was managed from the Kilmore ICC located at the 

Kilmore fire station. 158 The Incident Controller was initially the local CFA Brigade Captain. 159 He was relieved 

by a career staff member at 16:30. 160 The Kangaroo Ground ICC operated as a Divisional Command on 

7 February but overnight the management of the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires was rearranged. 161 

According to the evidence of Mr Rees, from the morning of 8 February, Kilmore and Kangaroo Ground ICCs 

managed the Kilmore East fire and Alexandra and Woori Yallock ICCs managed the Murrindindi fire. 162 

The fuel loads in and around areas where the Kilmore East fire burned — Mount Disappointment, Humevale, 

Strathewen, Kinglake and Glenvale — were extremely high. Senior, highly experienced CFA volunteer 

officers inspected these areas 3 to 4 weeks before 7 February. They were horrified by the fuel loadings; 

40 to 50 tonnes per hectare. There was a recognition they would be unable to control fire in these areas. 163 

The first phase of the fire 

164 

1.78 Mr Rees defined the first phase of the fire as ‘that period before it has crossed the Hume Freeway’. 

1.79 

1.80 

1.81 

At about 11:50 5 local brigades (Kilmore, Broadford, Clonbinane, Wandong and Wallan) were paged to 

respond to the fire. 165 At 11:51 the Kilmore Brigade received a second pager message to respond to a 

second fire on the Wandong–Kilmore Highway, 3 kilometres south of Kilmore. One pumper was deployed. 166 

At 12:02 a further 7 brigades were deployed, including the Midway Forest Industry Brigade. 167 A strike team 

of 5 tankers responded about 30 minutes later. 168 Aircraft were also requested; however, due to the conditions 

at the time, aircraft were ineffective in direct attack and were used to protect assets. 169 A fire-spotting aircraft 

operated from about 12:30 to 13:30. 170 Two aerial line scans were conducted at 12:45 and 12:55, leading 

to the production at the iECC of a fire prediction map at 13:40. 171 A further map based on the line scan was 

produced at 17:43. The line scans were not passed to the ICC at Kilmore. 172 According to Mr Rees, further 

line scans were not able to be completed until 21:45 that evening. 173 

Initial efforts were directed at controlling the fire before it crossed the Hume Highway into more open 

country; however, this was unsuccessful. 174 At 12:45 it was requested that the Hume Highway be closed. 175 

The fire crossed the Hume Highway at Heathcote Junction at 13:58. 176 At that time, the firefront was 

reported to be 3 kilometres wide, between Clonbinane Road and the Broadford–Wandong Road. 177 

The fire had a very elongated shape under the influence of north-westerly winds, with a length to breadth 

ratio of approximately 7:1. 178 Given the terrain and fuel conditions, it was difficult for many appliances to 

access the fire edge from the north. 179 Significant resources were deployed to the southern edge of the fire 

to protect townships from Whittlesea into the Yarra Valley and Healesville area. 180 

At the Kangaroo Ground fire tower, local weather observations at 13:45 were 47°C and relative humidity 

of 7 per cent. 181 At about 14:30 winds were gusting 60–70 kilometres per hour and the temperature was 

43°C. 182 Burnt leaves were falling on the fire tower as early as 14:13. 183 

56


The second phase of the fire 

1.82 

1.83 

Mr Rees defined the second phase of the fire as the period after it crossed the Hume Highway and went 

into the slopes of Mount Disappointment. 184 

Between 14:00 and 17:00 the firefront travelled another 6 kilometres under the influence of a 60–90 

kilometres per hour north-westerly wind, through timber plantations and agricultural land, before entering 

forest areas. It then travelled across the Great Dividing Range at Mount Disappointment (reaching the base 

of Mount Disappointment at 15:30), and then onto the Whittlesea–Yea Road, just south of the settlement 

of Kinglake West. 185 Spotting was reported at Smith Gully at 16:00. 186 Between Wandong and Kinglake, 

the forest fuels of Stringybark and Peppermint species, with pockets of Manna Gum, Grey Gum and 

Mountain Ash, resulted in significant spotting. 187 The fire travelled at up to 8 kilometres per hour to the 

crest of Mount Disappointment. 188 

189 

1.84 On 7 February Arthurs Creek and Whittlesea CFA Brigades were not attached to strike teams. They were 

operating independently in their areas of responsibility. 190 The Arthurs Creek–Strathewen Brigade Captain 

learnt of the Kilmore East fire from his Group Officer ‘some time after midday’. 191 He did not receive any 

advice on the fire from the Kilmore ICC or the Kangaroo Ground Divisional Control Centre. 192 His brigade first 

responded to fire (after several false alarms) at 15:43. 193 He received a ‘red flag’ warning at 17:45 of a pending 

‘very strong southerly change...in the next 10 minutes’. 194 Once spotting commenced he was unable to 

access Strathewen but eventually drove into the hamlet at about 19:00. 195 Nearly every structure in the hamlet 

was burnt. 196 Analysis by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre (Bushfire CRC) suggests that the fires 

reached Strathewen from a north-westerly wind and also via a major firefront approaching from the south. 197 

1.85 

At Kinglake, power failed across the town at 16:55 and soon after smoke was heavily entering the town 

from the direction of St Andrews. 198 By 17:30 Kinglake was under heavy ember attack with spot fires 

occurring close to the CFA station. It was dark. 199 Embers started burning in the town at 17:45. Ms Sharon 

McCulloch, owner and operator of the National Park Hotel described the experience: ‘Embers were now 

hailing down and being blown with such force onto the hotel roof that I thought there was every chance of 

something in or around the hotel catching fire’. 200 Ms McCulloch and her husband managed to save their 

hotel, although this meant they could not actively protect their home. It survived. On reflection, she said: 

There really didn’t seem to be any rhyme or reason why some buildings burnt and others didn’t. The 

firestorm was indiscriminate. Some people stayed to fight the fire and lost, some people evacuated and 

their houses remain standing. 201 

1.86 

By the time the fire had reached the Whittlesea–Yea Road, it was reported to be approximately 6 kilometres 

wide. 202 Between 17:00 and 18:00 spot fires were reported at Humevale, St Andrews (at 17:46) and 

Steels Creek. 203 The Kangaroo Ground fire tower operators, Ms Colleen Keating and Mr Gavin McCormack, 

made the following observations: 

… it just appeared out of nowhere … It appeared to have, like, jumped 10, 15 km, just the spotting … 

Then it took off like basically a main fire … It took off like a rocket. 204 

And subsequently: 

A spotfire … is normally a gradual development. These were almost a spontaneous development into 

a large fire. 205 

1.87 

Residents defending their homes described the fires from inside their houses. Mr John O’Neill, 

of Steels Creek, described the experience of his family: 

Almost immediately, the fire front hit us … Burning embers slapped into our windows and the rest of 

the house ... it was like being inside a washing machine on spin cycle, and full of fire and embers … the 

firefront lasted about 45 minutes … we spent the following seven hours fighting the fires and defending 

our main house. 206 

57



1.88 

The first reports of casualties were received at the Kangaroo Ground Divisional Control Centre at 17:00 

from the Arthurs Creek Captain. 207 The fire reached the National Park Hotel on Main Road, Kinglake at 

approximately 17:45. 208 The Kangaroo Ground tower had advised by radio of the wind change occurring at 

Kangaroo Ground at 17:43. 209 At 17:55 the tower recorded the wind change blowing at over 90 kilometres 

per hour and reported it to the fireground. 210 By 18:00 CFA tankers, pumpers and communications vehicles 

were responding to new fires at Humevale, Strathewen, Arthurs Creek, Yarra Glen, Gruyere and Healesville. 

All of these fires were caused by spotting. 211 

212 

1.89 At 18:01 the wind change had come through St Andrews. When the south-westerly wind change reached 

these fires between 18:00 and 19:00, it was not possible to secure the eastern flank of the fire due to the 

heavy forest and plantation fuel loads. 213 The main fire, and the subsequent spot fires, headed in a northeasterly 

direction, burning through heavy fuels. 214 At 19:40 the fire was recorded in Flowerdale. 215 The Kilmore 

East–Wandong section of the fire headed generally north along the Hume Highway towards Reedy Creek 

impacting at 20:00, burning through the remainder of the Wallaby Creek catchment, the Kinglake National 

Park and the Mount Disappointment Forest. 216 Progressively through the evening it impacted the settlements 

of Hazeldene and Silver Creek. The fire was recorded at Mudgegonga at about 22:00. 217 

1.90 

1.91 

From Strathewen and Humevale, the fire headed generally north, through Kinglake central, Castella and 

along the Melba Highway towards the settlement of Glenburn. The Kilmore East fire did not join with the 

Murrindindi fire on 7 February. 218 The fire was never under control on 7 February. 219 

Throughout the night of 7 February, and the following days, as the fire reached grassland, it was stopped 

and the edge of the fire progressively secured. However, in forested areas, particularly in the Maroondah 

catchment, Toolangi State Forest and Yarra Ranges National Park, containment was difficult. In particular, 

the fire caused considerable concern around the Healesville area over the next few days as containment 

works, including back burning, continued. 220 The fire was listed as contained on 16 February. 221 

Warnings 

58 

1.92 

1.93 

1.94 

1.95 

1.96 

Some warning messages for the Kilmore East fire were issued from the Seymour Regional Emergency 

Coordination Centre (authorised by the Regional Coordinator) and from the iECC (authorised by the State 

Duty Officer), in addition to those issued from Kilmore ICC. 222 

At 12:40 an initial awareness message was issued for the Kilmore East fire for Kilmore East, Wandong and 

Clonbinane. 223 Urgent threat messages were issued progressively for communities to the south-east and 

east of the fire, and subsequently updated as further information was available. 224 At 13:59 an urgent 

threat message was issued for Wandong. 225 At 14:40 an urgent threat message was posted to the CFA 

website for the community of Wandong, and messages were progressively posted for the communities of 

Hidden Valley (at 15:05), Whittlesea (at 15:33), Heathcote Junction and Upper Plenty (at 16:05), Humevale, 

Arthurs Creek, Eden Park, Nutfield and Doreen (at 16:35) and for communities from Kinglake to 

Flowerdale (at 17:55). 226 

At 17:20 an urgent threat message was released from Kangaroo Ground Divisional Control Centre indicating 

Wandong, Wallan, Wallan East, Eden Park, Whittlesea, Humevale, Bruces Creek, Upper Plenty, Kinglake 

West, Pheasant Creek, Smiths Gully, Kinglake, Flowerdale, Glenburn and Hurstbridge might be affected 

by the fire. 227 It also referred to road closures. 228 Urgent threat messages had been drafted earlier in the 

afternoon (from 14:30) at Kangaroo Ground Divisional Control Centre, but had not been released as the 

fire was being controlled from the ICC at Kilmore. 229 

At 18:45, an urgent threat message posted to the CFA website noted that Wandong, Wallan, Wallan East, 

Eden Park, Whittlesea, Humevale, Bruces Creek, Upper Plenty, Kinglake West, Pheasant Creek, Smiths 

Gully, Kinglake, Flowerdale, Glenburn and Hurstbridge might be directly affected by fire. 230 

As the fire continued to burn through the night, an urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website 

at 22:32 advising of possible direct attack on Broadford, Broadford East in the area of O’Gradys Road, 

south of Broadford, Broadford–Wandong/Sunday Creek Road, Reedy Creek and Tyaak. Residents were 

advised not to expect firefighting trucks to be in attendance if the firefront approached their properties. 231


1.97 

1.98 

On the morning of 8 February, the fire was described as burning in the Yarra Valley near Kinglake, in a northeasterly 

direction. At 04:38 an urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website stating that Kinglake, 

Kinglake West, Toolangi, Glenburn, Strathewen, Chum Creek, Dixons Creek, Castella, Pheasant Creek, 

Doreen, Yan Yean, Woodstock, Mernda, Mittons Bridge, Hurstbridge, St Andrews, Panton Hills, 

Arthurs Creek, Smiths Gully, Christmas Hills, Healesville, Yarra Glen, Coldstream, Tarrawarra and 

Steels Creek had been or might be directly affected by this fire. 232 

Further messages posted to the CFA website at 09:29 on 8 February advised that the fire was burning 

towards the Glenburn area, in particular Glenburn and settlements to the north and north-east along the 

Melba Highway, and Yea River Valley towards Murrindindi. Warnings were also posted for Yea, Seymour 

and Toolangi. 233 Warnings issued for the Kilmore East fire are discussed further in Chapter 9. 

Source: Pat Scala, courtesy of The Age 

59



Horsham 

Figure 1.11: Horsham interim fire progression map 


at 12:24 hrs 

Horsham 

Approx 12:53 hrs 

Wind change 

at 16:29 hrs 







Roads 

Waterways 

Fire Origin 


Fire Danger Index The maximum FDI was greater than 100 at Horsham AWS at 14:00 and again at 14:30. 235 



Overall area burnt 2200 hectares 238 


The peak CFA commitment was 41 appliances and 253 CFA personnel. DSE crews from the 

Horsham area also assisted. Local water-bombing aircraft were used when weather conditions 

permitted. 239 

60


1.99 

This fire occurred on the outskirts of Horsham, a regional centre of over 13,000 people. The area directly 

affected by the fire was Haven, with a population of 940 people. 240 

1.100 At 12:26 ESTA took a call for a fire at Remlaw Road, Vectis, west of Horsham, burning through crop 

and grazing land in a south-easterly direction. 241 As the point of origin was on private land, the CFA was 

nominated as the control agency. 242 An ICC located at the DSE Office in Horsham managed the fire. 243 

1.101 Tankers were deployed from 4 local brigades and subsequently, at 12:33, a further 6 tankers were 

requested. 244 Aircraft were requested at 12:46. 245 

1.102 The light-to-moderate fuel loads meant the fire was of moderate-to-high intensity, but it was fast running 

in a south-easterly direction. At approximately 13:15, the fire was entering the Wimmera River area and, 

as the fire burned through the dry river bed and surrounding river flats, the River Red Gums and associated 

scrub provided elevated fuels, resulting in spotting being reported around the Haven area. 246 The fire burned 

the Horsham Golf Club, destroying the club house and burning the rough areas of the golf course. 247 

248 

1.103 At 14:15 the fire’s run to the south was stopped. Most of the eastern flank of the fire was contained, 

although a narrow section of the fire broke out with the wind change, which moved through Horsham 

at 16:28. 249 Had most of the eastern flank not been secured, the town of Horsham might have been 

threatened. 250 By 16:52 the fire was reported to have crossed the Western Highway and was subsequently 

controlled and stopped at various land features, including roadside and irrigation channels. 251 At 18:20 it 

was reported that the fire was stopped at the Horsham–Lubeck Road. 252 It was listed as contained at 

15:31 on 8 February. 253 

Warnings 

1.104 An urgent threat message for the communities of Haven and McKenzie Creek, through to Wonwondah, 

west of Horsham, was posted to the CFA website at 13:20. 254 An urgent threat message for the 

communities of Haven, McKenzie Creek, Bungalally, Green Lake and west of Horsham, was posted to 

the CFA website at 14:56. This warning noted that when the wind change came through the area, the 

communities on the eastern side of the Western Highway between Drung Drung South and Horsham 

might be under threat. A further message providing information on the progress of the wind change was 

posted at approximately 16:35. An alert message was posted at 22:55 advising of fire suppression activity 

continuing in the area. 255 

61



Coleraine 

Figure 1.12: Coleraine interim fire progression map 



at 12:35 hrs 

Wind change 

at 13:23 hrs 

Coleraine 





Roads 

Waterways 




The maximum FDI was greater than100 at Hamilton AWS at 13:00 and an FDI greater than 

100 was reached at Casterton AWS at 12:00. 257 


House losses 1 house (as reported on 8 February) 259 



Resources were progressively deployed from local brigades and other regions. At the fire’s 

peak, there were 55 CFA appliances attending, including a number of forest industry brigade 

vehicles, with approximately 280 personnel. At least 35 DSE fire personnel attended this fire. 261 

62


1.105 At 12:36 ESTA took a call about a grass fire in undulating grazing land adjacent to the Glenelg Highway, 

north-west of Coleraine. 262 As the point of origin was on private land, the CFA was nominated as the control 

agency. 263 A CFA ICC, located at the DSE Heywood offices, managed the fire. 264 

265 

1.106 At 12:36 5 CFA tankers were deployed and 2 water-bombing aircraft were requested at 12:42. Local 

reports indicated that the fire was growing rapidly and at 12:43 a further 8 tankers were requested. 266 

267 

1.107 The fire behaved typically for a fire occurring in the western districts, albeit in extreme weather conditions. 

The countryside is undulating grazing land and fuel loads were medium to relatively heavy. 268 The fire ran 

through a dry creek bed to the south-west of the town and then, following the wind change at 13:23, 

burned in a north-easterly direction. 269 The eastern flank of the fire was not contained before the wind 

change. The timing of the wind change was critical to the safety of the town. Fire behaviour was at its 

worst in the heavy fuel areas with flame heights reported at approximately 12 metres. 270 

1.108 There was concern that the wind change would push the fire into the town of Coleraine. Plans to evacuate 

the Coleraine District Health Service were made although evacuation did not eventuate. 271 The fire was 

stopped at its most easterly point at 15:21, and was formally listed as contained at 17:21. 272 

Warnings 

1.109 The first urgent threat message for this fire was posted to the CFA website at 13:30 for Muntham, Coleraine 

and Hilgay. The message stated that the fire was burning immediately west of Coleraine, had jumped the 

Glenelg Highway, and was burning in an easterly direction. A prior alert or awareness message was not 

issued for this fire. Updated urgent threat messages were provided as the fire progressed. At 18:16 a threat 

downgrade message was posted to the CFA website, advising that the fire was contained. 273 

63



Pomborneit–Weerite 

Figure 1.13: Pomborneit–Weerite interim fire progression map 


at 13:15 hrs 

Lake Corangamite 

Weerite 


Wind change 

at 14:15–15:10 hrs 

Lake Purrumbete 

Pomborneit 

North 

Pomborneit 





Roads 

Waterways 

Fire Origin 


Fire Danger Index The maximum FDI was greater than 100 at Mortlake AWS at 13:30. 275 



Firefighting resources The CFA deployed 42 appliances and 298 personnel to this fire. 278 

64


1.110 At 13:17 an initial call was recorded of a grass and scrub fire west of Pomborneit/Stony Rises and south of 

the Princes Highway at Weerite. 279 As the point of origin was on private land, the CFA was identified as the 

control agency for the fire. 280 The ICC was located at Colac in a temporary DSE facility. 281 

1.111 At 13:18 5 local brigades were paged to respond to the fire. At 13:21, aircraft were requested although 

subsequent advice at 13:42 indicated that the prevailing weather conditions meant aircraft could not 

operate. Police were requested to close roads. 282 

1.112 The fire burned south, crossing and damaging the Geelong–Warrnambool railway line. At 13:42 VLine 

was contacted to stop trains using the damaged railway line. 283 Ground resources were progressively 

increased to protect the Swan Marsh township. 284 The south‐west wind change was reported as passing 

Mount Pardon at 14:15, which is about 5 kilometres south of the fire area. 285 When it reached the fire, the 

direction of the wind changed and headed north-east towards Lake Corangamite. As a result, the additional 

resources protecting Swan Marsh were redeployed for direct attack. At approximately 15:07 the fire crossed 

Pomborneit Foxhow Road and continued unchecked in a north-easterly direction until 16:35, when it was 

reported as stopped. 286 

287 

1.113 The fire was listed as contained at 12:11 on 8 February. 

Warnings 

1.114 The first urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website at 14:15 for ‘Scollers Road, Caters Road 

Settlement and Swan Marsh [sic]’. At 14:25 an awareness message was posted for Pomborneit, Stonyford 

and Swan Marsh. 288 At 19:18 a message was posted on the CFA website advising that the threat had been 

downgraded to alert status. 289 

Source: © Newspix / Renee Nowytarger 

65



Churchill 

Figure 1.14: Churchill interim fire progression map 

Wind change 

at 18:16 hrs 

18:30 hrs 

18:32 hrs 


at 13:32 hrs 

Churchill 22:18 hrs 

14:45 hrs 

15:20 hrs 

14:10 hrs 

14:15 hrs 

Spot Fire 15:56 hrs 

18:20 hrs 

18:22 hrs 

18:40 hrs 

19:04 hrs 

16:24 hrs 

18:40 hrs 

16:50 hrs 

17:11 hrs 

18:36 hrs 

18:15 hrs 

19:00 hrs 

18:20 hrs 

18:55 hrs 

18:45 hrs 

20:10 hrs 

17:13 hrs 

17:18 hrs 

17:28 hrs 








Wind change 

at 18:06 hrs 

Yarram 





Roads 


Parkland 



The maximum FDI was 82.7 at Latrobe Valley Aerodrome at 16:00 and an FDI greater than 

100 was reached at Yarram Airport AWS at 14:00. 291 




Firefighting resources The peak CFA commitment to this fire was 227 appliances and 1250 personnel. 295 

66


1.115 

The main communities affected in this fire were Callignee (population 495) and Hazelwood South 

(population 533). 296 

1.116 At 13:33 a fire was reported in open country but rapidly spreading uphill into a Blue Gum plantation on 

the south side of Glendonald Road, 3 kilometres south-east of Churchill. 297 This report was received 

concurrently with one from the public direct to the Churchill CFA Fire Station. As the point of origin was on 

private land, the CFA was identified as the control agency for the fire. 298 The ICC was located at Traralgon, 

initially as a Divisional headquarters, then as an ICC. 299 The Churchill fire was originally considered a division 

of the Delburn fires before it was independently managed. 300 

1.117 At 13:35 4 brigades were paged to respond to the fire. On arrival at 13:39 additional tankers were 

requested. At 13:36 aircraft were requested although, at the peak of the fire, aircraft were unable to operate 

because of weather conditions. The fire quickly burned into pine and gum plantations to the south and 

south-east, through steep gullies, north facing slopes and valleys of the Strezlecki Ranges. 301 Fuel loads 

were high due to a mixture of natural and plantation fuels. The main fire front travelled 7 kilometres in 

50 minutes and, by 14:20, the fire had reached Jeeralong Creek West Branch. 302 

1.118 

Spotting was reported up to 20 kilometres ahead of the fire outside Yarram and then, by 14:40 near Balook. 

303 

At 15:02 a spot fire was reported at Jack River, 6 kilometres west of Yarram. At 16:50 there was reporting 

of multiple spot fires around the township of Yarram. 304 By 17:15 the main firefront was approaching Mount 

Tassie, with spot fires on the east side of the mountain. 305 

1.119 Between 18:00 and 18:30 the wind change altered the direction of the fire, resulting in continued spotting 

but in a north-easterly direction towards Callignee, Traralgon South and Koornalla. 306 At 18:04 a spot fire 

was reported 9 kilometres east of Yarram on the South Gippsland Highway. At 18:05 a further spot fire was 

reported on the Hyland Highway, 4 kilometres north of Yarram. It burnt into the Won Wron State Forest. 

At 18:10 a spot fire was reported on the Currajung Woodside Road, 4 kilometres east of Carrajung South. 307 

1.120 

The wind change meant that 13 kilometres of the eastern flank, from near Churchill to Mount Tassie, 

was burning through steep, inaccessible country that carried high fuel loads of native forest and pine 

and Blue Gum plantations. 308 This had a progressive impact on areas such as Hazelwood South, Koornalla, 

Traralgon South, Callignee, Callignee South, Callignee North, Jeeralang North, Devon, Yarram and 

Carrajung South. 309 By around 20:00 the rate of spread had slowed; however, the fire was continuing 

to spread in a north-easterly direction. 310 While much of the fire was stopped on 8 February, some areas 

remained inaccessible and burning continued in heavy fuel areas. The fire was listed as contained at 

17:00 on 19 February. 311 

1.121 Loy Yang Power Station was identified as strategic infrastructure at risk, and substantial planning for its 

protection was undertaken. Ultimately, the fire did not affect this area but there was concern about the 

critical communications assets on Mount Tassie, including Loy Yang system controls and a variety of 

commercial and emergency communication transmitters. 312 The ABC FM transmitter failed on 

Mount Tassie; however, the ABC continued transmitting on the AM band. 313 

Warnings 

314 

1.122 From 13:51 there were a series of alerts and urgent threat messages. An urgent threat message 

was posted to the CFA website at 14:05 stating that the communities of Hazelwood South, Jeeralang, 

Jeeralang North and Jeeralang Junction might be affected by fire. At 15:45 alert messages were posted 

for the communities of Jumbuck, Le Roy, Budgeree East, Valley View, Traralgon South and Balook, and 

an urgent threat message was extended to the communities of Balook, Le Roy, Jumbuck, Valley View 

and Budgeree East. 315 

1.123 At 16:20 alert messages were posted to the CFA website for the communities of Madalya, Womerah, 

Callignee, Callignee South, Callignee North, Carrajung, Carrajung South and Won Wron. These were 

upgraded to an urgent threat message for Womerah and Macks Creek at 16:30. The communities of 

Devon North and Yarram were also included in urgent threat messages at 16:40. 316 

67



1.124 At 17:05 Woodside, Alberton, Tarraville, Manns Beach, Robertsons Beach, Woodside Beach and 

McLoughlins Beach were included in alert messages. At 17:28 an urgent threat message was posted for 

the communities of Alberton, Tarraville, Port Albert, Langsborough, Manns Beach and Robertsons Beach. 

At 18:03 Devon North, Yarram and Calrossie were added to this warning, as were campers in the coastal 

area between Port Albert and Woodside Beach. 317 

1.125 At 18:10, with the onset of the wind change, further alert messages were posted listing communities such as 

Willung South, Willung, Stradbroke, Stradbroke West, Giffard West, Darriman, Hiamdale and Gormandale. 318 

1.126 Following the wind change at 20:25 an urgent threat message was issued advising that the Glendonald 

Road fire was currently burning in and around Traralgon South, Callignee, Callignee North and Callignee South. 

At 20:47 the communities of Carrajung South and Carrajung Lower were included in an urgent threat message 

advising of impact in 20 minutes or less. At 01:05 on 8 February, following an unexpected change in conditions, 

further urgent threat messages were posted for the townships of Carrajung South, Carrajung Lower, Won Wron 

and Woodside. 319 Messages were issued to lower alert levels, when appropriate, on 8 February. 320 

68 

Source: Courtesy of The Herald & Weekly Times


Murrindindi 

Figure 1.15: Murrindindi fire progression map 

Yea 

Limestone 

Eildon 

Taggerty 

Rubicon 

Murrindindi 


Glenburn 

Buxton 

Enoch Point 

Toolangi 

Marysville 

Narbethong 

Dixon’s 

Creek 

Chum 

Creek 

Healesville 



Murrindindi Bushfire 

Kilmore Bushfire 

Roads 

Fire Origin 

Parkland 

Fire Tower 



The maximum FDI was 81 at Coldstream AWS at 16:34 and an FDI of 92 was reached at 

Eildon AWS at 16:31. 322 



In addition, on 17 February one ACT firefighter died as a result of a fallen tree branch. 324 



Records show that 167 NEO personnel, 4 CFA personnel, 2 dozers and 3 slip-on units 

attended the fire on 7 February. This increased significantly through to 12 February, by which 

date 660 NEO personnel, 1 dozer, 1 tanker and 94 slip-on units were deployed, along with 

970 CFA personnel and 187 tankers. 327 

69



1.127 Marysville was most affected by this fire, with a resident population of 517. The area surrounding Marysville 

has a population of 1200 people. 328 

1.128 Just before 15:00 a fire at Murrindindi Mill was reported to the Broadford and Alexandra DSE offices from 

the Mount Despair fire lookout tower. 329 The point of origin was estimated to be 2 kilometres south of 

Murrindindi on private land within the fire protected area, 330 and while this was not clear in the early stages of 

the fire, DSE became the control agency for this fire. 331 Fire control was through a DSE ICC at Alexandra. 332 

DSE had already deployed IMT personnel from Alexandra to support the CFA IMT managing the Kilmore 

East fire. 333 This included information and situation officers. Because of this, DSE advised that the Alexandra 

IMT was initially under-resourced. 334 

335 

1.129 CFA resources were deployed from the Yea Group and were the first to arrive at the fire. All local DSE 

fire line resources that had not been deployed to the Kilmore East fire (which was reported at 11:49), were 

deployed to the Murrindindi fire (being crews from Toolangi, Alexandra and Broadford). 336 The Toolangi DSE 

crew is recorded as responding at 15:00, with an estimated time of arrival of 15:30, although the first DSE 

resources were recorded as arriving at the fire at around 16:15. 337 Care was taken not to direct crews to 

take roads that might be affected by this fire, with the Alexandra crew taking a circuitous route. This initial 

attack on the fire included 6 personnel, 1 tanker, 2 slip-on units and 1 ‘first attack’ dozer. 338 

1.130 Early observations reported by the IMT were of severe fire behaviour, with flames 20 metres high and an 

estimated rate of spread of 8 kilometres per hour. Spotting was estimated at 5 kilometres. 339 Post-fire 

analysis indicated this was under-estimated — the likely spread of the fire was around 12 kilometres per 

hour with spotting to 15 kilometres. 340 The Alexandra DSE Office estimated a rate of spread of 8 kilometres 

per hour earlier in the day, based on the weather forecast. This was twice the speed of fire spread normally 

experienced in forest fire. 341 

1.131 The severity of the fire behaviour precluded direct attack, and both DSE and CFA resources concentrated 

on community and asset protection. Aerial support was sought to manage fire spread. 342 

1.132 The fire spread rapidly into the forests of the Black Range, between the Melba and Maroondah Highways, 

and began spotting when it reached the top of the range. In fact, the fire was burning in forest 3 kilometres 

from its point of origin, until it reached the outskirts of Narbethong, a further 17 kilometres away. Additional 

response resources were mobilised. 343 The Mount Gordon tower observer reported that at 16:20 the fire 

was crossing the Black Range. 344 The tower was abandoned at 16:30. 345 

346 

1.133 Two water-bombing aircraft and 1 light helicopter left Mansfield, arriving at the fire around 15:45. Water 

bombing was ineffective, due to the weather conditions, and each aircraft only made one bombing run. 347 

Additional dozers and graders were deployed from DSE and Murrindindi Shire for control line construction. 

DSE ground crews were deployed to communities to the east and west of the Black Range. 348 

1.134 The fire moved across the Black Range very quickly and was spotting long distances. At 16:30 spot fires 

and ember attack were reported in the Narbethong area, and aircraft were forced to suspend operations 

due to the increasingly hazardous flying conditions. 349 The Bushfire CRC Report indicates fire spread was 

likely to have been the result of ‘substantial spotting’. 350 

1.135 Fire crews were hampered by new fires created by spotting; these were moving towards the Marysville area. 

Firefighters continued to work on asset protection under extremely difficult conditions. A back burn was 

attempted around 18:00 east of Marysville, although it was quickly abandoned ‘when it became hazardous 

and was going to be overrun by the main fire’. 351 

1.136 After 18:30 the south-westerly wind change arrived. Advice from DSE indicates the wind change arrived 

earlier and passed through the area with greater force than forecast. 352 The wind continued to change 

direction during this period, making it difficult to identify the direction of spotting and firefront movement. 353 

Lightning from intense smoke plumes and atmospheric interaction with the south-west change triggered 

other fires between the Murrindindi and Bunyip fires. 354 

70


355 

1.137 The eastern flank of the fire became an extensive front. Asset protection was extremely hazardous. 

The spot fires that had grown in the Narbethong and Marysville areas now joined and burnt towards 

Marysville, from both the south-west and south-east. 356 A convoy of about 50 cars, led by Police, left 

Marysville at 16:45. 357 Embers started falling in the town at about 18:50. 358 CFA and DSE appliances 

withdrew to the Gallipoli Park Oval where some community members sheltered. 359 Embers were recorded 

falling in Marysville at 18:50 and many houses in the town were destroyed within an hour. 360 The wind 

change led to the fires reaching Buxton at 19:30 and travelling as far north as Taggerty. 361 

1.138 The fire eventually slowed under cooler conditions early on 8 February. It continued to burn for another 26 days 

before it was contained. This was after an immense effort in the forest on control line construction, back burning 

and burning out to stop the fire moving south and threatening the water catchments of Melbourne. 362 

363 

1.139 The fire was listed as contained at 18:00 on 5 March and Under Control 2 at 11:00 on 13 March. 

Warnings 

1.140 Mr Waller commented that early in the fire, the IMT was hampered by a lack of information on the fire, as 

aerial observation was not possible and it was travelling through remote areas. 364 At 15:45 an awareness 

message was issued indicating there was a fire in the Murrindindi area moving south-east. 365 

1.141 At about 16:20 an urgent threat message was prepared and sent from the Alexandria ICC for Clonbinane, 

Mount Disappointment, Kinglake, Heathcote Junction, Upper Plenty, Humevale, Reedy Creek and Strath 

Creek. 366 However, it was not posted on the website. 367 At 16:45 an urgent threat message was issued for 

Narbethong. 368 At 17:15 an urgent threat message was sent to agencies, media and the Victorian Bushfire 

Information Line (VBIL) for Marysville, Narbethong and Buxton, and at 17:34 a threat message for Marysville 

was relayed on 774 ABC Radio. 369 

1.142 At 17:20 an urgent threat message relating to Yea and Whittlesea roads was released. A further urgent 

threat message for areas from Kinglake to Flowerdale was released, although this second message was 

not posted to the CFA website until 17:55. 370 An urgent threat message for Buxton was also raised prior 

to 18:00. 371 Further urgent threat messages were issued through the night. 372 

71



Redesdale 

Figure 1.16: Redesdale interim fire progression map 

Mia Mia 


at 15:11 hrs 





Wind change 

at 18:35 hrs 



Glenhope 

Metcalfe 

Barfold 



Sidonia 

Baynton 





Roads 

Waterways 

Fire Origin 


Fire Danger Index The maximum FDI was 87.2 at Redesdale AWS at 16:00. 374 


House losses 7 houses (as reported on 8 February) 376 


Firefighting 

resources 

The CFA’s peak commitment to the fire was 73 appliances and 400 personnel. DSE fire personnel 

also attended this fire. 378 

72


379 

1.143 At 15:11 a fire at Coliban Park Road, Redesdale was reported to the CFA. As the point of origin was on 

private land, the CFA was identified as the control agency, although responsibility passed to DSE when the 

fire was burning on public land after 7 February. 380 The ICC was located at Huntly, Bendigo, which was the 

ICC for the Maiden Gully fire. 381 

1.144 At 15:11 5 local brigades were paged. At this time no aircraft were available for this incident. Two strike 

teams were activated at 15:30. 382 The fire burned through undulating grassland and scrub fuels and grazing 

country with steep gullies and washaways. 383 It burnt in a south-easterly direction and crossed the Metcalfe– 

Redesdale Road at 15:27 and the Kyneton–Heathcote Road at 15:42. At 16:49 Victoria Police was advised 

to close Watchbox Road to traffic. Further road closures followed. 384 

1.145 Direct attack on this fire was made wherever possible. However, due to the terrain, dozers and other 

equipment were needed to secure the fire edge. The speed of this fire was so rapid that there was concern 

that the fire might reach the Cobaw Ranges or further beyond to the communities of Lancefield and 

Carlsruhe. This did not eventuate. 385 

1.146 At approximately 18:30 the wind change reached the fire. Approximately two-thirds of the eastern flank of 

the fire was secured. The remaining eastern flank that did break away was in rough steep-gullied country. 

This part of the fire was progressively contained. 386 

387 

1.147 Over the next few days firefighters continued to secure the fire. This involved the strategic redeployment 

of resources between this fire and the nearby Maiden Gully fire. The fire was listed as contained at 09:56 

on 10 February. 388 

Warnings 

1.148 At 16:13 an urgent threat message was posted on the CFA website for the communities of Barfold, Langley 

and Metcalfe East. At 16:47 a revised alert message was posted for the communities of Sidonia, Pastoria, 

and other communities to the east of Kyneton. 389 

1.149 As the fire progressed, urgent threat messages were updated, advising ‘the communities of Pipers Creek, 

Carlsruhe, Woodend North, Newham, Cadello and Carbow [sic]’ to be alert and implement their fire plans. 

The messages advised that when the wind change arrived the fire would run in a north-easterly direction. 

Residents in Redesdale, Glenhope, Baynton and Baynton East, and residents in the areas between 

Glenhope, Baynton, Redesdale, Heathcote, Tooborac and Pyalong, were advised that they might also 

be under threat when the wind change passed through.’ 390 

1.150 Threat messages were downgraded to alert status on 8 February, as the fire was controlled. Further urgent 

threat messages were issued when the fire again threatened communities on 9 February. 391 

Narre Warren 

392 

1.151 The Commission has not yet taken evidence on the Narre Warren Fire that began at 15:32. 

73



Bendigo 

Eaglehawk 

Figure 1.17: Maiden Gully interim fire progression map 393 


at 16:33 hrs 

Approx at 17:00 hrs 


Long Gully 


Wind change 

at 18:44 hrs 



Specimen Hill 


0 0.5 1 Kilometres 



Roads 

74 

Railway 


Parkland



Fire Danger Index The maximum FDI was greater than 100 at Bendigo AWS at 15:31. 395 

Fatalities 1 fatality 396 




The CFA deployed 70 appliances and 420 personnel to the fire. DSE fire equipment 

and personnel were also deployed (numbers not provided). 399 

400 

1.152 This fire burnt a small area of Bendigo, including Bendigo West and parts of Long Gully. 

401 

1.153 At 16:34 a fire at Bracewell Street, Maiden Gully, Bendigo was reported. The fire was a classic ‘interface 

fire’ as it burned in and amongst houses and commercial premises on the outskirts of a large provincial 

city. 402 Resources from the Bendigo region had already been deployed to the Redesdale fire. 403 As the point 

of origin was on private land, the CFA was identified as the control agency and managed it from the Huntly 

ICC (from where the Redesdale fire was also managed). 404 

405 

1.154 Three brigades responded at 16:35. An unspecified number of additional brigades were paged at 16:38. 

The fire burned through disused mining country in and about the townships of Maiden Gully, Long Gully, 

California Gully and Eaglehawk. 406 Resources were deployed as the fire spotted into grassland from scrubby 

areas where access was difficult. Early in the fire’s development, as it ran to the south-east, it burnt houses 

and other structures. The wind change, which moved through the area at approximately 18:45, extended 

the fire to the north-east. 407 

1.155 The existence of relatively large tracts of vacant, unused land, coupled with scrub and recreation areas, 

made control extremely difficult. 408 While the fire was limited by an area of land in Pascoe Street, where 

fuel reduction had been undertaken, crowning and short distance spotting occurred elsewhere hampering 

firefighting efforts. 409 The fire burned within 1.5 kilometres of the centre of Bendigo and posed 

a considerable threat to the city before being contained at 21:52. 410 

1.156 The Bushfire CRC Report indicates that the Bendigo fire spread was faster by a factor of two to three 

times more than what was predicted using either the Forest Fire Danger Meter or the Project Vesta model 

(a comprehensive research project to investigate the behaviour and spread of high intensity bushfires). 

The Bushfire CRC suggests that the very open nature of the forest resulted in higher wind speeds under 

the canopy than is assumed by either model. 411 

Warnings 

1.157 An awareness message providing initial advice for the Maiden Gully area was posted to the CFA website 

at 17:17. 412 Numerous warnings and commentary were provided from 17:10 through to 21:10. 413 

At 21:37 an urgent threat message was posted noting that the fire west of Bendigo and Specimen Hill 

was burning in a northerly and north-easterly direction, and a section of the fire was moving towards 

Eaglehawk. Residents in the Upper California Gully Road and Hall Street area were warned that their 

area was under ember attack. This information was updated progressively through the night as the fire 

was brought under control. 414 

75



Beechworth–Mudgegonga 

Figure 1.18: Beechworth–Mudgegonga fire map 

Beechworth 

Baarmutha 


at 13:32 hrs 

Stanley 

Bruarong 

Murmungee 

Glen Creek 

Gundowring 

Dederang 

Taylor Gap 

Mudgegonga 

Gapsted 

Running Creek 

Merriang 

Myrtleford 

Ovens 

Buffalo Creek 

Happy Valley 

Eurobin 

Havilah 





Roads 

Fire Origin 

Parkland 



The maximum FDI was 42 at Hunters Hill AWS at 13:06 and an FDI of 126 was reached 

at Wangaratta AWS at 13:30. 416 


House losses 29 damaged or destroyed 418 

76 

Overall area burnt Approximately 31,000 hectares 419 


On 7 February 35 NEO personnel, 2 tankers, 2 dozers and 12 slip-on units attended the 

fire. Another 50 CFA personnel and 18 tankers responded together with 1 helicopter and 

2 fixed-wing aircraft. From 8–12 February up to 386 NEO personnel per day attended the 

fire, with 7 dozers, 8 tankers and 39 slip-on units. Up to 644 CFA personnel and 24 tankers 

were deployed, 420 together with appliances from Hancocks Plantations and the NSW Rural 

Fire Service. 421


1.158 The largest population in the immediate area is Yackandandah (population 2100). The towns most affected 

were Gapsted (population 294), Mudgegonga (population 385) and Dederang (population 422). The outer 

areas of Stanley (population 689) were also affected. 422 

1.159 At around 18:09 on 7 February a fire was reported to the DSE Beechworth depot via a mobile phone call 

from the Beechworth DSE office. 423 At around the same time a DSE staff member at the depot received 

a phone call from a member of the public reporting the fire. The point of origin was reported to be around 

4 kilometres south of Beechworth. 424 As the point of origin was on public land DSE was the control agency 

for the fire. 425 The ICC was located at the Beechworth DSE office and at Ovens from 8 February. 426 It was 

a joint DSE/CFA ICC. 

427 

1.160 Personnel at the Ovens, Beechworth and Bright DSE work centres were deployed to the fire. At 18:10 

the DSE Incident Controller called back a strike team he had stood down at 18:00 (expecting them to be 

deployed to the Kilmore East fire the next day). The team responded to the Beechworth fire, along with 

local CFA crews, at an estimated arrival time of 18:30 (earlier in the day a Beechworth DSE task force 

had already been deployed to assist the CFA at the Kilmore East fire). 428 

429 

1.161 Access to the fire was hindered near the point of origin due to sagging power lines. Reports from the 

fireground indicated that the fire was moving rapidly under the influence of a strong north, north-westerly 

wind, gusting up to 60 kilometres per hour, with subsequent spotting. 430 Initial fire behaviour was not 

extreme given that the fire was burning over areas previously burnt in 2002–03. However, the south-easterly 

spread of the fire into steep, inaccessible areas with heavy fuel loads led to some extreme fire behaviour. 431 

Spotting occurred a ridge ahead of the firefront. 432 

1.162 The first attack dozer was at the fire by 19:00. At about this time 2 fixed-wing bombers and a light 

helicopter based at Mansfield were deployed. The bombers made several drops until nightfall when 

they were stood down. 433 

1.163 The fire was burning in a south-easterly direction, through a steep, inaccessible sluiced area containing 

heavy, unburnt forest fuels. This limited access for CFA crews. Crews therefore worked the northern flank. 

Live low-hanging power lines prevented direct attack, and so indirect attack was undertaken. 434 Heavy 

smoke and limited fire line communications during the night made it difficult to estimate where the fire was. 

Overnight Victoria Police organised road blocks across the area. 435 

1.164 Throughout the night the power outage created significant issues for the operation of the ICC. 

Communications, situation reporting and planning activities were constrained, and communication 

and coordination were conducted on mobile phones and from vehicles. 436 

1.165 During the night the Incident Controller decided that due to the cramped conditions in the Beechworth ICC, 

the ICC would be relocated to Ovens from 07:00 on 8 February. That location was better equipped 

as a level 3 facility. 437 

1.166 At 06:00 on 8 February the size of the fire was estimated to be 20,000 hectares. Access to parts of the fire 

was restricted as a major transmission line through the fireground needed to be rebooted. In addition, there 

was a large number of lightning strikes across the region, and a fire near Bogong Village that also required 

firefighting resources. 438 

1.167 The fire was contained after 9 days (16 February), having burnt approximately 31,000 hectares, including 

20,000 hectares of forest and park. Areas where fuel had been reduced through burning had a significant 

effect on the spread and eventual control of this fire. 439 It was reported contained at 10:30 on 16 March 

and Under Control 2 at 11:00 on 25 March. 440 

77



Warnings 

441 

1.168 Due to the power failures distribution of warnings was in the first instance by mobile phone. At 19:10 

the first urgent threat message for Stanley, Barwidgee Creek and Mudgegonga was issued. 442 Subsequent 

urgent threat messages were sent out through the evening and the following day. On 7 February these 

were for Stanley, Barwidgee Creek, Mudgegonga, Yackandandah and Bruarong. On 8 February Rosewhite, 

Murmungee, Ovens and Myrtleford were included in the threat messages. 443 

1.169 Overnight the location of the fire could not be confirmed. A number of precautionary warnings were issued 

and these were also issued to towns later found not to be threatened. 444 

Other Fires 

1.170 Numerous other fires occurred on the day but are not being examined by the Commission because, 

amongst other factors, many were successfully contained. One such fire was the Upper Ferntree Gully fire 

at Quarry Road, which was reported to ESTA at 15:42. This fire burned 9500 hectares. Twenty-one CFA 

appliances and 168 personnel attended the fire. 445 A heavy helicopter was also redeployed from Bunyip to 

the fire. 446 The fire was reported as contained at 19:10 and was controlled at 21:27. 447 This fire, which was 

relatively small in size, resulted in no fatalities and only one house destroyed. 448 However, it was assessed 

by the CFA as having the ‘most significant potential’ for losses on the day, because of the conditions and 

its location at the foothills of Mount Dandenong, in a heavily populated area. 449 

Fire Activity after 7 February 

450 

1.171 After 7 February the Murrindindi and Bunyip fires continued to burn. On 8 February a fire ignited at 

Wilsons Promontory. 451 Many IMTs continued operating on a 24-hour basis. 452 The East Tyers–Thomson 

fire was contained on 16 February but not declared Under Control 2 until 30 March. 453 The Beechworth fire 

continued to burn until 25 March. 454 

455 

1.172 Weather conditions deteriorated on 23 February posing initial risks to the southern edge of going fires. 

While the CFA recorded 135 grass fires on that day, only 3 developed into significant fires — Upwey 

(igniting at 14:28), Muskvale near Daylesford (igniting at 14:55), and Won Wron (ignition time not advised). 456 

457 

1.173 Weather conditions deteriorated again through the weekend of 28 February–1 March. On 1 March a joint 

CFA/DSE/Victorian State Emergency Service media release was issued warning of an extreme weather 

threat. 458 The warning predicted an onset of increasing temperatures and strong northerly winds right across 

the State. 459 Total fire bans were declared on 2 and 3 March. 460 

1.174 As a result of these concerns comprehensive preparations were undertaken over the weekend and into 

Monday 2 March. On 2 March, weather for 3 March was predicted to include very strong northerly winds. 461 

In addition, the police sent out a text message to nearly all Victorian mobile phone customers, warning them 

of pending and extreme fire and wind changes. 462 

1.175 On 3 March this prediction was updated. Wind speeds were revised down and humidity was higher than 

estimated. Ultimately, the weather did not deteriorate as badly as predicted. 463 Humidity remained relatively 

high and this enabled new fires to be more easily controlled. That said, the CFA responded to 195 grass 

fires over the period 2–3 March. 464 

1.176 Following these weather patterns, some rainfall fell across the state. Although not significant enough to end 

the fire season, it assisted ground crews in dampening any fires that remained. 465 

1.177 Twenty-six days after ignition, the Kilmore East–Murrindindi fire was reported contained on 5 March, under 

control on 10 March and safe on 27 April. Due to the dry conditions, much of the firefighting was directed 

at and managed by back burning. 466 The Bunyip fire was reported contained on 4 March and under control 

on 15 March. 467 

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Previous Major Fires 

1.178 Maps from the Report of the Inquiry into the 2002–2003 Victorian Bushfires, comparing areas burnt across 

Victoria in 1939, 1983 and 2003, are presented in figures 1.19 –1.22. 468 The Commission has added a map 

for the 7 February fires. While the total area burnt in the 2009 fires is less than these earlier fires, the impact 

on lives and homes lost has been much greater. 

Figure 1.19: 1939 Victorian bushfires 

Ouven 

Corryong 

Bright 

Casterton 

Hamilton 

Stawell 

Ararat 

Ballarat 

Mansfield 

Yea 

Marysville 

Melbourne 

Dargo 

Omeo 

Bairnsdale 

Orbost 

Cann River 

Portland 

Warrnambool 

Geelong 

Colac 

Lorne 

Cowes 

Warragul 

Traralgon 

Yarram 

Sale 

Apollo Bay 


79




Nhill 

Echuca 

Wangaratta 

Corryong 

Horsham 

Bendigo 

Bright 

Stawell 

Ararat 

Seymour 

Yea 

Mansfield 

Omeo 

Casterton 

Ballarat 

Marysville 

Melbourne 

Dandenong 

Frankston Warragul 

Traralgon 

Sale 

Bairnsdale 

Orbost 

Cann River 

Mallacoota 

Portland 

Warrnambool 

Anglesea 

Lorne 

Cowes 

Yarram 

Apollo Bay 

Source: Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 11 (WIT.005.001.0951) [13] 470 

80



Murrayville 

Wangaratta 

Wodonga 

Corryong 

Bright 

Omeo 

Melbourne 

Dargo 

Cann River 

Colac 

Geelong 

Traralgon 

Sale 

Source: Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 11 (WIT.005.001.0951) [14] 471 

81



Figure 1.22: 2009 Victorian bushfires 

Ouyen 

Nhill 

Beechworth 

Horsham 

Bendigo 

Edenhope 

Castlemaine 

Yea 

Casterton 

Hamilton 

Ballarat 

Melbourne 

Marysville 

Dargo 

Dandenong 

Colac 

Warragul 

Traralgon 

Yarram 


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the february 2009 fires - 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

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