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Australian Maritime Issues 2005 - Royal Australian Navy

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SEAPOWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY<br />

13<br />

The second important task navies will have to perform in defending the system is<br />

maritime power projection and the associated role of naval diplomacy. The nature of<br />

navies makes them very appropriate and relatively easy to use as instruments of foreign<br />

policy. There is hardly any dispute about this really, because if you view the ocean as<br />

the world’s greatest manoeuvre space, it is readily apparent that naval forces are able to<br />

freely navigate virtually anywhere they choose. Indeed, the US Marine Corps (USMC)<br />

was the first and loudest to say that most of the world’s problems today are within reach<br />

of the sea.<br />

It is important clearly to understand what naval diplomacy involves. Whilst Figure 3<br />

breaks this function down into manageable components, it should be noted that naval<br />

presence greatly facilitates, but is not necessarily a condition for, picture-building, acts<br />

of coercion and coalition building activities. Moreover, the same maritime force may find<br />

itself engaged in more than one type of activity simultaneously. A naval force intercepting<br />

coastal vessels running illicit arms may be deterring, compelling and coalition building<br />

all at the same time. On the other hand, it is impossible to be present everywhere in<br />

order to defend the system against events occurring at sea or ashore. Naval presence<br />

therefore takes many different forms. It can be routine and continuous, particularly in<br />

important areas where a country wishes to demonstrate a permanent interest. It can, on<br />

the other hand, be periodic and in accordance with some regular deployment rhythm,<br />

once a year, once a month or ‘whenever we can’ (the latter usually reflects a less acute<br />

sense of interest in an area or a shortage of the naval resources needed to protect that<br />

interest). Finally, there is ‘contingency positioning’ - when a government orders a naval<br />

force to an area in a way that diverts ships from existing schedules but without quite<br />

knowing what it wants that force actually to do. The big advantage of a presence, of<br />

course, is that naval forces are not only on the spot before a crisis happens, but may also<br />

be in a position to prevent it from happening in the first place. At the same time it is of<br />

great assistance in building pictures, gathering intelligence and informing officials back<br />

at home of the emerging situation. This is most important, because it enables them to be<br />

proactive rather than reactive, always a huge advantage in political and military terms.<br />

Expeditionary<br />

Operations<br />

Coercion<br />

Deterrence<br />

Naval<br />

Diplomacy<br />

Presence<br />

Picture<br />

Building<br />

Compellence<br />

Humanitarian<br />

Operations<br />

Coalition<br />

Building<br />

Figure 3: Naval diplomacy (source Till 2004)

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