India's Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture - The Stimson Center

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RAJESH M. BASRUR ⏐ 73
and those that are deployed in the field. This is likely to remain a tacit
understanding partly because India will not want to make a commitment that
does not include China, and because, the current situation, is, in any case,
working well.
On the global front, the Indian approach is ambivalent. The NPT-based
nonproliferation regime is a major stumbling block, since it keeps India outside
the charmed circle of recognized nuclear weapons states. India is unlikely to
enter into any formal multilateral agreements (other than universal ones that do
not discriminate between nuclear haves and have-nots) without some sort of
implicit acceptance into the nuclear club, for instance by its inclusion in the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG). Hence its reluctance to join the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI), and its qualified support for the April 2004 Security Council resolution
requiring states not to support proliferation to non-state actors, both of which are
basically in accord with its interests.
At the same time, Indian interest in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and,
in a more acceptable form, of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
remains alive. On the latter, which was much debated in the media, the main
Indian complaint was not against the basic provisions of the Treaty itself as
much as against its evident intent to close the Indian nuclear option. After the
1998 tests, the Indian government explicitly accepted the idea of a CTBT so
long as it was not discriminatory. In terms of practical politics, there is little
doubt that some sort of indirect legitimization of India’s de facto status as a
nuclear weapon power will suffice to obtain a change in India’s position, as did
in fact happen with respect to the Antarctic Treaty in the early 1980s, when
India dropped its criticisms and became a party to what it had long held to be a
discriminatory treaty.
CONCLUSION
Barring a serious negative turn in relationships with Pakistan and China, or
the emergence of an unanticipated threat, the pace of India’s nuclear evolution is
likely to remain glacial, picking up some moraine by way of incremental
additions to hardware, but not deviating significantly from its doctrine of
minimum deterrence. In this projection, Indian forces will remain in a nondeployed
state, intermediate-range missiles targeting China will be inducted in
due course, a sea-based deterrent will be pursued without any sense of urgency,
and steady improvements will be made in command and control. In the main,
the trend will constrain the scope for escalation of nuclear tensions with both
Pakistan and China, though some hiccups may occur with Pakistan over missile
defense.
However, a significant deterioration in its security environment is likely to
invite changes in India’s nuclear thinking and practice. The kinds of change that
may occur are: a shift to deployment in response to a Pakistani initiative to
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