STRATEGIC MASTER PLAN FY06 and Beyond - Western States ...

Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond 

AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND 

STRATEGIC MASTER PLAN 

FY06 and Beyond 

AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND


For copies of this document or for more information on the AFSPC Integrated Planning Process 

contact: 

HQ AFSPC/XPXP 

150 Vandenberg Street, Suite 1105 

Peterson AFB, CO 80914-4610 

719-554-5323 

(DSN) 692-5323 

e-mail: afspc.xpxp@peterson.af.mil 


1 October 2003


TABLE OF CONTENTS 

FOREWORD ................................................................................................................................I 

TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................ II 

LIST OF FIGURES .....................................................................................................................IV 

1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1 

1.1 PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.2 BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.3 SMP OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................. 2 

2 AFSPC VISION.................................................................................................................... 3 

2.1 AFSPC TODAY .................................................................................................................................... 4 

2.2 CHANGING ENVIRONMENT ................................................................................................................. 4 

2.3 AFSPC TOMORROW ............................................................................................................................ 6 

3 THE PLANNING PROCESS .................................................................................................. 7 

3.1 PROCESS ........................................................................................................................................... 7 

3.2 IMPLEMENTATION.............................................................................................................................. 8 

3.2.1 NEAR-TERM (FY06-11) ...............................................................................................................9 

3.2.2 MID-TERM (FY12--17) ...............................................................................................................10 

3.2.3 FAR-TERM (FY18--30)...............................................................................................................11 

4 ANALYSIS......................................................................................................................... 12 

4.1 OVERVIEW........................................................................................................................................12 

4.2 ANALYSIS BASELINE..........................................................................................................................12 

4.3 ANALYSIS RESULTS...........................................................................................................................13 

4.3.1 Case 1 ........................................................................................................................................13 

4.3.2 Case 2 ........................................................................................................................................14 

4.3.3 Case 3 ........................................................................................................................................15 

4.4 THE PLAN .........................................................................................................................................15 

5 MISSION AREAS............................................................................................................... 17 

5.1 SPACE FORCE ENHANCEMENT (SFE) ..................................................................................................17 

5.1.1 Current and Programmed Capabilities........................................................................................17 

5.1.2 Plan Objectives...........................................................................................................................18 

5.1.3 Sustain and Modernize ...............................................................................................................18 

5.1.4 Transform ...................................................................................................................................19 

5.1.5 Plan Assessment ........................................................................................................................20 

5.2 COUNTERSPACE (CS) ........................................................................................................................21 

5.2.1 Warfighter's Perspective .............................................................................................................21 

5.2.2 Integrated Planning Process Pathfinder (IP3).............................................................................21 

5.3 SPACE FORCE APPLICATION (SFA) .....................................................................................................27 




5.3.4 Transform ...................................................................................................................................27 


5.4 SPACE SUPPORT (SS) ........................................................................................................................28 




5.4.4 Transform ...................................................................................................................................31 


5.5 MISSION SUPPORT (MS)....................................................................................................................32 

5.5.1 Responsibilities and Functional Areas ........................................................................................32 

5.5.2 Plan Highlights............................................................................................................................33 

6 THE WAY AHEAD .............................................................................................................. 34 

6.1 CHALLENGES.....................................................................................................................................34 

6.1.1 People ........................................................................................................................................34 


1 October 2003 

ii


6.1.2 Partners ......................................................................................................................................34 

6.1.3 Funding.......................................................................................................................................34 

6.1.4 Industrial Base and Technology Linkage ....................................................................................34 

6.1.5 Policy/Treaty...............................................................................................................................35 

6.1.6 Transformation............................................................................................................................36 

6.2 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................36 

APPENDIX A: REFERENCES ...................................................................................................A-1 

APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................B-1 

APPENDIX C: INTEGRATED PLANNING PROCESS RESULTS .................................................C-1 

APPENDIX D: AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES CONOPS LINKAGES..............................................C-1 

APPENDIX E: SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY PROCESS ...............................................................C-1 

APPENDIX F: DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................C-1 

APPENDIX G: SPACE FORCE ENHANCEMENT MAP ................................................................C-1 

APPENDIX H: COUNTERSPACE MAP......................................................................................C-1 

APPENDIX I: SPACE FORCE APPLICATION MAP ...................................................................C-1 

APPENDIX J: SPACE SUPPORT MAP ......................................................................................C-1 

APPENDIX K: MISSION SUPPORT PLAN ...............................................................................C-1 



iii


LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1-1: AFSPC Mission Areas and Mission Support........................................................................ 2 

Figure 2-1: AFSPC Vision ................................................................................................................. 3 

Figure 2-2: Military Space Power Construct ....................................................................................... 6 

Figure 3-1: Integrated Planning Process............................................................................................ 8 

Figure 4-1: Case 1 ........................................................................................................................ 13 

Figure 4-2: Case 2 ........................................................................................................................ 14 

Figure 4-3: Case 3 ........................................................................................................................ 15 

Figure 5-1: Mission and Sub-mission Areas......................................................................................17 

Figure 5-2: Space Force Enhancement (SFE) Roadmap .................................................................... 20 

Figure 5-3: Counterspace (CS) Roadmap......................................................................................... 24 

Figure 5-4: Space Force Application (SFA) Roadmap ........................................................................ 28 

Figure 5-5: Space Support (SS) Roadmap ....................................................................................... 31 



iv


1 Introduction 

1.1 PURPOSE 

Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) develops the Strategic 

Master Plan (SMP) as the capstone document of the 

command’s Integrated Planning Process (IPP). The SMP 

presents the AFSPC Vision, outlines a strategy to implement 

that Vision, and defines a 25-year plan. That plan is 

integrated across the AFSPC mission areas to provide the 

space capabilities required to achieve the Vision. 

During the IPP, AFSPC works to produce a fiscally and 

technologically feasible SMP and develops products to provide 

programming and budgeting guidance for AFSPC 

organizations and Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) 

product centers and research laboratories. The SMP also 

serves as the foundation for our inputs to Air Staff planning 

and programming activities. 

The SMP presents 

the AFSPC Vision, 

outlines a strategy 

to implement this 

Vision, and 

defines a 25-year 

plan … to achieve 

the Vision. 

1.2 BACKGROUND 

Our space systems and capabilities have become key to our nation’s military effectiveness. 

Without them, our military forces would not enjoy many of the advantages we currently have 

over our adversaries. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2, “Space Operations,” 

emphasizes the importance of space. 

Just as the advent of airpower greatly enhanced military operations of the time, 

space forces, likewise, greatly enhance modern military operations across the 

spectrum of conflict. 

Air Force doctrine views air, space, and information as key ingredients for 

dominating the battlespace and ensuring superiority. 

Effective use of space-based resources provides a continual and global presence 

over key areas of the world … satellites permanently “forward deployed” add another 

dimension to the capability of our force’s ability to quickly position themselves for 

employment. 

Military forces have always viewed the “high ground” position as one of dominance 

and warfare advantage. With rare exception, whoever owned the high ground owned 

the fight. 

This capability (Space) is the ultimate high ground of US military operations. 

Today, control of this high ground means superiority in information and significant 

force enhancement. Tomorrow, ownership may mean instant engagement anywhere 

in the world. 

Planners should consider integrating future development capabilities, such as the 

capability to deliver attacks from space, into the campaign plan when determining 

how best to strike adversary Centers of Gravity (COG). Space force application 

systems would have the advantages of rapid global access and the ability to 

effectively bypass adversary defenses. 


1


It is AFSPC’s responsibility to organize, train, and equip our space and missile forces by 

developing, acquiring, fielding, operating, and sustaining systems and capabilities to exploit and 

control the high ground of space. A "capability" is the union of doctrine, organization, training, 

materiel, logistics, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) that enables a force to execute a 

specified course of action. AFSPC already operates significant space and missile systems and 

a large supporting infrastructure in operation. To help understand these systems and their 

complexities and to facilitate its role to organize, train, and equip, AFSPC has organized these 

capabilities, based on the functions they perform, into four mission areas and one mission 

support area, as shown in Figure 1-1. This construct will be used throughout the SMP to present 

AFSPC’s plan to more fully exploit and control space. 

• Space Force Enhancement (SFE) 

– Capabilities that contribute to maximizing the effectiveness of military 

air, land, sea, and space operations 

• Counterspace (CS) 

– Capabilities to attain and maintain a desired degree of space 

superiority by allowing friendly forces to exploit space capabilities 

while negating an adversary's ability to do the same 

• Space Force Application (SFA) 

– Capabilities to execute missions with weapons systems operating 

from or through space which hold terrestrial targets at risk 

• Space Support (SS) 

– Capabilities to provide critical launch and satellite control 

infrastructure, capabilities and technologies that enable the other 

mission areas to effectively perform their missions 

• Mission Support (MS) 

– Functional areas that cut across all mission areas and provide the 

required infrastructure 

Figure 1-1: AFSPC Mission Areas and Mission Support 

1.3 SMP OVERVIEW 

As with any plan, the SMP should be viewed as a guide to future actions and not a recipe to be 

strictly followed. In the next chapter, the SMP presents AFSPC’s vision by briefly describing 

AFSPC today, where AFSPC wants to be in 25 years, the basic strategy to get there and our 

major thrusts to sustain, modernize and transform our capabilities. Chapter 3 then presents 

AFSPC’s plan to implement its vision, with Chapter 4 illustrating the fiscally constrained results 

for this planning cycle. Chapter 5 addresses specific mission area issues, with the last chapter 

describing the way ahead and some of the implementation challenges AFSPC may face. The 

approved results of each phase of the IPP can be found in Appendix C. 


2


2 AFSPC Vision 

The AFSPC vision looks 25 years into the future: 

Figure 2-1: AFSPC Vision 

• “Full Spectrum” means a command fully capable of performing its roles as an Air Force 

Major Command (MAJCOM) to organize, train and equip, as a warfighting component to 

United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and in support of the Executive Agent 

for space by: 

• Developing space professionals capable of 

intellectual / conceptual breakthroughs 

• Providing the capabilities and Command and Control 

(C2) to deliver warfighting effects 

• Accelerating and enhancing the technology-towarfighting 

cycle 

• “Space Combat Command” means the command 

has significant Counterspace (CS), Space Force 

Application (SFA) and information operations 

capabilities to present to the Joint Force Commander 

in addition to the traditional capabilities of Space 

Force Enhancement (SFE) and Space Support (SS). 

These capabilities will be presented to the theater 

Joint Force Commander through USSTRATCOM, 

though retaining the ability to work directly with the 

Commander Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR). 

• “Preeminent in the application of space power to 

national security and joint warfare” means a 

command that is recognized as having the world’s 

experts in all assigned systems and in the application 

of space power during peacetime, crisis and war. 

Commanding the Future 

AFSPC is executing an initiative titled 

"Commanding the Future" to further 

implement its vision. This initiative 

consists of seven “Thrust Areas” which 

focus the command's transformation 

efforts on those areas that will help 

make the command a full-spectrum 

space combat command. The 

"Commanding the Future" effort 

supports the IPP and SMP by expanding 

on the Commander's Intent and defining 

the command's vision for the future, 

further identifying the command's 

partners, and creating "wizards" (space 

experts) who can help develop strategic 

guidance. In turn, the IPP and SMP 

support the initiative by outlining an 

acquisition strategy that emphasizes 

warfighter value per dollar spent and 

integration with other agencies and 

Services, providing information AFSPC's 

partners require, outlining education and 

training initiatives that will aid the 

unleashing of human talent in the 

command, and reinforcing the AFSPC's 

warfighter focus by describing how the 

Command will acquire the warfighting 

component capabilities it requires to 

support USSTRATCOM. 


3


Implementing this vision requires an understanding of where AFSPC is today as well as a look 

at how the military environment may change in the future. With this understanding we can 

envision how AFSPC’s future force can contribute to the nation’s warfighting team. This future 

vision will, in turn, allow us to make wise sustainment, modernization, and transformation 

decisions to achieve that desired end state. 

2.1 AFSPC TODAY 

Today, AFSPC serves as a force provider, operating the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 

portion of the nation’s strategic nuclear deterrent forces and as a force enabler to conventional 

forces. From Desert Storm to recent operations in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

military operations depend increasingly on space capabilities as force multipliers. Many of our 

space systems that are critical to the warfighter fall largely within the SFE mission area, 

primarily filling supporting roles with communications, positioning and timing, missile warning, 

and environment monitoring (EM) integrated into all aspects of military operations. Information 

collected from and disseminated through space, as well as the timely and tailored presentation 

of intelligence from and for space systems, is crucial to monitoring situations and status of 

forces worldwide, developing courses of action, and determining and engaging targets. 

AFSPC’s space and missile capabilities also are integral to our ability to accomplish precision 

attacks from standoff locations and allow combatant commanders to “shorten the kill chain.” 

Flowing through United States (US) space forces, key information is sent directly to the 

battlefield, providing location data to Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers in tanks, 

messages to hardened portable computers with the troops and satellite images to weather 

stations set up on the front lines. 

Space capabilities have become essential to military operations, worldwide commerce and 

everyday life. Under a constant deluge of evolving technologies, traditional military, national and 

commercial capabilities in space are rapidly converging. Today, space capabilities previously 

accessible only to military and government users are available to almost anyone able to 

purchase them. For example, GPS has been integrated into military and civil applications 

ranging from precision weapons to rental cars. Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and space 

imaging continue to experience growth dominated by the commercial sector. This growth is 

placing increased demands on military launch resources, satellite operations, and space 

situation awareness (SSA) assets to effectively deploy, manage, and protect these capabilities 

as well as understand the threats posed by potential adversaries. 

2.2 CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 

Our ability to provide these supporting space capabilities to the warfighter depends on our ability 

to control space. To date, we control space and our access to space has been unchallenged. 

Additionally, the modernization of our ICBMs and other elements of the Strategic Triad will 

continue to provide the deterrent underpinnings so important to our nation’s National Security 

Strategy. 

While the US does not expect to face a global military peer in the next several decades, the 

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) postulates rogue states or “states of concern” could provide a 

challenge to classical cold war deterrence. In addition, we must contend with non-state actors 

and terrorists who may acquire a “loose nuke” or a so-called “dirty bomb.” To deter aggression 

in this new security environment, the US must possess credible capabilities to project military 

power and conduct rapid combat operations with a high probability of success across the 

spectrum of conflict. 


4


A viable, prompt global strike capability, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, will allow the US to 

rapidly and accurately strike distant high-payoff, difficult-to-defeat targets. This capability 

provides the US with the flexibility to employ innovative strategies to counter adversary antiaccess 

and area denial strategies. Such a capability will provide warfighting commanders the 

ability to rapidly deny, delay, deceive, disrupt, destroy, exploit, and neutralize targets in 

hours/minutes, even when US and allied forces have a limited forward presence. Thus, prompt 

global strike space capabilities will provide the President, Secretary of Defense, and warfighting 

commanders with flexible options to deter, or defeat, most threats in a dynamic security 

environment. 

Equally important, we cannot expect to continue to have unchallenged access to our space 

capabilities. We must be prepared to protect our access to and operations in space. An 

operationally responsive spacelift capability is critical to place timely missions on orbit assuring 

our access to space. Additionally, the convergence of military, national and commercial space 

capabilities generates new challenges to protect our space systems, to capitalize on potential 

efficiencies in space capabilities and to create new partnerships. Space capabilities are 

proliferating internationally, a trend that can reduce the advantages we currently enjoy. For 

example, the European Galileo network of navigation satellites will provide capabilities 

comparable to our GPS network; however, we will have no control over who has access to the 

Galileo signal or the accuracies provided. The Galileo network could degrade US GPS signals 

and cause a downturn in GPS manufacturer refinements. 

The benefits we derive from space assets are so pervasive that we depend on space 

capabilities often without realizing it. Our increasing reliance and dependency also creates 

vulnerabilities. US space dependency is not lost on our adversaries, making our position 

vulnerable to threats that could, in turn, affect our capabilities. 

Current space oriented threats can be found in the following classified documents: Interim 

Space Capstone Threat Capabilities Assessment (NAIC-1564-0727-03 dated July 2003); 

Threats to US Space Systems and Operations Over the Next Ten Years (NIC-ICB 2003-09C 

dated February 2003). Based on these and other documents, three key judgments that lend 

insight to the future access to and threats in space are: 

• The US military depends on national and commercial space systems of both domestic and 

foreign (or international consortia) origin. Offensive operations to disrupt or deny access to 

these systems could seriously affect US warfighting capabilities. 

• Space systems are potentially susceptible to offensive counterspace (OCS) operations 

• Potential adversaries could challenge US access to space by taking advantage of a range 

of OCS capabilities within their technological means. These offensive capabilities could 

include: denial and deception, ground station attack and sabotage, electronic attack, and 

direct attack on the satellites themselves. 

Finally, as commercial space capabilities mature, many areas may be useful to the military. 

However, the core or distinctive capabilities must remain as military capabilities while limited 

needs may be satisfied through the purchase of services or partnering with civil and commercial 

entities. Effective military use of civil and commercial space capabilities will require new 

partnerships and understanding of commercial and consortia capabilities and operating 

constraints. These may lead to new policies for sharing civil and commercial space information. 


5


2.3 AFSPC TOMORROW 

As we implement our vision to fully exploit space as a space combat command, AFSPC will 

become a significant force provider of CS, conventional and strategic prompt global strike 

capabilities with even greater force enabler capabilities. As depicted in Figure 2-2, our space 

capabilities are built upon a structure where the uppermost portions of SFE and SFA depend on 

a solid foundation. While our ultimate goals are truly to “exploit” space through SFE and SFA 

missions, as with other mediums, we cannot fully “exploit” that medium until we first “control” it. 

The needed foundation, therefore, consists of the assured space access and infrastructure 

provided by the SS and MS areas along with the CS capabilities (SSA, Defensive Counterspace 

(DCS), and OCS) required to control space and ensure Space Superiority. 

Figure 2-2: Military Space Power Construct 

Currently, our use and control of space has essentially gone unchallenged, allowing us to focus 

largely on SFE to support the warfighter. This “default space control” will not continue in the 

future as potential adversaries come to better understand the great advantages our space 

capabilities provide us and recognize how our increasing dependence on space represents a 

vulnerability they need to exploit. 

Our challenge, as we move into the future, is to strengthen the base of the pillar of space 

capabilities with operationally responsive spacelift, robust launch, satellite control, SSA, and 

infrastructure along with the supporting elements of OCS and Defensive Counterspace (DCS) to 

ensure continued control of space. This will enable us to more fully exploit space through 

improved SFE and SFA capabilities. 


6


3 The Planning Process 

3.1 PROCESS 

AFSPC uses an IPP to develop its 25-year strategy. This capabilities-based process allows the 

command to identify needed capabilities, determine shortfalls that must be filled through 

modernization and transformation, and develop a fiscally and technologically achievable 

investment plan to achieve its long-term vision. 

During the Integrated Planning Process, AFSPC performs the following four steps, as illustrated 

in Figure 3-1: 

• Mission Area Assessment (MAA): A strategy-to-task analysis of the capabilities AFSPC 

must provide in order to accomplish its assigned missions. A comprehensive collection of 

national, Department of Defense (DoD), and Service guidance documents, including the Air 

Force Capabilities Concept of Operations (CONOPs), are used to develop the set of 

specific tasks the command must perform. These tasks are prioritized and quantified to 

form the basis of the IPP. 

• Mission Needs Analysis (MNA): A needs analysis that identifies shortfalls in the 

command’s programmed and planned capabilities. These shortfalls pinpoint requirements 

for new systems concepts (to provide needed capabilities) as well as provide guidance to 

the Science and Technology (S&T) community on what new technologies need to be 

developed. 

• Mission Solutions Analysis (MSA): A development of improved or new concepts that can 

satisfy the shortfalls identified in MNA. These concepts reflect both fiscal and technological 

realities in order to provide executable options for the command. 

• Integrated Investment Analysis (IIA): A model- and analysis-based development of an 

integrated investment plan that maximizes military value in a fiscally constrained, 

technologically achievable way. 

USAF Capabilities CONOPS and the 

AFSPC Strategic Master Plan 

The Chief of Staff has directed the Air Force to develop a Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS)-based approach to develop the capabilities the 

service needs to accomplish its missions and to evaluate its progress towards 

that end. These “Capabilities CONOPS” were developed during the AFSPC 

IPP, which predate the Capabilities CONOPS language, and do not use the 

same terminology as the Air Force effort. However, AFSPC has been careful 

to ensure the capabilities required by the CONOPS are included in its plan, 

and these capabilities form the basis for both MAA and MNA. AFSPC can 

map each Air Force–wide capability to an equivalent capability or set of 

capabilities in the Strategic Master Plan. See Appendix D for Capabilities 

CONOPS linkage 


7


Integrated Planning Process 

QDR 

Report 

Nuclear 

Posture 

Review 

Defense 

Planning 

Guidance 

Unified 

Command 

Plan 

Theater 

Security 

Coop Plan 

Contingency 

Planning 

Guidance 

CC 

INTENT 

CC 

IPLs 

Joint and 

USAF 

Doctrine 

Joint, Service 

and Component 

Visions 

USAF 

Strategic 

Plan 

APPG 

Transformational 

Flight Plan 

Mission 

Area 

Assessment 

Operational 

& Support 

Tasks 

Capabilities Planning Process 

Mission 

Needs 

Analysis 

Prioritized 

Needs 

Mission 

Solutions 

Analysis 

Concepts & 

Enabling 

Technologies 

Integrated 

Investment 

Analysis 

25-Year 

Investment 

Roadmap 

Strategic 

Master Plan 

MAPs/MSP/CSP 

CONOPS 

Feedback 

CRRA 

Joint Capability Integration & Development System 

Acquisition 

Management 

System 

Figure 3-1: Integrated Planning Process 

3.2 IMPLEMENTATION 

This goal–attaining the command vision of a Space Combat Command–will require a phased 

approach. We will implement these capabilities across the planning horizon through the Near– 

(FY06 – 11), Mid–(FY12 – 17), and Far–(FY18 – 30) Term. AFSPC’s strategy is to transform 

AFSPC into a full spectrum space combat command. We will organize, train and equip space 

and missile forces to provide the President with a range of options to deter and defeat 

aggression or any form of coercion against the US, our allies, or our friends. 

AFSPC will focus on people, capabilities and effects. Our cadre of space professionals will 

integrate and employ our unique capabilities at the right place, at the right time and with the 

desired effects to prevail over any adversary. 

Our charter is to rapidly obtain and maintain space superiority and the space, nuclear, and 

conventional strike capabilities that produce desired warfighting effects. This requires a 

fundamental shift in our thinking. Instead of focusing on the force enhancement role of our 

space systems and the deterrence role of our nuclear and conventional forces, we must also 

pursue the ability to apply conventional combat in, from, and through space. We will 

aggressively modernize our existing nuclear forces and pursue a follow-on system while 

developing a flexible and responsive global deterrent force. 

In support of the Air Force’s Executive Agent for Space role, we advocate space capabilities 

and systems for all services. Together we provide the space capabilities our nation requires 

today and into the future. Some of these capabilities are prompt global strike, predictive 

battlespace awareness and targeting-quality information, SSA, OCS, and DCS. These 

capabilities will also provide critical support to our nation’s missile defense efforts. 


8


Counterspace Planning: 

The IPP Pathfinder 

This cycle, AFSPC tested an advanced planning process (IPP Pathfinder or IP3) to 

increase the rigor of its analysis in the CS mission area. This test program used 

more detailed concept analysis, architecture processes, and military utility analysis 

(including warfighting scenario modeling) to determine and evaluate CS investment 

options. The result was a proposed CS investment strategy that integrates SSA, 

DCS, and OCS while showing the architecture’s utility in warfighting terms (e.g., 

decrease in blue force attrition). 

3.2.1 NEAR-TERM (FY06-11) 

In the Near-Term, AFSPC will continue to produce a cadre of space experts -- fluent in land, 

sea, air and space power missions-who will seamlessly integrate space capabilities into military 

operations. AFSPC will also forge strong co-operative partnerships with other military services 

and national Security Space partners to allow us to maximize limited resources and focus 

technology development. This will enhance our ability to rapidly develop and field 

transformational warfighter and space capabilities. AFSPC will target its investments to: 

• Organize, train, and equip with the right people and resources to maximize their effect 

• Modernize our ICBM force 

• Field planned threat indicators and warning, secure and protected communications, global 

navigation, and predictive battlespace awareness capabilities 

• Build the foundation for our CS mission by procuring new SSA, DCS and characterization 

and reporting capabilities and fielding a space range capability 

• Integrate and improve the ability to seamlessly C2 space forces in any theater of 

operations Initiate work on offensive CS, non-nuclear prompt global strike and targetingquality 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; 

• Develop technologies to increase standardization of spacecraft design and operations, to 

facilitate spiral development, and to field “technologies that provide revolutionary 

capabilities in communications, propulsion, conventional and nuclear strike, C2, and 

operations 

This strategy translates into a high prioritization of space force enhancement transformation 

efforts to maximize support to the warfighter. Also of high importance are C2 of space forces 

and routine spacelift-both essential capabilities to the conduct of space operations. Finally, 

nuclear deterrence/strike, defensive counter space, and SSA capabilities will be emphasized 

along with initial work on OCS and responsive spacelift. This will set the stage for fielding of 

space combat capabilities in the Mid- and Far-Term. 

AFSPC will continue to refine and reprioritize our schedules, initiatives and requirements to 

deliver a higher level of sustained space and missile capability to engage evolving world threats 

to our national security. 


9


3.2.2 MID-TERM (FY12--17) 

In the Mid-Term, AFSPC will deploy a new generation of responsive space access, prompt 

global strike, and space superiority capabilities. Our Weapons Officers and other space 

professionals will integrate and operate these capabilities into joint and task force operations. In 

practical terms, AFSPC will continue to prioritize efforts that support SFE transformation to 

include Transformational Communications and space-based Ground Moving Target Indicator 

(GMTI) capabilities. Responsive spacelift capabilities become more important in this timeframe 

due to their support of both Global Strike and DCS (Responsive replenishment of space assets). 

Such work will increase support to the terrestrial warfighter while protecting US space assets 

and demonstrating space combat capabilities. Mid-Term targeted investments will include: 

• Complete fielding planned ISR and communications capabilities 

• Field Transformational Communications 

• Deploy a Space-Based GMTI and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) capability 

• Deploy capabilities to improve integration between space and terrestrial ISR 

• Develop and field contingency non-nuclear prompt global strike capabilities and assured 

access, responsive launch capabilities 

• Finalize development and begin deployment of a follow-on ICBM Force 

• Continue adding incremental improvements to our DCS and SSA capabilities while 

finalizing development of OCS capabilities 

• Field a research and development (R&D) spacecraft program to increase the quality and 

quantity of DoD experiments flown in space. Begin migration to a standardized spacecraft 

for small payloads. 

Integrating fielded SFE systems with complementary terrestrial systems will allow military forces 

to maximize their situation awareness at a reduced cost. This operational synergy allows us to 

pursue a cost-effective sustainment strategy, accept development risk in some force 

enhancement capabilities, and position the command for the Far-Term 


10


3.2.3 FAR-TERM (FY18--30) 

In the Far-Term, AFSPC will target resources toward fielding and deploying space and missile 

combat forces in depth, allowing us to take the fight to any adversary in, from, and through 

space, on-demand. Based on previous development efforts, AFSPC will focus on Battlespace 

Awareness (space and terrestrial), OCS and DCS, and prompt global strike and LBSD 

capabilities. Many of these will be supported by responsive spacelift and payload capabilities. 

We will continue to explore advanced technologies to revolutionize and transform our operations 

beyond 2025. The result will be a space combat command that is organized, trained, and 

equipped to rapidly achieve decisive results on or above the battlefield, anywhere, anytime. 


11


4 Analysis 

4.1 OVERVIEW 

AFSPC conducted extensive analysis to determine the best mix of forces providing the highest 

military utility with respect to our projected Total Obligation Authority (TOA). Eighty-five potential 

portfolio cases were examined. Ultimately the Integrated Investment Analysis (IIA) team 

narrowed the focus to three cases: the first to display the commander’s intent, the second to 

display AFSPC Modernization driven to the TOA, and the third a realistic, flexible, cost 

constrained planning picture. For each case, Space Command’s Optimization of Utility Tool 

(SCOUT) produced several optimized solutions. The Mission Area Teams (MATs) reviewed 

627 proposed solutions and removed the unacceptable ones, then focused on the best solution 

for the three final cases. 

4.2 ANALYSIS BASELINE 

The analysis producing AFSPC’s 25-year SMP involved over a year of detailed analysis of 

needed capabilities, shortfall, possible solutions, and investment options. It used the following 

assumptions. 

• Available planning would increase TOA at approximately 3% per year in real growth starting 

in Fiscal Year (FY)10 (after the current Future Years Defense Plan - FYDP). Although we 

expect relatively austere military funding in the future, the importance of space capabilities 

to the warfighting effort indicates that space TOA will increase slightly each year. 

• Mandated follow-ons must be funded to ensure no gaps in current capabilities. In other 

words, AFSPC must continue to provide essential services (communications, missile 

warning, positioning and timing, nuclear deterrence, etc.) without gaps to the warfighter. 

• MS must be adequately funded. Investment analysis usually focuses on major acquisitions, 

but MS (logistics, training, security, etc.) must also be invested in. 


12


4.3 ANALYSIS RESULTS 

4.3.1 CASE 1 

This cycle AFSPC investigated three major cases in its analysis. The first case depicts what 

resources would be required to acquire all the capabilities for which AFSPC is responsible in the 

timeframes desired by the warfighter. Shown in Figure 4-1, it is apparent the AFSPC TOA is 

inadequate. Driven by the high cost of major acquisitions for operationally responsive spacelift 

(ORS) and follow-on land based strategic deterrent (LBSD), this case is un-executable. It does, 

however, point out the drivers for AFSPC investment. 

Note: The attached sand charts depict each mission area total with two exceptions: SS has 

Space Operations Vehicle (SOV) broken out and SFA has LBSD broken out. 

$24 B 

$22 B 

$20 B 

$18 B 

$16 B 

$14 B 

$12 B 

$10 B 

$8 B 

$6 B 

$4 B 

$2 B 

$ B 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

2028 

2029 

2030 

Launch Total Land Based Strategic Deterrent SOV SFA Total 

SFE Total SS Total MS + SFA/SFE/SS MISC TOA MS TOA 

CS launch CS TOA AFSPC system total AFSPC TOA 

Figure 4-1: Case 1 


13


4.3.2 CASE 2 

The second case, shown in Figure 4-2, emphasizes fiscal constraints by requiring AFSPC TOA 

to remain under the planning assumptions. It is executable, but requires slipping both ORS and 

LBSD significantly past their required operational dates. This would cause major shortfalls in 

these two very high priority capabilities and would, in the case of LBSD, create a gap in the 

nation’s land-based nuclear deterrence capability (as the current nuclear deterrent system, 

Minuteman III, cannot be extended to the delayed LBSD availability). 

$24 B 

$22 B 

$20 B 

$18 B 

$16 B 

$14 B 

$12 B 

$10 B 

$8 B 

$6 B 

$4 B 

$2 B 

$ B 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

2028 

2029 

2030 


SFE Total SS Total MS + SFA/SFE/SS MISC MS TOA 

CS launch CS TOA AFSPC system total AFSPC TOA 



14


4.3.3 CASE 3 

The third case, which relaxes some TOA constraints, is shown in Figure 4-3. It allows both the 

timely fielding of LBSD and increases the capabilities of the entire space portfolio. However, it 

does not provide for ORS when it is required. Further analysis indicates that purchasing ORS 

“on time” would delay fielding many capabilities that, while individually less important, provide in 

aggregate more military value than ORS. These systems include Minuteman III sustainment 

through 2020, LBSD, Prompt Global Strike, space-based GMTI and SAR, and Transformational 

Communications Satellite replenishment. 

$26 B 

$24 B 

$22 B 

$20 B 

$18 B 

$16 B 

$14 B 

$12 B 

$10 B 

$8 B 

$6 B 

$4 B 

$2 B 

Note: ORS Concept Under 

Evaluation 

$ B 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

2028 

2029 

2030 


FE futures SFE Total SS Total MS + SFA/SFE/SS MISC 

MS TOA CS launch CS TOA AFSPC TOA 


4.4 THE PLAN 

AFSPC has determined that a long-term plan following the Case 3 construct is the most useful 

to influence the programming, requirements and technology efforts. This plan, with the 

exception of its inability to provide operationally responsive spacelift in a timely manner, is the 

best mix of cost constraint and capability. It should, however, be viewed as a guide to future 

action as opposed to a recipe to be strictly followed. The results are detailed by mission area in 

the following section. 

The primary problem during the development of a fiscally constrained, operationally supportive 

plan was the large cost profiles of the LBSD and ORS concepts. AFSPC will investigate and 

implement the following initiatives to alleviate this in the next planning cycle: 

• Cost Profile: Aggressively prepare an executable funding profile for both LBSD and ORS 

ASAP. 


15


• Spiral Development: The LBSD and ORS concepts did not include spiral development, 

which could stretch out and reduce their costs. Analyses of Alternatives (AoAs) for these 

capabilities are underway and should provide more executable acquisition plans for these 

systems. 

• Cost Sharing: AFSPC has collaborative and co-operative planning efforts across the 

DoD, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA). These efforts will be used to determine cost-sharing opportunities 

for capabilities (such as ORS) that benefit multiple organizations. 

• Divestiture: During the programming cycle AFSPC will investigate options to divest 

current programs linked to lower priority capabilities to provide additional funding for 

transformational capabilities. 

• Additional funding: Space capabilities provide value beyond their cost through their 

transformational nature. AFSPC will investigate options in obtaining additional funding 

during the budget cycle. 


16


5 Mission Areas 

Though the IPP results in a plan integrated across the mission areas, we present the plan here 

by mission area to show the progression from current to future capabilities. Figure 5-1 lists the 

mission areas and their related sub-missions along with the MS functional areas. 

Figure 5-1: Mission and Sub-mission Areas 

For each mission area we briefly outline current capabilities and then present a rolled-up 

investment roadmap highlighting our plan to sustain and modernize these capabilities while we 

transform space capabilities to achieve our vision. We provide a top-level assessment of how 

well the plan satisfies the needs identified for the mission area and the Air Force capabilities. 

(Refer to the appropriate Mission Area Plan (MAP) or Mission Support Plan (MSP) (Appendix H- 

-M) for a full list of defined needs, and a higher fidelity roadmap than presented here.) 

5.1 SPACE FORCE ENHANCEMENT (SFE) 

5.1.1 CURRENT AND PROGRAMMED CAPABILITIES 

The SFE mission area provides combat support operations to improve military forces 

effectiveness. SFE currently provides the capabilities to gather and disseminate timely and 

highly accurate information. The US military has become extremely reliant on our SFE 

capabilities. For example, our current space-based navigation system, GPS, provides highly 

reliable and accurate positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information that has become 

integral to the full military operations spectrum, from basic navigation and communications 

synchronization to precision weapons basing, targeting, and terminal guidance. Our SATCOM 

systems (Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), Global Broadcast System (GBS) 

and Milstar) provide military forces with the near-global, high-capacity voice, data, and video 

communications links essential to successful military operations. Weather satellites, including 

Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellites, along with terrestrial and space 

environment sensors, provide battlespace environment forecasts vital to operational planners. 


17


Defense Support Program (DSP) and ground radar stations, coupled with C2 capabilities within 

Cheyenne Mountain support NORAD and USSTRATCOM in processing the missile warning 

sensor info and providing the information to strategic and tactical missile warning. 

5.1.2 PLAN OBJECTIVES 

The SFE mission area will continue to lead the world in supporting air, ground, and naval forces 

from space, with precise and highly reliable PNT, reliable high-capacity communications, space 

and terrestrial EM, and strategic and tactical missile warning. AFSPC will ensure all new 

satellite constellation architectures provide responsive, assured mission data capability 

sufficient to execute wartime plans. We will transform SATCOM to provide network-centric, 

high-capacity communications. We will develop transformational advancements in our ability to 

task, collect, process, exploit, and disseminate ISR fully integrated with air, ground, and naval 

forces. Our superior C2 systems will allow us to shape the battlespace, take instigative actions, 

and react to developing situations. Figure 5-2 highlights AFSPC’s time-phased SFE mission 

area roadmap. 

5.1.3 SUSTAIN AND MODERNIZE 

AFSPC will sustain its current navigation and timing, missile warning, environmental monitoring, 

and C2 systems that support our military forces. We will work through the Near- and Mid-Term 

to modernize mature and aging capabilities by replacing and upgrading our current systems. 

The following is how we will sustain and modernize SFE capabilities: 

• ISR: AFSPC will ensure an uninterrupted and modernized missile launch warning 

capability by sustaining the DSP program, fielding the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), 

and ensuring that adequate upgrades to the ground–based radars (GBRs) are preformed to 

extend their system life. 

• EM: We will continue to support current capabilities, while we overcome existing and 

future deficiencies to meet the evolving future military operations requirements. The 

replacement of DMSP by National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS) and its follow-on systems maintains and improves our ability to monitor the 

terrestrial environment to meet global and theater weather forecasting needs. We are 

pursuing several systems to greatly improve our ability to monitor and characterize the space 

environment, supporting the counter-space mission. 

• SATCOM: In the Near-Term, we will ensure SATCOM users have uninterrupted 

communications capability, while greatly increasing overall communications capacity. DSCS 

and Milstar will be replaced with Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS), Advanced Extremely 

High Frequency (AEHF), and Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT). 

Similarly, Interim Polar system will be replaced with Advanced Polar System (APS). We will 

equip our forces with the family of advanced beyond line of sight terminals (FAB-T) and 

ground multi-band terminal (GMT) which will bring transformational communication to the 

battlefield. 

• PNT: AFSPC will provide a secure, survivable, and resilient navigation and timing 

capability to provide highly accurate data to friendly users through all conflict levels. We will 

replace GPS IIA and IIR satellites with GPS IIRM, IIF, and III to sustain current capabilities 

and to add improvements such as a Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) capability to protect GPS 

use by the US and its allies while denying use to our enemies. 


18


• C2: AFSPC will develop and field a world class C2 system, providing commanders the 

ability to quickly and effectively monitor, assess worldwide events and plan and execute 

space forces. The evolutionary development of the Combatant Commanders Integrated C2 

System (CCIC2S) will integrate the C2 capabilities for all the current and projected NORAD 

mission and USSTRATCOM space operations and missile defense missions into a single 

functional system rather than the current mission-unique, “stove-piped,” collection of systems. 

5.1.4 TRANSFORM 

In addition to evolving current capabilities, we will transform some of our SFE capabilities to 

meet new threats and greatly expanded SATCOM demands. We will: 

• Field a Space-Based Radar (SBR) Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) and Synthetic 

Aperture Radar (SAR) capability to provide worldwide persistent global situational awareness. 

• Development and field Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Explosive 

(CBRNE) detection capability though a space-based Hyperspectral Imaging (HSI) system. 

• Transform SATCOM from a set of stand-alone systems specifically developed for 

particular users to an integrated, network-centric SATCOM system architecture under the 

guidance of the Transformational Communication Architecture (TCA). AEHF, APS, and TSAT 

will be cross-linked to form an integrated network-centric system-of-systems for wideband and 

protected users, significantly increasing SATCOM’s capacity and utility. High data rate 

terminals will link platforms and satellites. 

• Ensure vital SFE capabilities are available to the warfighter by pursuing transformational 

capabilities such as: payloads ready to launch on demand, the capability for them to be 

transferred to necessary orbits, and the capability to be serviced on-orbit servicing spacecraft 

for life extension. 


19


SFE 

ISR - Conventional 

Near Term Mid Term Far Term 

06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 

SBR - GMTI 

MORF SBR Bi-Static AMTI 

SB HSI 

ISR - CBRNE 

NDS 

NDS Replenishment 

SB HSI 

ISR – Launch / 

Missile Events 

GBR 

DSP 

GBR ULE + MCEs 

SBIRS High – HEO 

SBIRS SBIRS High 

High GEO 

SBIRS High – HEO Replen 

SBIRS High - Replenishment 

Environmental 

Monitoring 

DMSP 

SBIRS NPOESS 

High 

NEMSS 

C/NOFS (Operational ) 

Solar Sentry 

Space Based Wind Lidar 

Positioning, 

Navigation, Timing 

GPS II A/R 

GPS II F 

GPS III 

MORF - GPS 

Satellite 

Communications 

Wideband 

(DSCS, WGS, GBS) 

Protected Mid Latitude (Milstar,AEHF) 

TS AT 

TS AT-R 

Protected Polar (IP, APS) 

APS-R 


and Control 

CCIC2S [Block 1 & Sust.] 

MORF - ISR 

MORF – BFT/CN 

CCIC2S [Block 2 & Sust.] 

Operational or Programmed 

Planned 

5.1.5 PLAN ASSESSMENT 

Figure 5-2: Space Force Enhancement (SFE) Roadmap 

This plan provides both significantly improved and new SFE capabilities. We are able to 

maintain and evolve our critical surveillance, SATCOM, navigation, and C2 capabilities to keep 

pace with growing requirements. The plan outlines new space capabilities to detect and track 

targets that currently can only be done from terrestrial-based systems. These new systems will 

be able to exploit the vantage point that space provides. However, as detailed in the SFE 

Mission Area Plan (MAP), the plan does leave some needs unfulfilled. These include the 

inability to globally detect and track CBRNE events and only a partial ability to satisfactorily 

monitor and forecast the space environment. 


20


By improving our SFE capabilities as outlined in this plan, we will significantly enhance our 

support to all the Air Force capabilities, and specifically to the Global Strike and Space and 

Command Control Communication Computers Intelligence and Surveillance (S&C4ISR) Air 

Force capabilities. Enhanced detection of hidden or moving targets, and the ability to pass that 

knowledge to any warfighter requiring it, are just two examples of how AFSPC will support these 

Air Force capabilities. 

5.2 COUNTERSPACE (CS) 

5.2.1 WARFIGHTER'S PERSPECTIVE 

Air Force CS capabilities are critical to the warfighter's ability to achieve strategic, operational, 

and tactical objectives. US forces are more dependent upon SFE than any other military forces. 

Our SFE capabilities give us an asymmetric advantage over our adversaries, so they make an 

attractive target set. The recent experience of GPS jamming by Iraqi forces in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and of Iranian jamming of Voice of America transmissions on a commercial satellite 

signal that we are now in a new era wherein adversaries are willing and able to attack America's 

military and commercial space capabilities. 

The loss of PNT, SATCOM, ISR, or C2 from space would significantly reduce the asymmetric 

advantage US forces have over adversary forces. The warfighter must be capable of defending 

SFE anywhere and anytime on or above the globe. Similarly, allowing adversary forces to have 

access to widely available SFE services also reduces our advantage. The warfighter must be 

capable of disallowing SFE to the adversary anywhere and anytime on or above the globe. 

A summary of our analysis, supporting this conclusion, follows. 

5.2.2 INTEGRATED PLANNING PROCESS PATHFINDER (IP3) 

IP3 is an initiative to test adding more analytical rigor in developing a more optimum 

architecture. IP3 increased analytical fidelity in three primary areas: engagement level analysis 

for competing system concepts and final architectures (Guardian model), detailed cost 

assessments of system concepts and the final CS architecture and CS utility to the warfighter, 

and prioritization of sub-mission areas through Military Utility Analyses (MUA). Other tools 

provided the capability to further assess and refine the myriad of architectures from SCOUT. 

These additional analytical processes lay a solid technical and cost foundation for follow-on 

AoAs. 

5.2.2.1 Current and Programmed Capabilities 

The CS mission area includes the sub-mission areas of SSA, DCS, and OCS. AFSPC’s current 

and programmed CS capabilities have, as a whole, been sufficient for the needs of the modern 

warfighter, but only because our exploitation of the space medium has until recently been 

uncontested. 

SSA capabilities perform ISR and space environmental characterization functions and are the 

crucial enablers for DCS and OCS capabilities. AFSPC is responsible for operating and 

maintaining the majority of the systems that make up the USSTRATCOM Space Surveillance 

Network (SSN). This includes ground-based radars and optical sensors, a space-based sensor, 

and the Space Control Center (SCC). The sensors and SCC, in concert with the 

USSTRATCOM Joint Intelligence Center (STRATJIC) and Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA), 

provide most of the warfighter's SSA. The SCC is part of the programmed CCIC2S and, 

coupled with the STRATJIC, will be essential to integrating contingency planning for air and 


21


space forces. Today, the sensors find, fix, track, and provide characterization data to the SCC 

and JIC, which complete the tasks of characterize, target, assess, and command and control. 

They task sensors and process, exploit, and disseminate (PED) the data to maintain the satellite 

catalog in support of deconfliction, space order of battle, satellite overflight warning, and space 

event characterization functions. Our SSA capabilities are less than adequate today. The 

sensors cannot consistently find small debris and have limited capability to find, track, and 

characterize objects in high-altitude orbits. Accordingly, our current capabilities do not meet all 

our timeliness requirements and have resultant gaps in coverage. These deficiencies amount to 

three main needs between now and the planning horizon: 

• Improve ability to find, fix, track, and provide characterization data on red, gray and blue 

near earth objects and events via all SSA disciplines. 

• Improve ability to find, fix, track, and provide characterization data on red, gray and blue 

deep space objects and events via all SSA disciplines. 

• Improve ability to adequately process and analyze data from all space regimes and from 

all SSA sources. 

In addition to shortfalls in space surveillance, there is also a deficiency in the ability to 

distinguish man-made attack and other sources of anomalies from natural environmental 

effects. These deficiencies relate to three needs: 

• Improve ability to observe operationally relevant aspects of the natural space 

environment 

• Improve our ability to rapidly fuse various sources of environmental data into a coherent 

and accurate current and forecast picture of the natural space environment 

• Improve our ability to rapidly process environmental data and link it to system effects 

DCS capabilities seek to deter adversaries from attacking our space capabilities, to defend them 

if an adversary does attack and to recover lost capability as quickly as possible after an attack. 

These capabilities are currently of higher precedence than OCS capabilities. We know that 

many potential adversaries are capable of attacking US space systems today. A system 

consists of three segments: space, link, and ground/surface segments. We must expect further 

attacks by nation-states or non-state (e.g., terrorist) actors on US military, civil, or commercial 

space systems. Intelligence, wargaming and experience project both capability and likelihood to 

rise dramatically in the near future-especially when associated with armed conflict. Our analysis 

concentrated on defending the space and link segments of a space system, while leaving the 

defense of ground/surface segments to force protection (MS). We must fill three major DCS 

space and link needs between now and the planning horizon: 

• Advance measures to ensure mission survivability during any known method of attack. 

Success in this area will improve defense by fending off or enduring attacks, and 

deterrence by convincing a potential adversary that any attack will have little, if any, 

desired effect. 

• Mitigate mission impact resulting from an attack and quickly restoring services based on 

mission priorities. This addresses the "recover" portion of DCS. 

• Starve the adversary of friendly SFE while maintaining the services for friendly use. 


22


OCS capabilities are intended to negate adversary space services. This sub-mission area is 

currently the least urgent capability AFSPC can provide, but we are proactively preparing for the 

future when it will become closer in importance to DCS. AFSPC still must address the following 

needs between now and the planning horizon: 

• Provide the capability to create reversible effects (deceive, deny, disrupt) against 

adversary space capabilities 

• Provide the capability to create irreversible effects (degrade, destroy) against adversary 

space capabilities 

Today the US holds an unquestioned advantage in space, which allows us to operate freely in a 

medium that increasingly is vital to the political, economic, and military well being of the US and 

its allies. Therefore, SFE now forms a center of gravity, and the ability to shape the military 

space environment is crucial to US national interests. As such, the ability to gain space 

superiority (the ability to exploit space while selectively disallowing it to adversaries) is critically 

important and maintaining space superiority is an essential prerequisite for success in modern 

warfare. Every military operation since the Gulf War has powerfully demonstrated the vital 

importance of SFE to military operations. To date, we have enjoyed de facto space superiority, 

but adversaries have shown that they have taken notice. 

AFSPC has accepted its responsibility to lead in CS. The building blocks of a CS capability are 

in final development. Between now and 2030, the command will deploy CS systems, stand up a 

CS squadron and a Space Test and Training Range (STTR) and will further its commitment to 

S&T research. 

5.2.2.2 Plan Objectives 

CS Mission Area planners have three strategic goals: 

• Dominant CS Capabilities: Simply, we must be able to quickly subjugate any space 

capability any adversary can field while maintaining our own. This includes the 

infrastructure and enablers as well as the "pointy end of the spear." 

• A Balanced Mix: AFSPC will provide the majority of any space-based capabilities in the 

DoD's mix of tactics, techniques, procedures, methods, and basing modes. The command 

will also provide any complementary terrestrial (air or surface) CS capability necessary to 

ensure the ability to gain and maintain space superiority. 

• Full Theater Integration: This will allow the COMAFFOR to plan for CS effects, synchronize 

effects with those of surface and air forces, task CS forces directly from theater operations 

centers, adjust the operation during execution and integrate CS feedback into combat 

assessment. Theater integration also requires space forces that fully understand how their 

capabilities work in concert with forces of the other media to achieve desired theater effects 

through parallel operations. 

Figure 5-3 highlights AFSPC’s time-phased roadmap for the CS mission area. SSA is the 

permanent crucial enabler for DCS and OCS. However, AFSPC will base the desired 

characteristics of the SSA data (such as quality, quantity, and timeliness) on DCS and OCS 

requirements and treaty obligations. Again, DCS is of greater urgency than OCS in the Near- 

Term, but by the Far-Term, DCS and OCS will have similar precedence. Some level of each 

general CS capability, appropriate to counter the projected space capabilities of potential 

adversaries, will be necessary in each period. 


23


Counterspace 

Space Situation Awareness 

Near-Term 

Mid-Term 

Far-Term 

(2006-2011 

(2012-2017) 

(2018-2030) 

05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 

SSN (ground-based) 

SSN Upgrades, CCIC2S 

Space- and Ground-Based Space Surveillance 

Defensive Counterspace 

Limited Counter measures on a 

case - by - case basis 

Active on orbit protection 

Spacecraft attack detection and reporting 

Offensive Counterspace 

Counter– Communications and –Surveillance & Reconnaissance Systems 

Future Counterspace 

Counterspace C2 and Infrastructure 

Space Control Center 

STRAT JIC and CCIC2S 

STRAT JIC, CCIC2S, and Space Test and Training Range 

Supporting Infrastruc ture for Counterspace 

Legend: 

Sustained Capability Modernized Capability Transformational Capabilities 

Development 

Development 

C2 Command and Control SSN Space Surv eillance Network 

CCIC2S Combatant Commander Integrated C2 System 

STRAT JIC US Strategic Command Joint Intelligence Center 

Figure 5-3: Counterspace (CS) Roadmap 

To facilitate maximum CS effectiveness, we will work directly with USSTRATCOM, the other 

AFSPC mission areas, Air Force MAJCOMs, Services and agencies, and foreign militaries. We 

will accelerate the evolution of needed technologies and work to keep each entity focused on its 

areas of expertise. 

We stated earlier that the command is working on DOTMLPF for all of CS. By examining each 

of these elements, AFSPC will bring the greatest possible CS utility to the warfighter at the 

strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, whether the battlespace is abroad or at home. 

We will make the necessary materiel and non-materiel changes to ensure US military, civil, and 

commercial space capabilities can exploit space for the benefit of America and her friends. 


24


5.2.2.3 Sustain and Modernize 

Figure 5-3 shows that AFSPC will sustain the systems that provide its current capabilities 

through a variety of Service Life Extension Programs (SLEPs) and other modifications until 

those systems are no longer necessary. AFSPC will also strive to incrementally modernize by 

enhancing its SSA capabilities and developing initial DCS and OCS capabilities. Evolutionary 

examples include: 

• SSA – AFSPC will augment the SSN with an upgrade to the Haystack radar and a new, 

dedicated ground-based X-band phased array radar network to improve detection of small 

objects. AFSPC will also develop an integrated SSA C2 architecture based on Command, 

Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(C4ISR) Operational Views of the CCIC2S architecture. This development will enable AFSPC 

to fully integrate all four elements of SSA. These programmed modernizations improve all 

three needs listed above in Current and Programmed Capabilities section. 

• DCS – AFSPC will enhance survivability and the defense of all its space capabilities by 

improving defensive tactics, techniques, and procedures and ensuring all future Air Force 

space systems incorporate countermeasures, to include passive and active on- and off-board 

solutions. By doing so, the command will begin to address most of the crucial needs listed 

above. 

• OCS – In the Near- and Mid-Term, AFSPC will field initial ground-based OCS capabilities 

such as a mobile Counter-Communications System, a Counter-Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance System, and a Counter-Navigation system, which will disallow adversaries 

use of space-based navigation signals. These systems will deliver capability to produce 

reversible effects. AFSPC will continue to pursue lethal or non-lethal effects such as the use 

of deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction of space capabilities. 

5.2.2.4 Transform 

AFSPC will transform its CS capabilities by fielding revolutionary capabilities to leapfrog ahead 

to fulfill the mission area's needs through the Mid- and Far-Terms. Examples include: 

• SSA – Space-based space surveillance systems including inspector satellites that are 

capable of providing details of space objects unattainable by ground-based systems. 

• DCS – An attack detection and reporting architecture based on the Rapid Attack 

Identification, Detection, and Reporting System (RAIDRS) concept capable of detecting, 

characterizing (identify and geo-locate), and reporting attacks on space systems, and 

assessing the resulting mission impacts (Acquisition Program: Space System Attack 

Identification and Characterization (SSAIC) MNS-99). 

• SSA/DCS/OCS – A STTR where engineers and doctrinaires will try theories and 

concepts, testers will evaluate new systems and space warriors can hone their defensive and 

offensive skills. 

• DCS – Off-board DCS capabilities to help space-based systems defend against kinetic 

energy and physical attacks. 

• OCS – Full spectrum, space-based OCS systems that bring the capability of negating 

adversarial space capabilities. 


25


• Readiness to launch on demand, capability to be transferred to necessary orbits, and the 

capability to be serviced by on-orbit servicing spacecraft for life extension. 

5.2.2.5 Plan Assessment 

This iteration of the IPP produced several important findings: 

• The ability to meet very stringent sensor-to-target timelines is a vital SSA capability DCS 

will require. NOTE: OCS systems also require timely sensor-to-shooter data. 

• SSA, DCS, and OCS produced true synergistic effects when planners performed the MUA 

against a near-peer in a scenario directed by Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). This 

synergy may also occur in other scenarios. 

• Infrastructure and enabling capabilities are essential to the effectiveness of CS systems 

• On-board defensive systems are most effective for defending space-based capabilities 

against all attack methods but kinetic energy and physical. They are also most cost-effective. 

• Off-board DCS systems provide defense in depth for kinetic energy and other physical 

methods of attack, but are more expensive than on-board systems. 

• The DCS function must break the adversary's kill chain against each applicable 

vulnerability, if it is to be successful. 

• DCS is twice as important as OCS in MUA on a DPG-directed near-peer scenario. Similar 

differences in precedence are likely in other scenarios. 

• In a scenario in which the adversary has access to commercial or other third-party space 

services, the ability to perform reversible negation provides greater utility to the US warfighter 

than the ability to irreversibly negate. Adversary access to neutral-party assets is the most 

probable projected scenario. 

• Multi-role systems contribute to more capabilities and, therefore provide the greatest utility 

to the warfighter. 

The CS portion of the SMP is key to the success of every Chief of Staff of the Air Force Task 

Force CONOPS. Our ability to thwart disruption of our navigation and timing signals will be 

critical to the precision strike capability required by the Global Strike, Air and Space 

Expeditionary, and Global Response CONOPS. Capabilities that negate adversary space-based 

ISR, communications, navigation and weather services will also be crucial in achieving the goals 

laid out in those CONOPS. Defending our communications is critical to passing weather data 

and other information required to support the airlift capabilities required by the Global Mobility 

CONOPS. CS capabilities play key enabling roles in the S&C4ISR CONOPS. Lastly, keeping 

our adversaries from gaining information on CONUS-based locations and working to protect 

valuable commercial and civil capabilities will be an essential part of the Homeland Security 

CONOPS. 


26


5.3 SPACE FORCE APPLICATION (SFA) 


Today’s SFA capabilities focus on nuclear deterrence, which is provided by nuclear-armed 

Minuteman (MM) III and Peacekeeper ICBMs and the infrastructure to maintain and protect 

them. The December 2001 NPR directs the Air Force to “extend the life of MM III until 2020, 

while beginning the requirements process for the next-generation ICBM.” This effort is well 

underway, with both the completion of the Land-Based Strategic Deterrent (LBSD) Mission 

Needs Statement and the beginning of an AoA study. The AoA becomes even more important 

as the Peacekeeper ICBM is deactivated by the end of FY05. 

AFSPC currently cannot provide a non-nuclear, prompt global strike capability to the warfighter, 

enabling a wide range of precise and selective lethality. However, completed LBSD and Prompt 

Global Strike AoAs should result in selecting operationally responsive options for applying force 

from or through space using non-nuclear munitions. 

Although Missile Defense and Counterair capabilities remain extremely important to theater 

commanders and Homeland Defense leadership, at this time there is no AFSPC force 

application role in the planning horizon to provide this capability. 


Figure 5-4 highlights AFSPC’s time-phased roadmap for the SFA mission area. Nuclear 

deterrence has been one of our nation’s highest priorities and will continue to be a top priority 

for AFSPC through the Far-Term. In the Near-Term, several MM III life extension programs 

currently underway will provide for a capable, reliable, and fully supportable MM III missile over 

the next two decades. We will also proceed with developing a non-nuclear prompt global strike 

capability to be fielded in the Mid-Term. 


We will sustain MM III with life extension programs through 2020 and we will field a follow-on 

ICBM with an IOC of 2018. Additionally, we will continue to sustain and modernize the nuclear 

support infrastructure (e.g., communications networks, mobile command and control center, 

helicopter and security programs). AFSPC’s chosen course of action will allow sustainment of 

MM III through its end of life, investment in MM III Elite, LBSD, and prompt global strike, 

therefore increasing AFSPC’s capability to maintain a vital nuclear deterrence and critical 

support through the Far-Term. 


Non-nuclear prompt global strike from and through space can transform the warfighter’s role in 

the future. Most notably, a non-nuclear strike capability, possibly in the form of a Common Aero 

Vehicle (CAV) launched by a ballistic missile, air launch system, or a SOV, could provide the 

President and the Secretary of Defense with a range of space power options. These options 

are for deterrence and flexible response when time is absolutely critical, risks associated with 

other options are too high, or when no other courses of action are available. 


27


Nuclear Space Force MS&A 

Deterrence/Strike 

Application 

Near-Term Mid-Term Far-Term 

05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 

MM III Elite 

FOC IOC 

MM III 

FOC 

EOL 

FOC AoA 

LBSD 

FOC IOC 

FOC 

FOC IOC 

MMP 

MCCC 

FOC 

ICBM Security Upgrades 

FOC AoA 

FOC IOC 

FOC 

LBM/CAV 

IOC 

SOV 

FOC 

Operational 

Funded 

Development 

Planned 

Development 

Planned 

Operational 

Figure 5-4: Space Force Application (SFA) Roadmap 


The SFA mission area’s top priority is to sustain a credible nuclear deterrent force. This plan 

meets this priority while also providing new, non-nuclear deterrence/strike options in the Midand 

Far-Terms. The plan, however, does not provide for a Target & Engage capability for 

missile defense. The Army and Navy will provide some terrestrial-based capabilities against a 

limited ballistic missile attack by 2004—the Air Force has not been directed to provide force 

application assets at this time. Furthermore, there is no AFSPC-provided Counterair warfighter 

capability. 

Our ability to implement the nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence/strike portion of the plan will be 

key to the success of the capability-focused Global Strike, Global Response and Nuclear 

Response Capabilities CONOPS. A credible, viable nuclear deterrent force forms the 

cornerstone of the Nuclear Response CONOPS. This plan also highlights the sustainment and 

modernization necessary to ensure that deterrent force remains viable and credible. The plan 

also focuses on the increasing urgency of deploying a non-nuclear prompt global strike 

capability. The end result will tremendously bolster the sought after capabilities in the Global 

Strike CONOPS. 

5.4 SPACE SUPPORT (SS) 


AFSPC employs the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) to provide satellite operations 

services to select DoD, National, Allied and Civil satellites. The AFSCN is comprised of two 

primary control nodes (located at Schriever Air Force Base (AFB), CO and Onizuka Air Force 

Station (AFS), CA), eight remote tracking stations and other control resources around the world. 

Today’s AFSCN does not perform all satellite operations for all satellite missions-typically it 

provides launch, early orbit and anomaly resolution services to the majority of satellite missions. 

It also provides low data rate mission data retrieval for requested satellite missions. For the 

satellite missions that do not use the AFSCN, there are program-unique ground stations and 

associated infrastructure. 


28


AFSPC’s current fleet of launch systems is comprised of a mix of medium- and heavy-lift 

expendable boosters. This fleet is currently transitioning to the new Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicles (EELV), which are the Delta IV and Atlas V families of launch vehicles. These vehicles 

support routine launch operations. By the Mid-Term, an assessment of EELV responsiveness, 

reliability, and affordability will be needed (represented in the Launch Operations roadmap by a 

diamond with DP [Decision Point]) to determine the future direction of routine spacelift. The 

evolutionary direction would extend EELV out into the future, while a revolutionary approach 

could be to move towards a spacelift capability providing orders of magnitude reduction in cost, 

significant improvements in responsiveness and greater reliability. 

To launch these boosters, AFSPC maintains the Launch and Test Range System (LTRS) 

consisting of the Eastern Range controlled from Cape Canaveral AFS, FL, and the Western 

Range controlled from Vandenberg AFB, CA. 

SS also advocates for the command’s Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis (MS&A) 

requirements, rapid prototyping and demonstration of cutting-edge space-centric technologies 

and Force Development Evaluation (FDE) efforts. Current MS&A tools focus on system-level 

analyses for system-specific missions, but are limited in their ability to address operating 

constraints to support multiple missions, integration with terrestrial missions, and multiple 

theaters. Minimal MS&A capabilities currently exist for quantifying the military value of space 

systems, particularly mission and campaign warfighting contributions. Additionally, AFSPC has 

contracted most mission and campaign studies in the past. This approach supported the 

development of proprietary tools for each study without creating a common set of reusable 

models, data and scenarios. 

AFSPC conducts FDE over the life of fielded systems to evaluate the operational effectiveness 

and suitability of AFSPC systems. 


Figure 5-5 highlights AFSPC’s time-phased roadmap for the SS mission area. The objective for 

Satellite Operations is on-demand execution of any US government space asset to support the 

full spectrum of worldwide military operations. In Launch Operations, AFSPC will strive to 

provide robust and responsive spacelift to support time-sensitive military operations and to 

develop capabilities to reposition, recover, and service assets on orbit. We will also develop an 

FDE infrastructure for evaluating space systems prior to declaring them operational. The 

resulting FDE infrastructure, combined with institutionalized and integrated MS&A capabilities, 

will be used to evaluate existing and emerging space concepts, strategy, doctrine, tactics, and 

utility. 


AFSPC will sustain and modernize its current Satellite and Launch Operations into the Far-Term 

when it will transition to advanced capabilities. Examples of this approach include: 

• Satellite Operations – AFSPC will sustain the AFSCN and implement a robust 

operational training capability. In the Mid- and Far-Terms, AFSPC will evolve our satellite 

operations capability to produce a national resource that will be integrated, robust, 

responsive, and able to support faster spacecraft initialization times. This Integrated 

Satellite Control Network (ISCN) will improve our ability to respond quickly to changing 

warfighter requirements for space services. Selected DoD and Civil satellite control 

capabilities will be integrated to produce complementary, interoperable networks that 


29


enhance mutual satellite operations support for launch, early orbit, anomaly resolution, 

and limited mission data handling functions. The ISCN will also allow a new architecture 

to meet the needs of a future environment with more satellites, greater commercial 

presence, long-term human activity in space, increased national security reliance on 

space, and new fiscal realities 

• Launch Operations – AFSPC will sustain Delta IV, Atlas V, and the Launch and Test 

Ranges into the far-term when advanced launch systems, upper stages, and a Global 

Launch and Test Range will be fielded to provide routine launch that is more robust and 

responsive. Additionally, AFSPC will continue to explore launch systems with the 

potential of providing one or more orders of magnitude reductions in costs to enhance 

our space access and responsiveness. 

• MS&A/FDE – AFSPC created the Space Analysis Division to be its Center of Excellence 

for MS&A. The Space Analysis Division consolidated dispersed and disparate analysis 

capabilities and will help establish a robust and consistent toolset and methodologies for 

the command. AFSPC will also establish the STTR to improve its FDE capabilities for 

CS and to ensure those systems are properly evaluated prior to being fielded. In 

addition, the STTR may support FDE for the other space mission areas in the Mid- and 

Far-Terms. The Space Warfare Center (SWC) 595 th Space Group, the 576 th Flight Test 

Squadron, the 17 th Test Squadron, and Air Force Reserve Command’s (AFRC) 14 th Test 

Squadron are the primary units tasked to execute the FDE mission. 

• Space Research and Development (R&D) – AFSPC will continue to manage the Space 

Test Program (STP) on behalf of the Air Force, our sister Services, and DOD agencies. 

AFSPC intends to enhance this program by using it as a test bed for spiral development 

and standardizing spacecraft designs and operations where appropriate. SMC Det 12 is 

responsible for managing the STP program and will pursue opportunities to increase the 

opportunities for DOD experiments to be flown in space. 


30


Near-Ter m Mid-Term Far-Ter m 

Space Support 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 

Satellite Operations 

AF SC N 

EOL 

Phase III 

Pha s e I 

IOC 

Pha s e I I 

ISCN 

FOC 

Launch Operations 

MLV 

HLV 

EOL 

EOL 

EELV 

EELV 

DP 

EOL 

EELV Extension 

IOC 

FOC 

ASC 

IOC 

IOC FOC 

FOC 

SLV 

Peacekeeper Post- Alert LV 

LTRS 

EOL 

IOC 

FOC 

GLTR 

Under Evaluation 

IOC 

SOV 

FOC 

IOC 

FOC 

SMV 

IOC 

FOC 

OTV 

MIS 

IOC 

FOC 

MS&A 

IOC 

FOC 

FOC 

Space Analysis Division 

Integrated Space M&S Toolset 

Rapid 

Prototyping 

FDE 

IWD 

IOC 

FOC 

EOL 

FOC 

FOC 

Standard Training Toolkit 

UIWD 

STTR 

Operational 

Funded 

Dev elopment 

Planned 

Dev elopment 

Planned 

Operational 

Figure 5-5: Space Support (SS) Roadmap 


AFSPC will begin working in the near-term to field several transformed SS capabilities in the 

Mid- and Far-Terms. Examples include: 

• Robust and responsive spacelift and rapid satellite configuration and on-orbit initialization 

providing quick-turn, on-demand, assured space access for time-sensitive military 

operations 

• Orbital transfer vehicles to reposition or boost on-orbit assets 

• Space-based elements of the LTRS to increase coverage while reducing operations and 

maintenance (O&M) costs associated with the ground-based infrastructure 


This plan satisfies the sustainment and modernization needs of current systems. AFSPC will 

evolve the AFSCN into a national resource that is integrated, robust, responsive, and able to 

support faster spacecraft initialization times to provide on-demand operations execution. For 

routine launch operations, EELV adequately covers our medium and heavy payload needs. 


31


Funding transformational capabilities is always a challenge. Responsive spacelift will be a new 

capability that will open new realms of possibilities. It will be focused on rapid response, 

affordability and payload capacity for warfighter operations. As with any new capability, this will 

require significant funding in the future. Without Near-Term investments, this capability may not 

be available in time to support a host of missions such as global strike in an anti-access 

environment. In order to adapt the LTRS to meet responsive spacelift requirements and to 

modernize its architecture, LTRS must be transformed to a Global Launch and Test Range 

System (GLTRS.) Funding for this initiative must parallel the development of responsive 

spacelift. 

Our SS plans will have the greatest impact on the Global Strike, Global Mobility, S&C4ISR, 

Global Response, and Air and Space Expeditionary CONOPS. A responsive launch and onorbit 

checkout capability will allow us to quickly enhance our ISR coverage of a new area of 

interest or expand our lines of communications to support Global Strike, S&C4ISR, and Global 

Mobility. And as the “kick down the door” phase transitions to a more protracted conflict, 

responsive launch, combined with responsive payloads, will enable us to support the Air and 

Space Expeditionary Force through sustainment and replenishment of our space assets. 

5.5 MISSION SUPPORT (MS) 

5.5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONAL AREAS 

The AFSPC MS functional areas provide the infrastructure, sustainment, security, and trained 

personnel needed to perform our missions around the globe. They cut across all four mission 

areas to ensure effective and efficient operations. 

• Communications and Information (C&I) Infostructure provides and sustains 

information assurance, positive C2 of strike resources, management, transport 

capabilities, and the communications and computer hardware and software resources for 

our forces worldwide. 

• Logistics provides the organizations, systems, and processes needed to maintain the 

mission readiness of AFSPC’s fielded systems. (Since this analysis, C&I and Logistics 

have been organizationally combined and accordingly referred to as Logistics and 

Communications.) 

• Civil Engineering provides, operates, maintains, and restores installations, facilities 

housing and environment needed to support our space and missile forces. 

• Security Forces provides policy guidance, specialized training, and personnel to maintain 

our physical security of ICBMs, spacelift facilities, space system ground assets, C2, and 

other facilities. 

• Training and Exercises ensures that all our mission ready forces are trained and 

exercised in the technologies they find on the job. 

• Education ensures that all command levels are “space-educated,” and that programs are 

in place to foster the development of Space Professionals. 

• Medical ensures a fit and vital military force, operates the TRICARE managed care 

system, and provides health care to deployed forces and to all other beneficiaries. 


32


5.5.2 PLAN HIGHLIGHTS 

Our ability to develop and maintain 21st Century air and space warriors and infrastructure is just 

as crucial to the success of the our vision as employing new technologies and advanced 

concepts. Improvements in MS effectiveness and efficiency enhance the ability of the mission 

areas to meet their goals and objectives. Planned MS improvements are detailed in the MSP, 

but some of the objectives are highlighted in this chapter: 

• The C&I Infostructure will transform to provide seamless information accessibility and 

sharing to support all operations, C2, and MS functions. 

• With adequate funding, Civil Engineering will ensure suitable facilities and infrastructure, 

environment, emergency services, and combat-ready forces are available to meet near, 

mid and long term AFSPC mission support requirements. 

• Training, Exercise, and Education capabilities of the future will transform to provide a 

virtual, global, synthetic battlespace in which space forces, fully integrated with other US 

and allied forces, will not only train but also rehearse missions through the distributed 

mission operations concept. Space professionals will be developed and emerge from all 

areas of the “space community.” 


33


6 The Way Ahead 

6.1 CHALLENGES 

Achieving our vision of fully exploiting the advantages of space while ensuring space superiority 

will not be easy. We will face many challenges, a few of which are summarized here. 

6.1.1 PEOPLE 

As previously stated, the US military enjoys an asymmetric advantage via our space capabilities 

that is not widely understood. Space is deeply imbedded in our warfighting capabilities, and we 

have come to rely on our space capabilities as a fact-of-life utility. But much more awaits us. 

Training and education are crucial in fostering the cultural change required as we move from an 

air force to an integrated air and space force. We must help commanders and the forces they 

command become confident and competent users of space capabilities. Likewise, we must help 

our space professionals better understand air, land, and sea operations to become better force 

enablers and transition into full spectrum combat commanders. Additionally, AFSPC must 

ensure the proper mix of reserve, guard, active duty, civilians, and contractors to develop and 

provide the space capabilities required by our vision. AFSPC must foster the development of 

space professionals capable of developing new doctrine and concepts of operations for space 

launch, offensive and defensive space operations, power projection in, from and through space. 

These space professionals must also be encouraged to develop other military uses of space 

while operating some of the most complex systems ever built and deployed. 

6.1.2 PARTNERS 

The need for space systems is growing, and a more open flow of ideas and cross-link of 

capabilities are essential. We can achieve our vision only if we work together with other 

organizations toward a unified goal. We must continue to establish and maintain key 

partnerships with the NRO, DoD, NASA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA), industry, other MAJCOMs and Services, and applicable international agencies. 

6.1.3 FUNDING 

Funding is one of our biggest challenges. Even though this plan is based on an assumed real 

growth in TOA of 3% per year after the FYDP, we still must delay the development of many of 

our desired advanced capabilities to later in the planning horizon or leave them out of the plan 

altogether. AFSPC must continue to advocate for adequate funding while investigating 

opportunities for decreasing costs (e.g., spiral development, cost sharing, and divestiture). 

6.1.4 INDUSTRIAL BASE AND TECHNOLOGY LINKAGE 

A strong US industrial base is essential to help provide us with the technology, people, 

acquisition, and logistics bases we need to support the development of our envisioned space 

capabilities. The Secretary of Defense has directed Headquarters (HQ) AFSPC to prioritize, 

oversee, and direct space-related lab work. 

S&T is integral to our planning process. Most of the future concepts and solutions included in 

this plan depend on the development of new technologies and the maturation of existing 

technologies. In some cases, needs are addressed by partial concepts or solutions, or not 

satisfied until the Far-Term. Our S&T programs should continue to pursue revolutionary 


34


concepts and next generation capabilities to address these shortfalls. See Appendix E for a 

detailed description of the S&T process. 

Additionally, the SWC plays a critical role in leveraging current national, military and commercial 

technologies to address warfighter requirements. SWC divisions like the Space Battlelab, Air 

Force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP), Fusion Center, Space 

Application and Integration Facility (SPAIF), and others routinely partner with private industry, 

military labs, agencies, commands, commanders, and national organizations to bring rapid 

solutions to address warfighter requirements. 

6.1.5 POLICY/TREATY 

To fully develop and exploit potential CS and space-based SFA capabilities, some US policies 

and international treaties may need to be reviewed and modified. 

6.1.5.1 Counterspace 

There are presently no formal US policies preventing development or deployment of CS 

capabilities. In actuality, the President’s National Space Policy, the DoD Space Policy, and the 

Secretary of Defense’s policy on CS all require development of “negation” capabilities and 

deployment as needed to ensure freedom of access and operations in space. However, the 

President and/or the Secretary of Defense approval will be required for any employment of force 

against enemy space assets, including ground and link segments of space systems. The major 

question in fielding OCS systems is the political will to do so. 

6.1.5.2 Conventional Strike 

Our vision calls for prompt global strike space systems with the capability to directly apply force 

from or through space against terrestrial targets. International treaties and laws do not prohibit 

the use or presence of conventional weapons in space. Policy makers are working to create 

conditions for a new Strategic Triad that includes non-nuclear global strike weapons. Nonnuclear 

prompt global strike space capabilities are being studied. Our nation's leadership will 

decide whether or not to pursue the development and deployment of conventional, space-based 

systems for global strike to fully exploit the advantages of space. 

6.1.5.3 Strategic Deterrence 

As part of US-Russia initiatives to further reduce their respective nuclear arsenals, the US will 

continue to reduce its nuclear forces. The US has reviewed its nuclear strategy and force 

structure and developed a prudent draw-down schedule to ensure we maintain our national 

security needs. In keeping with our international obligations, as well as our national security 

requirements, all three legs of the nuclear triad will undoubtedly see further reductions. The 

latest NPR speaks of the need to maintain enough capabilities to provide both a credible and 

adaptable deterrence posture. The NPR cautions that the “United States should prepare for 

deterrence failure even as it strives to deter.” Thus, our deterrence capabilities should be 

responsive to and adaptable in a dynamic security environment. Therefore, we remain 

committed to ensuring our ICBM arsenal is modernized to maintain an effective force and 

deterrent posture while pursuing a new generation of responsive prompt global strike 

capabilities. 


35


6.1.6 TRANSFORMATION 

AFSPC must manage two major transformation dilemmas, both of which arise from the need to 

invest scarce resources. 

The first transformation dilemma is the need to balance Near-Term, operational risk against 

future risk in investment decisions. Postponing major investments in transformation while 

devoting the bulk of resources to reducing Near-Term operational needs raises the risk of being 

overtaken by our adversaries. Progress in transforming requires significant investments in those 

aspects of transformation that we are confident have enduring benefits such as ORS. Because 

of limited resources, this may mean making the difficult decision of foregoing currently planned 

systems and investing instead in capabilities that we believe will reduce future risk. 

The second transformation dilemma is the need to invest now in specific technologies and 

concepts that are deemed transformational, while remaining open to other paths towards 

transformation. To transform the force we must commit resources, yet remain detached enough 

from these commitments to continue an iterative process of innovation and experimentation that 

permits new insights to guide future investment decisions. 

6.2 CONCLUSION 

As demonstrated with Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the 

contribution of space systems to the joint warfighter continues to grow. These systems, with 

their ultimate “high ground” access, their ability to rapidly forward deploy with a minimal logistics 

tail and their relative immunity from threats are invaluable assets to the land, sea and air 

warfighters. This SMP describes AFSPC’s strategy to transition into a space combat command, 

maintaining and increasing the “force multiplier” advantage these systems provide while 

expanding the role of space in future conflicts as a significant force provider. This is being done 

through a carefully considered blend of sustainment, modernization, and transformation, and is 

accomplished within AFSPC’s mission area construct (CS, SFA, SFE, MS, and SS). In the next 

cycle, this plan will be even more tightly integrated with the Air Force’s most recently developed 

capability-based CONOPS. 

No matter how it is structured, the end result will be a fiscally reasonable and technologically 

achievable plan-one that produces a fully integrated Air and Space Force that is persuasive in 

peace, decisive in war and preeminent in the application of space power. 


36


APPENDIX A: REFERENCES 

A. 

America’s Air Force Vision 2020, 2002 

National Space Policy, September 1996 

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), December 2001 

Air Force Executive Guidance, January 1996 

USAF Scientific Advisory Board Study, “A Space Roadmap for the 21 st Century Aerospace 

Force,” November 1998 

DoD Directive 3100.10, Space Policy, July 1999 

DoD Instruction 3100.15, January 2001 

Joint Vision 2020, July 2001 

USSPACECOM Vision for 2020, 1997 

AFSPC SFE MAP, FY06 and Beyond 

AFSPC SS MAP, FY06 and Beyond 

AFSPC SFA MAP, FY06 and Beyond 

AFSPC CS MAP, FY06 and Beyond 

AFSPC MSP, FY06 and Beyond 

Space Science & Technology Guidance, September 2003 

AFSPC and NRO FY05 Collaborative Space Plan 

AFSPC 2004 Strategic Master Plan (SMP), November 2002 

AF Annual Planning and Programming Guidance (APPG), 2000 

NORAD Vision 2010, December 1999 

The Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management 

and Organization (or The Rumsfeld Space Commission Report), January 2002 

Interim Space Capstone Threat Capabilities Assessment (NAIC-1564-0727-03 dtd Jul03); 

Threats to US Space Systems and Operations Over the Next Ten Years (NIC-ICB 2003-09C dtd 

19Feb03) 


A-1


A 

AEHF 

AFB 

AFDD 

AFMC 

AFRC 

AFS 

AFSC 

AFSCN 

AFSPC 

AMTI 

AoA 

APPG 

APS 

C 

C&I 

C2 

C4ISR 

CAV 

CBRNE 

CCIC2S 

COG 

COMAFFOR 

CONOPS 

CS 

D 

DARPA 

DCS 

DHP 

DMSP 

DoD 

DOTMLPF 

DPG 

DSCS 

APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency 

Air Force Base 

Air Force Doctrine Document 

Air Force Materiel Command 

Air Force Reserve Command 

Air Force Station 

Air Force Systems Command 

Air Force Satellite Control 

Network 

Air Force Space Command 

Airborne Moving Target Indicator 

Analysis of Alternatives 

Annual Planning and 

Programming Guidance 

Advanced Polar System 

Communications and Information 

Command and Control 

Command, Control, 

Communications, Computers, 

Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance 

Common Aero Vehicle 

Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High 

Explosive 

Combatant Commanders 

Integrated Command and Control 

Center System 

Centers of Gravity 

Commander Air Force Forces 

Concept of Operations 

Counterspace 

Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency 

Defensive Counterspace 

Defense Health Program 

Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program 

Department of Defense 

Doctrine, Organization, Training, 

Materiel, Logistics, Personnel 

and Facilities 

Defense Planning Guidance 

Defense Satellite 

Communications System 

B. 

DSP 

E 

EELV 

EM 

F 

FDE 

FY 

FYDP 

G 

GBS 

GLTRS 

GMTI 

GPS 

H 

HQ 

I 

ICBM 

IIA 

IP3 

IPP 

ISCN 

ISR 

L 

LBSD 

LTRS 

M 

MAA 

MAJCOM 

MAP 

MAT 

MDA 

MM 

MNA 

MS 

MS&A 

MSA 

MSP 

Defense Support Program 

Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle 

Environmental Monitoring 

Force Development Evaluation 

Fiscal Year 

Future Years Defense Program 

Global Broadcast System 

Global Launch and Test Range 

System 

Ground Moving Target Indicator 

Global Positioning System 

Headquarters 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

Integrated Investment Analysis 


Pathfinder 


Integrated Satellite Control 

Network 

Intelligence, Surveillance and 


Land Based Strategic Deterrence 

Launch and Test Range System 

Mission Area Assessment 

Major Command 

Mission Area Plan 

Mission Area Team 

Missile Defense Agency 

Minuteman 

Mission Needs Analysis 

Mission Support 

Modeling, Simulation, and 

Analysis 

Mission Solutions Analysis 

Mission Support Plan 


B-1


MUA 

N 

NASA 

NAVWAR 

NOAA 

NORAD 

NPOESS 

NPR 

NRO 

O 

O&M 

OCS 

ORS 

P 

PED 

PNT 

R 

R&D 

RAIDRS 

S 

S&C4ISR 

S&T 

SATCOM 

SBIRS 

SBR 

Military Utility Analysis 

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Navigation Warfare 

National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration 

North American Aerospace 

Defense Command 

National Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental 

Satellite System 

Nuclear Posture Review 

National Reconnaissance Office 

Operations and Maintenance 

Offensive Counterspace 

Operationally Responsive 

Spacelift 

Process, Exploit, and 

Disseminate 

Positioning, Navigation and 

Timing 

Research and Development 

Rapid Attack Identification, 

Detection, and Reporting System 

Space and Command, Control, 

Communication, Computers, 

Intelligence Surveillance & 


Science and Technology 

Satellite Communications 

Space-Based Infrared System 

Space Based Radar 

SCC 

SCOUT 

SFA 

SFE 

SLEP 

SMP 

SOV 

SPAIF 

SS 

SSA 

SSAIC 

SSN 

STEDE 

STSS 

STTR 

SWC 

T 

TCA 

TENCAP 

TOA 

TSAT 

U 

UN 

US 

USSPACECOM 

USSTRATCOM 

W 

WGS 

Space Control Center 

Space Command Optimization of 

Utility Toolkit 

Space Force Application 

Space Force Enhancement 

Service Life Extension Program 

Strategic Master Plan 

Space Operations Vehicle 

Space Application and Integration 

Facility 

Space Support 

Space Situation Awareness 

Space System Attack 

Identification and 

Characterization 

Space Surveillance Network 

Space Training, Education, and 

Exercise 

Space Tracking and Surveillance 

System 

Space Test and Training Range 

Space Warfare Center 

Transformational Communication 

Architecture 

Tactical Exploitation of National 

Capabilities 

Total Obligation Authority 

Transformational Satellite 

Communications System 

United Nations 

United States 

United States Space Command 

United States Strategic 


Wideband Gapfiller System 


B-2


C. 

APPENDIX C: INTEGRATED PLANNING PROCESS RESULTS 

APPENDIX D: AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES CONOPS LINKAGES 

APPENDIX E: SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY PROCESS 

APPENDIX F: DISTRIBUTION LIST 

APPENDIX G: SPACE FORCE ENHANCEMENT MAP 

APPENDIX H: COUNTERSPACE MAP 

APPENDIX I: SPACE FORCE APPLICATION MAP 

APPENDIX J: SPACE SUPPORT MAP 

APPENDIX K: MISSION SUPPORT PLAN 


C-1

STRATEGIC MASTER PLAN FY06 and Beyond - Western States ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?