2012 Conference Executive Record Report.pdf - YMCA of Greater ...
2012 Conference Executive Record Report.pdf - YMCA of Greater ...
2012 Conference Executive Record Report.pdf - YMCA of Greater ...
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PROGRAM SPONSORED BY:<br />
<br />
PROGRAM SPONSORED BY: BY:<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Greater</strong> Rochester NY State <strong>YMCA</strong> Foundation<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>of</strong> Long <strong>Greater</strong> Island Rochester NY Capital State District <strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>YMCA</strong> Foundation<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Greater</strong> Long Island New York Program Capital District Alumni <strong>YMCA</strong><br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Greater</strong> New York Program Alumni<br />
Legislative Sponsor<br />
Senator Dean G. Legislative Skelos, Senate Sponsor Majority Leader<br />
Senator Dean G. Skelos, Senate Majority Leader<br />
Assembly Sponsor Joseph D. Morelle<br />
Assembly Sponsor Joseph D. Morelle<br />
1<br />
1
April <strong>2012</strong><br />
Dear Reader,<br />
In her opening remarks for the 76 th annual New York State <strong>YMCA</strong> Youth and Government <strong>Conference</strong> Youth<br />
Governor Paige Hughes stated “outside the walls <strong>of</strong> the chamber you and I are standing in right now, a revolution<br />
has taken place. A revolution driven by the ability to use the most powerful thing a human being possesses: their<br />
voice. This weekend, there is a new group <strong>of</strong> individuals occupying Albany. But this group does not come with an<br />
abundance <strong>of</strong> tents and protest signs. Instead, they come with an abundance <strong>of</strong> new ideas and perspectives on the<br />
pressing issues they face as New York State citizens.”<br />
The following pages contain the ideas and summary <strong>of</strong> work these 555 selected teens delegates from across NY<br />
State have been engaged in since September<br />
Teen attorneys are responsible for developing a brief, arguing their case before an Appellant Court bench <strong>of</strong> teen<br />
justices. Using four courtrooms the eighteen justices heard each case rendering their decisions. Enclosed is a copy<br />
<strong>of</strong> each case, an addendum that includes the justice decisions and the Brief they deemed to be “the best.” The teen’s<br />
case assignment contained their select case references.<br />
During the weekend thirty chose to participate as lobbyists researching topics and bills <strong>of</strong> their interest which<br />
included a deviation from traditional government where they were afforded opportunities to speak for or against a<br />
bill on the chamber floor promoting their speaking/presentation skills. Dependent upon the persuasive arguments <strong>of</strong><br />
the lobbyist one was recognized by their peers as “the best” lobbyist in the Senate and in each <strong>of</strong> the two<br />
Assembly’s.<br />
Integral to government is the reporting <strong>of</strong> issues, opinions <strong>of</strong> Bill Sponsors and an overall review <strong>of</strong> the program.<br />
Inserted you will find a copy <strong>of</strong> The Dialectic newspaper that was developed by twenty journalism students.<br />
Included as well are copies <strong>of</strong> the pre and post conference newspaper (The Posti).<br />
This program is sponsored by the <strong>YMCA</strong>’s in New York State affording a special leadership opportunity for young<br />
people where they nurture their appreciation for the diversity <strong>of</strong> others while engaging in civic issues that may<br />
include collaborative working relationships with local high schools. In reviewing just one positive impact this<br />
program has on young people a Indiana University Study concluded that Youth and Government graduates when<br />
compared with the general population were much more engaged in civic issues:<br />
• 96 % are Registered voters vs.66 % General Population<br />
• 35 % Contribute to a campaign vs.24 % General Population<br />
• 43% Worked on community issues vs. 17% General Population<br />
• 15 % are Members’ <strong>of</strong> a local community board vs. 3% General Population<br />
To learn more about this program we welcome you to visit our web site: www.nystateymcayag.org, to contact your<br />
local <strong>YMCA</strong> or the programs State Director Mark Rutkowski at the host association: <strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Greater</strong> Rochester,<br />
444 East Main Street, Rochester, NY 14604 or 585-341-3235.<br />
“DEMOCRACY MUST BE LEARNED BY EACH GENERATION”<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Greater</strong> Rochester • Association Office • 444 East Main Street • Rochester, NY 14604<br />
Phone: (585) 546-5500 5500 • Fax: (585) 454-1328 • www.rochesterymca.org• www.nystateymcayag.org<br />
2
<strong>2012</strong> New York State <strong>YMCA</strong> Youth & Government <strong>YMCA</strong> Representation<br />
District 1 Represents the <strong>YMCA</strong>’s <strong>of</strong> <strong>Greater</strong> Rochester including clubs at:<br />
Lady <strong>of</strong> Mercy High School<br />
Southwest Y Branch<br />
McQuaid High School<br />
District Coordinator and State Director Mark Rutkowski, Association Office <strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Greater</strong> Rochester.<br />
District 2 Represents the <strong>YMCA</strong>’s <strong>of</strong> the Capital District with clubs affiliated with the:<br />
Troy Branch<br />
North Albany Branch<br />
District 3 Represents the following <strong>YMCA</strong>’s and High School Clubs:<br />
Glen’s Falls <strong>YMCA</strong>,<br />
Johnsburg High School<br />
Glens Falls High School<br />
Newcomb High School<br />
Bolton High School<br />
Ticonderoga High School<br />
Minerva High School<br />
District Coordinator Jackie Palandrani, Silver Bay Association <strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>Conference</strong> Center <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Adirondacks<br />
District 4 Represents the following <strong>YMCA</strong>’s and High School Clubs<br />
White Plains <strong>YMCA</strong>,<br />
Rockland County <strong>YMCA</strong>, with school clubs in:<br />
Middletown <strong>YMCA</strong><br />
Pearl River HS, North River HS, Nyack HS<br />
District Coordinator: Charles Maze, CEO Rockland County <strong>YMCA</strong><br />
District 5 Represents the <strong>YMCA</strong>’s <strong>of</strong> <strong>Greater</strong> New York and School Clubs:<br />
Bedford Stuyvesant Y Branch<br />
Harlem Y Branch<br />
Bronx Y Branch<br />
Long Island City Y Branch<br />
Archimedes Academy<br />
North Brooklyn Y Branch<br />
Chinatown Y Branch<br />
Prospect Park Y Branch<br />
Cross Island Y Branch<br />
Staten Island Y Branch<br />
Dodge Y Branch<br />
Vanderbilt Y Branch<br />
Flushing Beacon Y Branch<br />
District Coordinator: Tiffany Younger, Association Office <strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Greater</strong> New York<br />
District 6 Represents the Cortland and Syracuse <strong>YMCA</strong>’s and High School Clubs:<br />
Homer High School<br />
North Area Syracuse Y Branch<br />
Cortland High School<br />
East Area Syracuse Y Branch<br />
District Coordinator: Janine Giordano, Cortland <strong>YMCA</strong> volunteer and Social Studies teacher at Homer<br />
High School<br />
District 7 Represents the Long Island <strong>YMCA</strong>’s and High School Club:<br />
Mastic Y Branch,<br />
William Floyd High School<br />
District Coordinator: Helene Purdoski, Mastic YMC, supported by program volunteer Robert Feeney<br />
former Principal William Floyd High School<br />
3
<strong>2012</strong> New York State <strong>YMCA</strong> Youth & Government State <strong>Conference</strong><br />
Friends <strong>of</strong> Youth & Government<br />
• The Honorable Andrew Cuomo, Governor, New York State<br />
• Honorable Robert Duffy, Lieutenant Governor New York State<br />
• Honorable Dean Skelos, Senate Majority Leader, <strong>Conference</strong> Sponsor<br />
• Honorable Sheldon Silver, Speaker <strong>of</strong> the Assembly<br />
• Assembly Member Joseph Morelle, Assembly Sponsor<br />
• John Rappaport, <strong>Executive</strong> Director, McBurney <strong>YMCA</strong><br />
• New York State <strong>YMCA</strong> Foundation, Charles Clark, Chairperson<br />
• Kyle Stewart, Director <strong>of</strong> <strong>YMCA</strong>s <strong>of</strong> NYS Inc.<br />
• <strong>Greater</strong> Rochester <strong>YMCA</strong><br />
• George Romell, President and CEO<br />
• Youth & Government <strong>Conference</strong> Staff<br />
• Mark Rutkowski, State Director<br />
• Connie Angeles, <strong>Conference</strong> Assistant<br />
• Michele Palandrani, <strong>Conference</strong> Assistant<br />
• Flynn Jebb, <strong>Conference</strong> Assistant<br />
• Laura Bolan, <strong>Conference</strong> Assistant<br />
• John Catto, Program Consultant<br />
• Edgar Caldwell, Program Consultant<br />
• Jackie LaNoir, Program Consultant<br />
• Federal Prosecutor Joseph Depadilla, Judicial Program Director<br />
• Kathryn Boardman, Judicial staff volunteer<br />
• Deidra Rubenstrunk Judicial staff volunteer<br />
• Raphael Ortega, Judicial staff volunteer<br />
• Chris Butino, EMT / Night Duty<br />
4
New York State <strong>YMCA</strong> Foundation, Inc.<br />
Whose financial supportive commitment to the NY State Youth and Government creates an<br />
opportunity for every participant to grow in spirit, mind, and body.<br />
Board Members<br />
Charles Clark<br />
David Roman<br />
Jack Young<br />
Peter Pink<br />
Barbara Folkemer<br />
Peggy LoPresti<br />
John MacDougall<br />
Chuck Maze<br />
Norman Moore<br />
Earl S. Miller<br />
Laurie O’Shaugnessy<br />
John C. Travers<br />
Chair<br />
Vice Chair<br />
Secretary<br />
Treasurer<br />
Honorary Board Members<br />
Michael Grammatico<br />
Michael J. Fogarty<br />
John Alan Ramsdell, MD<br />
Mary E. Lane<br />
Robert J. Daly<br />
Chairman<br />
William P. Epke<br />
Treasurer<br />
William A. Roos, IV<br />
Legal Counsel & Secretary<br />
Charles Clark, Ex Offico<br />
William Mausert<br />
Brent Stephans<br />
Trustees Emeritus<br />
Richard E. Kaeyer<br />
Frank J. Keeler<br />
Nancy W. Lester<br />
Arthur B. McComb<br />
New York State <strong>YMCA</strong> Foundation Trustees<br />
5
Advisors<br />
DISTRICT 1<br />
Peter Wegman<br />
Demond Meeks<br />
Jay Polston<br />
Mark Rutkowski - District Coordinator / State Director<br />
Emily Bolan *<br />
Kathryn Maxwell *<br />
Kelli Barnes *<br />
DISTRICT 2<br />
Daniel Trinh<br />
- District Coordinator<br />
Charles Smith<br />
DISTRICT 3<br />
Bocinski Barry<br />
Clark Denise<br />
Hughes Danielle<br />
Kane Dan<br />
Gereau Candice<br />
Larkin Katherine<br />
Jackie Palandrani - District Coordinator<br />
McCarthy Scott<br />
Murtagh Colleen<br />
Schoder Tamara<br />
Showers Stephen<br />
Taylor Daphne<br />
Wells Matthew *<br />
DISTRICT 4 Chuck Maze - District Coordinator<br />
Lisa Bernardo<br />
Lynette<br />
Michael Burrauno<br />
Charlie<br />
Bruno Estrada*<br />
Shawn<br />
Brian Fitzgibbons<br />
Peter<br />
John Gerace<br />
Jean<br />
Mary Johnson<br />
Marshall<br />
Sith<br />
Thomas<br />
Wa<br />
Willock<br />
DISTRICT 5 Tiffany Younger * - District Coordinator<br />
Maame Agyeiwaah<br />
Yoko Liriano<br />
Jason Aubin *<br />
Dana Mantella<br />
Anabel Batista<br />
Jackelyn Mariano<br />
Tasia Brown<br />
Tariqua Morrison<br />
Howard Caretto<br />
Ariana Moy<br />
Justin Carroll<br />
Morissa Paul<br />
Jermaine Daley<br />
Jawaan Ramsay<br />
Spencer Ellis<br />
Deismond Rosa *<br />
Jaqueline James<br />
Marie Turenne<br />
Sadyia Khalique<br />
Octavio Villegas*<br />
Anthony Librera<br />
Continued….<br />
6
DISTRICT 6<br />
Clark Cayla<br />
Kenney Tess<br />
Dowgiallo Matthew<br />
Advisors Continued<br />
Janine Giordano – District Coordinator<br />
Reed *<br />
Buttino *<br />
Thomas<br />
Kelsie<br />
Christopher<br />
Henry<br />
DISTRICT 7<br />
Feeney<br />
Allo<br />
Castilo*<br />
Costell<br />
Coudrey<br />
Helene Purdoski - District Coordinator<br />
Robert<br />
Lauro<br />
Kevin<br />
Reformato<br />
Jerri<br />
Rega<br />
Patricia<br />
Shapiro<br />
Kerri<br />
Tator<br />
Joanne<br />
Kathy<br />
Savannah<br />
Eric<br />
Charles<br />
State Office Judicial Team Safety Team<br />
Connie Angeles Joseph DePadilla Christopher Buttino *<br />
John Catto Deidra Rubenstrunk * Jackie Palandrani<br />
Edgar Caldwell Kathryn Boardman * Helene Purdoski<br />
Flynn Jebb * Atrion Raimundi * Octavio Villegas<br />
Jacqueline LaNoir Raphael Ortega *<br />
Michele Palandrani Aaron Taggart *<br />
Mark Rutkowski Kelsy Willford *<br />
Laura Bolan * Molly Warren *<br />
Jane Henderson *<br />
Allison Bugenis *<br />
Logan Murphy *<br />
Overall <strong>Conference</strong> College Advisors<br />
Kelsie Reed *<br />
Matt Dowgallo *<br />
Emily Bolan *<br />
Kathryn Maxwell *<br />
Kelli Barnes *<br />
Bruno Estrada *<br />
Aaron Taggart *<br />
Logan Murphy *<br />
Kelsey Willford *<br />
Allison Bugenis *<br />
Jane Henderson *<br />
* Program Alum<br />
7
<strong>2012</strong> PRESIDING OFFICERS<br />
Governor…………………….………. Paige Hughes<br />
Lieutenant Governor……………….. Hans Lueders<br />
President Pro Tempore……………... Maria Henry<br />
Speaker <strong>of</strong> Assembly Freedom …….. Sebastian Franco<br />
Speaker <strong>of</strong> Assembly Liberty………. Adam Henn<br />
Deputy Speaker Assembly Freedom.. Taylor Goodspeed<br />
Deputy Speaker Assembly Liberty… Chelsea Smart<br />
Chief Justice………………...……….. Halle-Ann Orr<br />
Editor-in-Chief…………...…………. Hannah Reed<br />
Head Lobbyist………………………. Nicholas Speleotes<br />
<strong>2012</strong> COMMITTEE CHAIR’S<br />
SENATE<br />
Senate 1<br />
Senate 2<br />
Senate 3<br />
Senate 4<br />
Madlyn Wilson<br />
Emily Stepper<br />
Breeanna Dexter<br />
Casey Clemens<br />
ASSEMBLY FREEDOM<br />
Committee 1 Spencer DuB<strong>of</strong>f<br />
Committee 2 Tyler Nappo<br />
Committee 3 Leah Strassburg<br />
Committee 4 Rebecca Bolan<br />
Committee 5 Kelsey Mensch<br />
Committee 6 Claire Greenwood<br />
Committee 7 Kaylin Parisi<br />
ASSEMBLY LIBERTY<br />
Committee 8 Marisa Parotta<br />
Committee 9 Rebecca Kelly-Lyons<br />
Committee 10 Kelsey Barnett<br />
Committee 11 Michael Vasiliou<br />
Committee 12 Linnea Chesman<br />
Committee 13 Donavan Swanson<br />
Committee 14 Emily Wixted<br />
8
New York State <strong>YMCA</strong><br />
Youth and Government Program<br />
2011 - <strong>2012</strong> EXECUTIVE CABINET<br />
Governor<br />
Lt. Governor<br />
Secretary <strong>of</strong> State<br />
Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff<br />
Press Secretary<br />
<strong>Executive</strong> Clerk<br />
Comptroller<br />
Senate Liaison<br />
Liberty Assembly Liaison<br />
Freedom Assembly Liaison<br />
TR House Liaison<br />
Lobbyist Liaison<br />
Paige Hughes<br />
Hans Leuders<br />
Emily Vigliotta<br />
Joseph Gonyeau<br />
Ben Chapman<br />
Kaliel Williamson<br />
Ani Marellapudi<br />
Dalton Blue<br />
Molly Schoder<br />
Jordan Schroeder<br />
Nicholas Marshall<br />
Pat Brosnan<br />
DEPARTMENT HEADS<br />
Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Consumer <strong>of</strong> Protection<br />
Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Environmental Protection<br />
Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Health<br />
Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Labor<br />
Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Children & Family Services<br />
Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Transportation<br />
Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Education<br />
Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Correctional Services<br />
Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Taxation and Finance<br />
Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Agriculture<br />
Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Homeland Security<br />
Michael Anderson<br />
Sean Steele<br />
Ravyn Santiago<br />
Helen Dillingham<br />
Precious Asiedu<br />
Joseph Franzino<br />
Arrianna Hart<br />
James Johnson<br />
DeVar Jones<br />
Erik Gustafson<br />
Morgan Knudsten<br />
9
Fosdick - San Antonio<br />
Memorial Scholarship<br />
In late January 1992, Meegan Fosdick and Shannon San Antonio from the Silver Bay<br />
Association, <strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>Conference</strong> and Training Center tragically lost their lives in a car accident.<br />
These active participants in the New York State <strong>YMCA</strong> Youth & Government Program<br />
demonstrated qualities that all young people should emulate: they were involved in other<br />
community activities/ organizations, school and/or <strong>YMCA</strong> activities, coupled with a<br />
demonstrated passion <strong>of</strong> serving others.<br />
In memory <strong>of</strong> their spirit and enthusiasm, the New York State Youth and Government<br />
established a memorial scholarship fund. Proceeds from the fund are used to award annual<br />
scholarships to the <strong>YMCA</strong> Youth & Government Albany <strong>Conference</strong> defraying a teens State<br />
Program fee expense.<br />
Alison Collins<br />
Ashley Domagola<br />
Maria Henry<br />
Recipients in 2011 for the <strong>2012</strong> <strong>Conference</strong>:<br />
Paige Hughes<br />
Halle-Anne Orr<br />
Recipients in <strong>2012</strong> for the 2013 <strong>Conference</strong><br />
Dina Al Ajmi<br />
Karman Saini<br />
Fatounmata Makadji<br />
Chelsea Smart<br />
Kayleigh Martin<br />
10
Clement A. Duran<br />
Delegate Scholarship Award<br />
A scholarship program supported by the New York State <strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>Executive</strong> Committee honoring<br />
the vision and tireless commitment <strong>of</strong> <strong>YMCA</strong> Director Clement A. Duran to the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
affording teenagers an opportunity to have a voice in their community.<br />
A senior in High School<br />
Participation in the Youth & Government program for a minimum <strong>of</strong> two years<br />
A participant who has exemplified the conduct expected as spelled out in the Code <strong>of</strong> Conduct<br />
Leadership involvement in local community and the Youth & Government program<br />
Qualify as a participant to the Youth & Government Spring Leadership <strong>Conference</strong><br />
Assure the State <strong>Executive</strong> Committee that the award will be used for educational expenses.<br />
The $1,000 cash award is presented at the closing banquet <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>Conference</strong>.<br />
Raul Sanchez 2011<br />
Kathryn Maxwell 2010<br />
Alaina Ryan 2009<br />
Michaela Jebb 2009<br />
Emma Corey 2008<br />
Kristen Rafferty 2007<br />
Newton Kwan 2006<br />
Past Recipients Include:<br />
LaRelle Gee 2005<br />
Emilie Kershaw 2004<br />
Jerry Castillo 2003<br />
Leigh Arsenault 2002<br />
Lazaro Chavez 2001<br />
Ellie Gardner 2000<br />
<strong>2012</strong> Recipient: Maria Henry District 4<br />
Cleveland E. Dodge<br />
Collegiate Advisor Award<br />
Collegiate Advisor Leadership (Cleveland E. Dodge Memorial Award)<br />
A scholarship program supported by the New York State <strong>YMCA</strong> <strong>Executive</strong> Committee redesigned in<br />
2006 to support volunteer collegiate students instrumental in sustaining the vision <strong>of</strong> this civic<br />
engagement program in memory <strong>of</strong> the dedicated voluntary commitment rendered by Mr. Cleveland<br />
E. Dodge to the <strong>YMCA</strong>’s <strong>of</strong> New York.<br />
A former delegate that has participated in a Youth & Government State <strong>Conference</strong>.<br />
A college volunteer who exemplifies servant leadership to the Youth & Government program in areas<br />
<strong>of</strong> program implementation, program development, or leadership development.<br />
Demonstrated leadership with the local or State program endorsed by a <strong>YMCA</strong> Director.<br />
The $1,000 cash award is intended to assist with educational expenses being presented at the closing<br />
banquet <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>Conference</strong>.<br />
Past Recipients Include:<br />
Matthew Dowgiallo (LeMoyne College) 2011<br />
Michele Palandrani (HVCC) 2010<br />
Raphael Ortega (Indiana University School <strong>of</strong> Law) 2009<br />
Mike Couzens (Syracuse University) 2008<br />
Kate Harvey (Seton Hall Law School) 2007<br />
Leigh Arsenault (Middlebury College) 2006<br />
<strong>2012</strong> Recipient: Emily Bolan SUNY at Geneseo<br />
11
<strong>YMCA</strong> Youth <strong>Conference</strong> on National Affairs<br />
Purpose<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> sending a delegation <strong>of</strong> teens from the New York State <strong>YMCA</strong> Youth &<br />
Government program to National Affairs is to allow outstanding student leaders from New York to<br />
share in an extraordinary national teen leadership experience. From the more than 55,000 teens<br />
annually participating in this program across the country 600 gather for a week <strong>of</strong> debate and<br />
learning where they present proposals they deem <strong>of</strong> National importance. Through this experience<br />
delegates gain a respectful appreciation for others, the issues presented, and nurture their<br />
commitment to be civically engaged citizens.<br />
Philosophy<br />
The State <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the New York State <strong>YMCA</strong> Youth & Government program believes it is<br />
a great honor to attend the National Affairs conference. The committee <strong>of</strong> advisors that choose the<br />
delegates strive to send from New York only the most committed teen leaders who exemplify the<br />
values upon which the New York <strong>YMCA</strong> Youth & Government program is based. It is the<br />
intention to send delegates to National Affairs who want to be there and who are willing to put<br />
forth the effort necessary to demonstrate their leadership abilities at the North Carolina conference.<br />
Delegate Selection<br />
The National Affairs selection committee shall select the New York State delegation to the<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> Youth <strong>Conference</strong> on National Affairs held in North Carolina. The committee will be<br />
comprised <strong>of</strong> adult advisors selected by the State Director and the district coordinators, with one<br />
representative from each District. The committee will select delegates upon merit and diversity to<br />
represent the State <strong>of</strong> New York realistically. The delegates will be observed at the State conference<br />
and recommendations are received from all youth committee chairpersons, Adult committee<br />
advisors, chamber participants and Presiding <strong>of</strong>ficers in the selection consideration process.<br />
<strong>Conference</strong> Dates: June 30 – July 6, <strong>2012</strong> at the <strong>YMCA</strong> Blue Ridge Assembly <strong>Conference</strong> Center in<br />
Black Mountain North Carolina<br />
Criteria for selection<br />
1. Knowledge <strong>of</strong> topic<br />
2. Knowledge and use <strong>of</strong> parliamentary procedure<br />
3. Ability to speak in public<br />
4. Contribution to political process and interaction with other delegates<br />
5. Evidence <strong>of</strong> preparation for State <strong>Conference</strong><br />
6. Decorum during sessions<br />
7. Strict adherence to the Code <strong>of</strong> Conduct during the entire conference (Teens who<br />
cannot conduct themselves properly during social hours will not be considered).<br />
8. Self motivation and enthusiasm for <strong>YMCA</strong> programs, specifically Youth and<br />
Government.<br />
9. Leadership ability and potential<br />
12
Selected delegates to represent New York State at the National<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> teen <strong>Conference</strong> On National Affairs in North Carolina<br />
June 30 – July 6, <strong>2012</strong><br />
Delegates in <strong>2012</strong> include:<br />
Tom Jacobs District 1<br />
Halle Orr District 1<br />
Leah Strassburg District 1<br />
Devar Jones District 2<br />
Rebecca Bolan District 3<br />
Paige Hughes District 3<br />
Marissa Parrotta District 3<br />
Daniel Schwartz District 3<br />
Maria Henry District 4<br />
Lowell Hunt District 4<br />
Emily Stepper District 4<br />
Madlyn Wilson District 4<br />
Nana Apraku District 5<br />
Christopher Walker District 5<br />
Hellen Dillingham District 6<br />
Erik Gustafson District 6<br />
Kelsey Barnett District 7<br />
Cassey Clemens District 7<br />
Erin Engelman District 7<br />
Kelsey Mensch District 7<br />
Emily Vigliotta District 7<br />
Alternate Delegates in <strong>2012</strong> include:<br />
Ben Chapman District 1<br />
Nora Hanna District 1<br />
Erik Quitter District 1<br />
Kaliel Williamson District 2<br />
Peter Fritz District 3<br />
Tara Galusha District 3<br />
Partick Harrison District 3<br />
Mike Vasilliou District 3<br />
Caitlin Yandon District 3<br />
Claire Greenwood District 4<br />
Kevin Parakkaku District 4<br />
Michele Reichmann District 4<br />
Moesha Clark District 5<br />
Sebastian Franco District 5<br />
Rocco Graziano District 5<br />
Noor Ismail District 5<br />
Rebecca DeWitt District 6<br />
Ellen Wixted District 6<br />
Adam Henn District 7<br />
Morgan Knudtsen District 7<br />
Chelsea Smart District 7<br />
13
Marina Vanini<br />
Christopher Walker<br />
Officer Candidates for <strong>2012</strong> - 2013<br />
GOVERNOR<br />
Emily Vigliotta<br />
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR<br />
Erik Gustafson Ani Marellapudi Tyler Nappo<br />
Amanda Santaferra-McCarthy Michael Vasiliou<br />
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE<br />
Nana Apraku Casey Clemens Breeanna Dexter<br />
Emily Stepper<br />
Madlyn Wilson<br />
SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY - Liberty<br />
Asiedu Precious<br />
DeVar Jones<br />
Jonathan Kelly<br />
Chelsea Smart<br />
SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY - Freedom<br />
Morgan Knudtsen<br />
Kaylin Parisi<br />
Molly Schoder<br />
DEPUTY SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY - Liberty<br />
Kelsey Barnett<br />
Sidney Marino<br />
DEPUTY SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY - Freedom<br />
Ravyn Santiago<br />
Robert Vecchio<br />
Caitlyn Yandon<br />
CHIEF JUSTICE<br />
Dina AlAjmi Carl Ciccarelli Erin Engelmann<br />
Tom Jacobs<br />
Kevin Parakkatu<br />
Emily Freud<br />
Ethan Cooper<br />
Paige O’Flynn<br />
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF<br />
HEAD LOBBYIST<br />
Katy Delgado<br />
Nora Hanna<br />
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Delegates elected by their teen peers as:<br />
2011-<strong>2012</strong> ELECTED OFFICERS<br />
Governor…………………….… Christopher Walker<br />
Lieutenant Governor…………. Tyler Nappo<br />
President Pro Temp…………... Nana Apraku<br />
Speaker <strong>of</strong> the Assembly Liberty Chelsea Smart<br />
Speaker <strong>of</strong> the Assembly Freedom Morgan Knudtsen<br />
Deputy Speaker Assembly Liberty Kelsey Barnett<br />
Deputy Speaker Assembly Freedom Caitlyn Yandon<br />
Chief Justice………………...… Erin Engelmann<br />
Editor-in-Chief……………….. Emily Freud<br />
Head Lobbyist………………… Paige O’Flynn<br />
BEST DEBATER – SENATE<br />
Nana Apraku District 5<br />
BEST DEBATER – ASSEMBLY LIBERTY<br />
Donavan Swanson District 5<br />
BEST DEBATER – ASSEMBLY FREEDOM<br />
Kelsey Mensch District 7<br />
BEST BILL IN SENATE<br />
S 08 “Amend Section 661 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Education Law to allow for illegal immigrants<br />
the right to apply for financial aid for college. ”<br />
Carolina Fuentes, Kassandra Santiago,<br />
BEST BILL IN ASSEMBLY – LIBERTY<br />
AL - 01 “amend Education Law §313 in order to eliminate racial bias towards the<br />
admittance <strong>of</strong> students into state colleges.”<br />
Michael Anderson, Marisa Parrotta<br />
and<br />
AL – 08 “Amend §3-0313<strong>of</strong> the Environmental Conservation law by adding subsection<br />
8 to illegalize Hydraulic Fracturing”<br />
Kelci Henn Zoey Gliksman<br />
BEST BILL IN ASSEMBLY – FREEDOM<br />
AF - 07 “Allow registered independents to vote in primary elections.”<br />
Tyler Nappo, Daniel McDowell, Jolien VanNieuwenhuizen<br />
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BEST LOBBYIST SENATE<br />
Christopher O’Connor District 3<br />
BEST LOBBYIST – ASSEMBLY LIBERTY<br />
Thomas Mullally District 7<br />
BEST LOBBYIST – ASSEMBLY FREEDOM<br />
Christopher O’Connor District 3<br />
OUTSTANDING TEDDY ROOSEVELT (Jr. High/First Year) DELEGATE<br />
Moesha Clark District 5<br />
Megan Stacey District 3<br />
BEST PRESS DELEGATE<br />
Darien Ward District 5<br />
BEST ATTORNEY<br />
Court 1 Lindsay Springman District 7<br />
Court 2 Mary Stephenson District 1<br />
Court 3 Ethan Deabren District 7<br />
Court 4 Emily Collins District 1<br />
BEST BRIEF<br />
Team 24 Colton Bishop, Rebecca Sung, Daniel Schwartz District 3<br />
JUDICIAL EXEMPLAR<br />
Ashley Baudier<br />
Maxwell Beebe<br />
Emily Collins<br />
Briana Connolly<br />
Ethan Deabreu<br />
Mike Eyerman<br />
Kali Hoppe<br />
Emily LaSpisa<br />
Daniel Leisner<br />
Mikhail Lindsay<br />
Kathryn Lippa<br />
Ceejay L<strong>of</strong>land<br />
Fatoumata Makadji<br />
Alex Mauro<br />
Jenna Maxwell<br />
Liam McGurl<br />
Alvin Moreira<br />
Mallory Nargi<br />
Alana Narine<br />
John Nelson<br />
Diogenes Nunez<br />
Michelle Reichman<br />
Katthryn Rowan<br />
Matthew Scanlon<br />
Daniel Schwartz<br />
Lindsay Springman<br />
Mary Stephenson<br />
Vimbai Ushe<br />
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#1 Best Firm – B Respondent Mary Stephenson 1<br />
Firm Name: Carroll Daniel Schwartz 3<br />
Advisor: Justin Carroll Jasmine Somers 7<br />
Firm Leader: Ceejay L<strong>of</strong>land Diogenes Nunez 5<br />
Maxwell Beebe 3<br />
Ethan Deabreau 7<br />
Krista Barbeau 1<br />
Colton Bishop 3<br />
Koraly Adams 5<br />
Ceejay L<strong>of</strong>land 3<br />
Jeff Gao 7<br />
Rebecca Sung 3<br />
#2 Best Firm – A Respondent Nicole Rubertone 3<br />
Firm Name: Murphy Katie Roxstrom 1<br />
Advisor: Logan Murphy Ashley Hampson 7<br />
Firm Leader: Kathryn Rowan Matthew Scanlon 4<br />
Liam McGurl 3<br />
Lynsey Springman 7<br />
Stephen Viele 3<br />
Kathryn Rowan 1<br />
Brian Shiminski 7<br />
Brendan Conneely 4<br />
Jordin O’Reilly 7<br />
#3 Best Firm – D Respondent Emily Collins 1<br />
Firm Name: Bugenis John Nelson 7<br />
Advisor: Allison Bugenis Danielle Frohnhoefer 7<br />
Firm Leader: Adrianna Wurster Allen Perry 6<br />
Nikita Mehta 4<br />
Alana Narine 5<br />
Alex Mauro 7<br />
Adrianna Wurster 1<br />
Ferdousi Jahan 7<br />
Joseph Mineo 7<br />
Grace Kockubinski 4<br />
Sarah Griffin 7<br />
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<strong>2012</strong> STATE OF THE STATE<br />
Paige Hughes, Youth Governor<br />
Mr. Speaker, Mr. Lieutenant Governor, honorable members <strong>of</strong> the legislature, distinguished<br />
guests, and my fellow New Yorkers: allow me to formally welcome you, yet again, to our 76th annual<br />
New York State <strong>YMCA</strong> Youth and Government state conference.<br />
Over the past six months with the turn <strong>of</strong> each newspaper page and with the click <strong>of</strong> the remote to<br />
our television sets, we have seen headline after headline informing us <strong>of</strong> the importance <strong>of</strong> the Occupy<br />
Wall Street movement. From Oakland, to Dallas, from Washington to Chicago, and even outside the<br />
walls <strong>of</strong> the chamber you and I are standing in right now, a revolution has taken place. A revolution<br />
driven by the ability to use the most powerful thing a human being possesses: their voice.<br />
This weekend, there is a new group <strong>of</strong> individuals occupying Albany. But this group does not<br />
come with an abundance <strong>of</strong> tents and protest signs. Instead, they come with an abundance <strong>of</strong> new ideas<br />
and perspectives on the pressing issues they face as New York State citizens. This group, my fellow<br />
delegates, is you and I, because this weekend, we are occupying Albany.<br />
Contrary to what many adults believe, we the youth <strong>of</strong> New York State have a voice. In fact, over<br />
55,000 teens across the country who participate in this program have a voice. It is a voice that is powerful<br />
beyond measure. And even better, we have opinions, too! Together, we are able to overcome the<br />
obstacles <strong>of</strong> today’s negative society and make a significant mark on the history our <strong>of</strong> state. Together,<br />
we are able to see past each other’s differences and realize that there actually is a solution to every<br />
problem. Together, we are able to grasp and fully understand the concept <strong>of</strong> the four core values <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> and how we can incorporate these into our day-to-day lives. Together, we are able to utilize our<br />
passions and join as one large extended family striving toward one common goal. Our goal is to make<br />
change; to make our own revolution.<br />
For the state leadership team, we knew that <strong>2012</strong> was a year for reevaluation; a year for revision;<br />
and a year for remembering the sole purpose <strong>of</strong> why six hundred teenagers gather in Albany for one<br />
weekend in March every year. As a team, we strived to incorporate as many initiatives as possible that<br />
would benefit the wants and needs <strong>of</strong> the delegates in this program, rather than our own personal desires.<br />
For the first time in many years, we were able to create fairness and equal representation within the<br />
leadership development amongst seven districts. We helped guide an advocacy component to our program<br />
that helps capitalize the concerns the young people <strong>of</strong> our state deem important and integral for our<br />
legislators to hear. We have introduced a new service learning project known as Operation Gratitude that<br />
helps drive home the concept <strong>of</strong> servant leadership and the appreciation we have for those men and<br />
women fighting to keep our freedom alive. But realistically, our laundry list <strong>of</strong> accomplishments would<br />
not have been possible without each <strong>of</strong> you.<br />
In the beginning <strong>of</strong> 2011, New York State had seen some <strong>of</strong> its worst times. In fact, many were<br />
asking when enough is enough. The economy was hurting, our government was in turmoil, and valued<br />
systems were quickly deteriorating before our very eyes. We were divided and uncertain <strong>of</strong> how to unite<br />
with such burdens resting on our shoulders; but as we entered <strong>2012</strong>, we came with a different mindset and<br />
a different way <strong>of</strong> approaching each issue because we came to realize that things were looking up for New<br />
York.<br />
As a whole, the <strong>Executive</strong> Cabinet created an agenda that targeted two <strong>of</strong> what we felt were were<br />
the most significant areas that were in dire need <strong>of</strong> reform and renovation. By doing so, we entered our<br />
<strong>2012</strong> state conference looking for ideas to create a stronger educational system for future generations and<br />
how we can boost the economy so it can gradually grow to become one <strong>of</strong> the strongest in our nation.<br />
First, we began by evaluating public education. As a state, we must realize the importance <strong>of</strong><br />
putting the students first and rising above the public education bureaucracy that has been set forth over<br />
the years. New York State spends more money than any other state in the country for education, yet we<br />
are still lingering 38th in graduation rates. It simply does not make sense. So where do we start?<br />
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Let’s take a look at a fairly controversial topic you and I can easily recognize: abolishing teacher<br />
tenure. The tenure law has existed in New York State since 1917, but it was not until 1980 that all public<br />
school teachers and teaching assistants were included under the protections. In 2010, the federal<br />
government enacted legislation to qualify for Race to the Top, but this failed and left New York in search<br />
for a more allusive teacher evaluation system.<br />
Our current system makes it extremely difficult to reward our exceptional teachers and remove<br />
the under-performing ones. The time has come for New York to set precedence and move forward to a<br />
better and brighter future for our students. If we can hold our government accountable for their actions,<br />
then why should we not hold our public school teachers accountable, too?! Especially after the billions <strong>of</strong><br />
dollars we spend trying to do so with a faulty system.<br />
With that, I strongly urge the passage <strong>of</strong> Bill #9 in the Senate. Not only will this bill eliminate<br />
teacher tenure, but it will also create a new evaluation system that will act as building blocks to a stronger<br />
system in years to come.<br />
In 1966, New York State approved a constitutional amendment that allowed for a government-run lottery.<br />
Originally, the proceeds were to be “applied exclusively to, or in aid or support <strong>of</strong>, education.” Although<br />
this still remains true, the breakdown in the percentage <strong>of</strong> funds allocated to each area must be revised<br />
since the amount <strong>of</strong> money that was promised to go toward education has significantly decreased over<br />
time. Thus, I urge you to pass Bill #13 in Assembly Liberty.<br />
With this bill, we would be looking to amend Section 1612 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Tax Law, to increase<br />
and cap the percentage <strong>of</strong> money from the New York State lottery dedicated to education. By reducing the<br />
prize money for all lottery drawings from 51% to 40% and the administrative costs from 3% to 2%, we<br />
could easily increase education aid from 38% to 50%. This 12% increase is simple, it is effective, and it<br />
ensures that the original intentions <strong>of</strong> the lottery are to be upheld under every circumstance.<br />
A final bill regarding education that I ask you to support is Bill #25 in Assembly Freedom. This bill<br />
proposes an amendment to Section 3202 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Education Law, which would eliminate<br />
the funding for charter schools across the state. Each year, portions <strong>of</strong> public school district budgets are<br />
used to fund charter schools. Although these schools are are not required to follow the same stipulations<br />
as public schools, they are still funded in the same way - does this really seem fair?<br />
In the economic crisis our state is facing, we must take every available opportunity to save<br />
money, and in this case, making charter schools self-sustaining would save New York an abundance <strong>of</strong><br />
money. In fact, we could be saving up to $435.5 million per year. Additionally, we must understand that<br />
if this bill is passed, charter schools would not fail to operate seeing as though many heavily rely on a<br />
determined tuition and the support <strong>of</strong> benefactors in conjunction to the state funding.<br />
Moving forward to the second point on the <strong>Executive</strong> Agenda, I would like to call your attention<br />
to casino gambling. Over the years, we have gone back and forth on whether or not we should legalize<br />
this act across our state. But the fact <strong>of</strong> the matter is this: New York currently has five casinos on Native<br />
American reservations and nine racinos on our racetracks. Additionally, New York has 29,000 electronic<br />
gaming machines which total more than Atlantic City and any other state in the Northeast. That is why I<br />
am urging you to pass Bill #14 in Assembly Freedom and Resolution #20 in Assembly Liberty.<br />
Both pieces <strong>of</strong> legislation will legalize casino gambling, but in an effective way, to move our state<br />
into the right direction. Not only would we be generating excessive sums <strong>of</strong> money, but we would also be<br />
creating jobs and attracting tourists to our great state <strong>of</strong> New York.<br />
According to the Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, New York holds an unemployment rate <strong>of</strong> 8%. At the end<br />
<strong>of</strong> last year, the number <strong>of</strong> unemployed New Yorkers increased by 8,700 people from November to<br />
December. One major factor in this unemployment rate is illegal immigration. Currently, there are<br />
645,000 illegal immigrants within our state borders, and 374,000 <strong>of</strong> these immigrants are active in the<br />
workforce. This is creating fierce job competition between the illegals <strong>of</strong> our state and the struggling New<br />
York taxpayers. Thus, I strongly urge you to pass Bill #32 in Assembly Liberty.<br />
With this piece <strong>of</strong> legislation, we will be punishing businesses who knowingly or unknowingly<br />
hire illegal immigrants. By doing so, we will deter businesses from eying a cheap source <strong>of</strong> labor,<br />
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increase the availability <strong>of</strong> jobs for New Yorkers, and essentially aim to decrease the number <strong>of</strong> illegal<br />
immigrants within the American workforce.<br />
Finally, the last piece <strong>of</strong> legislation that coincides with the <strong>Executive</strong> Agenda is Bill #11 in the<br />
Senate. In a time where many families across New York are struggling to make ends meet, it is not<br />
uncommon for minors to contribute to the family income. In the context <strong>of</strong> this bill, minors aged sixteen<br />
and seventeen would be allowed to work a maximum <strong>of</strong> thirty-five hours a week when school is in<br />
session and fifty-four hours a week when school is out <strong>of</strong> session. Compared to Article 4, Section 134 <strong>of</strong><br />
the current New York State Labor Law, this would only result in a seven hour increase when school is in<br />
session, and a six hour increase when school is out <strong>of</strong> session. This bill by, no means, would interfere<br />
with the minor’s education since the proposed amendment leaves more than four hours per night to<br />
partake in other said activities.<br />
During chamber sessions today, I ask that you please be mindful <strong>of</strong> these seven bills and listen to each<br />
side <strong>of</strong> the argument before developing your own stance.<br />
One year ago, I stood before you at the Desmond Hotel and posed a challenge for each and every<br />
delegate in this program. A challenge that would not be easily accepted by many young adults our age<br />
throughout the world today. This challenge was to let your voice be heard.<br />
Again, I return to the program for another consecutive year to pose the same challenge for you.<br />
No matter which part <strong>of</strong> the program you represent this weekend, do not be afraid to speak up; do not be<br />
afraid to express your opinions; and do not be afraid to step out <strong>of</strong> your comfort zones. I assure you that if<br />
you use your voice, you will be successful.<br />
This weekend as Occupiers <strong>of</strong> Albany we are here to prove that New York’s next generation will<br />
be its greatest. As the honorable Governor Andrew Cuomo said in his <strong>2012</strong> State <strong>of</strong> the State Address,<br />
“Last year, we learned to walk - this year, we run... We have only begun to explore the capacity <strong>of</strong> our<br />
partnership and the limits <strong>of</strong> our imagination.”<br />
With that being said, let’s smile, let’s have fun, and let’s get to work! Thank you all for your<br />
ongoing attention and support, good luck in your endeavors for the course <strong>of</strong> this weekend, and may God<br />
bless the great State <strong>of</strong> New York!<br />
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<strong>Executive</strong> Bill Decisions<br />
Governor Paige Hughes<br />
2011 – <strong>2012</strong><br />
Signed<br />
S - 04 A Cap funding for correctional services and allocate the money towards educational<br />
facilities.<br />
S – 04 B Add subsection 14 to section 220.16 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Penal Law to ban “bath<br />
salts”, the manufacture, sale, and distribution <strong>of</strong> bath salts in New<br />
S – 11 extend the hours <strong>of</strong> work available for minors sixteen and seventeen years <strong>of</strong> age beyond<br />
the set maximum in § 134 <strong>of</strong> article 4 <strong>of</strong> New York State Labor Law in order to allow<br />
them to further support their families financially.<br />
S – 12 This bill will address flaws in the current system <strong>of</strong> criminal probation.<br />
S – 13 Amend the New York State Penal Law by adding section 125.30, to require parental<br />
permission for a minor to have an abortion.<br />
S - 20 Regulate in-store tobacco advertisement<br />
AL-01 Amend Education Law §313 in order to eliminate racial bias towards the admittance <strong>of</strong><br />
students into state colleges.<br />
AL-08 Amend §3-0313<strong>of</strong> the Environmental Conservation law by adding sub-section 8 to<br />
illegalize Hydraulic Fracturing<br />
AL-11 The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to limit the extent <strong>of</strong> Port Authority fare increase, and<br />
ultimately to save New Yorkers money.<br />
AL-13 Amend Section 1612, by adding subsection 6 to the New York State tax law to increase<br />
and cap the percentage <strong>of</strong> money from the New York State lottery dedicated to education.<br />
AL-16 Amend § 3609-E by Adding Subsection 5 to the New York State Education Law to<br />
Maintain Educational Funding at the 2010-11 Level for Each School District in the State.<br />
AL-20 Members <strong>of</strong> the assembly urge the state Senate in joining them to amend the New York<br />
State Constitution to legalize casino gambling.<br />
AL-26 create a database in which incidents <strong>of</strong> bullying are mandated to be recorded, and to<br />
establish a plan to terminate the problem <strong>of</strong> bullying.<br />
AL-27 Amend section 30.10 subsections (b) and (e) <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Procedure Law to increase<br />
the statute <strong>of</strong> limitations for rape and sexual conduct in the second and third degrees.<br />
AL-31 Restrict the amount <strong>of</strong> time an individual or family can live within public housing.<br />
AF-07 Allow registered independents to vote in primary elections.<br />
AF-08 Amend Section 490.60 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Penal Law to establish the crime <strong>of</strong><br />
terrorist recruitment a Class C felony<br />
AF-17 Amend section 3-C <strong>of</strong> the General Municipal Law to revoke the 2% property tax cap and<br />
replace it with a 2% spending cap for each school district<br />
AF-19 change the wording <strong>of</strong> the selective service law to mandate that both men and women<br />
have to sign up for the draft at age 18.<br />
AF-23 amend section 182.20 <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Procedure Law to mandate video arraignment<br />
AF-25 Amend §3202 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Education Law in order to eliminate the funding for<br />
charter schools<br />
AF-36 Amend section 606 <strong>of</strong> existing tax law S884-2011 to provide additional assistance to inhome<br />
caregivers by increasing the tax credit from twenty percent to forty percent<br />
AF-39 Require all New York State street vendors to adopt the New York City policy , to obtain a<br />
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positive letter grade from the department <strong>of</strong> health inspectors in order to maintain their<br />
street vendor license.<br />
AF-40 Amend an unfunded special education mandate in order to make it non mandatory for<br />
high schools <strong>of</strong> a Class C population and under to be required to have one special<br />
education teacher for each core subject.<br />
AF-41 Ban the possession <strong>of</strong> all tobacco products from minors<br />
Bills Vetoed by the <strong>Executive</strong> Branch:<br />
S-03: Allow a school nurse to give over-the-counter medication to students with parental consent.<br />
Vetoed as this is a school district issue.<br />
S-14: Repeal Status <strong>of</strong> Limitation on Child Abuse<br />
Vetoed as this goes against AL-27 (signed) which is to Amend section 30.10 subsections<br />
(b) and (e) <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Procedure Law to increase the statute <strong>of</strong> limitations for rape<br />
and sexual conduct in the second and third degrees.<br />
S-15: Make it possible for first time, nonviolent <strong>of</strong>fenders to serve in the military in lieu <strong>of</strong> a serving<br />
time in a correctional facility<br />
Vetoed - Criminals should not be able to serve in the military<br />
AL-18: End Affirmative Action in the admissions process to New York state Funded Colleges<br />
(SUNY's).<br />
Vetoed<br />
AL-19: Amend the Section 2 <strong>of</strong> Article 3 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Constitution to place a term limit on<br />
New York State Legislators <strong>of</strong> Four Two-Year Terms.<br />
Vetoed due to a technicality issue<br />
AL-35: Add letter C to TAX Article 22 Part 2 section 616, To exempt veterans within the state with 8<br />
years <strong>of</strong> service from future New York State income tax.<br />
Vetoed<br />
AL-36: Deduct tax dollars from correctional facilities and utilize it towards Educational purposes.<br />
Vetoed<br />
AF-01: Enforce stricter punishments for cases dealing with bullying, harassment, and intimidation in<br />
public schools as well as school-related activities in grades 7-12 across the state <strong>of</strong> New York.<br />
Vetoed: Idea, not something that can be implemented through legislation; school district<br />
issue<br />
AF-02: Remove the statue <strong>of</strong> limitations for reporting a case involving sexual misconduct with a minor.<br />
Vetoed: Goes against AL-27 (signed)<br />
AF-24: Amend Section 60.45 <strong>of</strong> the criminal procedure law; rules <strong>of</strong> evidence; admissibility <strong>of</strong><br />
statements <strong>of</strong> defendant<br />
Vetoed: Ineffective; interrogations should not be available to the public<br />
AL-28: Reinstate Capital Punishment in the State <strong>of</strong> New York<br />
Vetoed: Governor does not agree with Capital Punishment<br />
AF-29: Amend the NYS Education Law S-3204-A To prohibit school districts from disallowing<br />
homeschoolers residing in the state <strong>of</strong> New York from participating in interscholastic and<br />
intramural athletic programs and non-athletic extracurricular activities.<br />
Vetoed Students who are homeschooled should not have the ability to participate in<br />
extra-curriculars if they choose not attend the school<br />
AF-33: To prevent the abuse <strong>of</strong> foster care children.<br />
Vetoed: Ineffective; poorly written<br />
AF-35: Repeal New York State’s statue <strong>of</strong> limitations for child sexual abuse, allowing victims to<br />
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indefinitely press charges against their attackers.<br />
Vetoed: Goes against AL-27 (signed)<br />
AF-37: Add subsection 9 to section 605 <strong>of</strong> New York State Education Law. To provide better access to<br />
healthcare for the citizens under the poverty line in New York State through the creation <strong>of</strong> a<br />
scholarship program that allows prospective medical students to apply for a chance to reduce the<br />
cost <strong>of</strong> their education.<br />
Vetoed: There simply is not enough money within New York's Education budget to<br />
create such a program<br />
AF-38: To forbid smoking in multi-housing units<br />
Vetoed: Cannot be enforced; discretion <strong>of</strong> the citizen as to whether or not they want to<br />
smoke in their own homes<br />
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Bills Passed and Signed by the <strong>Executive</strong><br />
Cabinet during the<br />
76 th Youth and Government State<br />
<strong>Conference</strong><br />
March 9-11, <strong>2012</strong><br />
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER S – 04 A<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Nana Apraku, Tenaja Smith-Butler, Jainaba Darboe and Joy Ugiagbe<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Cap funding for correctional services and allocate the money towards educational facilities.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> our bill is to ensure that education is given proper priority in the NYS budget system. We wish to<br />
allocate more funds to education upon the passage <strong>of</strong> our bill.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1:<br />
Allocation: To set apart for a special purpose; designate.<br />
NYS (New York State) Budget: A drafting <strong>of</strong> how and where funding for NYS will be spread.<br />
Educational facilities can be daycares, schools, afterschool programs or a library.<br />
Section 2:<br />
Our bill is going to cap funding for correctional services and put the money that would have been given to correctional<br />
services to educational facilities. At the end <strong>of</strong> the drafting, where legislators create the budget, cap for correctional<br />
services made and all the extra original funds will be deducted from the planned amount and allocated to the educational<br />
portion <strong>of</strong> the NYS Budget.<br />
Justification<br />
Education is a major element in the development <strong>of</strong> children and young adults in society. However recent studies<br />
have shown that there is a growing unbalance in the amount <strong>of</strong> money spent on education compared to correctional<br />
institutions. California spends almost 3-5 times more money on jails and prisons than on education with a graduation rate<br />
<strong>of</strong> only 68% and this situation is where New York will be soon if there isn’t a plan to prevent it. New York spends about<br />
$56,000 per inmate compared to the average $16,000 per student enrolled in the school system. There has been an<br />
increasing trend to spend more money on jail systems, in 1986 the U.S. allocated almost 10 billion dollars toward<br />
correctional facilities by 2005 that number quadrupled to almost 43 billion dollars. State prisons have as many as 8,000<br />
excess beds at their 67 facilities, and the ratio <strong>of</strong> correction <strong>of</strong>ficers to inmates far exceeds national averages, state<br />
records show. Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars are also paid to improve jail beds or front gate presentation. New York State must set<br />
priorities and make sure that when money is tight that we are allocating it properly.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
We do not plan to add or reduce the amount <strong>of</strong> funds provided we wish to spread them more fairly.<br />
Effective Date<br />
The 2013-2014 NYS Budget Drafting process. (Begins in Spring).<br />
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER S-04 B<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Heather Kilmer, Jaye Kudreyko, Brittany Bassett, and Marisa Passaro<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Add subsection 14 to section 220.16 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Penal Law.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
To ban “bath salts”, the manufacture, sale, and distribution <strong>of</strong> bath salts in New York State.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1: Definitions<br />
“Bath Salts”: A mixture <strong>of</strong> hallucinogenic substances such as mephedrone, Methylenedioxypyrovalerone, or MDPV,<br />
methylone, and various other substances based on the manufacturer and brand.<br />
D.E.A: Drug Enforcement Administration; a component <strong>of</strong> the U.S. Department <strong>of</strong> Justice.<br />
Section 2: Provisions<br />
A person is guilty <strong>of</strong> criminal possession <strong>of</strong> a controlled substance in the third degree when he knowingly and unlawfully<br />
posses:<br />
1. A narcotic drug with intent to sell it; or<br />
2. A stimulant, hallucinogenic substance, or lysergic acid diethylamide, with intent to sell it and has previously<br />
been convicted <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence defined in article two hundred twenty or the attempt or conspiracy to commit any<br />
such <strong>of</strong>fense; or<br />
3. A stimulant with intent to sell it and said stimulant weighs one gram or more; or<br />
4. Lysergic acid diethylamide with intent to sell it and said lysergic acid diethylamide weighs one milligram or<br />
more; or<br />
5. A hallucinogen with intent to sell it and said hallucinogen weights twenty-five milligrams or more; or<br />
6. A hallucinogenic substance with intent to sell it and said hallucinogenic substance weighs one gram or more; or<br />
7. One or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances containing methamphetamine, its salts, isomers or<br />
salts <strong>of</strong> isomers with intent to sell it and said preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances are <strong>of</strong> an<br />
aggregate weight <strong>of</strong> one-eighth ounce or more; or<br />
8. A stimulant and said stimulant weighs five grams or more; or<br />
9. Lysergic acid diethylamide and said lysergic acid diethylamide weighs five milligrams or more; or<br />
10. A hallucinogenic substance and said hallucinogen weighs one hundred twenty-five milligrams or more; or<br />
11. A hallucinogenic substance and said hallucinogenic substance weighs five grams or more; or<br />
12. One or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances containing a narcotic drug and said preparations,<br />
compounds mixtures or substances are <strong>of</strong> an aggregate weight <strong>of</strong> one-half ounce or more; or<br />
13. Phencyclidine and said phencyclidine weighs one thousand two hundred fifty milligrams or more; or<br />
14. A “bath salt” containing mephedrone, methylenedioxypyrovalerone, and methylone with intent to sell or use it.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
There are no necessary funds needed, there is no tax paid on this substance.<br />
Justification<br />
This Bill will ensure the safety <strong>of</strong> the public in New York State. By banning “bath salts”, New York State can protect<br />
users <strong>of</strong> this drug and the people around them.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill will go into effect one year after its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER S-11<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Bree Dexter, Helen Dillingham, Ashley Moss, Gail Van Valkenburg<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Amend § 134 <strong>of</strong> article 4 <strong>of</strong> New York State Labor Law<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to extend the hours <strong>of</strong> work available for minors sixteen and seventeen years <strong>of</strong> age<br />
beyond the set maximum in § 134 <strong>of</strong> article 4 <strong>of</strong> New York State Labor Law in order to allow them to further<br />
support their families financially.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1<br />
Hours <strong>of</strong> work for minors sixteen and seventeen years <strong>of</strong> age. 1. When school is in session, no minor sixteen or<br />
seventeen years <strong>of</strong> age enrolled in a daytime school, other than a part-time or continuation school, shall be<br />
employed: a. (i) More than four hours on any day preceding a school day, other than on a Sunday or holiday; (ii)<br />
except that students enrolled in a cooperative work experience program approved by the department <strong>of</strong> education<br />
may be employed for no more than six hours on any day preceding a school day, other than on a Sunday or<br />
holiday, if such hours <strong>of</strong> employment occur solely pursuant to such program. Any hours worked by students in<br />
such programs shall be included when calculating the number <strong>of</strong> hours worked for purposes <strong>of</strong> subparagraph (i)<br />
<strong>of</strong> this paragraph;<br />
b. More than eight hours on a Friday, Saturday, Sunday or holiday;<br />
c. More than twenty-eight thirty-five hours a week.<br />
d. More than six days a week;<br />
e. After ten o'clock at night on any day preceding a school day, or after midnight on any day preceding a school<br />
day provided the employer receives and maintains both the written consent <strong>of</strong> the minor's parent or guardian and<br />
a certificate which shall be provided to the employer at the end <strong>of</strong> each marking period by the minor's school<br />
which shall assert that such minor is in satisfactory academic standing according to the standards in such school<br />
district;<br />
f. After ten o’clock at night on any day preceding a non-school day or, if the employer receives and maintains<br />
the written consent <strong>of</strong> the minor's parent or guardian, after midnight; or<br />
g. Before six o'clock in the morning.<br />
Section 2<br />
When school is not in session, no minor sixteen or seventeen years <strong>of</strong> age shall be employed:<br />
a. More than eight nine hours a day, except that for the purpose <strong>of</strong> making one or more shorter work days or a<br />
holiday in a week, such persons may be employed up to ten hours on any one day <strong>of</strong> the week, and nine hours on<br />
any <strong>of</strong> four other days, but not in excess <strong>of</strong> forty-eight fifty-four hours in any such week;<br />
b. More than forty-eight fifty-four hours a week.<br />
c. More than six days a week; or<br />
d. After twelve midnight or before six o'clock in the morning.<br />
Justification<br />
This bill gives teens more opportunities to earn money during a time <strong>of</strong> economic turmoil. The amount <strong>of</strong><br />
families that rely on teens’ income is increasing, and it is time that these teens are given more <strong>of</strong> a chance to<br />
assist their families. This bill only benefits families and minors that wish to work more.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
There are no fiscal implications.<br />
Effective Date<br />
If passed, this bill shall go into effect as <strong>of</strong> January 1, 2013.<br />
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER S - 12<br />
Introduced By: Maria Henry, Ani Marellapudi, Andrew Quigley, Cassius Wilkinson<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: This bill will address flaws in the current system <strong>of</strong> criminal probation.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The institution <strong>of</strong> an intensively supervised probation system, similar to Hawaii’s HOPE (Hawaii's Opportunity<br />
Probation with Enforcement) program, will minimize the amount <strong>of</strong> repeat <strong>of</strong>fenders (<strong>of</strong> drug related crimes) within our State’s<br />
criminal justice system. A combination <strong>of</strong> swift and consistent punishment for the violation <strong>of</strong> probation, coupled with the full<br />
cooperation <strong>of</strong> probation <strong>of</strong>ficers, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and New York State police forces, we can effectively induce the<br />
behavioral change that will allow probationers to return to their rightful place in society.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Probationers in HOPE Probation receive swift, predictable, and immediate sanctions – typically resulting in several days<br />
in jail – for each detected violation, such as detected drug use or missed appointments with a probation <strong>of</strong>ficer. In HOPE<br />
Probation, defendants are clearly warned that if they violate the rules, they go to jail. Defendants are required to call a hotline each<br />
weekday morning to find out if they must take a drug test that day. Random drug testing occurs at least once a week for the first<br />
two months. If probationers test positive, they are arrested immediately. If they fail to appear for the test or violate other terms <strong>of</strong><br />
probation, warrants for their arrest are issued immediately. Once they are apprehended, a probation modification hearing is held<br />
two days later, and violators are typically sentenced to a short jail term. The jail time may increase for subsequent violations and<br />
repeat <strong>of</strong>fenders are <strong>of</strong>ten ordered into residential treatment.<br />
Amendments will be made to New York State Penal Law Article 65.00 and 65.10 concerning the repeated probation <strong>of</strong><br />
drug users. Such criminals would be given a regimen <strong>of</strong> HOPE probation.<br />
Justification<br />
In New York State, we see the same fundamental problems in probation enforcement that once plagued the Hawaii Justice<br />
System. Offenders, convicted <strong>of</strong> drug related crimes, are placed in a probation system that is too lenient and too negligent <strong>of</strong> their<br />
problems. Probation <strong>of</strong>ficers frequently allow <strong>of</strong>fenders to have multiple violations <strong>of</strong> their parole without consequence. Then,<br />
after an arbitrarily chosen number <strong>of</strong> violations, <strong>of</strong>fenders’ probation is revoked and they serve the rest <strong>of</strong> their sentences in jail.<br />
Our current system is flawed on a psychological level as it <strong>of</strong>fers <strong>of</strong>fenders no incentive to change their behavior. They are allowed<br />
to violate the terms <strong>of</strong> their parole until their probation is suddenly and arbitrarily revoked. The policy <strong>of</strong> fast and consistent<br />
punishment will create the deterrence that <strong>of</strong>fenders currently lack. New York State will see that the threat <strong>of</strong> punishment, when<br />
upheld by the entire criminal justice system, will be enough alone to deter the violation <strong>of</strong> probation.<br />
Justification <strong>of</strong> this reform is warranted by the ineffectiveness <strong>of</strong> the current New York State probation. In 2010, there<br />
were 113,858 people arrested for drug <strong>of</strong>fenses and among those, 61.8% <strong>of</strong> the arrestees had prior <strong>of</strong>fenses. Being on the HOPE<br />
program reduces an <strong>of</strong>fender’s chance <strong>of</strong> facing sanction by one half, and <strong>of</strong> going to prison by two-thirds. Furthermore, it reduces<br />
the chance <strong>of</strong> being arrested for a new crime by over fifty percent. Institution <strong>of</strong> the HOPE program will not only shrink the drug<br />
market, but will save lives, as the vast majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fenders are deterred from using drugs, and the small percentage that continue<br />
to do will receive rehabilitative treatment on a more personal and effective level.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
The establishment <strong>of</strong> this parole reform would hold strong economic incentives for the state, in its current fiscal<br />
condition. The cost per <strong>of</strong>fender in the system is an additional $1400 per year (inclusive <strong>of</strong> the mandatory rehabilitation programs<br />
for <strong>of</strong>fenders who continue to fail tests), and saves $7000 per year. An average <strong>of</strong> $30,00 <strong>of</strong> public tax money is required to<br />
imprison a convict for one year. This probation system would help reduce the necessities from taxpayer funds, as it would create<br />
an environment in which a lower proportion <strong>of</strong> those on probation return to prison. With these results, taxes can either be<br />
decreased, or can instead be invested in state institutions with more productive returns (i.e. education).<br />
Effective Date<br />
If passed, this bill’s legislation would go into effect beginning on June 1, <strong>2012</strong>.<br />
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER S - 13<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Emily Vigliotta, Devin Messina, Celina Bassett and Ashley Guillois<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Amend the New York State Penal Law by adding section 125.30, to require parental permission for a minor to have<br />
an abortion.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to require any unemancipated minor to receive consent from a parent or guardian in order to<br />
have an abortion. This will ensure that minors make responsible decisions, under the guidance <strong>of</strong> their guardian,<br />
regarding whether or not to have an abortion.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1: Definitions<br />
Unemancipated: a minor still under parental authority<br />
Section 2: Provisions<br />
125.30 Parental Consent for a minor to have an abortion.<br />
It is required that all unemancipated minors receive parental permission, from one or more parents, to have an<br />
abortion.<br />
Justification<br />
Parents have traditionally been recognized as having rights regarding the medical authority <strong>of</strong> their children. In New<br />
York State, parents are required by law to provide permission when their minor child has a tooth drilled, bone x-rayed, or<br />
ears pierced, but they do not need to give consent for their pregnant daughter to have the surgical procedure <strong>of</strong> an<br />
abortion. Parents in New York State have the right to have a say in a serious medical procedure, which could affect their<br />
daughter both physically and emotionally for the rest <strong>of</strong> her life.<br />
This bill addresses the best interest <strong>of</strong> minors. In New York, over 83% <strong>of</strong> abortions occur in outpatient clinics; therefore,<br />
a girl is unlikely to have the benefit <strong>of</strong> conferring with a trusted family physician about her decision. Mandating parental<br />
consent <strong>of</strong> a minor’s decision to have an abortion will help to ensure that the minor is speaking to those who know her<br />
best about her medical history, the risks <strong>of</strong> abortion, and available alternatives.<br />
There are also a myriad <strong>of</strong> side effects from abortions including but not limited to PTSD, cancer, heart disease, urine<br />
hemorrhage, uterine perforation, or inflammation. This bill will help make sure the girl receives any necessary treatment<br />
or medical attention following the procedure. In order to protect any pregnant girls considering abortion, New York must<br />
join the 22 other states and require parental permission for a minor to have an abortion. Where parental consent for<br />
abortions has been put into effect, the results have been significant and extremely beneficial to the state and citizens.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
There are no fiscal implications for this bill.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill will go into effect exactly one year after its passage.<br />
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER S - 20<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Kaliel Williamson, Thomasina Nguyen, Jah'male Dickson, & Kiersten Gordon<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Regulate in-store tobacco advertisement<br />
The people <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
To prevent New York State minors from exposure to tobacco advertisements that may convince them to use said<br />
substance, even though it is only legal for adult use.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1<br />
"Material" means anything tangible which is capable <strong>of</strong> being used or adapted to arouse interest, whether through the<br />
medium <strong>of</strong> reading, observation, sound or in any other manner, or the display.<br />
“Class B Misdemeanor” means any misdemeanor that is punishable by imprisonment <strong>of</strong> up to six months.<br />
“ATUPA” means adolescent tobacco use prevention act - which says that stores cannot sell tobacco products to minors. If<br />
violated, fines and/or licence suspension is implemented depending on the number <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences.<br />
Section 2<br />
Tobacco materials are to be kept out <strong>of</strong> sight in stores that are open to minors. Tobacco materials may be kept under<br />
counters, in closed cabinets, or other areas out <strong>of</strong> sight to customers unless the customer demonstrates pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> legal age.<br />
A person or establishment is guilty <strong>of</strong> illegally advertising tobacco products to minors when the material is located in<br />
plain view inside, outside, and on the property <strong>of</strong> the store. Punishment for unlawful tobacco advertising corresponds with<br />
the punishment outlined in the Adolescent Tobacco Use Prevention Act (ATUPA) - Public Health Law Article 13-F.<br />
Justification<br />
Youth who shop in stores filled with tobacco advertisements are twice as likely to start smoking. Tobacco advertisements<br />
are more influential on adolescent smoking behavior than peer pressure. In a survey <strong>of</strong> Albany county minors, most agree<br />
that less teens would smoke without tobacco advertisements. Studies show that minors are influenced by tobacco<br />
advertisements more than adults. Studies show that adults who already use tobacco are barely influenced by the<br />
advertisements. On average, people who begin smoking do so before the age <strong>of</strong> 18.<br />
Tobacco companies may still communicate with adults and retailers may inform customers that cigarettes are for sale.<br />
Places that have criminalized in-store tobacco advertisement have seen decline in youth tobacco use, and local business<br />
have not experienced any significant impact.<br />
There are highly negative social implications for a large smoking population.<br />
(a) Smoking overall kills 25,500 people every year in New York State.<br />
(b) Secondhand smoke kills 2,500 New Yorkers every year.<br />
(c) There are an estimated 570,000 New Yorkers afflicted with serious disease directly attributable to their smoking.<br />
A state average <strong>of</strong> 14.8% <strong>of</strong> teenagers use tobacco products. Cigarettes are the only legal substance that is harmful when<br />
used properly or in any amount. The World Health Organization supports a ban on tobacco product displays. Minors are<br />
not legally permitted to smoke, so they should not be influenced to.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
The New York State government budget will not be altered. New York State small business owners will largely be<br />
unaffected as seen in countries that already apply this law (Canada, Thailand, Iceland)<br />
More than $8.1 billion is spent treating illnesses caused by smoking. In 2010, smoking caused $6.5 billion in lost wages<br />
and productivity. This law may eventually <strong>of</strong>fset the negative implications <strong>of</strong> a large smoking population.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This law will be enacted January 1st, 2013.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AL - 01<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Michael Andersen and Marisa Parrotta<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: amend Education Law §313 in order to eliminate racial bias towards the admittance <strong>of</strong> students into state colleges.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
Section 1<br />
1. State College - Any college in the state <strong>of</strong> New York baring the label <strong>of</strong> “SUNY” and any community college in the<br />
state <strong>of</strong> New York.<br />
Section 2<br />
We plan to amend this law in order to eliminate the current racial/ethnic bias we believe is being enacted on students who<br />
apply to state colleges.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
3. (f) The requirements <strong>of</strong> this section shall not apply to an students applying to a state run college in that race/ethnicity<br />
can no longer be listed or written on an application to a New York State funded college.<br />
Justification<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this initiative is to eliminate bias in the admission to the State University <strong>of</strong> New York collegiate system,<br />
giving fair opportunities to equally qualified students, regardless <strong>of</strong> race, ethnicity, or heritage.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
This would have little to no fiscal implications because most applications are online, and those that aren’t can simply be<br />
printed for the new year excluding the race/ethnicity sections.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill would go into affect upon its passage.<br />
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AL - 08<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Kelci Henn, Zoey Gliksman<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Amend §3-0313<strong>of</strong> the Environmental Conservation law by adding sub-section 8 to illegalize Hydraulic Fracturing<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to illegalize the process <strong>of</strong> hydraulic fracturing in the state <strong>of</strong> New York.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1: Definitions<br />
A. Hydraulic Fracturing – a process in which fractures within rock layers below the earth’s surface are opened<br />
and widened by injecting chemicals and liquids at high pressure: used especially to extract natural gas or oil.<br />
B. E.P.A. –The Environmental Protection Agency, established by the United States government to coordinate<br />
federal programs aimed at combating pollution and protecting the environment.<br />
C. Natural Gas – a combustible mixture <strong>of</strong> gaseous hydro carbons (HC) beneath the earth’s surface used for<br />
energy.<br />
D. Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC’s) - compounds emitted as gases from certain solids or liquids. They<br />
include a variety <strong>of</strong> chemicals, some <strong>of</strong> which may have short and long-term adverse health effects.<br />
Justification<br />
In 2010 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimated that 70 to 140 billion gallons <strong>of</strong> water are used to fracture<br />
35,000 wells in the United States each year. The extraction <strong>of</strong> so much water for fracking has raised concerns about the<br />
ecological impacts to aquatic resources, as well as dewatering or drinking water aquifers. In addition to large volumes <strong>of</strong><br />
water being wasted, there is a variety <strong>of</strong> chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing fluids which are proven to be toxic to<br />
humans and wildlife only further polluting the environment. Negative medical effects such as cancer, respiratory<br />
infection, nervous paralysis, and other respiratory or digestive complications are directly linked to the leftover chemicals<br />
from the highly flammable and toxic gas that is amidst within the drinking water and atmosphere <strong>of</strong> many residents due to<br />
this dangerous drilling process.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
There are no fiscal implications for this legislation.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill will go into effect immediately after its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AL - 11<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Rocco Graziano<br />
AN ACT:<br />
TO: Cap Port Authority fare hikes on bridges and tunnels<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose:<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to limit the extent <strong>of</strong> Port Authority fare increase, and ultimately to save New Yorkers<br />
money.<br />
Justification<br />
New Yorkers work hard for their money. A state employed worker makes around $33,000 a year. If someone<br />
pays cash on Port authority tolls, they are paying roughly $3,120 a year. This is because there are, on average, 260<br />
working days in a year, and the cash tolls is $12.00. If you use an EZ-Pass, you will pay $2,470 a year. To get more<br />
money, the avaricious Port Authority is trying to raise fares 4% <strong>of</strong> the next 4 years. New Yorkers can't afford to pay<br />
these prices. 10% <strong>of</strong> an average state employed worker's annual pay goes just to the Port Authority. In the past, people<br />
have not stood idly by while they had to pay large sums <strong>of</strong> money. Also, the unemployment rate in New York State was,<br />
according to good reports, 7.9% in October 2011. This bill would allow the unemployed save money. The fares hinder the<br />
unemployed from searching for jobs because they don’t have the money to pay the tolls. Also, the money they use on tolls<br />
could go towards basic living necessities such as, food, car payments, or their mortgage. A private audit will ensure that<br />
the income <strong>of</strong> the Port Authority is put to good and legal uses.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1<br />
Fare- the price <strong>of</strong> conveyance or passage in a bus, train, airplane, or other vehicle<br />
Cap- to put a maximum limit on<br />
Section 2<br />
Our bill will cap Port Authority fares on bridges and tunnels. It will limit the Port Authority to raising fares only 50 cents<br />
every four years. This bill would impose a yearly private audit <strong>of</strong> Port Authority expenses and income.<br />
Section 3<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to limit the extent <strong>of</strong> Port Authority fare increases, and ultimately to save New Yorkers money.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
This bill will have a positive impact on New York residents. It will save them thousands <strong>of</strong> dollars in money that<br />
they would have to pay in tolls. The state would be gaining money too. This bill does allow for tolls to increase, just not<br />
too much.<br />
Effective Date -This bill will go into effect immediately upon its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AL - 13<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Angela D’Angelo, Kelsey Barnett, Kwasi Enin, Matthew Carroll<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Amend Section 1612, by adding subsection 6 to the New York State tax law to increase and cap the percentage <strong>of</strong><br />
money from the New York State lottery dedicated to education.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to increase and cap the amount <strong>of</strong> money given to New York State education out <strong>of</strong> the New<br />
York State lottery funds. The lottery originally started out as taxes going towards community construction and aid. It was<br />
made governmental by New York State so the majority <strong>of</strong> lottery funding could go into education.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1: Definitions<br />
Administrative costs: An expense incurred in controlling and directing and directing an organization, but not directly<br />
identifiable with financing, marketing, or production operations. Administrative costs are related to the organization as a<br />
whole as opposed to expenses related to individual departments.<br />
Constitutional: Of or pertaining to the constitution <strong>of</strong> a state, organization, etc.<br />
Section 2:<br />
f. As consideration for the operation <strong>of</strong> the video lottery gaming facility at Aqueduct racetrack, the division shall<br />
cause the investment in the racing industry <strong>of</strong> the following percentages <strong>of</strong> the vendor fee to be deposited or paid, as<br />
follows:<br />
1. Six and one-half percent <strong>of</strong> the total wagered after payout <strong>of</strong> prizes for the first year <strong>of</strong> operation <strong>of</strong> video<br />
lottery gaming at Aqueduct racetrack, seven percent <strong>of</strong> the total wagered after payout <strong>of</strong> prizes for the second year <strong>of</strong><br />
operation, and seven and one-half percent <strong>of</strong> the total wagered after payout <strong>of</strong> prizes for the third year <strong>of</strong> operation<br />
and thereafter, for the purpose <strong>of</strong> enhancing purses at Aqueduct racetrack, Belmont Park racetrack and Saratoga race<br />
course.<br />
2. One percent <strong>of</strong> the total wagered after payout <strong>of</strong> prizes for the first year <strong>of</strong> operation <strong>of</strong> video lottery gaming at<br />
Aqueduct racetrack, one and one-quarter percent <strong>of</strong> the total wagered after payout <strong>of</strong> prizes for the second year <strong>of</strong><br />
operation, and one and one-half percent <strong>of</strong> the total wagered after payout <strong>of</strong> prizes for the third year <strong>of</strong> operation and<br />
thereafter, for an appropriate breeding fund for the manner <strong>of</strong> racing conducted at Aqueduct racetrack, Belmont Park<br />
racetrack and Saratoga race course.<br />
3. Four percent <strong>of</strong> the total revenue wagered after payout <strong>of</strong> prizes to be deposited into an account <strong>of</strong> the franchised<br />
corporation established pursuant to section two hundred six <strong>of</strong> the racing, pari-mutuel wagering and breeding law to be<br />
used for capital expenditures in maintaining and upgrading Aqueduct racetrack, Belmont Park racetrack and Saratoga<br />
race course.<br />
4. Three percent <strong>of</strong> the total revenue wagered after payout for prizes to be deposited into an account <strong>of</strong> the<br />
franchised corporation established pursuant to section two hundred six <strong>of</strong> the racing, pari-mutuel wagering and<br />
breeding law to be used for general thoroughbred racing operations at Aqueduct racetrack, Belmont Park<br />
racetrack and Saratoga race course<br />
5. Paragraphs one, two, three and four <strong>of</strong> this subdivision shall be known collectively as the "racing support<br />
payments".<br />
g. In the event the state elects to construct a video lottery terminal facility at the Aqueduct racetrack, all video lottery<br />
terminal revenues payable to the video lottery gaming operator at the Aqueduct racetrack remaining after payment <strong>of</strong><br />
the racing support payments shall first be used to repay the state's advances for (i) confirmation <strong>of</strong> the chapter eleven<br />
plan <strong>of</strong> reorganization and cash advances for the franchised corporation's operations following confirmation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
chapter eleven plan <strong>of</strong> reorganization and (ii) the amount expended by the state to construct such video lottery<br />
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terminal facility at Aqueduct racetrack pursuant to an agreement with the state. Subparagraphs (i) and (ii) <strong>of</strong> this<br />
paragraph shall be defined as the state advance amount and the<br />
amounts payable to the division <strong>of</strong> the lottery.<br />
6. The prize money for all lottery drawings shall be reduced from 51% to 40%, and Administrative costs are to be reduced<br />
from 3% to 2%. Education aid will be increased from 38% to 50% from all drawings. This will capped and mandated.<br />
Justification<br />
The lottery proceedings go by prize money (51%), aid to education (38%), retailer commissions (6%), contractor fees<br />
(2%) and administrative costs (3%). Today, more money is going to the government out <strong>of</strong> lottery than promised to go<br />
into education and the percentage <strong>of</strong> the money that was to go to education has decreased over time. As originally<br />
promised when the lottery was made governmental, the education percentage will be the highest coming out <strong>of</strong> lottery<br />
fund drawings and this bill will put into effect the original intentional and ensure that it remains that way.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
All funding comes directly out <strong>of</strong> the New York State lottery.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill will go into effect one year upon its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AL - 16<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Adam Henn, Nicholas Telano, Adam Zarcone, Amanda Reiffert<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Amend § 3609-E by Adding Subsection 5 to the New York State Education Law to Maintain Educational Funding<br />
at the 2010-11 Level for Each School District in the State.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
To ensure future educational prosperity by instituting that programs and funding that a district already holds cannot be<br />
further taken away due to state budget cuts year after year.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section1: Definitions:<br />
A) Fiscal Year – a period used for calculating annual financial statements for business, corporations, and other<br />
organizations. The New York fiscal year begins on April 1st and ends on March 31 st<br />
B) Fiscal Budget - An itemized summary <strong>of</strong> estimated or intended spending for a given period along with<br />
proposals for financing them.<br />
C) State Aid - Public money appropriated by a state government for the support or improvement <strong>of</strong> a public<br />
local institution<br />
Section 2: Provisions:<br />
§ 3609-E. School tax relief aid, when and how payable commencing July1, 1998. Notwithstanding any other<br />
provisions <strong>of</strong> this article, school tax relief aid shall be paid pursuant to this section.<br />
5. Any payment to a school district through state aid or government funding shall be given back, continuously held and<br />
maintained for the remainder <strong>of</strong> every school year without any cuts or withholdings <strong>of</strong> this money from any<br />
governmental institution at any time.<br />
a. The funding and state aid shall comprise <strong>of</strong> the school districts particular needs addressed for in that school<br />
district’s 2010-2011budget plan and shall never be altered by deductions from cuts.<br />
b. Educational funding shall never decrease from cuts and must be remained untouched by the state government based<br />
on the 2010-11 funding level but can be increased based <strong>of</strong>f <strong>of</strong> advancements <strong>of</strong> the curriculums and extracurricular<br />
activities within the district based on the allotted expenditures.<br />
Justification<br />
Before the extremely drastic education budget cuts around the state from the governor’s 2011 initial executive budget plan,<br />
school districts were plentiful with beneficial school activities, curriculums, and faculty. Any cuts towards NYS education will<br />
never be able to take place, and funding can only be added depending on the needs <strong>of</strong> the school district for that year, only<br />
resulting in educational success and maintained expenditures. Also, finding a job within this economy is extremely difficult,<br />
so faculty jobs and teacher positions will be kept and maintained rather than laid <strong>of</strong>f as we have seen in this past year, which<br />
only added to the unemployment. With this legislation we can ensure that proper learning, expenditures, and jobs are<br />
rightfully given back and maintained at the successful 2010-2011 level to the future students and teachers <strong>of</strong> the state, thus<br />
providing a well earned education that New York students rightfully deserve.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
Any fiscal cuts that take place towards education at any money value shall be based <strong>of</strong>f <strong>of</strong> what the previous year’s state aid<br />
statistics were for that district. Therefore, this legislation shall be enacted in accordance to every school district’s necessary<br />
funding, proportional to the 2010-2011 funding level data. Also, the funding shall adjust to the inflation rate at whatever time<br />
this legislation is enacted, therefore constantly positively changing according to the status <strong>of</strong> the state’s economy.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This legislation shall go into effect one year after its passage.<br />
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AL - 20<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Christopher Cicerelli, Michael Gross and Jack Franzino<br />
AN ACT<br />
To: RESOLUTION: Members <strong>of</strong> the assembly urge the state Senate in joining them to amend the New York State<br />
Constitution to legalize casino gambling.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
To amend Article I, section 9, <strong>of</strong> the New York State Constitution to legalize casino gambling.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Whereas, Article I, section 9 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Constitution allows for games <strong>of</strong> chance to be permitted to only bona<br />
fide religious, charitable or non-pr<strong>of</strong>it organizations for veterans, volunteer firefighter and similar non-pr<strong>of</strong>it organizations,<br />
Whereas, the Constitution further states that the legislature shall pass laws that ensure such games are rigidly regulated to<br />
prevent commercialized gambling,<br />
Whereas, the need <strong>of</strong> New York State to fund additional revenue to address its current deficit <strong>of</strong> over two (2) billion<br />
dollars,<br />
Whereas, the need to create jobs throughout the state is <strong>of</strong> permanent concern given the current unemployment state in the<br />
state,<br />
Whereas, this resolution will allow for the creation <strong>of</strong> five (5) casinos in the first year after public referendum, and for a<br />
maximum <strong>of</strong> ten (10) additional casinos over the next five (5) years, which will be spread throughout the geographical<br />
regions <strong>of</strong> the state,<br />
Resolved, that the assembly and Senate <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, jointly, that the Legislature <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York<br />
urges the passage <strong>of</strong> this resolution amending the Constitution <strong>of</strong> the State subject to a mandating public referendum,<br />
Resolved, that the Chief Clerk <strong>of</strong> the Assembly transmits copies <strong>of</strong> this resolution to the Speaker <strong>of</strong> the Assembly and the<br />
President Pro-Tempore and to each member <strong>of</strong> the New York State Legislature.<br />
The New York State Constitution is amended to legalize casino gambling throughout the state. In the first year after the<br />
passage <strong>of</strong> this amendment five (5) casinos will be licensed. There shall be a maximum <strong>of</strong> ten (10) casinos licensed over a<br />
five (5) year period.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill shall go into effect exactly one year after its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AL - 26<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Chelsea Smart, Ashley Enright, Francine Gangone, Spela Sulga<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: create a database in which incidents <strong>of</strong> bullying are mandated to be recorded, and to establish a plan to terminate the<br />
problem <strong>of</strong> bullying.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
This piece <strong>of</strong> legislation will establish a database, in which, school <strong>of</strong>ficials will be mandated to record reported incidents<br />
<strong>of</strong> bullying involving students within their school districts. Each case will be defined based on the levels <strong>of</strong> frequency and<br />
severity <strong>of</strong> the behavior provided. Then, bullies involved in the incident will be required to attend sessions with a school<br />
social worker to provide bullies with the help they need to terminate the behavior.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1: Definitions<br />
Level I Bullying: A first time <strong>of</strong>fender who intentionally harasses another by following them, engaging in a course <strong>of</strong><br />
conduct, or by committing acts which places a person in reasonable fear <strong>of</strong> physical or mental harm. This must be<br />
reported incident within the New York State school districts only.<br />
Level II Bullying: A bully who has been found bullying more than one time, by intentionally harassing another by<br />
following them, engaging in a course <strong>of</strong> conduct, or by committing acts which places a person in reasonable fear <strong>of</strong><br />
physical or mental harm. This can be in person bullying reported by a school <strong>of</strong>ficial into the database, cyber bullying<br />
reported by police into the database, or a combination there<strong>of</strong>.<br />
Level III Bullying: A child who has been reported for bullying more than once and more severe, causing the victim<br />
serious mental or physical injury. The bully must intentionally harass another by following them, engaging in a course <strong>of</strong><br />
conduct, or by committing acts which places a person in reasonable fear <strong>of</strong> physical or mental injury. This can be in<br />
person bullying reported by a school <strong>of</strong>ficial into the database, cyber bullying reported by police into the database, or a<br />
combination there<strong>of</strong>.<br />
School Official: For purposes <strong>of</strong> this bill, a school <strong>of</strong>ficial is defined as a staff member with disciplinary responsibilities<br />
such as, a principle, assistant principle or dean within New York State school districts.<br />
Cyber Bulling: Intentionally harassing a person by following them, or by committing acts which places a person in<br />
reasonable fear <strong>of</strong> physical or mental harm through technology.<br />
Section 2: Provisions<br />
(1) All New York State schools are required to form a database in which they are mandated to record reported incidents<br />
<strong>of</strong> bullying. Incident reports must include names <strong>of</strong> those involved in the situation, objective facts on what occurred, a<br />
rationally based conclusion on why the incident happened and the situation’s effect on the victim. This information’s<br />
access will be limited to school <strong>of</strong>ficials within the district only.<br />
(2) Police are mandated to report incident <strong>of</strong> cyber bullying into the student’s school district’s database.<br />
(3) The school district can view what police enter about students within their school districts only, but the police do not<br />
have access what the school has entered. A minor’s record shall be terminated upon their graduation from the school<br />
district.<br />
(4) All New York State schools are required to define the level <strong>of</strong> bullying, based on the provided definitions, and follow<br />
an action plan to provide a permanent solution to the problem. The plans <strong>of</strong> action are as follows: a bullying defined<br />
under Level I is required to attend three mandatory thirty minute secessions with a school social worker, already<br />
mandated by law, over a thirty day period <strong>of</strong> time: Level II <strong>of</strong>fenders are required to attend six mandatory thirty minute<br />
secessions with a school social worker over a sixty day period; and Level III bullies are required to attend nine thirty<br />
minute secessions with a school social worker over ninety days.<br />
(5) If a student refuses to go to the social worker sessions to correct the bullying behavior problem, the school has the<br />
discretion to take disciplinary actions to follow. The State mandates the minimal action is an extra social worker session.<br />
Justifications<br />
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Bullying and Cyber Bullying is a rapidly increasing problem in New York State. Though legislation has been passed to<br />
protect children from this violent epidemic, it has largely been unsuccessful because efforts solely attempt to help the<br />
victim. This bill will target bullying at the roots <strong>of</strong> the problem: the bully. Instead <strong>of</strong> schools simply punishing the bully<br />
through means such as suspension, this bill ensures that the perpetrator receives the help that they need to terminate their<br />
behavior. Thus, this bill shall end the cycle <strong>of</strong> bullying and provide a permanent solution to the victim and to the bully.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
Considering New York State already mandates social workers are employed in every school district based upon<br />
population, and the State mandates police <strong>of</strong>ficers report cyber bullying cases (this bill will only mandate the specific<br />
database it is entered into) it will not burden the state with any further fiscal implications.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This piece <strong>of</strong> legislation will go into effect six months after its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AL - 27<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Kayleigh Martin, Joseph Cervone, Christy Zegel<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Amend section 30.10 subsections (b) and (e) <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Procedure Law to increase the statute <strong>of</strong> limitations for<br />
rape and sexual conduct in the second and third degrees.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose:<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to increase the statute <strong>of</strong> limitations for rape from five years to seven years.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section I: Definitions<br />
Sexual Contact: the unlawful intentional touching <strong>of</strong> intimate parts for the purpose <strong>of</strong> degrading or humiliating the victim<br />
or sexually gratifying the actor.<br />
Sexual Conduct: means sexual intercourse, deviate sexual<br />
intercourse, aggravated sexual contact, or sexual contact.<br />
Section II: 30.10 Timeliness <strong>of</strong> prosecutions; periods <strong>of</strong> limitation.<br />
1. A criminal action must be commenced within the period <strong>of</strong> limitation prescribed in the ensuing subdivisions <strong>of</strong> this<br />
section.<br />
2. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three:<br />
(a) A prosecution for a class A felony, or rape in the first degree as defined in section 130.35 <strong>of</strong> the penal law, or a<br />
crime defined or formerly defined in section 130.50 <strong>of</strong> the penal law, or aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree<br />
as defined in section 130.70 <strong>of</strong> the penal law, or course <strong>of</strong> sexual conduct against a child in the first degree as defined<br />
in section 130.75 <strong>of</strong> the penal law may be commenced at any time;<br />
(b) A prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within five seven years after the commission there<strong>of</strong>;<br />
(c) A prosecution for a misdemeanor must be commenced within two years after the commission there<strong>of</strong>;<br />
(d) A prosecution for a petty <strong>of</strong>fense must be commenced within one year after the commission there<strong>of</strong>.<br />
3. Notwithstanding the provisions <strong>of</strong> subdivision two, the periods <strong>of</strong> limitation for the commencement <strong>of</strong> criminal<br />
actions are extended as follows in the indicated circumstances:<br />
(a) A prosecution for larceny committed by a person in violation <strong>of</strong> a fiduciary duty may be commenced within one<br />
year after the facts constituting such <strong>of</strong>fense are discovered or, in the exercise <strong>of</strong> reasonable diligence, should<br />
have been discovered by the aggrieved party or by a person under a legal duty to represent him who is not himself<br />
implicated in the commission <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fense.<br />
(b) A prosecution for any <strong>of</strong>fense involving misconduct in public <strong>of</strong>fice by a public servant may be commenced at<br />
any time during the defendant's service in such <strong>of</strong>fice or within five years after the termination <strong>of</strong> such service;<br />
provided however, that in no event shall the period <strong>of</strong> limitation be extended by more than five years beyond the period<br />
otherwise applicable under subdivision two.<br />
(c) A prosecution for any crime set forth in title twenty-seven or article seventy-one <strong>of</strong> the environmental<br />
conservation law may be commenced within four years after the facts constituting such crime are discovered or, in the<br />
exercise <strong>of</strong> reasonable diligence, should have been discovered by a public servant who has the responsibility to enforce<br />
the provisions <strong>of</strong> said title and article.<br />
(d) A prosecution for any misdemeanor set forth in the tax law or chapter forty-six <strong>of</strong> the administrative code <strong>of</strong> the<br />
city <strong>of</strong> New York must be commenced within three years after the commission there<strong>of</strong>.<br />
(e) A prosecution for course <strong>of</strong> sexual conduct against a child in the second degree as defined in section 130.80 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
penal law may be commenced within five seven years <strong>of</strong> the commission <strong>of</strong> the most recent act <strong>of</strong> sexual conduct.<br />
(f) For purposes <strong>of</strong> a prosecution involving a sexual <strong>of</strong>fense as defined in article one hundred thirty <strong>of</strong> the penal<br />
law, other than a sexual <strong>of</strong>fense delineated in paragraph (a) <strong>of</strong> subdivision two <strong>of</strong> this section, committed against a<br />
child less than eighteen years <strong>of</strong> age, incest in the first, second or third degree as defined in sections 255.27, 255.26<br />
and 255.25 <strong>of</strong> the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years <strong>of</strong> age, or use <strong>of</strong> a child in a sexual<br />
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performance as defined in section 263.05 <strong>of</strong> the penal law, the period <strong>of</strong> limitation shall not begin to run until the child<br />
has reached the age <strong>of</strong> eighteen or the <strong>of</strong>fense is reported to a law enforcement agency or statewide central register <strong>of</strong><br />
child abuse and maltreatment, whichever occurs earlier.<br />
(g) A prosecution for any felony defined in article four hundred ninety <strong>of</strong> the penal law must be commenced within<br />
eight years after the commission there<strong>of</strong> provided, however, that in a prosecution for a felony defined in article four<br />
hundred ninety <strong>of</strong> the penal law, if the commission <strong>of</strong> such felony <strong>of</strong>fense resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk <strong>of</strong>,<br />
death or serious physical injury to another person, the<br />
prosecution may be commenced at any time; provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to<br />
shorten or otherwise lessen the period, defined in any other applicable law, in which a prosecution for a felony<br />
designated in this paragraph may be commenced<br />
Justification<br />
In 2007, there were 248,300 victims <strong>of</strong> rape, attempted rape, or sexual assault. This does not include victims under the age<br />
<strong>of</strong> 12. In 2010, there were 2,771 rapes reported in New York State. Sixty percent <strong>of</strong> rapes or acts <strong>of</strong> sexual assault go<br />
unreported. Someone is sexually assaulted every two and a half minutes in the United States. By passing this amendment,<br />
we can extend the amount <strong>of</strong> time allowed to prosecute a rape or sexual assault, thus putting more pedophiles behind bars<br />
and getting justice for the victims.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
There are no fiscal implications in the foreseeable future.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill will go into effect one year after its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AL - 31<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Donavan Swanson Precious Asiedu<br />
AN ACT:<br />
TO: Restrict the amount <strong>of</strong> time an individual or family can live within public housing.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to improve New York City’s communities containing public housing. Public housing<br />
has increased social and criminal activity causing the state more money and has supported generations <strong>of</strong> non-working to<br />
low incoming families forming an unhealthy dependency on the state.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1<br />
Public Housing: affordable housing provided and regulated by the public based on income and needs<br />
(elderly, disabled, etc.)<br />
HUD: Department <strong>of</strong> Housing and Urban Development.<br />
Section 2<br />
This bill will essentially place a time limit on each current and entering family in the NYSHA system.<br />
This time limit would be created by HUD to help regulate and create an appropriate scale <strong>of</strong> for the amount within the<br />
family and the amount <strong>of</strong> time they are able to stay. Any elderly or disabled persons or not included within this new<br />
change. If a person exceeds their time limit they may apply again for public housing but may be required to prove<br />
financial stability and a course for other housing goals.<br />
Justification<br />
Although public housing has provided low income families with an opportunity for shelter and support<br />
it has formed an unhealthy dependency on residents and provided a cesspool for criminal activity and wasted tax dollars.<br />
According to the New York State Housing Bureau Comspstat, from 2009 to 2010 a 2.3% increase was found in crime<br />
within Public Housing along all five boroughs <strong>of</strong> New York City. These crimes include murder, rape, robbery, felony<br />
assault, burglary, grand larceny and grand larceny auto; the total for 2010 being 4,183. Not only is this number<br />
unacceptable for public housing grounds, but a reflection on the number <strong>of</strong> criminals entering the system alone from<br />
crimes committed in Public Housing. Criminal Activity in these houses is a response to generations <strong>of</strong> the same families<br />
living there breeding the same laid back, financially secure attitude. By pressuring families to exceed beyond the<br />
minimum expectation and incorporate themselves into reliable, independent citizens <strong>of</strong> New York State. In 2008 NYCHA<br />
held over 403,000 residents living in 178,000 apartments, home to 5 percent <strong>of</strong> New York City’s population with a budget<br />
<strong>of</strong> $2.8 billion dollars. That $2.8 billion dollars is a sum <strong>of</strong> states taxes that all residents <strong>of</strong> NYS contributed to and the<br />
federal government. It is time for a change.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
If this bill passes, Revenue sources such as government financial programs will receive money back from the<br />
very same people they once provided shelter for, these people will now be able to pay taxes and make a living for<br />
themselves. Depending on the age group and the number <strong>of</strong> family members there are, that can determine how much<br />
money the family will save. Saving money is important because they will be able to provide proper food, clothing,<br />
education, etc. for themselves and/or their children (if any). This bill not only helps the lives <strong>of</strong> New York state residents,<br />
however, it also helping the state’s budget. There is a possibility <strong>of</strong> more taxes entering the state’s budget, but the system<br />
will still continue, just not everyone will remain in the system to get government assisted help.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill would go into effect starting January 2014.<br />
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AF - 07<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Tyler Nappo, Daniel McDowell, and Jolien VanNieuwenhuizen<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Allow registered independents to vote in primary elections.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to allow independents to vote in primary elections, which will create a more balanced election<br />
and will make candidates less partisan.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1: Definitions<br />
State Primary-A preliminary election in which presidential candidates are chosen by their political party.<br />
Independent-A voter with no major political party affiliation.<br />
Open Election-A primary election where independents are allowed to vote.<br />
Section 2: Provisions<br />
Enrolled members <strong>of</strong> a party, or registered independents entitled to vote in the nomination <strong>of</strong> a candidate for public <strong>of</strong>fice<br />
or the election <strong>of</strong> such party, and equal in number to at least the number <strong>of</strong> signers required to designate a candidate for<br />
such <strong>of</strong>fice or position may file with the <strong>of</strong>ficer or board with whom or which are filed designating petitions for such<br />
<strong>of</strong>fice or position a petition requesting an opportunity to write in the name <strong>of</strong> a candidate or candidates, who need not be<br />
specified, for such <strong>of</strong>fice or position. Upon the receipt <strong>of</strong> such petition, such <strong>of</strong>fice or position shall be deemed contested<br />
and the primary ballots <strong>of</strong> the party shall afford an opportunity to vote thereon. Requests for an opportunity to write in the<br />
names <strong>of</strong> candidates for two or more <strong>of</strong>fices or positions may be included in the same petition. Such petitions shall be<br />
subject to objections and court determination there<strong>of</strong> in the same manner as designating petitions so far as the provisions<br />
therefor are applicable. All required notices shall be served on the members <strong>of</strong> the committee named in the petition. A<br />
signature to a petition for an opportunity to ballot in primary elections made earlier than sixteen days before the last day<br />
to file designating petitions for the primary election shall not be counted.<br />
Justifications<br />
Forty percent <strong>of</strong> Americans are registered independents. As <strong>of</strong> now, in 18 states, including New York, these citizens are<br />
deprived the right to vote in primary elections. Because <strong>of</strong> this, candidates tend to be more partisan, which doesn’t allow<br />
them to address problems that affect all Americans. While presidential candidates are more partisan during primaries, the<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten switch to more moderate views for the national election. This can mislead the voters, and give candidates<br />
inconsistent beliefs, which can be dangerous. In our democratic society, all Americans should exercise their right to vote.<br />
32 states allow open primaries, and New York should follow.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
There are no fiscal implications.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill will go into effect exactly one year after its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AF- 08<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Morgan Knudtsen Amber Pike, and<br />
Christopher Rodriguez<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Amend Section 490.60 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Penal Law to establish the crime <strong>of</strong> terrorist recruitment a Class C<br />
felony<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
To establish the crime <strong>of</strong> terrorist recruitment defined as intentionally soliciting another to engage in acts <strong>of</strong> terrorism, as<br />
a class C felony.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section One: Definitions:<br />
Class C Felony- A felony whose penalty is a fine <strong>of</strong> up to $100,000, or imprisonment <strong>of</strong> up to 40 years, or both; however,<br />
for a repeat <strong>of</strong>fender, the term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment may increase up to 2 years with prior misdemeanor convictions, and up to<br />
6 years with a prior felony conviction.<br />
Domestic or International Terrorism: The unlawful use <strong>of</strong> force or violence, committed by a group(s) <strong>of</strong> two or more<br />
individuals, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment<br />
there<strong>of</strong>, in furtherance <strong>of</strong> political or social objectives.<br />
Section Two: Provisions<br />
The Penal Law is amended by adding a new section to 490.60 to read as follows:<br />
A person is guilty <strong>of</strong> terrorism recruitment when, with the intent that another person engages in conduct, constituting any<br />
crime set forth in this article, he or she recruits, solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause<br />
such other person to engage in terrorist conduct. Terrorism recruitment is a Class C felony.<br />
Justification<br />
Terrorist organizations and their membership are in perpetual search to recruit new members. Terrorists seek to entice the<br />
disenfranchised and gain members to carry out their criminal acts. The active recruitment for terrorist acts is a growing<br />
trend which requires an immediate response. As law enforcement actively seeks to unearth these groups and defeat their<br />
heinous schemes, we have a responsibility to hold accountable those who solicit or recruit individuals or groups for<br />
terrorism. This bill seeks to effectively deter terrorist recruitment and punish those who seek to employ others for their<br />
criminal plans.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
Any fiscal implications would include the payment <strong>of</strong> law enforcement employees as well as the trial and jailing <strong>of</strong> all<br />
accused and convicted parties.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This legislation will go into effect exactly one year after its passage<br />
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AF - 17<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Robert Vecchio and Devin Imperatore<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Amend section 3-C <strong>of</strong> the General Municipal Law.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to revoke the 2% property tax cap and replace it with a 2% spending cap for each school district<br />
in New York State, in order to help school districts financially and decrease the New York State debt.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1 – Definitions:<br />
S<strong>of</strong>t cap: a cap with flexibility.<br />
Hard cap: a cap with little to no flexibility.<br />
"Tax levy limit" means the amount <strong>of</strong> taxes authorized to be levied by or on behalf <strong>of</strong> a local government pursuant<br />
to this section, provided, however, that the tax levy limit shall not include the following:<br />
Section 2 –<br />
This bill is repealing the 2% property tax cap and replacing it with a hard 2% spending cap. §3-c. Limit upon real<br />
property tax levies by local governments. 1. Unless otherwise provided by law, the amount <strong>of</strong> real property taxes that may<br />
be levied by or on behalf <strong>of</strong> any local government, other than the city <strong>of</strong> New York and the counties contained therein,<br />
shall not exceed the tax levy limit established pursuant to this section.<br />
2. When used in this section:<br />
(a) "Allowable levy growth factor" shall be the lesser <strong>of</strong>: (i) one and two one-hundredths; or (ii) the sum <strong>of</strong> one plus<br />
the inflation factor; provided, however, that in no case shall the levy growth factor be less<br />
than one.<br />
(b) "Available carryover" means the amount by which the tax levy for the prior fiscal year was below the tax levy<br />
limit for such fiscal year, if any, but no more than an amount that equals one and one-half percent<strong>of</strong> the tax levy limit for<br />
such fiscal year.<br />
(c) "Coming fiscal year" means the fiscal year <strong>of</strong> the local government for which a tax levy limit shall be<br />
determined pursuant to this section.<br />
(d) "Inflation factor" means the quotient <strong>of</strong>: (i) the average <strong>of</strong> the national consumer price indexes determined<br />
by the United States department <strong>of</strong> labor for the twelve-month period ending six months prior<br />
to the start <strong>of</strong> the coming fiscal year minus the average <strong>of</strong> the national consumer price indexes determined by the United<br />
States department <strong>of</strong> labor for the twelve-month period ending six months prior to the start <strong>of</strong> the prior fiscal year,<br />
divided by: (ii) the average <strong>of</strong> the national consumer price indexes determined by the United States department <strong>of</strong> labor<br />
for the twelve-month period ending six months prior to the start <strong>of</strong> the prior fiscal year, with the result expressed as a<br />
decimal to four places.<br />
(e) "Local government" means a county, city, town, village, fire district, or special district including but not<br />
limited to a district created pursuant to article twelve or twelve-A, or governed by article thirteen <strong>of</strong> the town law, or<br />
created pursuant to article five-A, five-B or five-D <strong>of</strong> the county law, chapter five hundred sixteen <strong>of</strong> the laws <strong>of</strong> nineteen<br />
hundred twenty-eight, or chapter two hundred seventy-three <strong>of</strong> the laws <strong>of</strong> nineteen hundred thirty-nine, and shall<br />
include town improvements provided pursuant to articles three-A and twelve-C <strong>of</strong> the town law but shall not include<br />
the city <strong>of</strong> New York or the counties contained therein.<br />
(f) "Prior fiscal year" means the fiscal year <strong>of</strong> the local government<br />
immediately preceding the coming fiscal year.<br />
(g) "Tax levy limit" means the amount <strong>of</strong> taxes authorized to be levied by or on behalf <strong>of</strong> a local government<br />
pursuant to this section, provided, however, that the tax levy limit shall not include the<br />
following:<br />
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(i) a tax levy necessary for expenditures resulting from court orders or judgments against the local government<br />
arising out <strong>of</strong> tort actions for any amount that exceeds five percent <strong>of</strong> the total tax levied in the<br />
prior fiscal year;<br />
(ii) in years in which the system average actuarial contribution rate <strong>of</strong> the New York state and local employees'<br />
retirement system, as defined by paragraph ten <strong>of</strong> subdivision a <strong>of</strong> section nineteen-a <strong>of</strong> the<br />
retirement and social security law, increases by more than two percentage points from the previous year, a tax<br />
levy necessary for expenditures for the coming fiscal year for local government employer ontributions to the New<br />
York state and local employees' retirement system caused by growth in the system average actuarial contribution rate<br />
minus two percentage points;<br />
(iii) in years in which the system average actuarial contribution rate <strong>of</strong> the New York state and local police and fire<br />
retirement system, as defined by paragraph eleven <strong>of</strong> subdivision a <strong>of</strong> section three hundred nineteen-a <strong>of</strong> the<br />
retirement and social security law, increases by more than two percentage points from the previous year, a tax levy<br />
necessary for expenditures for the coming fiscal year for local government employer contributions to the New York<br />
state and local police and fire retirement system caused by growth in the system average actuarial contribution rate<br />
minus two percentage points;<br />
(iv) in years in which the normal contribution rate <strong>of</strong> the New York state teachers' retirement system, as defined<br />
by paragraph a <strong>of</strong> subdivision two <strong>of</strong> section five hundred seventeen <strong>of</strong> the education law,<br />
increases by more than two percentage points from the previous year, a tax levy necessary for expenditures for the<br />
coming fiscal year for local government employer contributions to the New York state teachers'<br />
retirement system caused by growth in the normal contribution rate minus two percentage points.<br />
(h) "Tax” or “taxes” shall include (i) a charge imposed upon real property by or on behalf <strong>of</strong> a county, city, town,<br />
village or school district for municipal or school district purposes, and (ii) special ad valorem levies and special<br />
assessments as defined in subdivisions fourteen and fifteen <strong>of</strong> section one hundred two <strong>of</strong> the real property tax law.<br />
Justification<br />
A hard cap on how much more local municipalities and school districts can raise their spending compared to their prior<br />
fiscal year’s budget is 2%. This excludes the city <strong>of</strong> New York and counties contained within. The 2% property tax cap<br />
needs to be repealed due to the fact that it is discriminatory towards low property wealth districts. When schools with<br />
fewer students will get more money per student than larger populated schools it will <strong>of</strong>fer the student in the smaller<br />
school more opportunities and give them an unfair edge when applying for colleges. The 2% spending cap is needed to<br />
check the local municipalities and schools with spending more than they have, thus, attempting to limit the amount <strong>of</strong><br />
debt in New York State. Repealing the 2% property tax cap will even out the opportunities for students. For example,<br />
William Floyd will have to cut 6 million dollars if state aid remains the same. They would be forced to cut remaining<br />
sports clubs and programs. William Floyd students applying for college will be overlooked because their activities sheet<br />
will be almost empty, compared to a sachem student whose activities sheet will be very full. A 2% spending cap will<br />
allow school districts to keep remaining programs; therefore, equalizing the opportunity for New York students to go to<br />
college.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
When put into effect, this bill will limit the amount <strong>of</strong> debt in New York State by preventing the excess spending without<br />
cutting a revenue source in all municipalities.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill will go into effect one year after its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AF - 19<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Rebecca Bolan, Taylor Goodspeed, Rachel Bush, Mary LaBar, and Emily Marra<br />
AN ACT<br />
RESOLUTION TO: change the wording <strong>of</strong> the selective service law to mandate that both men and women have to sign<br />
up for the draft at age 18.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
To urge congress to include women in selective service registration to further equalize men and women’s rights.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1<br />
Selective Service- the law responsible for supplying U.S. armed forces with people in the event <strong>of</strong> a<br />
national emergency. It is an independent agency <strong>of</strong> the federal government's <strong>Executive</strong> Branch.<br />
Section 2<br />
Both men and women will be mandated to register for the draft within thirty days <strong>of</strong> their eighteenth<br />
birthday. If either fail or refuse to register, one could be sent to prison for up to 5 years and may be fined up to<br />
$250,000. In addition, one cannot qualify for federal student grants or loans for college, job training benefits and<br />
state and federal jobs.<br />
Justification<br />
Women should have the same rights as men are afforded. If women want equal rights and equal<br />
opportunities as men then they should have to adhere to the same rules and regulations. Women have proved<br />
themselves to be willing and able to serve in the military. Both women and men will have to take both physical<br />
and mental tests to make sure they are fit and able to serve if the draft went into effect.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
The fiscal implications will be nominal.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This resolution will go into effect at the start <strong>of</strong> the upcoming year after its passage.<br />
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AF - 23<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Chelsea Bona, Scott McPhie, Seth Gliksman, and Kelsey Whelpley<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: amend section 182.20 <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Procedure Law to mandate video arraignment<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose:<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to mandate that the arraignment process be done through video. When a person is arrested and<br />
accused <strong>of</strong> a felony, they must be transported to and from court with police escorts. There, judges, attorneys, court<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers, and others must be paid for their presence. This process could be accomplished quickly and more effectively<br />
with a video system, and therefore save the state money.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions:<br />
1. Notwithstanding any other provision <strong>of</strong> law and except as provided in section 182.30 <strong>of</strong> this article, the court, in its<br />
discretion, will dispense with the personal appearance <strong>of</strong> the defendant being charged with a felony, except an<br />
appearance at a hearing or trial, and conduct an electronic appearance in connection with a criminal action [pending in<br />
Albany, Bronx, Broome, Erie, Kings, New York, Niagara, Oneida, Onondaga, Ontario, Orange Putnam, Queens,<br />
Richmond, St. Lawrence, Tompkins, Chautauqua, Cattaraugus, Clinton, Essex, Montgomery, Rensselaer, Warren,<br />
Westchester, Suffolk, Herkimer or Franklin county provided that the chief administrator <strong>of</strong> the courts has authorized<br />
the use <strong>of</strong> electronic appearance and the defendant, after consultation with counsel, consents on the record. Such consent<br />
shall be required at the commencement <strong>of</strong> each electronic appearance to such electronic appearance].<br />
2. If, for any reason, the court determines on its own motion or [on the motion <strong>of</strong> any party that the conduct <strong>of</strong> an<br />
electronic appearance may impair the legal rights <strong>of</strong> the defendant, it shall not permit the electronic appearance to<br />
proceed. If, for any other articulated reason] either party requests at any time during the electronic appearance that such<br />
appearance be terminated, the court [shall] may grant such a request. Upon the adjourned date the proceeding shall be<br />
recommenced from the point at which the request for termination <strong>of</strong> the electronic appearance had been granted.<br />
Justification<br />
Transporting alleged criminals is dangerous, time consuming and expensive; in order to help the state and the citizens<br />
within it, we must implement a video arraignment system.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
Each year our tax dollars are wasted on an unnecessary expense. By paying an initial start-up fee and for the upkeep <strong>of</strong> a<br />
video arraignment system, we will save the money that was previously spent on the transport <strong>of</strong> the arrested.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This will go into effect two years after the passage <strong>of</strong> this bill.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AF - 25<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Alison Collins, Melissa Weiner, Kelsey Mensch<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Amend §3202 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Education Law in order to eliminate the funding for charter schools<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to eliminate the funding for Charter Schools. Any student that attends a charter school is paid<br />
for by the tax dollars <strong>of</strong> the members in the community they are from. It is not fair that tax payers are providing the tuition<br />
for students (whom they don’t even know) to attend a Charter School. With the aid to education getting slashed every<br />
year, it is vital that we save as much money as possible to help preserve our schools and protect students’ futures. By<br />
cutting the funding for Charter Schools, the money saved would be allocated to public schools. In essence, Charter<br />
schools are to be made self-sustaining and be funded only by a tuition enacted by the specific school.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1: Definitions<br />
A) Charter Schools: are primary or secondary schools that operate according to a five-year charter funded only<br />
by a private source.<br />
B) Private School: A school supported by a private organization, private individuals or by the payment <strong>of</strong> fees rather than<br />
by the government<br />
C) Public School: A school supported by public funds<br />
Section 2:<br />
§3202 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Education Law<br />
8. Homeless children. A homeless child, as defined in subdivision one <strong>of</strong> section thirty-two hundred nine <strong>of</strong> this article,<br />
over the age <strong>of</strong> five and under twenty-one years <strong>of</strong> age, who has not received a high school diploma, shall be entitled to<br />
attend a public school without payment <strong>of</strong> tuition, in accordance with the provisions <strong>of</strong> section thirty-two hundred nine <strong>of</strong><br />
this article.<br />
9. Charter schools: Charter schools, as defined by the definitions, are open and attended by choice. They are separate and<br />
indifferent to the public schooling system. Any student wishing to attend a Charter School is required to pay the tuition in<br />
place. The tuition will be up to the specific Charter School’s discretion. The Charter School will not be subject to receive<br />
public funding under any circumstance. Any Charter school is not to be chartered solely by school districts, teachers,<br />
parents, activists, state-authorized, non-pr<strong>of</strong>it groups, universities and/ or government entities. Any entity listed in the<br />
previous statement wishing to donate money towards the charter school, may do so as long as it does not solely fund the<br />
school and its attendees.<br />
Justification<br />
Every year, school districts are giving portions or their already scarce budgets to fund charter schools. This occurs at the<br />
taxpayer’s expense. Lately, their produced results have not even been worth it. Typically, students from charter schools<br />
perform at a lower level than their peers in public schools. This is due to the fact that charter schools have a greater<br />
tendency to hire inexperienced teachers than public schools. Charter schools are not subjected to the same rules as public<br />
schools, yet are funded in the same way: with public money.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
By making Charter Schools self-sustaining, New York State will be saving an abundance <strong>of</strong> money. With 35,000 students<br />
attending Charter Schools in New York State, there is a substantial amount <strong>of</strong> tax dollars that, given the economic<br />
circumstance, New York cannot lose. This bill does not cost any money to be implemented but will be saving money in<br />
the long run. This legislation will save public schools money each year that they would regularly have to put towards<br />
funding charter schools. They will be able to allocate that money for other programs within their own school, if they so<br />
choose.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill will go into effect exactly one year after its passage<br />
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AF - 36<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Morgan Chamberlain, Marie DeLorenzo, Tori Persons, Mitchell Jordon<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Amend section 606 <strong>of</strong> existing tax law S884-2011 to provide additional assistance to in-home caregivers by<br />
increasing the tax credit from twenty percent to forty percent<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The passage <strong>of</strong> this amendment will create addition revenue for the state along with decreasing the money being spent on<br />
Medicaid every year. By raising the tax credit from twenty percent to forty percent, it will give another incentive for<br />
people to care for their elders and in the long run, create family bonds<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1<br />
Caregiver- a person who provides unpaid assistance in daily living, health care, financial matters, guidance,<br />
companionship and social interaction.<br />
Tax Break- a tax deduction that is granted in order to encourage a particular type <strong>of</strong> commercial activity.<br />
Medicaid- an insurance program for New Yorkers who can't afford to pay for medical care.<br />
Section 2<br />
For the purpose <strong>of</strong> this amendment, we provide the definitions set above as a background, and we wish to enact<br />
as follows:<br />
Amend section 606 <strong>of</strong> existing tax law S884-2011 to provide additional assistance to in-home caregivers.<br />
Regulations: In order to receive the tax credit a receipt must be shown at the time the money is being collected.<br />
Justification<br />
This will create revenue for New York State by decreasing the amount <strong>of</strong> money being spent on Medicaid each year. By<br />
giving an incentive for people to take care <strong>of</strong> their elders it will produce a sense <strong>of</strong> family along with providing seniors a<br />
loving and healthy environment<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
The money given to the people will cost less than the money originally put into Medicaid. In the long run, this will save<br />
money for the state.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This amendment will be put into effect immediately upon passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AF - 39<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Ravyn Santiago and Kaylin Parisi<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Require all New York State street vendors to adopt the New York City policy , to obtain a positive letter grade from<br />
the department <strong>of</strong> health inspectors in order to maintain their street vendor license.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
This bill will require all New York State street vendors to be rated in a similar, if not exactly the same manner as<br />
New York City restaurants, with the letter grade sanitary inspection system. The street vendors will receive a letter grade<br />
determined by their health conditions, and they must publicly display their letter grade for customers to see how clean the<br />
street vendor conditions are.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1<br />
Street Vendor: A seller <strong>of</strong> goods in small amounts to consumers without having a fixed retail location<br />
Letter Grade System: Sanitary inspection results given to a place that sells, cook , and prepares food, like a restaurant,<br />
from an inspector from the department <strong>of</strong> health based on the place health conditions.<br />
Prepare: Make (food or a meal) ready for cooking or eating.<br />
Section 2<br />
To remain in business, street vendors must receive and maintain a positive letter grade from sanitary inspectors that<br />
inspect their health conditions. Sanitary inspector will not only be inspecting a street vendor on their health conditions but<br />
also will be scoring them on the street vendor sanitary conditions, giving them a letter such as A,B, or C. This will cause<br />
street vendors to receive a letter grade from the health inspectors just like a restaurants will receive based on the sanitary<br />
conditions. This will also require street vendors to maintain a satisfactory grade “A” to keep their street vendor license.<br />
Justification<br />
There are 4,000 to 6,000 street vendors found in New York State today. New York State has had several reports <strong>of</strong><br />
customers that purchase street vendor food that has been ill from eating there food. Customers have caught food<br />
poisoning, other diseases, itching skin, etc. Also, within the last year there has been about 2,575 violations that came<br />
from street vendors alone .If customers had knowledge <strong>of</strong> the conditions <strong>of</strong> witch their food was coming from before<br />
purchase, some <strong>of</strong> these cases, if not all, could have been avoided. New York State should aim towards keeping its<br />
citizens safe and make sure know as much knowledge's as they can about the food they eat and spend their money on, by<br />
having a letter grade system for street vendor inspections. This system that will cost the state nothing and will bring<br />
knowledge to its citizens.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
This bill will not have a financial impact on New York State residents. This bill will only require inspectors to<br />
include the letter grade system into their inspections for street vendors and giving them a letter grade.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill will go into effect immediately after it is passed<br />
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AF - 40<br />
INTRODUCED BY: Molly Schoder, Olivia Seamans, Sarah Calzada<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Amend an unfunded special education mandate in order to make it non mandatory for high schools <strong>of</strong> a Class C population<br />
and under to be required to have one special education teacher for each core subject.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
Amend a government mandate, which requires a special education teacher for each core subject in high schools. Class C and D<br />
schools would be exempt from the future law.<br />
– Schools <strong>of</strong> Class C populations and under would be wasting budget money on unneeded teachers if this mandate were<br />
passed excluding this amendment.<br />
– With the passage <strong>of</strong> our amendment, it will save high schools from spending more budget money than is already spent on<br />
special education and salaries <strong>of</strong> teachers.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1<br />
Charter School- a primary or secondary school that receives public money but are not subject to some <strong>of</strong> the rules, regulations,<br />
and statutes that applies to other public schools.<br />
Class C population- 175-300 high school students<br />
Class D population- 1-174 high school students<br />
Race to the Top Fund- a competition between the 50 states and their local school districts that focuses on the improvement <strong>of</strong><br />
students’ education and the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> teachers <strong>of</strong> the United States.<br />
Section 2<br />
Amend a government mandate, which requires a special education teacher for each core subject in high schools. Class C and D<br />
schools would be exempt from the future law.<br />
– Schools <strong>of</strong> Class C populations and under would be wasting budget money on unneeded teachers if this mandate were<br />
passed excluding this amendment.<br />
– With the passage <strong>of</strong> our amendment, it will save high schools from spending more budget money than is already spent on<br />
special education and salaries <strong>of</strong> teachers.<br />
Justification<br />
The average salary <strong>of</strong> a special education teacher is about $51,000. With the passage <strong>of</strong> this bill, many small schools will<br />
be saved from spending unnecessary budget money to pay these new teachers that the school would be required to hire if<br />
this bill is not passed.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
With the passage <strong>of</strong> this bill, no money will be spent in any way. The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to prevent the<br />
unnecessary spending <strong>of</strong> money.<br />
Effective Date<br />
Our bill will go into effect as soon as this government mandate is passed by legislation.
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STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AF - 41<br />
INTRODUCED BY: William Lawrie, Garrison Hughes, Ian Lawrie, Josie Worley<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Ban the possession <strong>of</strong> all tobacco products from minors<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to ban the possession <strong>of</strong> all tobacco products from minors in the State <strong>of</strong> New York.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Section 1:<br />
Minor: Any person under the age <strong>of</strong> eighteen.<br />
Tobacco Products: All products and articles made <strong>of</strong>, or containing tobacco such as cigarettes, cigars, smokeless tobacco,<br />
snuff, snus, kreteks, pipe tobacco, dissolvable tobacco (strips or sticks), and all foreign types <strong>of</strong> tobacco products.<br />
Tobacco Education Program: a class/course taught by teachers or staff members <strong>of</strong> an organization qualified in helping<br />
prevent teens from using tor ceasing the use <strong>of</strong> tobacco products<br />
Section 2:<br />
To enforce this law, all police <strong>of</strong>ficers and all other persons able to write a citation can do so if a minor is caught with any<br />
sort <strong>of</strong> tobacco product in their possession. Consequences for the minor are as follows:<br />
First <strong>of</strong>fense: $25 fine<br />
Second <strong>of</strong>fense: $50 fine + 10 hours <strong>of</strong> community service<br />
Third <strong>of</strong>fense: $75 fine + 15 hours <strong>of</strong> community service + mandatory attendance to a tobacco<br />
education program<br />
Any additional <strong>of</strong>fenses will be up to the judge’s discretion. Failure to uphold any <strong>of</strong> the consequences regardless <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>of</strong>fense will result in further punishment brought about by a court hearing.<br />
Justification<br />
Within New York State, about ninety percent <strong>of</strong> all tobacco users start before the age <strong>of</strong> eighteen. Currently, individuals<br />
under eighteen are not allowed to purchase tobacco products, however, they are able to possess them. A number <strong>of</strong> studies<br />
indicate that adolescents are especially vulnerable to the effects <strong>of</strong> tobacco, and may be more likely to develop a more<br />
serious addiction in comparison to adults. By enacting this piece <strong>of</strong> legislation, New York State would not only prevent<br />
these tobacco users from harming themselves, but also those around them, including the environment. Our state, as a<br />
whole, must take small steps toward decreasing the number <strong>of</strong> underage tobacco users to in turn save lives.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
Upon the passage <strong>of</strong> this bill, it will generate revenue to villages, towns, and cities across New York State.<br />
Effective Date<br />
Once passed, this bill will go into effect January 1, 2013.
Legislative Branch Activity<br />
Senate Results<br />
Lieutenant Governor:<br />
President pro Tempore:<br />
Hans Lueders<br />
Maria Henry<br />
Passed<br />
Failed<br />
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S - 11 S - 06<br />
S - 08 S - 01<br />
S - 12 S - 18<br />
S – 04 A S - 09<br />
S - 05 S - 10<br />
S - 04 B S - 07<br />
S - 15 S - 02<br />
S - 20 S - 19<br />
S - 03 S - 17<br />
S - 14 AF - 04<br />
AF - 35 AF - 11<br />
AF - 38 AF - 13<br />
AF - 20<br />
AF - 50<br />
AF - 22<br />
Topics <strong>of</strong> Passed Senate Bills<br />
S – 03 Allow a school nurse to give over-the-counter medication to students with parental consent.<br />
S - 04 A Cap funding for correctional services and allocate the money towards educational facilities.<br />
S – 04 B Add subsection 14 to section 220.16 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Penal Law to ban “bath salts”, the<br />
manufacture, sale, and distribution <strong>of</strong> bath salts in New<br />
S – 05 Give the right to donate a person’s body to science after death, even if they have been imprisoned<br />
or on death row given that their body qualifies.<br />
S – 08 Amend Section 661 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Education Law to allow for illegal immigrants the right<br />
to apply for financial aid for college<br />
S – 11 extend the hours <strong>of</strong> work available for minors sixteen and seventeen years <strong>of</strong> age beyond the set<br />
maximum in § 134 <strong>of</strong> article 4 <strong>of</strong> New York State Labor Law in order to allow them to further<br />
support their families financially.<br />
S – 12 This bill will address flaws in the current system <strong>of</strong> criminal probation.<br />
S – 13 Amend the New York State Penal Law by adding section 125.30, to require parental permission<br />
for a minor to have an abortion.<br />
S – 14 S-14: Repeal Status <strong>of</strong> Limitation on Child Abuse<br />
S – 15 Make it possible for first time, nonviolent <strong>of</strong>fenders to serve in the military in lieu <strong>of</strong> a serving<br />
time in a correctional facility.<br />
S - 20 Regulate in-store tobacco advertisement<br />
AF – 35 Repeal New York State’s statue <strong>of</strong> limitations for child sexual abuse, allowing victims to<br />
indefinitely press charges against their attackers.<br />
AF – 38 To forbid smoking in multi-housing units<br />
Topics <strong>of</strong> Failed Senate Bills<br />
S – 01 Add a wealth tax for people who make above two million dollars per year after debts.<br />
S – 02 To repeal the current tax cap in New York State.<br />
S – 06 Remove Open Enrollment in Public High School Honors and AP Classes<br />
25
S - 07 facilitate the ability <strong>of</strong> students to pay for college by mandating that all banks <strong>of</strong>fer a loan in which<br />
the long-term interest rate does not exceed 5%<br />
S – 09 Eliminate Teacher Tenure from Public Schools grades K-12 in New York State.<br />
S – 10 Increase the retirement age <strong>of</strong> New York State tier I, II, III, IV, and V teachers to sixty-five from<br />
the age range <strong>of</strong> fifty-five to sixty-two depending upon which tier one falls in. This will decrease<br />
the state’s taxpayer’s burden to support the pension fund for teachers.<br />
S – 16 Amend Section 924 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Real Property Tax Law to relieve all businesses and<br />
residential properties impacted by the floods as a result <strong>of</strong> Hurricane Irene<br />
S – 17 develop nuclear power plants throughout the state <strong>of</strong> New York.<br />
S - 18 Make it a crime to ingest alcohol to the point <strong>of</strong> inebriation while pregnant<br />
S – 19 Lower Minimum Wage for Businesses with less than 500 employees<br />
AF – 04 Permit the usage <strong>of</strong> tablets or laptop computers in school for educational purpose for public high<br />
school students.<br />
AF – 11 Equalize the punishments for labor trafficking and sexual trafficking to a minimum <strong>of</strong> 25 years in<br />
prison.<br />
AF – 13 : Allow the sale <strong>of</strong> any alcoholic beverages in places <strong>of</strong> food sales to be determined by the<br />
county in which the store is located<br />
AF – 20 Amend N.Y. [PUB. HEALTH] LAW § 1399-hh (1997) to restrict use <strong>of</strong> any tobacco products to<br />
children under the age <strong>of</strong> 18.<br />
AF – 22 Reduce the amount <strong>of</strong> illegal searches performed by New York State Police Officers<br />
Assembly Liberty Results<br />
Speaker:<br />
Deputy Speaker:<br />
Adam Henn<br />
Chelsea Smart<br />
Passed<br />
Failed<br />
AL – 01 AL – 07<br />
AL – 11 AL – 28<br />
AL – 26 AL – 40<br />
AL – 27 AL – 10<br />
AL – 08 AL – 25<br />
AL – 02 AL – 21<br />
AL – 29 AL – 06<br />
AL – 24 AL – 39<br />
AL – 32 AL – 37<br />
AL – 16 AL – 23<br />
AL – 31 AL – 05<br />
AL – 20 AL – 12<br />
AL – 19 AL – 09<br />
AL – 13 AL – 17<br />
AL – 18 AL – 38<br />
AL – 35 AL - 41<br />
AL – 36 AL – 04<br />
AL – 03 AL – 34<br />
AL – 22<br />
AL – 30<br />
AL – 14<br />
AL – 15<br />
AL – 33<br />
AL - 42<br />
26
Topics <strong>of</strong> Passed Assembly Bills<br />
AL-01 Amend Education Law §313 in order to eliminate racial bias towards the admittance <strong>of</strong><br />
students into state colleges.<br />
AL-08 Amend §3-0313<strong>of</strong> the Environmental Conservation law by adding sub-section 8 to<br />
illegalize Hydraulic Fracturing<br />
AL-11 The purpose <strong>of</strong> this bill is to limit the extent <strong>of</strong> Port Authority fare increase, and<br />
ultimately to save New Yorkers money.<br />
AL-13 Amend Section 1612, by adding subsection 6 to the New York State tax law to increase<br />
and cap the percentage <strong>of</strong> money from the New York State lottery dedicated to education.<br />
AL-16 Amend § 3609-E by Adding Subsection 5 to the New York State Education Law to<br />
Maintain Educational Funding at the 2010-11 Level for Each School District in the State.<br />
AL-18: End Affirmative Action in the admissions process to New York state Funded Colleges<br />
(SUNY's).<br />
AL-19: Amend the Section 2 <strong>of</strong> Article 3 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Constitution to place a term limit on<br />
New York State Legislators <strong>of</strong> Four Two-Year Terms.<br />
AL-20 Members <strong>of</strong> the assembly urge the state Senate in joining them to amend the New York<br />
State Constitution to legalize casino gambling.<br />
AL-24 Mandate all public school students from grades seven to twelve take a self-defense course<br />
in their physical education class.<br />
AL-26 create a database in which incidents <strong>of</strong> bullying are mandated to be recorded, and to<br />
establish a plan to terminate the problem <strong>of</strong> bullying.<br />
AL-27 Amend section 30.10 subsections (b) and (e) <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Procedure Law to increase<br />
the statute <strong>of</strong> limitations for rape and sexual conduct in the second and third degrees.<br />
AL-31 Restrict the amount <strong>of</strong> time an individual or family can live within public housing.<br />
AL-35: Add letter C to TAX Article 22 Part 2 section 616, To exempt veterans within the state with 8<br />
years <strong>of</strong> service from future New York State income tax.<br />
AL-36: Deduct tax dollars from correctional facilities and utilize it towards Educational purposes.<br />
Topics <strong>of</strong> Failed Assembly Bills<br />
AL-04 Improve the nutritional content <strong>of</strong> school foods<br />
AL-05 Amend section 1399-q <strong>of</strong> the Public Health Law to prohibit smoking in all hotel/motel rooms in<br />
New York State<br />
AL- 06 Require all welfare applicants submit to a drug test prior to receiving any state run government<br />
provided benefits<br />
AL-07 Better regulate the fur trade.<br />
AL- 09 Enforce New York State drivers to retake the Department <strong>of</strong> Motor Vehicles driver’s license<br />
exam every time the license needs a renewal.<br />
AL-10 Amend the Green Jobs – Green New York Act <strong>of</strong> 2009. to limit the environmental impact <strong>of</strong><br />
government buildings in New York State by providing loans to county governments who are<br />
eager and able to perform these transformations.<br />
AL-12 Provide an alternative to euthanizing sheltered animals.<br />
AL-14 Updating Education with Today’s Modernizations by replacing school books with portable<br />
electronic devices.<br />
AL-15 Repeal the newly installed 2% property tax cap <strong>of</strong> chapter 97 <strong>of</strong> the 2011 New York State law.<br />
AL-17 Require public schools to provide autistic students with a touch screen learning device.<br />
AL-21 Mandate that all universities and institutions <strong>of</strong> higher learning must disclose any criminal history<br />
<strong>of</strong> a student to potential roommates.<br />
AL-22 Amend Legislative Law Article 4A, to add section 72A to create a public committee to review and<br />
revise, remove, and/or re-categorize legislation.<br />
AL-23 Strengthen the requirements necessary for employment as a New York State politician, by<br />
requiring all politicians to hold part-time employment outside the domain <strong>of</strong> the acquired<br />
government position.<br />
AL-25 Reduce gang related crime throughout New York State by providing every community in NYS<br />
27
with access to the funds necessary to reduce gang-related crime.<br />
AL-28 Reinstate Capital Punishment in the State <strong>of</strong> New York.<br />
AL-30 Raise awareness about police brutality<br />
AL-33 Amend the insider trading law to make it clear that government <strong>of</strong>ficials are subject to the same<br />
rules as the general public.<br />
AL-34 Amend Article 20A, Section 725 to eliminate collective bargaining rights <strong>of</strong> New York State labor<br />
unions.<br />
AL-37 Amend section 605-a under the Education Code to provide monetary grants for overall academic<br />
excellence in New York State’s secondary education institutions.<br />
AL-38 Amend Vehicle and Traffic Law Article 19 § 502 and mandate a road test be taken by licensed<br />
drivers once every ten years.<br />
AL-39 Amend section 131 <strong>of</strong> New York State social service law by changing subsection18 to mandate<br />
the earning <strong>of</strong> a high school diploma, or a GED in order to apply for welfare.<br />
AL-40 To amend §131 <strong>of</strong> the New York State Social Services law to hold legal guardians responsible for<br />
their biological or legally adopted children if they do not attend school on a regular basis.<br />
AL-41 establish a streamlined secondary education system in the state <strong>of</strong> New York.<br />
28
Chief Justice<br />
Halle-Anne Orr<br />
<strong>2012</strong> JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP TEAM<br />
Associate Justices<br />
Erin Englemann<br />
Mitchell Beatie<br />
Becca Dewitt<br />
Lauren Dole<br />
Ashley Domagola<br />
Evan Malone<br />
Dina Al-Akmi<br />
Kevin Parakkatu<br />
Brittany Sutton<br />
3 rd year Justice Principal Justice for D7<br />
2 nd year Justice<br />
2 nd year Justice Principal Justice for D6<br />
2 nd year Justice<br />
2 nd year Justice Principal Justice for D1<br />
2 nd year Justice Principal Justice for D3<br />
Principal Justice for D5<br />
Principal Justice for D4<br />
Principal Justice for D4<br />
Barbara Blaszczyk<br />
Carl Cicerelli<br />
Manserat Dhami<br />
Erica Finan<br />
Jessica Furia<br />
Sierra Galusha<br />
Logan King<br />
Tom Jacobs<br />
Vincent Kappel<br />
Michael Mazzeo<br />
Thomas Muthig<br />
Brittany Sutton<br />
Marina Vanini<br />
Christopher Walker<br />
Attorney General<br />
Tara Galusha<br />
Deputy Attorney General<br />
Joanna Bugenis<br />
Public Defender<br />
Eric Quitter<br />
Deputy Public Defender<br />
Stephen Bruno<br />
29
BEST <strong>2012</strong> ATTORNEY BRIEF<br />
IN THE<br />
SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST<br />
DEPARTMENT<br />
------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
In the Matter <strong>of</strong> Raphael Ortega, Appellant<br />
v.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, Respondents<br />
____________________________________________________<br />
On Appeal from the Trial Court<br />
------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT (TEAM 24)<br />
------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
Colton Bishop District 3<br />
Daniel Schwartz District 3<br />
Rebecca Sung District 3<br />
30
TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
Table <strong>of</strong> Authorities.........................................................................................................................2<br />
QuestionsPresented......................................................................................................................... 2<br />
Statement <strong>of</strong> Facts............................................................................................................................2<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Argument....................................................................................................................5<br />
Argument.........................................................................................................................................5<br />
Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................9<br />
31
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES<br />
People v. Adair, 84 A.D.3d 1752 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2011) 6<br />
People v. Foy, 32 N.Y.2d 473 (N.Y. 1973) 5<br />
People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d 698 (N.Y. 1984) 5<br />
QUESTIONS PRESENTED<br />
I. Did the trial court abuse it’s discretion in denying Appellant Ortega a third adjournment in<br />
order to locate his alibi witness, thus violating Appellant Ortega’s Sixth Amendment right?<br />
(1) Was Atiron a material witness?<br />
(2) Was due diligence exercised by the Appellant?<br />
(3) Will Atrionbe available at a future trial?<br />
II. Did the trial court violate Appellant Ortega’s right to effectively confer with counsel?<br />
STATEMENT OF FACTS<br />
Appellant Ortega and his best friend Atrion Raimundi attended a wedding in Saratoga<br />
Springs, New York in which they were the only two minorities at the almost completely white<br />
wedding. Both men made song requests <strong>of</strong> the DJ, but the DJ did not want to play Appellant<br />
Ortega’s song request and stated that he had just given a song request. Being the only two<br />
minorities at the event, Appellant Ortega angrily replied that it was the other black man. Later<br />
that night, the DJ reported his $5,000 digital mixer stolen and the DJ identified Appellant Ortega<br />
Page<br />
in the lineup as the man whole stole the mixer. This identification was backed up by two other<br />
witnesses. Appellant Ortega’s attorney failed to notify the prosecution until two days prior to<br />
trial that they would be calling Atrion Raimundi as an alibi witness.<br />
During the prosecution’s case, Flynn Jebb, Appellant’s former girlfriend and Atrion’s<br />
date for the evening, testified Atrion was with her almost the entire night and <strong>of</strong>ten in the dessert<br />
line, but not on or near the dance floor. She further testified that she saw the Appellant on the<br />
dance floor. No witnesses testified that they saw the Appellant and Atrion together in the dessert<br />
line, contradicting Atrion’s statement upon which Appellant’s attorney was basing their<br />
32
argument. Flynn Jebb also testified that Appellant became very angry when others at the<br />
wedding could not stop laughing when the Appellant told the “other black guy” story.<br />
After the prosecution rested, the Appellant was directed to call his first witness. Atrion<br />
was to be that first witness, but he had left the courtroom on the first day <strong>of</strong> trial and was told to<br />
return when the defense started its case. No new subpoena was issued to Raimundi. The trial<br />
judge used her discretion and adjourned the matter to the next day. A second adjournment was<br />
graciously given to 2:00 p.m. after the Appellant’s attorney stated to the Court that he did not<br />
have an answer as to where the witness was, as he was told by telephone that Atrion would be<br />
there when the trial began in the morning. The witness was still not there at 2:00 p.m. and the<br />
request for a material witness subpoena was denied.<br />
The Appellant was directed to proceed with his case by the trial judge and was given first<br />
a ten minute conference and then a 15 minute break to confer with his attorney on how to<br />
proceed. When a third break was denied, Appellant testified contrary to the other witnesses by<br />
testifying that he and Atrion were together for long periods <strong>of</strong> time in the dessert line. Appellant<br />
could find no other witnesses at the large event to support his claim. The prosecution cross<br />
examined him regarding how long it took for Atrion to surface as an alibi witness. Appellant<br />
was convicted and sentenced to one year in prison. He appeals lower court’s ruling on the<br />
grounds that the denial <strong>of</strong> the third continuance to produce his alibi witness and the second<br />
request for an adjournment to confer with counsel violated his sixth amendment rights.<br />
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT<br />
In any case, “when the protection <strong>of</strong> fundamental rights has been involved..., that<br />
discretionary power has been more narrowly construed” for judges. People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d<br />
698, (N.Y. 1984). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when denying Appellant Ortega’s<br />
final request for an adjournment to produce his alibi witness. This continuance was not<br />
warranted because the request was based on the lack <strong>of</strong> appearance from a witness who was not<br />
33
material, and there was no certainty that he would attend a later trial date. Also, the defense did<br />
not exercise due diligence in order to guarantee his appearance. Finally, the denial <strong>of</strong> a second<br />
recess was appropriate and did not violate the Appellant’s Constitutional Rights because the<br />
appellant had already been given plenty <strong>of</strong> time to confer with counsel.<br />
ARGUMENT<br />
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT<br />
ORTEGA A THIRD ADJOURNMENT TO LOCATE HIS ALIBI WITNESS, NOR DID IT<br />
VIOLATE APPELLANT ORTEGA’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT.<br />
When reviewing the appropriateness <strong>of</strong> a denial <strong>of</strong> an adjournment request, the appellate<br />
court defers “to the discretion <strong>of</strong> the court, which is consistent with the general rule that the<br />
granting or denial <strong>of</strong> any adjournment by a Trial Judge is a matter <strong>of</strong> discretion.” People v. Foy,<br />
32 N.Y.2d 473, 476 (N.Y. 1973); citing People v. Jackson (111 N. Y. 362); also citing People v.<br />
Oskroba, 305 N. Y. 113, 117.) A trial judge must consider three factors in making the decision to<br />
allow a continuance: “‘(1) that the witness is really material and appears to the court to be so; (2)<br />
that the party who applies has been guilty <strong>of</strong> no neglect; (3) that the witness can be had at the<br />
time to which the trial is deferred.’” People v. Foy, supra at 477; citing King v. D’Eon (1 W.<br />
Black. 510). A review <strong>of</strong> the above cited three prong test in consideration <strong>of</strong> this case clearly<br />
shows that the lower court judge did not abuse her discretion.<br />
(1) Atrion Raimundi is not a material witness. It is obvious that the judge did not believe<br />
the witness was material, as she denied a material witness warrant request. It is a judge’s duty to<br />
consider all possibilities when making decisions on the materiality <strong>of</strong> witness and whether a<br />
subpoena should be issued to ensure their appearance at the court. “The decision whether to grant<br />
an adjournment lies in the sound discretion <strong>of</strong> the trial court, and the exercise <strong>of</strong> that discretion<br />
‘in denying a request for an adjournment will not be overturned absent <strong>of</strong> showing prejudice’.”<br />
People v. Adair, 84 A.D.3d 1752, 1754 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2011); citing People v.<br />
Arroyo, 161 AD2d 1127, 1127. The judge in this case made her decision regarding Atrion’s lack<br />
34
<strong>of</strong> materiality after listening to all the other witnesses and weighing their demeanor and<br />
credibility. The judge makes the overall decision whether or not the witness is credible, and there<br />
is no evidence that she was biased, so her decision that Atrion is not a material witness should be<br />
upheld.<br />
(2) Further evidence that the trial judge was correct to deny the third continuance request<br />
is because Appellant is guilty <strong>of</strong> neglect. Although Atrion Raimundi was initially subpoenaed<br />
and sent away and told to come back at a later date, no subpoena was issued thereafter.<br />
Although calls were made to the witness and his family to guarantee his appearance, it was<br />
clearly not enough. It could be argued that the failure <strong>of</strong> the Appellant’s attorney to take steps to<br />
ensure Atrion’s presence in court by a new subpoena or other means was a factor in the Trial<br />
Judge’s decision to deny a material witness warrant. In People v. Foy (supra at 478), they<br />
concluded that “a request for a short adjournment... should not be denied merely because <strong>of</strong><br />
possible inconvenience to the court or others.” In fact, the court was not inconvenienced and<br />
rather granted adjournments several times prior to deciding that the trial would proceed, because<br />
it was necessary and the trial court wanted to make sure that the Appellant had was not unfairly<br />
prejudiced. But since the defense did not exercise due diligence, when choosing not to take<br />
preliminary steps like issuing another subpoena or other actions, the trial court did not abuse it’s<br />
discretion in declining another adjournment.<br />
(3) The court was within it’s rights to decline the third adjournment because the<br />
Appellant cannot show that Atrion would be available at a trial set at a later date. In People v.<br />
Foy, an alibi witness, Martin Lopez, had taken a day <strong>of</strong>f from truck driving to appear in court. He<br />
did not get the chance to testify that day, and could not afford to take another day <strong>of</strong>f from work.<br />
Although subpoenaed to testify at the following court date, he did not show up. The witness in<br />
our case, Atrion, similarly would not show up to another court date, but for different reasons.<br />
While the witness in People v. Foy would not be able to attend for financial reasons, Atrion will<br />
35
not because his actions show that he has changed his mind and doesn’t wish to testify. The fact<br />
that Atrion only revealed his knowledge two days before trial, he did not seek alternative<br />
transportation on other scheduled trial days, and other witnesses testified to never seeing the<br />
Appellant and him together during the wedding, shows he most likely changed his mind on<br />
testifying as he does not want to perjure himself. The close timing <strong>of</strong> adding Atrion to the<br />
witness list shows that it may be a last resort for the defense as the Appellant should have raised<br />
Atrion as an alibi long before this time if he is in fact an alibi. Since the Appellant cannot<br />
satisfy any <strong>of</strong> the three prongs set forth in People v Foy, the trial court was correct and within its<br />
right to deny a third continuance.<br />
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT ORTEGA’S SIXTH<br />
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVELY CONFER WITH COUNSEL.<br />
Throughout the trial, two contiuances were granted for a total <strong>of</strong> twenty-five minutes, for<br />
Ortega to confer with his counsel. In People v. Spears (supra at 700), the trial judge allowed the<br />
defense “a few minutes” to converse, but interrupted their discussion in no less than five seconds<br />
after the unexpected end <strong>of</strong> the prosecution’s case. That case was overturned at the appellate<br />
division. In comparison, the defense was given ample amount <strong>of</strong> time to meet because in<br />
addition to the twenty-five minutes given by the trial judge after the Appellant was told he must<br />
proceed with his case, he actually had since 3:00 p.m. on the previous day when the prosecution<br />
rested and the first adjournment was granted to discuss the possibility that the witness may not<br />
appear, and to discuss the pros and cons <strong>of</strong> Appellant testfying on his own behalf. The judges<br />
came to the conclusion that “denying even ‘a few minutes’ delay was arbitrary and an abuse <strong>of</strong><br />
discretion as a matter <strong>of</strong> law.” People v. Spears (supra at 700). Our case can easily be<br />
distinguished from People v. Spears. The defendant’s constitutional right to confer with counsel<br />
was in no means violated.<br />
36
CONCLUSION<br />
The Appellant’s request to have a new trial is unnecessary and unwarranted. The trial<br />
judge did not abuse her discretion when denying any <strong>of</strong> the Appellant’s requests. Their request<br />
for another continuance was unsubstantiated because they did not follow the necessary steps<br />
before they requested it. Also, in People v. Foy (supra at 478), they came to the conclusion that<br />
“when the witness is identified to the court, and is found to be within the jurisdiction, a request<br />
for a short adjournment after a showing <strong>of</strong> some diligence and good faith should not be denied<br />
merely because <strong>of</strong> possible inconvenience to the court or others.” The quote states that a short<br />
adjournment should be granted when some effort is placed into locating a witness. We agree,<br />
with the trial Judge, as two adjournments had been granted, making another unnecessary. In<br />
addition, the request for another recess to further discuss the case was also needless because the<br />
Appellant and his attorney had numerous opportunities from the beginning <strong>of</strong> the trial to consult.<br />
Therefore, the Respondent asks the Court to uphold the trial judge’s decision in its entirety.<br />
Respectfully Submitted,<br />
___________________<br />
Colton Bishop District 3<br />
___________________<br />
Daniel Schwartz District 3<br />
___________________<br />
Rebecca Sung District 3<br />
37
Attorney General Judicial Review Case<br />
Presented Friday March 9, <strong>2012</strong><br />
This 2011 Bill was Passed by Assembly Freedom<br />
STATE OF NEW YORK<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT<br />
BILL NUMBER AL – 37<br />
INTRODUCED BY:<br />
Raven Santiago, Brianna Bautista, Tia Drummond<br />
AN ACT<br />
TO: Prohibit the act <strong>of</strong> smoking around minors.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, represented in the<br />
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:<br />
Purpose<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> our bill is to stop smoking around minors. We need this bill in New York State because a<br />
plethora <strong>of</strong> minors die or get effected by second hand smoke.<br />
Summary <strong>of</strong> Provisions<br />
Second hand smoking and third-hand smoking are very dangerous. This bill will band second hand smoking with a<br />
minor. We strongly believe that banning second hand smoking with a minor will save a lot <strong>of</strong> lives. .Second hand<br />
smoking can be very toxic are over 4000 chemical compounds in secondhand smoke, consisting there have been <strong>of</strong><br />
60 have been identified as causes to cancer. The consequences that we think will be settling and fair due to the child<br />
and parents is that the first time caught well smoking with a child is that the parent must pay $500 fine and attend<br />
classes that understand the dangers <strong>of</strong> second hand smoking. Also if the adult charged with smoking with a minor<br />
does not attend classes given by the Department <strong>of</strong> health and proven to a court then there license is suspended. If<br />
caught a second time smoking with a minor present then the adult will get there license suspended, also have to pay<br />
a $1000 fine, and is charged with child endangerment.. This bill is helping saving young life's that haven't even lived<br />
and they shouldn't have to pay for being there when not able to have any control <strong>of</strong>f what someone else is doing..<br />
Justification<br />
45 million people smoke in the U.S and 126 million Americans are exposed to secondhand smoke and 22<br />
million <strong>of</strong> that are children aged 3-11 that are exposed to second-hand smoke. Between 70% and 90% <strong>of</strong> nonsmokers<br />
in the American population, children and adults, are regularly exposed to secondhand smoke. It is estimated<br />
that only 15% <strong>of</strong> cigarette smoke gets inhaled by the smoker. The remaining 85% lingers in the air for everyone to<br />
breath. If a person spends more than two hours in a room where someone is smoking, the nonsmoker inhales the<br />
equivalent <strong>of</strong> four cigarettes. Second hand smoking can cause many diseases and can affect anyone a great deal (let<br />
alone a minor) in a health hazards way, and decreases the child's life with each breath that they take. The second<br />
hand smoke, underage passengers are subjected to when the driver is actively smoking while operating the vehicle in<br />
places the child at a much high risk <strong>of</strong> developing a host <strong>of</strong> repertory illnesses like pneumonia, emphysema, lung<br />
cancer etc.<br />
Fiscal Implications<br />
In our bill there will be a small influx in the operational budget <strong>of</strong> the Administration for Children Services<br />
operating budget. Due to the increase <strong>of</strong> new ACS investigations and subsequent removal. But the budgetary<br />
increase will fail in comparison to what the state currently pays for children suffering from second hand smoke<br />
related illnesses.<br />
Effective Date<br />
This bill will go into effective immediately after its passage.<br />
38
Attorney General Judicial Review Con Law Case 1 <strong>2012</strong><br />
Atrion Raimundi, Appellant<br />
v.<br />
Child Protective Services and Mike Couzens, individually, Respondent<br />
Supreme Court Appellate Division, Third Department<br />
New York<br />
______________________________________________________________________________<br />
Facts <strong>of</strong> the Case:<br />
In 2011, the New York State Assembly Freedom passed a bill criminalizing smoking cigarettes and driving<br />
while a minor (defined as under the age <strong>of</strong> 18) is in the vehicle. The penalties for breaking the law include fines,<br />
mandatory counseling, and referral to Child Protective Services (CPS) for investigation. If the case is referred to<br />
Child Protective Services, the case worker may remove a child from the home <strong>of</strong> a smoker if they find it is in the<br />
best interest <strong>of</strong> the child.<br />
On February 26, 2011, Atrion Raimundi and his son, Joe (age 2), were on their way to Saratoga Springs,<br />
NY for a wedding. They were running late so Atrion was speeding. Just after passing through Albany, Atrion was<br />
seen by State Police Officer, Molly Warren, who pulled Atrion over.<br />
Molly went up to the drivers-side window and asked Atrion to roll it down. Immediately, a cloud <strong>of</strong><br />
cigarette smoke wafted out Atrion’s window. It was hard to see into the car because <strong>of</strong> all the smoke, but Molly<br />
thinks she saw cigarette butts in the ash try <strong>of</strong> the car. It wasn’t until she heard Joe cry that she realized there was a<br />
child in the backseat <strong>of</strong> the car. Molly immediately became concerned for Joe’s safety due to all the second-hand<br />
smoke he was inhaling.<br />
Molly asked Atrion if he was smoking. He denied it saying “I’ve been driving too fast for the last two<br />
hours and the smoke is from my car overheating. We were just putting up with the smoke in order to get to Saratoga<br />
National on time for my friend’s wedding.” Molly did not believe Atrion. She wrote him two tickets one for<br />
speeding and one for smoking within 10 feet <strong>of</strong> a minor.<br />
Due to Molly’s concern for Joe, Molly called local CPS right after she finished writing the tickets for<br />
Atrion. She reported her concerns about the second-hand smoke to which Joe was being exposed and mentioned<br />
they were on their way to a wedding at Saratoga National. That same day, CPS selected Case Worker Mike<br />
Couzens to investigate.<br />
Mike was trained on how to spot signed <strong>of</strong> physical abuse, including aggressiveness and indifference<br />
towards children. The CPS Policy and Training Manual allowed case workers to make immediate decisions to<br />
remove a child from a potentially abusive situation. It was policy to remove a child temporarily if the parent is<br />
caught smoking in the car with a minor (in violation <strong>of</strong> state law) in addition to one other indicator <strong>of</strong> potential<br />
abuse. However, it warned that smoking in the presence <strong>of</strong> minors was not enough by itself to remove a child from<br />
the parents on an emergency basis.<br />
Mike decided not to waste any time and headed over to Saratoga National. Molly met him there to help<br />
“just in case.” When Mike arrived, he saw a male, matching Atrion’s description, standing outside the building<br />
smoking a cigarette. A toddler sat next to him in the snow by a bush—crying and screaming at his father. Atrion<br />
appeared indifferent to Joe’s tears. When Atrion finished smoking, he grabbed Joe’s hand forcefully led him into<br />
the building. Joe cried louder and resisted going into the building with his father, Atrion. Molly then went over to<br />
Mike and told him the story <strong>of</strong> the traffic stop. She ended by commenting, “It’s because <strong>of</strong> parents like Atrion that<br />
innocent children get cancer and asthma.”<br />
After watching Atrion and speaking to Molly, Mike decided to temporarily remove Joe from Atrion’s care<br />
to check for physical abuse and for side-effects to his second-hand smoke inhalation. At 5pm, Molly found Atrion<br />
and asked him to accompany him outside, while Mike went inside to find Joe. Mike and Molly brought Joe to<br />
Saratoga Hospital.<br />
Atrion was told where Joe was taken, but not allowed to see his son at any point while Joe was at Saratoga<br />
Hospital. It took several hours <strong>of</strong> waiting in the Emergency Department for Joe to be seen by a doctor. They ran a<br />
barrage <strong>of</strong> tests. No bruises or any other signs <strong>of</strong> physical abuse were found. However, there were some abnormal<br />
results in Joe’s breathing tests and the doctors were concerned Joe may be asthmatic. They admitted him for the<br />
night in order to run more tests throughout the night.<br />
After many tests, the doctors determined Joe had Allergic Asthma caused by a unique type <strong>of</strong> pollen from<br />
the bushes outside Saratoga National. The doctors gave Joe an antihistamine and he immediately started to get<br />
better. Based on the doctor’s findings, he determined Joe was not in risk and returned him to his father at<br />
approximately 5am the following morning.<br />
39
Atrion and Joe brought §1983 claims against CPS and Mike Couzens, individually, for their alleged<br />
constitutional violations. Atrion argued that (1) CPS, through its agent Mike, violated the Fourth Amendment by<br />
unreasonably seizing Joe without probable cause that Joe was in danger; and (2) CPS, through its agent Mike,<br />
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, substantive due process, because Atrion and Joe’s separation was shocking,<br />
arbitrary, and capricious. CPS and Mike countered by arguing that (1) CPS and Mike were protected by qualified<br />
immunity; (2) Mike did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights because there was probable cause Joe was<br />
in immediate danger if he remained with Atrion; and (2) Mike did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because<br />
Atrion and Joe were not separated so long a period <strong>of</strong> time as to violation Plaintiffs substantive due process rights.<br />
At trial, both parties moved for summary judgment. The court dismissed Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment<br />
claims finding that no reasonable juror would conclude that Atrion and Joe’s separation was so long as to be<br />
shocking, arbitrary, and capricious. It also dismissed Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims finding that CPS and<br />
Mike were entitled to qualified immunity. The Appellate Division agreed. Atrion now appeals.<br />
AG Tara Galusha represents: Child Protective Services and Mike Couzens, individually, Respondent<br />
PD Eric Quitter represents: Artion Raimundi Appellant<br />
40
Chief Justice Decision<br />
Atrion Raimundi, Appellant, v. Child<br />
Protective Services and Mike Couzens,<br />
individually, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 9, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Eric Quitter and Stephen Bruno,<br />
for Appellant.<br />
Tara Galusha and Joanna Bugenis, for<br />
Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Last, Last, Last, and Last.<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York rule part in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, Child<br />
Protective Services and Mike Couzens, and part<br />
in favor <strong>of</strong> the Appellant, Atrion Raimundi.<br />
The Constitution <strong>of</strong> the United States protects<br />
the most sacred rights <strong>of</strong> our citizens, and the<br />
two amendments at issue in this case are the 4th<br />
amendment, which protects against unreasonable<br />
seizures, and the 14th amendment, which<br />
protects our right to familial association. First,<br />
this court does not find that there was a violation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the 4th amendment. The Attorney General<br />
was able to successfully convince the court that<br />
Couzens acted appropriately under the<br />
circumstances. Under the 4th amendment, CPS<br />
can only seize a child if one other sign <strong>of</strong> abuse<br />
is coupled with the violation <strong>of</strong> smoking with a<br />
minor in a motor vehicle. The Attorney General<br />
adequately showed that this abuse existed, thus<br />
constituting a 4th amendment violation. In our<br />
case, however, several factors made it clear that<br />
possible abuse in an emergency situation<br />
existed. Couzens used both his knowledge from<br />
Molly Warren, who is a trained police <strong>of</strong>ficer,<br />
his abilities as a trained CPS worked to<br />
determine when abuse is taking place, and the<br />
scene he witnessed, which included Joe crying<br />
and screaming in the snow as Atrion acted<br />
indifferent and eventually forcefully grabbed the<br />
child. Considering the totality <strong>of</strong> the events, we<br />
believe that an emergency situation did exist and<br />
that it was in the best interest <strong>of</strong> the child for Joe<br />
to be taken into the custody <strong>of</strong> CPS. Because <strong>of</strong><br />
this, the 4th amendment was not violated.<br />
In regards to the 14th amendment, we find that<br />
CPS violated Atrion’s fundamental right to<br />
familial association. This violation existed due<br />
to the fact that the separation was shocking,<br />
arbitrary, and capricious. Just as there was a<br />
threshold <strong>of</strong> time when the children should have<br />
been returned in the case <strong>of</strong> Perez v. Sugarman,<br />
the Public Defender sufficiently demonstrated<br />
that such a threshold exists in our case. Prior to<br />
when physical abuse was <strong>of</strong>ficially ruled out, we<br />
find that the holding <strong>of</strong> Joe was not shocking,<br />
arbitrary, and capricious. Since the possible<br />
threat <strong>of</strong> physical abuse still existed, the 14th<br />
amendment was not violated. However, we find<br />
that this threshold was surpassed once Atrion<br />
was denied visitation to his son after the<br />
physical abuse had been disproven. According to<br />
Anthony v. New York, a main reason a 14th<br />
amendment violation was not found was because<br />
contact was given to the family. In our case,<br />
however, no such contact was granted, thus<br />
justifying the 14th amendment violation. Since<br />
there was no further threat <strong>of</strong> abuse we find that<br />
withholding Joe from Atrion’s custody was<br />
shocking, arbitrary, and capricious, thus<br />
constituting a 14th amendment violation. The<br />
14th amendment protects the rights <strong>of</strong> familial<br />
association. Being as this is a part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
constitution and thus a fundamental right, we the<br />
court feel that protecting this right is <strong>of</strong> upmost<br />
importance.<br />
Even though we find no violation <strong>of</strong> the 4th<br />
amendment, the violation <strong>of</strong> the 14th<br />
amendment provides justification that a new trial<br />
should be granted.<br />
41
Case A <strong>2012</strong><br />
Supreme Court Appellate Division, 4th Department<br />
New York<br />
Mark Rutkowsky, Petitioner<br />
v.<br />
The <strong>YMCA</strong>, Respondent<br />
Facts <strong>of</strong> the Case:<br />
(Note for this case you must consider the <strong>YMCA</strong> to be a government run agency. Non-pr<strong>of</strong>its are notoriously close<br />
to government anyway so it is not a stretch <strong>of</strong> the imagination)<br />
Mark Rutkowsky had worked for the <strong>YMCA</strong> for 40 years before being terminated for conduct detrimental<br />
to a government agency. As part <strong>of</strong> his punishment he also lost his pension. Mark had been the conference<br />
organizer for New York Youth and Government (Y&G) for 20 years. Under his leadership he grew the program<br />
from approximately 400 students to 600 students. Mark also represented the New York Y&G program at<br />
<strong>Conference</strong> <strong>of</strong> National Affairs (CONA) for 25 years. Mark mentored students who had gone on to be selected as<br />
committee chairs and presiding <strong>of</strong>ficers at both the state and national level. In a forty year career Mark had only<br />
been reprimanded once for the Bowerman “Speedo” incident <strong>of</strong> 2003. Mark had quickly corrected that problem by<br />
ending the use <strong>of</strong> the pool at Y & G. Otherwise he was a model employee who was regularly promoted and had<br />
received bonuses during financially sound years.<br />
The <strong>YMCA</strong> had a direct budget from the <strong>YMCA</strong> for Y&G, which was supplemented by dues paid by the<br />
students. Mark’s problems began when the economy declined in 2007. Not only was his budget decreased, but he<br />
realized that not enough funds were being devoted to Y & G to provide scholarships for students who could not<br />
afford to pay on their own. Mark tried traditional fundraisers and applied for grants but by 2009 over 50 students<br />
were unable to attend the conference.<br />
In 2010, Mark began directing funds from other <strong>YMCA</strong> programs to provide money for scholarships. In<br />
2010, Mark “redirected” $20,000 which allowed an extra hundred students to attend. Mark never took a dollar for<br />
himself. In order to do this, Mark falsified financial records, created false status reports, and lied to his direct<br />
superiors on at least ten occasions. During this same time Mark had several, but not excessive, unauthorized<br />
absences because he needed to construct the fake documents at home to avoid being caught at work. He could not<br />
provide doctors notices and seldom could notify his supervisor in advance. Ironically, Mark took funds from a<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> mutual fund which was decimated by the debt ceiling crisis and the money would have been lost in the stock<br />
market anyway.<br />
When the <strong>YMCA</strong> learned <strong>of</strong> Mark’s actions, Mark was terminated. Mark appealed the termination and revocation<br />
<strong>of</strong> his pension in a Section 75 Hearing. After all <strong>of</strong> the evidence above was entered and Mark testified that he only<br />
committed the conduct because it was in the best interests <strong>of</strong> the students. He also testified he was too old to get<br />
another job and he still had the responsibility to support himself and his wife during their retirement years. Hearing<br />
Officer Allison Bugenis stated she considered all <strong>of</strong> the evidence and then found there was substantial evidence to<br />
support the charge <strong>of</strong> conduct detrimental to a government agency and found the penalty was appropriate.<br />
Mark is now appealing the Hearing Officers Bugenis decision as being arbitrary and capricious stating<br />
specifically that the punishment was so disproportionate to the <strong>of</strong>fense in light <strong>of</strong> the all the circumstances as to be<br />
shocking to one’s sense <strong>of</strong> fairness.<br />
The following cases are the only cases you may use in your brief. If other cases are cited in the supplied cases you<br />
may cite them but only for the paragraphs from the original cases. The Iarocci case contains several summaries for<br />
other cases not given to you. Use the summaries in your brief and arguments as you will.<br />
Iarocci v. West Haverstraw, 2011 WL 1678418<br />
Muraik v. Landi, 798 N.Y.S.2d 497, (2 nd Dept. 2005)<br />
Goudy v. Schaffer, 808 N.Y.S.2d 712 (2 nd Dept. 2005)<br />
Alston v. Morgan, 664 N.Y.S.2d 819 (2 nd Dept. 1997)<br />
42
Team 1 v 11<br />
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v. THE<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong>, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Thomas Hendrix, Cody Shaner, and<br />
Zech Yaw, for Appellant.<br />
Matthew Scanlon and Brendan<br />
Conneely, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami, Vanini, King,<br />
Finan<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> he State <strong>of</strong> New York rule<br />
in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, the <strong>YMCA</strong>. The<br />
respondent provided sufficient evidence to prove that<br />
the decision <strong>of</strong> the lower court to uphold termination<br />
was justified. The respondent also provides such<br />
evidence as to justify the revocation <strong>of</strong> Mark’s<br />
pension.<br />
The first issue debated within this case was whether<br />
or not Mark Rutkowsky’s actions were a result <strong>of</strong><br />
moral turpitude or were detrimental to a government<br />
agency, thus justifying the termination <strong>of</strong> his<br />
employment. The respondent does this by using<br />
Muraik v. Landi in which it was found there was<br />
insufficient evidence to support either <strong>of</strong> these<br />
claims. However, the respondent then compares the<br />
facts <strong>of</strong> the cases to show that, through Mark’s<br />
submission <strong>of</strong> fraudulent records, he is indeed<br />
committing an act <strong>of</strong> moral turpitude. The court<br />
finds that this is dissimilar to the acts <strong>of</strong> fraud within<br />
Muraik due to the fact that Mark’s actions also had<br />
an adverse affect on a government agency, whereas<br />
the acts in Muraik did not. The respondent then<br />
moved to explore the differences between our case<br />
and that <strong>of</strong> Alston v. Morgan. Alston is used by the<br />
respondent to expose the ruling that “the failure to<br />
report to work and to provide documentation for<br />
absences as an employee is directed to do, is a<br />
rational basis for finding misconduct.” These<br />
findings <strong>of</strong> misconduct are then augmented by the<br />
respondents showing that the actions committed by<br />
Mark were much more severe than in the Alston case.<br />
The respondent provided sufficient evidence to prove<br />
that Mark’s transgressions were <strong>of</strong> moral turpitude as<br />
well as detrimental to a government agency, thus we<br />
find termination to be an appropriate punishment.<br />
The second issue in this case similarly addresses the<br />
acts <strong>of</strong> moral turpitude and those detrimental to a<br />
government agency when compared to the reputable<br />
career <strong>of</strong> Mark Rutkowsky in order to determine the<br />
appropriateness <strong>of</strong> the revocation <strong>of</strong> pension. The<br />
respondent highlights the variations between our case<br />
and that <strong>of</strong> Iarocci v. West Haverstraw in order to<br />
emphasize the severity <strong>of</strong> the circumstances <strong>of</strong><br />
Mark’s actions. The respondent successfully argued<br />
that, unlike Iarocci, Mark’s absences were<br />
unauthorized and no documentation was provided,<br />
thus the rulings <strong>of</strong> Iarocci should not apply. This<br />
argument sufficed in negating the mitigating factors<br />
that would ordinarily apply due to Mark’s extensive<br />
career with the <strong>YMCA</strong>. Mark’s immoral crime <strong>of</strong><br />
fraud and stealing from another <strong>YMCA</strong> program for<br />
his own interests strongly overrode any career<br />
accolade he received throughout his lifetime.<br />
Following that point, the respondent proceeded to<br />
contrast our case to that <strong>of</strong> Goudy v. Schaffer, in<br />
which “the evidence did not establish, nor does the<br />
respondent suggest, that the petitioner’s misconduct<br />
was one <strong>of</strong> moral turpitude or motivated by malice or<br />
selfishness.” While the appellants attempted to argue<br />
that Mark’s actions were on behalf <strong>of</strong> the students,<br />
we agree with the respondents that Mark was, in fact,<br />
acting out <strong>of</strong> selfishness. We agree with the<br />
respondent in this regard due to Mark’s connection to<br />
the success <strong>of</strong> the program and the fact that the<br />
greater the amount <strong>of</strong> students who attended this<br />
program, the greater the benefits to Mark’s<br />
reputation. Due to these findings, we conclude that<br />
the revocation <strong>of</strong> Mark’s pension is the appropriate<br />
punishment given the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case.<br />
We concur with the respondents and move to uphold<br />
the decision <strong>of</strong> the trial court.<br />
43
Team 2 v 8<br />
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v. THE<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong>, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
COUNSEL:<br />
for Appellant.<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
Evan Prentice and Dan Liesner,<br />
Steven Viele and Nichole<br />
Rubertone, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole, Galusha,<br />
Muthig<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent as for the<br />
termination <strong>of</strong> his position, and in favor <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Appellant as for keeping his pension after a<br />
deduction <strong>of</strong> $20,000. The respondent proved<br />
that Rutkowski’s actions were no longer worthy<br />
<strong>of</strong> him being employed with the <strong>YMCA</strong>. The<br />
appellant showed that Rutkowski’s actions were<br />
not harmful enough to toward the <strong>YMCA</strong> for<br />
him to lose his pension, but were harmful<br />
enough for him to get $20,000 deducted from his<br />
pension.<br />
Crucial to this case was the fact <strong>of</strong> whether or<br />
not “termination imposed on [Mark Rutkowski]<br />
by [the <strong>YMCA</strong>] was ‘disproportionate as to<br />
shock one’s sense <strong>of</strong> fairness.” In Iarocci v.<br />
West Haverstraw. We review the search <strong>of</strong> the<br />
“standard for determining the appropriate<br />
penalty when a finding <strong>of</strong> guilt has been found<br />
in an administrative proceeding and punishment<br />
imposed.” The petitioners were unable to cover<br />
any part <strong>of</strong> this cross case that makes it unable to<br />
cite any arguments and benefits in the case. The<br />
respondent was able to cover how Rutkowski<br />
didn’t have excused absences, and provide the<br />
proper documents in order to show how it is<br />
irrelevant. In the case, like in Muraik v Landi we<br />
held that submitting falsified documents to ones<br />
superiors does not constitute as a reasonable<br />
justification for losing one’s pension. However<br />
in our case because Rutkowski embezzled<br />
$20,000 we deduct that from his pension and<br />
because <strong>of</strong> the embezzlement we terminate his<br />
position at the <strong>YMCA</strong> as the respondent argued.<br />
The petitioner’s used Muraik v Landi to show<br />
Rutkowski’s long history as a distinguished<br />
employee. They also showed the devastation that<br />
would come if we took away his pension and the<br />
affect on his family and his future. In addition<br />
they were able to prove that Rutkowski wasn’t<br />
motivated by malice and selfishness in his<br />
actions. The respondents used the case in how<br />
Rutkowski willingly and knowingly submitted<br />
falsified records and documents. Unlike in<br />
Goudy v. Schaffer where the court suggested<br />
that where “a petitioner’s misconduct was one<br />
<strong>of</strong> moral turpitude or motivated by malice or<br />
selfishness” would result in loss <strong>of</strong> a pension it<br />
doesn’t compare to the appellant because<br />
Rutkowski wasn’t guilty <strong>of</strong> moral turpitude.<br />
Also the petitioners had ‘to change the ruling <strong>of</strong><br />
termination because <strong>of</strong> the affect it would<br />
impose on the family” for this reason Rutkowski<br />
was able to keep his pension. Although<br />
embezzlement usually constitutes a crime <strong>of</strong><br />
moral turpitude the case at bar is the rare<br />
exception. The petitioners failed to use this case<br />
in a way to prove Rutkowskis innocence’s. The<br />
respondents were able to show guilt on<br />
Rutkowski because <strong>of</strong> the one stain on his<br />
record. The petitioners were able though to show<br />
how he quickly took care <strong>of</strong> the Bowerman<br />
Speedo incident, and how nothing has happened<br />
like it again. In the end both sides contradicted<br />
what they said by agreeing on the loss <strong>of</strong> job but<br />
keeping <strong>of</strong> the pension and the deduction <strong>of</strong>f <strong>of</strong><br />
the pension.<br />
We hereby find in favor <strong>of</strong> both the appellant<br />
and respondent by rewarding the appellant his<br />
pension and the respondent with the termination<br />
<strong>of</strong> Rutkowski and a deduction <strong>of</strong> $20,000<br />
44
Team 4 v 14<br />
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v. THE<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong>, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
COUNSEL:<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
Joey Catalano, for Appellant.<br />
Jordin O'Reilly and Lynsey<br />
Springman, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,<br />
Kappel, Sutton<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, The<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong>. The respondent properly sufficed to<br />
show that Officer Bugenis’ decision should be<br />
upheld. The respondent adequately proved that<br />
Mark Rutkowski’s punishment was not arbitrary<br />
and capricious, did not “shock one’s sense <strong>of</strong><br />
fairness” and was proportionate to his crime.<br />
Crucial to this case was the determination <strong>of</strong><br />
whether the punishment <strong>of</strong> the lower court was<br />
“proportionate” to the crime. According to<br />
Iarocci v. West Haverstraw, 31 Misc. 3d 1222A<br />
(N.Y. 2011) “the test is whether such<br />
punishment is ‘…..so disproportionate to the<br />
<strong>of</strong>fense, in light <strong>of</strong> all the circumstances, as to be<br />
shocking to one’s sense <strong>of</strong> fairness.’” In Iarocci,<br />
the court annulled the termination where<br />
Iarocci’s termination was based on excessive<br />
absences due to hospitalizations for medical<br />
reasons. Unlike in Iarocci, however,<br />
Rutkowski’s absenses in this case were tainted<br />
by moral turpitude because he was using the<br />
time to falsify records and misappropriate funds.<br />
While the petitioner showed that Rutkowski’s<br />
40-year career was notable, Rutkowski’s<br />
negative actions out-weighed the positive years<br />
he spent with the Y. Therefore, the respondent<br />
proved that Rutkowski’s punishment <strong>of</strong> losing<br />
his job and pension was proportional to the<br />
crime <strong>of</strong> committing fraud and falsifying<br />
records.<br />
The respondent adequately proved that<br />
Rutkowski’s actions were ones constituting<br />
“moral turpitude.” As stated in Goudy v.<br />
Shaffer, 24 A.D.3d 764 (N.Y. 2005) “…the<br />
petitioner’s misconduct was one <strong>of</strong> moral<br />
turpitude or motivated by malice or selfishness.”<br />
In the case <strong>of</strong> Goudy, there were 42<br />
specifications <strong>of</strong> incompetence, but none were as<br />
severe as the <strong>of</strong>fenses Rutkowski committed.<br />
Rutkowski’s use <strong>of</strong> the <strong>YMCA</strong>’s money in order<br />
to further his own interest in the Youth and<br />
Government program proved to be motivated by<br />
selfishness and his failure to ask permission<br />
constituted malice.<br />
In addition, the court needs to make a<br />
determination <strong>of</strong> whether the punishment <strong>of</strong> the<br />
lower court is “shocking to one’s sense <strong>of</strong><br />
fairness.” In Muraik v. Landi, 19 A.D.3d 697<br />
(N.Y. 2005), Muraik’s termination was reversed<br />
even where there were “several instances <strong>of</strong><br />
misconduct by the petitioner in knowingly<br />
submitting false time records for his<br />
subordinates,” because <strong>of</strong> the “minimal<br />
prospects <strong>of</strong> alternative employment thus<br />
imposing a devastating impact on his ability to<br />
support his family.” In the case at bar,<br />
Rutkowski acted in such a way that reflected<br />
moral turpitude, unlike the case involving<br />
Muraik. The respondent proved that Rutkowski<br />
knowingly submitted false records while<br />
“redirecting” <strong>YMCA</strong> funds. Therefore, the<br />
matter <strong>of</strong> removing Rutkowski’s pension, could<br />
not constitute a “shock to one’s sense <strong>of</strong><br />
fairness.”<br />
In conclusion, even though the petitioner<br />
brought about points that were notable, the court<br />
has decided that the hearing <strong>of</strong>ficer’s decision<br />
will be upheld, and that the punishment with<br />
proportionate to the crime committed.<br />
45
Team 7 v 9<br />
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v.<br />
THE <strong>YMCA</strong>, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Vimbai Ushe and Erin<br />
L<strong>of</strong>tus, for Appellant.<br />
Katie Roxstrom and Kathryn Rowan, for<br />
Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,<br />
Blaszczyk, Furia<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, the<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong>. The respondent properly established<br />
that Mark acted against the interests <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong> when redirecting the company’s<br />
$20,000. The respondent also proved that it is<br />
not shocking to one’s sense <strong>of</strong> fairness to take<br />
Mr. Rutkowski’s pension as his actions<br />
constituted moral turpitude.<br />
Fundamental to this case is, understanding the<br />
definition <strong>of</strong> moral turpitude which is being<br />
“motivated by malice or selfishness” as cited in<br />
Robert Muraik v. Anthony M. Landi. The<br />
respondent proved that Mark’s actions were <strong>of</strong><br />
moral turpitude as he stole a substantial sum <strong>of</strong><br />
money from the <strong>YMCA</strong> to improve his own<br />
image. The <strong>YMCA</strong>’s Youth & Govt. program<br />
was Mark’s brain child and this court finds that<br />
this was one <strong>of</strong> Mr. Rutkowski’s ‘pet projects’ in<br />
that in making the Youth and Govt. program<br />
look better was in his best interest. Therefore we<br />
hold that in this sense he was acting not with<br />
malice, but with selfishness alone in his<br />
reallocating the <strong>YMCA</strong>’s resources. Although<br />
the transported money did benefit an extra<br />
hundred students, Mark only did this to maintain<br />
the longevity <strong>of</strong> the program and his own job.<br />
When regarding mitigating factors, counsel<br />
proved that past factors have no control upon<br />
present situations. Specifically, Mark’s generally<br />
flawless career <strong>of</strong> 40 years except for the<br />
Bowerman Speedo Incident <strong>of</strong> 2003 should not<br />
be considered by the court as committing fraud<br />
outweighs such deeds.<br />
Next, the respondent clearly expressed that it is<br />
not shocking to one’s sense <strong>of</strong> fairness to take<br />
away Mr. Rutkowski’s pension. In the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Goudy v. Schaffer, William Goudy was able to<br />
keep his job and pension though he had 42<br />
specifications <strong>of</strong> incompetence and misconduct.<br />
Counsel effectively proved that Mark has no<br />
resemblance to Mr. Goudy as incompetence and<br />
misconduct is in no way similar to lying to one’s<br />
employers while committing fraud. Council<br />
proved that by allowing Mark to keep his<br />
pension, the <strong>YMCA</strong> would be setting a<br />
precedent to condone moral turpitude as long as<br />
the outcome works in the company’s favor.<br />
Respondent stressed that to respect <strong>YMCA</strong><br />
values such as honesty the organization must not<br />
give any benefits to Mark.<br />
With such evidence provided, we agree in the<br />
lower court’s decision to terminate Mark’s<br />
career and pension<br />
46
Team 2 v 20<br />
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v.<br />
THE <strong>YMCA</strong>, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Dan Liesner and Evan<br />
Prentice, for Appellant.<br />
Ashley Hampson and Brian<br />
Shiminski, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,<br />
Blaszczyk, Furia<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
find in favor <strong>of</strong> the appellant, Rutkowski.<br />
The appellant successfully proved that<br />
Rutkowski's termination and loss <strong>of</strong> pension<br />
were too severe. The appellant adequately<br />
proved that Rutkowski’s actions did not<br />
constitute as moral turpitude.<br />
The crucial issue <strong>of</strong> this case was that<br />
Rutkowski's punishment <strong>of</strong> termination from<br />
his job was disproportionate to the <strong>of</strong>fense.<br />
The appellant compared the case at bar to<br />
Muraik v. Landi, in which the appellant had<br />
a 29 year career with only one incident prior<br />
to the act <strong>of</strong> fraud. Similarly, Rutkowski<br />
was a model employee with many years <strong>of</strong><br />
good service and only one prior <strong>of</strong>fense.<br />
Though both employees committed fraud,<br />
the appellant argued that Rutkowski acted<br />
without "malice or selfishness." Rutkowski's<br />
actions were most certainly motivated by a<br />
desire to serve the students <strong>of</strong> the Youth and<br />
Government program, who were not able to<br />
pay for the conference.<br />
The appellant in our case also successfully<br />
compared the records <strong>of</strong> these men, arguing<br />
that Rutkowski's service overrode his fraud.<br />
In the case <strong>of</strong> Romano v. Town Board <strong>of</strong><br />
Town <strong>of</strong> Colonie, the petitioner had received<br />
several warnings about his excessive<br />
absenteeism. Appellant demonstrated that<br />
Rutkowski had received no warning prior to<br />
his termination and that this termination was<br />
erroneous and thusly, merited a new trial.<br />
The appellant also used Alston v. Morgan to<br />
counter that Rutkowski's absences were not<br />
excessive and took place over a shorter<br />
time-span.<br />
The second most crucial issue was that <strong>of</strong><br />
the petitioner's pension. The petitioner<br />
defined a pension as an award for good<br />
service. In the case <strong>of</strong> Goudy v. Schaffer,<br />
the petitioner was terminated after 42 counts<br />
<strong>of</strong> incompetence and misconduct, yet his<br />
pension was restored after they determined it<br />
was too severe a punishment. Similar to<br />
Rutkowski's case, Goudy had to provide for<br />
his family. The appellant in our case did not<br />
excuse Rutkowski's act <strong>of</strong> fraud, and<br />
recognized that Rutkowski inappropriately<br />
redirection $20,0000. The petitioners<br />
argued that Rutkowski's prior service earned<br />
him the right to keep his pension, and<br />
encouraged that his only punishment be<br />
repaying the money that he had taken for the<br />
Youth and Government program. He<br />
compared Rutkowski's right to maintain his<br />
pension to Muraik v. Landi, where it was<br />
determined that due to his years <strong>of</strong> good<br />
service, and that because Mark had a family<br />
support, he deserved his pension.<br />
We believe that the decision <strong>of</strong> the lower<br />
court should be overturned and that<br />
Rutkowski receives both his job and pension<br />
with the $20,000 he embezzled, deducted<br />
from his pension.<br />
47
Team 7 v 13<br />
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v. THE<br />
<strong>YMCA</strong>, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
COUNSEL:<br />
for Appellant.<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
Erin L<strong>of</strong>tus and Vimbai Ushe,<br />
Liam McGurl, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,<br />
Kappel, Sutton<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York partially affirm and partially overturn the<br />
decision <strong>of</strong> the lower court. The appellant<br />
properly justified the security <strong>of</strong> Mark<br />
Rutkowski’s pension while the respondent<br />
properly justified the termination <strong>of</strong> Mark<br />
Rutkowski. The appellant successfully proved<br />
that the 40-year career <strong>of</strong> Mark Rutkowski<br />
provided a sufficient reason to keep his pension.<br />
The respondent on the other hand proved that<br />
Rutkowski’s absences, along with the<br />
redirecting <strong>of</strong> $20,000, was sufficient grounds<br />
for termination.<br />
Crucial to this case is the determination <strong>of</strong> when<br />
a removal <strong>of</strong> a pension is improper. In the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Muraik v. Landi, termination <strong>of</strong> a pension<br />
was improper where Muraik’ had a 29-year<br />
career and the evidence showed that it would<br />
impact the ability to support his family. The<br />
petitioners successfully analogized the 40-year<br />
career <strong>of</strong> Mark Rutkowski and the impact a<br />
pension has on his ability to support his family<br />
to the Muraik case. The petitioner also<br />
successfully argued that a pension is a reward<br />
for past years <strong>of</strong> good service and Mark<br />
Rutkowski had 40 great years as a <strong>YMCA</strong><br />
employee, as seen through his positive impact<br />
on the Youth and Government program.<br />
The respondent failed to cite case law that would<br />
justify the removal <strong>of</strong> Mark Rutkowsky’s<br />
pension. Although the respondent brought about<br />
the Alex Bowerman “speedo” incident in 2003,<br />
he could not refute the argument presented by<br />
the petitioner. The respondent attempted to<br />
tarnish Mark Rutkowski’s almost clean slate<br />
with this prior incident, but the Court finds that<br />
this single incident does not cast a shadow on<br />
Mark’s otherwise exemplary 40-year career.<br />
Along with bringing about the Alex Bowerman<br />
“speedo” incident, the respondent tried to refute<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> Muraik v. Landi but could not<br />
differentiate that case from the current case. In<br />
conclusion, the Court finds that the removal <strong>of</strong><br />
Mark Rutkowski’s pension is shocking to one’s<br />
sense <strong>of</strong> fairness and must be reversed.<br />
Secondly, a crucial factor <strong>of</strong> this case is when<br />
termination <strong>of</strong> employment is considered just. In<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> Alston v. Morgan it states, “the<br />
determination that the petitioner be dismissed<br />
was not so disproportionate to the <strong>of</strong>fenses<br />
committed as to be shocking to one’s sense <strong>of</strong><br />
fairness.” Here, the respondent successfully<br />
used the case <strong>of</strong> Alston v. Morgan to justify<br />
termination on the grounds <strong>of</strong> Mark Rutkowski’s<br />
numerous absences. The respondent linked<br />
Alston’s unauthorized absences to Mark<br />
Rutkowski’s unauthorized absences. Also, the<br />
respondent emphasized that the absences in this<br />
case were for used to commit fraud,<br />
strengthening the justification for termination.<br />
Furthermore, the Court agrees with the<br />
Respondent that the <strong>YMCA</strong> needs to set a<br />
precedent for those who commit crimes <strong>of</strong> moral<br />
turpitude and Mark must be used to set this<br />
precedent. The petitioners failed to convince the<br />
Court that Mark’s absences should not being<br />
grounds for termination <strong>of</strong> his employment.<br />
While the petitioners attempted to distinguish<br />
Mark’s personality from his misconduct, we find<br />
that the termination <strong>of</strong> Mark Rutkowski’s job<br />
was an appropriate punishment for his <strong>of</strong>fense<br />
and is not shocking to one’s sense <strong>of</strong> fairness.<br />
With respect to the pension, we overturn the<br />
lower court’s decision. With respect to the<br />
termination <strong>of</strong> employment, the lower court’s<br />
decision is affirmed.<br />
48
Case B <strong>2012</strong><br />
Raphael Ortega, Appellant<br />
v.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, Respondents<br />
Supreme Court Appellate Division, First Department<br />
New York<br />
Facts <strong>of</strong> the Case:<br />
In February 2001, best friends Raphael Ortega and Atrion Raimundi attended the whitest wedding known<br />
to man in Saratoga New York. In fact they were the only two minorities at the event which even included the people<br />
working. Atrion is a 6'3", light skinned, clean shaven African American with a shaved head weighing in at 220<br />
pounds on a good day. Raphael is <strong>of</strong> mixed race <strong>of</strong> Puerto Rican/Dominican descent with dark skin, a full head <strong>of</strong><br />
hair, goatee, approximately 5'9" and 160 pounds wet at least until he gained ten pounds studying for the bar. Also<br />
attending the wedding was Flynn Jebb who was Raphael’s ex (after a very bitter breakup) and Atrion’s current date.<br />
During the wedding Atrion approached “Slick Sam” the D.J. and requested the Electric Slide. Five minutes later<br />
Raphael approached Sam and asked for the Cha Cha Slide and Sam replied, you just requested electric slide.<br />
Raphael, who was angry, replied, no that was the other black guy. Later that evening many wedding guests saw a<br />
person they described as a minority in and around “Slick Sam”’s DJ equipment. At the end <strong>of</strong> the night “Slick<br />
Sam” reported that his $5000 digital mixer was missing and told the police that the “other black guy” must <strong>of</strong> stolen<br />
it. He later identified Raphael in a line up. Two other people identified Raphael as the minority near the dance<br />
floor and one other witness was unsure. The police also interviewed Flynn who stated Atrion was with her most <strong>of</strong><br />
the evening but was also constantly on the dessert line (which was not near the dance floor) and that she saw<br />
Raphael on the dance floor. Atrion stated he was mostly on the desert line and had the waistline to prove it. He<br />
also stated Raphael loved to dance and no matter what wedding they were at he would be found on the dance floor<br />
or on the dessert line with him. Two days before trial Raphael’s attorney contacted the prosecutor and told him that<br />
they would be calling Atrion as an alibi witness.<br />
The matter proceed to trial. Raphael’s attorney’s opening argument centered around Atrion providing an<br />
alibi for Raphael that involved a lot <strong>of</strong> high calorie desserts. Raphael’s attorney also subpoenaed Atrion as a defense<br />
witness. Atrion either misread the subpoena or the subpoena was wrong and showed up to trial on the first day and<br />
was told to come back when it was the defense case. Slick Sam testified he had not really gotten Atrion and<br />
Raphael mixed up, it was only he did not like the Cha Cha slide so he was trying to anger Raphael. Flynn Jebb<br />
testified consistent with the above and included that Raphael had come back to their table at the wedding and retold<br />
the “other black guy” story to the other guests who made him even angrier because they could not stop laughing.<br />
No one testified to seeing Atrion and Raphael together on the dessert line but several people remember Atrion eating<br />
an entire cake. The People rested at 3p.m. and Judge Colleen Murtagh asked Raphael’s attorney to call his first<br />
witness. Atrion was not in the courtroom and the attorney asked for an adjournment to the next day. The next day<br />
the attorney made the representation that he had spoken to Atrion on the phone and he had agreed to be there first<br />
thing in the morning. Judge Murtagh then asked where was Atrion and the lawyer did not have an answer. The<br />
lawyer asked for a second adjournment until two p.m. which was granted. At 2 p.m. the attorney made the<br />
representation that he had talked to Atrion’s family who had stated he had missed the bus because he could not run<br />
fast enough and they were not sure how far he would have to walk to court. Raphael’s attorney asked for a material<br />
witness warrant which was denied. Judge Murtagh also denied the next request for a continuance and made Raphael<br />
proceed. Raphael conferred with his counsel for about ten minutes after which Judge Murtagh became impatient<br />
and asked if the defendant was going to testify. The attorney asked for a 15 minute break, which was granted and<br />
then for another 30 minute break which was denied. Judge Murtaugh muttered something like this trial needs to<br />
end in the next six months. Then Raphael testified that Atrion was with him on the dessert line for significant times<br />
during the wedding and the prosecution cross him on the fact that Atrion only came to light two days before the trial.<br />
Raphael was convicted and sentence to one year in jail.<br />
Raphael now appeals the judge’s decision to deny his third request for a continuance on the grounds that<br />
Judge Murtaugh’s denial <strong>of</strong> the two motions for adjournment violated his rights to call witnesses on his behalf and to<br />
effectively confer with his counsel.<br />
The following cases are the only cases you may use in your brief.<br />
People v Adair, 84 A.D.3d 1752 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2011)<br />
People v. Foy, 32 N.Y.2d 473 (N.Y. 1973)<br />
People v. Singleton, 41 N.Y.2d 402 (N.Y. 1977)<br />
People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d 698 (N.Y. 1984)<br />
49
Team 15 v 60<br />
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE<br />
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW<br />
YORK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,<br />
Third Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Aaron DeLoria and Alex<br />
Ruzbacki, for Appellant.<br />
Ethan DeAbreau and Jeff<br />
Gao, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,<br />
Blaszczyk, Furia<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate court <strong>of</strong> the state <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, the<br />
People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York. The issue<br />
in this case was whether or not the judge<br />
abused his discretion in denying a third<br />
adjournment. The respondents adequately<br />
disproved the test in People v. Foy that<br />
states, “to put <strong>of</strong>f trial it must appear that:<br />
(1) that the witness really is material and<br />
appears to the court to be so; (2) that the<br />
party who applies has been guilty <strong>of</strong> no<br />
neglect; (3) that the witness can be had at<br />
the time to which the trial is deferred. “ The<br />
state proved that the Foy test was not<br />
applicable in this case.<br />
First, they successfully proved that<br />
Raimundi was not a material witness due to<br />
the fact that he would not provide a proper<br />
alibi for Raphael Ortega. The state properly<br />
explained that it was simply not possible for<br />
the two minorities to be together the entire<br />
night. Another case law concerning a<br />
material witness is People v. Adair. They<br />
successfully compared the nonmaterial<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer in question in Adair to Atrion<br />
Raimundi. We therefore find Raimundi was<br />
not material.<br />
With regards to the second prong, the<br />
respondents successfully proved that the<br />
appellants had shown neglect throughout the<br />
trial. They properly expressed the different<br />
possibilities the appellants could have taken<br />
to provide their “material witness.” They<br />
provided examples such as providing a car,<br />
or providing another subpoena for Atrion<br />
Raimundi.<br />
And lastly, the respondents disproved the<br />
third prong by mentioning the errors within<br />
the subpoena. They mentioned the<br />
importance <strong>of</strong> due diligence and gave proper<br />
examples <strong>of</strong> how to improve the actions <strong>of</strong><br />
the appellants.<br />
The respondents also properly disclosed the<br />
second issue <strong>of</strong> whether or not the judge had<br />
shown bias by not granting a third<br />
adjournment. They adequately explained the<br />
issue <strong>of</strong> time. The appellants had over 23<br />
hours, which was found by the respondents<br />
to be plenty <strong>of</strong> time to revise their argument.<br />
They also properly compared this situation<br />
to People v. Singleton, where they only had<br />
17 hours to prepare a new argument. The<br />
respondents properly expressed the logical<br />
reasoning for <strong>of</strong> Judge Murtaugh’s denial <strong>of</strong><br />
a third adjournment by proving how<br />
unprepared the appellants were by not<br />
providing a backup for their argument. We<br />
agree with the original ruling <strong>of</strong> the court<br />
and certify that Raphael’ Ortega’s<br />
conviction came at the conclusion <strong>of</strong> a<br />
properly conducted and fairly run trial.<br />
50
Team 17 v 24<br />
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE<br />
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,<br />
Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Kiersten Chambers and Kassie<br />
Chopa, for Appellant.<br />
Daniel Shwartz, Colton Bishop,<br />
and Rebecca Sung, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,<br />
Kappel, Sutton<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, The State<br />
<strong>of</strong> New York. The respondent properly showed<br />
that the judge’s decision to deny Raphael<br />
Ortega’s third request for a continuance was not<br />
violating his right to call a witness and the right<br />
to effectively confer with his council.<br />
The respondent’s properly showed that Ortega’s<br />
rights to call a witness were not violated by<br />
using the test outlined in The People <strong>of</strong> the State<br />
<strong>of</strong> New York v. Foy. The test consists <strong>of</strong> three<br />
prongs, 1. That the witness is really material and<br />
appears to the court to be so; 2. That the party<br />
who applies has been guilty <strong>of</strong> no neglect and 3.<br />
That the witness can be had at the time to which<br />
the trial is deferred. The appellants attempted to<br />
prove that the defense did all they could to reach<br />
Raimundi and to ensure his presence in court.<br />
The respondent properly refuted this by arguing<br />
that a phone call to the family and a delayed<br />
material witness warrant were not enough to<br />
grant a new trial and thus failed the second<br />
element <strong>of</strong> the Foy test. It is required that the<br />
appellant prove that Ortega practiced due<br />
diligence in providing his alibi witness. But, the<br />
respondent’s continued emphasis on the lack <strong>of</strong><br />
communication between Raimundi and Ortega,<br />
as well as the failure to provide transportation,<br />
only confirmed that Ortega lacked due diligence<br />
in providing a witness.<br />
Next, the respondent successfully argued that the<br />
appellant had also failed the third element <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Foy test by inadequately arguing that Raimundi<br />
would in fact arrive if the trial had been<br />
adjourned. The respondent correctly showed<br />
how the two adjournments and the 15 minute<br />
break were adequate amounts <strong>of</strong> time for the<br />
defense to locate their witness. The appellants<br />
failed to prove how Raimundi would have been<br />
any more likely to appear in court, especially<br />
that he could not even be reached after the<br />
subpoena. The request for a third adjournment<br />
was correctly denied since the witness was<br />
proven to be unreliable and elusive.<br />
The respondent lastly proved that Ortega’s right<br />
to effectively confer with his council was not<br />
violated. By correctly citing the case <strong>of</strong> The<br />
People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York v. Spears, the<br />
respondents proved the previously granted<br />
adjournments were ample time for the defense to<br />
prepare their case and that Ortega’s right to<br />
confer with council was not violated. The<br />
respondent showed that when the judge granted<br />
the extra adjournment, the defense should have<br />
discussed alternative ways to prove their case for<br />
the sake <strong>of</strong> efficiency <strong>of</strong> time for the court.<br />
Ortega was granted more than a few minutes to<br />
discuss with his lawyers over the course <strong>of</strong> the<br />
trial. In the case <strong>of</strong> Spears, the judge only<br />
granted a few minutes, while Ortega was given<br />
sufficient time to discuss the possibility <strong>of</strong> the<br />
witness not appearing.<br />
We disagree that Raphael Ortega’s third request<br />
for a continuance was violating his right to call a<br />
witness and the right to effectively confer with<br />
his council. We find that the lower court’s<br />
original ruling should not be overturned.<br />
51
Team 21 v 26<br />
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE<br />
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW<br />
YORK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,<br />
Third Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Seth Jaff and Joe Alari, for<br />
Appellant.<br />
Dio Nunez and Koraly<br />
Adams, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole,<br />
Galusha, Muthig<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, the<br />
People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York. The<br />
respondent properly showed that Judge<br />
Colleen Murtagh did not abuse her<br />
discretion by refusing the additional 30-<br />
minute delay. The respondent also proved<br />
that sufficient time was given to confer with<br />
the counsel.<br />
The issue presented in this case is whether<br />
or not the court abused its discretion by<br />
refusing the third adjournment. The rule for<br />
whether or not the court abused its<br />
discretion is the Foy test addressed in<br />
People v. Foy. The Foy test states that “to<br />
put <strong>of</strong>f a trial it must appear (1) that the<br />
witness is really material and appears to the<br />
court to be so; (2) that the party who applies<br />
has been guilty <strong>of</strong> no neglect; (3) that the<br />
witness can be had at the time to which the<br />
trial has deferred.” In People v. Adair the<br />
witness was not material because the <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
was not present during the crime. Similarly,<br />
in our case Atrion was not a material witness<br />
because there are two other witnesses that<br />
stated Atrion and Raphael were not together<br />
the whole night. As to the second Foy test<br />
factor, Raphael was neglectful. He could<br />
have done much more to get Atrion to the<br />
courtroom; there are many means <strong>of</strong><br />
transportation in New York City. They<br />
could have sent him a bus schedule, ordered<br />
a taxi, or taken a subway. Addressing the<br />
third factor <strong>of</strong> the Foy test, there is no way<br />
to be sure Atrion could be present at the<br />
time to which the trial would be deferred.<br />
Atrion failed to attend the two<br />
adjournments. Thus, he has decided to<br />
change his mind and not testify. In sum, all<br />
three factors have not been met.<br />
The second issue presented is whether or not<br />
sufficient time was given to confer with<br />
counsel. In People v. Spears the judge gave<br />
the defendant 5 seconds to confer with<br />
counsel. In Spears the court found that 5<br />
seconds was not enough time. In our case,<br />
15 minutes were given for counsel to confer<br />
with Raphael. That amount <strong>of</strong> time is<br />
sufficient to satisfy the right to counsel.<br />
Unlike Spears, Raphael was given two<br />
previous adjournments when another<br />
argument should have been prepared in case<br />
Atrion did not show up, which was likely<br />
given the fact he did not appear to testify<br />
after two adjournments were granted.<br />
Defense counsel should have prepared<br />
previously. The court properly denied the<br />
second request for an additional 30-minute<br />
delay.<br />
We agree with the original ruling <strong>of</strong> the<br />
court and that Raphael’s conviction came at<br />
the conclusion <strong>of</strong> a properly conducted,<br />
fairly run trial.<br />
52
Team 58 v 28<br />
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE<br />
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,<br />
Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Danamarie Gangon, for Appellant.<br />
Maxwell Beebe and Ceejay L<strong>of</strong>land, for<br />
Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami, Vanini,<br />
King, Finan<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellant Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, The People<br />
<strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York. The respondent<br />
properly illustrated that Judge Murtaugh’s<br />
actions did not deny Raphael Ortega his<br />
constitutional right to call a witness on his<br />
behalf nor his right to effectively confer with<br />
council. The respondent was able to prove that<br />
Judge Murtaugh’s action to deny a third<br />
adjournment was not a violation <strong>of</strong> these rights.<br />
The Sixth amendment grants every citizen the<br />
right to call a witness in his or her defense. In<br />
this case the respondent was able to prove that<br />
Judge Murtaugh did not abuse her discretion<br />
when she denied Raphael Ortega a third<br />
adjournment. In People v. Foy the court cites<br />
People v. Brabson when they say “…the<br />
defendant does not have the right to delay his<br />
trial unreasonably regardless <strong>of</strong> reality.” The<br />
respondent accentuated that since Raimundi<br />
failed to arrive after the first two adjournments<br />
the court could not further delay the trail<br />
because <strong>of</strong> his inability to come at the proper<br />
time. Additionally the respondents explained<br />
that a case cannot be delayed indefinitely when<br />
they explained why Ortega did not deserve a<br />
third adjournment as referenced in People v.<br />
Singleton. In People v. Singleton, three<br />
adjournments were issued prior to denying the<br />
final adjournment. The respondents correctly<br />
correlated Singleton to our case, where Judge<br />
Murtaugh issued two adjournments, proving<br />
there was no abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion.<br />
The third prong <strong>of</strong> the Foy test states, “to put <strong>of</strong>f<br />
a trial it must appear that the witness can be had<br />
at the time to which the trial is deferred”,<br />
respondents proved that Raimundi would most<br />
likely not show up if a third adjournment were<br />
granted. As the respondents successfully argued,<br />
Raimundi’s failures to be present after the first<br />
and second adjournments were enough to<br />
suggest that he would not appear if a third<br />
adjournment had been granted.<br />
Both the respondents and appellants addressed<br />
the second prong <strong>of</strong> the Foy test which<br />
recognizes that to delay a trial “…the party who<br />
applies has been guilty <strong>of</strong> no neglect”. The<br />
appellants argued against this, claiming that the<br />
defendants used due diligence including<br />
contacting Raimundi’s family to try and ensure<br />
his arrival. However, the respondents provided a<br />
stronger argument explaining that Ortega’s<br />
counsel could have taken further measures such<br />
as providing Raimundi a bus schedule to ensure<br />
his arrival to the courthouse on the proper day.<br />
The first prong <strong>of</strong> the Foy test states “…to put<br />
<strong>of</strong>f a trial it must appear that the witness is really<br />
material and appears to the court to be so.”<br />
Judge Murtaugh’s decision to deny the<br />
defendants a material witness warrant proves<br />
Raimundi was not a material witness. While the<br />
appellants argued that Atrion was a material<br />
witness being the only other minority at the<br />
wedding and a friend <strong>of</strong> defendant, the<br />
respondents successfully argued that Raimundi<br />
could not confirm the whereabouts <strong>of</strong> Ortega<br />
every minute <strong>of</strong> the night.<br />
The sixth amendment <strong>of</strong> the constitution also<br />
ensures that one is allowed to refer to their<br />
counsel throughout the duration <strong>of</strong> a trial. As the<br />
respondents stated, in the case <strong>of</strong> People v.<br />
Adair adjournments lie in sound discretion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
court. The respondents correctly connected this<br />
to our case to show that Judge Murtaugh did not<br />
abuse her discretion when she denied Raphael a<br />
thirty minute break to confer with his counsel.<br />
Additionally, referencing the case <strong>of</strong> People v.<br />
Spears, the respondents explained that the judge<br />
in the Spears case openly issued a prejudice<br />
statement where as in this case Judge Murtaugh<br />
simply muttered something under her breath. We<br />
believe the jury used their best discretion upon<br />
hearing Judge Murtaugh’s comment.<br />
We therefore uphold the ruling <strong>of</strong> the lower<br />
court on all issues<br />
53
Team 16 v 23<br />
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE<br />
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,<br />
Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Beth Crimi and Brianna<br />
Connolly, for Appellant.<br />
Mary Stephenson and Krista<br />
Barbeau, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole, Galusha,<br />
Muthig<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, the people<br />
<strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York. The respondent was<br />
able to clearly establish that the amount <strong>of</strong> time<br />
given to the defendant by Judge Murtagh<br />
infringed upon neither the defendant’s right to<br />
call a witness on his behalf nor his right to<br />
affectively confer with his co-council. The<br />
respondent was also able to sufficiently attack<br />
the veracity <strong>of</strong> the materiality <strong>of</strong> Atrion<br />
Raimundi to justify the denial the third<br />
adjournment on the grounds that he was not<br />
sufficiently important to the case as applied to<br />
People v. Foy.<br />
Crucial to this case was the 3 prong Foy test, in<br />
which it is clearly outlined that the criteria for a<br />
new trial to be granted in regard to a lack<br />
witness testimony require: (1) That the witness<br />
is really material and appears to the court to be<br />
so; (2) that the party who applies has been guilty<br />
<strong>of</strong> no neglect (3) that the witness can be had at<br />
the time to which the trial is deferred.<br />
As to the first prong <strong>of</strong> the test, the respondent<br />
was able to cast a reasonable doubt on the<br />
materiality <strong>of</strong> Atrion Raimundi as a witness with<br />
numerous statements by attendees <strong>of</strong> the<br />
wedding that contended that Atrion and Raphael<br />
had minimal interaction during the wedding, and<br />
Atrion was therefore not material enough to<br />
warrant a third adjournment even if he could<br />
have been marginally important to the trial in<br />
question.<br />
As to the second prong <strong>of</strong> the test, the<br />
respondent was able to prove that the defendant<br />
was guilty <strong>of</strong> neglect, by arguing that the<br />
defendant should have been able to get to the<br />
court room in the time allotted due to the<br />
flexibility <strong>of</strong> the New York City transit system.<br />
In regard to the third prong <strong>of</strong> the test, though<br />
the defendant’s contention that Atrion’s<br />
attendance on the wrong day demonstrated his<br />
capacity to be in the courtroom on time was well<br />
received. The respondent was successfully able<br />
to demonstrate that this contention alone was not<br />
enough to justify a new trial. The defendant also<br />
attempted to contend that the Judge Murtagh’s<br />
mutterings during the case were a showing <strong>of</strong><br />
prejudice, similar to People v. Spears. However,<br />
the respondent was able to demonstrate that this<br />
matter, in which the Judge was only alleged to<br />
have whispered a predatory statement, is very<br />
different from Spears, in which the defendant<br />
was berated and abused by the judge.<br />
Finally the defendant argued that the denying <strong>of</strong><br />
the adjournment by judge Murtagh infringed<br />
upon the right <strong>of</strong> the defendant to affectively<br />
confer with his co-council. However the court<br />
agrees that all defendants should have had plan<br />
“A, B, C, D, and E” in case <strong>of</strong> a problem and the<br />
right was not infringed upon.<br />
While the defendant’s contention that the<br />
discretion <strong>of</strong> Judge Murtagh was “not unlimited”<br />
as stated in People v. Singleton was well<br />
received, the arguments <strong>of</strong> the respondent<br />
clearly showed that the lower court judge did not<br />
abuse her discretion. Therefore we find that the<br />
decision <strong>of</strong> the lower court should be upheld and<br />
no new trial to be granted.<br />
Order affirmed, Justices Muthig, Engelmann,<br />
Galusha, and Dole concur.<br />
54
Team 18 v 60<br />
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE<br />
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW<br />
YORK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,<br />
Third Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Auden Lewis and Randi<br />
Ciminello, for Appellant.<br />
Ethan DeAbreau and Jeff<br />
Gao, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: . Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami,<br />
Vanini, King, Finan<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We, the Appellant Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York, find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, the<br />
People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York. The<br />
respondent successfully argued that Judge<br />
Murtaugh did not infringe on Ortega’s<br />
constitutional rights to confer with his<br />
counsel and call witnesses for his defense.<br />
A vital factor in this case is determining<br />
whether or not Ortega’s constitutional right<br />
to call a witness was violated. The case <strong>of</strong><br />
People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York v. Ronald<br />
Foy says that, “to put <strong>of</strong>f a it must appear (1)<br />
that the witness is really material and<br />
appears to the court to be so; (2) that the<br />
party who applies has been guilty <strong>of</strong> no<br />
neglect; (3) that the witness can be had at<br />
the time to which the trial is deferred.” The<br />
Respondent clearly stated that the Foy Test<br />
failed on all counts, and therefore, the trial<br />
cannot be put <strong>of</strong>f simply due to the absence<br />
<strong>of</strong> Atrion Raimundi. The respondents said<br />
that the witness is not material because the<br />
testimony <strong>of</strong> Raimundi could not affect the<br />
outcome <strong>of</strong> the case because there were no<br />
other witnesses that saw them together at the<br />
party. They said that Ortega’s trial attorneys<br />
were guilty <strong>of</strong> neglect because <strong>of</strong> their lack<br />
<strong>of</strong> due diligence. This was proven through<br />
the fact that they could not do something<br />
like provide other transportation methods to<br />
Raimundi. The third prong <strong>of</strong> the trial also<br />
failed because Raimundi did not come for<br />
the first two times he was summoned to<br />
trial, so we do not know if he would be there<br />
another time. The respondent also correctly<br />
compared our case to People v. Adair by<br />
emphasizing that, under the “totality <strong>of</strong> the<br />
circumstances,” Ortega had adequate time to<br />
prepare for the trial. They said that, if the<br />
attorney in the case <strong>of</strong> Adair was able to<br />
prepare for the case in 17 days, Ortega could<br />
clearly be ready to present within a time<br />
frame <strong>of</strong> two months. We agree with the<br />
respondent’s assessment.<br />
Another essential issue in this case<br />
surrounds the situation <strong>of</strong> whether or not<br />
Ortega was allowed the right to confer with<br />
his co-council. The respondents used the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> People v. Spears; they stated that<br />
unlike Spears, the judge gave Ortega more<br />
than just a “few minutes” to consult with his<br />
lawyer. The respondents stated that the<br />
fifteen minutes break Judge Murtaugh<br />
granted Ortega could have been used as<br />
valuable time to confer with his co-council.<br />
In fact, Ortega could have conferred with his<br />
co-council the<br />
We find no abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion. Therefore,<br />
we rule in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondents because<br />
they effectively debated that Judge<br />
Murtaugh did not violate Ortega’s<br />
constitutional rights to confer with his<br />
counsel and call witnesses for his defense.<br />
55
Team 20 v 26<br />
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE<br />
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW<br />
YORK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,<br />
Third Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Shanta Stevens, Raad Alam,<br />
and Armajit Singh, for Appellant.<br />
Dio Nunez and Koraly<br />
Adams, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,<br />
Kappel, Sutton<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the Respondent, the<br />
People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York. The<br />
Respondents sufficiently showed that the<br />
appellant’s right to both call a witness on his<br />
behalf and to effectively confer with his<br />
counsel were not violated.<br />
According to the case <strong>of</strong> People v. Foy , in<br />
order to “put <strong>of</strong>f a trial it must appear that<br />
the witness is really material and appears to<br />
the court to be so; that the party who applies<br />
has been guilty <strong>of</strong> no neglect; that the<br />
witness can be had at the time to which the<br />
trial is deferred.” The respondent’s<br />
adequately showed that Atrion was material<br />
to the case by citing evidence that he was<br />
not present with Raphael at the wedding. In<br />
addition, they demonstrated that the<br />
appellant was guilty <strong>of</strong> some neglect, for if<br />
they really wanted Atrion to appear in court<br />
they could have ensured he had an adequate<br />
source <strong>of</strong> transportation. In regards to<br />
ensuring Atrion’s right to call witnesses on<br />
his behalf.<br />
The respondents also used the case <strong>of</strong><br />
People v. Singleton to show that the amount<br />
<strong>of</strong> adjournments given to the appellant was<br />
sufficient to protect Raphael’s constitutional<br />
right to confer with council. In our case, 2<br />
adjournments as well as a short break were<br />
granted, which the respondents successfully<br />
argued should have been enough time for<br />
the appellant to consult with council.<br />
Because the amount <strong>of</strong> adjournments was<br />
appropriate, the appellants’ right to confer<br />
with council was not violated.<br />
The respondents also stated that the court’s<br />
discretion “in denying a request for an<br />
adjournment will not be overturned absent a<br />
showing <strong>of</strong> prejudice,” as stated in People v.<br />
Adair. They adequately argued that no such<br />
prejudice existed by showing how the<br />
comments made by Judge Murtaugh did not<br />
affect the actions <strong>of</strong> the jury. The<br />
respondents made this clear by comparing<br />
the judge made excessively loud and<br />
prejudicial comments which could easily be<br />
heard by the jury, thus justifying the<br />
granting <strong>of</strong> a new trial. However, in our<br />
case, Judge Murtaugh’s mumbles do not<br />
clearly compare and do not justify the<br />
granting <strong>of</strong> a new trial.<br />
In conclusion, we decide to rule in favor <strong>of</strong><br />
the respondent. We find that no new trial<br />
will be granted, and Raphael’s conviction<br />
will remain.<br />
56
Team 59 v 28<br />
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE<br />
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW<br />
YORK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,<br />
Third Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Ashley Rogers, Claire<br />
Delayne, and Christina Fallone , for<br />
Appellant.<br />
Maxwell Beebe and Ceejay<br />
L<strong>of</strong>land, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,<br />
Blaszczyk, Furia<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, the<br />
People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York. The<br />
respondent sufficiently demonstrated that<br />
Judge Murtagh did not in any way abuse her<br />
discretion. The respondents disproved all <strong>of</strong><br />
the factors in the test outlined in People v.<br />
Foy to determine abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion when a<br />
court denies an adjournment. The<br />
respondent proved that Judge Murtagh did<br />
not abuse her discretion in denying further<br />
consent with counsel.<br />
The issue in this case is whether or not the<br />
lower court abused their discretion in<br />
denying the third adjournment through<br />
application <strong>of</strong> the Foy test. The Respondents<br />
adequately disproved the three criteria <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Foy test which are as follows: (1) that the<br />
witness is really material and appears to the<br />
court to be so, (2) that the party who applies<br />
has been guilty <strong>of</strong> no neglect (3) and that the<br />
witness can be had at the time to which the<br />
trial is deferred. The Respondents proved<br />
the first criteria <strong>of</strong> the Foy test was unmet by<br />
accurately arguing that Atrion is not a<br />
material witness because there was sworn<br />
testimony presented in the trial by both<br />
Flynn Jebb and DJ Slick Sam which stated<br />
that Raphael was on the dance floor all night<br />
and not with Atrion. This case was related to<br />
that <strong>of</strong> People v. Adair in that the judge did<br />
not abuse her discretion due to denying an<br />
adjournment. It was also argued that Atrion<br />
would not be considered material to the case<br />
because he was not called as a witness until<br />
two days before the trial.<br />
The second criterion <strong>of</strong> the Foy test was<br />
additionally not met, as shown by the<br />
respondents. The defense was clearly guilty<br />
<strong>of</strong> neglect and they did not take necessary<br />
steps to make sure Atrion would make it to<br />
court at the time <strong>of</strong> the trial. The defense<br />
should have issued an additional subpoena<br />
and could have made more effort to inform<br />
the witness <strong>of</strong> bus scheduling or they could<br />
have paid for a car to pick him up. The third<br />
criterion was unmet as the respondents<br />
addressed the fact that the witness was given<br />
two opportunities to appear in court and<br />
failed both times and therefore could not be<br />
had at the time to which the trial was<br />
deferred.<br />
The second issue in this case is whether or<br />
not Judge Murtagh abused her discretion in<br />
not allowing the defendant to properly<br />
confer with their counsel. The respondent<br />
stated that “the defense asked for 15 minutes<br />
and they were granted 15 minutes.” This<br />
was put in contrast to People v. Spears<br />
where the judge only gave the defendant a<br />
mere 5 seconds to consult his lawyer. Given<br />
this wide disparity in time pointed out by the<br />
respondents we have determined that it<br />
would be inappropriate to grant the<br />
defendant a new trial as the court did in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> People v. Spears.<br />
Therefore, we agree with the lower court<br />
and uphold their decision to deny the<br />
defendant, Raphael Ortega, a new trial.<br />
57
Team 57 v 25<br />
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE<br />
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,<br />
Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Katie Seeger and Maggie<br />
Miller, for Appellant.<br />
Jasmine Somers, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami, Vanini,<br />
King, Finan<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the appellant, Raphael<br />
Ortega. The appellant properly proved that<br />
Judge Murtaugh’s decision in not granting the<br />
third adjournment was considered as violating<br />
Ortega’s right to call a witness to court.<br />
However, the appellant failed to prove that the<br />
lower court violated the defendant’s right to<br />
confer with his counsel.<br />
An important aspect <strong>of</strong> this case was proving<br />
whether the defendants’ right to call a witness to<br />
stand was violated or not. The appellant proved<br />
that the witness, Atrion Raimundi, was a<br />
material witness because he was an alibi witness<br />
and the whole defense essentially centered his<br />
presence in court. The appellant proceeded to<br />
properly apply the first prong <strong>of</strong> the Foy test,<br />
found in People v. Foy, to support her claim that<br />
Raimundi was essential to the case and that<br />
Judge Murtagh abused her discretion when<br />
denying the third adjournment. The appellant<br />
continued to effectively apply the second and<br />
third prong <strong>of</strong> the Foy test in the argument. They<br />
went about proving the second prong <strong>of</strong> the Foy<br />
test, that the party who applies has been guilty <strong>of</strong><br />
no neglect, successfully by stating that it is the<br />
court is at fault by not issuing the material<br />
witness warrant that was requested in the<br />
original trial. By stating that the court failed to<br />
show importance towards the material witness in<br />
this case proves that a new trial is in order due to<br />
the violation <strong>of</strong> the defendant’s constitutional<br />
right to call a witness to the stand. Finally, the<br />
appellant established that the third prong <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Foy test, that the witness can be had at the time<br />
to which the trial is deferred, was met in this<br />
case. The appellant went on to prove this by<br />
stating that the witness was on his way to court<br />
when he was last contacted and that the thirty<br />
minutes could have, in fact, been enough time<br />
for the witness to get to there. This argument<br />
clarifies the question <strong>of</strong> whether the defendants’<br />
right to call a witness to the stand had been<br />
violated or not and affirms that the lower court<br />
did, indeed, abuse its’ discretion by not granting<br />
the third adjournment.<br />
Another crucial aspect <strong>of</strong> this case was the<br />
proving that Judge Murtagh abused her<br />
discretion when not allowing the defendant<br />
enough time to confer with their counsel. While<br />
the appellant was successful in properly proving<br />
the first aspect <strong>of</strong> the case they failed to address<br />
the second one. The appellant was incorrect in<br />
comparing the case to that <strong>of</strong> People v. Spears,<br />
where a judge vocally expressed impatience and<br />
only allowed the counsel five seconds to confer<br />
with his defendant. This case is incomparable to<br />
that <strong>of</strong> People v. Spears because in our case the<br />
defendant was given a total <strong>of</strong> 23 hours to<br />
effectively confer with their counsel and failed<br />
to properly use that time. The court cannot be<br />
held accountable for the irresponsibility <strong>of</strong> the<br />
defense. Therefore, the appellant failed to show<br />
the court that Judge Murtagh abused her<br />
discretion by not allowing more time for the<br />
defendant to confer with his counsel.<br />
We disagree with the original ruling <strong>of</strong> the court<br />
and certify that Raphael Ortega be granted a new<br />
trial.<br />
58
Case C <strong>2012</strong><br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York, Appellants<br />
v.<br />
Deidre Rubenstrunk, Respondent<br />
Supreme Court Appellate Division, - Fourth Department New York<br />
Facts <strong>of</strong> the Case:<br />
In March <strong>of</strong> 2009, Deidre Greeley and Brian Rubenstrunk moved into a three bedroom fixer-upper in<br />
Mastic Long Island in preparation for their marriage in July 2011. Brian was a handy guy who could fix most<br />
anything so the two began gutting the house to the joists and rafters in an effort to create their “dream home”.<br />
Things began to deteriorate when they began working on the kitchen just days before the wedding. Next door<br />
neighbors Aaron Taggert and Jane Henderson could hear verbal arguments and both clearly remember Deidre<br />
threatening Brian that if the Kitchen was not finished before their honeymoon, he was a dead man.<br />
Brian and Deidre returned from Bora Bora with the kitchen still in disrepair. They hosted a dinner party for<br />
their good friends Jane, Aaron, Kelsey Willford and Logan Bowman. The party was a disaster because a kitchen<br />
cabinet fell on Murphy’s head splitting his skull and then hit Deidre in the back <strong>of</strong> the head as she tried to help<br />
Logan. Deidre was further incensed that all <strong>of</strong> the women guests include her were wearing the exact same outfits<br />
(Michael Kors steel grey dress) which is common in Long Island. All <strong>of</strong> the guests remember Deidre giving Brian<br />
her patented “death look” and quietly saying, “Your finished”. The next morning, Deidre dialed 9-1-1 report Brian<br />
had been shot in the kitchen. The murder weapon was found on the floor next to Brian. No sign <strong>of</strong> forced entry or<br />
fingerprints were found except for those <strong>of</strong> the dinner guests. The police also found a nanny cam (Deidre denied<br />
knowing one existed) that clearly showed a woman <strong>of</strong> Deidre’s height, wearing a steel grey dress shooting Brian in<br />
the kitchen and dropping the gun on the floor. The video was black and white and shot from behind so you did not<br />
see the shooters face and only lasted about 4 seconds. Deidre told police she had been hit in the back <strong>of</strong> the head by<br />
someone around midnight and then work up the next morning. The police found the gun still in place on the floor<br />
but the lab messed up all <strong>of</strong> the potential forensic tests to including a finger print and DNA test <strong>of</strong> the weapon as<br />
well as a gunshot residue test <strong>of</strong> Deidre’s dress.<br />
Based on the testimony <strong>of</strong> the witnesses from the party, and the nanny cam, Deidre was charged and tried<br />
for second degree murder. The main witness for the People was Logan Murphy who give riveting testimony that<br />
Deidre was in a mood to kill that night after her pasta was ruined by the accident. Logan was subjected to extensive<br />
cross examination concerning the extent <strong>of</strong> his injuries from cabinet falling on his head. The second most important<br />
witness was Jane Henderson who corroborated Logan and added about the early fights she could hear next door.<br />
Both Jane and Kelsey were cross examined thoroughly on the fact that they could have been the woman in the video<br />
and that they had potential motives to kill Brian. Kelsey was cross examined about a possible affair she was having<br />
with Brian and the defense produced a picture <strong>of</strong> Brian with his arm around her at a barbeque. Jane was also cross<br />
examined about a potential affair she was having with Brian, but the Judge did not give the defense much leeway<br />
because there was no corresponding picture.. Kelsey and Aaron were less helpful to the prosecution and only<br />
testified things were tense but they could not tell if Deidre was joking when she said he was finished. Aaron could<br />
not remember the earlier arguments. Deidre was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.<br />
Deidre filed a CPL Section 440.10 motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence<br />
approximately 2 months after the trial based on several factors. She included a sworn affidavits that Logan Murphy<br />
had been being treated for memory loss from the time <strong>of</strong> the accident and was actually committed to Stonybrook<br />
University labs for dementia approximately two days after testifying. She also included a sworn affidavit from<br />
Kelsey Willaford that stated a week after the murder Jane Henderson told her that she had killed Brian because he<br />
was obnoxious even though she loved him. Additionally Deidre provided a sworn affidavit from Aaron that stated<br />
about a month after the trial he had been at a bar same bar as Jane and after she had had too much to drink she had<br />
said aloud she was sorry that she killed him, but he was obnoxious after all. Defense counsel attempted to obtain a<br />
sworn affidavit from Henderson but she refused.<br />
The trial judge considered all <strong>of</strong> the Salemi factors and found that Deidre did not meet the six factor test<br />
from the Salemi test but failed to state why. Then he granted the motion for a new trial anyway stating where there<br />
is that much smoke something is probably burning.<br />
The People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York now appeal this decision stating it was not in the judge’s discretion to<br />
grant the motion if the Salemi test is not met. Deidre Rubenstrunk also appeals the ruling because she believes she<br />
did meet the six factor test based on the evidence she has submitted.<br />
The following cases are the only cases you may use in your brief. If other cases are cited in the supplied<br />
cases you may cite them but only for the paragraphs from the original cases.<br />
People v. Salemi, 309 N.Y. 208 (1955) People v. Balan, 484 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1985)<br />
People v. Macon, 924 N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) People v. Powell, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626 (N.Y. County Ct.<br />
1980)<br />
59
Team 29 v 33<br />
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF<br />
NEW YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE<br />
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Justin Viele, Lukas Marra,<br />
and Jon Orday, for Appellant.<br />
Raymond Garcia and Alex<br />
Lester, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,<br />
Kappel, Sutton<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellant Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the Appellant, The<br />
People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York. The<br />
Appellant successfully showed that the<br />
information related to Logan Murphy and<br />
Jane Henderson is not “Newly Discovered<br />
Evidence”, and The Respondent failed to<br />
prove the existence <strong>of</strong> new evidence based<br />
on the test in People V. Salemi. They further<br />
failed to show that this court can allow a<br />
new trial without all six factors <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Salemi test having been met, in the interests<br />
<strong>of</strong> justice as suggested in People V. Balan.<br />
The Appellant proved to the court that the<br />
test detailed in People v. Salemi must be<br />
entirely satisfied in order for evidence to be<br />
considered “Newly discovered”. The<br />
respondent argued that under Balan, the<br />
court has the inherent discretion to grant a<br />
new trial which is not compliant with the<br />
statute in People v. Salemi in the interests <strong>of</strong><br />
justice. If the court were to ever allow a<br />
new trial in the interests <strong>of</strong> justice, a party<br />
must prove that the newly discovered<br />
evidence is trustworthy. The Appellant<br />
proved that in this matter it is not in the<br />
interests <strong>of</strong> justice to grant a new trial<br />
because the alleged new evidence was not<br />
trustworthy. The Appellant showed that the<br />
affidavit which cites Jane Henderson as<br />
having said she killed Brian was not<br />
trustworthy because the comments Jane<br />
made were while she was inebriated and<br />
regardless <strong>of</strong> the fact that affidavit is sworn,<br />
its content is not trustworthy.<br />
While the Respondent proved most <strong>of</strong> the<br />
prongs <strong>of</strong> the Salemi test, they failed to<br />
prove two <strong>of</strong> them, which is not acceptable<br />
for the information they wish to provide to<br />
be counted as “Newly discovered evidence”<br />
warranting a new trial. The Salemi test<br />
states: Newly discovered evidence in order<br />
to be sufficient must fulfill all the following<br />
requirements: 1. It must be such as will<br />
probably change the result if a new trial is<br />
granted; 2. It must have been discovered<br />
since the trial; 3 it must be such as could not<br />
have been discovered before the trial by the<br />
exercise <strong>of</strong> due diligence; 4. It must be<br />
material to the issue; 5. It must not be<br />
cumulative to the former issue; and, 6. It<br />
must not be merely impeaching or<br />
contradicting the former evidence.” The<br />
Appellant proved that the Logan Murphy’s<br />
mental status and dementia could have been<br />
discovered prior to the trial, had the<br />
Respondent’s lawyers done their due<br />
diligence <strong>of</strong> ensuring the mental state <strong>of</strong> the<br />
witness. Furthermore, the Appellant showed<br />
the “new evidence” would have merely<br />
impeached and contradicted what was<br />
presented in the original trial, if Logan were<br />
to be asked to speak again to his former<br />
mental status, he would only contradict<br />
what was originally said. These two facts<br />
nullify the other prongs <strong>of</strong> Salemi test and as<br />
such this information cannot be considered<br />
“newly discovered evidence”<br />
We over turn the lower court’s Judge’s<br />
decision to grant a new trial based on the<br />
interest <strong>of</strong> justice.<br />
60
Team 30 v 36<br />
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW<br />
YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE<br />
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Erin Clark and Hannah Crosby, for<br />
Appellant.<br />
Lauren Navarro and Jenna Maxwell for<br />
Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole, Galusha,<br />
Muthig<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, Deidre<br />
Rubenstrunk. Although, the respondent failed to<br />
persuade the court that all factors <strong>of</strong> the Salemi<br />
test were met, they proved that the judges<br />
original ruling was supported by precedent case<br />
law. The respondents also made clear to the<br />
Court that this ruling was made in the interest <strong>of</strong><br />
justice and was supported by trustworthy<br />
evidence.<br />
The test for this case was outlined in the matter<br />
<strong>of</strong> People v. Salemi. “( 1) such as will probably<br />
change the result if a new case is granted; (2)<br />
discovered since trial; (3) not discoverable<br />
before trial by due dilligence; (4) material to the<br />
issue; (5) not cumulative to the former issue; (6)<br />
not merely impeaching or contradicting former<br />
evidence.” The appellants adequately pointed<br />
out that several factors <strong>of</strong> that Salemi case were<br />
not met. First, the evidence <strong>of</strong> Logan Murphy's<br />
dementia was clearly cumulative because<br />
Murphy was extensively cross examined on his<br />
injuries in the original trial so this new evidence<br />
would be merely building on that. Additionally,<br />
the evidence as presented to the court is merely<br />
impeaching former testimony because Murphy's<br />
medical status serves only to discredit his<br />
original testimony.<br />
The prevailing argument in this case became<br />
whether or not the Salemi Test is necessary in<br />
determining if new evidence is sufficient<br />
grounds for a new trial. On this issue, the<br />
respondents cited the case <strong>of</strong> People v. Balan<br />
which allows a new trial even if the Salemi test<br />
is not met as long as it is in “the interest <strong>of</strong><br />
justice” and complies with the statute for new<br />
evidence, CPL 440.10(g). The first part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
statue requires that the evidence be “such that<br />
would probably change the outcome <strong>of</strong> the<br />
case.” The respondents made apparent to the<br />
Court that Jane's admission <strong>of</strong> guilt coupled with<br />
Murphy's dementia was likely to change the<br />
outcome <strong>of</strong> the case. The second prong<br />
stipulates that it must be such that could not<br />
have been discovered before the trial. Once<br />
again, the respondent's proved that the evidence<br />
supported this because dementia is a condition<br />
that progresses over time and would therefore<br />
could not have been diagnosed before hand. The<br />
sworn statements were given only after Jane<br />
Henderson had admitted to the murder and the<br />
trial was over. Inasmuch, there was absolutely<br />
no way for the court to reasonably expect the<br />
respondents to uncover this beforehand even<br />
with due diligence. In People v. Powell the court<br />
noted that the Salemi case ”sets forth the criteria<br />
which must be satisfied to meet the newl<br />
discovered evidence standard <strong>of</strong> the statute.”<br />
Despite that legal precedent, we are compelled<br />
to agree with the respondent's argument that the<br />
matter <strong>of</strong> People v. Balan is the controlling<br />
precedent because it is the most recent case.<br />
The appellants compared our case to that <strong>of</strong><br />
People v. Macon. However, we must recognize<br />
the clear distinctions between the two cases. In<br />
Macon, one <strong>of</strong> the major reasons a new trial was<br />
not granted was because they lacked sworn<br />
statements. Conversely, in the case at hand, as<br />
stated by the respondents, there were two sworn<br />
statements. The additional evidence <strong>of</strong> Murphy's<br />
dementia was obviously trustworthy because it<br />
was determined by a medical pr<strong>of</strong>essional. In<br />
this matter, we find that there was not a lack <strong>of</strong><br />
“trustworthy evidence” sufficient to necessitate a<br />
new trial<br />
We agree that “where there's smoke, there must<br />
be fire” as stated by the original trial judge and<br />
so in the interest <strong>of</strong> justice order a new trial be<br />
granted to Deidre Rubenstrunk.<br />
61
Team 31 v 38<br />
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF<br />
NEW YORK”, Appellant, v. DEIDRE<br />
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Sarah Holl and Valerie<br />
Manghir, for Appellant.<br />
Ravneet Dhillion and Doug Palacios, for<br />
Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami,<br />
Vanini, King, Finan<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, Deidre<br />
Rubenstrunk. The respondent proved that a<br />
new trial may be granted without meeting all<br />
six factors <strong>of</strong> the Salemi test, which is used<br />
to find new evidence sufficient in court, if<br />
the evidence is in the interest <strong>of</strong> justice.<br />
In the case <strong>of</strong> People v. Salemi, it states that<br />
a new trial cannot be granted unless six<br />
criteria are satisfied. The appellant argued,<br />
through the use <strong>of</strong> People v. Powell, that all<br />
six elements <strong>of</strong> the test must be proven by<br />
the respondent in order for the decision <strong>of</strong><br />
the lower court to be upheld. The respondent<br />
successfully countered this argument and<br />
cited the case <strong>of</strong> People v. Balan, a more<br />
recent precedent, in which the court<br />
“specifically found a new trial may be<br />
granted in the interest <strong>of</strong> justice. Through<br />
the Balan case, the respondents argued that a<br />
new trial can be granted without satisfying<br />
all elements <strong>of</strong> the test if the new evidence is<br />
trustworthy and in the interest <strong>of</strong> justice.<br />
We believe that the respondent successfully<br />
argued that although the new evidence<br />
obtained did not fully satisfy the Salemi test,<br />
it was both trustworthy and in the interest <strong>of</strong><br />
justice.<br />
The respondents argued that Logan<br />
Murphy’s testimony was in the interest <strong>of</strong><br />
justice. They stated from the first factor <strong>of</strong><br />
the Salemi test that the discovery <strong>of</strong> Logan<br />
Murphy’s dementia would probably change<br />
the outcome <strong>of</strong> a new trial. The respondents<br />
then emphasized the third factor <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Salemi test in that the defense practiced due<br />
diligence because there would be no way to<br />
know about Logan Murphy’s dementia<br />
because it is a progressive disease. Finally,<br />
the respondents emphasized the sixth factor<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Salemi test that states “it must not be<br />
merely impeaching or contradicting the<br />
former evidence”. The respondents applied<br />
this by saying this knowledge <strong>of</strong> Logan’s<br />
dementia would not contradict his former<br />
testimony. The new evidence obtained<br />
would emphasize how memory loss could<br />
have affected Murphy’s testimony,<br />
something that was not discussed or<br />
examined in the previous trial.<br />
Also, the respondents successfully proved to<br />
us that the new evidence concerning Jane<br />
Henderson is also trustworthy and necessary<br />
for the pursuit <strong>of</strong> justice. They stated that<br />
the sworn affidavits from Kelsey Willford<br />
and Aaron Taggart, in which Jane<br />
Henderson admitted to being the killer, can<br />
be used in a new trial because it is probable<br />
that it will change the result <strong>of</strong> this new trial.<br />
It goes further to satisfy another element <strong>of</strong><br />
the Salemi test because it was not discussed<br />
in the previous trial and therefore is not<br />
cumulative.<br />
We believe that the ruling <strong>of</strong> the original<br />
court should be upheld and that a new trial<br />
should be granted to Deidre Rubenstrunk<br />
despite her not satisfying the six factor<br />
Salemi test for her new evidence.<br />
62
Team 34 v 39<br />
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF<br />
NEW YORK”, Appellant, v. DEIDRE<br />
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Fatomauta Majadjifor, for<br />
Appellant.<br />
Kenny Reynolds and Philip<br />
Yeh, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,<br />
Blaszczyk, Furia<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the appellant, the State<br />
<strong>of</strong> New York. The appellant sufficiently<br />
proved that Deidre Rubenstrunk did not<br />
meet the test outlined in People v. Salemi,<br />
and therefore did not earn a new trial.<br />
The main issue <strong>of</strong> the case is whether<br />
Rubenstrunk met all six factors <strong>of</strong> the test in<br />
People v. Salemi. The six factors <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Salemi test determine the conditions under<br />
which a new trial can be ordered. The<br />
factors are: it must be such as will probably<br />
change the result if a new trial is granted, it<br />
must have been discovered since the trial, it<br />
must be such as could have not been<br />
discovered before the trial by exercise <strong>of</strong> die<br />
diligence, it must be material to the issue,<br />
and it must not be merely impeaching or<br />
contradicting the former evidence. The<br />
appellant emphasized that in order for the<br />
standard to be met, it is essential for all six<br />
elements to be proven.<br />
The respondent argued that all elements <strong>of</strong><br />
the Salemi test do not need to be met if the<br />
evidence presented is overwhelmingly<br />
trustworthy and in the interest <strong>of</strong> justice by<br />
citing the case <strong>of</strong> People v. Balan. The<br />
appellant proved that Balan is trumped by<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> People v. Powell, which states<br />
that the six element standard is a necessary<br />
precedent. Furthermore, the appellant<br />
demonstrated that the failure <strong>of</strong> one element<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Salemi test must result in no retrial<br />
being granted.<br />
The appellant successfully argued that in<br />
order for new evidence to be found worthy,<br />
the defendant must have practiced due<br />
diligence in finding this evidence previously<br />
and that it could not have been found until<br />
after the trial had occurred. The appellant<br />
demonstrated that the respondent has failed<br />
to prove these elements on both counts.<br />
Logan Murphy's injury and corresponding<br />
mental competency were well know before<br />
the original trial and the discovery <strong>of</strong> a<br />
mental condition only proves that<br />
Rubenstrunk did not practice due diligence<br />
when examining witnesses previously.<br />
Furthermore, a sworn affidavit from Kelsey<br />
Willaford claiming Jane's guilt could have<br />
been obtained before the trial because the<br />
statement was made prior to the original<br />
proceedings. In failing the second and third<br />
elements <strong>of</strong> the Selami test, Rubenstrunk is<br />
not entitled to a new trial.<br />
We believe that the decision <strong>of</strong> the lower<br />
courts should be upheld, and that Deidre<br />
Rubenstrunk should not receive a new trial.<br />
63
Team 31 v 62<br />
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW<br />
YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE<br />
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Sarah Holl and Valerie Manghir<br />
for Appellant.<br />
Seth Steele and Kalia Hoope for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole, Galusha,<br />
Muthig<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the Appellant, the People<br />
<strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York. The appellant showed<br />
that the decision should be overturned because<br />
the prongs in the Salemi case were not met. The<br />
appellant succeeded in this by proving that there<br />
was no new evidence presented and Deidre’s<br />
defense did not express due diligence in the<br />
original trial.<br />
The appellant showed that Deidre provided no<br />
newly discovered evidence through the sixprong<br />
Salemi test. The first prong states “New<br />
evidence will probably change the result at<br />
trial”. The appellant demonstrated that both the<br />
testimonies <strong>of</strong> Logan Murphy and Aaron and<br />
Kelsey would not be new evidence. Logan was<br />
extensively cross examined for memory loss<br />
prior to the trial and because there was no sworn<br />
affidavit for Jane’s testimony, respectively. The<br />
second prong states that the “evidence must have<br />
been discovered since the trial.” This prong was<br />
also not met because the information about both<br />
Jane and Logan was discovered prior to the trial.<br />
Also, the appellant proved that the respond did<br />
not meet the third prong <strong>of</strong> the test. The third<br />
prong is that “evidence could not have been<br />
discovered before trial, even with due<br />
diligence”. The appellant showed that Deidre’s<br />
defense failed to exercise due diligence in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> both Logan and Jane. In the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Salemi, the new information about the witness<br />
going to a mental hospital did not pass this third<br />
factor because they knew <strong>of</strong> the mental illness<br />
before the trial. Similar to our case, the defense<br />
should have known about Logan’s dementia and<br />
they also cross examined him about the memory<br />
loss. Moreover, they should also have known<br />
about Jane’s guilt prior to try because she<br />
admitted to killing Brian to Kelsey prior to trial.<br />
The appellant was also successful in proving that<br />
Deidre failed to fulfill the fifth prong that states<br />
that “evidence is not cumulative to the former<br />
issue.” Moving to the final issue, the evidence<br />
was cumulative to that in the original trial<br />
because it was already considered. As<br />
mentioned above, the fact that Logan had<br />
dementia already came to light in the original<br />
trial when he was extensively cross examined<br />
and Jane was cross-examined about her possible<br />
motive to kill Brian. In sum, regarding the<br />
Salemi factors, the appellant successfully<br />
demonstrated through the facts <strong>of</strong> the case that<br />
Deidre failed to meet the factors.<br />
Next, the appellants successfully argued that the<br />
“interest <strong>of</strong> justice” argument found in People v.<br />
Balan was not a proper basis for granting a new<br />
trial unless the Salemi test was satisfied. People<br />
v. Balan states as follows: “Assuming that the<br />
court has the inherent discretion to grant a<br />
motion which is not in compliance with the<br />
statute the interest <strong>of</strong> justice does not require<br />
that such relief be granted here, given the wholly<br />
untrustworthy nature <strong>of</strong> defendant’s papers….”<br />
Here, there was no trustworthy evidence, so the<br />
interest <strong>of</strong> justice argument does not apply to the<br />
case at hand. While the respondent attempted to<br />
argue that all six factors <strong>of</strong> the Salemi test did<br />
not have to be met in order for a new trial to be<br />
granted, the case <strong>of</strong> People v. Powell states<br />
“[t]he power to grant an order for a new trial,<br />
based upon newly discovered evidence, is purely<br />
statutory and such a power may be exercised by<br />
the court only when the requirements <strong>of</strong> the<br />
statute have been satisfied, the determination <strong>of</strong><br />
which rests in the sound discretion <strong>of</strong> the court”.<br />
Because the respondents failed to meet all six <strong>of</strong><br />
these prongs, it is clear that no new trial can be<br />
granted.<br />
We overrule the decision <strong>of</strong> the lower court and<br />
hold that no new trial be granted.<br />
64
Team 34 v 37<br />
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF<br />
NEW YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE<br />
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Fatomauta Majadji, for<br />
Appellant.<br />
Sarah Busso and Olivia Corder, for<br />
Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami,<br />
Vanini, King, Finan<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We, the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York, rule in favor <strong>of</strong> the appellant. We<br />
believe that the trial judge erred in granting<br />
Diedre a new trial because she did not meet<br />
all six factors <strong>of</strong> the Salemi Test.<br />
The test for the admission <strong>of</strong> newly<br />
discovered evidence, as stated in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
New York v. Salemi contains six points that<br />
explain that “Newly-discovered evidence in<br />
order to be sufficient must fulfill all the<br />
following requirements: 1. It must be such<br />
as will probably change the result if a new<br />
trial is granted; 2. It must have been<br />
discovered since the trial; 3. It must be such<br />
as could have not been discovered before the<br />
trial by the exercise <strong>of</strong> due diligence; 4. It<br />
must be material to the issue; 5. It must not<br />
be cumulative to the former issue; and, 6. It<br />
must not be merely impeaching or<br />
contradicting the former evidence.”<br />
The appellant successfully proved Logan<br />
Murphy’s failure to comply with the Salemi<br />
Test based upon the fifth factor <strong>of</strong> the test.<br />
The appellant’s argument, consisting <strong>of</strong> the<br />
effects <strong>of</strong> dementia, was sufficient to show<br />
that any alleged evidence regarding the<br />
discovery <strong>of</strong> Murphy’s condition was<br />
cumulative to the evidence put forth at the<br />
initial trial. Thus, not complying with the<br />
fifth factor <strong>of</strong> the Salemi Test has<br />
discredited the respondents claim to Murphy<br />
constituting as newly discovered evidence.<br />
The appellant also successfully proved Jane<br />
Henderson’s failure to comply with the<br />
Salemi test based upon the first factor <strong>of</strong> the<br />
test. Due to her inebriated state,<br />
Henderson’s credibility in her statements to<br />
Aaron is compromised and is thus<br />
untrustworthy. This lack <strong>of</strong> credibility<br />
would prevent a different outcome in a new<br />
trial based upon CPL Section 440.30 as<br />
shown underlined in the case <strong>of</strong> New York<br />
v. Macon.<br />
In addition, the appellant’s argument<br />
regarding the interpretation <strong>of</strong> the Salemi<br />
Test sufficed to show that all six factors<br />
must be met in order for a new trial to be<br />
granted as stated by the case <strong>of</strong> New York v.<br />
Powell. Although the respondent posed the<br />
argument that the court should consider the<br />
testimony trustworthy and in the interest <strong>of</strong><br />
justice, thus complying with the<br />
interpretation as set by People v. Balan, they<br />
failed to show that the evidence in our case<br />
was either trustworthy or in the pursuit <strong>of</strong><br />
justice.<br />
Based upon the reasons above, we rule in<br />
favor <strong>of</strong> the appellant and move to overturn<br />
the lower court’s decision.<br />
65
Team 30 v 40<br />
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW<br />
YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE<br />
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Erin Clark and Hannah Crosby for<br />
Appellant.<br />
Massitan Fafana and Karman Saini, for<br />
Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,<br />
Blaszczyk, Furia<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellant Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York<br />
finds in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondent, Diedre Rubenstrunk.<br />
The court finds that Deidre deserves a new trial based<br />
on the premise that she met all six factors <strong>of</strong> the test<br />
outlined in Salemi v. State <strong>of</strong> New York.<br />
The respondent proved that Deidre deserved a new<br />
trial due to the fact that new evidence exists. As<br />
cited in the case <strong>of</strong> People v. Salemi, newly<br />
discovered evidence needs to pass a six prong test in<br />
order to be sufficient in court. The case outlines that<br />
the respondent must satisfy the following: 1. It must<br />
be such as will probably change the result if a new<br />
trial is granted, 2. It must been discovered since the<br />
trial, 3. It must be such as could have not been<br />
discovered before the trial by the exercise <strong>of</strong> due<br />
diligence, 4. It must be material to the issue, 5. It<br />
must not be cumulative to the former issue, and 6. It<br />
must not be merely impeaching or contradicting the<br />
former evidence. The respondent proved that the<br />
outcome <strong>of</strong> the case would most likely change if<br />
evidence was presented that the trial’s primary<br />
witness, Logan Murphy, is suffering from dementia<br />
and memory loss. Furthermore, the respondent<br />
confirmed that Logan’s condition could only have<br />
been discovered after the trial, proving that element<br />
two <strong>of</strong> the Salemi test is satisfied. The respondent<br />
successfully argued that all six elements were met<br />
and that testimony concerning Logan’s mental<br />
competency is material to the case and it would not<br />
serve to merely impeach the witness or to be<br />
cumulative.<br />
New evidence was also found in the testimonies <strong>of</strong><br />
Kelsey Williford and Aaron Taggert concerning Jane<br />
Henderson. The respondent adequately proved that<br />
the two legal documents stating that Jane Henderson<br />
had admitted murdering Brian Rubenstrunk, strongly<br />
satisfied the six elements <strong>of</strong> the Salemi test. As the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> People v. Macon states, and the respondent<br />
confirms, a sworn statement carries more merit than<br />
an unsworn statement. The testimony <strong>of</strong> Williford<br />
and Taggart requires a new trial because the new<br />
evidence was not cumulative or contradicting<br />
because these testimonies were not brought forth in<br />
the first trial. The respondent clearly stated that this<br />
case is unlike People v. Powell, were the evidence<br />
was in fact cumulative.<br />
We agree with the lower court’s decision to grant<br />
Deidre Rubenstrunk a new trial on the premise that<br />
she meets all six factors as set forth in the case <strong>of</strong> The<br />
People v. Salemi.<br />
Additionally, there were two different sworn<br />
affidavits from Kelsey Williford and Aaron Taggert.<br />
The sworn statements also came about a month after<br />
the trial. The third criterion <strong>of</strong> the test says that the<br />
evidence has to have not been able to be discovered<br />
before the trial with the exercise <strong>of</strong> due diligence.<br />
The respondent adequately proved that Deidre could<br />
not have known this information before the trial<br />
because Kelsey was not going to say that Jane<br />
committed the murder, when she was a suspect<br />
herself. The respondent argued that She felt safe<br />
coming out with the statement after she had been<br />
cleared on the accounts <strong>of</strong> murder, and therefore no<br />
longer had a reason not to tell the truth under oath.<br />
The fourth prong states that the evidence must be<br />
material to the issue and Logan’s newly discovered<br />
dementia was completely material due to the fact that<br />
his testimony may be unreliable. The evidence <strong>of</strong><br />
possibility that Jane committed the murder is also<br />
material because Deidre may be kept in jail for a<br />
crime she did not commit. The respondent also<br />
proved that the evidence was not cumulative unlike<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> People v. Powell. The evidence was not<br />
cumulative because Jane’s possible affair was never<br />
brought up in the trial because the Judge did not give<br />
any leeway due to the fact that no picture was<br />
present. The final factor <strong>of</strong> the Salemi test was<br />
proven when the respondent proved that none <strong>of</strong> the<br />
evidence contradicted the evidence presented in the<br />
trial. Deidre now had sworn affidavits accusing Jane<br />
<strong>of</strong> the murder, which had not been done in the<br />
original trial. As the case <strong>of</strong> People v. Macon states, a<br />
sworn statement carries more merit than a unsworn<br />
statement. Logan’s dementia was not contradicting<br />
because he was only tested on his mental state rather<br />
than memory loss which occurs when someone is<br />
diagnosed with dementia.<br />
We agree with the lower court’s decision to grant<br />
Deidre Rubenstrunk a new trial on the premise that<br />
she meets all six factors <strong>of</strong> the Salemi test.<br />
66
Team 35 v 41<br />
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF<br />
NEW YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE<br />
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Nina Feldman and Michelle<br />
Richman, for Appellant.<br />
Kathryn Lippa and Michael<br />
Eyerman for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,<br />
Kappel, Sutton<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the Respondent,<br />
Deidre Rubenstrunk. The Respondent<br />
successfully argued that the standard<br />
outlined in People v. Salemi does not need<br />
to be satisfied and a new trial can be<br />
awarded in the interest <strong>of</strong> justice.<br />
The Appellant did not successfully argue<br />
that the Respondents failed enough prongs<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Salemi test to reverse the lower<br />
court’s grant <strong>of</strong> a new trial. The Appellant<br />
attempted to use the precedent case <strong>of</strong> The<br />
People <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York v.<br />
Bernadette Powell to prove that all six<br />
prongs <strong>of</strong> the Salemi test must be met to<br />
grant a new trial, but were ultimately not<br />
persuasive on this point. The Respondent<br />
successfully countered this argument<br />
through the use <strong>of</strong> People v. Balan which<br />
asserts that all six elements do not need to<br />
be met in the interest <strong>of</strong> justice.<br />
The Respondent demonstrated to the court,<br />
again using Balan, that when evidence is<br />
trustworthy and material to the case, a new<br />
trial must be granted. The two new<br />
affidavits, presented to the court by Kelsey<br />
Williford and Aaron Taggart, were deemed<br />
trustworthy and successfully satisfied a<br />
number <strong>of</strong> the elements in the Salemi test.<br />
The Appellant adequately argued the two<br />
separate confessions from Jane Henderson<br />
would absolutely change the outcome <strong>of</strong> the<br />
original trial and that this information would<br />
not be brought in merely to impeach or<br />
contradict Henderson’s original testimony.<br />
Ultimately it was demonstrated by the<br />
appellant that this information was<br />
trustworthy and therefore a new trial is<br />
necessary.<br />
When considering the evidence surrounding<br />
the severity <strong>of</strong> Logan Murphy’s mental<br />
condition, and the discovery <strong>of</strong> dementia,<br />
the appellant definitively proved that it<br />
would be in the interest <strong>of</strong> justice for this<br />
information to be brought into a newly<br />
granted trial. The Appellant argued that this<br />
information could have been discovered<br />
before the trial but the Respondent<br />
disproved this by stating that the disease is a<br />
progressive disorder and that there was no<br />
way for Rubenstrunk to know before or even<br />
during the trial that Murphy was suffering<br />
from dementia, especially at his young age.<br />
Furthermore, this piece <strong>of</strong> evidence would<br />
have a significant impact on the outcome <strong>of</strong><br />
the case because Murphy acted as the<br />
primary witness in Rubenstrunk’s<br />
conviction.<br />
We agree with the decision <strong>of</strong> the lower<br />
court and confirm that Deidre Rubenstrunk<br />
should be granted a new trial.<br />
67
Case D <strong>2012</strong><br />
Supreme Court Appellate Division, 4th Department<br />
New York<br />
Chuck Maze on behalf <strong>of</strong> 15 Minors<br />
Petitioners<br />
v.<br />
City <strong>of</strong> Albany, New York, Respondents<br />
Facts <strong>of</strong> the Case:<br />
During the 2010 N.Y.S. Y. & G. conference held at the Capital in Albany, 15 minors became trapped on a<br />
City elevator for approximately two hours. During that time their advisors could communicate with them and they<br />
had plenty <strong>of</strong> sugar snacks and c<strong>of</strong>fee since none <strong>of</strong> them had slept the night before. The City quickly dispatched<br />
two state police <strong>of</strong>ficers who acknowledged the growing concern <strong>of</strong> several Youth Advisors while they waited for an<br />
elevator repair technician to arrive and open the door. As a result all 15 student-attorneys were late for their runthroughs<br />
which could <strong>of</strong> been detrimental to their law firms. Waiting at the door when it opened was Chief Legal<br />
Advisor Joe DePadilla who advised the students to quit whining and get to your courtrooms because you are late.<br />
Every student was in time to complete their tasks.<br />
Katie Boardman, who volunteered at the conference had just opened her own firm after clerking for two<br />
years and she smelled her first class action suit with a big contingent fee payout. She contacted the parents <strong>of</strong> the<br />
15 students and interviewed all <strong>of</strong> them concerning their pain and suffering <strong>of</strong> being trapped in the elevator with<br />
only the caffeine laded drinks and snacks they had at the time. None <strong>of</strong> the students seemed that traumatized and<br />
Katie was disappointed. Katie went home and discussed what happened with her husband Jeremy. Jeremy had just<br />
started working as her paralegal after the Democrats shut down Standard and Poors for giving the United States a<br />
bad credit rating. Jeremy told Katie she was asking the wrong questions, she should have asked the students if they<br />
were traumatized because they were late for a requirement enforced by Joe DePadilla who Jeremy found<br />
intimidating in the past. Jeremy suggested they interview every student who had ever worked in the Legal program<br />
in Y & G since 1996. Since Katie had no other clients, the two <strong>of</strong> them spent all their time doing that. They found<br />
the 15 students did suffer a lot <strong>of</strong> anxiety in dealing with Joe especially after the elevator. They also interviewed<br />
2000 former students including Molly Warren and Jane Henderson, who stated they had lived in fear <strong>of</strong> Joe for<br />
years and they easily imagine the psychological damage the students would have suffered being late. The vast<br />
majority <strong>of</strong> students though Joe was no big deal and one student Michael Cousins actually liked him.<br />
Katie and Jeremy filed suit against the City <strong>of</strong> Albany after two years <strong>of</strong> research. Pre-trial deposition,<br />
motions and other matters took another year. The case went to trial for two fiercely litigated weeks with 20<br />
witnesses and the Boardman’s won on all counts. This was the first plaintiffs victory every under a theory that a<br />
third party could cause pain and suffering from an industrial accident. The jury awarded each <strong>of</strong> the students a year<br />
supply <strong>of</strong> red bull and snickers bars. The Boardmans then submitted their costs and fees. They provided two<br />
spreadsheets documenting every interview, all <strong>of</strong> the legal research, motion practice, and trial time which added up<br />
to 2.5 million dollars. Judge Robin Kheleher who presided over the litigation also reviewed the fee request. She<br />
decided to apply the Lodestar method. She set the hourly rate for Katie at $300 (which was the American Bar<br />
Associations reasonable rate for class actions by experienced attorneys in Albany), and for Jeremy at $150 (as a<br />
paralegal) for hours out <strong>of</strong> trial and double that for in trial. She then calculated the hours for the interviews as 1000,<br />
motion practice 200 hours, interrogatories 1000 hours, and trial time 80 hours. Jeremy only billed for ½ the<br />
interviews and Katie for the rest which yielded a sum <strong>of</strong> $633,000. (The judge’s calculation <strong>of</strong> the hours was<br />
derived by the spreadsheets submitted by the Boardmans, the judge reduced the reported hours by 30% in all<br />
categories besides trial from the original hours) Judge Kheleher then reduced the amount by $50,000 because it was<br />
Katie’s first case, increased the amount by $100,000 because it was Katie’s only case, increased it $50,000 because<br />
it was novel, decreased it $25,000 because <strong>of</strong> the amount recovered on behalf <strong>of</strong> each student (approximately<br />
$46.22) for a final total <strong>of</strong> $708,000.<br />
The Boardmans and the City <strong>of</strong> Albany now appeal the Judges determination <strong>of</strong> fees. The City Claims the<br />
amount should be less because the judge did not fully research the reported hours, over counted the interview hours<br />
because so few witnesses were for the plaintiffs (Everyone knows Joe is universally loved by Judicial participants),<br />
over calculated the hourly rate, and did not reduce the fee enough because the students basically recovered a six<br />
pack <strong>of</strong> coke and two snickers bars. The Boardman’s claim the amounts should be more because the judge<br />
arbitrarily reduced the number <strong>of</strong> hours they spent, did not take into account the novelty <strong>of</strong> the suit (making Joe into<br />
a bad guy is very hard to do because he is universally loved by Judicial participants) and did not take into account<br />
they won on all claims.<br />
The following cases are the only cases you may use in your brief. If other cases are cited in the supplied<br />
cases you may cite them but only for the paragraphs from the original cases.<br />
Matakov v. Kel Tech, 924 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1 st Dept. 2011) Fleming v. Barnwell, 865 N.Y.S.2d 706, (3 rd Dept. 2008)<br />
Lunday v. City <strong>of</strong> Albany, 42 F.3d 131 (2 nd Cir. 1994) Rahmey v. Blum, 466 N.Y.S.2d 350 (2 nd Dept. 350)<br />
68
Team 43 v 54<br />
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15<br />
MINOR, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF<br />
ALBANY, NEW YORK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
COUNSEL:<br />
for Appellant.<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
Emily Davis and Devon Drake,<br />
Nikita Mehta and Grace Kockubinski, for<br />
Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami, Vanini,<br />
King, Finan<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York uphold the lower court’s decision and<br />
maintain the fee that Judge Kheleher awarded to<br />
Katie Boardman. A major determining factor <strong>of</strong><br />
this case was whether or not Judge Kheleher<br />
abused her discretion in determining the proper<br />
award for Katie Boardman. Both the petitioner<br />
and the respondent spent a major amount <strong>of</strong> time<br />
detailing with how much the fee should be<br />
augmented or diminished but both sides failed to<br />
prove to us that Judge Kheleher abused her<br />
discretion in administering the Lodestar Method.<br />
The appellant mentioned how in Matakov v.<br />
Kel-Tech Construction Inc. “It is well<br />
established that a trial court’s fee award in a<br />
class action is entitled to broad deference, “and<br />
will not be overturned absent an abuse <strong>of</strong><br />
discretion, such as a mistake <strong>of</strong> law or a clearly<br />
erroneous factual finding.” This was in regards<br />
to the 30% fee reduction <strong>of</strong> Katie Boardman’s<br />
award by Judge Kheleher without a reason.<br />
However, we have found that this reduction was<br />
completely within Judge Kheleher’s discretion.<br />
This decision is upheld by Lunday v. City <strong>of</strong><br />
Albany with the precedent that “We do not<br />
require that the court sets forth item-by-item<br />
findings concerning what may be countless<br />
objections to individual billing items.”<br />
The first adjustment <strong>of</strong> the Lodestar method<br />
detailed in Rahmey v. Blum is “the novelty and<br />
difficulty <strong>of</strong> the questions presented.” The<br />
respondent stated that they agree with the fee<br />
award for novelty, while the petitioner<br />
acknowledged the fee award but stated it wasn’t<br />
enough. We have found that Judge Kheleher’s<br />
decision <strong>of</strong> a $50,000 augmentation due to the<br />
new theory that a “third party could cause pain<br />
and suffering from an industrial accident” is the<br />
correct amount for the novelty <strong>of</strong> this case. This<br />
decision that it is a novel case is supported by<br />
the fact that there is no case law that would give<br />
precedents to abide by in ruling one way or<br />
another. This lack <strong>of</strong> case law also increases the<br />
difficulty <strong>of</strong> the original trial. We can turn to the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Fleming v. Barnwell to find that a<br />
similar situation <strong>of</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> case law would cause<br />
an increase <strong>of</strong> the fee award “in part by the<br />
novelty <strong>of</strong> the case” and “the difficulty involved<br />
in proving” the claim. The increase that Judge<br />
Kheleher made is the correct adjustment.<br />
The second adjustment <strong>of</strong> the Lodestar method<br />
is “the skill requisite to perform the legal<br />
services.” The petitioners stated that the amount<br />
<strong>of</strong> requisite skill is high because <strong>of</strong> the novelty<br />
<strong>of</strong> the case and disagreed with the $50,000<br />
decrease because it was her first case. The<br />
respondents failed to show that because this was<br />
her first case she deserved the reduction<br />
prescribed by Judge Kheleher. We have found<br />
that the Judge Kheleher’s reduction <strong>of</strong> $50,000<br />
due to the fact that this was her first case and<br />
there was not much skill requisite is a sufficient<br />
amount. In Fleming v. Barnwell an experienced<br />
lawyer got the requested “award <strong>of</strong> $425,000”<br />
and his award was granted because <strong>of</strong> his<br />
experience. Therefore, Katie Boardman’s award<br />
should be reduced because she is inexperienced.<br />
The third adjustment <strong>of</strong> the Lodestar Method is<br />
“the preclusion <strong>of</strong> other employment by the<br />
attorney due to acceptance <strong>of</strong> the case.” The<br />
respondents failed to mention the issue <strong>of</strong><br />
preclusion and thus, do not have any complaints<br />
with the fee award <strong>of</strong> $100,000 issued by Judge<br />
Kheleher. We also agreed with Judge Kheleher’s<br />
decision because none <strong>of</strong> the precedent cases<br />
have any preclusion involved. We can refer to<br />
the dissent in Matakov v. Kel-Tech which states,<br />
“The trial court ‘is intimately familiar with the<br />
nuances <strong>of</strong> [a] case, [and] is in a far better<br />
69
position to [rule on a fee application] than is an<br />
appellate court, which must work from a cold<br />
record.” With this being said we reserve the<br />
discretion to Judge Kheleher.<br />
The seventh adjustment <strong>of</strong> the Lodestar Method<br />
states “the amount involved and the results<br />
obtained.” The petitioners supported an<br />
augmentation to the fee award for the results<br />
obtained because they won on all accounts.<br />
However, the respondents requested an increase<br />
in the penalty <strong>of</strong> $25,000 because they stated<br />
that the $46.22 won for each student is not<br />
comparable to the $708,000 won for the<br />
Boardman’s. We agree with the Judge’s decision<br />
to decrease the fee award by $25,000. This<br />
decision is supported by the comparison<br />
between this and Barnwell v. Fleming because<br />
in this precedent case there was $30,000 won for<br />
each client, which would constitute a major<br />
decrease in our case. However, the fact that none<br />
<strong>of</strong> the students complained about the award and<br />
the fact that the Boardmans got exactly what<br />
was requested and won on all accounts, justifies<br />
the decrease <strong>of</strong> $25,000.<br />
The eighth adjustment <strong>of</strong> the Lodestar Method<br />
states “the undesirability <strong>of</strong> the case.” The<br />
petitioners requested an increase in award<br />
because <strong>of</strong> the fact that they had to deal with 45<br />
clients – the 15 students and their 30 parents.<br />
The respondents requested for a reduction to the<br />
award because she jumped at the opportunity<br />
and created this case. However, we found that<br />
neither <strong>of</strong> these arguments was compelling<br />
enough to constitute an adjustment. To support<br />
this decision we refer to Matakov v. Kel-Tech<br />
again, “The trial court ‘is intimately familiar<br />
with the nuances <strong>of</strong> [a] case, [and] is in a far<br />
better position to [rule on a fee application] than<br />
is an appellate court, which must work from a<br />
cold record.”<br />
We agree with the decision <strong>of</strong> Judge Kheleher<br />
and will uphold the adjustments to the award.<br />
70
Team 45 v 53<br />
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15<br />
MINOR, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF<br />
ALBANY, NEW YORK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Joe Penna and Emily<br />
LaSpisa, for Appellant.<br />
Allen Perry, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole,<br />
Galusha, Muthig<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the Respondent. As<br />
cited in the case <strong>of</strong> Matakov v. Kel-Tech,<br />
the “trial court’s fee award in a class action<br />
is entitled to broad deference, and will not<br />
be overturned absent an abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion,<br />
such as mistake <strong>of</strong> law or a clearly erroneous<br />
factual finding.” Here, certain Lodestar<br />
adjustments made by Judge Kheleher<br />
constituted an abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion.<br />
The test for deciding the payment <strong>of</strong> the<br />
attorneys in this case is the Lodestar method.<br />
As described in Rahmey v. Blum, the<br />
Lodestar method “is to multiply the number<br />
<strong>of</strong> hours reasonably expended on the<br />
litigation by the reasonable hourly rate” and<br />
then to make adjustments as necessary. In<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> Flemming v. Barnwell it is stated<br />
that with regards to fee calculations and<br />
adjustments, the “determination as to the<br />
proper amount <strong>of</strong> an award <strong>of</strong> counsel fees<br />
lies largely within the discretion <strong>of</strong> the court,<br />
the discretion is not unlimited.” The<br />
respondent successfully argued that the<br />
lower court abused its discretion in reducing<br />
Boardman’s fees by 30% without providing<br />
an explanation. The Court finds that the<br />
percentage deduction should have been<br />
greater in light <strong>of</strong> negligible public policy<br />
impact <strong>of</strong> Boardman’s victory in the lower<br />
court. The appellant successfully argued<br />
that the attorneys should receive a smaller<br />
award <strong>of</strong> attorney’s fees, and therefore the<br />
Court remands this case to the lower court<br />
with instructions to decrease the total<br />
number <strong>of</strong> hours compensated by an amount<br />
greater than the 30% and to provide detailed<br />
findings supporting the revised deduction<br />
amount.<br />
Additionally, as stated in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Raymey v Blum, “it is appropriate to<br />
distinguish between legal work and<br />
investigation, clerical work, and other work<br />
that can <strong>of</strong>ten be accomplished by nonlawyers.”<br />
The respondents successfully<br />
showed that the countless interviews<br />
performed by Katie could be considered<br />
clerical work, and because <strong>of</strong> this, we<br />
further instruct the lower court to<br />
compensate any <strong>of</strong> Boardman’s hours billed<br />
for interviews at the reduced paralegal rate<br />
<strong>of</strong> $150 per hour instead <strong>of</strong> $300 per hour.<br />
In conclusion, we remand with instructions<br />
for the lower court to reduce Boardman’s<br />
attorneys fees by a greater percentage and to<br />
reduce Boardman’s hourly wage for time<br />
spent on interviews to the hourly rate for a<br />
paralegal.<br />
71
Team 48 v 51<br />
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15<br />
MINOR, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF<br />
ALBANY, NEW YORK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Mikhail Lindsay and Alvin<br />
Moreira, for Appellant.<br />
Jon Nelson and Ferdousi<br />
Jahan for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,<br />
Kappel, Sutton<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find that the judge abused her<br />
discretion during the determination <strong>of</strong> fees.<br />
As cited in Matakov v. Kel-Tech, the “trial<br />
court’s fee award in a class action is entitled<br />
to broad deference, and will not be<br />
overturned absent an abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion,<br />
such as mistake <strong>of</strong> law or a clearly erroneous<br />
factual finding.” This original fee is<br />
determined by the Lodestar test, which<br />
multiplies the number <strong>of</strong> hours by the<br />
reasonable hourly rate, and several<br />
adjustments can be made to this. Both the<br />
appellant and respondent showed that the<br />
trial judge incorrectly applied the Lodestar<br />
test and accordingly an abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion<br />
existed thus allowing us to reexamine the<br />
determination <strong>of</strong> fees.<br />
First, the appellant cited Flemming v.<br />
Barnell Nursing Home to prove that the<br />
“determination as to the proper amount <strong>of</strong> an<br />
award <strong>of</strong> counsel fees lies largely within the<br />
discretion <strong>of</strong> the court, the discretion is not<br />
unlimited.” Because the appellant showed<br />
that the courts original ruling can be<br />
changed, we then move to the prongs which<br />
can be used to adjust the fee amount. As<br />
cited in the case <strong>of</strong> Rahmey v. Blum,<br />
novelty is one such prong to be considered<br />
when adjusting the Lodestar fee amount.<br />
Judge Kheleher originally increased the fee<br />
amount by $50,000 because <strong>of</strong> its novelty.<br />
However, we believe that this estimate was<br />
not sufficient. The appellant successfully<br />
proved that this case was novel because it is<br />
a unique issue that had not previously been<br />
brought to court. We rule to change this<br />
increase to $125,000.<br />
The respondent also made compelling<br />
arguments to have the Lodestar fee adjusted.<br />
First, they claimed that the $300 per hour<br />
rate given to Katie was not accurate because<br />
that rate is the American Bar Association’s<br />
rate for an experienced attorney. The<br />
respondents adequately showed that because<br />
Katie is just out <strong>of</strong> law school, has never had<br />
a case before, and much work for this case<br />
consisted <strong>of</strong> merely interviews, giving her<br />
this rate is not accurate. Because <strong>of</strong> this, we<br />
choose to lower Katie’s rate to $225 per<br />
hour. The respondents also successfully<br />
argued that the amount recovered was<br />
significantly disproportional to the fees<br />
received. The Boardman’s received<br />
$708,000, which is significantly<br />
disproportional to the $46.22 each student<br />
received. Because <strong>of</strong> this, we choose to<br />
increase the $25,000 reduction to $100,000.<br />
After these adjustments, we have determined<br />
that final total the Boardman’s will receive<br />
will be $550,500.<br />
72
Team 63 v 50<br />
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15<br />
MINOR, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF<br />
ALBANY, NEW YORK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: RJ Morrow and Mason<br />
Callahan, for Appellant.<br />
Emily Collins and Adrianna<br />
Wurster, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,<br />
Blaszczyk, Furia<br />
OPINION BY: Last<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellant Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the appellant, Chuck Maze<br />
on behalf <strong>of</strong> the 15 minors. The appellant<br />
properly proved that the Boardman’s deserved to<br />
receive more money for their services rendered<br />
to their clients.<br />
The respondent made good claims that the hours<br />
expended on the case were excessive and the<br />
Boardman’s could have conducted the<br />
interviews in a more efficient way. Therefore,<br />
we uphold the decision <strong>of</strong> Judge Kheleher to<br />
reduce the reported hours by thirty percent. The<br />
court felt that the defendant proved that the work<br />
done for the interviews was clearly clerical<br />
work. Therefore we find that the fee <strong>of</strong> $708,000<br />
needs to be reduced by $25,000 based on the<br />
fact that “it is appropriate to distinguish between<br />
legal work, in the strict sense, and investigation,<br />
clerical work…and other work that can be<br />
accomplished by nonlawyers…” as sited in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Rahmey v. Blum.<br />
However, the respondents were more convincing<br />
in that the Judge abused his discretion by not<br />
granting enough money to the Boardman’s. The<br />
appellant properly used the nine adjustments <strong>of</strong><br />
the Lodestar test outlined in the case <strong>of</strong> Rahmey<br />
v. Blum to explain why the Boardman’s<br />
deserved more money. The appellant proved that<br />
the Boardman’s took on a very novel case. This<br />
case was novel due to the fact that Katie made a<br />
third party pay for the pain and suffering <strong>of</strong> the<br />
minors in the elevator. The appellant properly<br />
cited that in the case in Flemming v. Barnwell, a<br />
precedent was set for our case in that the lawyers<br />
received more money then was asked for<br />
because <strong>of</strong> the novelty <strong>of</strong> the case. We the court<br />
award the appellant $100,000 for the novelty <strong>of</strong><br />
the case. A legitimate claim was presented that<br />
no other employment could be taken on at the<br />
time due to the fact that they had to complete<br />
two thousand interviews in order to find two<br />
valuable unbiased witnesses to testify that Joe<br />
was a “bad” guy. Therefore we raise the amount<br />
by $10,000 for the preclusion <strong>of</strong> other<br />
employment. We the court felt that prong four<br />
and five did not apply to this matter, and neither<br />
side proved <strong>of</strong> what nature and length was the<br />
relationship with their clients. The appellant<br />
adequately proved that the Boardman’s received<br />
more than $46.22 for their clients by proving<br />
that the Boardman’s are protecting New York<br />
citizens by adding an incentive for more<br />
frequent elevator maintenance. The appellant<br />
cited this to the case <strong>of</strong> Lunday v. The City <strong>of</strong><br />
Albany which states that “the plaintiffs success<br />
is the ‘most critical’ factor in determining the<br />
reasonableness <strong>of</strong> the fee awarded.” Therefore,<br />
we the court grant an increase <strong>of</strong> $25,000 for<br />
results obtain. The appellant also adequately<br />
proved to the court that this was an undesirable<br />
case due to the fact that it is very hard to prove<br />
Joe to be a bad person because he is beloved by<br />
many. Also the case was undesirable because<br />
they had to complete two thousand tedious<br />
interviews about the same topic. The court<br />
grants the Boardman’s $30,000 due to the fact<br />
that the case was undesirable.<br />
For these reasons we rule to overturn Judge<br />
Khelher’s decision to give more money to the<br />
Boardman’s for their services rendered to their<br />
clients. We therefore we find in favor <strong>of</strong> the<br />
appellant and awards for attorney fees <strong>of</strong><br />
$848,000.<br />
73
Team 63 v 52<br />
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15 MINOR,<br />
Appellant, v. THE CITY OF ALBANY, NEW<br />
YORK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: RJ Morrow and Mason Callahan,<br />
for Appellant.<br />
Emily Collins and Adrianna<br />
Wurster, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu, Blaszczyk,<br />
Furia<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York<br />
find in favor <strong>of</strong> appellant in part and respondent in<br />
part. Both proved that there was an abuse <strong>of</strong><br />
discretion on behalf <strong>of</strong> the lower courts. The<br />
respondents provided sufficient evidence that the<br />
hourly rate for the 2000 hours <strong>of</strong> interviews should be<br />
decreased. The appellants effectively persuaded the<br />
court that the adjustments for novelty, and nature <strong>of</strong><br />
the relationship should be increased.<br />
The first issue we must consider is if we should defer<br />
our authority to the lower courts discretion in<br />
determining attorney fees. As the respondents pointed<br />
out, in the case <strong>of</strong> Flemming v. Barnwell, “While the<br />
determination as to the proper amount <strong>of</strong> fees lies<br />
largely within the discretion <strong>of</strong> the court, the<br />
discretion is not unlimited.” The appellant furthered<br />
this precedent when citing the case <strong>of</strong> Lunday v. City<br />
<strong>of</strong> Albany which states that in a case <strong>of</strong> “abuse <strong>of</strong><br />
discretion” the lower courts decision in determining<br />
fees will be overturned. In this case the 30%<br />
reduction <strong>of</strong> all fees was proved an abuse <strong>of</strong> Judge<br />
Kheleher's discretion because according to People v.<br />
Lunday “whenever the court augments or reduces the<br />
lodestar fee, it must state its reasons for doing so as<br />
specifically as possible.” Clearly here Judge<br />
Kheleher's failure to state the reason for this arbitrary<br />
adjustment was an abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion.<br />
Since an abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion was established, we next<br />
determined there were several incorrect calculations<br />
in the original fees. In the case <strong>of</strong> Rahmney v Blum<br />
the Lodestar fee, defined as “to multiply the number<br />
<strong>of</strong> hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the<br />
reasonable hourly rate”, is used to calculate attorney<br />
fees and then several adjustments, “(1) the novelty<br />
and difficulty <strong>of</strong> the questions presented; (2) the skill<br />
requisite to perform the legal services properly; (3)<br />
the preclusion <strong>of</strong> other employment by the attorney<br />
due to acceptance <strong>of</strong> the case; (4) whether the fee is<br />
fixed or contingent; (5) time limitations imposed by<br />
the claim or circumstances; (6) the nature and length<br />
<strong>of</strong> the pr<strong>of</strong>esional relationship; (7) the amount<br />
obtained and the results obtained; (8) the<br />
undesirability <strong>of</strong> the case; and (9) awards in similar<br />
cases.” As stated by the respondents, the 2,000 hours<br />
<strong>of</strong> interviews were excessive and should be<br />
considered clerical work. According to the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Rahmney v. Blum, “it is important to distinguish<br />
between legal work, clerical, and investigative tasks.”<br />
Here, it is apparent that the lower court should have<br />
considered all 2,000 hours clerical work and so all<br />
fees in conducting the interviews should be consistent<br />
with the paralegal hourly rate. Additionally,<br />
throughout all <strong>of</strong> these interviews, only 2 witnesses<br />
were found. Surely we must consider 2,000<br />
interviews to find two witnesses excessive especially<br />
when, as the respondents suggested, many <strong>of</strong> the<br />
information obtained could have been recovered<br />
through a written survey. In the original trial, Judge<br />
Kheleher increased the the fee by $50,000 because it<br />
was novel. We agree with the appellants that this<br />
increase was insufficient to express the true novelty<br />
and difficulty <strong>of</strong> the case. As emphasized by the<br />
appellants, this was the first case where a third party<br />
caused stress from an industrial accident making it<br />
more difficult because there was no precedent case<br />
law to guide the them. Furthermore, the appellants<br />
went on to prove that the fee should be increased<br />
because <strong>of</strong> the extensive 2 year relationship with<br />
what would essentially be 45 clients (15 teens and 30<br />
parents). These new adjustments will be applied to<br />
the Boardmans attorney fees in this case.<br />
The remainder <strong>of</strong> Judge Kelehers Lodestar<br />
adjustments will remain the same. Although the<br />
appellant did argue concerning the Boardmans'<br />
preclusion <strong>of</strong> other employment for this case, we<br />
must agree with the respondents that because this was<br />
Katy Boardman's first case, it cannot be reasonably<br />
assumed that she would have the opportunity to find<br />
other means <strong>of</strong> employment had she not been<br />
working on this case. We further agree with the trial<br />
courts decision to reduce the fee by $25,000<br />
concerning the success <strong>of</strong> the trial. As the<br />
respondents argued, according to the matter <strong>of</strong><br />
Lunday v. City <strong>of</strong> Albany “the degree <strong>of</strong> success is<br />
the most critical factor in determining attorneys fees”<br />
and the Boardmans' won only $46.22 in candy and<br />
soda for each <strong>of</strong> their clients. However, we reject the<br />
notion that this fee should be further decreased<br />
because the appellants were correct in their<br />
contention that this case successfully set a new safety<br />
precedent in New York State.<br />
We disagree with the lower court's original findings<br />
and remand for changes on the following factors (1)<br />
adjustment in regards to the novelty be increased (2)<br />
adjustments in regards to the nature and length <strong>of</strong> the<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essional relationship be increased and (3) the<br />
hourly rate and hours accounted for the 2,000 hours<br />
be decreased.<br />
74
Team 46 v 64<br />
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15<br />
MINOR, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF<br />
ALBANY, NEW YORK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Ashley Baudier and Mallery<br />
Nargi, for Appellant.<br />
Alex Mauro and Sarah Griffen, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,<br />
Kappel, Sutton<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in overall favor <strong>of</strong> the Respondent, the<br />
City <strong>of</strong> Albany, New York. The Respondent<br />
proved that the lower court abused its discretion<br />
in determining Boardman’s fees under the<br />
Loadstar method as outlined in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Rahmey v. Blum. The Respondent proved that<br />
Katie Boardman’s rate and the total fees paid<br />
were not decreased adequately to account for<br />
Katie Boardman’s lack <strong>of</strong> experience. The<br />
Petitioners successfully proved, however, that<br />
the fee should have been increased by an even<br />
greater amount in light <strong>of</strong> the novelty <strong>of</strong> the<br />
case. The Petitioner also proved per Flemming<br />
v. Barnwell, the court does not have unlimited<br />
discretion in manipulating fees and as such, a<br />
30% decrease in attorney fees for interviewing<br />
hours without explanation was not within the<br />
jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> the court and is not permissible.<br />
This case is centered on the Loadstar method for<br />
attorney compensation in class action suits.<br />
Under the Loadstar method in Rahmey v. Blum,<br />
attorney compensation is calculated by<br />
multiplying an attorney’s reasonable rate by a<br />
reasonable number <strong>of</strong> hours, with adjustments as<br />
necessary. Under the Loadstar method,<br />
adjustments can be made for: (1) the novelty and<br />
difficulty <strong>of</strong> the questions presented; (2) the skill<br />
requisite to perform the legal services properly;<br />
(3) the preclusion <strong>of</strong> the other employment by<br />
the attorney due to the acceptance <strong>of</strong> the case;<br />
(4) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (5)<br />
time limitations imposed by the client or the<br />
circumstances; (6) the nature and length <strong>of</strong> the<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essional relationship with the client; (7) the<br />
amount involved and the results obtained; (8) the<br />
undesirability <strong>of</strong> the case; and (9) awards in<br />
similar cases. The Petitioners successfully<br />
proved that the novelty <strong>of</strong> this case was not<br />
properly compensated for. The idea <strong>of</strong> a third<br />
party being guilty for damages had never before<br />
been heard in court and there is no other case<br />
which it can be compared to, nor is there any<br />
similar information on the topic. For that reason<br />
the amount paid to Boardman <strong>of</strong> $50,000 on<br />
account <strong>of</strong> novelty should be tripled to<br />
$150,000. The Respondent, however, proved<br />
that Katie Boardman should not have been paid<br />
the hourly rate <strong>of</strong> the American Bar Association<br />
<strong>of</strong> $300 for experienced lawyers because she<br />
was a recent law school graduate without any<br />
court experience aside from clerking. The Court<br />
finds that the hourly rate requested by the<br />
Respondent <strong>of</strong> $150 per hour is too low, but that<br />
an hourly rate <strong>of</strong> $225 adequately acknowledges<br />
that some level <strong>of</strong> skill is required in order to<br />
win a class action suit as a first case. In<br />
addition, the Court makes an additional<br />
adjustment to the lower court’s Loadstar<br />
analysis and increases the deduction for<br />
Boardman’s first case from $50,000 to<br />
$100,000.<br />
The matter <strong>of</strong> Flemming v. Barnwell states that a<br />
judge does have discretion in determining fee<br />
and rate reductions for class action suits but that<br />
discretion is not unlimited. Rahmey v. Blum<br />
states a Judge must explain the reductions or<br />
additions as specifically as possible. The<br />
Petitioner demonstrated the Judge abused his<br />
discretion by reducing the overall number <strong>of</strong><br />
hours by 30% without listing any specific<br />
reasons. Therefore that 30% reduction in hours<br />
should be removed from the calculations.<br />
In total, Boardman’s final fees are calculated as<br />
follows: $225 per hour for her 1780 hours, 500<br />
hours at the rate <strong>of</strong> $150 for paralegal work, a<br />
$150,000 increase for novelty and a $100,000<br />
decrease for this having been Katie Boardman’s<br />
first case. The 30% reduction is removed and all<br />
other lower court adjustments are preserved.<br />
Therefore this court orders the final<br />
compensation for Katie Boardman in the amount<br />
<strong>of</strong> $600,500.<br />
75
Team 48 v 55<br />
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15<br />
MINOR, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF<br />
ALBANY, NEW YORK, Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Mikhail Lindsay and Alvin<br />
Moreira, for Appellant.<br />
Alana Narine, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole, Galusha,<br />
Muthig<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York<br />
find in favor <strong>of</strong> the respondents in part and the<br />
appellants in part. We remand the case to the trial<br />
court to re-evaluate the award in accordance with this<br />
opinion.<br />
The attorney’s fees are calculated through the<br />
lodestar method, as explained in Rahmey v. Blum.<br />
The lodestar fee is computed by multiplying the<br />
number <strong>of</strong> hours reasonably expanded on the<br />
litigation by the reasonable hourly rate. According to<br />
Flemming v. Barnwell Nursing Home we review the<br />
trial court’s decision under the abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion<br />
standard. According to Flemming, the<br />
“determination as to the proper amount <strong>of</strong> an award<br />
<strong>of</strong> [counsel] fees lies largely within the discretion <strong>of</strong><br />
the court, the discretion is not unlimited.” The 30%<br />
reduction fee properly reduced the reward because <strong>of</strong><br />
the additional hours Katie had to spend in order to<br />
learn how to prosecute a case. As for the hourly rate<br />
we find that the 1,000 hours <strong>of</strong> interviews should be<br />
charged at a $150 an hour rate. As stated in Rahmey<br />
v. Blum “[it] is appropriate to distinguish between<br />
legal work, in the strict sense, and investigation,<br />
clerical work, complication <strong>of</strong> facts and statistics and<br />
other work which can <strong>of</strong>ten be accomplished by nonlawyers<br />
but which a lawyer may do because he has<br />
no other help available. Such non-legal work may<br />
command a lesser rate. Its dollar value is not<br />
enhanced just because a lawyer does it.” Here Katie<br />
did the work <strong>of</strong> a paralegal during the interviews, so<br />
she should be paid as a paralegal.<br />
the legal services properly; (3) the preclusion <strong>of</strong> other<br />
employment by the attorney due to acceptance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
case; (4) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (5)<br />
time limitations imposed by the client or the<br />
circumstances; (6) the nature and length <strong>of</strong> the<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essional relationship with the client; (7) the<br />
amount involved and the results obtained; (8) the<br />
undesirability <strong>of</strong> the case; and (9) awards in similar<br />
cases.” We find that the first lodestar adjustment, the<br />
novelty <strong>of</strong> the case, should be increased even more<br />
than $50,000 -- the amount that the Boardman’s<br />
received. The novelty <strong>of</strong> this case is very high<br />
because there has been no other case like this. The<br />
second factor <strong>of</strong> the lodestar method addresses the<br />
skill <strong>of</strong> the attorney. Judge Kheleher decreased the<br />
amount awarded to Katie because <strong>of</strong> this fact, but it<br />
should be decreased even more. The skill <strong>of</strong> Katie<br />
was very low because this was her first case and she<br />
just opened her own law firm. The third prong <strong>of</strong> the<br />
lodestar fee is the preclusion <strong>of</strong> other employment.<br />
Katie may have not taken another case because <strong>of</strong> the<br />
difficulty <strong>of</strong> this one, or she could not find another<br />
case because she is simply an inexperienced lawyer.<br />
Thus, the trial court properly did not adjust the award<br />
because <strong>of</strong> that factor. The fourth factor <strong>of</strong> the<br />
lodestar method is whether the fee is fixed or<br />
contingent. No money should be taken away from the<br />
Boardman’s because <strong>of</strong> the fee being contingent.<br />
Most cases like that are taken on a contingency fee;<br />
therefore she was not entitled to extra money for that.<br />
The sixth prong to the lodestar method is addressing<br />
the relationship with the clients. In this case Katie<br />
spent two years in contact with these 15 students and<br />
30 parents. Contradicting this, Katie spent more time<br />
with the 2,000 interviewed students. There will be no<br />
adjustments to the fee for the relationship to the<br />
clients. Number seven <strong>of</strong> the Lodestar method applies<br />
to the results <strong>of</strong> the case. In Lunday v. City <strong>of</strong> Albany<br />
it states that the seventh prong <strong>of</strong> the Lodestar<br />
method is the most important. Here Judge Kheleher<br />
decreased it $25,000 because the Plaintiff’s were<br />
only awarded $46.22. This was not an abuse <strong>of</strong><br />
discretion. The final consideration is the desirability<br />
<strong>of</strong> the case. This case is very desirable to Katie,<br />
because she could be awarded a high amount <strong>of</strong><br />
attorney fees. Therefore we direct the lower court to<br />
decrease the award because <strong>of</strong> the ninth factor.<br />
In conclusion we the court after these adjustments we<br />
have determined the final total the Boardman’s will<br />
received will be reduced by the lower court on<br />
remand.<br />
Also, adjustments must be made to the fee. The nine<br />
prongs are “(1) the novelty and difficulty <strong>of</strong> the<br />
questions presented; (2) the skill requisite to perform<br />
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