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NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

1<br />

EDITORIAL BOARD<br />

Chairman<br />

Captain P. J. Law, RAN<br />

Members<br />

Engineering Advisory Council (EAC)<br />

Editor<br />

WOMT Mark Richardson<br />

Published by<br />

Defence Publishing Service<br />

Disclaimer<br />

The views expressed in this Bulletin are the personal views of<br />

the authors, and unless otherwise stated, do not in any way<br />

reflect <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> Policy<br />

Deadline<br />

Issue 5 July 2003 Contributions by May 2003<br />

Contributions should be sent to<br />

The Editor<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> Engineering Bulletin<br />

CP4–7–131<br />

Campbell Park ACT 2600<br />

Telephone: (02) 6266 4212<br />

Fax: (02) 6266 2388<br />

E-mail: navyengineeringbulletin@defence.gov.au<br />

Distribution<br />

To be added to the distribution list contact the Editor.<br />

ISSN 0642295654<br />

Foreword 2<br />

CNE Introduction 3<br />

From the Editor’s Desk 4<br />

An Essay on Reform in <strong>Australian</strong> Defence Industry 5<br />

MOTU-WEST in New Zealand 9<br />

From the desk of DTA LOG (ENG) 10<br />

DNOP News 11<br />

Replacing the ANZAC Class Frigates’ Propulsion Diesel Engines 12<br />

Darwin Naval Base and Home of Fima Darwin 16<br />

Personal Limitations versus Unreal Expectations 19<br />

RAN Condition Monitoring - Vibration Analysis 27<br />

Design and Concept for an Unmanned Major Surface Combatant 29<br />

Turning Things Around - A Team Effort 33<br />

CPOATT - Aviation Technician Inaugural Diploma Presentation 35<br />

Revolutionising Naval Maintenance with RCM 38<br />

CONTENTS<br />

Sailor Promotions 44<br />

Gun Empty, Bore Clear! 46<br />

MOBI - A Look at the Past 48<br />

ERUS 51<br />

MT Category Sponsor gets Junior Sailor Perspective 56<br />

Focus on Laser Safety in the RAN 57<br />

Engineers Need to Lighten Up and Round Out 60<br />

The <strong>Navy</strong> Technical Regulatory System (TRS) - Development and<br />

Implementation Project - an Update (Formally Project HELP) 61<br />

Officer Promotions 63<br />

Orange Overalls 64<br />

The Importance of Reliability, Availability and Maintainability in<br />

Engineering for the RAN 68<br />

HMAS CERBERUS Divisions and RMIT Passing Out Parade 73<br />

APESMA Management 75


2 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

C.A. RITCHIE<br />

VICE ADMIRAL, RAN<br />

CHIEF OF NAVY<br />

Foreword<br />

It is with great pleasure that I take the opportunity to introduce this, the<br />

fourth edition of the <strong>Navy</strong> Engineering Bulletin.<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> Engineering in all its forms<br />

is essential to maintaining<br />

capability and meeting our<br />

escalating operational demands.<br />

The old adage ‘Preparation for<br />

Battle begins in the Engine Room’<br />

succinctly articulates this concept<br />

and still rings true today. This<br />

makes the <strong>Navy</strong> Engineering<br />

Bulletin important for a number<br />

of reasons. It promotes<br />

professionalism among <strong>Navy</strong><br />

Engineers and technicians by<br />

providing a forum where topics of<br />

interest to the <strong>Navy</strong> Engineering<br />

Community can be presented and<br />

openly discussed. It also provides<br />

a place where the history of<br />

Engineering in the <strong>Navy</strong> can be<br />

celebrated and remembered, and<br />

where Engineering personnel<br />

news can be disseminated,<br />

thereby nurturing the camaraderie<br />

and traditions of <strong>Navy</strong><br />

Engineering.<br />

The current busy, challenging<br />

operational profile <strong>Navy</strong> is<br />

maintaining is providing valuable<br />

lessons in all spheres, not the<br />

least of which are learnt in the<br />

engineering disciplines. Operating<br />

and integrating with other Navies,<br />

dealing with defects under<br />

increased pressure and pushing<br />

our Ships, Submarines and<br />

Aircraft to their engineering limits<br />

are now the norm in RAN<br />

activities rather than the<br />

exception. The <strong>Navy</strong> Engineering<br />

Bulletin allows the valuable<br />

knowledge and enhanced<br />

expertise gained from these<br />

experiences to be shared among<br />

the wider <strong>Navy</strong> Engineering<br />

Community. This can only serve to<br />

further enhance the<br />

professionalism and effectiveness<br />

of our engineers and technicians,<br />

making them better prepared to<br />

meet the rising challenges<br />

expected in future RAN<br />

operations.<br />

I would also like to take this<br />

opportunity to convey my<br />

personal thanks to all our<br />

technical people, ashore and<br />

afloat, who in keeping with the<br />

efforts of all <strong>Navy</strong> personnel have<br />

drawn upon hidden reserves of<br />

strength, energy and initiative to<br />

ensure the RAN has met and<br />

exceeded the demands of our<br />

recent missions. My confidence<br />

that this exemplary dedication to<br />

duty from our Engineering people<br />

will continue as long as the <strong>Navy</strong><br />

requires it, remains unwavering.<br />

I commend the <strong>Navy</strong> Engineering<br />

Bulletin to you, and encourage all<br />

in the <strong>Navy</strong> Engineering<br />

Community to give this<br />

publication their utmost support<br />

to ensure its continued success.<br />

C.A. Ritchie<br />

Vice Admiral, RAN<br />

Chief of <strong>Navy</strong>


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

3<br />

CNE Introduction<br />

BY CDRE TIM BARTER<br />

CHIEF NAVAL ENGINEER<br />

Welcome once again to the Engineering Bulletin. Never let it be said that<br />

rank does not have its privileges and one of mine is that I get to have a<br />

sneak preview of your contributions to this Bulletin. Once again I am<br />

extremely impressed by the quality and relevance of the articles. To all<br />

those who have contributed – well done, and to all those who were going<br />

to but didn’t quite get around to it - now is the time to put pen to paper<br />

for the next issue.<br />

2003 finds many of our <strong>Navy</strong><br />

community involved in or directly<br />

supporting an historically high<br />

level of operations. As engineers<br />

and technicians I know we are all<br />

doing our upmost to meet this<br />

operational demand and in<br />

particular ensuring risks to the<br />

technical integrity of our maritime<br />

capability is being well managed.<br />

I would like to focus on two of the<br />

articles in this Bulletin to<br />

highlight two of the many issues<br />

that I consider I need to focus on<br />

this year.<br />

In Leading Seaman Wayne<br />

Smith’s article we have a first<br />

hand view of the demands we are<br />

placing on our technicians. If you<br />

add up the demands on this ET<br />

there appears only one solution -<br />

increase the hours in the day.<br />

Clearly this is an unrealistic<br />

demand but unfortunately my<br />

observation is that we are placing<br />

these unrealistic demands on our<br />

personnel both at sea and<br />

ashore. When I add up category<br />

training requirements, EACs,<br />

professional advancement<br />

courses, team training, small<br />

arms re-qualification (and the list<br />

goes on) it seems that any<br />

technical work performed must<br />

only occur in the after hours and<br />

I’m not sure where family and<br />

sleep fit in. Perhaps this explains<br />

why many have unacceptably<br />

large leave credits outstanding.<br />

Something must be done. We<br />

cannot continue to place these<br />

unrealistic demands on our<br />

personnel. From my perspective I<br />

will be looking closely at the<br />

category demands. What can we<br />

do to improve the balance<br />

between work and personal<br />

demands on our time? Currently<br />

the sailor technical training<br />

requirements are being reviewed<br />

and I hope that I can advise of<br />

the plans for improvements in the<br />

next issue.<br />

The second article I would like to<br />

mention is the article by Dr Alun<br />

Roberts on RCM. The RAN has<br />

been dabbling in Reliability<br />

Centred Maintenance (RCM) for a<br />

number of years. I would argue<br />

that much of our planned<br />

maintenance is not too far off the<br />

RCM track. More accurately, and<br />

to continue the analogy, we are<br />

on the RCM track but bogged<br />

down to the axles and making no<br />

progress because we lack the<br />

tools and techniques to continue<br />

the journey.<br />

The benefits of RCM come from<br />

managing risk. For those who<br />

have read previous articles in this<br />

Bulletin on the Technical<br />

Regulatory System you should<br />

note the symmetry of aims. The<br />

Technical Regulatory System is<br />

about providing the tools and<br />

processes to “manage the risk to<br />

technical integrity”. Our ability to<br />

implement RCM has stalled<br />

because:<br />

• we do not have systems to<br />

devolve technical decisions on<br />

risks to technical integrity to<br />

competent authorised individuals<br />

– Technical Regulation provides<br />

this framework.<br />

• RCM requires changes to planned<br />

maintenance. PM is part of the<br />

system configuration so any<br />

change needs to be managed as<br />

a configuration change. Our<br />

highly inefficient configuration<br />

change processes have often<br />

prevented RCM initiated<br />

improvements. Technical<br />

Regulation System clarifies<br />

engineering change requirements<br />

and will allow efficient processes<br />

to be implemented.<br />

The establishment of a sound<br />

Technical Regulation system is<br />

essential if we are to resolve<br />

many of the major technical<br />

management issues confronting<br />

the <strong>Navy</strong>. This year we must<br />

make substantial change to our<br />

processes to ensure the Technical<br />

Regulatory principles are<br />

implemented across RAN.<br />

Enjoy the read.


4 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

WOMT MARK (RICHO)<br />

RICHARDSON<br />

From the Editor’s Desk<br />

It was with some trepidation that I took over the reins of the <strong>Navy</strong><br />

Engineering Bulletin from LCDR Tom Munneke in September. The first<br />

three issues were top class, and I had big boots to fill in matching the<br />

high standard set by the previous editorial staff. Fortunately, the <strong>Navy</strong><br />

Engineering Community has come through with the goods again and a<br />

collection of high quality articles have been submitted for this, the fourth<br />

edition. As I didn’t suffer from the same problem as previous editors<br />

(that of having too much ‘copy’ to fit in one issue), every article<br />

submitted got a guernsey, along with some that had missed out on<br />

inclusion in previous Bulletins.<br />

There is quite a good mix of<br />

topics for this edition, with a<br />

number of deeper technical<br />

issues discussed, interesting<br />

You’ll notice that I’ve departed<br />

slightly from the rules set by my<br />

predecessors in that some of the<br />

articles are longer than normal.<br />

I’m pleased to report that the<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> Engineering Bulletin has<br />

been very well received<br />

among the wider Engineering<br />

Community.<br />

management information and<br />

some excellent personnel<br />

perspective. We’ve also<br />

introduced a historical focus with<br />

a regular section featuring lighthearted<br />

articles about life as a<br />

MOBI by an ex-techo, WOETP<br />

‘Sandy’ Freeleagus. Pleasing to<br />

see also is the Junior Sailor<br />

fraternity rising to the challenge<br />

and providing input, with two<br />

articles from Leading Seamen<br />

featuring in this edition.<br />

I’ve deliberately included them<br />

unabridged, as they are topical,<br />

informative and should generate<br />

constructive discussion on some<br />

of the issues currently facing<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> Engineering. I’ve also tried<br />

to involve private enterprise<br />

agencies that support <strong>Navy</strong><br />

Engineering by asking them to<br />

submit articles. The article on<br />

Reliability Centered Maintenance<br />

by Dr Alun Roberts resulted from<br />

this, and I’ve secured promises<br />

from a number of other agencies<br />

for articles for future editions,<br />

ensuring this sector of the <strong>Navy</strong><br />

Engineering Community is also<br />

well represented in the Bulletin<br />

from now on.<br />

I’m pleased to report that the<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> Engineering Bulletin has<br />

been very well received among<br />

the wider Engineering Community.<br />

Requests to be added to the<br />

Bulletin’s distribution list are<br />

regularly received from a wide<br />

variety of professional engineering<br />

and academic organisations, as<br />

well as individuals with an<br />

engineering interest. This is<br />

indicative of the rapidly growing<br />

interest in our publication,<br />

probably due to the high quality<br />

and possibly the uniqueness of<br />

its content. Those who have<br />

helped to make the NEB such an<br />

outstanding success, including<br />

past contributors and Editorial<br />

Staff, can be justifiably proud of<br />

their achievement.<br />

I hope you enjoy reading this<br />

edition of the NEB as much as I<br />

enjoyed compiling it. Please don’t<br />

hesitate to provide feedback if<br />

you can think of any way we can<br />

improve the Bulletin. Last but not<br />

least, I would like to<br />

wholeheartedly thank all the<br />

contributors who made the fourth<br />

edition possible. It is remarkable<br />

that, in these the busiest times<br />

for <strong>Navy</strong> in many years, people<br />

still found the time and resources<br />

to provide such high quality<br />

input. Support like this is exactly<br />

what’s needed to ensure the<br />

continued success of the <strong>Navy</strong><br />

Engineering Bulletin – please<br />

keep it coming!


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

5<br />

An Essay on Reform in<br />

<strong>Australian</strong> Defence<br />

Industry<br />

The Government’s objective is to have a sustainable and competitive<br />

defence industry base, with efficient, innovative and durable<br />

industries, able to support a technologically advanced ADF.<br />

Defence 2000 1<br />

LIEUTENANT ANDREW<br />

REICHSTEIN RAN<br />

Defence acquisition over the last ten years has seen considerable<br />

reform, in relation to the way Defence interacts with Industry and the<br />

involvement of <strong>Australian</strong> Industry in providing capability. This essay will<br />

provide a history on the previous reform process and will address the<br />

next range of reforms that are to take place in the Regional Defence<br />

Industry. It will also discuss what the implications will be regarding the<br />

delivery of capability and the provision of in-service support.<br />

Reform in the Defence Acquisition<br />

Process and Defence and<br />

Industry relationship was first<br />

attempted in 1992 with the<br />

release of the "Defence Policy<br />

and Industry Report" by Roger<br />

Price. The report continually<br />

stressed the importance on<br />

<strong>Australian</strong> Defence Policy being<br />

based on self-reliance. In<br />

addition to this it highlighted the<br />

reliance that the Federal<br />

Government was to place on the<br />

Defence Industry to maintain and<br />

develop Australia's Defence<br />

Force, as was stated in the 1987<br />

White Paper. These statements<br />

were not necessarily ground<br />

breaking at the time, as Defence<br />

Industry had seen a considerable<br />

increase in <strong>Australian</strong> Industry<br />

Involvement (AII), with the<br />

procurement of the Collins and<br />

ANZAC platforms, and the<br />

upgrades of various Airforce<br />

platforms. Along with Jindalee<br />

Operational Radar Network<br />

(JORN) and others, these projects<br />

were reliant on AII as the prime<br />

systems integrator. In particular<br />

with the ANZAC, Collins and JORN<br />

capabilities, the <strong>Australian</strong><br />

Defence Force (ADF) was for the<br />

first time the "parent" capability<br />

manager for such platforms. This<br />

in itself has resulted in<br />

considerable cultural changes<br />

both within Defence and also<br />

Industry. It was with the latter that<br />

this report attempted to address<br />

the bridging of the gap between<br />

Defence and Industry for<br />

acquisition and in-service<br />

support. However the only real<br />

change that occurred as a result<br />

of the Price report was for<br />

Defence to release forward<br />

planning information for Defence<br />

capital investment programs to<br />

Defence industry, along with a<br />

continued increase in AII. 2<br />

In 1998, Senator Bronwyn<br />

Bishop, Minister for Defence<br />

Industry, Science and Personnel,<br />

released the "Defence and<br />

Industry Strategic Policy<br />

Statement". Unlike the report in<br />

1992, this was a whole of<br />

Government approach to a<br />

Defence Industry Policy. 3 Once<br />

again it promoted and stressed<br />

the requirement for cultural<br />

change within both Defence and<br />

Industry. The policy highlighted<br />

the requirement for both Defence<br />

and Industry to work closely<br />

together in order to maintain a<br />

sustainable Defence industry<br />

base. Under the cover of "Team<br />

Australia" it laid down six<br />

strategies that were required for<br />

change improvement:<br />

• Integrate industry into capability<br />

development;<br />

• Enhance industry's contribution<br />

to the nation's capability edge;<br />

• Reform procurement;<br />

• Establish new ways to involve<br />

<strong>Australian</strong> industry in Defence<br />

business;<br />

• Increase <strong>Australian</strong> exports and<br />

materiel cooperation; and<br />

• Commit to cultural change and<br />

improved communication. 4<br />

THE NEED FOR ANOTHER<br />

ATTEMPT AT REFORM<br />

In addition to the above<br />

strategies the "Defence and<br />

Industry Strategic Policy<br />

Statement" stated that one of the


6 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

components of Australia's<br />

Strategic Policy was to have an<br />

established knowledge edge as<br />

our highest capability<br />

development priority. Four years<br />

have passed since the release of<br />

this policy statement, and whilst<br />

a considerable amount of change<br />

has taken place, and industry has<br />

become more actively involved<br />

and informed in the Defence<br />

Acquisition Process, there needs<br />

to be questions about whether<br />

the ADF has access to a<br />

sustainable knowledge edge<br />

within the resources of local<br />

industry. With the limited Defence<br />

Budget on offer to fund major<br />

capability development type<br />

projects, a competitive tendering<br />

process will always eventuate in<br />

one or more companies missing<br />

out on providing their service.<br />

Therefore the answer whilst being<br />

no fault of local industry is<br />

'probably not’. As part of<br />

obtaining the "best value for<br />

money" this is seen as a good<br />

thing, as in theory the company<br />

with the most competitive offer<br />

and solution should win the<br />

contract. Whilst this generally is<br />

the case, if the successful<br />

company has not had recent work<br />

in the industry that they have just<br />

been awarded a contract for, they<br />

will need to undergo a<br />

comprehensive recruiting and<br />

training program. This in itself<br />

takes considerable time and does<br />

not necessarily allow for the skill<br />

sets developed from previous<br />

projects of a similar nature,<br />

performed potentially by another<br />

contractor to be evolved or<br />

utilised. This can result in the<br />

same problems occurring as<br />

those on earlier projects of a<br />

similar nature, resulting in no<br />

establishment of a knowledge<br />

edge. Aside from poor contract<br />

development and political<br />

decision making regarding<br />

capability implementation, it<br />

could be said that the<br />

deficiencies in the required skill<br />

sets are the result of budget and<br />

schedule overruns that<br />

subsequently reflect poorly on the<br />

Defence Materiel Organisation<br />

(DMO).<br />

THE PLAN BEING PUT IN PLACE<br />

FOR REFORM<br />

As highlighted previously, the ADF<br />

does not have a Defence Budget<br />

to effectively sustain multiple<br />

Defence Industry capability<br />

providers for common platforms<br />

and services. Nor can it continue<br />

to expect the high level of service<br />

from industry when no effort or<br />

ability is being put in place to<br />

develop industries that are able<br />

to maintain a "knowledge edge".<br />

In the past Defence has received<br />

considerable pressure from the<br />

media, politicians and the general<br />

public, regarding our poor<br />

acquisition track record, with<br />

projects being late and over<br />

budget. In order for Defence to<br />

achieve the best results from<br />

industry without the constant and<br />

considerable cost over runs,<br />

changes in the approach to<br />

Defence Acquisition are required.<br />

The question for the Government<br />

is to decide how best to respond<br />

to such a situation, should they<br />

allow market forces determine the<br />

Naval shipbuilding sector's future<br />

or should they intervene and<br />

guide industry to try and reduce<br />

the risks. 5 The recent Department<br />

of Defence Naval Shipbuilding<br />

and Repair Sector Strategic Plan,<br />

considers the merits of forming<br />

strategic alliances between<br />

Defence and Industry, as a<br />

means of achieving superior<br />

performance, value for money<br />

and flexibility 6 . In particular this<br />

plan as the title suggests,<br />

primarily addresses the<br />

shipbuilding industry, but alike<br />

alliances with other sectors of<br />

Defence Industry are also being<br />

considered. The likely approach<br />

will consist of Defence developing<br />

a long-term relationship with a<br />

number of Australia's 'tier 1'<br />

prime-contractors, which will in<br />

turn be actively supported by<br />

expected open competition at the<br />

'tier 2' subcontractor level. As<br />

part of this two-tiered approach,<br />

new accountability and<br />

transparency measures would<br />

need to be implemented to<br />

ensure value for money<br />

outcomes. 7<br />

THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS<br />

AS A RESULT OF REFORM<br />

The consolidation of Defence<br />

Industry into a smaller group will<br />

result in a reduction of duplicated<br />

services/functions. As it is more<br />

likely that the smaller group will<br />

have more work, their overhead<br />

and infrastructure costs will be<br />

lower, which should flow onto<br />

Defence as a cost saving. The<br />

skill sets of personnel within the<br />

various sectors will be able to be<br />

maintained and continually<br />

evolved, as a result of the longerterm<br />

work and security in their<br />

particular sector. This in turn<br />

should lead to a highly skilled<br />

work force that is able to meet<br />

the challenging demands that<br />

Defence procurement requires,<br />

along with achieving consistency<br />

in the management of the<br />

projects. 8<br />

The costs associated with<br />

recruiting and developing the<br />

required skill set necessary to<br />

perform the tasks of the awarded<br />

contract are considerable. With<br />

a consolidated Defence Industry,<br />

skill sets could again be<br />

maintained, the recruiting<br />

requirements would not be<br />

required for new projects and a<br />

career path could be established<br />

for personnel in the industry. 9<br />

With a single source supplier<br />

arrangement, costs associated<br />

with the tendering process would<br />

be reduced, and the time taken<br />

for the tendering process to take<br />

place would also be significantly<br />

reduced. This would provide the<br />

ability for Defence to implement<br />

capability to the warfighter<br />

quicker and more cost<br />

effectively. 10<br />

The current capability<br />

development process initially<br />

involves the development of<br />

requirements and the formulation<br />

of the costs involved to<br />

implement the requirements. By<br />

not having a close and open<br />

relationship with industry, any<br />

cost estimates that are obtained<br />

during this process are generally


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

7<br />

not near the actual cost of the<br />

requirement implementation.<br />

Various committees approve<br />

these costs and requirements<br />

and the contracts are in the end<br />

generally signed as "Fixed Price"<br />

contracts. The Government then<br />

transfers the risk of the project to<br />

the successful contractor, who<br />

more than likely has under-bid<br />

their price, which was already<br />

inaccurate in order for them to be<br />

competitive. Whilst this may<br />

appear to be a cynical view on<br />

what happens, it is one of the<br />

reasons as to why many projects<br />

result in cost and time<br />

overruns 11 . With a closer<br />

relationship with industry in the<br />

various consolidated sectors, firm<br />

costings could be obtained<br />

during the capability development<br />

stage, and the ability for industry<br />

to meet our requirements could<br />

also be determined, which would<br />

result in less schedule overruns.<br />

Whilst the benefits detailed above<br />

are in favour of such a strategy<br />

there are risks needing to be<br />

considered and carefully<br />

managed by Defence. Defence<br />

will need to implement new<br />

procedures and performance<br />

monitoring processes to ensure<br />

that value-for-money outcomes<br />

and delivery of the required<br />

capability occur on cost and<br />

time. 12<br />

The sole source supplier<br />

approach removes the<br />

competitive tendering process,<br />

which will potentially result in<br />

inflated costs by the sole<br />

supplier. The lack of competitors<br />

may also result in a reduction in<br />

innovative thinking and solutions.<br />

A sole source supplier will have<br />

no need to continually strive for<br />

better solutions for them to<br />

maintain a lead in their particular<br />

market.<br />

Due to their market power, some<br />

unions may take advantage of<br />

their monopolistic nature and<br />

push for better conditions for<br />

their members. Vertical integration<br />

could also take place that will<br />

result in sub-contractors not<br />

being able to compete and<br />

subsequently reduce the<br />

innovation for that particular<br />

sector. 13<br />

Whilst the role of 'Parent <strong>Navy</strong>' is<br />

still relatively new to the RAN, the<br />

implications of the new<br />

acquisition alliance may result in<br />

minimal '<strong>Australian</strong>isation' of<br />

existing 'off-the-shelf' design. 14<br />

This could result in the majority of<br />

Defence capability requirements<br />

being met by overseas industry,<br />

with a shop front in Australia. As<br />

the control of the Intellectual<br />

Property associated with the<br />

overseas solutions will be held by<br />

the parent companies, Defence<br />

will have little control over what<br />

development path the capabilities<br />

implemented under the new<br />

acquisition arrangement will<br />

follow. This will have implications<br />

on what upgrades and tailoring<br />

could be performed in order for<br />

the future requirements of the<br />

ADF to be met.<br />

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS<br />

The consolidation of Defence<br />

Industry within Australia is more<br />

than likely to result in a greater<br />

influence of overseas Defence<br />

conglomerates in the capability<br />

transitioned into ADF service,<br />

such conglomerates would<br />

include BAE, Thales, TMS,<br />

Raytheon etc. We are already<br />

seeing a number of vigorous<br />

mergers and takeovers in the<br />

Defence Industry sector. The<br />

greater their influence the more<br />

locally developed solutions by<br />

small to medium enterprises<br />

(SME's) will be pushed out. This<br />

could have an effect on<br />

Australia’s ability to be “Defence<br />

Self Reliant”. Whilst we will more<br />

than likely able to maintain a<br />

sound Defence Industry<br />

capability within Australia for our<br />

various platforms, it will be the<br />

hearts of the platforms that will<br />

be vital in ongoing support and<br />

upgrades. These components will<br />

be sourced and controlled by<br />

overseas companies, and in the<br />

future the RAN could encounter<br />

difficulties in supporting certain<br />

elements of the platforms as a<br />

result of their origin and lack of in<br />

country support. The concept of<br />

repairs being carried out by the<br />

Original Equipment Manufacturer<br />

(OEM) often results in the items<br />

having to go overseas for repair,<br />

costing considerable time and<br />

money. The consolidation of<br />

<strong>Australian</strong> Defence Industry<br />

should result in the ADF having<br />

common platforms for its various<br />

capabilities. This would provide<br />

the ability to have a sustainable<br />

in country support base that<br />

would allow for the OEM related<br />

function previously carried out<br />

overseas to be performed in<br />

country.<br />

The merger and influence of such<br />

large conglomerates within the<br />

<strong>Australian</strong> Defence Industry will<br />

have an impact on<br />

interoperability. The political push<br />

for a closer alliance with the<br />

American Defence Forces will<br />

result in American Defence<br />

Industry having a major influence<br />

in the <strong>Australian</strong> region. With such<br />

an American influence in the<br />

<strong>Australian</strong> Defence Industry,<br />

interoperability will occur as part<br />

of the course, however, will this<br />

interoperability extend to our<br />

regional neighbours and our allies<br />

in the European region?<br />

The reduction in the number of<br />

docking ship repair facilities on<br />

both the East and West coast<br />

may not have any immediate<br />

implications in a peacetime<br />

environment, however in the event<br />

of an outbreak in hostilities or<br />

unexpected requirements where<br />

multiple ships require repairs to<br />

battle damage or upgrades, the<br />

consolidated dockyard facilities<br />

may not be sufficient. In order to<br />

have the infrastructure in place<br />

for such a scenario that would<br />

involve docking related activities<br />

outside the normal routine<br />

maintenance, a third docking<br />

facility would be required. 15 This<br />

is further highlighted by the<br />

requirement for all Major Fleet<br />

Units to undergo a docking<br />

availability every two years. With a<br />

docking availability taking on


8 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

average three months each, six<br />

ships on each coast (this could<br />

be as high as eight) will utilise a<br />

dry dock for 18 months out of<br />

the two-year period. If any<br />

abnormal docking activity is<br />

required, or ship construction is<br />

underway, docking related<br />

maintenance may not be able to<br />

be performed, subsequently<br />

restricting the operational<br />

availability of platforms. In the<br />

event of docking related<br />

maintenance being performed<br />

away from homeports, specific<br />

maintenance skeleton crews<br />

would need to be employed to<br />

ensure that crew rest and<br />

repatriation was achieved.<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

There is no doubt that reform and<br />

consolidation is required in order<br />

for <strong>Australian</strong> Defence Industry to<br />

remain sustainable, and provide<br />

the ADF with the ‘knowledge<br />

edge’ capability that it requires.<br />

Caution will need to be taken<br />

during this current reform process<br />

to ensure that Defence Industry<br />

will be able to meet the<br />

Defence’s needs both in<br />

peacetime and in times of<br />

heightened hostilities.<br />

In order for the reform process to<br />

be a success the DMO and<br />

Defence Industry will need to<br />

develop new levels of trust and in<br />

particular DMO will need to<br />

ensure that the necessary<br />

accountability and ‘best value for<br />

money’ is still achieved in a<br />

market place that will be more<br />

monopolistic focused.<br />

In order for Defence to be truly<br />

“Self Reliant”, any future<br />

acquisitions that will involve the<br />

utilisation of overseas equipment<br />

should be maintained completely<br />

in Australia. This will ensure that<br />

in times of heightened hostilities,<br />

the ADF will still be able to<br />

receive the necessary support<br />

from local industry that would be<br />

necessary in order to ensure the<br />

‘Defence of Australia’.<br />

Notes<br />

1 Department of Defence 2000, Defence<br />

2000: Our Future Defence Force, Defence<br />

Publishing Service.<br />

2 Price, Roger, November 1992, Defence<br />

Policy and Industry, <strong>Australian</strong> Government<br />

Press, Canberra, p. i.<br />

3 Department of Defence 1998, Defence<br />

and Industry Strategic Policy Statement,<br />

Defence Publishing and Visual<br />

Communications, Canberra, p iii.<br />

4 Ibid, p. 1.<br />

5 Department of Defence Aug 2002, Media<br />

Release, MIN 440/02<br />

6 ibid.<br />

7 Federal Government, The Howard<br />

Government Putting Australia's Interests<br />

First - Strengthening Australia's Defences,<br />

p. 44.<br />

8 Department of Defence 2002, Naval<br />

Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic<br />

Plan, p. 64.<br />

9 Ibid, p. 65.<br />

10 Ibid.<br />

11 Views of the author based on<br />

experience in the Defence Material<br />

Organisation and Knowledge Staff<br />

(Capability Systems).<br />

12 Department of Defence 2002, op.cit.,<br />

p. 67.<br />

13 Ibid.<br />

14 Ibid, p. 21.<br />

15 Ibid, p. 58.<br />

Bibliography<br />

Department of Defence 1998, Defence and<br />

Industry Strategic Policy Statement,<br />

Defence Publishing and Visual<br />

Communications, Canberra.<br />

Department of Defence 2000, Defence<br />

2000: Our Future Defence Force, Defence<br />

Publishing Service.<br />

Department of Defence Aug 2002, Media<br />

Release, MIN 440/02, Canberra.<br />

Federal Government, The Howard<br />

Government Putting Australia's Interests<br />

First - Strengthening Australia's Defences,<br />

Canberra.<br />

Price, Roger, November 1992, Defence<br />

Policy and Industry, <strong>Australian</strong> Government<br />

Press, Canberra.<br />

About the author: LEUT Andrew Reichstein<br />

has recently assumed the position of DWEEO<br />

on HMAS NEWCASTLE. Prior to this posting he<br />

has held positions in the Defence Materiel<br />

Organisation in the Minehunter Coastal<br />

Project (SEA 1555), Systems Engineer for the<br />

Naval Communications Area Master Station<br />

Australia (NAVCAMSAUS) and recently in<br />

Knowledge Staff as the Desk Officer for<br />

Maritime Communications & Information<br />

Management Architecture Modernisation<br />

Project (SEA 1442).


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

9<br />

MOTU-WEST in<br />

New Zealand<br />

The Mobile Operational Technical Unit – Weapons Electrical (MOTU-<br />

WE) is the uniformed combat system engineering service organisation<br />

located on the East and West coasts of Australia. MOTU-WE is part of<br />

the Engineering Division of Maritime Headquarters (MHQ) and is<br />

directly responsible to the Fleet Weapons Electrical Engineer Officer<br />

(FWEEO).<br />

DI(N) LOG 88-2<br />

In accordance with a section of the charter, MOTU-WE function as a<br />

combat system engineering service organisation in support of the<br />

Fleet.<br />

POET CAMPBELL INSTALLS A SECTION OF<br />

THE FLUSHING RIG ONBOARD HMNZS<br />

TEKAHA.<br />

A request for assistance from the<br />

RNZN has resulted in staff from<br />

MOTU-West travelling to HMNZS<br />

Tekaha alongside in Auckland.<br />

Periodic maintenance required for<br />

the Mark 41 Vertical Launching<br />

System’s deluge components was<br />

due. At a huge cost saving to the<br />

RNZN, the periodic maintenance<br />

was conducted by members of<br />

the RAN from HMAS Stirling.<br />

With VLS being installed to all<br />

eight of Australia’s Anzac Class<br />

ships, and planned for all six of<br />

the Adelaide Class FFGs, the<br />

ongoing cost of having technical<br />

expertise imported from Port<br />

Hueneme, USA has been<br />

overcome. A test bench and<br />

flushing equipment has been<br />

purchased, with associated<br />

training provided to ET sailors.<br />

With HMAS Stirling having the<br />

only authorised facility capable of<br />

conducting the required overhaul<br />

and testing in the southern<br />

hemisphere, it made sense that<br />

the RNZN utilise the service that<br />

could be provided by the RAN.<br />

Initially the deluge valves were<br />

removed from the HMNZS Tekaha<br />

and shipped to MOTU-West. The<br />

deluge valves were overhauled by<br />

MOTU-West staff, with assistance<br />

from FIMA-P personnel. Following<br />

overhaul the valves were rebuilt<br />

and certified after passing hydro<br />

testing and operational capability.<br />

The deluge valves along with the<br />

flushing rig and associated<br />

equipment, was then shipped to<br />

New Zealand to be available<br />

onboard HMNZS Tekaha. POET<br />

Scott Campbell and LSET Rob<br />

Mooney from MOTU-West,<br />

travelled to Auckland and<br />

conducted the system flushing<br />

requirements. The procedure<br />

took four days to complete, which<br />

included the reinstallation of the<br />

deluge valves into the system<br />

with final operational testing<br />

taking place.<br />

As further Anzac class ships<br />

come into operation and the<br />

FFGs complete their upgrade, the<br />

VLS deluge maintenance<br />

equipment will be utilised more<br />

frequently, further justifying the<br />

purchase of the training and<br />

equipment. MOTU-West remains<br />

the point of contact regarding<br />

deluge valve maintenance and<br />

overhaul, for Mark 41 Vertical<br />

Launching Systems, within the<br />

RAN.<br />

POET CAMPBELL AND LSET MOONEY CONDUCT A PLANNED<br />

MAINTENANCE ROUTINE ONBOARD HMNZS TEKAHA.


10 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

CMDR STEVE BASLEY<br />

From the desk of DTA LOG<br />

(ENG)<br />

Along with 2002 coming to a close, comes the end of my two and a half<br />

year tenure as both Head of the Engineering faculty, Cerberus and DTA<br />

LOG (ENG). Many personnel have passed through the DTA LOG (ENG)<br />

sphere of influence in this time and have progressed into the fleet better<br />

suited to life in the naval community after the experience.<br />

Many personnel are unaware of<br />

exactly who makes up DTA LOG<br />

(ENG). It’s not just those of us<br />

here in ‘sunny” CERBERUS, the<br />

DTA LOG (ENG) sphere of<br />

influence includes:<br />

• Training Unit Anzac Ship Support<br />

Centre (TUASSC)<br />

• <strong>Royal</strong> Melbourne Institute of<br />

Technology (RMIT)<br />

• <strong>Navy</strong> Technical Training Units East<br />

and West (NTTU-E And NTTU-W)<br />

• Combat System Maintenance<br />

School (CSMS)<br />

• RAN Training Establishment<br />

Salisbury (RANTES)<br />

• The Advanced Welding School<br />

located in FIMA Sydney<br />

• Skills Development Centres<br />

nested in FIMA Perth and FIMA<br />

Sydney<br />

Whenever you are involved in<br />

technical training you are almost<br />

always in contact with DTA LOG<br />

(ENG) and its responsibilities to<br />

provide technical training to the<br />

navy. New platforms and<br />

hardware are continually being<br />

introduced into the fleet and<br />

there is almost always a training<br />

requirement that goes with it. This<br />

means DTA LOG (ENG) is<br />

continually updating and<br />

reviewing the training and courses<br />

that we provide.<br />

When DTA LOG (ENG) is looked<br />

at as a whole, the number of<br />

trainees that are managed is<br />

staggering. ITT and Category<br />

School trainees are in excess of<br />

600 personnel and, like all areas<br />

within navy ashore, we are being<br />

asked to manage and achieve<br />

this with a reduced uniformed<br />

manning level; makes it a difficult<br />

balancing act indeed. There is an<br />

ongoing requirement for quality<br />

people to ask for postings into all<br />

areas of DTA LOG (ENG).<br />

Whenever you mention training<br />

and <strong>Navy</strong> requirement in the one<br />

sentence all personnel ask<br />

“What’s in it for me?” closely<br />

followed by “What qualification do<br />

I get?” Qualifications and<br />

recognition would have to rate as<br />

the two biggest issues for ET and<br />

MT sailors. The <strong>Navy</strong> is committed<br />

to providing civilian qualifications<br />

and we do. However, the national<br />

training environment is a complex<br />

one and is poorly understood,<br />

particularly in some states and by<br />

a great many people working in<br />

the TAFE sector. Our training and<br />

qualifications are developed<br />

under the governance of the<br />

<strong>Australian</strong> National Training<br />

Authority (ANTA). However, the<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> system is more complicated<br />

than it needs to be due in part to<br />

the adoption of Maritime<br />

Competency Standards (MCS)<br />

which are mapped to Industry<br />

Training Advisory Boards (ITAB)<br />

competencies. Between the TA-<br />

LOG organisation and your<br />

category sponsor (DNPR(E&L))<br />

the training system is being<br />

refined with the following<br />

outcomes in mind:<br />

• Training that is relevant to the<br />

work we do, delivered at the most<br />

appropriate time.<br />

• Qualifications that fit neatly into<br />

the most appropriate industry<br />

training package and are<br />

recognisable to both the holder of<br />

the qualification and any<br />

informed prospective employer.<br />

We are also investigating the way<br />

in which technical training is<br />

provided and media used to “get<br />

the message across”. The current<br />

contract through which we deliver<br />

the bulk of ITT and ATT will expire<br />

at the end of 2003. We are<br />

currently working on a new<br />

contract and as part of that we<br />

are looking closely at what<br />

training and qualifications are<br />

provided. This is not something to<br />

be rushed into and just the<br />

process of review has the<br />

potential to cause concern for the<br />

future. But we are confident that<br />

the next iteration to technical<br />

training for ET and MT sailors will<br />

be a simpler training system with<br />

content that better matches the<br />

work we do. We are also keen to<br />

simplify our qualifications in order<br />

that pathways to further<br />

qualifications are clear and the<br />

value of our skills is understood.<br />

Another part of the review is<br />

looking at where our training<br />

should be provided. The majority<br />

of fleet units are concentrated in<br />

very few geographical areas and


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

11<br />

we are investigating which training<br />

courses can be delivered in these<br />

areas close to ships.<br />

An example of this is the<br />

continuing development of the<br />

TUASSC Transition Plan. As the<br />

process of ANZAC platform<br />

acceptance becomes smoother<br />

and the end of building ships in<br />

Williamstown approaches, the<br />

focus of TUASSC will change to<br />

the provision of training to<br />

operational ships. By moving<br />

TUASSC to the west, one removal<br />

will get personnel to their new<br />

locality and attending Position<br />

Prerequisite Training. This will<br />

provide training without having to<br />

endure unnecessary separation<br />

and provide more stability for<br />

families.<br />

With the success of the Skills<br />

Development Centres (SDC) in<br />

FIMA Sydney and Perth, the<br />

intention is to establish a SDC in<br />

FIMA Cairns. This will enable<br />

auxiliary streamed sailors in FIMA<br />

and small boats to progress<br />

competencies whilst ashore or<br />

alongside. The centre will target<br />

specific competencies that are<br />

difficult to complete as part of<br />

the normal daily routine on small<br />

boats and enable completion of<br />

competency logs in a manner<br />

consistent with promotion and<br />

job requirements.<br />

Hopefully this brief snapshot of<br />

what is happening with some of<br />

the current issues at DTA LOG<br />

(ENG) will reassure you that<br />

things are on the move. The future<br />

for DTA LOG (ENG) staff is<br />

shaping up to be one of<br />

continuing challenges and<br />

change. If you feel up to the<br />

challenge and want to help the<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> train to do our jobs then<br />

there is always a place for you<br />

within the training world of DTA<br />

LOG (ENG).<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> Engineering Bulletin<br />

DNOP NEWS<br />

Poster’s Postings<br />

As indicated in the last edition of the <strong>Navy</strong> Engineering Bulleton LEUT Chris Miller<br />

(Christopher.Miller@cbr.defence.gov.au) relieved LEUT Peter Dowton as Staff Officer Engineering 2 on 5<br />

September 2002.<br />

LCDR Phil Scott (Phillip.Scott1@cbr.defence.gov.au) relieved LCDR Mike Simpson as Staff Officer Engineering 1<br />

on 13 January 2003. Phil joined the RAN in January 1980 as an Apprentice ETS and reached the rank of<br />

POETS before being selected for RMIT degree studies in 1987. As an officer Phil has completed shore postings<br />

in MDIP and CDSC and has served at sea as an AWEEO in HMAS CANBERRA and DWEEO HMAS MELBOURNE.<br />

He has just completed another posting to HMAS MELBOURNE as WEEO.<br />

Mike Simpson has been posted to the <strong>Australian</strong> Command and Staff Course.


12 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

BY LEUT DAVE WALTER<br />

Replacing the ANZAC<br />

Class Frigates’ Propulsion<br />

Diesel Engines<br />

Introduction<br />

The modular design of the ANZAC Class ship not only allows for easier<br />

maintenance, removal, and construction processes, but is also<br />

conducive to platform improvements through modifications by<br />

equipment replacement.<br />

During my posting to HMAS<br />

ARUNTA as the DMEO I<br />

researched and developed a<br />

configuration change to modify<br />

the propulsion plant after a<br />

frustrating period with the<br />

Propulsion Diesel Engines (PDEs),<br />

and social drinks with the MEO.<br />

The modification was essentially<br />

to replace the PDEs with an<br />

improved propulsion plant.<br />

Background<br />

The ANZAC class propulsion<br />

consists of one LM2500 gas<br />

turbine, two 1163 MTU diesel<br />

engines, three MAAG reduction<br />

gearboxes and two Bird-Johnson<br />

Controllable Pitch Propellers<br />

(CPPs). This essentially allows for<br />

three recognised modes: GT, DE<br />

and ECO mode. GT mode is<br />

designed for high speed sprints<br />

and can propel the ship to<br />

greater than 27 knots. DE mode<br />

is the main propulsion mode and<br />

has both PDEs driving both<br />

shafts. DE mode can provide<br />

ship’s speed of 20 knots<br />

continuous and 21 knots (110%<br />

of PDEs’ capability) for 2 hrs in<br />

every 12. Finally ECO mode,<br />

which is the most economical<br />

mode, can be used for speeds up<br />

to 12 knots utilising one engine<br />

driving both shafts.<br />

The ANZACs were intended to<br />

spend most of their operational<br />

period in DE mode, and utilise<br />

ECO mode for when patrolling,<br />

loitering and transiting. GT mode<br />

was intended for short sprints<br />

and was initially predicted to be<br />

used for only 300 hours per year.<br />

However, as the ANZAC ships are<br />

operationally tasked, the<br />

propulsion plant operating profile<br />

has changed.<br />

WHY CHANGE FROM<br />

PROPULSION DIESELS TO GAS<br />

TURBINES.<br />

The design and operational<br />

characteristics of the MTU 1163<br />

series PDEs are not matched to<br />

the current operational tasking of<br />

the ANZAC’s. There are clear<br />

deficiencies in regards to the<br />

ships’ operations, reliability and<br />

maintainability, planned and<br />

breakdown maintenance, stores,<br />

and environmental concerns.<br />

There are four clear areas of<br />

benefits in changing over to a gas<br />

turbine (GT) power plant.<br />

Operations, Maintenance,<br />

Reliability, and Simplicity.<br />

To enable the proposal to be<br />

considered on a practical basis a<br />

GT was selected. Whilst there are<br />

four manufacturers of gas<br />

turbines that would meet the<br />

output requirements, the General<br />

Electric LM500 was selected.<br />

This selection process shall be<br />

explained later.<br />

Operational Benefits.<br />

The MTU 1163, like all diesel<br />

engines, is designed and built for<br />

constant speed and specific<br />

power outputs. MTU has indicated<br />

that this engine was originally<br />

intended for fast ferry usage. Its<br />

operational cycle is such that<br />

once away from the wharf it will<br />

increase to the best operational<br />

speed and maintain that until the<br />

intended destination. This usage<br />

does not match the current<br />

program for the ANZAC’s.<br />

The LM500’s operational<br />

characteristics match the<br />

operational tasking of the<br />

ANZACs. Its construction and<br />

design is such that rapid and<br />

repeated accelerations,<br />

decelerations, and mode changes<br />

are not detrimental to the life of<br />

engines. They accelerate faster<br />

than the MTU 1163, without the<br />

possibility of stalling the engine.<br />

Also, long periods at idle do not<br />

result in polishing or injector<br />

fouling. This aids in such<br />

evolutions such as man<br />

overboard drills, CASEXs, and<br />

Officer of the Watch Manoeuvres<br />

(OOWMANs).<br />

The LM500 also has a lower fuel<br />

consumption rate than the MTU<br />

1163 PDEs above 50% of the<br />

power setting, as per the figure.<br />

The LM500 curve is based on<br />

one gas turbine developed from


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

13<br />

information supplied by General<br />

Electric, and the PDE’s curve is<br />

for one diesel, developed from<br />

HMAS ARUNTA Steady Steaming<br />

Curves.<br />

FUEL CONSUMPTION COMPARISON<br />

Maintenance Benefits<br />

In comparison with the MTU<br />

1163, the LM500 has a greater<br />

variety of Planned Maintenance<br />

(PM) tasks to complete, however<br />

the LM500s PMs take less time<br />

to complete, and have a greater<br />

interval between them. The longer<br />

intervals between PMs are not<br />

only for OLM tasks, but also<br />

includes ILM and DLM tasks. For<br />

example, the GT is required to<br />

complete an overhaul after<br />

approximately 15000-20000hrs<br />

(condition based) compared with<br />

the MTU 1163’s mandatory<br />

12000hrs.<br />

Reliability Benefits<br />

The MTU 1163s are a relatively<br />

reliable diesel, and have proven<br />

dependable in the application on<br />

passenger ferries. However, a<br />

passenger ferry’s operational<br />

parameters are vastly different<br />

from that of a warship. The<br />

LM500 configuration will have a<br />

higher reliability compared with<br />

the PDE’s based on the figures<br />

released from both MTU and GE<br />

alone.<br />

The added reliability and<br />

commonality of parts, combined<br />

with the better maintenance<br />

package of the LM500 will also<br />

reduce the number and volume of<br />

stores required on board each<br />

vessel. Thus allowing more stores<br />

to be carried for other equipment<br />

and in turn possibly increases the<br />

ship’s independent operational<br />

time.<br />

The change to a gas turbine<br />

configuration will reduce the<br />

potential for support system<br />

failure, as the LM 500 has less<br />

associated ancillary equipment.<br />

The LM500, like the PDE, has a<br />

lube oil conditioning system, but<br />

it does not require systems such<br />

as engine coolant, seawater<br />

cooling, and control air. Systems<br />

such as the troublesome<br />

seawater cooling will no longer be<br />

required, thus negating any need<br />

for the respective maintenance<br />

requirements.<br />

Simplicity Benefits<br />

Whilst the LM500 has more<br />

exotic materials and complex<br />

construction requirements, the<br />

most important factor is that the<br />

design is simpler and has fewer<br />

parts than a piston arrangement<br />

engine. The MTU 1163 PDEs<br />

comprises approximately 320<br />

major moving parts, while the<br />

LM500 has just 15. 1 The end<br />

result is that there are fewer<br />

parts, and fewer wearing surfaces,<br />

which in turn reduce the<br />

probability of a failure regardless<br />

of the reason.<br />

Cost Analysis<br />

The final comparison for the<br />

change are the cost benefits. It<br />

must be stressed that these<br />

calculations are only preliminary<br />

and the graphical representation<br />

is only to indicate the estimated<br />

value of the change. 2 Cost<br />

considered in the analysis<br />

included; fuel and oil<br />

consumption, breakdown<br />

maintenance 3 , and Planned<br />

Maintenance. All levels of<br />

maintenance (OLM, ILM, and<br />

DLM) were considered with their<br />

associated stores and labour<br />

costs.<br />

The calculation for the<br />

modification was based on only<br />

one ship being changed. It<br />

included the purchase of the gas<br />

turbine and production work<br />

required. It assumed that it was<br />

an in-service ANZAC, to ensure<br />

the greatest cost for changeover. 4<br />

Final changeover cost, including<br />

set to work and documentation, is<br />

estimated at A$20 million per<br />

ship.<br />

Debits and incomes that were not<br />

considered in the cost analysis<br />

include; sale of the removed<br />

diesels and associated stores,<br />

RAN personnel man hours,<br />

current contract cancellation<br />

costs, and possible legal/public<br />

relation costs.


14 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

GT Selection<br />

19. The gas turbine selection,<br />

though preliminary, was made<br />

considering all gas turbine<br />

manufacturers available at the<br />

time of research. Each<br />

representative for the<br />

manufacturer was asked to<br />

supply information that could<br />

meet the following requirements:<br />

a. Produce 3600kW or be able<br />

to be electronically limited to<br />

3600kW;<br />

b. Have an output shaft speed of<br />

between 300 and 1200rpm;<br />

c. Able to fit with the same<br />

dimensions as the PDEs;<br />

d. No increase in the hull noise<br />

signature;<br />

e. Be able to run on F76 and<br />

F44 fuel; and<br />

f. Able to integrate easily with<br />

the C&M System.<br />

20. The LM500’s performance,<br />

fuel consumption characteristics,<br />

easily integrated control and<br />

monitoring method, cost and<br />

commonality of parts with the<br />

LM2500 meant that the LM500<br />

was selected, thus enabling a<br />

physical review of the proposal.<br />

Modification Considerations<br />

21. PDE Removal: The first step in<br />

the modification is the removal of<br />

the PDE, which already has a<br />

designated removal route, and<br />

redundant systems. The<br />

redundant systems to be<br />

removed include; Seawater<br />

system, PDE Enclosure, Control<br />

air, Lube oil circulation tanks,<br />

Lube oil replenishment system,<br />

Coolant recirculation system,<br />

PDE’s Local Operating Panel<br />

(LOP), and Drainage and dirty oil<br />

system.<br />

22. Stability: The modification<br />

shall require the importing of<br />

approximately 11,000kg and<br />

export of 60,100kg. This fifty<br />

tonne difference does affect the<br />

ship’s stability by causing the<br />

centre of gravity to increase from<br />

6m to 6.08m. Thus, would have<br />

little effect on the ship’s<br />

operation unless severe flooding<br />

was experienced.<br />

23. Power transfer: The LM500<br />

has an output of 4.4MW and a<br />

maximum operating shaft speed<br />

of 7000RPM. However, it has an<br />

incorporated gearbox that<br />

reduces the output shaft speed to<br />

that of the PDEs (300 –<br />

1200RPM), enabling the LM500<br />

to be connected directly to the<br />

existing Geislinger Coupling.<br />

24. Intake and Exhaust: The<br />

LM500 has a greater air flow<br />

rate, but lower exhaust temp,<br />

than that of the PDEs.<br />

Calculations have shown existing<br />

intake plenums and exhaust<br />

trunkings are sufficient. 5<br />

25. Control and Monitoring: This<br />

may seem to be one of the more<br />

complex obstacles in the<br />

modification, however it is<br />

relatively simple. The C&M<br />

Siemens display changes are a<br />

matter of simple programming<br />

changes, whilst the monitoring<br />

system changes will require<br />

connection of the LM500 ECM to<br />

the existing C&M wiring. The<br />

program will then have to be<br />

changed to ensure that the<br />

displays and control are corrected<br />

for the input/output voltages.<br />

However the engine power<br />

requirements are different, as the<br />

LM500 sets a PLA (not RPM as<br />

for the PDEs), and will therefore<br />

require trials to set PLA for shaft<br />

RPM.<br />

Integration Issues<br />

26. Some of the perceived<br />

integration issues that could<br />

occur with the change include; an<br />

increased IR signature, and fuel<br />

consumption at lower speeds.<br />

Whilst gas turbines are renowned<br />

for a large heat plume during<br />

operation, this can be reduced by<br />

using a venturi effect to draw in<br />

ambient air. It could be safely<br />

predicted that the exhaust<br />

experienced after the<br />

modification will most likely not<br />

require any further reduction in IR<br />

signature, with the air-diluting<br />

duct already fitted to the ANZAC<br />

Class ships.<br />

27. However a major flaw with the<br />

LM500 (or any gas turbine) is low<br />

load, or idle, fuel consumption<br />

compared with a diesel. As<br />

shown in the earlier figure.<br />

Conclusion<br />

28. The proposal has clear<br />

benefits with operations,<br />

maintenance, reliability, support<br />

requirements, environmental<br />

issues and costs. Whilst the<br />

change to LM500s is a feasible<br />

project, both financially and<br />

practically, it is never likely to<br />

eventuate. The article was<br />

forwarded to inspire technical<br />

discussion, and encourage others<br />

to utilise their engineering<br />

prowess to see that some<br />

solutions are outside the square.<br />

Notes<br />

1 Major parts are classified as items that<br />

are constantly cycling to keep the engine<br />

self-sustaining, such as rockers, shafts,<br />

pushrods, etc, but not dividing into their<br />

components or considering fuel racks, or<br />

variable stator vanes.<br />

2 The cost analysis utilises information<br />

from PDE experience, and records obtained<br />

from serving ANZACs (AMPS). It also drew<br />

upon documentation and records supplied<br />

from GE regarding the LM500’s marine<br />

propulsion service, combined with current<br />

RAN gas turbine operating experience.<br />

3 Even though each ship should not expect<br />

a prime mover to fail, one total failure for<br />

both the LM500 and PDE, requiring<br />

overhaul, was assumed to occur once in<br />

the life of the ship, and included in the<br />

cost analysis. This was done to enable an<br />

even comparison, noting that one PDE has<br />

already failed on HMAS ANZAC.<br />

4 Calculations were completed with<br />

assistance from project managers, both<br />

RAN and private industry. The end<br />

production figure was then given a 25%<br />

increase for expansion of work, and<br />

rounded up to the nearest million dollars.<br />

5 Calculations conducted by Author, iaw<br />

theories and formulas from Marks’<br />

Standard Handbook For Mechanical<br />

Engineers (Tenth Edition), McGraw Hill.


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

15


16 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

Darwin Naval Base and<br />

Home of Fima Darwin<br />

Darwin Naval Base (DNB), geographically located within Larrakeyah Army<br />

Barracks, was officially opened by HM Queen Elizabeth on 6 October<br />

1982. The cost of construction at that time was $23 million. The base<br />

was originally constructed by building two breakwaters, a wharf,<br />

undercover maintenance shed, workshops, the syncrolift shiplift system,<br />

transfer yard and by dredging 180,000 tonnes of material from the<br />

basin. The two breakwaters, 100 and 460 metres in length are 20<br />

metres high and 50 metres wide at the base. The 200,000 tonnes of<br />

granite rock required to construct the breakwaters was mined from Mt<br />

Bundy, 110km from Darwin, and hauled by flat top trailer roadtrains, 50<br />

tonnes at a time. Each rock weighed between 0.5 to 5.0 tonne and was<br />

individually placed in position.<br />

When constructed, the base was<br />

capable of supporting six Patrol<br />

Boats. The 30 metre high<br />

undercover maintenance facility<br />

commonly known as “the shed”<br />

could accommodate two vessels<br />

whilst another two could be dry<br />

berthed outside in the tie down<br />

yard. In 1993 an additional four<br />

tie down berths were completed<br />

and in 2001 another three were<br />

completed as part of the<br />

redevelopment project<br />

commenced in the year 2000.<br />

The redevelopment project was<br />

completed during 2001 at a cost<br />

of $12.4 million. The Minister for<br />

Defence, The Honourable Peter<br />

Reith, officially opened the new<br />

facilities on Saturday 1<br />

September 2001 following an<br />

Open Day at Darwin Naval Base<br />

that attracted over 3,500 visitors.<br />

The redevelopment included a<br />

new 146M wharf, extension of the<br />

existing wharf, three new<br />

hardstands, addition of a 100<br />

tonne fuel tank and fuel filtering<br />

equipment.<br />

Darwin Naval Base provides a<br />

home port and maintenance<br />

facility for North <strong>Australian</strong> based<br />

Minor War Vessels. As of 30<br />

November 2001 there are ten<br />

Fremantle Class Patrol Boats<br />

(FCPB’s) and two Heavy Landing<br />

Craft (LCH) based in Darwin. They<br />

are HMA Ships BUNBURY,<br />

CESSNOCK, DUBBO, FREMANTLE,<br />

GAWLER, GEELONG, GERALDTON,<br />

LAUNCESTON, WARRNAMBOOL<br />

and WOLLONGONG (FCPB’S),<br />

BALIKPAPAN and BETANO (LCH).<br />

Darwin Naval Base is also home<br />

to four of the Army LCM8’s<br />

(Landing Craft) and numerous<br />

support craft.<br />

The Darwin Naval Base<br />

maintenance facility operates a<br />

725 tonne capacity Syncrolift<br />

used primarily for the docking of<br />

Patrol Boats and Landing Craft<br />

Heavy. In addition, a range of<br />

other military watercraft are<br />

docked on an as required basis.<br />

Docked vessels are transferred to<br />

one of eleven shore berths, called


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

17<br />

hardstands, with full services for<br />

maintenance or for securing<br />

during cyclone season. Two berths<br />

are undercover in the DNB<br />

“shed”. During 2002 FIMA Darwin<br />

conducted 109<br />

dockings/undockings on the<br />

syncrolift. This is by far the most<br />

carried out in any previous year.<br />

Darwin Naval Base is the home of<br />

the Fleet Intermediate<br />

Maintenance Activity Darwin<br />

(FIMA Darwin). The primary<br />

functions of the FIMA Darwin<br />

organisation are to:<br />

• Manage and conduct<br />

maintenance activities on RAN<br />

Minor War Vessels,<br />

• Provide skills and knowledge<br />

development/ consolidation<br />

through exposure to maintenance<br />

and other work on RAN platforms,<br />

systems and equipment,<br />

• Improve the condition of the Fleet<br />

by providing workshop and<br />

specialist assistance beyond ship<br />

staff capability or capacity<br />

• Provide urgent operational reliefs<br />

to the Fleet<br />

• Provide local engineering<br />

specialist support services to<br />

Minor War Vessels<br />

• Provide a robust and reliable<br />

organisation that services the<br />

needs of the Fleet and returns<br />

sailors to sea that are more<br />

competent, confident and<br />

motivated<br />

• Promote and support the <strong>Navy</strong><br />

identity, culture and heritage.<br />

• Provides a team of mobile<br />

technical personnel able to<br />

support the Fleet at short notice<br />

away from their homeport<br />

Workshop facilities are divided<br />

into five major areas:<br />

Engineering Outsides -<br />

responsible for docking of<br />

vessels, metal fabrication,<br />

welding, maintenance of<br />

refrigeration and air conditioning<br />

machinery and woodworking;<br />

Engineering Machinery -<br />

responsible for maintenance of<br />

main and auxiliary propulsion<br />

systems, associated auxiliary<br />

machinery as well as general<br />

fitting and machining;<br />

Electronics (Communications) -<br />

responsible for maintenance of<br />

communication equipment and<br />

navigational aids (including GPS,<br />

radar, gyro compass and echo<br />

sounders);<br />

Electronics (Weapons) -<br />

responsible for maintenance of<br />

weapons and hydraulic systems<br />

and ship’s power generation and<br />

distribution equipment;<br />

Rigging and Corrosion Control -<br />

responsible for abrasive grit<br />

blasting and spray painting,<br />

maintenance and testing of lifting<br />

appliances, ship’s rigging and<br />

maintenance of safety<br />

equipment.<br />

FIMA Darwin continues to provide<br />

Darwin based and visiting ships<br />

with very good technical service<br />

and is provider of a professional<br />

and skilled workforce where<br />

sailors want to work. The<br />

reputation of FIMA Darwin is<br />

based on the diverse group of<br />

incredibly dedicated sailors who<br />

when called upon give their all to<br />

support the fleet that enables<br />

Maritime Command operational<br />

commitments and agreed<br />

readiness levels to be achieved in<br />

accordance with the Maritime<br />

Strategic Plan 2002.<br />

While FIMA is the principle<br />

occupant there a number of other<br />

occupants that provide<br />

operational support to<br />

homeported and visiting fleet<br />

units:


18 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

Port Services –<br />

• Coordinate and control harbour<br />

movements, preparation of berths<br />

and the provision of shore<br />

services for vessels<br />

• Coordinate and control fuelling<br />

operations<br />

• Coordination of all logistic<br />

requirements<br />

• Action for the containment of oil<br />

spills in Naval waters<br />

• Provision of diving support<br />

• Control of Naval waters<br />

• They also arrange for shore<br />

services for major warships<br />

berthing at commercial wharves<br />

or at anchor in Darwin harbour.<br />

Naval Stores –<br />

• Provides stores support for defect<br />

rectification and operational<br />

support<br />

• Warehousing of District Naval<br />

Stores Stock<br />

• Provides logistic support for RAN<br />

Fleet Units<br />

• Rotatable Pool management<br />

• Food Services management<br />

Sustainment Project Office –<br />

• Responsible for contract<br />

maintenance activities<br />

• Provides contract management<br />

for Depot Level Maintenance and<br />

repairs<br />

• Management and control of<br />

configuration changes<br />

Defence Maritime Services –<br />

• Operates and maintains auxiliary<br />

craft such as the water and fuel<br />

lighter, crane stores lighter and<br />

tug boat<br />

• Provides maintenance for Ship’s<br />

boats, and outboard motors<br />

Key personnel are:<br />

LCDR Frank Ostrowski<br />

CO FIMA DARWIN<br />

(08) 8935 5400<br />

CMDR Van Wyck<br />

Supply Officer<br />

(08) 8935 4168<br />

LCDR David Plummer<br />

Port Services Manager<br />

(08) 8925 5420<br />

LEUT Jack Martins<br />

Sustainment Project Office<br />

(08) 8935 5133<br />

Mr Peter Easthope<br />

Defence Maritime Services<br />

(08) 9841 8775


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

19<br />

Personal Limitations<br />

versus Unreal Expectations<br />

LEADING SEAMAN WAYNE<br />

SMITH, HMAS DARWIN<br />

It’s 0515 and I’m just off another four-hour stint of Upper Deck Sentry. I<br />

look a treat wearing that cursed heavy body armour, the helmet causing<br />

my head to sink below my shoulders, the venerable F88 Steyr, not to<br />

mention the radio communications and extended Maglite torch. All I<br />

want to do is sleep, my back aches, my neck cracks as I move it from<br />

side to side and the hammies are so tight I could use them to propel<br />

arrows. However, respite eludes me as the ship has received orders to<br />

sail ASAP and the CAS track radar refuses to complete ATO1 and the<br />

STIR blows fuses in train. The Gunnery Officer and the Commanding<br />

Officer want their fighting capability restored, the WEEO is asking for the<br />

finer details of each fault and the Petty Officer Bosun wants to know why<br />

I am not closed up at specials. Another long, testing day awaits this<br />

Killick ET.<br />

Background<br />

This article analyses the key<br />

areas that are affecting<br />

experienced technicians on board<br />

a fighting warship. It highlights<br />

observations of personal<br />

limitations that ultimately lead to<br />

expectations becoming<br />

unrealistic. I forward this<br />

submission in the hope that one<br />

day my contribution may help the<br />

higher order of command within<br />

the <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> better<br />

understand why the separation<br />

rates are so high in the<br />

engineering branches.<br />

As a result of the terrorist attacks<br />

of September 11th 2001, the<br />

<strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> has<br />

experienced a massive increase<br />

in operational tempo.<br />

Subsequently, <strong>Navy</strong> personnel<br />

have experienced significant<br />

increases in duties and<br />

responsibilities, the expectations<br />

sometimes overwhelming.<br />

As a result of the terrorist<br />

attacks of September 11th<br />

2001, the <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong><br />

<strong>Navy</strong> has experienced a<br />

massive increase in<br />

operational tempo<br />

Force protection, boarding party,<br />

café party, messman, laundry<br />

hand, departmental collateral<br />

duties, light jackstay, heavy<br />

jackstay, NBCD, SSD, TOWEX,<br />

CASEX, HE, ECCD, ADEX, SSFB,<br />

pirate watch, life-buoy sentry, sort<br />

trash, compact trash,<br />

maintenance, defect rectification,<br />

paint and clean. A non-exhaustive<br />

list of additional duties that<br />

personnel are required to perform<br />

on a daily basis. Our people<br />

perform these duties further<br />

restricted by managerial catch<br />

phrases such as; do more with<br />

less, reduce budget outlay, work<br />

smarter, and provide an overall<br />

better quality of service. Each<br />

phrase becoming more common.<br />

Repeatedly we do the same tasks<br />

and hear the same statements. I<br />

am sure everyone at some stage<br />

thinks to themselves; “Why am I<br />

doing this?” “Why do I do this to<br />

my family?” “Why do I do this to<br />

myself?” “Is it really worth it?”<br />

“Does the financial package<br />

agree with the tasks performed<br />

and training required?” “Do I<br />

receive the recognition I<br />

deserve?” I have heard these<br />

questions and the never-ending<br />

complaints that continue to arise<br />

with every new generation of<br />

sailor. I have experienced first<br />

hand how the regularity of these<br />

very questions has increased over<br />

the last few years with the <strong>Navy</strong>’s<br />

transition from a peacetime<br />

service to a highly operational<br />

entity. The hurt has been<br />

amplified with the loss of highly<br />

experienced and trained<br />

personnel, our corporate<br />

knowledge, who became


20 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

disillusioned and could no longer<br />

balance their personal limitations<br />

against unreal expectations.<br />

Knowledge Barriers<br />

Every person is a valuable asset,<br />

which the <strong>Navy</strong> cannot afford to<br />

lose, especially for extended<br />

periods of time. This has become<br />

of greater significance with the<br />

introduction of the Minimum<br />

Manning concept. Some<br />

managers are reluctant to release<br />

personnel for further training<br />

often hamstrung by operational<br />

requirements. Who in their right<br />

mind allows their most effective<br />

technician to proceed on leave<br />

with an extant Priority 1 Ops<br />

URDEF? Conversely, who in their<br />

right mind would want to remain<br />

with an organisation that rewards<br />

people by taking them away from<br />

their families? The longer an<br />

individual remains with the ship,<br />

the greater the amount of<br />

corporate knowledge is imparted<br />

to that individual hence, the<br />

importance of the individual’s<br />

contribution to the team. Further<br />

training approaches the<br />

impossible, only so much can be<br />

learnt “on the job”.<br />

A point is reached where<br />

maintainers “hit a brick wall” in<br />

their knowledge and fault finding<br />

ability to further diagnose and<br />

rectify defects. The impact is a<br />

loss of a capability for extended,<br />

unacceptable periods. Personally,<br />

I believe that the technical<br />

training scheme has not<br />

furnished me with adequate or<br />

appropriate knowledge, skills or<br />

expertise to deliver the required<br />

service to Command. I feel my<br />

true knowledge and expertise has<br />

been developed through close<br />

liaison with external agencies<br />

such as MOTU-WE and other<br />

Repair Agencies. Consequently, I<br />

am convinced that our technical<br />

training scheme must provide<br />

more appropriate skills and<br />

incorporate continual exposure to<br />

agencies such as MOTU-WE to<br />

enhance and foster corporate<br />

knowledge.<br />

An interesting situation arises<br />

when personnel, already trying to<br />

do more with less, are expected<br />

to operate and maintain<br />

An interesting situation<br />

arises when personnel,<br />

already trying to do more with<br />

less, are expected to operate<br />

and maintain additional<br />

systems.<br />

additional systems. Systems for<br />

which they have no technical<br />

training and systems that have<br />

been shown to be operationally<br />

imperative. Some of the examples<br />

of additional equipment that have<br />

been to fitted to FFG are ASMD,<br />

INMARSAT, Trash Compactor<br />

Room and EOTS. When this<br />

additional technical burden is<br />

added to the participation in<br />

Wholeship evolutions such as<br />

boarding operations, force<br />

protection, seamanship evolutions<br />

and communal duties the<br />

expectation becomes unrealistic. I<br />

believe this situation could be<br />

overcome by supplementing the<br />

billeted technical personnel with<br />

additional sailors who possess<br />

the required skills and expertise.<br />

A compromise between Junior<br />

Officer training billets and<br />

additional technical personnel<br />

could reduce workload and help<br />

sustain combat capability. I am<br />

certain that four Midshipmen are<br />

not of any realistic benefit during<br />

an operational deployment to the<br />

North Arabian Gulf.<br />

Serving Member’s Needs and<br />

Values<br />

Each individual has needs or<br />

values, each as diverse as the<br />

individual’s physical make up. I<br />

believe it is fair to say that most<br />

people desire the following to be<br />

fulfilled; need to be valued, need<br />

to be with family and friends,<br />

requirement to be continuously<br />

challenged, able to progress<br />

personal interests, and job<br />

satisfaction. These points help<br />

define a set of goals which an<br />

individual wishes to achieve in a<br />

work environment and indeed in<br />

a personal sense. For an<br />

individual to be happy there must<br />

be equilibrium met between work<br />

related and personal values.<br />

From a professional perspective, I<br />

chose to be an operator/<br />

maintainer of the Mk 92 Fire<br />

Control System. I chose this<br />

system as I found it would be<br />

challenging and interesting. I had<br />

a sense of purpose by performing<br />

this job and relished the<br />

important role it has in the overall<br />

function of the FFG as a fighting<br />

platform. During the infancy of my<br />

Mk 92 FCS streaming I was<br />

unaware of the impact it would<br />

prove to have on being afforded<br />

opportunities to spend time with<br />

family and friends, something I<br />

value immensely as an individual.<br />

Apart from the effect on spending<br />

time with family and friends I did<br />

not realise the importance of<br />

knowing how to balance ship<br />

commitments with my normal job<br />

of operating/maintaining the Mk<br />

92 FCS. Unfortunately, the two<br />

requirements clash with the result<br />

of superhuman efforts having to<br />

be made and inevitably, personal<br />

sacrifices. It is not uncommon for<br />

my fellow workmates and I to<br />

spend extra hours during<br />

weekdays and weekends<br />

maintaining the system due to<br />

ship’s commitments and vice<br />

versa. These, of course, are<br />

weekends immediately following<br />

weeks spent at sea qualifying<br />

Principle Warfare Officers or<br />

conducting a shakedown during a


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

21<br />

period that would normally be<br />

defined as Contractor Sea Trials.<br />

I have definitely fulfilled my<br />

needs to be challenged. Similarly,<br />

my craving for job satisfaction<br />

and pride in maintaining the Mk<br />

92 FCS has been satisfied.<br />

However, with every positive<br />

aspect there often comes a<br />

negative. By satisfying my workrelated<br />

values, my personal<br />

needs have suffered and I spend<br />

little time with my family and<br />

friends. Additionally, in terms of<br />

personally being valued, there is<br />

little-to-no financial remuneration.<br />

What price do you place on not<br />

being able to celebrate your<br />

child’s birthday because that<br />

URDEF has to be rectified and<br />

you hold the corporate<br />

knowledge. Not because of your<br />

brilliance but because others<br />

haven’t been afforded the<br />

opportunity to be trained.<br />

Yes, my sea-readiness badge<br />

provides visible recognition of the<br />

sea service I have completed.<br />

Again the remuneration doesn’t<br />

balance my needs and values. A<br />

metal badge that merely<br />

damages my uniforms is no<br />

recognition of the personal time,<br />

effort and sacrifice I have made.<br />

The sea-readiness badge will not<br />

compensate or support my family.<br />

My current financial and leave<br />

package would be appropriate if<br />

my sole responsibility was to<br />

operate and maintain the Mk 92<br />

FCS. However, considering the<br />

other tasks I must be able to<br />

perform, the amount of time and<br />

training required to maintain the<br />

quality of the tasks performed<br />

and the large amount of time<br />

spent away from my family and<br />

friends, I seriously do not think<br />

that the package provided is<br />

adequate.<br />

Family Values<br />

Society has changed significantly<br />

since the <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong><br />

was established and<br />

consequently individual ideals<br />

and expectations have also<br />

changed. I have certainly noticed<br />

that serving members wish to<br />

experience a more unrestricted<br />

lifestyle and no longer accept the<br />

requirement to be removed from<br />

society and indeed their families<br />

and friends for long periods. As<br />

sea-time, and therefore total time<br />

spent away from home, increases<br />

due to operational requirements<br />

a greater strain will be felt by<br />

each family unit and individual<br />

alike. If the philosophy governing<br />

the sea-shore roster cannot be<br />

drastically changed to allow a<br />

greater balance then we will<br />

continue to see increasing<br />

separation rates.<br />

Apart from the actual time spent<br />

at sea, another problem exists<br />

due to the maintenance and<br />

defect rectification requirements<br />

for the ship’s projected<br />

operational program. Every<br />

system requires preventative and<br />

corrective maintenance<br />

throughout the ship’s Usage and<br />

Upkeep Cycle. Considerable<br />

increase in these maintenance<br />

requirements is evident with the<br />

ship’s completion of each IMAV<br />

and D/SRA and subsequent<br />

progression through the Workup<br />

process. During these periods it is<br />

not uncommon for many<br />

engineering departments, whether<br />

it is Weapons Electrical, Aviation<br />

or Marine, to work extended<br />

working hours during the week<br />

and weekends. In doing so,<br />

personnel are not able to take<br />

the amount of rest and recreation<br />

they need to sustain their focus<br />

at sea.<br />

The family unit receives added<br />

pressure from a combination of<br />

different factors. Members return<br />

home mentally and physically<br />

exhausted. Wives, girlfriends,<br />

husbands, and boyfriends refuse<br />

to understand why their partner is<br />

required to remain at work having<br />

just returned from a two-week<br />

period at sea. This is not a oneoff<br />

event and is a considerable<br />

burden. Upon return from sea you<br />

cannot afford to upset the family<br />

routine, it’s simply not fair to<br />

them. Even if your partner can<br />

spare time, you’re usually too<br />

tired and aren’t able to devote<br />

any real form of “quality time”.<br />

This has a greater effect on<br />

children. How do you explain to<br />

them that, “Yes, I am alongside<br />

however I am unable to spend<br />

“quality time” with you.” They<br />

become frustrated in their own<br />

sense, usually in the form of<br />

misbehaving. It becomes a<br />

vicious circle where in some<br />

cases the pressure becomes too<br />

great and relationships and<br />

family cohesion falter.<br />

From my own experiences, I have<br />

seen many marriages and<br />

relationships fail due to the<br />

demands of naval life. The <strong>Navy</strong><br />

however, has come a long way in<br />

regards to looking after families<br />

needs. This is typified with<br />

services such as; the DCO,<br />

improved childcare, social<br />

workers, and keeping families<br />

informed about ship activities<br />

and what part the member will<br />

play. There is still some way to go.<br />

Personally, the greatest source of<br />

arguments that my wife and I<br />

have experienced has been the<br />

amount of extra hours worked on<br />

weekdays and weekends when I<br />

am alongside when I am<br />

supposed to be spending time<br />

with my family. A vicious circle<br />

that devours everybody<br />

concerned.<br />

Remuneration<br />

One initiative the <strong>Navy</strong> has<br />

currently undertaken is the<br />

recognition of the sea service<br />

through restructuring of Sea<br />

Going Allowance (SGA). However,<br />

the <strong>Navy</strong> has entered a new<br />

domain requiring individuals to<br />

be competent in weapon<br />

handling, boarding operations<br />

and force protection, just to name<br />

a few. These are of course in<br />

addition to conducting their<br />

normal job and special duties.<br />

Does the restructuring of the SGA<br />

tiers reflect the current service<br />

provided at sea or is it merely<br />

making up for past?<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> has also introduced the<br />

sea-readiness badge for


22 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

identification of personnel<br />

readiness and in recognition of<br />

completed sea service. A sound<br />

concept that has not realised its<br />

full potential. It makes other<br />

members aware of the<br />

commitment that a particular<br />

individual has contributed to the<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> however, it requires<br />

additional backing whether it be<br />

in the form of a financial or leave<br />

incentive.<br />

Whilst deployed in a designated<br />

Area of Operations (AO) you are<br />

being duly compensated by the<br />

respective Conditions of Service -<br />

allowances, tax-free pay and war<br />

service leave. The allowances in<br />

the AO acknowledge the<br />

individual’s acceptance of risk,<br />

the additional workload, and<br />

surroundings required to be<br />

personally weathered.<br />

Realistically how long can<br />

individuals perform the additional<br />

arduous duties associated with<br />

serving in an AO? When the<br />

member returns to Australia to<br />

find there is no respite and the<br />

need to complete another<br />

maintenance period is as intense<br />

as it was to have the ship ready<br />

for deployment to the AO, what<br />

does the member do? How does<br />

the member justify this<br />

requirement to friends and<br />

family? What true remuneration<br />

exists that is aligned with<br />

individual and family values? This<br />

environment will inevitably cause<br />

personnel to “burn out” at a<br />

faster rate than would normally<br />

occur in a peacetime<br />

environment.<br />

An interesting situation arose<br />

during recent deployments to OP<br />

RELEX whereby RAN members<br />

were required to undertake roles<br />

similar in nature to those<br />

experienced during OP SLIPPER.<br />

Certainly the risk level was<br />

different however the additional<br />

training required to proceed to<br />

OP RELEX reflected the<br />

requirement during deployment.<br />

Additionally, crews were exposed<br />

to situations that would not<br />

normally be experienced in<br />

general service, all without any<br />

real remuneration. The question<br />

begs asking, “Is this a reasonable<br />

expectation?”<br />

Improving Conditions of Service<br />

Some shipmates and I conducted<br />

a brainstorming session to<br />

identify possible ways of<br />

improving the Conditions of<br />

Service to retain experienced<br />

personnel. As can be seen the<br />

ideas vary in theme, which<br />

reflects varying individual values.<br />

We arrived at the following:<br />

• Tier Service Allowance similar to<br />

SGA to recognise the experience<br />

and commitment personnel have<br />

made.<br />

• Tier the sea-going leave<br />

component in addition to tiering<br />

of the SGA and Service<br />

Allowance. Increase the amount<br />

of recreation leave for sea-going<br />

personnel by five days at the<br />

completion of every three years of<br />

service. That is, 10 days sea<br />

service leave for 0-3 years of<br />

service, 15 days sea service<br />

leave for 3-6 years of service and<br />

20 days sea service leave for in<br />

excess of 6 years sea service.<br />

• Reintroduce the pension for<br />

completion of 20 years service.<br />

• Provide a sign on bonus at 4<br />

yearly intervals.<br />

• Recreational leave or travel<br />

warrants that cannot be taken<br />

should be refunded in cash or as<br />

pre-packaged holiday.<br />

• Before IMAV or DSRA periods<br />

have a compulsory two-week<br />

leave period prior to<br />

commencement of the<br />

Maintenance Activity.<br />

• For completing 10 years of<br />

service provide a deposit for a<br />

house in addition to long service<br />

leave.<br />

• Introduce a greater number of<br />

‘out of category’ shore billets for<br />

technical sailors.<br />

• Provide technical billets on<br />

Custom vessels.<br />

• Remove stamp duty and tax on<br />

all household goods, vehicles,<br />

and housing for military<br />

personnel.<br />

• Give personnel the opportunity to<br />

take their normal leave<br />

entitlements.<br />

Conclusion<br />

If the <strong>Navy</strong> wishes to be at the<br />

forefront by operating a small, yet<br />

highly motivated, trained and<br />

experienced force it must focus<br />

on retaining the experienced<br />

personnel. So how do we<br />

recognise the additional training<br />

to get an individual to a certain<br />

standard? Inevitably how do we<br />

retain and maintain the focus of<br />

our experienced personnel? How<br />

do we balance personal<br />

limitations against unreal<br />

expectations?<br />

Recruiting sufficient numbers to<br />

try and cover separation rates<br />

may work in the short term, but<br />

there will be degradation in the<br />

quality of service provided by the<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> over the long term due to<br />

the demise of corporate<br />

knowledge. The loss of corporate<br />

knowledge is felt to a larger<br />

extent in the engineering<br />

branches. This loss is primarily<br />

due to the requirement to<br />

maintain equipment to a high<br />

standard in varying environments<br />

that also demand the<br />

development of new skills.<br />

Technicians are dragged away<br />

from their primary job to<br />

undertake Wholeship roles hence<br />

losing the opportunity to further<br />

build knowledge. The technicians<br />

become annoyed and disgruntled<br />

with having to perform additional<br />

duties such as boarding and<br />

force protection. The workload<br />

approaches an unrealistic level<br />

as a result of trying to strike a<br />

balance between performing their<br />

primary job and fulfilling<br />

Wholeship commitments. The end<br />

result is a tired workforce left with<br />

the real option of discharge.


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

23<br />

The <strong>Navy</strong> must recognise the<br />

“human factor” by realising that<br />

each crew consists of individuals<br />

from different demographics,<br />

possessing their own individual<br />

needs, ideals and expectations.<br />

Each person wants to feel they<br />

are needed, acknowledged and<br />

above all, the amount of time<br />

devoted to the job is adequately<br />

rewarded. The end must justify<br />

the means. As the amount of<br />

duties increase for an individual<br />

sailor or officer they must be duly<br />

compensated or rewarded.<br />

Whether it is in the form of a<br />

bonus, opportunity to take normal<br />

recreational leave, additional<br />

leave or simply an appropriate<br />

increase in salary.<br />

Pride in your job and pride in<br />

serving your country is personally<br />

satisfying however, pride will only<br />

get you so far. Pride will not<br />

support your family nor<br />

compensate for the amount of<br />

time you spend away from<br />

friends and loved ones. What<br />

other job expects you to perform<br />

such a diverse range of tasks<br />

and still maintain such a high<br />

quality of service in all tasks<br />

performed? This is in addition to<br />

living with sixty-six other men,<br />

sharing four toilets, remaining<br />

confined to a world no longer<br />

than 185 metres and spending<br />

substantial periods of time away<br />

from home.<br />

If a warship can not generate<br />

electrical power, propel through<br />

the water, pump water over the<br />

side, and provide the basic<br />

elements to support the crew, the<br />

warship can no longer fight, move<br />

or float. Currently, the only way a<br />

warship can perform these roles<br />

is through the dedication and<br />

commitment of its personnel. The<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> must realise its best assets<br />

are the experienced personnel<br />

that enable a warship to achieve<br />

its designed purpose. The <strong>Navy</strong><br />

must invest wisely in its people to<br />

sustain effectiveness and not<br />

become a liability for the people<br />

of Australia.<br />

In addition to my own experiences<br />

and thoughts, I have attached a<br />

table that provides a quick<br />

snapshot of ten different<br />

engineering personnel currently<br />

serving on board and the duties<br />

they perform. It must be noted<br />

this table does not include<br />

training such as; first aid, NBCD,<br />

competency log progression,<br />

weapon trade testing, quality<br />

control and basic initial technical<br />

training. Of particular interest, is<br />

the amount of equipment required<br />

to be operated and maintained by<br />

individuals in addition to other<br />

Wholeship tasks that are required<br />

to be performed. We are not<br />

without limits, and expectations<br />

have already moved beyond<br />

personal realities.<br />

DARWIN FIRE CONTROL GREENIES: L-R LS TIM DONALD, LS YVETTE BEATTIE AND LS WAYNE<br />

SMITH


24 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

Rank CPOET POET ABET LSET<br />

Billet 03D 13D 26D 11D<br />

Normal Working 0745-1600 Defence Watches 0745-1800 (offline 0745-1800 (offline<br />

Hours 7’s and 5’s for boarding party) for boarding party)<br />

(12 hrs on/<br />

12 hrs off)<br />

(24 hrs online as (24 hrs online as<br />

techo)<br />

techo)<br />

Equipment Expected Mk 92 FCS NCDS<br />

to Maintain/ Mk 15 CIWS SPS-49<br />

Operate Harpoon FCS SPS-55<br />

MVI<br />

TV DAC<br />

U/Water Telephone<br />

E-phone<br />

SLQ-32<br />

Nulka<br />

Nixie<br />

IFF<br />

TACAN<br />

Echo Sounder<br />

WSC-3, Couplers,<br />

AS1735 Ae, 23’s,<br />

CRH 11, VEA38<br />

Couplers, SRA49,<br />

SRA 56, VRC46,<br />

Internal Comms,<br />

Link 11, Manual<br />

Patching Panels,<br />

FCCID,<br />

Chirpsounder,<br />

SSR1, Modems,<br />

Cryptographic<br />

Equipment, OTCIXS,<br />

MXT 1200, HF,<br />

ACX11, ACX5,<br />

ACX5A, Fan,<br />

VCS945, ACX2,<br />

Lamda power<br />

supplies, GCCS-M,<br />

INMARSAT, IR<br />

Communications,<br />

Weather Fax,<br />

Mini - M<br />

NCDS Equipment:<br />

Computers<br />

OJ-197<br />

OJ-194<br />

SDC<br />

SB-2780<br />

LS-537<br />

CEG<br />

RVP<br />

Additional<br />

Equipment:<br />

EOTS<br />

Nixie<br />

UQN-4<br />

U/Water Telephone<br />

Displays<br />

Equipment Actually<br />

Trained For Mk 92 FCS NCDS, Nixie, Nulka, All the above except All NCDS<br />

Echo Sounder, GCCS-M, OTCIXS Equipment, Displays,<br />

U/Water Telephone and INMARSAT UQN-4, U/water<br />

Telephone, Nixie<br />

Period of Service 17 yrs 11 mths 8 yrs 5 mths 5 yrs 7 mths 4 yrs 10 mths<br />

Sea Time 11 yrs 5 yrs 7 mths 2 yrs 7 mths 2 yrs 4 mths<br />

Shore Time 2 yrs 5 mths 1 yr 1yr 2 mths 8 mths<br />

Training Time 4 yrs 6 mths 1 yr 10 mths 1 yr 10 mths 1 yrs 10 mths<br />

(inc. initial training)<br />

Normal Duty IC CS01 IC Radar Comcen Tx room NCDS maintainer<br />

maintainer<br />

Boarding Operations Nil Nil Sweep 1, Broco Engineering sweep<br />

handler<br />

and health and<br />

comfort checks<br />

Force Protection Force Protection CPO Duty PO APS/ UDS/ DWEAB APS/ UDS/ DWELH<br />

Special Sea Dutymen Nil Nil Fender Party/ Ricer/Force<br />

Force Protection Protection<br />

Evolutions IC Distance Line Jackstay Comms line TOWEX/ Jackstay/<br />

Boat handler<br />

Departmental Duties Training DVD officer/ Stores person, PM Software<br />

Co-ordinator/ Publications Coordinator, Coordinator, garbage<br />

Library Coordinator/Port Publication sorting<br />

Watch ECC Coordinator, JS Café/<br />

Coordinator/Equity Scullery hand,<br />

and Diversity garbage sorting<br />

Facilitator<br />

Family Composition Wife, 1 Child Girlfriend Wife, 1 Child Wife, 1 Child


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

25<br />

Rank LSET POMT LSMT<br />

Billet 31D 28C 08C<br />

Normal Working Hours Defence Watches One 4 hour watch per 2330-0345/ 1130-<br />

7’s and 5’s day/ night plus full 1545 (watch keeping)<br />

(12 hrs on/ 12 hrs off) working day 0800- 2 hrs off-watch work<br />

1800 (24 hrs on call) and study (AMOCS)<br />

Equipment Expected to<br />

Maintain/Operate<br />

GMLS Mk13<br />

Magazine Sprinklers<br />

Mk 75 76mm gun<br />

Mk 32 SVTT<br />

Mk 36 SRBOC<br />

Propulsion Control<br />

Console, Electric Plant<br />

Control Console, Ship<br />

Service Generator, Ship<br />

Service 60 Hz SWBD,<br />

400 Hz SFC and SWBD,<br />

Helicopter Recovery<br />

System, Ships Fin<br />

Stabiliser, 7.2m RHIB,<br />

Boat Davit, Galley<br />

Equipment, Domestic<br />

Services, Degaussing<br />

Equipment, Electric<br />

Operated Valves,<br />

Vibration Analysis,<br />

Equipment and<br />

Monitoring, Operate all<br />

Auxiliary Machinery<br />

Refrigeration and A/C.<br />

Ice Cream Machine, Ice<br />

Making Machine,<br />

Beverage Dispensers,<br />

Fan Coil Units, Domestic<br />

Fridges, LPAC<br />

Dehydrators, LPACs,<br />

HPACs, CHT, EVAC, CHT<br />

Doors (watertight),<br />

Eductors, Firemain,<br />

Fireplugs and Hoses,<br />

AFFF/ NAF-S 3 Fire<br />

Fighting, Showers,<br />

Auxiliary Pumps,<br />

Evaporators, Reverse<br />

Osmosis, Counter<br />

Measure Washdown,<br />

APC, Ventilation, Milk<br />

Dispenser, Drains and<br />

Handyman jobs.<br />

Equipment Actually GMLS Mk 13 400 Hz Maintenance, All of the above,<br />

Trained For Mk 75 76mm gun Vibration Analysis, other than<br />

Mk 36 SRBOC Trade Training, FFG Refrigeration<br />

Specific Courses<br />

Period of Service 12 yrs 9 mths 16 yrs 4 yrs 8 mths<br />

Sea Time 7 yrs 10 yrs 8 mths 2 yrs 5mths<br />

Shore Time 2 yrs 9 mths 3 yrs 1 yr 2 mths<br />

Training Time 3 yrs 2 yrs 4 mths 1 yr 1 mth<br />

(inc. initial training)<br />

Normal Duty IC GMLS Mk 13 Engineering Officer Watch keeper-<br />

Of the Watch/ 2 IC EPCCO(CCS) off-<br />

Electrical Workshop watch/ fridge ME-3<br />

Boarding Operations Nil Nil Nil<br />

Force Protection APS/ UDS EOOD Dutywatch Dutywatch- EPCCO/<br />

electrical isolations<br />

Special Sea Dutymen Comms Fx 1JV On watch as EOOW Watch keeping or closed<br />

up in engineering spaces<br />

Evolutions Point to point comms On watch as EOOW Watch keeper, RAS SSD,<br />

fuelling party<br />

Departmental Duties Stores Vibration Analysis General Duties-<br />

PM coordinator Coordinator TM200, Stores, PMS,<br />

LHOM 2 IC Electrical Workshop Defect Database<br />

Sort garbage<br />

EOOD<br />

Family Composition 1 Ex-wife Defacto Defacto<br />

1 Ex-fiancee<br />

1 child


26 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

Rank LSATV ABMT LSATA<br />

Billet 25H 33C 20H<br />

Normal Working Hours 14 hrs on 0745-1800 (offline 14 hrs on<br />

for boarding party) 7 hrs crew rest<br />

3 hrs miscellaneous<br />

(24 hrs online as techo)<br />

Equipment Expected to<br />

Maintain/ Operate<br />

S70B2-<br />

Communications<br />

Auto Flight Control ASW,<br />

Inertial, Radio, Radar<br />

Nav Sys, Tactical Sys,<br />

Radar, Electrical Power,<br />

Lighting and<br />

Instrumentation. Aviation<br />

Survival Equipment-<br />

Aircrew Life Preserver,<br />

Macpac, Nowra Strop,<br />

Double Lift Harness,<br />

Alpha Helmet, Alpha<br />

400, Pass Immersion<br />

Suit, Heeds, Despatcher<br />

Harness, 7 man Liferaft,<br />

Personal Survival Pack<br />

Ships Auxiliary<br />

Equipment ie. HPAC/<br />

LPAC/ AC’s, Firemain,<br />

CHT System, General<br />

Maintenance on this<br />

equipment plus PM’s,<br />

general jobs around the<br />

ship ie. Doors, Drains<br />

and Handyman jobs.<br />

S70B2- Engines,<br />

Transmission, Drive Train,<br />

Hydraulic Systems and<br />

Powered Flight Controls,<br />

Main/ Tail Rotor<br />

Systems, Airframe<br />

Structures, Skins and<br />

Composite Materials,<br />

Perform Non-destructive<br />

Inspections, Vibration<br />

Analysis of Air Frame/<br />

Engines/ Rotor Systems,<br />

Maintenance Quality<br />

Inspections, Flight<br />

Servicing Inspector,<br />

Intermediate Composite<br />

Repair and Bonding<br />

Equipment Actually All of the above No FFG specific training All of the above<br />

Trained For<br />

Period of Service 8 yrs 4 mths 3 yrs 6 mths 7 yrs 7 mths<br />

Sea Time 3 yrs 1 mth 1 yr 10 mths 7 mths<br />

Shore Time 2 yrs 3 mths 2 weeks 7 yrs<br />

Training Time 3 yrs 1 yr 8 mths 3 yrs<br />

(inc. initial training)<br />

Normal Duty Seahawk Avionics ME-3 maintainer/ Seahawk Air/ Engine<br />

Technician boarding operations Technician<br />

Boarding Operations Nil Sweep 2 (engineering) Nil<br />

Force Protection QM/APS In the RHIB UDS<br />

Special Sea Dutymen Nil Watch keeping or closed Nil<br />

up in engineering space<br />

Evolutions Lifebuoy Sentry/RAS/ Watch keeper, RAS SSD, Lifebuoy Sentry<br />

HCO sentry<br />

fuelling party<br />

Departmental Duties Aviation SE Stores person Aviation equipment<br />

Flight Deck Marshal Cleaner Flight Deck Team<br />

OP Sentinel Lookout Garbage Sorter Flight Deck Marshal<br />

Maintenance<br />

OP Sentinel Hangar<br />

OH&S<br />

Security<br />

Representative<br />

Family Composition Fiancee Single Girlfriend


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

27<br />

RAN Condition Monitoring<br />

– Vibration Analysis<br />

WOMT PETER DERBY<br />

FLEET CONDITION ASSESSMENT<br />

UNIT<br />

In the previous edition of the Bulletin the Fleet Condition Assessment<br />

Unit addressed the RAN Spectrographic Oil Analysis. This article aims to<br />

give the reader an insight into Vibration Analysis<br />

Understanding the<br />

Fundamentals of Vibration<br />

Analysis<br />

Vibration Analysis is well proven<br />

as a powerful tool for assessing<br />

the condition of rotating<br />

machinery. It is known as the<br />

most useful of any parameter<br />

used for condition monitoring,<br />

such as temperature, current or<br />

lube condition. Fundamental to<br />

using this tool effectively however,<br />

is gaining an understanding of<br />

the basic machinery faults that<br />

can be diagnosed and<br />

recognising typical failure<br />

characteristics.<br />

Introduction<br />

What is vibration? It is the<br />

movement of a body about a<br />

reference position. What causes<br />

vibration? Vibration is caused by<br />

an excitation force such as:<br />

Driving force acting on a<br />

machine, reaction from the load<br />

on the machine, additional stress<br />

caused by a problem such as:<br />

• Unbalance<br />

• Misalignment<br />

• Looseness<br />

• Anti-Friction Bearing Defects<br />

To analyse a problem, the analyst<br />

tries to relate the vibration to the<br />

excitation force. The following will<br />

concentrate on the accurate<br />

identification of the above<br />

mentioned faults through<br />

vibration analysis.<br />

Unbalance<br />

Simple Unbalance (Imbalance)<br />

occurs when the center of mass<br />

of a rotating object differs from<br />

the center of rotation (static<br />

unbalance). More general<br />

unbalance occurs when the<br />

rotation axis is not coincident<br />

with the principal axis of inertia of<br />

the rotating body – often called<br />

dynamic unbalance.<br />

Causes of Unbalance include:<br />

• Improper assembly of parts<br />

• Material build up of fan blades<br />

and impellers<br />

• Broken or missing rotor parts<br />

Characteristics of unbalance<br />

include:<br />

• High amplitude radial peaks at<br />

1 x shaft RPM<br />

• Very low axial vibration levels at<br />

1 x shaft RPM (except for<br />

overhung rotors)<br />

• Any harmonics of shaft RPM<br />

(integer multiples of shaft RPM)<br />

are very low in amplitude.<br />

• If harmonics of shaft RPM have<br />

significant amplitude, other faults<br />

should be suspected.<br />

Misalignment<br />

Misalignment occurs when the<br />

centerlines of two shafts are<br />

offset or meet at an angle.<br />

Different categories of this defect<br />

include:<br />

• Offset misalignment<br />

• Angular misalignment<br />

• Bearing misalignment<br />

Vibration caused by angular<br />

misalignment:<br />

• Shaft centerlines meet at an<br />

angle<br />

• Often strong component at<br />

1 x RPM<br />

• May cause dominant vibration in<br />

any plane<br />

• Therefore it is important to take 2<br />

radial readings per bearing plus<br />

one axial reading per shaft<br />

Vibration caused by offset<br />

misalignment<br />

• Shaft centerlines parallel but<br />

offset


28 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

• Strong radial component at<br />

2 x run speed<br />

• Almost always combined with<br />

angular misalignment<br />

Characteristics of misalignment<br />

include:<br />

• High axial vibration at 1,2,3 x<br />

shaft RPM<br />

• High radial vibration at 1,2,3 x<br />

shaft RPM<br />

• Higher orders of shaft RPM (>4 x)<br />

are generally low in amplitude<br />

(depending on type of coupling<br />

and the stiffness of the structure)<br />

Looseness<br />

There are two main types of<br />

looseness, structural looseness<br />

and rotating element looseness.<br />

Structural looseness:<br />

• Faulty or eroded base mounts<br />

• Cracked or split casings<br />

• Improperly torqued bearing caps<br />

• Bearing supports<br />

Rotating looseness:<br />

• Impellers<br />

• Fan blades<br />

• Bearings<br />

• Couplings<br />

Characteristics of looseness<br />

include:<br />

• Spectra show large number of<br />

orders<br />

• Vibration is often directional –<br />

horizontal and vertical amplitudes<br />

may differ significantly<br />

• “Half – harmonics” and “one –<br />

third harmonics” may occur in<br />

some cases.<br />

Anti – Frictional Bearing Defects<br />

Causes of premature bearing<br />

failure include:<br />

• Improper techniques for mounting<br />

bearings on shaft and in housing<br />

during rebuild<br />

• Excessive or inadequate<br />

lubrication<br />

• Incorrect application of bearing<br />

shortens life<br />

• Excessive vibration causes<br />

increased stress<br />

Characteristics of bearing defects<br />

include:<br />

• Harmonics of non-synchronous<br />

peaks visible (multiples of<br />

bearing frequencies)<br />

• Sidebands may become apparent<br />

(shaft frequency for inner race<br />

fault and cage frequency for<br />

rolling element fault)<br />

Calculating Defect Frequencies:<br />

• Require physical dimensions and<br />

shaft speed (pitch and ball/roller<br />

diameters, number of balls/rollers<br />

etc)<br />

• Or need manufactures bearing<br />

data<br />

Journal Bearing Defects<br />

High vibration in journal, sleeve<br />

or plain bearings can be caused<br />

by:<br />

• Excessive internal clearances<br />

• Improper loading of the bearing<br />

• Improper lubrication<br />

Excessive clearance:<br />

• Even small excitation force, eg.<br />

slight imbalance can cause<br />

significant vibration<br />

• Looseness in bearing results in<br />

many harmonics of shaft<br />

frequency in the spectrum<br />

• Presence of low amplitude shaft<br />

orders in the spectrum not<br />

automatically cause for alarm<br />

Incorrect loading:<br />

• Excessive loading can shorten<br />

bearing life<br />

• Too little load can cause oil whirl;<br />

• Under normal conditions, shaft<br />

rides on oil film<br />

• Due to friction and leakage, oil<br />

circulates in the bearing<br />

clearance from 38 to 49% of<br />

RPM<br />

• Oil whirl shows in this frequency<br />

range<br />

• If bearing load is too low, the<br />

force exerted by the oil on the<br />

shaft may dominate, causing<br />

shaft whirl about the centerline,<br />

possibly contacting the journal<br />

Improper lubrication:<br />

• May give high frequency, nonsynchronous<br />

vibration sometimes<br />

known as “dirtwhirl”<br />

In summary, it is true to say that<br />

vibration analysis can help ship’s<br />

staff and support agencies.<br />

Useful results can be achieved<br />

from analysing most shipboard<br />

machinery and also give<br />

operational benefits by reducing<br />

radiated and internal ship’s<br />

noise. Ship’s staff are<br />

encouraged to ensure that<br />

accurate and reliable condition<br />

assessments are obtained by<br />

consistent and proper practices.<br />

Vibration testing of rotating<br />

machinery must be conducted<br />

uniformly so measured data stays<br />

comparable regardless of when,<br />

where or by whom the<br />

measurement were taken.<br />

Need More Information<br />

For further information regarding<br />

Vibration Analysis please contact<br />

CPOMT(E) Glen Collins, I/C VA<br />

cell (02) 9359 2441 or e-mail<br />

glen.collins@defence.gov.au


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

29<br />

Design and Concept for an<br />

Unmanned Major Surface<br />

Combatant<br />

SBLT JASON NISSEN<br />

This paper proposes a method of extending a ship’s Combat System<br />

network, to allow its Command and Control to be conducted remotely<br />

using a device called the ‘Remote Network Unit’. This would be<br />

integrated with the Electronic Chart Display and Information System<br />

(currently being fitted to all MFUs), and MCR Control to allow the ship’s<br />

manned spaces to be controlled remotely.<br />

The Design and Concept for an<br />

Unmanned Major Surface<br />

Combatant is shown to be a<br />

technically feasible major project,<br />

that would provide the RAN with<br />

CONFIGURATION A<br />

Bm, and really any<br />

communications system that can<br />

reliably, securely and quickly send<br />

high bandwidth data. The RNU’s<br />

function is to quickly and reliably<br />

and the ship still needs to be<br />

driven.<br />

To make this unmanned warship<br />

concept a reality, it will need to<br />

CONFIGURATION B<br />

FIGURE 1 - COMBAT SYSTEM WAN CONFIGURATIONS<br />

an enormous force multiplier, and<br />

also making a Flexible Manning<br />

Policy possible.<br />

The Remote Network Unit is<br />

simply a network adapter with an<br />

abundant supply of high speed<br />

cache and modems to connect to<br />

the COMMCEN’s matrix, Inmarsat<br />

retransmit all combat system<br />

network traffic to a remote<br />

command and control system<br />

using identical protocols to form<br />

a seamless network.<br />

However this is just half the<br />

design, as the combat system<br />

only covers the warfare aspects,<br />

rely on the Electronic Chart<br />

Display and Information System<br />

(ECDIS) currently being fitted to<br />

all RAN ships. At this point I will<br />

briefly discuss this project still<br />

unknown to the majority of us<br />

wearing the white service<br />

uniform.


30 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

NETWORK DESIGN<br />

FIGURE 2 – REMOTE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE 9LV 453 COMBAT SYSTEM<br />

SEA 1430 will have the same<br />

impact to Maritime Navigation,<br />

that the introduction of radar<br />

technology had on warfare in the<br />

1950’s. Phase 1 of the project<br />

has radically changed the way our<br />

Hydrography units operate now<br />

and forever more. For hundreds of<br />

years our sealanes have been<br />

surveyed using a paper based<br />

charting system. These charts<br />

would then be available for the<br />

safe passage of the Merchant<br />

and Service <strong>Navy</strong>. Not much has<br />

changed except that the storage,<br />

distribution and use of the<br />

collected data, is all done<br />

electronically. Sound familiar? For<br />

Seaman Officers this has made<br />

the bane of bridge watchkeeping<br />

(fixing), redundant to a far more<br />

superior and accurate system.<br />

The Ship’s Navigational Data<br />

System (collaboration of SINS,<br />

GPS, EM Log, WS&D), is used in<br />

real-time to pinpoint the ship’s<br />

position on the electronic charts<br />

provided at a rate far quicker<br />

than ‘2 minute fixing’. For the<br />

Navigator, plotting a course is<br />

simply entering a set of GPS<br />

waypoints for the ship to steer to.<br />

The next generation of Electronic<br />

Charting Systems should see an<br />

interface between it and MCR<br />

Control. At that point selecting<br />

‘Autopilot’ on the helm will do<br />

exactly that, and the role of the<br />

Officer of the Watch will be that<br />

of a safety number.<br />

For the unmanned warship<br />

concept to become a reality, this<br />

second generation system would<br />

need to be interfaced to an RNU,<br />

or have an RNU of its own.<br />

However I expect by that stage<br />

this would not be needed as it<br />

(Navigation, MCR and Bridge<br />

control) would be simply an<br />

extension of the Combat System<br />

network.<br />

Of course even if this MAJOR<br />

project was started today, nothing<br />

would be seen for at least 10 to<br />

15 years, due to the amount of<br />

development and testing involved.<br />

The evolution of the UAV<br />

(Unmanned Air Vehicle), is<br />

testimony to this military fact.<br />

CONCEPT and Issues that need<br />

to be discussed<br />

• The concept and requirement for<br />

unmanned / drone warships<br />

Drone warships are not a new<br />

concept. It is simply Network<br />

Centric Warfare taken to the next


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

31<br />

level. Furthermore the RAN, has<br />

been operating drone ships for<br />

quite some time in the form of<br />

Mine Hunters.<br />

If we the RAN are continuing to<br />

find that manpower is a problem,<br />

in an operational tempo of high<br />

threat surveillance roles, then<br />

maybe this TM-187<br />

(CCP/ANZSPO/00470/2002)<br />

might just be the solution. Should<br />

it be approved for further<br />

investigation, its number one<br />

hurdle would not be technical,<br />

financial or manpower in nature,<br />

but cultural.<br />

However this technological step<br />

should not be viewed as the end<br />

of sea-faring days, but as a force<br />

mutliplier that allows a mediumsized<br />

navy much greater flexibility<br />

in the manning of her deployed<br />

ships.<br />

• Communications Link Failure<br />

Technically, the concept’s<br />

vulnerability undoubtedly lies in<br />

maintaining a quick and reliable<br />

high bandwidth data channel<br />

continuously. At this point I see<br />

two options should the<br />

communications link fail for<br />

whatever reason:<br />

a. In peace time, the ship would<br />

sail at best speed to the<br />

nearest homeport; or<br />

b. In times of war, the ship would<br />

revert to a Full ADC mode, and<br />

continue to actively prosecute<br />

anything that does not return<br />

the correct IFF Mode 4<br />

response.<br />

Support and Maintenance<br />

philosophy<br />

Condition fault codes from all<br />

networked systems with a Built-In<br />

Test, would communicate these<br />

codes over the RNU, for MOTUs<br />

and FIMAs to diagnose and<br />

correct when the ship was<br />

alongside again.<br />

Unfortunately due to the need for<br />

onboard technicians to perform<br />

Planned Maintenance routines on<br />

their equipment, ships could only<br />

spend a week at sea. As fitted<br />

equipment becomes more<br />

reliable and self-sufficient, the<br />

maximum period of time a vessel<br />

could operate unmanned would<br />

increase.<br />

• The roles of an unmanned ship<br />

An unmanned warship would still<br />

need to be piloted in and out of<br />

harbour, through high traffic<br />

straits and environmentally<br />

sensitive areas. Furthermore an<br />

unmanned warship is incapable<br />

of performing functions such as<br />

boarding operations. For these<br />

reasons, an unmanned warship<br />

would primarily be used for<br />

surveillance and patrol<br />

(Configuration A), and form part<br />

of a larger manned taskgroup in<br />

blue water areas (Configuration<br />

B).<br />

• SWOT Analysis<br />

Strengths –<br />

Efficiency - The savings in<br />

operational costs in the lifetime<br />

of just one unmanned warship,<br />

could fund many other projects.<br />

Capability - The RAN could plan<br />

and implement for taskgroups,<br />

that have far greater mission<br />

capablility than a single ship,<br />

more frequently.<br />

Weaknesses –<br />

Real-time Control - Software<br />

integration is the number one risk<br />

here. Real time controls over a<br />

sophisticated communications<br />

system, will introduce a time<br />

delay of at least a few seconds in<br />

what is a closed loop system.<br />

Opportunities –<br />

Manning - A Flexible Manning<br />

Policy could be introduced, to suit<br />

the operational requirements of<br />

the day. A ship fitted with a<br />

Remote Network Unit, could still<br />

be operated as a traditionally<br />

fully manned warship, with the<br />

combat system booted up in<br />

‘local control’.<br />

Ship Design and Supportability -<br />

Utilising manned spaces, for<br />

greater fuel, ammunition and<br />

FIGURE 3 – COLLABERATED C2 OF A TASK GROUP


32 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

equipment capacity would<br />

dramatically increase a warship’s<br />

capability. On the flip side,<br />

ensuring a ship could operate<br />

manned or unmanned from the<br />

one baseline, would work quite<br />

favourably for our support<br />

systems.<br />

Operations - The possibility of colocating<br />

all the ships’ “Remote<br />

Ops Room” of a task group, in the<br />

same underground bunker as that<br />

of your operations and<br />

intelligence centre has many<br />

warfare advantages.<br />

Threats -<br />

Captured / Rogue ships – When<br />

a ship is unmanned a security<br />

system would be needed to<br />

detect movement in her internal<br />

and external spaces. The<br />

detection of motion would alert<br />

command, of a possible intrusion<br />

into the unmanned vessel.<br />

The possibility of an unmanned<br />

ship going ‘rogue’ should the<br />

communications link fail, was<br />

addressed in a paragraph titled<br />

exactly that.<br />

International Regulations -<br />

Compliance with International<br />

Maritime Organisation (IMO)<br />

standards will prove challenging.<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

The Design and Concept for an<br />

Unmanned Major Surface<br />

Combatant has been shown to be<br />

a technically feasible major<br />

project, that would provide the<br />

RAN with an enormous force<br />

multiplier, and also making a<br />

Flexible Manning Policy possible.<br />

Its first step would be to ‘prove<br />

the concept’ of the Remote<br />

Network Unit.<br />

Undoubtedly the two biggest<br />

technical risks - Communications<br />

Link Failure and the need for<br />

ongoing Organisational level<br />

maintenance, dictates that<br />

Configuration B would be the far<br />

more sustainable option. Here the<br />

drone ship(s) is controlled and<br />

supported by a fully manned<br />

Command Ship. For IMO<br />

compliance, a qualified OOW<br />

could be rotated through to act<br />

as a safety number for pilotage of<br />

the ship.<br />

I urge the Senior Engineers of the<br />

RAN to take this design and<br />

concept seriously, and comment<br />

in this open forum regarding the<br />

idea, as Unmanned Warships may<br />

be more of a necessity rather<br />

than science fiction as this<br />

Operational Tempo begins to slow<br />

down.<br />

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: SBLT Nissen joined<br />

the RAN as an undergraduate in 1997,<br />

before completing his AWEEO time on<br />

HMAS ANZAC.<br />

He has since been posted to the ANZAC<br />

SPO and recently formed Combat Support<br />

Group, and is now employed as the<br />

Development Engineer within the Surface<br />

Combatant FEG.<br />

In the civilian arena he has won awards<br />

from Farnell and the Nescafe Big Break<br />

Competition for Computer Hardware /<br />

Software design.<br />

BLOHM + VOSS’S MEKO D FRIGATE DESIGN


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

33<br />

Turning Things Around – A<br />

Team effort<br />

CAPT CRAIG KERR,<br />

DIRECTOR, NAVY PROFESSIONAL<br />

REQUIREMENTS (ENGINEERING<br />

AND LOGISTICS)<br />

In the second issue of the <strong>Navy</strong> Engineering Bulletin I wrote an article<br />

regarding workforce structures which pondered the underlying reasons<br />

why RAN technical workforces are seemingly ‘upside down’ and<br />

unsustainable. One of the main points of the article was that through<br />

modernising our <strong>Navy</strong> we had changed the required ratio of Senior<br />

Sailors to Junior Sailors. But, by reducing the relative requirement for<br />

Junior Sailors we have unwittingly decimated the ‘breeding ground’ for<br />

our Senior Sailors.<br />

In this article, I will touch on the<br />

changes that have been<br />

developed to address the ANZAC<br />

MT conundrum. I offer it as an<br />

example of what can be achieved<br />

when adequate time and<br />

resource are made available and<br />

focussed effort is put into<br />

resolving problems. There has<br />

been tremendous teamwork<br />

across and beyond the RAN in<br />

addressing not only the specific<br />

ANZAC MT problem, but also in<br />

taking on other technical<br />

personnel issues across <strong>Navy</strong>.<br />

ANZAC Marine Technicians<br />

There have been some exciting<br />

developments regarding the<br />

ANZAC MTs, which you may recall<br />

had more POMTs in their<br />

workforces than LSMTs. (This<br />

made for an “upside down”<br />

workforce structure and carried<br />

with it unsustainable manpower<br />

overheads.) A comprehensive<br />

‘reverse engineering’ of the<br />

Organisational and Corrective<br />

Maintenance requirements has<br />

been completed together with an<br />

analysis of a number of options<br />

to restructure the ANZAC MT<br />

workforce. The result was that it<br />

can be demonstrated the ANZAC<br />

MTs can have a sustainable<br />

workforce and meet the onboard<br />

‘O’ level maintenance<br />

requirement, (there are, of<br />

course, limits and a number of<br />

caveats to this statement)<br />

Trials and implementation<br />

subsequently commenced.<br />

HMAS ANZAC deployed with extra<br />

bunks fitted and additional crew<br />

to facilitate transition into the<br />

new structure. The end state<br />

increases the onboard MT<br />

Scheme of Complement by one<br />

ABMT per Ship. (Shock, Horror –<br />

8 sea going billets across the<br />

class. But...) The number of<br />

POMTs is reduced and offset by<br />

an increase in LSMTs and in<br />

doing so we can re-align the<br />

driving rank and actually reduce<br />

the ANZAC Class total (sea and<br />

shore) liability from approx 890<br />

MT billets to 445. Smoke and<br />

mirrors, you might say but the<br />

facts are we simply don’t have<br />

the 890 personnel and are<br />

unlikely to even get them / afford<br />

them. What has been done here<br />

is an optimisation of the available<br />

/ projected available ANZAC MT<br />

workforce, and adjustment of the<br />

workloads to best fit the available<br />

workforce. We are trying to live<br />

within our means.<br />

Use the Technology!<br />

In order to make this work it was<br />

necessary to free up the talent<br />

invested in our Engineer Officer of<br />

the Watch (EOOW) at the POMT<br />

level tied to the Machinery<br />

Control Room Consoles<br />

watchkeeping. The analysis found<br />

that we actually needed the<br />

POMTs to supervise maintenance<br />

rather than watchkeep in the<br />

traditional manner. It was also<br />

considered that the levels of<br />

protection and automation<br />

provided by the machinery<br />

controls did not justify the<br />

presence of an EOOW qualified<br />

technician in the MCR under<br />

most circumstances. An<br />

alternatively (lesser) qualified<br />

person should be able to safely<br />

monitor and control the plant –<br />

and bring it to a safe state under<br />

fault conditions.<br />

The above considerations also<br />

prompted a questioning of<br />

current paradigms relating to all<br />

MT watchkeeper requirements.<br />

Through a fairly intense series of<br />

Marine Engineering Advisory<br />

Group (MEAG) meetings we are<br />

changing towards more relevant /<br />

modern watchkeeping<br />

arrangements. There is reinvigoration<br />

in the air. Technology<br />

already embedded in our Ships is<br />

being utilised more appropriately.<br />

There have also been a number<br />

of trials conducted in Major Fleet<br />

Units which break the mould of<br />

machinery rounds and recording<br />

data (seemingly) just for the sake<br />

of recording it. I personally<br />

believe rounds need to further


34 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

evolve from a data recording<br />

exercise to really assessing plant<br />

performance, identifying<br />

developing problems and<br />

preventing accidents. We are a<br />

smart <strong>Navy</strong> – time to get with the<br />

times.<br />

Where we now have Ships that, to<br />

a much greater degree, have<br />

automated systems and autoinitiate<br />

corrective ‘fail to safe’<br />

capability, we should capitalise<br />

on the utility of those systems<br />

and free up our technicians.<br />

Modern personnel systems need<br />

to be applied to the modern<br />

technology available in the Fleet.<br />

WOMT Mark Richardson’s “ERUS”<br />

article in this NEB discusses in<br />

more detail the issues I have<br />

touched on above.<br />

Resource and Teamwork<br />

I am really excited about the<br />

quantum improvements springing<br />

out of the ANZAC MT initiatives.<br />

But these improvements have not<br />

come about without focussing on<br />

real problems, resourcing and<br />

using a team approach.<br />

To address this problem firstly<br />

required the “right” people to<br />

really “listen” and to quarantine<br />

the time to really do something<br />

about it. Support from Naval<br />

Personnel and Training (NPT)<br />

branch in facilitating WOMT Brad<br />

Whitford’s return to Continuous<br />

Full Time Service was key to<br />

getting the ball rolling. Brad has<br />

taken a leading role in this<br />

project and all parties have<br />

endeavoured to ensure this<br />

project remained his primary<br />

task. We all considered it was<br />

important he did not get dragged<br />

off to do “other things” as all too<br />

often happens.<br />

Analysis of the problem and<br />

solution development used input<br />

at various stages from the<br />

Workforce Planners, DNPR(E&L)<br />

and in particular, the ANZAC CEM.<br />

The MEAGs provided a<br />

consultative forum for the Marine<br />

Engineering community, including<br />

the RNZN and considerable<br />

information flow was achieved.<br />

Most certainly, the results of<br />

surveying of crews shaped the<br />

direction taken. A vital<br />

consideration has been<br />

acceptance and ownership of the<br />

changes by those they most<br />

concern, the Marine Engineers<br />

and Technicians.<br />

MHQ Engineering Division<br />

initiated and successfully trialed<br />

revisions to watchkeeper routines<br />

within the Fleet. High level<br />

direction and support was<br />

willingly afforded by the SCFEG<br />

Commander, DGNPT and CNE.<br />

Noting the FEG-centric structure<br />

of the <strong>Navy</strong> we tried as far as<br />

practicable to facilitate the<br />

changes through the FEG. So far,<br />

there has been great enthusiasm<br />

from the crews, and in particular<br />

from HMAS ANZAC, the first Ship<br />

to be “converted”.<br />

Resourcing the Category<br />

Sponsors at DNPR(E&L) by<br />

actually getting our MT billets<br />

filled has empowered the team!<br />

This rings true also for the WE/ET<br />

and AE/AT category sponsors who<br />

are also kicking goals (I will leave<br />

you to read their respective<br />

articles in future NEB’s).<br />

The message is clear, you must<br />

provide resource (the right people<br />

with enough time) if you are<br />

going to have any hope of solving<br />

problems.<br />

The Bottom Line<br />

I have been at this now for 3<br />

years and it’s time to move on.<br />

Undertaking the role of<br />

DNPR(E&L) has been an<br />

education for me. I hope I have<br />

been able to positively contribute<br />

to the future of engineering and<br />

time will tell. Perhaps the most<br />

rewarding part of this job has<br />

been the fantastic support I have<br />

enjoyed from the <strong>Navy</strong> at all<br />

levels. The bottom line is we are<br />

all in this together. Our <strong>Navy</strong> is<br />

small and resources are tight. We<br />

will not succeed in turning things<br />

around unless we work as a<br />

coherent, efficient team.<br />

By the time you read this I will<br />

have handed over to CAPT Peter<br />

Law. Please support him in the<br />

same way you have supported<br />

me.<br />

All the best,<br />

Craig Kerr<br />

About the author: Capt Craig Kerr joined<br />

the <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> on the UVEN<br />

scheme from Monash University in 1979.<br />

He has served in numerous RAN warships<br />

and was MEO of HMA Ships Darwin and<br />

Perth. His shore postings have covered a<br />

range of areas including Ship repair, refit<br />

and material support, quality assurance<br />

and training delivery. In the training role he<br />

served on the staff at CERBERUS and<br />

RNEC Manadon. Twice on the engineering<br />

staff of MHQ, he more recently served as<br />

FMEO. Capt Kerr was elected Fellow of the<br />

Institution of Engineers, Australia in 2002,<br />

and has finally been posted to CDSS<br />

thanks to the hint he dropped in Issue 2 of<br />

the <strong>Navy</strong> Engineering Bulletin!


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

35<br />

CPOATT - Aviation<br />

Technician<br />

Inaugural Diploma<br />

Presentation<br />

October 24, 2002 saw the inaugural presentation of the ‘Diploma in<br />

Aeronautical Engineering - Maintenance’, to graduates of the first two<br />

CPOATT-AT courses, co-conducted by the <strong>Royal</strong> Melbourne Institute of<br />

Technology (RMIT) and the RAN.<br />

CPOATA ROHAN DENMAN<br />

NASPO<br />

HMAS ALBATROSS<br />

The presentations were made by<br />

Professor Nelson Chen, Vice<br />

chancellor of RMIT and CAPT<br />

DePetrio RAN (COS-AVN).<br />

The graduation represented the<br />

culmination in the shift of<br />

technical training towards a<br />

competency-based scheme,<br />

which began with the introduction<br />

of the Technical Training Plan<br />

1992 (TTP92).<br />

The presentation also marked the<br />

successful association between<br />

RMIT and the RAN, in the delivery<br />

of Aviation Technician training.<br />

The coupling of the RAN’s<br />

Advanced Technical Training<br />

continuum and RMIT’s Aerospace<br />

Engineering Curriculum being the<br />

result of many years’ hard work.<br />

The Aviation Advanced Technical<br />

Training Continuum is designed to<br />

provide the RAN with Chief Petty<br />

Officers who can undertake the<br />

demanding duties of Flight Senior<br />

Maintenance Sailor (FSMS).<br />

Such duties require high levels of<br />

professional competency,<br />

foresight and flexibility. The<br />

responsibilities associated with<br />

Technical Airworthiness cannot be<br />

under-estimated, and the<br />

associated training must be of<br />

the highest standards. It could<br />

be argued that the position of<br />

FSMS is one of the most arduous<br />

tasks that can be given to a Non-<br />

Commissioned Officer, in the ADF.<br />

BACKGROUND<br />

Most ADF personnel are aware<br />

that the environment in which we<br />

operate and work has changed<br />

significantly in recent years. This<br />

is particularly so in the areas of<br />

technology, acquisition and<br />

Industry policy, as well as the way<br />

government expects us to<br />

manage our assets and<br />

expenditure. 1<br />

No longer can we operate with a<br />

purely military mentality,<br />

distancing ourselves from the<br />

civilian world. The ever increasing<br />

sophistication of ADF Aviation<br />

assets, combined with an<br />

increase in Defence<br />

civilianisation, has seen on-going<br />

Contractor involvement in<br />

maintenance and management<br />

activities.<br />

Concurrently, the shift to Tri-<br />

Service Aviation Regulations has<br />

seen an increase in the need to<br />

meet higher airworthiness<br />

standards. ADF Aviation technical<br />

personnel are often delegated<br />

specific authority to make<br />

engineering decisions. These<br />

personnel are required to<br />

understand the legal liability for<br />

their decisions, or the decisions<br />

of staff who make decisions on<br />

their behalf. The modern<br />

Technical manager is therefore<br />

required to have a higher level of<br />

awareness, technical expertise<br />

and management skills, than their<br />

predecessors.<br />

They are required to be more<br />

safety and quality assurance<br />

focused, while aiming to get the<br />

most out of their equipment,<br />

people and money – both afloat<br />

and ashore. This need requires<br />

special engineering and<br />

management skills. The modern<br />

Technical manager must have an<br />

understanding of whole of life<br />

management, mathematics,<br />

statistics, as well as being able to<br />

define measurable performance<br />

and quality indicators.<br />

Inter-woven with the expectations<br />

described above, has been the<br />

need to develop, articulate and<br />

implement career structures that<br />

deliver the engineering expertise<br />

required by the ADF in the future.<br />

There is also an on-going need to<br />

ensure that our knowledge<br />

remains current, with well<br />

considered professional<br />

development and career<br />

management programs that<br />

consider the needs of the ADF<br />

and the individual.<br />

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT<br />

In June 1998, The Chief Naval<br />

Engineer endorsed the<br />

establishment of an Advanced<br />

Diploma (in a relevant technology<br />

discipline)(ADT), as the indicative<br />

minimum educational


36 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

qualification for AE/ME/WEE<br />

Charge Qualification (CQ).<br />

On 18 October 2000, the Chiefs<br />

of Staff Committee (COSC)<br />

endorsed recommendations for<br />

the Senior Review Team report on<br />

improvements to the ADF Aviation<br />

capability. An endorsed<br />

recommendation was that ‘Air<br />

Forces Engineering sustainability<br />

project be widened to an ADF<br />

Aerospace Engineering<br />

Sustainability Project’. A Key<br />

area identified was Professional<br />

development.<br />

CN had endorsed a similar<br />

program for <strong>Navy</strong>, to that being<br />

conducted by the RAAF, for the<br />

development of Aerospace<br />

Engineers. This initiative aligned<br />

with strategies identified for <strong>Navy</strong><br />

Key Result Area 10: Learning<br />

Organisation, by cultivating the<br />

intellectual capital of its<br />

Aerospace Engineers.<br />

In November 2000, the Advanced<br />

Diploma (Technical) stream was<br />

introduced to provide CC<br />

qualified Senior Sailors with an<br />

avenue to progress to Engineering<br />

Officer, without the need to<br />

undertake a four-year engineering<br />

Degree. This scheme is known as<br />

‘The Engineer Officer Scheme’<br />

(EOS). It strives to recognise the<br />

experience, technical charge<br />

qualification and competence of<br />

technical senior sailors.<br />

All Technical sailors with a CC, by<br />

virtue of their accumulated<br />

training and experience, now only<br />

require an Advanced Diploma (in<br />

the relevant discipline) to enable<br />

them to enter the EO charge<br />

program.<br />

This has been seen as creating<br />

challenging, meaningful and<br />

rewarding employment for all<br />

engineering personnel, as well as<br />

providing personalised and<br />

decisive technical HR<br />

management. It also serves to<br />

provide professional recognition<br />

within the wider ADF and civilian<br />

community.<br />

The level of education provided<br />

by the Diploma and Advanced<br />

Diploma of Aerospace<br />

Engineering is suited to ensuring<br />

that <strong>Navy</strong> continues to be an<br />

‘informed customer’, with access<br />

to the latest technological<br />

advances.<br />

ADVANCED TECHNICAL<br />

TRAINING<br />

Aviation Advanced Technical<br />

Training aims to address the<br />

issues identified above, as well as<br />

keeping abreast of developing<br />

issues in the wider Aviation<br />

community, that may impact on<br />

the ADF at a future date.<br />

The Naval Aviation Training<br />

Continuum seeks to develop a<br />

technician (Able Seaman), into a<br />

Manager (CPO), capable of<br />

maintaining and managing Naval<br />

helicopters, maintenance<br />

personnel and support<br />

equipment, at sea or remote from<br />

parent squadrons.<br />

At each rank after Able Seaman,<br />

specific Aviation ATT courses<br />

(LSATT, POATT, and CPOATT)(Coconducted<br />

by RMIT and the RAN)<br />

are coupled with <strong>Navy</strong> generic<br />

Leadership and Management<br />

courses (LSLC, POMC).<br />

These courses are undertaken at<br />

each rank to enable us to<br />

develop our tradespeople into<br />

technical supervisors/managers,<br />

with varying increased levels of<br />

supervision/management<br />

responsibilities, at each rank<br />

STANDING (L TO R) CPO ROBERT MOORE- CPO CRAIG JOHNSON-CPO DARREN MURRAY-CPO DAVE WOODS-CPO FRED CAMPBELL-CPO ANTONY<br />

WILLIAMS-CPO MARK MCGUINESS-CPO BILL MORSCH-PO DANNY SIMEON-PO RAI WINKLER-CPO JAMIE EDWARDS- PO GARY BURNS-CPO ROHAN<br />

DENMAN-CPO BARRY TRAPP<br />

SITTING (L TO R) LEUT DUANE UNWIN-LCDR PETER BURLEY- CAPTAIN VINCENZO DIPIETRO- PROFESSOR NELSON CHEN- MR IAN BAILEY- WO IAN<br />

DAVIES.


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

37<br />

level. This approach ensures<br />

those generic principles of<br />

supervision; leadership and<br />

management that apply across<br />

the wider Naval communities’<br />

non-commissioned ranks, are<br />

coupled with the specific Naval<br />

Aviation responsibilities inherent<br />

in the Naval Aviation<br />

maintenance system.<br />

The training is derived from<br />

Aviation competency standards<br />

(3 for LS, 10 for PO and 8 for<br />

CPO), which define the category<br />

employment profile for each rank<br />

level.<br />

On promotion to Chief Petty<br />

Officer, the CPO-ATT Competency<br />

Journal is required to be<br />

completed, before FSMS<br />

authorisation is granted. FSMS<br />

authorisation being one of the<br />

eligibility requirements for<br />

promotion to Warrant Officer.<br />

Chief Petty Officers are involved in<br />

the management, co-ordination<br />

and supervision of aircraft<br />

maintenance activities at the<br />

squadron level, as well as on<br />

detachments ashore and<br />

embarked. They also have<br />

increased responsibilities for the<br />

management of aircraft<br />

configuration, performance<br />

testing, QA and OH&S, while<br />

authorised as an FSMS.<br />

SUMMARY:<br />

The inaugural presentation of the<br />

‘Diploma in Aeronautical<br />

Engineering - Maintenance’, sees<br />

Naval Aviation Technicians being<br />

recognised for their high levels of<br />

skill and training. With the Civil<br />

Aviation Safety Authority (CASA),<br />

looking to introduce the ‘Diploma’<br />

as the minimum requirement for<br />

Licensed Aircraft Mechanical<br />

Engineer (LAME) in the near<br />

future, Naval Aviation personnel<br />

are set to be at the fore-front of<br />

training and recognition, both in<br />

the ADF and Civilian Aviation<br />

communities.<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY:<br />

(Extracts from Speech given by CAPT<br />

DePetrio; 24 November 2002)<br />

(Extracts from Article by CMDR Varcoe RAN,<br />

Naval Engineering Bulletin; June 2001)<br />

(Extracts from Article by CMDR Varcoe RAN,<br />

Naval Engineering Bulletin; February 2002)<br />

(Extracts from Article by LEUT Unwin RAN,<br />

Naval Engineering Bulletin; August 2002)<br />

(Extract from Article by WOATA Tunnah,<br />

Naval Engineering Bulletin; August 2002)<br />

(Extracts from Article by CDRE Barter, Naval<br />

Engineering Bulletin; August 2002)<br />

(Extracts from Article by LCDR Cairney,<br />

Naval Engineering Bulletin; February 2002)<br />

(Extracts from Article by CMDR Hamilton,<br />

Naval Engineering Bulletin; February 2002)<br />

(Extracts from Article by CDRE Joseph,<br />

Naval Engineering Bulletin; February 2002)


38 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

DR ALUN ROBERTS, THE ASSET<br />

PARTNERSHIP<br />

Revolutionising Naval<br />

Maintenance with RCM<br />

Introduction<br />

This article describes the application of Reliability-centred Maintenance (RCM)<br />

to Naval assets and the revolutionary changes being made through its<br />

application.<br />

Over the years, several myths and<br />

misunderstandings have arisen<br />

about RCM: what it is; whether it<br />

consumes too much resource,<br />

whether it can be applied to all<br />

types of naval assets including<br />

structures; whether the ends<br />

justify the means. Following the<br />

recent visit to Australia by<br />

Commander Nigel Morris RN,<br />

Head of the <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Navy</strong>’s Warship<br />

Support Agency RCM Group,<br />

considerable interest has again<br />

been raised within the RAN about<br />

the RCM process and how it can<br />

be applied to review and reduce<br />

burdensome maintenance<br />

workloads. It is apparent that the<br />

RN has made enormous progress<br />

over the past five to six years in<br />

implementing RCM-based<br />

maintenance programmes to the<br />

Hunt Class MCMVs, Type 23<br />

Frigates and other platforms and<br />

that the benefits of RCM no<br />

longer need justification in the<br />

naval context. The RAN (through<br />

ANZAC) and the US <strong>Navy</strong>’s Naval<br />

Air Warfare Center have also<br />

started using RCM to review<br />

maintenance policies across a<br />

range of systems.<br />

practices been more necessary<br />

than in the aviation industry<br />

during the late 1950s and early<br />

1960s. In this post-war period,<br />

new aircraft types were being<br />

FIGURE 1: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE.<br />

brought into service with new<br />

technologies (greatly increased<br />

numbers of hydraulic, pneumatic,<br />

electro-mechanical and electronic<br />

systems) placing new and<br />

unforeseen demands on<br />

operators and maintainers.<br />

Up to this time aviation<br />

equipment had been much<br />

simpler and less stressed, with<br />

underlying maintenance policy<br />

being based on the belief that<br />

components and equipment<br />

displayed a ‘useful life’ after<br />

for equipment types was believed<br />

to increase around a specific<br />

number of operating periods as<br />

shown in Figure 1.<br />

As the new generation of aircraft<br />

entered service, aviation<br />

accidents associated with<br />

equipment failure were becoming<br />

more frequent to the point at<br />

which the US Federal Aviation<br />

Authority undertook a<br />

fundamental review of aircraft<br />

maintenance and safety. A major<br />

finding was that failure was<br />

considerably more complex than<br />

had previously been thought.<br />

There were in fact not one, but six<br />

patterns governing equipment<br />

failure, as we see in Figure 2.<br />

Against a background of having<br />

to do more with less, RCM offers<br />

a proven and robust means for<br />

the <strong>Navy</strong> to obtain maintenance<br />

‘value for money’ and, in parallel,<br />

improve operating safety, system<br />

reliability and platform<br />

availability.<br />

The need for change<br />

Nowhere was the need for change<br />

in maintenance thinking and<br />

FIGURE 2: THE SIX FAILURE PATTERNS<br />

which failures would accelerate in<br />

frequency. In response,<br />

maintenance policies were<br />

developed to change or overhaul<br />

items as they approached this<br />

perceived ‘life’. Graphically, the<br />

conditional probability of failure<br />

Recognition of these patterns<br />

heralded a revolution in the world<br />

of aviation maintenance and<br />

equipment design. Patterns A, B<br />

and C supported the existence of<br />

age-related failure, but only in a<br />

relatively small percentage of


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

39<br />

cases (11%), whereas Patterns D,<br />

E and F were not age related and<br />

constituted the vast majority of<br />

failures (89%). In the case of<br />

Pattern F, scheduled overhaul<br />

activities associated with the<br />

traditional Pattern B introduced<br />

infant mortality and contributed<br />

to early life failures and the<br />

appalling accident rate at the<br />

time of 60 crashes per million<br />

take-offs (approximately 40 of<br />

these being due to equipment<br />

failure).<br />

The low percentage of age-related<br />

failures (Patterns A, B and C) and<br />

the preponderance of failure<br />

patterns D, E and F in automated<br />

systems shifted the aviation world<br />

towards an emphasis on<br />

condition-based maintenance<br />

with a corresponding move away<br />

from scheduled overhaul activity<br />

as the primary means of asset<br />

care. This shift in maintenance<br />

focus has been at the root of a<br />

120-fold improvement in aircraft<br />

safety due to equipment failure<br />

since the mid 1960s.<br />

The history and development of<br />

RCM<br />

Recognition of the complex<br />

nature of aviation equipment<br />

failure culminated in a new<br />

approach to the development of<br />

aircraft maintenance programmes<br />

which was first trialed on the<br />

Boeing 747 in the late 1960s.<br />

This methodology, known as<br />

MSG-1 recognised that:<br />

• scheduled overhaul had little<br />

effect on overall reliability of a<br />

complex item unless there was a<br />

dominant age related failure<br />

mode;<br />

• the intrusive nature of the<br />

overhaul activity itself was the<br />

cause of unreliability; and<br />

• there are many items and failures<br />

for which there is no effective<br />

form of scheduled preventive<br />

and/or predictive maintenance.<br />

Over the subsequent decade, the<br />

rudimentary MSG-1 approach<br />

was further developed and<br />

towards the end of the 1970s,<br />

both commercial airline and<br />

defence aviation safety and<br />

reliability had been transformed.<br />

In 1974, the US Department of<br />

Defense commissioned United<br />

Airlines to prepare a report on<br />

the processes used by the civil<br />

aviation industry to prepare<br />

maintenance programmes for<br />

aircraft. The resulting document,<br />

entitled ‘Reliability-centred<br />

Maintenance’ by its’ authors, Stan<br />

Nowlan and Howard Heap,<br />

heralded the birth of a new era in<br />

maintenance programme<br />

development. Reliability-centred<br />

Maintenance is therefore the<br />

specific maintenance<br />

development process described<br />

in this report.<br />

In the early 1980s, RCM was first<br />

applied to non-aviation assets,<br />

primarily in the South African<br />

mining industry through John<br />

Moubray. Through this pioneering<br />

work, Moubray discovered that<br />

the original Nowlan and Heap<br />

FIGURE 3: RCM DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1965<br />

concept, though sound, needed<br />

further development for nonaviation<br />

use and also required a<br />

comprehensive training process<br />

to underpin it. In 1990, Moubray<br />

developed the industrial version<br />

of RCM known as RCM II which<br />

over the past decade or so has<br />

become the standard approach<br />

adopted throughout the world.<br />

The principal developments of<br />

RCM over a thirty year period are<br />

shown above (Figure 3).<br />

In the mid 1990’s, the <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Navy</strong><br />

developed a naval version of<br />

Moubray’s RCM II known originally<br />

as Naval Engineering Standard<br />

45, since issued as Defence<br />

Standard 02-45. Both RCM II<br />

and Def Stan 02-45 approaches<br />

are fully compliant with a new<br />

SAE Standard SAE JA 1011<br />

(Evaluation Criteria for Reliabilitycentred<br />

Maintenance processes).<br />

So what is RCM?<br />

RCM is a process used to<br />

determine the maintenance<br />

requirements of any physical<br />

asset so that it fulfils its intended<br />

functions over the life cycle and<br />

in its’ operating context. The RCM<br />

process must therefore start by<br />

defining user requirements or<br />

‘functions’. This in itself is usually<br />

something of a challenge for<br />

most organisations. Unless this<br />

user requirement is understood, it<br />

is hardly surprising that operators<br />

and maintainers have difficulty<br />

agreeing and communicating on<br />

when equipment failure has<br />

occurred.<br />

SAE JA 1011 compliant RCM<br />

asks the following seven<br />

questions from which a<br />

comprehensive approach to<br />

failure for the asset can be<br />

developed:<br />

• What are the functions of the<br />

asset in its present operating<br />

context?<br />

• How can the asset fail to fulfil<br />

each function?<br />

• What would cause each<br />

functional failure?


40 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

• What happens when each failure<br />

occurs?<br />

• In what way does each failure<br />

matter?<br />

• What can be done to predict or<br />

prevent each failure?<br />

• What should be done if no<br />

suitable proactive task can be<br />

found?<br />

The first four questions develop a<br />

functional Failure Modes and<br />

Effects Analysis (FMEA) and the<br />

last two define the appropriate<br />

failure management policy. The<br />

vitally important fifth question<br />

determines how we should react<br />

to the failure in relation to<br />

whether the failure is ‘Hidden’ or<br />

‘Evident’ and whether Safety, the<br />

Environment or Operations<br />

(Mission in the naval sense) are<br />

FIGURE 4: TYPICAL RCM REVIEW GROUP<br />

affected. These seven questions<br />

can only sensibly be answered by<br />

people who know the asset best;<br />

this includes maintainers and<br />

operators, supplemented by<br />

representatives from OEMs The<br />

group (a typical example of which<br />

is shown in Figure 4) is guided<br />

through the RCM process by a<br />

competent ‘Facilitator’ who is an<br />

expert in the RCM process and its<br />

application rather than the<br />

system expert.<br />

RCM is an integral part of the<br />

Integrated Logistic Support (ILS)<br />

process as defined in Def Stan<br />

00-60 (and highlighted in Def<br />

Stan 02-45). The process falls<br />

squarely within the Logistic<br />

Support Analysis (LSA) process<br />

and provides inputs which are<br />

needed for a rational approach to<br />

spares, tools and skills<br />

determination.<br />

Application of RCM produces a<br />

‘safe minimum’ maintenance<br />

programme which includes:<br />

• A comprehensive range of failure<br />

management tasks for<br />

maintenance and operations staff<br />

(incorporating predictive,<br />

preventive, detective maintenance<br />

as well as the foundation for the<br />

development of all likely<br />

corrective tasks);<br />

• Mandated and recommended<br />

redesigns of either the asset or<br />

the way it is operated or<br />

maintained; and<br />

• Recommendations for ‘no<br />

scheduled maintenance’ or runto-failure<br />

which require the<br />

development of strategies to deal<br />

with such failures as they occur.<br />

The process has been applied<br />

widely to mechanical, electrical<br />

and electronic systems as well as<br />

to platform structures. John<br />

Moubray’s book ‘Reliabilitycentred<br />

Maintenance’ and Def<br />

Stan 02-45 both provide<br />

comprehensive details of how this<br />

is achieved.<br />

The RN RCM Programme<br />

Following a Strategic Defence<br />

Review in the early 1990s, a<br />

decision was made by the <strong>Royal</strong><br />

<strong>Navy</strong> to use RCM to address<br />

excessive maintenance manpower<br />

and resource costs and to<br />

develop a rational approach to<br />

risk management and extension<br />

of upkeep cycles. Since RCM<br />

was a ‘new’ technology for naval<br />

platforms and systems, although<br />

well established in many other<br />

applications, full implementation<br />

was to be dependent of the<br />

success of a trial to be<br />

conducted on the Hunt Class<br />

HUNT CLASS MCMV<br />

MCMVs. If successful, application<br />

would proceed across the fleet to<br />

include frigates, auxiliaries and<br />

submarines.<br />

At the outset, the decision was<br />

made to apply a ‘Whole of<br />

Platform’ approach, using the<br />

RCM process as a means of not<br />

only reviewing maintenance on<br />

specific systems, but also<br />

providing a solid foundation for<br />

optimising upkeep cycles.<br />

Hunt Class Trial<br />

The Hunt Class trial began in<br />

1996 and used four vessels as a<br />

control group for comparison with<br />

non-RCM maintained vessels.<br />

Selection was based on:<br />

• Hunt possessing the majority of<br />

the significant functions of larger<br />

vessels (Float-Move-Fight);<br />

• Systems being sufficiently<br />

complex to test the RCM process<br />

comprehensively; and<br />

• Low risk to fleet operations if the<br />

trial was not successful.<br />

The RCM analysis took place in<br />

1996 and 1997 following a<br />

period developing Naval


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

41<br />

Engineering Standard 45 and an<br />

associated database and<br />

maintenance management<br />

software package (much like<br />

AMPS). After completing a<br />

functional model of the vessel,<br />

around 15,000 failure modes<br />

were run through the RCM<br />

decision-making process using<br />

teams comprising experienced<br />

staff who had worked closely with<br />

the systems in service and a<br />

range of OEM representatives.<br />

Of the 15,000 failure modes<br />

examined, it was found that just<br />

20% responded to some form of<br />

condition-based maintenance,<br />

whilst ‘traditional’ scheduled<br />

restoration or discard was only<br />

appropriate for just 6% of all<br />

failure modes. A further 18% of<br />

the failure modes required was<br />

associated with protective<br />

devices which required detective<br />

maintenance or ‘failure finding’ as<br />

this is known in RCM. Two thirds<br />

of the failure modes did not<br />

respond to any form of proactive<br />

maintenance activity. These<br />

findings lined up closely with the<br />

experiences of the aviation<br />

industry and reflected the<br />

complexity of systems installed.<br />

The first ship to go to sea with an<br />

RCM-based programme was HMS<br />

ATHERSTONE in April 1998<br />

followed by BROCKLESBY,<br />

LEDBURY and QUORN. All<br />

MCMVs are expected to be<br />

operating on RCM-based<br />

maintenance programmes within<br />

the next year to eighteen months.<br />

Results from the trials can be<br />

divided into three categories:<br />

operational costs, availabilities<br />

and impact on HQ and shorebased<br />

support organisations.<br />

• Operating costs for the RCM<br />

control group showed a 19%<br />

reduction over the period of the<br />

trial amounting to £0.5M per<br />

vessel per annum, despite a<br />

stores supply problem which<br />

pushed up spares cost for the<br />

control group. Discounting this<br />

effect, savings in maintenance<br />

effort for the control group were<br />

33% lower.<br />

• Availabilities of the control group<br />

and the non-RCM vessels were<br />

comparable, although the control<br />

group was negatively influenced<br />

by the stores problem above.<br />

Control group availabilities have<br />

improved as stores processes<br />

have been tackled.<br />

• The most significant changes<br />

have been a shift in maintenance<br />

effort from non-Fleet to Fleet<br />

time, and the removal of large<br />

work packages associated with<br />

‘Refits’. All this has required the<br />

development of a more dynamic<br />

relationship between ship and<br />

shore. The associated review of<br />

the Upkeep Cycle has<br />

recommended slightly more<br />

frequent, but shorter dockings –<br />

with an associated increase in<br />

availability to the extent that 9 of<br />

the 10 MCMVs are likely to be<br />

needed for current tasking levels.<br />

Under the previous regime all 10<br />

MCMVs would have been needed.<br />

The potential impact on support<br />

costs is clear if this were to be<br />

followed through to the logical<br />

conclusion.<br />

FIGURE 6: TYPE 23 FRIGATE<br />

Overall costs for running the RCM<br />

programme on Hunt amounted to<br />

£2M. Across the Class, savings<br />

of around £5M per annum are<br />

expected, providing a Return on<br />

Investment measured in months.<br />

The encouraging results of the<br />

Hunt Class trial were sufficient to<br />

harness support for an extensive<br />

programme to apply RCM-based<br />

maintenance regimes to a range<br />

of other platforms, a process<br />

which is now well and truly<br />

underway.<br />

Implementation to Type 23<br />

Frigate<br />

The RCM analysis and<br />

implementation on HMS<br />

Lancaster was completed in mid-<br />

2002, providing confidence that<br />

the RCM process can be applied<br />

to a major warship. Over 31,000<br />

failure modes had been<br />

examined over 377 separate<br />

systems with once again, a major<br />

shift towards condition-based<br />

maintenance with only 14% of<br />

failure modes responding to<br />

some form of scheduled<br />

restoration or discard (overhaul)<br />

activity. Benefits obtained so far<br />

include:<br />

• Removal of maintenance with no<br />

value;<br />

• Less overhaul and reduced<br />

requirement for docking when<br />

compared with the former<br />

maintenance cycle. Reduction in<br />

the time needed for maintenance<br />

is flowing through to shorter<br />

periods available for refit which in<br />

turn is forecast to improve<br />

contractor efficiency;


42 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

• Reduced time needed for testing<br />

and tuning;<br />

• On-line fault diagnostics available<br />

through the RCM analysis and<br />

associated database and<br />

maintenance management<br />

software packages; and<br />

• The acquisition of failure rate<br />

data for specific equipment<br />

failure modes which is better<br />

enabling the determination of<br />

spares requirements and supply<br />

chain location.<br />

• An overall maintenance cost<br />

surface vessels and submarines<br />

by around 2009. These include<br />

Vanguard and Trafalgar Class<br />

submarines, HMS Ocean<br />

Amphibious Assault Ship, and<br />

several <strong>Royal</strong> Fleet Auxiliaries.<br />

Beyond this point, the RCM<br />

activity will be largely associated<br />

with on-going review and<br />

application of the process to new<br />

assets for which RCM to Def Stan<br />

02-45 is an endorsed activity<br />

which was analysed in its’ entirety<br />

using a team comprising RAN<br />

staff and representatives from the<br />

OEMs. As with the RN effort,<br />

reductions in the level of<br />

scheduled discard and<br />

replacement were highlighted and<br />

increased use of condition-based<br />

maintenance techniques were<br />

recommended. This has the<br />

effect of securing the maximum<br />

service from expensive system<br />

components which permit the<br />

FIG 7: FORECAST RN ANNUAL COST SAVINGS THROUGH RCM APPLICATION<br />

VANGUARD SSBN<br />

reduction estimated to be £15M<br />

per annum for the Class.<br />

Future RN Programme and<br />

Benefits<br />

HMS OCEAN<br />

Analysis of several more platform<br />

classes is currently underway with<br />

implementation due to be<br />

complete across the majority of<br />

within ILS. Total expenditure on<br />

RCM activities will be roughly<br />

£40M by this time (covering all<br />

training, software development,<br />

staffing, and contractor support)<br />

with ongoing savings of £50M per<br />

annum by 2009/10, excluding<br />

savings on spares. Additional<br />

benefits are anticipated with<br />

availabilities expected to increase<br />

by around 10-15%. From a<br />

commercial perspective, the RCM<br />

project internal rate of return is<br />

about 80% over this time period<br />

at current interest rates.<br />

RAN and other <strong>Navy</strong> experience<br />

It is not only the <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Navy</strong><br />

which has been busy reviewing<br />

maintenance requirements using<br />

RCM. Over the past eighteen<br />

months or so, the RAN has<br />

applied both Def Stan 02-45 and<br />

RCM II versions of RCM to a<br />

number of assets including three<br />

on HMAS MANOORA and two on<br />

ANZAC.<br />

Particularly noteworthy is the<br />

ANZAC Target Indication Radar<br />

RAN to reduce life cycle support<br />

costs for the Radar by potentially<br />

several millions of dollars without<br />

increasing operational risk.<br />

Not surprisingly, faced with this<br />

type of saving, disbelievers in the<br />

RCM process argue that<br />

reductions in the level of<br />

proactive maintenance will be<br />

quickly followed by increases in<br />

reactive maintenance. The US<br />

<strong>Navy</strong>, through the Naval Air<br />

Warfare Center (Navair) has been<br />

monitoring whether this happens<br />

in practice across a number of<br />

assets which have received RCM<br />

analysis. For these systems,<br />

proactive maintenance effort has<br />

been reduced by between 55 and<br />

80% and corresponding reactive<br />

maintenance has in fact<br />

declined, initially by 5% and now<br />

running in excess of 10%.<br />

What does this mean for the<br />

RAN?<br />

The good news is that several<br />

areas of the RAN are now actively<br />

looking at RCM as the only


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

43<br />

systematic way of reviewing<br />

maintenance requirements with<br />

safety. Pilot programmes for the<br />

ANZAC frigate class together with<br />

the vast experience gained<br />

through the RN implementation<br />

have largely dispelled doubts that<br />

RCM will work in the <strong>Australian</strong><br />

naval context.<br />

However, it is clear there is now a<br />

need to set an overall direction<br />

for RCM for the RAN as a whole<br />

and to set up the management<br />

processes needed to ensure that<br />

outputs are properly<br />

implemented, that the revised<br />

maintenance programmes are<br />

adhered to by each operational<br />

unit and that operators and<br />

maintainers are adequately<br />

trained in new maintenance<br />

procedures.<br />

Further application of RCM will<br />

occur over the forthcoming<br />

months and several members of<br />

the Defence and Contractor<br />

community will have the<br />

opportunity of playing their part<br />

in what promises to be a turning<br />

point in maintenance thinking in<br />

the RAN.<br />

For further information on the<br />

application of RCM within the<br />

RAN, contact Ian O’Hara, Director<br />

of the Centre for Maritime<br />

Engineering or Graham<br />

McDonald, also of CME at<br />

Defence Plaza, Sydney on 02<br />

9377 2335 and 02 9377 2979,<br />

respectively.<br />

About the author: Alun Roberts is a<br />

Director of The Asset Partnership, based in<br />

Sydney. His company has been closely<br />

allied to the RCM implementation<br />

programmes being conducted by the <strong>Royal</strong><br />

<strong>Navy</strong> and the US <strong>Navy</strong>. The Asset<br />

Partnership has supported the RNZN,<br />

ANZAC and ASASMO in RCM reviews of<br />

several systems and is also working closely<br />

with the Army in determining the<br />

supportability requirements of the new<br />

BUSHMASTER Infantry Mobility Vehicle<br />

using RCM II. In addition to working in<br />

world of Defence, The Asset Partnership<br />

works closely with a range of assetintensive<br />

businesses including mining,<br />

utilities, petrochemicals and manufacturing.<br />

HMAS KANIMBLA


44 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

Sailor Promotions<br />

NAME EMPLOYER ID PROMOTED TO SHIP/ESTAB<br />

CORCORAN 8088565 CPOMT WESTRALIA<br />

EVANS 8076663 CPOATV 723 SQN<br />

MYERS 8063253 CPOATA 816 SQN<br />

STEPHENSON 8081737 CPOATA ALBATROSS<br />

MOORE 8084553 CPOMT BENALLA<br />

HORNE 8077326 CPOET HARMAN<br />

EDWARDS 8082579 CPOATA KUTTABUL<br />

KANE 8077610 CPOET KUTTABUL<br />

SMITH 8089834 CPOET KUTTABUL<br />

EAST 8089844 CPOMT KUTTABUL<br />

CRUICKSHANK 8078253 CPOET KUTTABUL<br />

ROYAL 8083624 CPOET KUTTABUL<br />

ANDERSON 8091659 CPOET KUTTABUL<br />

WALLER 8090084 CPOET KUTTABUL<br />

DOUGHTY 8089946 CPOET MELBOURNE<br />

BRENNAN 8078273 CPOMTSM STIRLING<br />

GILL 8096038 CPOMTSM STIRLING<br />

MANSELL 8091730 CPOMT WARRAMUNGA<br />

SANDSTROM 8096252 POATV 723 SQN<br />

BEKER 8096135 POATV 805 SQN<br />

BEAVIS 8078063 POATA 816 SQN<br />

JONES 8084155 POATV 816 SQN<br />

SPENCER 8094752 POET ADELAIDE<br />

BEENHAM 8095559 POMT ADELAIDE<br />

FRY 8095504 POATA ALBATROSS<br />

GARLAND 8095525 POATA ALBATROSS<br />

HAMMER 8094417 POATA ALBATROSS<br />

DIMOV 8095302 POATV ALBATROSS<br />

GOODWIN 8095294 POATV ALBATROSS<br />

JAMES 8094678 POATV ALBATROSS<br />

RAYMER 8096125 POATV ALBATROSS<br />

HUNTER 8097027 POMT ANZAC<br />

BITHELL 8088962 POET ARUNTA<br />

NELSON 8093939 POMT ARUNTA<br />

ANTHONY 8090699 POMT BETANO<br />

GOODWIN 8099002 POATA CAIRNS<br />

DAY 8096847 POET CAIRNS<br />

YOUNG 8075014 POMT CANBERRA<br />

MCDONALD 8097356 POATA CERBERUS<br />

ALBERTSON 8094656 POATV CERBERUS<br />

HIGGINS 8095733 POMT CERBERUS<br />

NICHOLLS 8095978 POMT CERBERUS<br />

COOK 8097305 POET CERBERUS<br />

MCAWAY 8095614 POMT COONAWARRA<br />

BUTLER 8095509 POMT DARWIN<br />

LINTON 8094463 POMTSM DECHAINEUX<br />

NAME EMPLOYER ID PROMOTED TO SHIP/ESTAB<br />

BLACKMAN 8095492 POATA HARMAN<br />

DINGLE 8095427 POATV HARMAN<br />

SEAMAN 8096776 POATV HARMAN<br />

GRAM 8086608 POET KUTTABUL<br />

AHERN 8092011 POMT KUTTABUL<br />

GODDARD 8083106 POMT KUTTABUL<br />

THOMAS 8092640 POMT LAUNCESTON<br />

MITCHELL 8095768 POMT MANOORA<br />

STEPHENSON 8095353 POATV MELBOURNE<br />

SMEETS 8095553 POMT NEWCASTLE<br />

MOLD 8097340 POETSM NHQSA<br />

WHITE 8095371 POET NORMAN<br />

WERNAS 8096288 POETSM SHEEAN<br />

KELLY 8096489 POET SHEPPARTON<br />

MUDGE 8094335 POETSM STIRLING<br />

RANDALL 8088930 POMT STIRLING<br />

RYAN 8091370 POMT STIRLING<br />

MACLEOD 8094156 POMTSM STIRLING<br />

MULLINS 8094173 POMTSM STIRLING<br />

DWYER 8089227 POMT SUCCESS<br />

GRECH 8095732 POMT SUCCESS<br />

MILGATE 8096272 POMT SUCCESS<br />

PAPAIS 8082273 POMT TOBRUK<br />

CAMERON 8095829 POET WATERHEN<br />

SMITH 8091630 POMT WESTRALIA<br />

CHAMBERLAIN 8093305 POMT WOLLONGONG<br />

QUINN 8094127 POET YARRA<br />

BALDOCK 8109428 LSATA 723 SQN<br />

BERTHOLINI 8107193 LSATA 723 SQN<br />

HAW 8109272 LSATA 723 SQN<br />

MCINTOSH 8100753 LSATA 723 SQN<br />

PEARCE 8107190 LSATA 723 SQN<br />

MILNER 8109265 LSATV 723 SQN<br />

REDUCH 8100890 LSATV 723 SQN<br />

SMITH 8111763 LSATV 723 SQN<br />

SMITH 8101043 LSATV 723 SQN<br />

BROWN 8099801 LSATA 816 SQN<br />

CAVEY 8099548 LSATA 816 SQN<br />

CHARLES 8099728 LSATA 816 SQN<br />

HUSSEY 8089611 LSATA 816 SQN<br />

REEVE 8100754 LSATA 816 SQN<br />

SOLOMON 8100286 LSATV 816 SQN<br />

FAIRWEATHER 8106592 LSATA 817 SQN<br />

HOLMES 8099650 LSATV ADELAIDE<br />

FLYNN 8107352 LSMT ADELAIDE<br />

KENNY 8100533 LSMT ADELAIDE<br />

ROWE 8112566 LSMT ADELAIDE<br />

BARDSLEY 8108223 LSATA ADFA


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

45<br />

Sailor Promotions (continued)<br />

NAME EMPLOYER ID PROMOTED TO SHIP/ESTAB<br />

HODGSON 8107507 LSATA ALBATROSS<br />

MAIDMENT 8100733 LSATA ALBATROSS<br />

COLLIER 8107358 LSATV ALBATROSS<br />

FORKE 8101029 LSATV ALBATROSS<br />

HALE 8095232 LSATV ALBATROSS<br />

HUTTON 8082250 LSATV ALBATROSS<br />

MARMONT 8097288 LSATV ALBATROSS<br />

MILLS 8109121 LSATV ALBATROSS<br />

OCONNOR 8112372 LSATV ALBATROSS<br />

SCULLIN 8099506 LSATV ALBATROSS<br />

UNSWORTH 8100963 LSATV ALBATROSS<br />

WILSON 8086067 LSATV ALBATROSS<br />

HALL 8113229 LSET ANZAC<br />

STAGG 8112475 LSET ANZAC<br />

AGARS 8099245 LSMT ANZAC<br />

BELL 8109897 LSMT ARUNTA<br />

GORDON 8094612 LSET BENDIGO<br />

HUDSON 8098517 LSMT BENDIGO<br />

RUEGER 8109258 LSATA CANBERRA<br />

SMITH 8110757 LSATA CANBERRA<br />

COX 8109984 LSATV CANBERRA<br />

FALT 8109957 LSATV CANBERRA<br />

DAVIS 8112556 LSET CANBERRA<br />

BEATTIE 8108015 LSMT CANBERRA<br />

CHRIMES 8110982 LSMT CANBERRA<br />

EDMONDS 8100546 LSMT CANBERRA<br />

FEARN-WANNAN 8099716 LSMT CANBERRA<br />

FERGUSSON 8110370 LSMT CANBERRA<br />

HAUGHEY 8107773 LSMT CANBERRA<br />

HOWES 8110968 LSMT CANBERRA<br />

PAYNE 8099631 LSMT CANBERRA<br />

SUNDERLAND 8112266 LSMT CANBERRA<br />

SCOTT 8111211 LSET CERBERUS<br />

DRAPER 8107833 LSMT CERBERUS<br />

BOWDEN 8100574 LSET DARWIN<br />

HARRIS 8107761 LSET DARWIN<br />

TANAKA 8110230 LSET DARWIN<br />

SLETTEN 8110229 LSET DECHAINEUX<br />

MATTHEWS 8111225 LSETSM DECHAINEUX<br />

RUSSELL 8099458 LSMTSM FARNCOMB<br />

COLLING 8100323 LSET HARMAN<br />

OTOOLE 8100127 LSET HARMAN<br />

PORTER 8110955 LSET HS WHITE<br />

BEETON 8095389 LSMT HUON<br />

VESCO 8115620 LSET KANIMBLA<br />

BROMLEY 8113385 LSMT KANIMBLA<br />

DOUTHETT 8110211 LSMT KANIMBLA<br />

HUNT 8110932 LSMT KANIMBLA<br />

NAME EMPLOYER ID PROMOTED TO SHIP/ESTAB<br />

LINKENBAGH 8113141 LSMT KANIMBLA<br />

PENTLAND 8100886 LSATV KUTTABUL<br />

HYDER 8098323 LSET KUTTABUL<br />

ALCHIN 8100269 LSMT KUTTABUL<br />

PIDDUCK 8109443 LSATA MANOORA<br />

ELLIS 8099528 LSET MANOORA<br />

BLAIN 8112159 LSMT MANOORA<br />

JONSSON 8107354 LSATA MELBOURNE<br />

ALEXANDER 8095821 LSMT NEWCASTLE<br />

GONZALEZ 8100111 LSMT NEWCASTLE<br />

HANNA 8097683 LSMT NEWCASTLE<br />

JACOBS 8100597 LSMT NEWCASTLE<br />

JOHNSON 8110733 LSMT NEWCASTLE<br />

LE GROS 8108967 LSMT NEWCASTLE<br />

MACLEOD 8111334 LSMT NEWCASTLE<br />

PFRUNDER 8113210 LSMT NEWCASTLE<br />

ROBSON 8109893 LSMT NEWCASTLE<br />

TAYLOR 8111262 LSMT NEWCASTLE<br />

BOWER 8094304 LSET PENGUIN<br />

WATSON 8108316 LSETSM RANKIN<br />

CREIGHTON 8098499 LSMTSM RANKIN<br />

MICHAEL 8107526 LSMTSM RANKIN<br />

LANGSHAW 8100678 LSMTSM SHEEAN<br />

ALDRIDGE 8107285 LSMT STIRLING<br />

DUNSTAN 8100085 LSMT STIRLING<br />

LEY 8092139 LSMT STIRLING<br />

MOALA 8100381 LSMT STIRLING<br />

WURFEL 8113621 LSMT STIRLING<br />

PUGH 8093044 LSMTSM STIRLING<br />

NGUYEN 8099257 LSET STUART<br />

STUART 8100258 LSATA SUCCESS<br />

LUKES 8106954 LSATV SUCCESS<br />

WALKER 8110646 LSET SYDNEY<br />

COCKS 8108961 LSMT SYDNEY<br />

CONNOR 8106926 LSMT SYDNEY<br />

FRISKIN 8108914 LSMT SYDNEY<br />

MCDERMOTT 8107843 LSMT SYDNEY<br />

COX 8108939 LSET TARAKAN<br />

LOBWEIN 8110083 LSATV TOBRUK<br />

DAY 8108099 LSET TOBRUK<br />

SMITH 8100388 LSET WATERHEN<br />

GALE 8098903 LSMT WATERHEN<br />

STONE 8087894 LSET WATSON<br />

CARR 8110456 LSMT WEWAK<br />

EBDON 8109261 LSMT WHYALLA<br />

TODD 8109433 LSMT WOLLONGONG<br />

BELSON 8111625 LSET YARRA


46 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

CPOET ALARIC O'NEILL<br />

HMAS WATSON<br />

Gun Empty, Bore Clear!<br />

Providing specialist technical advice to the Warfare Community<br />

Innocuously tucked away in a quiet corner of HMAS WATSON, hidden<br />

among the PWO, SEAAC and CSO training facilities, is an office<br />

occupied by two Chief ET's. Allowed a relatively high degree of<br />

autonomy, they are mainly employed to undertake fun tasks, such as<br />

tracking and shooting at various targets with real guns and live<br />

ammunition!<br />

The Principal Warfare Officer<br />

Faculty (PWOFAC), HMAS<br />

WATSON, falls under the authority<br />

of the Training Authority -<br />

Maritime Warfare (TAMW). The<br />

role of the PWOFAC is to provide<br />

instruction in specialist warfighting<br />

skills to prospective PWO<br />

students, so that <strong>Navy</strong> can fulfil<br />

its mission to 'Fight and Win' at<br />

sea. The PWO course is <strong>Navy</strong>'s<br />

premier course for Seaman<br />

officers, and is widely<br />

acknowledged to be one of the<br />

most intensely demanding<br />

courses the RAN can offer.<br />

To support PWO training both at<br />

WATSON and at West Head<br />

Weapons Training Facility<br />

(WHWTF), two ETFCS senior<br />

sailors are posted to the<br />

PWOFAC. While the current<br />

incumbents are both ANZAC FCS<br />

specialists, previous billet<br />

occupants have included Mk 68<br />

GFCS Gun Plot Officers, M22 and<br />

MK 92 FCS Fire Control Officers<br />

(FCO). The desired mix is one<br />

member with Mk 92 experience,<br />

with the other holding the ANZAC<br />

Fire Control Officer EDP number.<br />

The overarching billet pre<br />

requisite for these postings,<br />

however, is far simpler. Can you<br />

confidently operate a Fire Control<br />

System?<br />

Notwithstanding the normal<br />

course attendance activities of a<br />

technical sailor posted ashore for<br />

respite, an FCO posted to the<br />

PWOFAC can expect to undertake<br />

the following tasks:<br />

a. provide equipment specific<br />

instruction to a wide range of<br />

Seaman and Warfare Officers,<br />

act as FCO in WATSON's<br />

model Operations Room<br />

during practice warfare<br />

exercises (SWIPE),<br />

b. act as FCO at WHWTF for PWO<br />

common and advanced<br />

practical gunnery exercises,<br />

c. act as FCO at WHWTF for<br />

SEACC practical warfare<br />

exercises,<br />

d. provide assistance to Mk 92<br />

Operator and ANZAC FCO<br />

Preparatory training both at<br />

WATSON and at WHWTF,<br />

e. provide specialist advice to a<br />

range of Warfare officers<br />

regarding system specific<br />

capabilities and limitations,<br />

and<br />

f. perform QETO / Business Plan<br />

/ Regulatory / Instructional<br />

duties as directed by OICPWO<br />

and provide specialist advice<br />

to PWOFAC on Fire Control<br />

matters.<br />

Our primary roles are to assist<br />

the PWOFAC Direction Staff (DS)<br />

instruct LCDR & LEUT PWO<br />

candidates in the finer<br />

performance characteristics of<br />

our respective equipment, and to<br />

act as FCO's during their practice<br />

and live fire gunnery serials. As<br />

there is a fairly high turnover of<br />

DS, the tenure of FCO's posted to<br />

WATSON is usually reasonably<br />

long and secure. This provides<br />

consistency in the Command and<br />

Control drill instruction we provide<br />

to students. This consistency is<br />

further complimented by constant<br />

contact with both Fleet Warfare<br />

staff and TAMW specialists. The<br />

DS are, for the main, comprised<br />

of senior LCDR PWO'S, who<br />

typically have had two postings to<br />

sea in the PWO role. The<br />

professional competence of the<br />

DS, coupled with the high<br />

gunnery experience levels of the<br />

FCO'S, dovetails well into the<br />

needs of the students for calm,<br />

considered, knowledgable<br />

instruction.<br />

Of course, for an FCO, the fun<br />

part occurs at West Head. We are<br />

tasked to conduct medium<br />

calibre engagements with either<br />

the 76mm or 4.5" gun hanging<br />

off the M22 systems, against<br />

various AA, SU and NGS targets.<br />

This style of gunnery is pure bliss<br />

for an FCO. Apart from 'Correcting<br />

and Directing' the students, there<br />

are none of the usual 'At Sea'<br />

firing requirements to sweat over.<br />

Preparations for firing are<br />

conducted by the WHWTF staff,<br />

students take records, and there<br />

are no whole ship activity<br />

constraints to interfere with the<br />

delivery of naval ordnance to the<br />

target. At West Head, it's always a<br />

perfect Gunnery Day! It is not<br />

unusual to close up after<br />

students' gunnery brief, conduct<br />

one tracking and 9 firing runs,<br />

break for lunch, then conduct


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

47<br />

another 4 advanced chill & firing<br />

runs. Thanks to the high degree of<br />

equipment availability and<br />

technical support provided by the<br />

professional, dedicated gun and<br />

system maintainers at West Head,<br />

PWOFAC staff merely turn up for a<br />

shoot, wing off one or two<br />

hundred rounds, then go home!<br />

A further interesting challenge for<br />

the PWOFAC FCO is the chance to<br />

become involved in the initial<br />

warfare training for the SEACC<br />

Phase 3 & 4 officers posted to<br />

WATSON. This involvement<br />

provides an opportunity to revisit<br />

basic recording requirements,<br />

ammunition and fuse selection,<br />

ballistic input determination and<br />

calculation, and gunnery safety<br />

rule determination and<br />

application. This ties neatly into<br />

the assistance also given to the<br />

Mk 92 Operators and ANZAC FCO<br />

preparatory course (when<br />

requested). The increased<br />

awareness of Gunnery Command<br />

decision making that we gain<br />

from our exposure to PWO<br />

training, allows us in turn, to<br />

provide greater realism to the<br />

training that is given to trainee<br />

FCO'S.<br />

A posting to the PWOFAC is not<br />

for every FCS streamed<br />

technician. We are employed, first<br />

and foremost, to deliver<br />

Command and Control drill<br />

training and instruct FCS<br />

operation, capabilities and<br />

limitations. We are, realistically,<br />

posted out of branch with respect<br />

to the day to day Weapons<br />

Electrical Engineering activities<br />

and events. We work with and for<br />

Warfare Officers and liase with<br />

AIO staff regarding the majority of<br />

our activities. The challenge set<br />

for ET's posted to PWOFAC is to<br />

become acknowledged subject<br />

matter experts on all aspects of<br />

gunnery operation including<br />

76mm / Mk 92, 4.5" / M22 (yes<br />

we still use them!) and 5" / 9LV-<br />

453. A good working knowledge<br />

of Harpoon, SM1 and Sea<br />

Sparrow is highly desirable, an<br />

engaging instructional technique<br />

is mandatory, and the ability to<br />

relate well with both junior and<br />

senior SMN officers is particularly<br />

advantageous.<br />

If you seek a professionally<br />

challenging shore role, with the<br />

undoubted opportunity to<br />

conduct advanced and unusual<br />

gunnery serials that few ships at<br />

sea today are conducting, then a<br />

draft to the PWOFAC should be<br />

high on your posting preference<br />

form. And, let's face it, if we<br />

Techo's don't teach the PWO how<br />

best to use our Weapon Systems<br />

and Sensors, who will?


48 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

MOBI – A look at the past<br />

At the risk of sending some of the old ‘tiffies’ misty eyed with nostalgia,<br />

I’d like to introduce a new regular feature of the <strong>Navy</strong> Engineering<br />

Bulletin, dedicated to the MOBI and the RAN’s now defunct Apprentice<br />

Training Establishment, HMAS NIRIMBA.<br />

My source for this material is a<br />

book of MOBI anecdotes called<br />

“NIRIMBA, resting place of the<br />

pelicans, or where the big birds<br />

go to skulk – and the ancestral<br />

home of the MOBI’ written by an<br />

ex-tiffy, WOETP4SM ‘Sandy’<br />

Freeleagus. Sandy has kindly<br />

agreed to allow us to re-print his<br />

material for the enjoyment of our<br />

readers. He is a talented storyteller<br />

and an accomplished<br />

cartoonist, and his narratives<br />

provide an interesting, amusing<br />

and valuable insight into RAN<br />

technical training as it was, and<br />

form a fitting introduction to the<br />

historical viewpoint I’d like to<br />

foster as a regular feature of the<br />

NEB.<br />

For those who would like a copy<br />

of Sandy’s book, which comprises<br />

thirty light hearted reflections on<br />

this bastion of RAN Technical<br />

training, with accompanying<br />

cartoons, it is available for $15<br />

from:<br />

CMDR Murray Baker<br />

26 Leist St<br />

Weston ACT 2611<br />

Ph 02 6288 9916<br />

Email: murryb@webone.com.au<br />

In the course of our<br />

correspondence, Sandy penned<br />

me a quick biography which I’ve<br />

included below. – Ed.<br />

Dear Mark<br />

Received your EMail to-day<br />

reference MOBI stories for<br />

inclusion in your <strong>Navy</strong> Engineering<br />

Bulletin.<br />

It's fine by me for your<br />

publication to reproduce my<br />

memories of "home". I feel<br />

though most of the present<br />

members will wonder just what<br />

and how ancient an Artificer was,<br />

and how could anyone could do a<br />

five year apprenticeship in one<br />

hit. When I joined the fleet in<br />

HMAS Vampire (before its refit<br />

when it was a proper destroyer<br />

with an open bridge, a manned<br />

director and torpedo tubes and it<br />

was Captain D 10th Destroyer<br />

Flotilla) we had an ex-MOBI in A<br />

turret, in B turret, myself in X<br />

turret, another as AS tiffy and<br />

another as the close range tiffy<br />

with ex MOBI Greenies working<br />

high power. So we paid our way<br />

in the Fleet.<br />

A quick run down on my history:<br />

Joined Nirimba in July 1961 as<br />

an Ordnance Artificer Apprentice<br />

(Fitter and Turner specialising in<br />

hydraulics, pneumatics, servo<br />

systems and Ordnance<br />

engineering) and did the normal<br />

4 years at Nirimba. The 5th year<br />

that was supposed to be<br />

completed at sea was done in<br />

Cerberus doing a System Artificer<br />

Power change over course where<br />

we were trained as Electrical High<br />

Power Artificers. (A significant<br />

ruling was if you failed this<br />

electrical course your previous 4<br />

years at Nirimba were null and<br />

void and you did a quick change<br />

over course as an ERA).<br />

An Anti-Submarine course at<br />

Watson included the Limbo<br />

Mortar Mk 10, the Pentad<br />

torpedo tubes, 21" Mk 9<br />

torpedoes, electrical homing<br />

torpedoes, sonar hull outfits,<br />

Ikara handling systems, and<br />

Minesweeping (?) normal sweep,<br />

acoustic and ground influence<br />

mines.<br />

Then joined Vampire (Captain D<br />

10th Destroyer Flotilla) for 2 years<br />

as X turret OA. Coral Sea, New<br />

Zealand and a 9 month trip Up<br />

Top (where we were the only ship<br />

in Singapore who the <strong>Royal</strong><br />

Marines would call in close<br />

gunfire support). Came back to<br />

Australia as i/c of all 3 turret<br />

maintenance. Was told by<br />

Dockyard during refit that I was<br />

too young to know what I was<br />

talking about so volunteered for<br />

submarines.<br />

Flew to UK in January 1969 and<br />

completed Part I and II S/M<br />

training and escape training at<br />

HMS Dolphin and joined HMS/M<br />

Opossum for sea training Part III.<br />

Did tour of Bay of Biscay and 5<br />

month North Atlantic patrol.<br />

Visited Halifax Nova Scotia,<br />

Boston Mass and Providence<br />

Rhode Island. Back to Australia in<br />

October 1970; joined Platypus as<br />

spare crew SAP. To sea on HMAS<br />

Ovens (as spare crew for "only a<br />

couple of weeks"); joined HMAS<br />

Otway directly from Ovens some 6<br />

months later and served on<br />

Otway for 5 straight years<br />

(including a refit at VCD). Took<br />

Otway Up Top for 6 month<br />

deployment as Chief of Electrical<br />

Branch - the first SAP to do so<br />

(as CoB was traditionally a<br />

CSAW). Naturally, Otway was "MY"<br />

boat and I knew every nut and<br />

bolt in her. 12 months in Plats<br />

then back to sea in HMAS Oxley<br />

and took her into refit. Just before<br />

it left refit was promoted Warrant<br />

Officer and moved to Canberra<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> Office to DSMR (Director of<br />

Submarine Maintenance and<br />

Repair) for 2-1/2 years where I<br />

was the Special Projects Officer<br />

(which really meant that they<br />

didn't know what to do with me),


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

49<br />

Security Officer and Research<br />

Officer. One of my more enjoyable<br />

jobs was the New Submarine<br />

Construction Project where the<br />

technical data of all the foreign<br />

contenders was forwarded to me<br />

where I correlated all this data<br />

into comparison charts (before<br />

the days of computers).<br />

So I worked on WW II quadruple<br />

40mm Bofors mountings, Single<br />

Mk 7 40mm Bofors and Twin Mk<br />

V 40mm Bofors mountings, Twin<br />

4" Mk XVI guns in a CP Mk XIX<br />

mountings, 4.5" Mk VI* turret<br />

(with 1944 Mk 18H vavle<br />

amplifiers), Mk 9 21" torpedoes,<br />

electrical supply and distribution<br />

on a Daring class destroyer and<br />

an Oberon class submarine. In<br />

addition to these duties, at sea<br />

on a submarine a techo kept<br />

seaman duties, so I did inshore<br />

navigation, radar watches,<br />

periscope watches and target<br />

plotting.<br />

I belonged to the Gunnery Branch<br />

(as an OA), the Electrical Branch<br />

( as a SAP), the Engineering<br />

Branch (as an A1MTLSM), and<br />

finally the Electrical Branch again<br />

(as a CPOETP3SM, a CPOETP4SM<br />

and a WOETP4SM).<br />

I think Pussers got their moneys<br />

worth out of me.<br />

Use what you can of my book. I<br />

would like a copy of each issue<br />

as "payment". I hope I don't end<br />

up like I did whilst cartooning for<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> News where I was censored<br />

by Admiral Hudson and my<br />

Captain S/M was told to "charge<br />

that man with I don't care what -<br />

but I want him charged."<br />

THE GOOD OLD DAYS<br />

I got off the train at Central<br />

Railway Station, Sydney early one<br />

grey morning with the other<br />

members of the Queensland<br />

intake, having barely survived the<br />

rigors and food of the New South<br />

Wales Government Railways. We<br />

were met by a Petty Officer with a<br />

'just you wait until I get you lot'<br />

grin and the almost mandatory<br />

clip board with our now<br />

recognisable names (in<br />

alphabetical order of course),<br />

who herded us into a Pusser's<br />

bus with a maximum amount of<br />

diabolical threats and rude words<br />

for the final stage of our journey<br />

out to the RAN's Apprentices<br />

Training Establishment - HMAS<br />

NIRIMBA<br />

The bus driver was a fairly<br />

average driver as we would later<br />

come to appreciate, but as young<br />

Civies, our first Pusser's bus ride<br />

was to say the least a harrowing,<br />

hair raising event, falling<br />

somewhere between the<br />

Indianapolis 500 and a chase<br />

scene from some cops & robbers<br />

TV show.<br />

We were all worried, excited,<br />

apprehensive and eager as we<br />

started our great adventure. Out<br />

of all the hundreds of applicants,<br />

we few had made it - we were in<br />

the <strong>Navy</strong>.<br />

Our 'ship' was landlocked HMAS<br />

NIRIMBA - an old Naval Air<br />

Station spread over quite some<br />

area, some 25 miles west of<br />

Sydney. We were in a dairy<br />

farm/chook farm area, so that<br />

meant flies - flies of all sizes,<br />

shapes and colours - millions<br />

upon millions of them - all<br />

wanting to make my personal<br />

acquaintance - and temperatures<br />

that ranged from physical<br />

meltdown in Summer to brass<br />

monkey warning in Winter. It was<br />

a sprawled conglomerate of<br />

mixed corrugated tin huts of<br />

various sizes (and vintages),<br />

hangars, taxiways, airstrips,<br />

manicured lawns, trees, shrubs,<br />

scrub - but who cared - it flew<br />

the White Ensign - the old White<br />

Ensign with the red cross of Saint<br />

George.<br />

We all mustered outside the the<br />

Regulating Office, all together for<br />

the first time from all the States<br />

and Territories of Australia - 52 of<br />

us now known as the 'July 61<br />

Intake'.<br />

We were immediately identified -<br />

we each received a Service<br />

Number. 'You think you may be<br />

N.A.A'-- or Naval Artificer<br />

Apprentices', we were informed,<br />

'but you are really (in my case)<br />

R42489. Your rank and rate may<br />

change, but you'll always be<br />

R42489. Remember it - you'll live<br />

with it and until the day you die;<br />

you'll still recall it above all other<br />

numbers or combination of<br />

numbers!!' He was oh so right.<br />

So I joined the Mob in July 1961<br />

at HMAS NIRIMBA and was<br />

therefore one of the old MOBles'<br />

(standing for 'Most Objectionable<br />

Bastards Imaginable!) - a term of<br />

derision of which we became<br />

fiercely proud and revelled in its<br />

implications. We were all young<br />

teenagers in the delicate process<br />

of growing rapidly and were<br />

continually subjected to harsh<br />

discipline and a very rigorous and<br />

strenuous work and sports load.<br />

Remember these were the days<br />

before the <strong>Navy</strong> let the<br />

psychologists run amok - the<br />

days when if a Kellick told you to<br />

jump - you jumped and God help<br />

you if you came down before he<br />

said it was okay; the days when a<br />

Petty Officer was King, a Chief<br />

Petty Officer beyond<br />

comprehension and when once a<br />

month, Zeus, in the form of your<br />

Divisional Officer, descended from<br />

Mount Olympus and walked<br />

amongst us mere mortals; and<br />

where a three-badge Seaman<br />

was Lord of the Manor.<br />

We doubled everywhere in heavy<br />

boots (brass studs on leather<br />

soles - specially designed to slip<br />

and slide easily - steel toe and<br />

heel caps so that when you<br />

stamped on the Parade Ground,<br />

sparks flew from under your feet)<br />

and of course, full webbing was<br />

worn to differentiate you from the<br />

rest of the Apprentices. The<br />

webbiing said 'see look a new<br />

boy!' or 'Sprog".<br />

Punishment for any<br />

misdemeanour (real or imagined)<br />

was immediate - usually in the<br />

form of PT or a 'double' around


50 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

NIRIMBAs' two main airstrips and<br />

a large taxiway set in a large<br />

triangle - a distance of some 3-4<br />

miles; or if the indescretion was<br />

committed at night, you found<br />

yourself (along with the rest of<br />

your hut members) doubling the<br />

length of the main airstrip (about<br />

1000 yards) with your mattress<br />

over your head. We learnt very<br />

early in these days at NIRIMBA<br />

that most punishments were<br />

directed against the whole term<br />

instead of just the individual<br />

perpetrator. This was 'designed to<br />

divide and separate' the term.<br />

Unfortunately, in our case, we<br />

found that the opposite occurred<br />

and it, if anything, brought our<br />

term closer together and we<br />

readily accepted group<br />

punishment on behalf of an<br />

individual. (Looking back on it<br />

now, this was a fact quickly<br />

recognised by our Commander,<br />

who, I feel, was quite pleased<br />

with our term loyalty).<br />

The nights offered us no respite<br />

at all, as, as the first termers (or<br />

'Sprogs') we were subjected to<br />

continual, and sometimes quite<br />

brutal harrassment in the form of<br />

senior term hunting parties who<br />

would, when they came upon a<br />

Sprog, strip him, coat his private<br />

parts quite liberally with boot<br />

polish (that had to be scrubbed<br />

off in cold water in a Sydney<br />

western suburbs winter - not<br />

funny, especially with an 'issue<br />

soap' that was flat out giving a<br />

lather in the best of<br />

circumstances), and the odd and<br />

not so infrequent fist or elbow<br />

from the polishers on the<br />

polishee - just to tide him over.<br />

This we could endure for a month<br />

or so (all done of course with<br />

'unofficial' sanction from Sir), but<br />

it began to wear thin after twothree<br />

months every night; so, we,<br />

as a term, did the unthinkable,<br />

the unheard of -'we retaliated<br />

against our senior term<br />

tormentors. We advised them that<br />

for every one of us that was<br />

bastardised - one of them would<br />

cop it from us. This was laughed<br />

off until we actually had to prove<br />

the point. This was in the form of<br />

a one-to-one confrontation<br />

between one of 'ours' and one of<br />

'them' with the unspoken<br />

agreement that whoever emerged<br />

the victor, had the right of<br />

decision of future 'activities'. This<br />

gladitorial event took place in the<br />

gym with both terms fully<br />

represented and quite a number<br />

of the other termers as<br />

'interested spectators', (with a<br />

couple of Senior Sailors quite<br />

inconspicuous at the rear of the<br />

screaming throng, just to see<br />

things were kept above board and<br />

lives were not lost), all cheering<br />

on their respective champions in<br />

the best traditions of the Circus<br />

Maximus. Let it be quite certain<br />

that we didn't want just a victory<br />

- we wanted BLOOD! That our<br />

'champion' proved the victor of<br />

the foray was, needless to say, an<br />

immense relief and a source of<br />

great enjoyment to us, as now we<br />

had set the precedent with the<br />

warning, and our intentions now<br />

were a valid threat. (This, I must<br />

hasten to add, was also with full<br />

'unofficial' approval with the<br />

statement: 'if you can't cop it<br />

sweet, why should you deal it<br />

out!!')<br />

As night fell, we all would dress in<br />

black (black battle dress,<br />

seaman's jumper, beret and light<br />

boots) and head for the scrub.<br />

We got quite proficient at<br />

camouflage and the art of<br />

immovability. I can still remember<br />

lying in a dark shallow ditch not<br />

daring to breathe with a second<br />

termer standing over me with one<br />

foot either side of the ditch,<br />

looking for 'Sprogs' to 'get'. I was<br />

sure he would hear my heart, but<br />

he missed me and moved on. Our<br />

harrassment declined steadily,<br />

but our first five months were<br />

fairly brutal - so much so, we, as<br />

'old hands' the following term,<br />

refused to harrass the new<br />

'Sprogs' in any physical form at<br />

all. (Their beds and huts took a<br />

hell of a beating, but the person<br />

was untouched).<br />

This harrassment came to a head<br />

during our first mid-term break.<br />

We were billeted on a disused<br />

emergency airstrip by HMAS<br />

'CRESWELL' in fibro huts. Once<br />

again as night fell, so the jackals<br />

and hyenas closed in. We 'Sprogs'<br />

barricaded ourselves in one of<br />

the huts and successfully held off<br />

all attacks for the whole night.<br />

The senior termers came at us<br />

with everything - battering rams,<br />

fire hoses, clubs, rocks - anything<br />

they could lay their hands on and<br />

kept at us all night without<br />

respite. The result next morning<br />

was a completely devastated and<br />

wrecked hut. What seemed funny<br />

to Sir the previous evening, didn't<br />

seem so hilarious the next<br />

morning - and was definitely<br />

most unfunny when he received<br />

the bill from 'CRESWELL' to repair<br />

the hut when we returned to<br />

‘NIRIMBA'. During the course of<br />

Sir's admonitory tirade to the<br />

senior termers that following<br />

morning, we 'Sprogs' filtered out<br />

of camp to relative safety. Our<br />

choice was the beach, (where we<br />

could see sharks swimming just<br />

beyond the first line of breakers,<br />

or the bush, which was literally<br />

swarming with black snakes,<br />

being smack in the middle of the<br />

mating season). Most of us took<br />

the sharks, although one of our<br />

‘bushies' walked quite openly<br />

around the base camp amongst<br />

the senior termers quite<br />

unmolested and was granted all<br />

manner of unheard-of courtesies.<br />

The fact that he continually held<br />

a mad as hell black snake in his<br />

hand at all times probably helped<br />

somewhat.


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

51<br />

ERUS<br />

(Engineering Ready-Use Stuff!)<br />

News, Views and Issues concerning Marine Technicians<br />

WOMT MARK RICHARDSON<br />

MT CATEGORY SPONSOR<br />

Welcome to the first of what will become a regular feature of the <strong>Navy</strong><br />

Engineering Bulletin, presenting and discussing current issues affecting<br />

the MT Category.<br />

The MT Category is currently on<br />

the threshold of some major<br />

changes which will radically alter<br />

the way we do business. Your<br />

operator qualifications and their<br />

application at sea have been<br />

critically reviewed and revised to<br />

align with today’s technology and<br />

the needs of a modern, minimum<br />

manned <strong>Navy</strong>. CAPT Craig Kerr,<br />

the outgoing Director of <strong>Navy</strong><br />

Professional Requirements, has<br />

discussed some of the reasons<br />

and history behind these changes<br />

in his articles “Why is the<br />

Workforce Upside Down” (<strong>Navy</strong><br />

Engineering Bulletin Feb 2002<br />

Edition) and “Turning Things<br />

Around” (Article 14 of this<br />

edition). This article aims to<br />

provide details of the proposed<br />

changes; discuss how they will<br />

affect you, the technician; and<br />

introduce the principles of the<br />

transition arrangements to the<br />

new watchkeeping qualifications.<br />

What about these watchkeeping<br />

changes?<br />

Many of you will have been<br />

introduced to the proposed<br />

changes to watchkeeping<br />

practices and operator<br />

qualifications at the DNPR(E&L)<br />

Roadshows presented around the<br />

country during October and<br />

November 2002. Furthermore,<br />

some of you will already be<br />

involved in trialing some aspects<br />

of the new way of doing business,<br />

especially if you’re currently<br />

serving in HMAS ANZAC or in one<br />

of the FFG’s selected to<br />

undertake the trials in the last<br />

quarter of 2002.<br />

Basically, the changes you can<br />

expect can be divided into two<br />

main categories:<br />

a. Changes to Watchkeeping<br />

Procedures, incorporating:<br />

reduced manual data<br />

recording; reduced frequency<br />

but increased complexity of<br />

machinery rounds; reduced<br />

engineering watch manning<br />

and an increased watch<br />

rotation routine (i.e. a shift to<br />

one-in-four or greater watch<br />

rotation in place of the old<br />

one-in-three routine), and<br />

b. Changes to operator<br />

qualifications, incorporating<br />

disbandment of the MWC and<br />

ERWC and the introduction of<br />

four new qualifications:<br />

i. The Engineering Harbour<br />

Watchkeeping Certificate<br />

(EHWC);<br />

ii.<br />

iii.<br />

iv.<br />

The Marine Systems<br />

Technician Watchkeeping<br />

position (MST);<br />

The Marine Systems<br />

Controller Qualification<br />

(MSC); and,<br />

The Marine Systems<br />

Manager Qualification<br />

(MSM).<br />

Procedural Changes.<br />

The changes to watchkeeping<br />

practices have evolved from a<br />

number of influences, in<br />

particular a requirement to<br />

release more technical manpower<br />

resources to undertake<br />

Organisational Level and<br />

Corrective Maintenance (OLM and<br />

CM). They are also greatly<br />

influenced by the results of<br />

recent attitude and retention<br />

surveys, where task mundanity<br />

and the duplication of effort<br />

created by watchkeeping on fully<br />

monitored, automated<br />

equipment, have been identified<br />

as major causes of job<br />

dissatisfaction and the decision<br />

to separate from the <strong>Navy</strong>.<br />

A critical review of on-watch data<br />

recording in the FFG class<br />

revealed that, of all the readings<br />

taken and manually recorded by<br />

watchkeepers doing rounds, only<br />

a handful were actually critical to<br />

the operation of the plant that<br />

weren’t duplicated elsewhere by<br />

automatic monitoring. In some<br />

FFG, only 17 readings are now<br />

being recorded manually per<br />

watch instead of the previous<br />

240. Coupled with this is a<br />

reduction in the frequency of<br />

machinery rounds.<br />

COMAUSNAVSYSCOM HBC/HBE<br />

072356Z NOV 02, authorised


52 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

CSO-E to allow Ships to reduce<br />

rounds of Machinery Spaces<br />

containing running machinery,<br />

from hourly, to a minimum of<br />

once per four hour watch. This<br />

provides watchkeepers with the<br />

necessary time to conduct a<br />

more comprehensive set of<br />

machinery rounds. Having more<br />

time ‘in front of the machinery’,<br />

allows watchkeepers to apply<br />

more critical engineering<br />

judgement when evaluating the<br />

operating state of the systems in<br />

their charge. This in turn leads to<br />

the early identification of defects<br />

and provides the opportunity to<br />

rectify these on watch. Feedback<br />

from the Ships trialing these new<br />

practices has so far been<br />

positive. Listed below are<br />

comments from minutes and e-<br />

mails by Ship’s Engineer Officers<br />

reporting on the results of the<br />

trials, recounting some of the<br />

benefits and advantages of the<br />

new routines:<br />

a. a marked increase in the<br />

number of reported defects;<br />

b. an increased ability for<br />

watchkeepers to address<br />

defects on watch, reducing the<br />

burden on dayworkers;<br />

c. improved training<br />

opportunities for junior<br />

watchkeepers, and more<br />

effective training due to the<br />

ability to progress system<br />

tracing on watch and be<br />

mentored by more senior<br />

personnel;<br />

d. enhanced time management<br />

due to the removal of the<br />

constant requirement to<br />

interrupt tasks in order to<br />

undertake rounds;<br />

e. one single set of diligent<br />

rounds provides the EOOW<br />

with a better understanding of<br />

the true state of the plant<br />

than the previous four cursory<br />

sets of rounds;<br />

f. greatly increased opportunity<br />

to progress OLM and<br />

undertake cleaning on watch,<br />

and<br />

g. No machinery breakdowns<br />

occurred which could be<br />

attributed to the reduced<br />

conduct of rounds. In fact it<br />

may be that the opposite is<br />

true, that due to the greater<br />

vigilance exercised in the<br />

single set of rounds, defects<br />

which previously may have<br />

gone unnoticed were identified<br />

and corrected before they<br />

became major problems.<br />

Indications are that the new<br />

routines, incorporating reduced<br />

data recording and reduced<br />

rounds frequency, are<br />

overwhelmingly supported by the<br />

MT sailors involved in the trials. It<br />

is generally considered that they<br />

remove the mundane and<br />

monotonous aspects of<br />

watchkeeping, replacing them<br />

with opportunities to exercise and<br />

hone core technical skills in<br />

diagnosing and rectifying defects,<br />

as well as providing increased<br />

training opportunities and<br />

enhancing training quality. The<br />

demarcation between dayworker<br />

and watchkeeper has been<br />

significantly reduced, with<br />

watchkeeping becoming a<br />

favoured role.<br />

Following on from the success of<br />

these trials will be a move<br />

towards a one-in-four or greater<br />

watch rotation, enabled by a<br />

reduction in the numbers of<br />

engineering personnel actually on<br />

watch. This initiative is closely<br />

linked to the introduction of the<br />

new operator qualifications, which<br />

re-define the roles of on watch<br />

engineering personnel. An<br />

example of the proposed future<br />

FFG and ANZAC engineering<br />

watch composition is tabled<br />

below:<br />

CLASS CRUISING DEFENCE ACTION SPECIAL SEA HARB. W/K HARB. W/K HARB. W/K<br />

STATIONS STATIONS STATIONS DUTYMEN 4hrs NFS >4hrs NFS<br />

Limited Shore Full Shore<br />

Services Services<br />

ANZAC MSM on call MSM on call MSM closed<br />

up<br />

1xMSC 1xMSC No Change 1 x MSC Cruising HWC HWC<br />

Watch personnel personnel<br />

1xMST 1xMST 1 x MST MSC Onboard MSC on<br />

pager/phone<br />

Trainees A/R Trainees A/R Trainees A/R Trainees as Trainees as<br />

required required<br />

FFG MSM on call MSM on Call MSM closed<br />

up<br />

(FOUR 1xMSC 1xMSC 1xMSC HWC HWC<br />

WATCHES) personnel personnel<br />

1xMST 1xEPCCO No Change 1xEPCCO Cruising MSC Onboard MSC on<br />

on call Watch pager<br />

Trainees A/R 1xMST 1xMST Trainees A/R Trainees A/R<br />

Trainees A/R<br />

Trainees A/R


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

53<br />

The aim of reducing watchkeeping<br />

numbers and instituting a greater<br />

watch rotation is to release more<br />

maintainers to undertake<br />

organisational level and corrective<br />

maintenance. It will also align the<br />

watchkeeping requirement with<br />

the technology currently employed<br />

in our more modern platforms,<br />

and prepare for the reduced<br />

manning levels and more<br />

advanced technologies<br />

anticipated in Ships entering<br />

service over the next decade.<br />

The New Operator Qualifications<br />

The demise of Steam Propulsion<br />

in the RAN forced a critical review<br />

of Marine Engineering operator<br />

qualifications, some aspects of<br />

which were written with steam<br />

Ships specifically in mind and<br />

have remained virtually<br />

untouched ever since. To avoid<br />

confusion, rather than making<br />

major amendments to the<br />

existing qualifications, it was<br />

decided to devise new<br />

qualifications which truly reflected<br />

the current and anticipated role<br />

of the MT sailor in propulsion and<br />

machinery plant operation, as<br />

well as making better use of the<br />

skills and knowledge of the more<br />

experienced technicians. Not all<br />

qualifications will change; the<br />

AMOC and MTCC will remain in<br />

their current form.<br />

The Marine Systems Technician<br />

(MST)<br />

The Marine Systems Technician<br />

equates to a watchkeeping<br />

position, (i.e. you will be known<br />

as the ‘on-watch Marine Systems<br />

Technician). It encompasses the<br />

duties of the old Third<br />

Hand/ASM, with an emphasis on<br />

reduced manual data recording<br />

enabling an increased<br />

achievement of on-watch OLM.<br />

The Marine Systems Controller<br />

(MSC)<br />

The Marine Systems Controller<br />

Qualification formally recognises<br />

the shift to console operation<br />

invoked by the newer propulsion<br />

plant technology. The MSC will be<br />

in charge of the operation of the<br />

machinery plant for the duration<br />

of his watch. His core duties and<br />

functions are as follows:<br />

a. conduct on watch flash-up<br />

and shut-down procedures for<br />

all aspects of the propulsion<br />

plant;<br />

b. operate the plant as<br />

required;<br />

c. conduct initial response to<br />

engineering casualties i.a.w.<br />

EOSS or SOP, to make the<br />

plant safe and meet<br />

Command priorities;<br />

d. will not be required to recover<br />

from a casualty while on<br />

watch after taking that initial<br />

response. The Marine Systems<br />

Manager will provide back-up<br />

support to the on-watch MSC<br />

for engineering casualties and<br />

will manage the defect<br />

rectification process;<br />

e. act as higher-level technical<br />

support for the duty<br />

Engineering Harbour<br />

Watchkeeping sailor when<br />

alongside on full shore<br />

services, providing advice by<br />

phone, and<br />

f. undertake EOOD duties when<br />

the Ship is not on full shore<br />

services.<br />

The MSC qualification loosely<br />

equates to the old MWC and in<br />

some platforms there will be very<br />

little difference between the MWC<br />

and MSC syllabus. However, in<br />

some Ship classes, notably the<br />

FFG, there is significant additional<br />

content in the MSC compared to<br />

the MWC, to provide the MSC<br />

sailor with the level of proficiency<br />

required to operate the PCC<br />

alone, a function not previously<br />

undertaken by MWC qualified<br />

sailors in FFG.<br />

The MSC qualification will be a<br />

pre-requisite for promotion to<br />

Petty Officer. It will also attract a<br />

consolidation period of 1000<br />

hours of console operation,<br />

however the consolidation period<br />

will not be a pre-requisite for<br />

promotion – just the award of the<br />

qualification itself.<br />

The Marine Systems Manager<br />

(MSM)<br />

The Marine Systems Manager<br />

Qualification loosely equates to<br />

the ERWC. Technicians at this<br />

level possess comprehensive<br />

systems knowledge and


54 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

maintenance management<br />

acumen, therefore, employing<br />

them as simple console operators<br />

is a wasteful and inefficient use<br />

of an extremely valuable<br />

resource. These technicians are<br />

more effectively employed as<br />

maintenance managers,<br />

facilitating the progress of the<br />

increased OLM inherent in<br />

minimum manned, highly<br />

automated platforms, and able to<br />

react promptly and effectively to<br />

address defects. One of the<br />

fundamental principles in<br />

establishing the MSM<br />

qualification was to divorce it<br />

from it from a watchkeeping role,<br />

thereby affording the MSM sailor<br />

the opportunity to manage and<br />

progress maintenance while<br />

providing advanced technical<br />

support for the on-watch MSC<br />

sailor. The roles of the MSM sailor<br />

are defined as follows:<br />

a. will not keep watches on<br />

consoles during cruising<br />

watches;<br />

b. will be required to be in<br />

attendance during SSD/Mod<br />

SSD but will not necessarily<br />

be required to operate the<br />

console;<br />

c. will manage planned and<br />

corrective maintenance in his<br />

or her workcentre;<br />

d. will respond to the on-watch<br />

MSC sailors needs; and<br />

e. will recover and restore plant<br />

after an engineering casualty.<br />

The period that the MSM sailor is<br />

‘on watch’ or ‘on duty’, (i.e. the<br />

period that he/she is nominated<br />

as on call to assist the MSC<br />

sailor as required) may vary from<br />

Ship to Ship and may not<br />

necessarily adhere to the<br />

traditional four hour periods. It<br />

may be more appropriate for the<br />

MSC sailor to be ‘duty’ for a 24<br />

hour period, or in shifts of eight<br />

hours each. This will be an<br />

individual Ship management<br />

decision, and it is envisaged that<br />

a number of varying routines will<br />

be trialed before arriving at the<br />

most appropriate and effective<br />

arrangement.<br />

The MSM Qualification will be a<br />

promotion pre-requisite for Chief<br />

Petty Officer.<br />

Engineering Harbour<br />

Watchkeeping Certificate<br />

(EHWC)<br />

Another common cause of<br />

dissatisfaction among<br />

technicians, identified in attitude<br />

surveys and arising from<br />

interviews with discharging<br />

sailors, is the requirement to<br />

keep frequent, nugatory duties<br />

when the Ship is alongside in<br />

home port. In response to this,<br />

the concept of the EHWC has<br />

evolved. The aim is to reduce the<br />

duty watch requirement (in those<br />

Ships that can support it) such<br />

that the EHWC qualified sailor<br />

comprises the Engineering Duty<br />

Watch in situations where the<br />

Ship is alongside on full shore<br />

services. Technical support for the<br />

EHWC sailor will be provided by<br />

an MSC qualified sailor, who will<br />

not be required on board but will<br />

be contactable via mobile phone<br />

or pager.<br />

The EHWC Sailor will act as<br />

technical adviser to the Officer of<br />

the Day in the event of a Damage<br />

Control incident. He will not be<br />

required to flash up or shut down<br />

the propulsion plant and his<br />

responsibilities will be limited to<br />

maintaining the minimal level of<br />

systems required to support a<br />

Ship berthed alongside in a<br />

secure port, with full shore<br />

services supplied. For example, in<br />

the event of a failure of Shore<br />

Power, he will be responsible for<br />

establishing Ship’s Power and<br />

taking the necessary action to<br />

have the shore service provider<br />

restore Shore Power. He will not<br />

be required to rectify engineering<br />

defects that do not affect these<br />

minimum essential services.<br />

The EHWC will be a competency<br />

based, platform specific<br />

qualification, consisting of those<br />

elements of the AMOC considered<br />

necessary to allow a sailor to<br />

keep a duty alongside with the<br />

support of full shore services.<br />

These competencies are currently<br />

under development and will differ<br />

between Ship classes due to their<br />

varying requirements. The<br />

competencies will be listed in<br />

ABR 5225 when completed.<br />

For some vessels, particularly the<br />

Minor War Vessels, MHC and<br />

Submarines, introduction of the<br />

EHWC will have no effect on the<br />

composition of their MT Duty<br />

Watch in home port, as this duty<br />

is presently undertaken by only<br />

one sailor. The benefit of the<br />

EHWC for these vessels will be to<br />

formalise the competencies, and<br />

therefore the training, required to<br />

qualify a sailor as proficient to<br />

undertake this duty.<br />

The EHWC will be a promotion<br />

pre-requisite to Leading Seaman.<br />

So when does it all happen?<br />

The overarching management<br />

authority for these changes is the<br />

Marine Engineering Advisory<br />

Group (MEAG). Due to the<br />

magnitude of the changes and<br />

their impact on the way we<br />

operate Ships, the MEAG has<br />

adopted a close management<br />

policy, meeting approximately<br />

quarterly to assess the trials of<br />

the new watchkeeping practices<br />

and formulate the transition<br />

period to the new qualifications.<br />

The MEAG last met in late<br />

November 2002, with the first<br />

meeting for 2003 to be convened<br />

in early April.<br />

At the last meeting, the MEAG<br />

directed DNPR(E&L) to<br />

promulgate the competencies<br />

and syllabi for the EHWC, MST,<br />

MSC and MSM by April 2003.<br />

Subsequently, migration to the<br />

new qualifications is planned to<br />

occur on a platform by platform<br />

basis, beginning with the ANZAC<br />

Class. It was also proposed that a<br />

project team should be<br />

established to assist Ships in<br />

implementing the changes. This


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

55<br />

team will consist of at least one<br />

MT Senior Sailor with extensive<br />

experience in the class concerned<br />

and a member with the computer<br />

skills necessary to allow the<br />

“manpower vs maintenance”<br />

computer model, (which was<br />

used so effectively in analysing<br />

and restructuring the ANZAC MT<br />

workforce) to be modified to suit<br />

the platform. The Senior Sailor’s<br />

role will be to validate the<br />

maintenance and manning data<br />

input into the computer model,<br />

and to provide on-site<br />

management and advice during<br />

the transition to the new<br />

qualifications and watchkeeping<br />

routines.<br />

A fundamental principle of the<br />

transition period is to avoid<br />

disadvantaging individual Marine<br />

Technicians as far as possible.<br />

The changes shouldn’t be<br />

perceived as moving the<br />

goalposts or creating extra<br />

hurdles to be overcome before<br />

promotion, but in some cases<br />

extra learning and the<br />

achievement of extra<br />

competencies may be<br />

unavoidable. Conversely, in some<br />

Ships the transition to the new<br />

qualifications may consist of<br />

nothing more than a simple name<br />

change. To ensure the transition<br />

arrangements are equitable and<br />

streamlined, during the<br />

implementation phase Ship’s<br />

Engineer Officers, Senior Marine<br />

Technicians and the STO’s of<br />

MWVs will be provided with the<br />

ability to award the new<br />

qualifications and set<br />

consolidation periods on a case<br />

by case basis, based on their<br />

assessment of an individual<br />

sailor’s current level of<br />

proficiency. For example, a sailor<br />

may automatically be awarded an<br />

EHWC based on the fact that he<br />

already holds a full AMOC and<br />

has sufficient DC knowledge in<br />

the opinion of the awarding<br />

officer. Or, a sailor may be<br />

awarded an MSC, and have the<br />

consolidation period waived or<br />

significantly reduced, based on<br />

his previous console operating<br />

experience.<br />

Sounds good, but…..<br />

The changes outlined in this<br />

article represent one of the<br />

greatest transformations to occur<br />

in the history of Marine<br />

Engineering in the RAN. We are<br />

challenging old, outmoded work<br />

practices with a new vision which<br />

will not only help us better man<br />

and operate the Ships we have<br />

now, but will prepare us for the<br />

technology of the future. Major<br />

platforms entering service in the<br />

next decade are likely to be<br />

classified as Unmanned<br />

Machinery Spaces (UMS) under<br />

the Certification of Notation for<br />

Ships, meaning watchkeeping as<br />

we now know it will cease to<br />

exist. We need to institute change<br />

now, to be proactive rather than<br />

reactive, or we risk being caught<br />

out with unsustainable<br />

workforces, excessive workloads<br />

and unhappy, unfulfilled<br />

technicians.<br />

Perhaps the greatest benefit<br />

these changes will bring is to<br />

improve working conditions for<br />

Marine Technicians, by helping to<br />

eliminate the mundane,<br />

monotonous aspects of their<br />

employment and allowing them<br />

more opportunity to exercise and<br />

improve their technical skills.<br />

However, they have no chance of<br />

success without the cooperation,<br />

involvement and commitment of<br />

the whole Category. We all need<br />

to take ownership of the change,<br />

to mould it so we get what we<br />

really want. These changes are<br />

dynamic and can be customised<br />

to suit changing requirements or<br />

overcome unforeseen difficulties,<br />

which is why the MEAG is meeting<br />

regularly to manage them.<br />

However, this will only occur if<br />

those they affect most, Marine<br />

Technicians both at sea and<br />

ashore, work with the change and<br />

provide constructive feedback. To<br />

this end, you are actively<br />

encouraged to make use of this<br />

forum to promote discussion<br />

about these issues. ‘ERUS’ will be<br />

a regular feature of the <strong>Navy</strong><br />

Engineering Bulletin from now on<br />

and is available to present your<br />

comments and hopefully answer<br />

your questions. Other avenues<br />

you might like to use to air your<br />

views are the Techo’s Discussion<br />

Database on Lotus Notes, for<br />

those who have access to the<br />

DEFWEB, or you can contact the<br />

MT Category Sponsors direct.<br />

Their details are listed below.<br />

However, they have no chance<br />

of success without the<br />

cooperation, involvement and<br />

commitment of the whole<br />

Category.<br />

I hope this article has answered<br />

some of your questions about the<br />

new watchkeeping routines and<br />

operator qualifications and<br />

allayed any concerns you might<br />

have had. There will obviously be<br />

considerably more information to<br />

pass on as the details of the<br />

transition and implementation<br />

phases take shape. I will keep<br />

you informed.<br />

In the meantime, whatever you<br />

do, don’t postpone or delay<br />

progressing towards your current<br />

operator qualifications in any way.<br />

Till next time, Cheers.<br />

Richo<br />

WOMT MARK RICHARDSON CPOMT ROSS MARTIN LSMT RACHEL SIMPSON<br />

SSOMT to DNPR (E&L) SOMT1 to DNPR(E&L) SOMT3 to DNPR(E&L)<br />

CP 4-7-131 CP 4-7-130 CP 4-7-132<br />

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE<br />

CAMPBELL PARK OFFICES CAMPBELL PARK OFFICES CAMPBELL PARK OFFICES<br />

CANBERRA, ACT 2600 CANBERRA, ACT 2600 CANBERRA, ACT 2600<br />

PH. 02 6266 4212 PH. 02 6266 4211 PH. 02 6266 4071<br />

FAX 02 6266 2388 FAX 02 6266 2388 FAX 02 6266 2388<br />

E-mail E-mail E-mail<br />

mark.richardson3@defence.gov.au ross.martin@defence.gov.au rachel.simpson@defence.gov.au


56 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

MT Category Sponsor gets<br />

Junior Sailor perspective<br />

As a relatively new post-in to DNPR(E&L) I’d like to introduce myself. I<br />

am LSMT(E) Rachel Simpson and have come from HS Blue in Cairns.<br />

This is my eighth year in the Mob and I have been lucky enough to be<br />

posted to the category sponsors in Canberra for four short months so<br />

far. My new posting is vastly different to my previous ones. In my first<br />

week I helped to proof read the previous bulletin. Subsequent weeks I<br />

acted as a travel agent, drafted minutes, processed your IEAUST<br />

applications, attended two MEAGs (Marine Engineer Advisory Group<br />

meetings) and have travelled to some of the bases around Australia to<br />

help promulgate the new watchkeeper routines etc on the roadshows.<br />

The big project our office is<br />

working on at the moment is the<br />

change to the watchkeeper<br />

qualifications and associated<br />

routines that have been<br />

necessitated by the Anzac class<br />

sustainability problems. To<br />

change the scheme of<br />

complement the watchkeeping<br />

personnel have to change; that<br />

changes the qualification<br />

requirement and the increased<br />

sea time coupled with the new<br />

crewing requires the maintenance<br />

ability to also be brought into<br />

alignment. To design and<br />

implement these changes a close<br />

liaison with the MEAG members<br />

is required as it is a policy<br />

change that will ultimately affect<br />

the whole branch. At least being<br />

in this job I get to see why ABR<br />

5225 is so outdated and has not<br />

been updated before.<br />

I must admit I am biased toward<br />

using the multi million dollar<br />

systems on our ships as they<br />

were originally intended to be<br />

used. Especially now we are<br />

facing minimum manning as the<br />

norm now that we no longer have<br />

steam ships. With these<br />

watchkeeper and dutywatch trials<br />

currently being conducted the<br />

time to lay our trust in technology<br />

is fast approaching. I anticipate<br />

that job satisfaction can be<br />

improved and retention therefore<br />

increased with the<br />

implementation of the new<br />

system.<br />

During my time here I look<br />

forward to hearing from many of<br />

you and fielding any suggestions<br />

you may have further up. I can<br />

be contacted by email at<br />

rachel.simpson@defence.gov.au<br />

and will reply to all emails<br />

personally.<br />

LSMT RACHEL (I WASN’T HIRED FOR MY DISPOSITION) SIMPSON, STAFF OFFICER 3, MT CATEGORY SPONSOR


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

57<br />

Focus on Laser Safety in<br />

the RAN<br />

How do we use lasers in defence?<br />

Lasers are already commonplace in defence forces around the world,<br />

and their numbers and uses are increasing. Their military applications<br />

are numerous and can range from optical communications to highenergy<br />

weapons. Accurate range finding is currently the most common<br />

use, and it is a capability that we implement on many RAN platforms<br />

(ANZAC 9LV, FFG EOTS, and MHC EOSS). We also use hand held laser<br />

thermometers in damage control to determine the temperature of<br />

objects from a safe distance, without having to touch the potentially hot<br />

surface. We use a system known as Laser Airborne Depth Sounder<br />

(LADS) to perform ocean depth surveying using lasers operated on<br />

board an aircraft. RAN ships have even used laser designators to guide<br />

beam-riding missiles. These applications are only the beginning. As the<br />

technology matures we will begin to see laser systems used for hard and<br />

soft kill point defence systems, low power line of sight communications<br />

with very high bandwidth, LIDARs that construct real-time threedimensional<br />

images of distant targets, one day we may even have to<br />

learn ceremonial light-sabre drill.<br />

LEUT CHRIS DAVIDSON NAOS<br />

What are the dangers?<br />

Apart from the obvious danger<br />

involved with an inbound laser<br />

guided missile, there are other<br />

risks to personnel involved with<br />

the use of lasers. Laser radiation<br />

is non-ionising (ie, will not result<br />

in radiation sickness or genetic<br />

abnormalities), but it can burn<br />

flesh, and eyes are especially<br />

susceptible. Even a 100 mW<br />

laser is powerful enough to blind<br />

you permanently. A person can<br />

happily stare at a 100 W light<br />

globe because it emits noncollimated<br />

light. That means that<br />

the power is dissipated in every<br />

direction, so only a tiny fraction of<br />

the total power emitted enters the<br />

eye of any single observer. Laser<br />

light on the other hand is highly<br />

collimated (every ray has<br />

approximately the same direction<br />

of travel). So if a laser beam is<br />

pointed at an observer, the full<br />

power of the laser is concentrated<br />

onto the small spot on the skin<br />

where the laser beam strikes.<br />

What makes the eye even more<br />

susceptible to damage than skin<br />

is the ‘Spot Size effect’. This<br />

refers to wavelengths in the<br />

optical hazard region (not only<br />

visible wavelengths from 0.4 –<br />

0.7 micrometres, but also the<br />

near infra-red from 0.7 – 1.4<br />

micrometres), which are bought<br />

into sharp focus onto the retina<br />

of the eye. This concentrates the<br />

full energy of the laser beam onto<br />

an even smaller spot,<br />

superheating that point on the<br />

retina. Depending<br />

on the wavelength,<br />

and duration of<br />

exposure to the<br />

laser, the resultant<br />

super-heating can<br />

cause damage<br />

ranging from<br />

temporary dazzle<br />

to blind spots to<br />

total blindness.<br />

Eyes can be put in<br />

further danger if<br />

magnifying optics such as<br />

binoculars are used. Binoculars<br />

have a much larger aperture than<br />

the eye, so they have the ability<br />

to collect a lot more laser<br />

radiation from beams with a large<br />

diameter, and focus this radiation<br />

into the eye.<br />

What is being done about laser<br />

safety in the RAN?<br />

The Defence Laser Safety<br />

Committee (LSC) is a tri-service


58 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

organisation put together by the<br />

Defence Safety Management<br />

Agency (DSMA). The LSC<br />

promulgate defence laser safety<br />

procedures in Ref A in order to<br />

minimise the likelihood of<br />

Defence personnel being injured<br />

by laser radiation. Subject matter<br />

experts from ADFA and DSTO<br />

ensure that the LSC keep abreast<br />

of developments in laser<br />

technology, laser safety and laser<br />

incidents.<br />

<strong>Navy</strong>, Army and Air Force all have<br />

their own Service Laser Authority<br />

(SLA) each of whom is a member<br />

of the LSC. The RAN SLA is<br />

located in the Naval Acoustic and<br />

Optronic Systems (NAOS) section<br />

headed by DDNAOS and is part<br />

of the <strong>Navy</strong> ISREW Systems<br />

Group in the <strong>Navy</strong> C4ISREW<br />

Directorate of the <strong>Navy</strong> Systems<br />

Branch. DDNAOS sponsors a<br />

DI(N) (Ref B) which is a tailored,<br />

<strong>Navy</strong>-specific version of Ref A.<br />

This DI(N) details the<br />

responsibilities of laser safety in<br />

the RAN and the process by<br />

which laser safety measures are<br />

put in place.<br />

The basic elements of the laser<br />

safety process are:<br />

i. Laser Safety Paper (LSP);<br />

ii. Range Safety Paper (RSP);<br />

iii. Laser Safe To Fire Zones<br />

(LSTFZ); and<br />

iv. equipment specific Standard<br />

Operating Procedures (SOP).<br />

When a new laser system is<br />

being procured for <strong>Navy</strong>, the<br />

project authority is to either<br />

produce a LSP, or if the laser<br />

class is below Class 3B (See the<br />

accompanying laser classification<br />

diagram), simply produce proof<br />

that the laser classification is in<br />

accordance with Ref C.<br />

Assuming the laser is Class 3B or<br />

higher, the LSP contains the laser<br />

properties, hazard distance<br />

calculations, built<br />

in/recommended safety<br />

precautions and any compatibility<br />

problems with other<br />

systems/equipment. Basically the<br />

LSP should ensure that all<br />

pertinent safety aspects<br />

associated with the laser system<br />

have been considered and that<br />

personnel and materiel are not<br />

endangered by the use of the<br />

laser device. It also acts as a<br />

foundation for the development<br />

of the RSP, LSTFZ and SOPs. A<br />

LSP template and examples are<br />

available from the NAOS section.<br />

When the NAOS section receives<br />

a LSP, they either validate or<br />

return the LSP to the project with<br />

corrections to be made. Once<br />

DDNAOS has signed off on a LSP<br />

and the LSC have given final<br />

approval, the RSP is produced by<br />

FIST, LSTFZ produced by both<br />

DNWS and FIST and SOPs are<br />

developed by<br />

Ships/Establishments that use<br />

the laser system. The LSP is a<br />

good starting point for<br />

Ships/Establishments writing<br />

SOPs. NAOS section provides<br />

assistance to all these agencies<br />

in laser matters.<br />

If a laser system is modified, the<br />

through-life support agency of the<br />

system makes DNC4ISREW aware<br />

of the modification details. The<br />

RAN SLA then assess whether the<br />

LSP needs updating. If so the<br />

above process is repeated.<br />

EOTS Laser Upgrade<br />

An example of a laser system<br />

that is being modified is the FFG<br />

EOTS Ranger 600 Laser Range<br />

Finder. It was found that the laser<br />

optics could not meet specified<br />

mean time between failures,<br />

which was resulting in more<br />

frequent maintenance. The<br />

contractor has found that they<br />

can fix this problem by reducing<br />

the power in the laser to a point<br />

where specified range<br />

performance is still met, and the<br />

optics are put under less stress.<br />

Reducing the power of the laser<br />

has a useful knock-on affect in<br />

the form of reduced laser safety<br />

restrictions.<br />

The reduction in power has<br />

resulted in the Ranger 600 being<br />

reclassified from laser Class 3B<br />

to Class 3A.<br />

Although Class 3A lasers do not<br />

strictly need a LSP, the NAOS<br />

section is producing a LSP<br />

anyway to help with the<br />

production of new LSTFZs and<br />

SOPs. To give an idea of the<br />

relaxed safety restrictions, the<br />

current Class 3B EOTS laser has<br />

an ocular hazard distance of 348<br />

yd’s for an observer looking<br />

through standard 7x50 bridge<br />

binoculars (Ref D). The new Class<br />

3A laser will reduce the 7x50<br />

ocular hazard distance to around<br />

22 yd’s.<br />

The EOTS lasers are currently<br />

being upgraded during their


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

59<br />

Approximate<br />

power limits for<br />

visible light<br />

0.5 W<br />

5mW<br />

1mW<br />

0.4 µW<br />

to 220<br />

µW<br />

scheduled maintenance periods.<br />

HMAS Newcastle is the only ship<br />

currently fitted with the new Class<br />

3A laser, but SOPs will not<br />

change until the new LSP is<br />

released early 2003.<br />

Ship/Establishment Laser<br />

Responsibilities<br />

Simplified Laser Classification System<br />

All ships that use laser systems<br />

require a qualified Laser Safety<br />

Officer (LASO) (Ref A). This is<br />

usually the DWEEO or WEEO. To<br />

become a qualified LASO, a<br />

member must undergo a<br />

weeklong laser safety course held<br />

at the <strong>Australian</strong> Defence Force<br />

Academy in Canberra. It teaches<br />

validation and calculation of laser<br />

hazards by providing<br />

mathematical tools for analysis of<br />

laser physical and safety<br />

parameters. Dr Geoff Cochrane<br />

and Dr John Baird teach the laser<br />

safety course, and are both<br />

members of the LSC.<br />

LASOs may find the DSTO<br />

produced laser hazard calculator<br />

useful. It can be downloaded<br />

from:<br />

http://webvic.dsto.defence.gov.au/DSTO/ser<br />

vices/corporate_facilities/laser_c<br />

alculator.exe<br />

To avoid confusion, only members<br />

who have successfully completed<br />

the ADFA laser safety course<br />

should use this calculator.<br />

Class 4<br />

Class 3B<br />

Class 3A<br />

Class 2<br />

Visible wavelengths only<br />

Class 1<br />

Unsafe for eyes<br />

Unsafe for skin<br />

Unsafe for eyes<br />

Safe for skin<br />

Safe in the visible with<br />

aversion response<br />

No viewing aids<br />

Safe with aversion<br />

response<br />

No viewing aids<br />

No precautions required<br />

What is being done to Counter<br />

Foreign Laser Threats?<br />

Although we can protect<br />

ourselves from our own lasers,<br />

there is still the foreign laser<br />

threat to be considered. DSTO<br />

has for many years researched<br />

technologies for protecting<br />

against anti-sensor lasers, which<br />

can also prove hazardous to one<br />

of our most valued sensors, the<br />

Mk 1 eyeball. DSTO provides<br />

advice to the ADO on the<br />

specification and provision of<br />

laser protective filters, goggles<br />

and visors, for standard and nonstandard<br />

lasers.<br />

DSTO is also taking the first steps<br />

in countering the laser threat<br />

associated with subsequent<br />

incoming ordnance. In<br />

development is an in country<br />

Laser Warner Receiver (LWR)<br />

system. Although still being<br />

trialed, some LWRs can detect<br />

the wavelength, peak power,<br />

angle of arrival, pulse width,<br />

Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF)<br />

and check for the coherence of<br />

an incoming laser threat and then<br />

attempt to classify it accordingly<br />

(ie rangefinder/designator etc).<br />

In the near future, the<br />

Command’s ability for Ship/Task<br />

Group self-defence, situational<br />

awareness and probability of<br />

mission success will all be<br />

affected by the use of LWRs. A<br />

trial is being planned in Australia<br />

in which The Technical<br />

Cooperation Program (TTCP)<br />

member countries will be trialing<br />

their own LWR and<br />

countermeasure systems.<br />

More Information:<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> is about to release an<br />

introductory video on laser safety<br />

awareness. This video will provide<br />

ships and establishments that<br />

use laser systems, with a good<br />

introduction to laser hazards.<br />

In early 2003, Ref C will be<br />

replaced with a new <strong>Australian</strong><br />

standard on Laser Safety.<br />

Changes to the laser<br />

classifications will include the<br />

replacement of Class 3A with<br />

Class 3R (not an exact swap,<br />

there will be some differences),<br />

and the addition of Class 1M and<br />

Class 2M. These two new classes<br />

deal with special cases of Class<br />

1 and Class 2 lasers that can be<br />

hazardous if viewed with<br />

magnifying optics.<br />

RAN Contacts:<br />

For advice/assistance with laser<br />

safety in the RAN, the NAOS<br />

section is located in Campbell<br />

Park building 4 level 4 in<br />

Canberra. The DDNAOS is Mr Aiyel<br />

Chelliah, E-mail:<br />

aiyel.chelliah@defence.gov.au, Ph<br />

(02) 6266 3204. The RAN SLA is<br />

LEUT Chris Davidson, E-mail:<br />

christopher.davidson@defence.gov<br />

.au, Ph: (02) 6266 4886.<br />

References:<br />

A. ADFP 410 – Defence Laser<br />

Safety<br />

B. DI(N) LOG 72-6 – <strong>Royal</strong><br />

<strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> Laser Safety<br />

C. AS/NZS 2211.1:1997 – Laser<br />

Safety<br />

D. Laser Safety Paper for Project<br />

1698: Electro Optical Tracking<br />

System for FFGs<br />

Incorporating the Ranger 600<br />

Laser Rangefinder<br />

THE AUTHOR, LEUT CHRIS DAVIDSON, AND<br />

DDNAOS, MR AIYEL CHELLIAH.


60 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

Editor’s Note: This little article was picked up by the<br />

Chief Naval Engineer from the Career 1 website, and is<br />

included as an item of general interest.<br />

Engineers need to lighten<br />

up and round out<br />

Engineers must change the way<br />

they value their skills to boost<br />

their rating in the salary stakes,<br />

advises a recruitment expert.<br />

Mike Cowlishaw, of Cowlishaw<br />

Engineering & Manufacturing,<br />

says engineers earn significantly<br />

less than other professionals do<br />

and yet <strong>Australian</strong> engineers<br />

enjoy a worldwide reputation for<br />

their expertise and work ethic.<br />

He says senior engineering<br />

salaries have actually fallen by<br />

20-30 per cent in the last year or<br />

so.<br />

"Salaries are not major drivers for<br />

engineers," Mr Cowlishaw<br />

explains. "Engineers seem more<br />

turned on by the role rather than<br />

the salary so they can only blame<br />

themselves for their poor rate of<br />

pay compared to what they<br />

actually contribute to an<br />

employer."<br />

He also warns those looking to<br />

add to their skill base to avoid<br />

expensive MBA programs.<br />

"A degree in marketing is worth<br />

heaps more (than an MBA) and<br />

doesn’t eat into your free time as<br />

much," Mr Cowlishaw says.<br />

"Some engineers should also<br />

work on their personality and<br />

realise that as they lose<br />

themselves in a technical world<br />

they are leaving themselves wide<br />

open to getting their salary<br />

screwed down."<br />

"In business, you are only<br />

worth something if you can<br />

show you can add value to<br />

most aspects of the<br />

organisation”.<br />

"Engineers need to demonstrate<br />

to employers that they are global<br />

thinkers not merely tech heads."<br />

Outside of work, Mr Cowlishaw<br />

recommends engineers spread<br />

their wings to try new things. He<br />

says, too many have personal<br />

interests that merely mirror their<br />

work interests - solo hobbies that<br />

revolve around building or making<br />

something.<br />

"For example, instead of getting<br />

into a series of DIY projects,<br />

engineers need to get a life and<br />

get out with others," he says. "Go<br />

abseiling, bush walking or<br />

canoeing - team based activities<br />

are a great way to develop people<br />

skills."<br />

"There is an unwritten law that<br />

the more narrow your pursuits in<br />

life the lower your salary and the<br />

more likely you are destined to be<br />

a doormat."<br />

He said in all roles people skills<br />

are a bonus.<br />

"Engineers have only themselves<br />

to blame if they aren’t taken<br />

seriously," he said. "They need to<br />

show their personality is actually<br />

quite well-rounded and that they<br />

can contribute across a wide<br />

variety of activities and add real<br />

value to an organisation."<br />

"Anyone can get a string of<br />

degrees but the more you<br />

concentrate on your qualifications<br />

the more likely you are to be<br />

buried in the nether world at the<br />

back of the building or some site<br />

shed without air-conditioning<br />

earning the same money as an<br />

unqualified office support<br />

worker."<br />

"In business, you are only worth<br />

something if you can show you<br />

can add value to most aspects of<br />

the organisation”.<br />

CareerOne, November 1, 2002.<br />

Tim Barter<br />

Department of Defence<br />

Campbell Park Offices CP4-7-152<br />

Canberra ACT<br />

2600<br />

Email<br />

Tim.Barter@cbr.defence.gov.au<br />

Tel 02 62663010<br />

Fax 02 6266 3776


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

61<br />

The <strong>Navy</strong> Technical<br />

Regulatory System (TRS) –<br />

Development and<br />

Implementation Project –<br />

an Update<br />

(Formally Project HELP)<br />

Introduction<br />

In the last Engineering Bulletin, I detailed the background to the <strong>Navy</strong><br />

TRS Development and Implementation Project and outlined plans for its<br />

immediate future. This article will provide an update of progress to date,<br />

describe the plan for the next six months of the project, and highlight<br />

some interesting developments.<br />

CMDR BOB HORSNELL CSC<br />

For those readers who missed the<br />

previous articles, <strong>Navy</strong> Technical<br />

Regulation is defined as “A<br />

system for controlling the risks,<br />

during design, construction and<br />

maintenance, that impact on the<br />

fitness for service, safety and<br />

environmental compliance of ADF<br />

maritime materiel.”<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> Technical Regulation is<br />

achieved by ensuring that work<br />

undertaken during design,<br />

construction and maintenance of<br />

ADF maritime materiel is:<br />

a. carried out to approved<br />

standards,<br />

b. is undertaken by competent<br />

and authorised individuals,<br />

who<br />

c. act as members of Authorised<br />

Engineering Organisations, and<br />

d. whose work is certified as<br />

correct.<br />

The Project was established to<br />

develop and deploy the <strong>Navy</strong> TRS<br />

during the period 2002 to 2004.<br />

A review of the last article<br />

In the last article I described, in<br />

crude terms, the overall RAN<br />

Regulatory Framework and where<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> Technical Regulation fits<br />

within this framework. Further,<br />

the regulatory responsibilities of<br />

the Director General <strong>Navy</strong> Safety,<br />

Certification and Acceptance<br />

(DGNCSA), CAPT Mark Sander,<br />

and the Chief Naval Engineer<br />

(CNE), CDRE Tim Barter were<br />

outlined, as well as the overall<br />

Project plan and methodology.<br />

The article also described the<br />

Common Regulatory Architecture<br />

under which the Project Team will<br />

develop the <strong>Navy</strong> Technical<br />

Regulatory System (TRS), and<br />

outlined the eight regulatory<br />

areas the Team will focus on.<br />

These eight areas include:<br />

a. Technical Risk Management,<br />

b. Engineering Change<br />

Management,<br />

c. Reporting of Defective and<br />

Unsatisfactory Materiel,<br />

d. Delegation of Engineering<br />

Authority,<br />

e. Maintenance Management,<br />

f. Authorised Engineering<br />

Organisations,<br />

g. Technical Data Management,<br />

and<br />

h. Technical Compliance.<br />

At the time of printing of the last<br />

Engineering Bulletin, the Project<br />

had just commenced developing<br />

the first section of the TRS —<br />

Technical Risk Management. The<br />

plan was to prepare a prototype<br />

of the section and trial it in two<br />

‘test beds’, ANZSPO and FIMA<br />

Perth, to determine its utility in<br />

the workplace.<br />

Progress since the last article<br />

The Technical Risk Management<br />

Section of the TRS has been<br />

developed and promulgated on<br />

CD. The ‘test-bedding’ of the<br />

prototype proved successful with<br />

excellent feedback received from


62 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

both ANZSPO and FIMA Perth.<br />

Both organisations embraced the<br />

TRS and provided unconditional<br />

support. In particular, thanks<br />

must go to CMDR Peter Gorman<br />

(CFM), LCDR Greg Church (CO<br />

FIMA Perth), LEUT Will West (FIMA<br />

Perth) and LCDR Jason Sears of<br />

ANZSPO. Technical Risk<br />

Management was also ‘rolled out’<br />

to all FIMAs following a request<br />

from then CSO(E), CAPT Paul<br />

Field.<br />

Engineering Change Management<br />

and Reporting of Defective and<br />

Unsatisfactory Materiel sections<br />

of the TRS have also been<br />

completed and are currently<br />

being prepared for ‘burning’ on to<br />

CDs for distribution (Version 0.2).<br />

At time of printing, all remaining<br />

sections of the TRS are under<br />

development and the Project is<br />

approximately six months ahead<br />

of schedule.<br />

The TRS will be formally<br />

documented and promulgated in<br />

hard copy as the <strong>Navy</strong> Technical<br />

Regulations Manual (ABR 6492).<br />

Promulgation is expected to occur<br />

in July this year. However, in the<br />

interim, as each section of the<br />

TRS manual is developed it will<br />

be issued as part of a provisional<br />

ABR (ABR 6492P) on a regularly<br />

updated CD. The Manual will<br />

comprise three volumes. Volume<br />

one will contain the Technical<br />

Regulatory principles and the<br />

regulations themselves. Volume<br />

two will be in eight sections<br />

representing each of the areas<br />

requiring regulation (see list<br />

above), and volume three is a<br />

pocket size guide to the<br />

management of technical risk.<br />

In addition to the above, the<br />

Directorate of Technical<br />

Regulation – <strong>Navy</strong> (DTR-N) was<br />

stood up on 30 September last<br />

year to manage the TRS as it is<br />

rolled out. A website (see details<br />

at the end of the article) was also<br />

established on the DEFWEB, and<br />

readers are encouraged to visit<br />

the site for further information on<br />

the roles of the DTR-N, contact<br />

details of staff, and answers to<br />

frequently asked questions. A<br />

copy of the Manual is also<br />

located on the website and is<br />

updated as each section of the<br />

TRS is documented.<br />

Immediate future<br />

The second issue of the<br />

provisional manual (on CD) will<br />

occur in March this year. This<br />

version (0.2) will contain the two<br />

recently completed sections<br />

(Engineering Change<br />

Management and Reporting of<br />

Defective and Unsatisfactory<br />

Materiel), as well as an updated<br />

Technical Risk Management<br />

section. This CD will also contain<br />

the initial version of Volume One.<br />

As stated above, ABR 6492 will<br />

be completed by mid year, and<br />

the Project will enter a six-month<br />

phase of rollout, training and<br />

‘marketing’ of the TRS.<br />

During 2003, the DTR-N will also<br />

facilitate the re-write of the RAN<br />

Ship Maintenance Administration<br />

Manual (ABR 5230). This long<br />

overdue task will result in a<br />

considerable change in the look<br />

of ABR 5230. Policy statements<br />

will be removed to ABR 6492 and<br />

common processes reviewed.<br />

Readers may have read a<br />

DGNAVSYS message sent late<br />

last year (HAE/OAE 152325Z<br />

DEC 02) detailing the<br />

requirement for the use of form<br />

TT117 — Materiel or Equipment<br />

Trial Proposal. This was raised<br />

following concern that insufficient<br />

consideration of the impact of the<br />

trial on the platform’s fitness for<br />

service, safety and environmental<br />

compliance was being<br />

undertaken. To correct this,<br />

personnel raising TT117s for trials<br />

involving engineering changes,<br />

are to support the TT 117 with a<br />

completed SG-2, or TM187. DTR-<br />

N will review the Form TT117,<br />

DI(N) LOG 82-3 and the process<br />

during this year.<br />

In closing, the Project is one of<br />

development, and as such, the<br />

Team is keen for input from<br />

engineers and technicians in the<br />

field. Further, the Team is more<br />

than happy to discuss any<br />

technical regulatory issue you<br />

might have, and any question(s)<br />

that arise from this article.<br />

Contact details below.<br />

Contact details<br />

DEFWEB: see NAVSYSCOM site<br />

then select ‘Regulation’, then<br />

DTR-N<br />

E-mail: DTR-N@defence.gov.au<br />

Phone: CMDR Bob Horsnell<br />

02 6266 2652


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

63<br />

Officer Promotions<br />

INCUMBENT RANK NAME DATE SHIP/ESTABLISHMENT<br />

CAPT ME Irwin,G.J 1-Jan-03 MAR CMD<br />

CAPT ME Sippel,D.P. 1-Jan-03 MAR CMD<br />

CAPT WE Uzzell,M.J. 1-Jan-03 NAVSYSCOM<br />

CAPT ME Idrus,T. 1-Jul-02 MAR CMD<br />

CMDR EOE Woodcock,R.J.W. 1-Jan-03 JALO<br />

CMDR ME English,S.J. 1-Jan-03 MANOORA<br />

CMDR ME Rees,R.R. 1-Jan-03 NAVY HQ<br />

CMDR WE Turner,C.R. 1-Jan-03 FFG SPO<br />

CMDR WE Franklin,A.L. 1-Jan-03 NAVSYSCOM<br />

CMDR ME Fysh,A.W. 1-Jan-03 HARMAN<br />

CMDR WE Lindsay,A.A. 1-Jan-03 SM FEG<br />

CMDR WEA Burley,P.G. 1-Jan-03 NAVSYSCOM<br />

CMDR WE Chesher,G.M. 1-Jul-02 NAVSYSCOM<br />

CMDR ME Bourke,C.D. 1-Jul-02 WESTRALIA<br />

CMDR WE Rossendell,M.A. 1-Jul-02 CAPSYS<br />

CMDR WE Burningham,D.A. 1-Jul-02 AWDSPO<br />

CMDR ME Richardson,M.A. 1-Jul-02 HARMAN<br />

CMDR WE Chandler,J.A. 1-Jul-02 SUBMARINES<br />

LCDR ME Williams,G.F. 1-Jan-03 SUCCESS<br />

LCDR WE Durward,D. 1-Jan-03 MAR CMD<br />

LCDR WE Paddison,S.R. 1-Jan-03 ANZAC SPO<br />

LCDR EOE Drage,L.W. 1-Jan-03 MAR CMD<br />

LCDR ME Ridgway,P.F. 1-Jan-03 NAVSYSCOM<br />

LCDR WE Price,W.M. 1-Jan-03 CDSC<br />

LCDR WE Mcgrann,M.J. 1-Jan-03 JALO<br />

LCDR WE Coleman,M.A. 1-Jan-03 NAVSYSCOM<br />

LCDR ME Murfett,E.D. 1-Jan-03 FFG SPO<br />

LCDR WE Cormack,M.J. 1-Jan-03 MAR SYS<br />

LCDR WE Dowton,P.R. 1-Jan-03 NAVY HQ<br />

LCDR ME Radesich,A.A. 1-Jan-03 NAVSYSCOM<br />

LCDR ME Birch,A.M. 1-Jan-03 MELBOURNE<br />

LCDR ME Shawcross,R.B. 1-Jan-03 SM FEG<br />

LCDR WE Kestel,L.L. 1-Jan-03 DIO<br />

LCDR WE Smith,N.J. 1-Jan-03 NAVY HQ<br />

LCDR ME Spurling,A.N.C. 1-Jan-03 SM FEG<br />

LCDR WE Penny,S.M. 1-Jan-03 DSTO<br />

INCUMBENT RANK NAME DATE SHIP/ESTABLISHMENT<br />

LCDR ME Walter,D.M. 1-Jan-03 HS RED<br />

LCDR ME Barton,D. 1-Jan-03 STIRLING<br />

LCDR WE Elphick,R.G. 1-Jan-03 NAVSYSCOM<br />

LCDR WE Mclennan,G.C. 1-Jan-03 MW SPO<br />

LCDR WEA Barnes,A.P. 1-Jan-03 817 SQN<br />

LCDR AE Cornish,D.J. 1-Jan-03 723 SQN<br />

LCDR WEA Banic,G. 1-Jan-03 NAVY HQ<br />

LCDR ME Gardiner,D.A. 27-May-02 MAR SYS<br />

LEUT AE Mchugh,S. 1-Jan-03 ALBATROS<br />

LEUT AE Yates,K.N. 1-Jan-03 NAVSYSCOM<br />

LEUT WE Shanny,J.P. 1-Jan-03 NAVSYSCOM<br />

LEUT WE Speke,M.D. 1-Jan-03 MAR SYS<br />

LEUT WE Milne,D.K. 1-Jan-03 NAVCAMSAUS<br />

LEUT WE Grosse,D.M. 1-Jan-03 MW SPO<br />

LEUT WE Houen,P.J. 1-Jan-03 MELBOURNE<br />

LEUT WE Dawson,I.L. 1-Jan-03 NAVSYSCOM<br />

LEUT WE Sweet,G.L.B. 1-Jan-03 FFG SPO<br />

LEUT WE Melville,N.J. 1-Jan-03 NAVSYSCOM<br />

LEUT ME Goodson,I.M. 1-Jan-03 NASPO<br />

LEUT ME Rice,K.J. 1-Jan-03 ADELAIDE<br />

LEUT ME White,B.J. 1-Jan-03 CANBERRA<br />

LEUT ME Cain,I.K. 1-Jan-03 NEWCASTLE<br />

LEUT ME Thomas,S.R. 1-Jan-03 CERBERUS<br />

LEUT ME Milne,R.D. 1-Jan-03 SYDNEY<br />

LEUT ME Ford,S.B. 1-Jan-03 CERBERUS<br />

LEUT ME Carroll,M.V. 1-Jan-03 CERBERUS<br />

LEUT ME Gerrard,D.T. 1-Jan-03 STUART<br />

LEUT WEA Fairs,G.A.C. 1-Jan-03 DGTA ADF<br />

LEUT WEA Arney,S.G. 1-Jan-03 723 SQN<br />

LEUT WEA Newhill,G.M. 1-Jan-03 RANTEWSS<br />

LEUT WEA Semaan,C.S. 1-Jan-03 AVN FEG<br />

LEUT WEA Dantoc,M.M.D. 1-Jan-03 KUTTABUL<br />

LEUT EA Kyle,C.G. 1-Jan-03 AVN FEG<br />

LEUT EA Moloney,M.M. 1-Jan-03 MIS DIV<br />

LEUT ME Dixon,L.T. 14-Jul-02 KANIMBLA<br />

LEUT ME Coles,J.P. 24-May-02 ANZAC SPO


64 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

LCDR VAUGHN THOMPSETT<br />

Orange Overalls<br />

I recently had the opportunity of sea-riding on a merchant vessel<br />

operated as a joint venture between BHP T&L and Teekay Shipping (a<br />

large Canadian based shipping company). The, Pacific Triangle, is a<br />

211,000 tonne (full load displacement), Lloyds registered, bulk carrier<br />

operating on a triangular route: iron ore from Port Hedland to Port<br />

Kembla, coal from Australia’s East Coast to Japan, ballast return to Port<br />

Hedland.<br />

The reason for this secondment,<br />

apart from training, was to<br />

compare ideas and<br />

methodologies ie: what do the<br />

Merchant <strong>Navy</strong> do better than us<br />

and can we adopt or adapt it?<br />

One subject that always surfaces<br />

when discussing the Merchant<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> is rates of pay, so lets get<br />

this out of the way before<br />

continuing. Yes ladies and<br />

gentlemen, your fellow<br />

engineering counterparts who, in<br />

BHP’s case, get to wear trendy<br />

orange overalls, do get paid a<br />

whole lot more than you do and,<br />

on first impressions, appear to<br />

work under much better<br />

conditions of service. A question<br />

to ponder though: which one of<br />

you is worried that their next trip<br />

could be their last, only to be<br />

THE AUTHOR (SECOND FROM LEFT) WITH THE ENTIRE PACIFIC TRIANGLE ENGINEERING<br />

DEPARTMENT<br />

fired and replaced with a<br />

Ukrainian or Philipino crew?<br />

Note that the Pacific Triangle<br />

(operated by “The Big <strong>Australian</strong>”)<br />

is Liberian flagged, requiring the<br />

mainly <strong>Australian</strong> crew to hold<br />

The first thing that strikes<br />

you about the two year old<br />

Pacific Triangle, is its size.<br />

It’s massive.<br />

Liberian qualifications. I also<br />

found that our total “seagoing”<br />

salary package was not all that<br />

far behind our civilian<br />

counterparts in a strictly dollars<br />

sense ie: ignoring their roughly six<br />

week on, six week off routine.<br />

Now for the finer details:<br />

I joined Pacific Triangle on a<br />

Sunday in Port Headland. The<br />

ship’s agent met me at the<br />

airport for the trip into town and,<br />

within a few minutes of arriving at<br />

the town jetty, a workboat arrived<br />

to ferry me to the ship, which was<br />

still loading two grades of iron ore<br />

bound for the smelters at Port<br />

Kembla. The CO (Old Man) and<br />

Chief Engineer were waiting at the<br />

top of the accommodation ladder<br />

to greet me and I was shown to a<br />

spacious cabin with double bed<br />

and ensuite. So far, so good.<br />

The CO showed me around the<br />

accommodation and upper deck<br />

and, after having me sign the<br />

Ship’s Articles and relieving me of<br />

my passport, gave me a Safety<br />

Induction leaflet and BHP<br />

Shipboard Health, Safety and<br />

Environment Pocket Guide. I was<br />

then given a tour and safety brief<br />

of the machinery spaces by the<br />

Chief Engineer.<br />

The Ship<br />

The first thing that strikes you<br />

about the two year old Pacific<br />

Triangle, is its size. It’s massive.<br />

It can lift almost 190,000tonnes<br />

of cargo, in nine holds, and the<br />

only reason it wasn’t loading to<br />

capacity at Port Hedland was that<br />

it’s full load draft of over 17m is<br />

too deep for Port Kembla. It is<br />

300m long, 50m wide, and is<br />

powered by a single, six cylinder,<br />

Samsung-MAN-B&W slow speed<br />

two stroke reversible diesel<br />

engine, rated at 21,100BHP at<br />

83.7 RPM, driving a single fixed<br />

pitch propeller. Normal transit<br />

output is approximately<br />

19,000BHP at 83 RPM, giving<br />

between 11-15 knots, weather<br />

dependant. The engine is<br />

optimised to minimise NOX<br />

emissions and the whole vessel<br />

has been designed to be as<br />

environmentally friendly as<br />

possible. For the yachties<br />

amongst us: from “Full Away”<br />

(transit speed) to stop, it takes<br />

2.6 miles with the main engine<br />

going Full Astern, so I suggest you<br />

don’t try to enforce right-of-way.<br />

Electrical power is provided by<br />

three, six cylinder 700kw<br />

Hyundai-MAN-B&W medium<br />

speed diesels, only one of which<br />

is required under normal cruising<br />

conditions. There are no shaft<br />

alternators.


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

65<br />

only gauges calibrated on board<br />

were test equipment, safety<br />

related (eg: Gas Detectors) and<br />

any considered critical. Makes<br />

you ask what value we are<br />

gaining from removing and<br />

calibrating thousands of gauges<br />

each year. Especially when you<br />

consider the cost, down-time, and<br />

danger of system damage from<br />

this requirement!<br />

each port of call. For any<br />

planned or defect maintenance<br />

beyond ship’s staff capability, the<br />

Chief informs the ship manager<br />

when he wants it carried out and<br />

by whom from the preferred list.<br />

This works well as non-performing<br />

contractors simply don’t get the<br />

work next time.<br />

Machinery Operation<br />

PACIFIC TRIANGLE LOADING IRON ORE AT PORT HEADLAND<br />

The great size is not restricted to<br />

the outer dimensions. The engine<br />

room and machinery spaces are<br />

also cavernous and appear to be<br />

very well laid out. Being a long<br />

stroke cross-head design, a high<br />

deckhead is required above the<br />

main engine to allow for removal<br />

of the 2.3tonne pistons and<br />

3metre long piston rods. The<br />

purifiers and HFO pumps are<br />

located in a separate, spacious,<br />

compartment, as are the<br />

generators. Speaking of size, the<br />

Chief Engineers cabin and dayroom,<br />

identical to the CO’s, is<br />

bigger than a Fremantle’s engine<br />

room!<br />

The Department<br />

The crew numbers 17 of which<br />

four, the Chief and 1st, 2nd and<br />

3rd Engineers make up the<br />

important part. One Integrated<br />

Rating (IR) is also detailed off on<br />

a rotational basis to assist in the<br />

Engine Room. The 1st Engineer,<br />

equivalent to our DMEO, is seen<br />

as the HOD and holds an<br />

equivalent position to the 1st<br />

Mate (XO). Their cabins also both<br />

have Day Rooms although slightly<br />

smaller than the CO/Chief’s. The<br />

1st, 2nd and 3rd Engineers all<br />

have specific areas they are<br />

responsible for eg: the 2nd Eng<br />

has Generators, the 3rd, Purifiers<br />

and water/fuel/oil testing etc.<br />

Planned Maintenance<br />

routines as they see fit, as long<br />

as they still conform to<br />

Classification Society and<br />

manufacturers requirements.<br />

Where I found this most useful<br />

was that anything learned during<br />

the course of a PM routine (eg:<br />

special tools to use, things to<br />

look out for etc) could be easily<br />

added to the routine and would<br />

be printed out next time it was<br />

due. The PM sheets were placed<br />

in a folder on a monthly basis in<br />

the Control Room. At the start of<br />

each day the engineers would<br />

choose which PMs, pertaining to<br />

their areas, they wanted to do<br />

that day and, on completion,<br />

place the opening/closing<br />

reports, spares consumed list etc,<br />

back in the folder. Spares<br />

inventory control is carried out<br />

using another apparently simple<br />

and user friendly system called<br />

“Microstore”. This system is<br />

easily cross-linked to various<br />

items of machinery and PMs<br />

utilising similar spares. Most<br />

other reports, such as fuel usage,<br />

engine hours etc, are completed<br />

on generic Excel spreadsheets.<br />

The Chief holds a “Certificate of<br />

Authorisation” from Lloyds to<br />

carry out most of their Surveys on<br />

a rolling basis. Some surveys,<br />

such as the main engine main<br />

journal bearings, can only be<br />

carried out by Lloyds’ surveyors:<br />

to ensure the society retains<br />

visibility of machinery state.<br />

Another interesting point: the 3rd<br />

Mate (equivalent to a SBLT with a<br />

bridge ticket) is also the NBCD<br />

Yeoman, and the seamanship<br />

department is responsible for all<br />

cargo loading/unloading and<br />

ship’s stability. This is extremely<br />

important as the stresses<br />

imposed by incorrect loading can<br />

result in catastrophic structural<br />

failure (in recent years, more<br />

vessels have been lost without<br />

trace after leaving Port Headland<br />

than any other port in the world).<br />

Defect Maintenance<br />

Any defect maintenance carried<br />

out by the crew is recorded on<br />

worksheets at the end of each<br />

day, for updating of records by<br />

the Chief. A list of “company<br />

preferred” contractors is held for<br />

The vessel runs Unmanned<br />

Machinery Spaces (UMS), which<br />

means that, apart from a set of<br />

rounds carried out by the duty<br />

It seemed very alien to<br />

change the alarm panel to<br />

“unmanned” and walk out of<br />

that huge engine room<br />

leaving no-one on watch.<br />

engineer (on the gear) at 2100,<br />

the spaces are unmanned from<br />

1700 until 0800 and during<br />

lunch and smokos. It seemed<br />

very alien to change the alarm<br />

panel to “unmanned” and walk<br />

out of that huge engine room<br />

leaving no-one on watch. Having<br />

said that, I see no reason why<br />

warships of the future can’t be<br />

operated the same way while<br />

“steady steaming” and indeed<br />

some RAN vessels could be<br />

relatively easily modified to<br />

operate UMS. The alarm and<br />

control systems fitted after the<br />

fire to the already UMS classed<br />

WESTRALIA, are actually more<br />

The Chief acts as the PM<br />

coordinator, using what appeared<br />

to be simple and user friendly<br />

software called “Microplan”.<br />

He/she can also change the PM<br />

One point of note wrt planned<br />

maintenance: neither the<br />

classification societies, AMSA, the<br />

owners, or manufacturers, require<br />

all gauges to be calibrated; the<br />

PACIFIC TRIANGLE’S ENORMOUS MAIN ENGINE TURBOCHARGER


66 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

modern and comprehensive than<br />

those on the two year old Pacific<br />

Triangle. Food for thought?<br />

Quality and Operational<br />

Documents<br />

BHP/Teekay vessels operate<br />

under a Quality System known as<br />

the QASEP (Quality, Safety and<br />

Environmental Protection)<br />

Management System.<br />

The governing document for this<br />

system is the Marine Logistic<br />

Services – Operations -<br />

Management Manual (MLSOMM)<br />

are company specific, and the<br />

remaining two, Work Instructions<br />

and Operations Procedures (PAC-<br />

WI and PAC-OPS in the case of<br />

Pacific Triangle), are ship specific.<br />

The manuals are designed to<br />

satisfy the objective of retaining<br />

certification under:<br />

ISO 9001 Quality Management<br />

Systems<br />

DNV Management of Safety<br />

and Environmental Protection<br />

(SEP) Rules, and<br />

ISM Code Chapter IX of SOLAS.<br />

The alarm and control<br />

systems fitted after the fire<br />

to the already UMS classed<br />

WESTRALIA, are actually more<br />

modern and comprehensive<br />

than those on the two year<br />

old Pacific Triangle. Food for<br />

thought?<br />

with four other primary<br />

documents used for vessel<br />

operation. Two of these primary<br />

documents, the Vessel Operations<br />

Management Manual (VOMM)<br />

and the Vessel Operations<br />

Management Manual – Common<br />

Vessel Procedures (VOMM-CVP),<br />

MAIN ENGINE, BOTTOM PLATES<br />

The manuals cover the following<br />

areas:<br />

MLSOMM<br />

Organisational Structure<br />

QASEP Management,<br />

Implementation and Auditing<br />

OH&S<br />

Pollution<br />

Ship Safety<br />

Training and Qualifications<br />

Regulations and Laws<br />

Purchasing and<br />

Sub-Contracting<br />

Insurance<br />

Administration<br />

Documentation<br />

Ship Acquisition<br />

Emergency/Contingency<br />

Planning<br />

Management System<br />

Procedures<br />

VOMM<br />

Covers the same areas as the<br />

MLSOMM but with the<br />

inclusion of: Responsibilities<br />

and Duties of All Personnel<br />

Onboard<br />

VOMM-CVP<br />

Management System Review<br />

Documentation and Document<br />

Control<br />

Administration<br />

Resources & Personnel<br />

(Manning, Training, Victualling,<br />

Working Hours etc)<br />

Accidents, Hazards, Safety<br />

Procedures<br />

Navigation<br />

Maintenance<br />

Fuels and Oils<br />

Waste Management<br />

PAC-OPS<br />

Navigation<br />

Cargo<br />

Deck<br />

Engineering<br />

Maintenance<br />

Bunkering<br />

Waste<br />

PAC-WI<br />

Crew Induction<br />

Arrival & Departure Check-lists<br />

Equipment Operation<br />

Machinery Operation<br />

Safety Equipment Rounds<br />

Waste Management<br />

I found all of these documents to<br />

be easy to use, well written, and<br />

informative, but sometimes<br />

lacking detail. The VOMM and<br />

VOMM-CVP can only be changed<br />

by BHP T&L management.<br />

Recommended changes to OPS<br />

are forwarded to the vessel<br />

management, while WIs can be<br />

changed by ship’s staff.<br />

Performance Appraisal<br />

BHP’s “Officer Review and<br />

Development Program” is a result<br />

of agreements between the<br />

company, unions, and Masters<br />

and Chiefs, and a development<br />

process involving a cross-section<br />

of officers (remember all<br />

engineers are officers). Masters<br />

and Chiefs are required to be<br />

reviewed yearly and all others<br />

biennially. The areas covered are<br />

not unlike those used in our own<br />

Performance Appraisal process<br />

but some points of interest are:<br />

• Goal setting and achievement for<br />

Masters and Chiefs includes<br />

ship’s, as well as personal, goals,<br />

• The person being assessed is<br />

required to include a “self rating”<br />

for each section, and<br />

• The system appears much<br />

simpler than, and is certainly no<br />

where near the administrative<br />

nightmare of, our newly<br />

implemented system (although<br />

promotions appear less reliant on<br />

performance and more on<br />

qualifications aquired).<br />

Daily Routine<br />

Ship’s staff work a seven day<br />

week for the entire six week<br />

“swing”. My standard working<br />

day onboard consisted of:<br />

0645 Attend HODs meeting –<br />

the Mate, 1st Engineer<br />

and Chief Integrated<br />

Rating(CIR) plan the<br />

day’s and upcoming work<br />

including employment of<br />

the IRs.<br />

0730-0800 Breakfast<br />

0800 Turn to<br />

1000-1030 Smoko<br />

1200-1300 Lunch<br />

1500-1530 Smoko<br />

1700 Stand Down<br />

1730-1800 Dinner<br />

If you had the watch (on the<br />

gear) which occurred every third<br />

day, two sets of rounds, at 0800


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

67<br />

LOOKING FWD OVER THE MAIN ENGINE. THE CIRCULAR JIG IN THE FOREGROUND HOUSES THE<br />

HYDRAULIC UNITS FOR REMOVING THE HEAD-BOLTS. NOTE THE SPARE PISTON AND PISTON-<br />

ROD HANGING AT THE FWD END.<br />

and 2100, were also included.<br />

This also meant that the alarms<br />

were turned to the duty<br />

engineer’s cabin during the silent<br />

hours. If the alarms had not<br />

been acknowledged in the engine<br />

room within 6 minutes, they<br />

would sound throughout the ship.<br />

On Sundays the whole crew,<br />

including the CO, split into two<br />

groups and carried out Safety<br />

Rounds. I thought this was an<br />

excellent idea as not only was all<br />

safety equipment checked, but<br />

personnel became familiar with<br />

equipment outside their own work<br />

and living areas. Even more<br />

important on such a large vessel<br />

with such a small crew.<br />

One thing that impressed me was<br />

the “can do” attitude of all the<br />

engineers.<br />

No job was too big or difficult to<br />

tackle. If there wasn’t a spare<br />

then it was “you’re a tiffy, make a<br />

bastard” (am I getting a bit<br />

nostalgic?), and modify it so it<br />

doesn’t happen again. During my<br />

15 days on board, only two<br />

defects were discovered that were<br />

simply beyond ship’s staff<br />

capability, and one of those was<br />

only due to a lack of appropriate<br />

materials.<br />

Some of the range of tasks I was<br />

involved in during my stay<br />

included: inspections of the<br />

200m long “duct keel” and<br />

5300cz capacity forepeak ballast<br />

tank, a main engine unit changeout<br />

over the weekend in Port<br />

Kembla, repairs to electronic<br />

valve control systems,<br />

manufacture and fit of main<br />

engine manifold sliding mounts,<br />

testing of alarms, trace and repair<br />

of electric crane controls, and<br />

rebuild of HFO pump, to name a<br />

few.<br />

Fire Fighting and Damage<br />

Control<br />

This was one area where I was<br />

not impressed. We held only one<br />

exercise during the 15 days I was<br />

on-board. This was a helo crashon-deck<br />

and it certainly didn’t<br />

leave me with any warm fuzzy<br />

feelings about my chances if I<br />

was in the helo.<br />

I believe the Merchant <strong>Navy</strong><br />

would benefit greatly from a “sea<br />

training group” type approach. I<br />

don’t mean our “cast-ofthousands”<br />

type STG, or the sort<br />

of standards that we quite rightly<br />

aspire to, but maybe two experts<br />

joining each vessel for a couple<br />

of days twice a year to put the<br />

crew through it’s paces. I realise<br />

this is very much a dollar driven<br />

decision, but with the spiralling<br />

cost of insurance it may soon<br />

prove feasible.<br />

General Observations<br />

There appeared to be little known<br />

about the current recruiting and<br />

training pipeline/system for<br />

merchant engineers. It seems<br />

that initial training must be<br />

commenced off your own back<br />

(usually at AMC or similar) then<br />

applications to relevant<br />

companies made for cadetships.<br />

All engineering officers used to<br />

do IR time first but this has now<br />

been discontinued.<br />

The crew lived in places as widely<br />

spaced as Perth, Newcastle and<br />

the Phillipines. This results in<br />

little, or no, interaction outside<br />

the workplace and, I believe, less<br />

camaraderie.<br />

There are still very few females at<br />

sea in the Merchant <strong>Navy</strong> (there<br />

were none on the Pacific<br />

Triangle).<br />

Even the CO cleans his own cabin<br />

(no steward service) and is on<br />

the cleaning roster for the Officers<br />

TV Room.<br />

Conclusion<br />

We can learn a lot from the way<br />

merchant ships are operated,<br />

especially as we reduce our<br />

manning levels and look for ways<br />

of cutting out the mind numbingly<br />

boring aspects of watchkeeping<br />

carried over from a bygone era.<br />

Their, much simplified,<br />

maintenance and administrative<br />

One thing that impressed me<br />

was the “can do” attitude of<br />

all the engineers.<br />

LOOKING AFT FROM THE FORE-MAST<br />

processes produce cost savings<br />

that we will probably have no<br />

choice but to follow if we want to<br />

keep our ships operating with the<br />

ever-shrinking budgets. They<br />

could also learn a lot from us,<br />

especially in the areas of Fire<br />

Fighting, Damage Control, and<br />

Safety.<br />

I spent a very enjoyable and<br />

informative 15 days on the<br />

Pacific Triangle with a friendly and<br />

professional crew. I recommend<br />

it to anyone who gets the chance<br />

and is prepared to get their<br />

hands dirty.


68 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

ALAN LEGGE<br />

The Importance of<br />

Reliability, Availability and<br />

Maintainability in<br />

Engineering for the RAN<br />

The <strong>Navy</strong> lives with the consequences of poor engineering and, in<br />

extremis, dies with it. Equipment in a warship has to be reliable in use,<br />

available when required, and maintainable at sea.<br />

There is nothing new about<br />

engineers and operators wanting<br />

their machinery to be reliable and<br />

maintainable. As the<br />

Seamanship Manual advised in<br />

1861:<br />

“Engines and machinery,<br />

liable to many accidents may<br />

fail at any moment, and there<br />

is no greater fallacy than to<br />

suppose that ships can be<br />

navigated on long voyages<br />

without masts and sails, or<br />

safely commanded by officers<br />

who have not a sound<br />

knowledge of seamanship…”<br />

It might reasonably be asked,<br />

therefore, what has changed?<br />

Why the particular emphasis on<br />

reliability and maintainability?<br />

What is wrong with good<br />

engineering judgement?<br />

Fifty years ago the machinery fit<br />

of a warship was large and<br />

inefficient. It consisted, almost<br />

entirely, of the main propulsion<br />

system and occupied a<br />

significant proportion of the<br />

ship’s total volume. Although<br />

physically large and heavy, the<br />

number of components in the<br />

machinery fit was not large and<br />

the materials used were not<br />

particularly sophisticated. This<br />

machinery could – and did –<br />

break down, but a large<br />

engineering department borne for<br />

labour-intensive watch keeping<br />

and preventative maintenance<br />

duties effected repairs. Even if<br />

the breakdown was serious<br />

enough to prevent a ship from<br />

sailing, there were plenty of ships<br />

to cover the loss.<br />

As weapon systems and the<br />

requirements of modern warfare<br />

developed, this situation could<br />

not continue. Lessons learnt in<br />

World War II caused demands of<br />

higher efficiency and endurance<br />

to be made on the main<br />

propulsion system, necessitating<br />

the use of sophisticated materials<br />

and higher stressed components.<br />

Equipment became less tolerant<br />

of operator error and this,<br />

combined with the need for<br />

remote machinery operation in<br />

nuclear, biological or chemical<br />

warfare environments, led to the<br />

introduction of complex control<br />

systems.<br />

Meanwhile, weapon systems and<br />

their sensors became larger,<br />

heavier and demanded more<br />

auxiliary support services. The<br />

Marine Engineering Department<br />

grew in scope to satisfy this<br />

demand, adding sophisticated<br />

electrical, chilled water,<br />

refrigeration and extensive<br />

hydraulic systems to its<br />

responsibilities. However, the<br />

greater space required for<br />

weapons reduced substantially<br />

the space and weights that could<br />

be made available for marine<br />

engineering. The equipment<br />

became more compact, more<br />

efficient and more complex.<br />

Operators had to become more<br />

highly trained, but were,<br />

themselves, less numerous<br />

because of lack of space,<br />

recruiting problems, and the cost<br />

of training. A ship unable to<br />

proceed to sea in 2000 is a<br />

serious loss to the RAN with only<br />

nine frigates and destroyers on<br />

the active list.<br />

Poor reliability or maintainability<br />

in modern warships can no longer<br />

be tolerated. Support is very<br />

expensive – both in terms of<br />

administrative organisation and<br />

cost of spares; ships are few, as<br />

are the crews that man them.<br />

The traditional “ good engineering<br />

judgement” approach to design<br />

assessment is just not adequate<br />

for the complex, interdependent<br />

systems in naval engineering<br />

today. Perhaps, in days gone by,<br />

the procurement authority would<br />

examine a drawing submitted by<br />

a contractor and use judgement<br />

to identify weaknesses in<br />

material, component choice or<br />

arrangement. With such a method<br />

one can never be sure that<br />

absolutely every component has<br />

been considered for its effects in<br />

the event of failure. Nor can one<br />

be absolutely sure that all the<br />

failure modes have been<br />

considered. A hydraulic valve, for<br />

example, can fail open, fail set,<br />

and fail shut or leak. The effect<br />

on the parent system will vary<br />

greatly depending on which


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

69<br />

failure mode has occurred and<br />

the designer must be prepared<br />

accordingly. A disciplined,<br />

methodical approach to reliability<br />

and maintainability is, therefore,<br />

essential for naval engineering<br />

systems and equipment.<br />

What are Reliability, Availability<br />

and Maintainability?<br />

There would definitely be a case<br />

for reliability and maintainability<br />

in design but what are these<br />

nebulous parameters? How far<br />

do we go with our detailed,<br />

methodical examination of<br />

designs as they evolve?<br />

Can reliability and maintainability<br />

be measured? Can they be given<br />

a number, quantified? Yes, they<br />

can. The reliability and<br />

maintainability characteristics of<br />

a machine or system can be<br />

specified for a design in exactly<br />

the same way as performance<br />

characteristics such as power,<br />

pressure or speed.<br />

The standard Defence definition<br />

of reliability is “The ability of an<br />

item to perform a required<br />

function under stated conditions<br />

for a stated period of time”. It<br />

will be gathered that this strict<br />

definition of reliability is a<br />

statistical probability. For<br />

example, a propulsion system<br />

might be required to have a 95%<br />

probability of remaining in<br />

operation without failure for a<br />

mission time of, say, three<br />

months. Its specified reliability<br />

would be 95% for that mission<br />

time. Similarly, we can look at<br />

the definition of maintainability:<br />

"The ability of an item under<br />

stated conditions of use to be<br />

retained in or restored to a<br />

specific condition when<br />

maintenance is performed by<br />

personnel having specified skill<br />

levels under stated conditions,<br />

and using prescribed procedures<br />

and resources." This is also<br />

expressed as a probability.<br />

Finally, because some defects<br />

can be repaired at sea we need<br />

another parameter that can take<br />

account of both these<br />

characteristics. We call it<br />

availability: "A measure of the<br />

degree to which an item is in an<br />

operable and committable state<br />

at the start of a mission when the<br />

mission is called for at an<br />

unknown (random) time."<br />

There are several types of<br />

availability. Perhaps the<br />

commonest used for marine<br />

engineering are intrinsic<br />

availability, which is a function of<br />

the system or machine design,<br />

and operational availability which<br />

takes into account logistic delays.<br />

Clearly, in the final analyses,<br />

operational availability is<br />

important to the Commanding<br />

Officer of a ship because it<br />

represents availability of the ship<br />

as a weapon platform.<br />

Using statistics to quantify<br />

reliability and maintainability,<br />

while sometimes unavoidable,<br />

can be cumbersome: two<br />

parameters, the probability and<br />

the mission time (in the case of<br />

reliability) have to be stated using<br />

this method. For this reason it is<br />

usual to assume for reliability,<br />

that failures will occur in a<br />

random manner. When this<br />

assumption is made then the<br />

parameter mean time between<br />

failure (MTBF) can be used to<br />

express the reliability of a system<br />

or equipment. As the title<br />

suggests, MTBF is calculated by<br />

dividing the total equipment<br />

running hours accumulated in<br />

service by the number of failures<br />

that have occurred. It is a<br />

characteristic of equipment in a<br />

specified design state and may<br />

be used to compare the reliability<br />

of one system or machine with<br />

another. For example, a diesel<br />

engine with MTBF of 1000 hours<br />

compared to a gas turbine with<br />

MTBF of 5000 hours. There are<br />

mathematical relationships<br />

between MTBF, reliability, missiontime<br />

and failure rate such that<br />

the reliability of a complete<br />

system can be predicted by<br />

building from the MTBFs of the<br />

component equipment or subassemblies.<br />

Reliability prediction may be used<br />

to indicate whether a system or<br />

equipment is near to the<br />

specified target and hence to<br />

determine whether the amount of<br />

reliability assessment conducted<br />

on the design is sufficient.<br />

Prediction can also be used to<br />

compare the reliabilities of<br />

different parts of the design, eg<br />

fuel system versus cooling system<br />

on a diesel engine. The latter use<br />

enables design effort to be<br />

directed to where it can do the<br />

most good. However a<br />

fundamental pre-requisite of<br />

reliability prediction is numerical<br />

data (MTBF or failure rate) on<br />

sub-assemblies, equipment or<br />

components, although such data<br />

is scarce on mechanical<br />

equipment. This underpins the<br />

importance of reporting systems<br />

for equipment in service although<br />

maintainers are, understandably,<br />

reluctant to record details such<br />

as running hours, details of repair<br />

etc, whenever a failure occurs.<br />

Reliability, Availability and<br />

Maintainability Consideration in<br />

Naval Engineering<br />

Having established a case for<br />

reliability and maintainability to<br />

be addressed specifically during<br />

design, and identified ways of<br />

quantifying these parameters,<br />

how do Engineers ensure that<br />

they will be included in the<br />

design process? In an ideal<br />

world Engineers would specify our<br />

requirements in numerical terms,<br />

just as we do for performance<br />

requirements and the<br />

manufacturer would design and<br />

build the product accordingly.<br />

Calculation and test would<br />

evidence proof that the<br />

requirements had been met.<br />

Unfortunately this process is not<br />

as easily achieved for reliability<br />

and maintainability as it is for<br />

performance requirements -<br />

particularly for mechanical<br />

equipment. Calculation of<br />

performance is achieved using<br />

well established engineering<br />

formulae and is usually quite<br />

accurate; testing for performance<br />

is, again, fairly straightforward -


70 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

there can be no doubt whether a<br />

machine has developed a<br />

specific power, fuel consumption<br />

or pressure. Calculation of<br />

reliability, on the other hand, is<br />

not accurate in absolute terms.<br />

This is partly because of the<br />

difficulties of finding accurate<br />

numerical data on components;<br />

testing to demonstrate reliability<br />

(or maintainability) is statistically<br />

based and time consuming -<br />

while it can be (and sometimes<br />

is) done, the time and cost<br />

involved sometimes makes it an<br />

impractical exercise.<br />

Because of the practical<br />

difficulties of relying purely on<br />

numerically based techniques to<br />

demonstrate the achievement of<br />

reliability and maintainability, it is<br />

usually necessary to resort to<br />

additional methods of obtaining<br />

reliability assurance. Basically,<br />

the process involves having a say<br />

in the reliability and<br />

maintainability techniques that<br />

are to be used by a contractor<br />

and generally having some<br />

influence or interest in the design<br />

as it evolves, notwithstanding the<br />

contractors' responsibilities as<br />

the designer.<br />

There are four fundamentally<br />

essential ingredients to a<br />

procurement program if reliability<br />

and maintainability are to be<br />

properly addressed, and these<br />

can be described as follows.<br />

The Specifications Must Be<br />

Right<br />

The numerical RAM 1 targets are<br />

the starting point for all reliability<br />

and maintainability work. If they<br />

are not derived from a sound<br />

base then the rest of the program<br />

may be wasted. The aim is to<br />

educate design procurement staff<br />

sufficiently to ensure that the<br />

targets specified for new<br />

equipment are sensible,<br />

achievable and demonstrable.<br />

RAM requirements may originally<br />

be specified for a whole weapon<br />

platform (based on operational<br />

considerations) then apportioned<br />

down to equipment or system<br />

level. It is important to ensure<br />

that the impact of this<br />

apportionment on, say, marine<br />

engineering equipment is<br />

assessed during the feasibility<br />

study to ensure that the RAM<br />

target of the equipment is a<br />

reasonable figure. It would not be<br />

sensible to demand an MTBF of<br />

40 000 hours for a gas turbine,<br />

for example, if existing gas<br />

turbines had MTBFs of only<br />

3 000 hours; the program of<br />

improvement required would be<br />

enormous and, even then, may<br />

not achieve the result.<br />

In some instances, there may be<br />

a lack of MTBF information<br />

components or equipment in the<br />

system being considered. In this<br />

case, then, the procurement<br />

authority may require a special<br />

reporting exercise to be instituted<br />

to determine the MTBF of<br />

appropriate items in service, or<br />

omit quantified RAM targets from<br />

the specification altogether. The<br />

latter option, while not preferred,<br />

may be necessary for minor items<br />

not meriting a special reporting<br />

exercise, or for large,<br />

comparatively reliable, items such<br />

as a main thrust block, where the<br />

time taken to collect the data<br />

would be prohibitively large. If this<br />

option were chosen, then<br />

reliability assurance would be<br />

obtained by placing more<br />

emphasis on the qualitative<br />

methods available.<br />

An essential requirement when<br />

specifying quantified RAM targets<br />

is to define "failure"<br />

unequivocally. This is needed not<br />

only for deriving MTBF from<br />

service data, but also at the<br />

acceptance stage so that there<br />

would be no dispute with the<br />

supplier. This task is by no means<br />

as easy as it sounds; there can<br />

little doubt about catastrophic<br />

failure, but instances of degraded<br />

performance - a diesel capable of<br />

only 90% power or a gas turbine<br />

with a minor fuel leak, for<br />

example - need careful<br />

consideration.<br />

Particular care is given to relating<br />

the RAM requirements to the<br />

application of the equipment.<br />

There is no point in specifying<br />

MTBFs for stand-by equipment<br />

such as emergency fire pumps or<br />

stand-by generators. If an item is<br />

likely to spend most of its life on<br />

stand-by then the supplier would<br />

be directed to concentrate his<br />

RAM effort on probable dormant<br />

failures such as stiction, corrosion<br />

or brinelling of bearings. Overall,<br />

the aim is to advise suppliers of<br />

the environment in which their<br />

machines will operate, as far as<br />

possible.<br />

In general, the specification stage<br />

is, perhaps, the most important<br />

because the procurement<br />

authority has to think far ahead.<br />

Adequate resources have to be<br />

set aside to fund and administer<br />

the RAM program, and this can<br />

be as much as 10% of the total<br />

development cost. If these<br />

preparations are not done or the<br />

feasibility of the RAM targets is<br />

not properly addressed, then<br />

retrospective action will be<br />

difficult or even impossible and<br />

the situation may never be<br />

recovered.<br />

Choose the Right Techniques<br />

A wide range of analyses are<br />

available to refine a design from<br />

a reliability and maintainability<br />

viewpoint but only highly critical<br />

items need to have all these<br />

analyses applied. Funds are not<br />

unlimited and we try to ensure<br />

that resources are spent where<br />

they will do the most good.<br />

A minimum requirement is to<br />

learn from past experience.<br />

Equipment in new ships is often<br />

a repeat of similar items already<br />

in service and it is essential to<br />

ensure that existing shortcomings<br />

are corrected before committing<br />

that equipment to, perhaps,<br />

another 25 years in the Fleet.<br />

The documented history of items<br />

proposed for future service is,<br />

therefore, examined in detail and<br />

a modification program is<br />

instituted if necessary.


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

71<br />

It is essential in any reliability<br />

work to identify the area of the<br />

design where improvements will<br />

have the most effect. It would be<br />

wasteful, for example, to plough<br />

design effort into improving the<br />

reliability of a supercharger if<br />

60% of all diesel engine defects<br />

occurred in the fuel system.<br />

Three techniques available to<br />

assist with this identification are:<br />

1. Novel feature analysis. A novel<br />

feature is a component or<br />

arrangement in the design<br />

that has not been used before<br />

in the Fleet. Its reliability is,<br />

therefore, unknown and so it<br />

is a potential risk. A designer<br />

would be required to list all<br />

such features and justify their<br />

inclusion. Novel features<br />

would be given particular<br />

attention with regard to<br />

reliability throughout the<br />

design.<br />

2. Fault tree analysis and<br />

prediction. Using reliability<br />

prediction to rank the<br />

unreliability of sub-assemblies<br />

has already been described.<br />

Fault tree analysis is a "top<br />

down" approach to system<br />

failure. Starting with an<br />

undesired event (eg "engine<br />

fails to start") it catalogues<br />

the combination of events that<br />

could cause it. Later, the<br />

probability of the undesired<br />

event can be calculated using<br />

Boolean algebra. The<br />

advantage of fault tree<br />

analysis is that it takes into<br />

account failures without the<br />

actual machine design, eg<br />

operator error or notion of the<br />

ship. It can, therefore, assist in<br />

identifying special operating<br />

procedures that may be<br />

required.<br />

3. Failure mode effect and<br />

criticality analysis (FMECA).<br />

FMECA is a "bottom up"<br />

analysis. Every single<br />

component in the machine or<br />

system is considered<br />

systematically to determine:<br />

a. how it can fail (eg fail<br />

open, fail shut);<br />

b. the end effect on the<br />

parent system of this failure<br />

mode; and<br />

c. the likelihood of the failure<br />

mode.<br />

"End effects" are categorised<br />

according to severity and a chart<br />

is produced to highlight failure<br />

modes and components that are:<br />

a. likely to happen (ie a high<br />

probability); and<br />

b. will be catastrophic if they<br />

do.<br />

Although tedious and labour<br />

intensive the FMECA has been<br />

demonstrated to be an extremely<br />

powerful tool because it will<br />

identify weaknesses that were by<br />

no means obvious. An engine<br />

control system relay which, when<br />

failing closed circuit, caused the<br />

engine throttle to fail open and<br />

the propeller pitch to fail at full<br />

pitch might well be classified as<br />

an undesirable event! The FMECA<br />

has the advantage over the fault<br />

tree analysis in that it is<br />

particularly amenable to<br />

amendment as design changes<br />

occur. The reliability engineer<br />

merely has to make one<br />

additional entry for every new<br />

component proposed.<br />

A traditional view among nonpractitioners<br />

is that reliability and<br />

maintainability analysis involves<br />

complex statistical calculation,<br />

which, in the end, produces<br />

inaccurate results! This is far from<br />

the case. Prediction plays an<br />

important part in the work but<br />

comprises, perhaps, less than<br />

10% of the effort. Essentially,<br />

most reliability and<br />

maintainability analyses are<br />

nothing more than applied<br />

common sense. The important<br />

thing to realise is that<br />

examination is systematic and<br />

methodical, and must be<br />

undertaken by engineers familiar<br />

with the equipment under review.<br />

Make Sure the Reliability and<br />

Maintainability Program can<br />

Influence the Design<br />

It has already been mentioned<br />

that, in practice, "specification,<br />

order, delivery, demonstration and<br />

acceptance" are not enough for<br />

naval procurement. Engineers<br />

have found it necessary to be<br />

involved in the actual design<br />

process in order to obtain the<br />

degree of assurance we require<br />

for equipment. This involvement<br />

consists of ensuring that<br />

reliability and maintainability are<br />

given proper consideration during<br />

the design.<br />

One of the first points to bear in<br />

mind when examining a<br />

company’s organisation structure<br />

is that a designer cannot criticise<br />

his own design objectivity. This is<br />

a human failing. Hence, engineers<br />

in a separate organisation to the<br />

design department must conduct<br />

reliability and maintainability<br />

analyses. Moreover, weaknesses<br />

identified by the reliability and<br />

maintainability analyses must be<br />

considered impartially by<br />

someone independent of both<br />

organisations, eg a Project<br />

Manager. Records must be kept<br />

of design changes proposed as a<br />

result of reliability and<br />

maintainability analyses, together<br />

with their outcome. This is<br />

evidence that reliability and<br />

maintainability have been<br />

properly addressed.<br />

Essentially, reliability and<br />

maintainability analyses are<br />

design refinement tools that are<br />

they are meant to influence and<br />

improve the design as it<br />

develops. It is axiomatic that<br />

such analyses have to be fully<br />

integrated with the design<br />

process otherwise the whole<br />

process would be a waste of<br />

time. Engineers obtain assurance<br />

that this integration is taking<br />

place by requiring contractors to<br />

hold periodic reviews throughout<br />

the design process. At these<br />

reviews, the contractor presents<br />

to the procurement authority the<br />

results of the reliability and


72 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

maintainability work up to that<br />

time and shows how this work<br />

has altered his design. The<br />

contractor must also demonstrate<br />

that design changes introduced<br />

for performance reasons are<br />

being considered for their effects<br />

on reliability and maintainability.<br />

Design changes are, after all,<br />

sometimes proposed for reasons<br />

other than improving reliability<br />

and maintainability! However,<br />

such changes must be “swept up”<br />

by the reliability program.<br />

Acceptance Must be<br />

Demonstrable<br />

Engineers have found that a clear<br />

and unequivocal acceptance<br />

criterion is essential, particularly<br />

now that most equipment is<br />

purchased on a fixed price basis.<br />

The importance of defining<br />

“failure”, for example, has already<br />

been mentioned.<br />

It is possible to demonstrate, with<br />

a desired degree of statistical<br />

confidence, that a prototype has<br />

met quantified reliability and<br />

maintainability targets, failures<br />

and running hours recorded<br />

during test can be related to<br />

target MTBF. However, this can be<br />

very time consuming (and hence<br />

expensive) for items with large<br />

desired MTBFs such as is found<br />

in marine engineering. A single<br />

main engine may reasonably be<br />

expected to last a three month<br />

mission without failure and would<br />

need, typically an MTBF of 2 200<br />

hours to achieve this. Even if the<br />

prototype encountered no failures<br />

during test it would take 66 000<br />

hours – that is 7.5 years of<br />

continuous testing – to<br />

demonstrate achievement of the<br />

MTBF with 95% statistical<br />

confidence. It is for this reason,<br />

as much as anything else, that<br />

engineers have to be involved in<br />

how a contractor conducts his<br />

business; it is rarely practical, in<br />

marine engineering, physically to<br />

demonstrate achievement of<br />

numerical RAM targets.<br />

One possibility, which has been<br />

successful in the procurement of<br />

naval weapons, is to extend the<br />

contractor’s responsibility to<br />

include acceptance in the Fleet.<br />

Design improvement continues at<br />

the manufacturer’s expense<br />

during the initial period after<br />

installation. Failures and running<br />

hours are monitored – again, at<br />

the contractor’s expense – and<br />

used to demonstrate achievement<br />

of the requirement before formal<br />

acceptance. This acceptance<br />

testing has the advantages of<br />

running machines in their own<br />

true environment, together with<br />

accumulating running hours fairly<br />

quickly from the equipment “on<br />

test”. Consideration should be<br />

given to introducing this<br />

approach for acceptance in<br />

marine engineering systems and<br />

equipment.<br />

Concluding Remarks<br />

Advancements in technology,<br />

combined with escalating costs,<br />

mean that consideration of<br />

reliability and maintainability can<br />

no longer be left to good<br />

engineering judgement in the<br />

course of a design; they must be<br />

given specific attention. The<br />

difficulties of demonstrating<br />

achievement of quantified<br />

reliability and maintainability<br />

targets in mechanical equipment,<br />

mean that owners must obtain<br />

additional assurance by<br />

monitoring the actual design<br />

process without, however,<br />

relieving a designer of his<br />

contractual responsibilities.<br />

The importance of reliability and<br />

maintainability in modern naval<br />

procurement does not mean,<br />

however, that unlimited funds are<br />

made available for every<br />

conceivable type of reliability and<br />

maintainability analyses. One<br />

does not design motor cars to<br />

have the same reliability as a<br />

nuclear power station, despite the<br />

fact that cars are far more likely<br />

to kill! The emphasis today is to<br />

obtain value for money. Within<br />

the overall cost, the achievement<br />

of specified availability and<br />

performance must be accorded<br />

equal consideration. The<br />

reliability and maintainability<br />

program is chosen carefully to<br />

ensure that a good balance<br />

between this work and<br />

performance is obtained.<br />

As the Fleet grows smaller, more<br />

is being demanded of our ships<br />

and men than ever before. They<br />

deserve better equipment than in<br />

the past and our aim should be<br />

to ensure that everything is being<br />

done to achieve this.


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

73<br />

HMAS CERBERUS<br />

DIVISIONS AND RMIT<br />

PASSING OUT PARADE<br />

6 DECEMBER 2002<br />

VADM C.A. RITCHIE<br />

CHIEF OF NAVY<br />

CAPT Thomas, Graduating class,<br />

Distinguished Guests, CERBERUS<br />

staff, Trainees, Ladies and<br />

Gentlemen.<br />

I am delighted to be here today<br />

to review CERBERUS Ceremonial<br />

Divisions and the Passing Out<br />

Parade for these Officers who<br />

have completed their training at<br />

the <strong>Royal</strong> Melbourne Institute Of<br />

Technology. The general turnout<br />

today was very smart, well done!<br />

I am particularly pleased to see<br />

so many family members and<br />

friends of the graduates with us.<br />

You should all be very proud of<br />

the achievements of those here<br />

today. I thank you for your<br />

contribution over the past four, or<br />

in some cases five years - I know<br />

that your support, most often<br />

unheard and unseen, helps to<br />

keep our people going when<br />

things get tough.<br />

The course that the graduating<br />

class has just completed is very<br />

challenging. For over twenty<br />

years, the RMIT Officer Entry<br />

Scheme has been very<br />

successful, producing Naval<br />

Engineers of the highest quality in<br />

all the necessary engineering<br />

disciplines that the <strong>Navy</strong> needs to<br />

complete its mission. This<br />

scheme provides an opportunity<br />

for sailors from any specialisation<br />

to nominate, with successful<br />

selection for the scheme<br />

becoming more competitive each<br />

year.<br />

It is an intense and rewarding<br />

course, culminating in the<br />

awarding of a Bachelor of<br />

Engineering. I understand that<br />

the results for this graduating<br />

class have been excellent. Well<br />

done to you all.<br />

To the RMIT platoons on parade, I<br />

commend you on all of your<br />

achievements to date and I take<br />

this opportunity to wish you<br />

similar success as your studies<br />

continue.<br />

To the graduating class, you have<br />

successfully completed a major<br />

component of your education,<br />

further challenges lay ahead.<br />

Extensive application courses<br />

here at CERBERUS and also at<br />

HMAS ALBATROSS will provide<br />

you with both the Naval<br />

Engineering and Leadership skills<br />

needed in your future roles as the<br />

Officers and Engineers within the<br />

<strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong>.<br />

It is essential to understand the<br />

importance that you as Engineers<br />

play in supporting <strong>Navy</strong><br />

objectives. As Engineers you have<br />

an important role to play at sea<br />

and ashore. During operations<br />

such as Slipper and Relex, it is<br />

the equipments and the men and<br />

women that you are responsible<br />

for that allow the Command to<br />

achieved its operational<br />

objectives.<br />

Also your expertise in logistic<br />

support, and repair and<br />

maintenance is vital. Safety is<br />

another area where the skills you<br />

have as an Engineer are needed,<br />

with tragic accidents such as<br />

WESTRALIA emphasising to us<br />

the dangers of our profession.<br />

And finally, the future of the <strong>Navy</strong><br />

is in your engineering hands.<br />

Projects for new Ships, aircraft<br />

and systems are where your<br />

engineering expertise combines<br />

with operational requirements to<br />

ensure that a workable affordable<br />

solution is achieved.<br />

Successful achievement of all of<br />

these elements: operations,<br />

logistics, safety and development<br />

is essential if <strong>Navy</strong> is to continue<br />

to fulfil its mission, now and into<br />

the future.<br />

Be assured that I understand the<br />

critical importance to our <strong>Navy</strong> of<br />

a competent and professional<br />

uniformed engineering corps. To<br />

look more widely at <strong>Navy</strong>, in a<br />

broader sense, the importance of<br />

what we do has been highlighted<br />

firstly in the aftermath of the<br />

September 11 terrorism attacks<br />

last year, and more recently, the<br />

Bali bombing much closer to<br />

home. The security environment in<br />

which we live and serve has<br />

changed. The operational<br />

commitments of the RAN will<br />

continue to be high, with Ships<br />

deployed in the War Against Terror<br />

in the Gulf, and others continuing<br />

patrol operations for border and<br />

fisheries protection. Today, our<br />

Ships and Aircraft are working<br />

much harder than they were<br />

18 months ago, and it is the<br />

Engineers and their technical<br />

sailors that are putting in<br />

enormous efforts to sustain those<br />

operations and keep our Ships<br />

running safely.<br />

We should be under no illusions -<br />

service at sea, particularly at the<br />

current levels of operational


74 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

tempo is very demanding. It is<br />

demanding not only on the<br />

equipment, it is also very<br />

demanding on the people. At<br />

times it can be monotonous,<br />

uncomfortable and exhausting.<br />

On occasion, it can also be<br />

dangerous. It requires you, the<br />

men and women of our <strong>Navy</strong> to<br />

set aside, for a time at least,<br />

many of the privileges that those<br />

in the wider <strong>Australian</strong> community<br />

take for granted - simple but<br />

important privileges like privacy,<br />

or the company of family and<br />

friends. But it is also very<br />

rewarding and the <strong>Australian</strong><br />

community appreciates <strong>Navy</strong>’s<br />

contribution to Australia. The<br />

nation is both grateful and proud<br />

that <strong>Australian</strong>s like yourselves on<br />

parade here today are willing to<br />

make these sorts of sacrifices to<br />

serve your country in the <strong>Royal</strong><br />

<strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong>.<br />

If I can turn to CERBERUS for a<br />

few minutes, Divisions today is<br />

probably one of the largest seen<br />

at CERBERUS for some years.<br />

That is a direct result of<br />

improvements in recruiting which<br />

is in part due to our excellent<br />

reputation within the wider<br />

<strong>Australian</strong> community. These<br />

recruits are flowing through to the<br />

Category Schools and eventually<br />

out into the Fleet.<br />

The increase in numbers has<br />

meant that 2002 was another<br />

busy year. I would say to<br />

CERBERUS staff, both uniformed<br />

and civilian, your job here is<br />

critical to the success of our<br />

<strong>Navy</strong>. CERBERUS continues to<br />

deliver training which is vital to<br />

the fleet, and with increased<br />

numbers your ability to maintain<br />

the quality and throughput is a<br />

credit to you all. I appreciate<br />

your hard work, and I compliment<br />

your efforts and commitment.<br />

CERBERUS has been<br />

instrumental in the<br />

implementation of the Sea Eagle<br />

program which aims at instilling<br />

our Naval culture and values in<br />

our new shipmates.<br />

I consider the development of<br />

<strong>Navy</strong> values embodied in Sea<br />

Eagle a necessary augmentation<br />

to the curriculum of Category<br />

Schools. The staff within those<br />

schools are the role models for<br />

our future sailors. Your approach<br />

and knowledge is critical in the<br />

development of navy’s culture<br />

and values. Thank you all for your<br />

efforts.<br />

In closing, to those passing out<br />

today well done, you have shown<br />

you have what it takes, but there<br />

is still much to learn - build on<br />

the grounding you have received,<br />

maintain your enthusiasm, and<br />

most importantly, enjoy what you<br />

do.<br />

To all, it is of paramount<br />

importance in these challenging<br />

times and uncertain future that<br />

you all make the most of your<br />

training and the values and<br />

knowledge it instills. All the very<br />

best for the remainder of the year<br />

and your service with the RAN.<br />

And finally, to those so often<br />

forgotten, and without whom no<br />

one here can succeed, to the<br />

families and friends. I thank you<br />

on behalf of all those here on<br />

parade today, for your patience<br />

and your support in the past,<br />

today, and into the future.<br />

Thank You.


NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN MARCH 2003<br />

75<br />

Course Schedule<br />

Contract Management<br />

Members $650 Non Members $750<br />

This course is designed to provide participants with an<br />

understanding of the key concepts, skills and issues involved in<br />

contract management.<br />

Date: Location: Duration:<br />

February 20-21 Melbourne 2 days<br />

April 03-04 Adelaide 2 days<br />

April 10-11 Brisbane 2 days<br />

May 22-23 Sydney 2 days<br />

June 05-06 Perth 2 days<br />

June 19-20 Melbourne 2 days<br />

Finance for Non-Financial People<br />

Members $650 Non Members $750<br />

This course is recommended for participants with little or no<br />

financial or accounting experience who wish to develop their ability<br />

to understand and utilise financial information.<br />

Date: Location: Duration:<br />

February 20-21 Brisbane 2 days<br />

February 27-28 Perth 2 days<br />

March 5-6 Melbourne 2 days<br />

March 6-7 Canberra 2 days<br />

March 20-21 Hobart 2 days<br />

March 27-28 Sydney 2 days<br />

May 08-09 Adelaide 2 days<br />

May 22-23 Melbourne 2 days<br />

Leadership & Team Management<br />

Members $650 Non Members $750<br />

This course will enable participants to understand how effective<br />

leadership can improve productivity, and what constitutes effective<br />

leadership and team management.<br />

Date: Location: Duration:<br />

February 5-6 Melbourne 2 days<br />

March 25 - 26 Adelaide 2 days<br />

April 08-09 Sydney 2 days<br />

May 06-07 Melbourne 2 days<br />

June 12-13 Brisbane 2 days<br />

Managing Consultants & Contractors<br />

Managing Consultants & Contractors<br />

Members $650 Non Members $750<br />

This course is designed to help participants avoid the pitfalls and<br />

maximise the benefits from contracting work to others.<br />

Date: Location: Duration:<br />

March 04-05 Adelaide 2 days<br />

March 12-13 Sydney 2 days<br />

April 03-04 Melbourne 2 days<br />

June 03-04 Brisbane 2 days<br />

June 11-12<br />

2 days<br />

Strategic Marketing for Technical People<br />

Members $650 Non Members $750<br />

This course has been designed for enterprises wanting to develop<br />

coherent, and appropriately structured, marketing plans and to<br />

understand the importance and value of developing marketing<br />

effective marketing strategies.<br />

Date: Location: Duration:<br />

March 17-18 Sydney 2 days<br />

March 24-25 Melbourne2 days<br />

April 07-08 Adelaide 2 days<br />

May 08-09 Brisbane 2 days<br />

Winning Business Presentations<br />

Members $350 Non Members $450<br />

This course is designed to increase the competence and<br />

confidence of participants in delivering powerful messages to their<br />

audiences.<br />

Date: Location: Duration:<br />

April 8th Melbourne 1 Day<br />

Project Management<br />

Members $650 Non Members $750<br />

This course aims to assist participants to understand how project<br />

management can be used to achieve business goals.<br />

Date: Location: Duration:<br />

February 4-5 Adelaide 2 days<br />

February 13-14 Sydney 2 days<br />

March 04-05 Brisbane 2 days<br />

March 19-20 Melbourne 2 days<br />

April 01-02 Sydney 2 days<br />

April 09-10 Hobart 2 days<br />

May 06-07 Canberra 2 days<br />

May 13-14 Perth 2 days<br />

June 03-04 Melbourne 2 days<br />

June 17-18 Darwin 2 days<br />

Risk Management<br />

Members $650 Non Members $750<br />

This course gives participants an understanding of the principles,<br />

current processes and techniques of risk management.<br />

Date: Location: Duration:<br />

February 27-28 Melbourne 2 Day<br />

March 05-06 Sydney 2 Day<br />

March 11-12 Adelaide 2 Day<br />

March 26-27 Perth 2 Day<br />

May 20-21 Darwin 2 Day<br />

May 22-23 Brisbane 2 Day<br />

May 29-30 Melbourne 2 Day<br />

Writing Winning Technical Documents<br />

Members $350 Non Members $450<br />

This course teaches a new approach to writing reports.<br />

Date: Location: Duration:<br />

February 5th Brisbane 1 Day<br />

February 13th Melbourne 1 Day<br />

February 18th Sydney 1 Day<br />

February 20th Adelaide 1 Day<br />

February 26th Hobart 1 Day<br />

April 1st Canberra 1 Day<br />

April 8th Perth 1 Day<br />

May 1st Sydney 1 Day<br />

June 25th Melbourne 1 Day<br />

Negotiation Skills & Dispute Resolution<br />

Members $650 Non Members $750<br />

This course aims to demonstrate the importance of communication<br />

and problem solving skills in the negotiation process.<br />

Date: Location: Duration:<br />

March 13-14 Melbourne 2 days<br />

March 19-20 Brisbane 2 days<br />

June 03-04 Sydney 2 days<br />

June 17-18 Adelaide 2 days<br />

Strategic Asset Management<br />

Members $650 Non Members $750<br />

This course has been designed for enterprises wanting to develop<br />

coherent, and appropriately structured, asset management plans.<br />

Date: Location: Duration:<br />

April 02-03 Brisbane 2 days<br />

May 01-02 Melbourne 2 days<br />

May 15-16 Sydney 2 days<br />

June 04-05 Adelaide 2 days


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