Morningside Report and Summary Here - KiwiRail

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1. Work with other agencies in the development of their long-term (5-10 year) transport infrastructure plans to ensure that, over time, busy crossings are taken off grade with over and under passes. 2. Ensure those over and under passes are effective alternatives for mobility users. 3. Liaise with manufactures of mobility vehicles to try and establish improvements to wheel design to minimize risk at flange gaps. This could include wider wheels and or double wheels. Investigation Findings The findings of the Investigation Report are as follows: 1. The combination of the uneven surface of the crossing on the day of the accident, the width and depth of the flange gap, and the angle of the crossing (which was at 67 degrees to the railway line and runners) were major contributing factors to the accident. 2. A number of factors contributed to this situation existing at the time of the accident and our findings in that regard are: • At the highest level, the fact that at-grade pedestrian crossings (as opposed to the use of under and overpasses) continue to be utilised in New Zealand on busy metro networks meant that this accident was possible. • No specific consideration was given to the appropriateness of the design of the pedestrian crossing used at Morningside for special needs users such as wheelchair bound pedestrians, push chair users and cyclists. Had such consideration been made, it may have resulted in a choice of design which may have been less susceptible to damage and/or once damaged, would have posed less of a potential hazard to wheelchair users. However, had the Morningside crossing been maintained as constructed, the crossing surface would likely not have posed a potential hazard to wheelchair users. • There was no specific recognition of potential hazards to special needs users such as wheelchair bound pedestrians, push chair users and cyclists in the maintenance inspection procedures for level crossings and when granting an exemption to the inspection regime to permit inspections to be undertaken from the cabs of locomotives, no specific consideration was given to level crossings. • Once the Morningside crossing suffered the water damage, the track inspection regime did not identify the deteriorated condition of the crossing, it was identified by a Track Inspector while performing other duties who reported it as requiring work. • Due to a number of failings within KiwiRail’s systems, the remedial work required to repair the surface of the Morningside Crossing was recorded with a lower priority than intended, the required remedial work was then not undertaken and it was also then incorrectly recorded as having been completed. Recommendations The recommendations of the Investigation Report are as follows: 1. A review be undertaken of international practice in respect of the design, construction, inspection and maintenance of rail pedestrian crossings. The review should also include:
a. Consideration of whether (and if so in what situations) at-grade crossings should be used; b. Consideration of raising the public awareness of the residual risk of at-grade crossings. This review should involve representatives of all stakeholders including those representing special needs users such as wheelchair bound pedestrians, push chair users and cyclists as well as roading authorities and other agencies with an interest in and/or responsibility for safety at road/rail crossings. 2. Based on the review, KiwiRail’s end to end work processes be reviewed and revised as necessary (including interim measures based on learnings as the review takes place). 3. A review be undertaken of the code exemption process to ensure it is aligned to the relevant NRSS risk management approach to changes. 4. A review be undertaken of KiwiRail’s processes to ensure work identified as being required from Inspection reports is properly prioritised, reviewed, logged, programmed and completed.
Page 1: Summary of KiwiRail’s Report into
Page 5 and 6: • 35 collisions between pedestria
Page 7 and 8: COLLISION TRAIN 126 WITH POWER WHEE
Page 9 and 10: Glossary Asset Data Base (ADB) At-g
Page 11 and 12: Figure 1 shows the layout of Mornin
Page 13 and 14: What caused the wheelchair to becom
Page 15 and 16: 83mm 75mm 72mm 92mm Field gap Direc
Page 17 and 18: individual crossings would be stagg
Page 19 and 20: Figure 7 Condition of Morningside D
Page 21 and 22: Undertaking the Work What do the Co
Page 23 and 24: No specific consideration was given

Morningside Report and Summary Here - KiwiRail

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