Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime
Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime
Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime
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<strong>Sanctioning</strong> <strong>Cartel</strong> <strong>Activity</strong>:<br />
<strong>Let</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Punishment</strong> <strong>Fit</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Crime</strong><br />
Gregory J. Werden<br />
Senior Economic Counsel<br />
Antitrust Division<br />
U.S. Department of Justice<br />
Sanctions, Fines and Settlements in <strong>Cartel</strong> Cases:<br />
Developments and Deterrence in <strong>the</strong> EU and Ireland<br />
22 November 2008<br />
The views expressed herein are not purported<br />
to reflect those of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Department of Justice
Sanctions for <strong>Cartel</strong> <strong>Activity</strong><br />
in <strong>the</strong> United States
What Constitutes<br />
“<strong>Cartel</strong> <strong>Activity</strong>”
<strong>Cartel</strong> <strong>Activity</strong> Should Be<br />
Viewed and Treated as a <strong>Crime</strong>
<strong>Cartel</strong> <strong>Activity</strong><br />
Does Substantial Harm
Deterring <strong>Cartel</strong> <strong>Activity</strong><br />
Requires Serious Sanctions
Business Liquidity and<br />
Individual Sanctions
Business Organization and<br />
Individual Sanctions
Detecting <strong>Cartel</strong>s<br />
Requires Serious Sanctions
Determination of Sanctions<br />
in Particular Cases
Conclusion
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