The RighT To Food oF Milk and Maize FaRMeRs - UK Food Group

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The RighT To Food oF Milk and Maize FaRMeRs - UK Food Group

The Right to Food

of Milk and Maize

Farmers

Report of an investigative mission to Uganda


FIAN INTERNATIONAL

Willy-Brandt-Platz 5

69115 Heidelberg, German

Tel.:+49-6221-6530030

Fax:+49-6221-830545

E-mail: fian@fian.org

http://www.fian.org

Consumer Education Trust (CONSENT)

1st floor Office D7, Ambassador House,

Kampala Road, Kampala

GPO Box 1433, Kampala - Uganda.

Tel.: +256-75-1502441

+256-772-502441

+44-7872-272246

E-mail: consentug@yahoo.com

Author:

Gertrud Falk

Editors:

Henry Richard Kimera

Rolf Künnemann

Kerstin Lanje

Armin Paasch

Photos:

Gertrud Falk

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union.

The contents of this document is the sole responsibility of the project partners and can

under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.


The Right to Food

of Milk and Maize

Farmers

Report of an investigative mission to Uganda


Table of Content

Acronyms 6

Acknowledgements 7

1. Introduction 8

1.1 Background

1.2 The Right to Adequate Food

1.3 Uganda

2. Methodology 10

3. Uganda’s Agricultural Policy 10

3.1 Structural Adjustment Programmes and the Ugandan agricultural sector

3.2 Impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes on Agriculture

3.3 The Poverty Eradication Action Plan

3.4. Farming in Uganda

3.5 Dairy

3.6 Maize

4. Uganda’s trade policy since 1996 16

4.1 Uganda’s trade relation with the European Union

4.2 Dairy sector and trade relations

4.3 Maize sector and Trade relations

5. Uganda’s negotiations on an Economic Partnership Agreement 20

5.1 Negotiations between the EU and EAC

5.2 EU position

5.3 Civil society position on EPA


6. Dairy farming in Mbarara District 22

6.1 Dairy Supply Chain

6.2 Development of Prices and Costs

6.3 Gender

6.4 Food Security

6.5 Findings in Mbarara

7. Maize farming in Bugiri District 27

7.1 Maize Supply Chain

7.2. The World Food Programme

7.3 Development of Prices and Costs

7.4 Gender

7.5 Food Security

7.6 Findings Bugiri

8. Impact of EU Agricultural and Trade Policies 32

9. Recommendations 33

References 34

Annex I: Questionnaire 36

Questionnaire for semi-structured interviews

Statistical data required (1990 – 2008)

Annex II: Persons interviewed 38


Acronyms

ACORD

Agency for Cooperation and

Research in Development

FAO

Food and Agriculture Organisation

of the United Nations

ACP

AU

BUDAC

CBO

CESCR

COMESA

CONSENT

CPA

DCL

DDA

EAC

EBA

EC

EDF

EPA

ERP

ESA

African, Caribbean, and Pacific

African Union

Bugiri District Advocacy Coalition

Community Based Organisation

United Nations’ Committee on

Economic, Social, and Cultural

Rights

Common Market for Eastern and

Southern Africa

Consumer Education Trust

Cotonou Partnership Agreement

Dairy Corporation Limited

Dairy Development Authority

East African Community

Everything But Arms

European Commission

European Development Fund

Economic Partnership Agreement

Economic Recovery Programme

Eastern and Southern Africa

FIAN

GDP

GSP

ha

ICESCR

IDA

IDP

IMF

ISFG

kg

l

LDC

MAAIF

NAADS

Food First Information and Action

Network

Gross Domestic Product

Generalised System of Preferences

hectare

International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights

International Development

Association

Internally Displaced People

International Monetary Fund

Integrated Support for Farmers

Groups

kilogramme

litres

Least Developed Country

Ministry of Agriculture, Animal

Industry and Fishery

National Agricultural Advisory and

Development Service

ETO

EU

Extra Territorial Obligations

European Union

NDTPF

National Development and Trade

Policy Forum

6 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


Acknowledgements

NEMA

NGO

PEAP

PMA

PMB

PRSP

RNF

SAP

UDC

UGS

UNDP

USD

WFP

WTO

National Environmental

Management Authority

Non-Governmental Organisation

Poverty Eradication Action Plan

Plan for Modernisation of

Agriculture

Produce Marketing Board

Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Regional Negotiating Forum

Structural Adjustment Program

Uganda Dairy Corporation

Uganda Shilling

United Nations Development

Program

USDollar

World Food Programme

World Trade Organisation

FIAN would like to extend its appreciation to Mr. John

Mwemba, of the Magoye Smallholder Dairy Farmers

Cooperative Zambia, and to Mrs. Caroline Adio of

Acord Uganda for taking part in the investigative

mission. Specific thanks go to Henry Richard Kimera

and the team of the Consumer Education Trust Uganda

for organising the investigative mission and giving the

mission team all the necessary support and service.

Further thanks go to Gershom Matsiko from Food Rights

Alliance Mbarara and to Mugoya Awali Ogonzaki from

Food Rights Alliance Bugiri for organising our field visits.

FIAN also thanks all interview partners for their input

and contribution, namely:

Geoffey Bakunda, George Walusimbi-Mpanga

NGO Trade Forum, Mbarara District Farmers

Association, Uganda Crane Creameries Cooperative

Union Ltd., Mbarara, Patrick Byaruhanga, Benon

Bwemgye, Eduardi Nyamahinja, Moses Rhambarara,

Community of Nyakisharara, Bubaare Sub-County,

Mbarara District, Bugiri District Farmers Association,

Paul Oteba Orisai, George Migero, Community of

Bukyansiko, Kasita parish, Nabokalu Sub-County, Bugiri

District, Millers Association Bugiri, EU Office Uganda,

Ministry of Agriculture, FAO Office Uganda. All other

interview partners and supporters

7


1. Introduction

1.1 Background

In the course of globalization, the impact of international

trade has gained overwhelming importance. To guarantee

the global flow of goods, the World Trade Organisation

(WTO) strives for reduction of import tariffs for all goods

in all member States. Developing countries demonstrated

resistance against a far reaching multilateral agreement

on tariff reduction on agricultural trade during the socalled

Doha Round under the umbrella of the WTO,

because most developing countries rely on agriculture

as a main contributor to their Gross Domestic Product

(GDP). Developing countries fear import surges from

industrial countries which have the potential to severely

damage their agricultural production. Most farmers

in developing countries cannot compete with the

subsidized and highly mechanised mode of production

in industrial countries like the US and EU.

Agriculture, however, is not only relevant for macroeconomic

policies of developing countries. It is even more

important for the food security of farmers and of the

general population. Most agricultural producers, particularly

in sub-Saharan African countries, are smallholder

farmers who produce at least partly for subsistence.

In the past, the EU granted one-sided tariff free imports

of goods from African, Caribbean, and Pacific developing

countries (ACP countries) into the EU under the Lomé

Conventions (1975-1999). As this practice is not

permitted under WTO rules of reciprocal market access

arrangements, the Cotonou Agreement, which followed

the Lomé Conventions, provided for the negotiation of

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). With EPAs,

the European Union strives for mutual tariff reductions

down to zero in mostly all trade between the EU and the

ACP countries. According to the Cotonou Agreement,

all ACP countries should have negotiated EPAs with

the EU from 2000 until December 2007. However, this

period has been too short to allow for the developing

countries to finalize the negotiations. Especially among

West African countries, there is resistance against EPAs

since they see them as unfavourable for their economic

and social development. The EU took this into account by

adding the step of EPA interim agreements/Framework

EPAs which are not as detailed as comprehensive EPAs.

In November 2007, Uganda initiated a Framework EPA

as a member of the East African Community (EAC).

From a human rights perspective, free trade agreements

between industrial and developing countries are

criticized, since these agreements often lead to import

surges in the developing country- severely affecting

its industry or other economic sectors. By doing so,

smallholders or workers in the respective developing

country lose their market access or their job, and thus

their income. This may affect their enjoyment of social

and economic human rights in the sense that they may

no longer be able to buy enough food, pay school fees

for their children and/or pay for health care.

This report highlights the findings of an investigative

mission to Uganda from the 14th to the 26th of April

2008. The mission team investigated the impact of

agricultural trade policies of the EU on the right to food

of smallholder farmers in Uganda. The mission has been

part of the project “African Smallholders in focus – a voice

in EU trade policy” conducted by the non-governmental

organisations (NGOs) Germanwatch, FIAN, UK Food

Group, BothENDS, Send Foundation, Civil Society Trade

Network, and CONSENT. The Ugandan mission was the

third within the project. Similar missions were conducted

in Ghana and Zambia 1 . The mission in Uganda focussed

on the two products: milk and maize. The following

person participated in the mission: Caroline Adio

(Acord Uganda), Geraldine Galvaing (UK Food Group),

Gertrud Falk (FIAN Germany), Henry Richard Kimera

(Consent Uganda), John Mwemba (Magoye Small Holder

Dairy Farmers Cooperative Zambia), and Armin Paasch

(FIAN Germany).

1.2 The Right to Adequate Food

The human right to food is enshrined in article 11 of

the International Covenant on Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and is mentioned there as

part of the right to an adequate standard of living.

The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social

and Cultural Rights has interpreted its legal scope in its

General Comment No. 12. :

The right to adequate food is realized when every

man, woman and child, alone or in community with

others, has physical and economic access at all times to

adequate food or means for its procurement.”

This means that food has to be available, accessible,

culturally accepted, and safe. The Committee interprets

the right to food far beyond a purely technical

understanding:

The right to adequate food shall therefore not be

interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense which

equates it with a minimum package of calories, proteins

and other specific nutrients. The right to adequate food

will have to be realized progressively.” [CESCR 1999,

Italics in original]

The Right to Food implies access to productive resources

and an environment, which enables people to feed

themselves in dignity. For small-scale farmers, who represent

half of the people affected by hunger globally,

access to land, water, seeds, extension services and markets

are crucial to the enjoyment of their right to food.

The strategy should address critical issues and measures

in regard to all aspects of the food system, including

the production, processing, distribution, marketing and

consumption of safe food, as well as parallel measures

in the fields of health, education, employment and social

security.” (CESCR 1999; Italics in original)

1 See: http://www.fian.org/resources/documents/others/right-to-food-of-tomatoand-poultry-farmers-ghana/pdf

and http://www.fian.org/resources/documents/

others/right-to-food-of-milk-and-honey-farmers-report-of-an-invesitagtive-missionto-zambia/pdf

8 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


A human right implies the States’ obligations to respect,

protect, and fulfil the enjoyment of this right. Human

rights and States’ obligations are two sides of the same

coin. Failure to comply with these obligations is called

a violation of human rights. The obligation to respect

the enjoyment means that States should not undermine

the enjoyment of the respective human right. The

obligation to protect means that they should prevent

destruction of the enjoyment of the respective human

right by third parties like companies or foreign States.

The obligation to fulfil enjoyment of a human right of

a person or group who lacks enjoyment of the right in

question means that States should take measures to the

full extent of their available resources, and as expeditiously

as possible, in order to establish the enjoyment

for this person or group.

Although states are responsible for guaranteeing human

rights to the people in their territories, human rights

are not a domestic issue alone. States also have human

rights obligations to persons outside their territories

– extraterritorial obligations (ETOs). International

assistance and cooperation are important tools to

implement these ETOs. The ICESCR, for example, obliges

countries to realize human rights through international

assistance and cooperation. Article 2.1 reads:

“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes

to take steps, individually and through international

assistance and co-operation, especially economic and

technical, to the maximum of its available resources,

with a view to achieving progressively the full realization

of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all

appropriate means, including particularly the adoption

of legislative measures.”

Regarding the right to food, states are obliged to assist

each other in a number of ways, for example in times

of famine or in other emergencies which might lead to

national food shortages. Extraterritorial obligations to

respect the enjoyment of the right to food are relevant in

the context of trade agreements as they imply that states

must not harm the right to food of people through their

trade policies. Governments have to ensure that their

trade policies do not have negative effects on the right

to food of vulnerable people living in other countries.

In his report to the Human Rights Council in February

2009, Olivier De Schutter, the United Nations Special

Rapporteur on the Right to Food, explicitly referred to

international trade in agriculture as a cause of hunger

for poor farmers. In the instance that international trade

agreements do not respect the human right to food, he

states: “Trading more food will not help them if they are

excluded from production and have no means to buy

the food which arrives on the markets.” Countries must

make sure that farmers are not pushed out of markets,

nor that they lose their income and face hunger.

Furthermore, international and bilateral trade

agreements should not hinder developing countries’

obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right of

food of its inhabitants. “States have to ensure that the

right to food is adequately considered in international

agreements.” (FIAN International 2003). Jean Ziegler,

former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate

Food, insisted that: “States should also refrain at all

times from policies of which the effects can be foreseen

or that they are aware will have negative effects on

the right to food.” (Ziegler 2005) This is also valid for

agricultural trade policies of the EU and EPAs.

1.3 Uganda

Uganda is a landlocked country in Eastern Africa and is

classified by the United Nations Development Program

(UNDP) as a least developed country (LDC). The grade of

urbanisation is low: only 12 percent of the population

lives in urban areas. The income of 80 percent of the

Ugandans depends on agriculture. Approximately 80

percent of the supplied food is produced by small-scale

farmers who cultivate between one and two acres of

land per household. Primary traditional export crops are

coffee, tea, and cotton. Primary non-traditional export

crops are cereals, fish, cut flowers, fruits and vegetables.

While the total food production has continiously

increased since 1999, the per capita production has

decreased due to population growth and shortage of

arable land per capita. An estimated 40 percent of

the population are food insecure and live in absolute

poverty (Kintu 2007, Bertow/Schultheis 2007, Werth et

al. 2005).

After its independence was declared in 1962, the country

suffered from several internal wars and dictatorships. The

current President ,Yoweri Museveni, came to power in

1986 through a military coup but converted the political

system into a multi-party democracy. However, there are

complaints from the opposition parties and from civil

society organisations that democratic procedures are

not always followed.

Uganda ratified the International Covenant on Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights in 1986 and is therefore

obliged to respect, protect and fulfil the right to food

of its population. The Right to Food was enshrined

into the National Food and Nutrition Policy in 2003.

However, the percentage of the population which is

undernourished has remained at 19 percent since 2002.

More than 38 percent of the children aged 6-59 month

have experienced stunted growth, which indicates

chronic malnutrition (Rukundo 2008, FAO interview).

The most vulnerable groups are internally displaced

people, female-headed households, HIV/AIDS affected,

disabled, pastoralists in Karamoja and the urban poor.

At the same time, Uganda has very high soil fertility,

a favourable climate for agriculture, and produces 95

percent of its food within the country, mainly at the

hands of small-scale farmers (FAO interview).

The government has established mechanisms to

implement food security, but it lacks funds to put those

mechanisms into practice. In 2001, the government

started a pilot project in 16 districts. In a first step,

advisory services were provided. Currently, these advisory

services have extended to all 79 districts. In a second

step, ISFG programmes (Integrated Support for Farmers

9


Groups) were started. These programmes give grants

to sub-counties to establish farmer managed credit

schemes for procurement of technologies and inputs.

These programmes have extended to 20 districts. But

the funds are limited. The Government spends only 4

percent of its budget on the agricultural sector. Higher

priorities are human security in the north, peace, energy,

education, and health. The budget for agriculture

is mainly financed by donors. The overall budget has

decreased because of limited contribution from the

government 2 .

Uganda is member of the African Union (AU), the

East African Community (EAC), Common Market for

Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the World

Trade Organisation (WTO). Under the WTO regulations,

Uganda is treated as a Least Developed Country (LDC)

and granted Most-Favoured-Nation status by all trading

partner countries (RATES 2007). Uganda is also eligible

to benefit from the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative

of the EU.

2. Methodology

The investigative mission to Uganda was conducted

under a rights-based approach focussing on the human

right to adequate food which is enshrined in article 11

of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights (see Chapter 1.2).

The dairy and maize sectors were chosen for four

reasons:

a. maize and milk are both produced in Uganda and

imported from the EU;

b. both are relevant sectors for rural development, food

security, contribution to employment and income

(thus also for livelihood sustainability) (DENIVA

2006);

c.

both are produced by small-scale farmers;

d. for both sectors, necessary data is available.

The following are underlying questions of the mission:

• Have trade policy measures such as dumping or

market deregulation significantly contributed to

sharp increases of imports of dairy products and

maize from EU countries into Uganda?

• Did or do these imports have a negative impact on

the incomes of the families of small-scale farmers to

such a degree that their access to food is destroyed

or limited?

• Has the state of Uganda breached its legal obligation

to respect, protect and fulfil the human right to

adequate food of the peasant families as the result

of its trade and agricultural policies?

2 European donors add a maximum of 50% as development aid to sector

budget. Hence, if a govnement of a developing country reduces a sector budget

those donors reduce their development aid for the respective sector.

• Have EU member states breached their extraterritorial

obligations to respect and protect the right to food of

these communities through unfair dumping practices,

or through pressuring Uganda to reduce support to

the farmers or to open up its domestic markets to

imports?

• Will the EPA (interim agreement) lead to increased

imports of dairy products and maize under unfair

conditions, negatively affecting the right to food of

peasant families?

To answer the questions raised, the research team has

applied a fivefold approach:

• Research studies were used to get relevant background

information.

• Focus group discussions, gender-mixed and genderseperated,

were held to get the experience and

opinions of members of networks, associations and

farmer communities.

• Individual interviews were conducted to verify general

findings in individual cases.

• Expert interviews were held to get deeper insights

in issues and to cross-check information from focus

groups and individual interviews.

• Observations on site helped to complement the

information given during the discussions and

interviews.

A questionaire with guiding questions was used to

structure focus group discussions and interviews (see

Annex I).

The researchers were a mixed gender team (three women,

three men) comprising two people from Uganda, one

from Zambia, two from Germany and one from the UK.

Five team members were NGO representatives, one was

a farmer.

The investigative mission was organised and conducted

in cooperation with local partner organisations. Based

on terms of reference, the local partners gave advice on

the identification of the two crops, the two regions and

the two villages chosen for the mission.

3. Uganda’s Agricultural Policy

Agriculture is the main economic sector in Uganda. It

accounts for 38.5 percent of the GDP, 69 percent of

employment and 48 percent of export earnings (Werth

et al. 2005). The majority of the output is produced by

smallholder farmers who produce with little technical

support. 71 percent of the value of agricultural production

is provided by food crops, 5 percent by export crops, 4

percent by fisheries and 3 percent by forestry, and 17

percent by livestock (Werth et al. 2005).

Due to fertile soils and a favourable climate, with temperatures

between 15 and 30°C and annual rainfalls of

750-2000 mm, Uganda’s farmers produce a wide range

of cash and food crops and livestock. Primary traditional

10 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


cash crops are coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco. Nontraditional

cash and food crops are root crops, grains,

legumes, oilseeds, fruits, vegetables, spices and flowers.

Livestock production comprises cattle, goats, sheep,

poultry and pigs. The most important agricultural export

crop is coffee accounting for almost 20 percent of the

total foreign export earnings, followed by cotton, tea

and tobacco. The EU is the main export market of Uganda’s

agricultural sector and accounts for 33 percent of

exports followed by COMESA with 27 percent (Werth

et al. 2005).

Maize ranks the second most produced crop in terms of

planted area. In 2002, 676,000 ha were planted with

maize. With a production of 1,217 thousands tons in

2002, it is the most produced cereal in Uganda. 10,609

USD of maize was exported in 2002, while a value of

5,938,335 USD has been imported into Uganda. The

crop ranks second in terms of imports in value from

the EU. But its revenue contribution for Uganda is low.

From 1999 until 2004 the revenue authority received

only 457,991 USD in tax from maize production out

of export revenue of 573,750,436 USD from 25 top

products (Werth et al. 2005).

In 2003, dairy farmers produced 1,100 million litres (l)

of milk. From this quantity, 70 percent (770 mio. l) are

marketed, while 30 percent (330 mio. l) are retained for

domestic consumption. Out of the 770 mio. l of milk

marketed, only 154 mio. were processed and 616 mio.

were sold unprocessed through the informal market.

From 2000 to 2003, the sales of milk have increased

from 700 mio. l to 1,100 mio. Post-harvest losses along

the market chain total 25 percent per year which led

to an average loss of value of 23,000 USD in the years

2000-2003 (DDA 2004).

3.1 Structural Adjustment Programmes and

the Ugandan agricultural sector

The first structural adjustment program (SAP) with

a long-term impact on the agricultural sector was

implemented in Uganda from 1987 to 1995 under the

Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). At that time, the

Ugandan population and economy had been severely

harmed by several wars and dictatorships. “Production

was low, the transport system was in disarray, the social

infrastructure had collapsed, inflation was over 150 per

cent, foreign exchange was limited, the budget was out

of control, corruption and black marketeering was wide

spread, and skilled personnel had migrated.” (Baffoe,

2000) Through the ERP, the Government tried to create

a stable macroeconomic environment.

The ERP followed conditions of the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to stabilize monetary

and fiscal policies, to deregulate the Ugandan economy

and to fight poverty. It prioritised public spending

into rural infrastructure, primary education, primary

health, and agricultural reseach and extension (SEATI-

NI, 2005a). Between 1991 and 1993, trade-liberalizing

policies were introduced into the agricultural sector to

increase production. Parastatal marketing and extension

services were abolished. Input and output prices were

adapted to the world market through deregulation of

the exchange rate and drastic reduction of subsidies.

Measures were taken to rehabilitate the infrastructure,

which had been destroyed during the wars.

Positive effects of the ERP were a decline of inflation

from 200 to 7 percent between 1987 and 1996, an

increased Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by an average

of 6.5 percent, as well as an increased agricultural

output by an average of 5.1 percent especially in food

crop production. Public investment increased by a

remarkable 30 percent and private investment increased

more than100 times its original amount between 1987

and 1994. Export revenues increased from 406 million

USD to 555 million USD with a decrease in 1993 to only

169 USD due to falling world market prices on coffee –

the main export crop.

On the other hand, the increase of imports and external

debts led to an increasing trade deficit ranging from

194 million USD in 1987 to 625 million USD in 1996.

While 39 percent of the households were defined as

absolutely poor by a household survey in 1989/90, this

percentage raised slightly to 40 percent in 1992/93.

Inequality measured by the GINI Coefficient rose in this

period from 0.38 to 0.41, with the strongest increase in

urban areas (Baffoe, 2000).

3.2 Impact of Structural Adjustment

Programmes on Agriculture

Before the ERP, the parastatal Produce Marketing

Board (PMB) controlled marketing of agricultural food

crops and their pricing. The PMB also had to sell those

commodities to deficit areas within Uganda to guarantee

food security. Only surpluses were exported (Bakunda

2006). But due to late or non-adequate payment by

cooperatives some farmers also sold their harvest outside

the formal channels. The Government of Uganda, on the

other hand, subsidised agricultural inputs. Nevertheless,

there was a need to modernize production techniques

and to improve extension services.

Through the ERP, the Government addressed those

shortcomings by setting up the Agricultural Sector

Policy Agenda in 1991. The programme was financed

by the International Development Association (IDA) and

implemented by the Agricultural Policy Committee. It

had six major objectives:

• intensifying agricultural production and processing

• increasing agricultural producer prices

• restructuring the finance of production cooperatives

• deregulating agricultural trade

• reorganizing agricultural marketing institutions

• improving agricultural research and extension

services.

11


During the implementation phase of the agenda, all

markets for food crops were deregulated and farmers’

cooperatives were dissolved. As a result, private traders

entered into rural markets. Prices went up. The price for

maize increased from 48 UGS per kg in 1992 to 126

UGS (0,12 USD) per kg in 1997.

According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the Government

of Uganda destroyed the cooperatives by raising

awareness of farmers that they were being exploited by

the cooperatives. Cooperatives were poorly managed

and the managers tried to profit from their positions.

In the dairy sector, the dairy corporation plant and milk

collection centres were reinstalled and the sector opened

to private entrepreneurs. Veterinary services were

privatised under a Livestock Services Project to improve

delivery of their services to small livestock farmers. In

the initial step, milk collection and processing increased

from 50,000 l in 1990 to 1.2 million l in 1995. This

increase occurred mainly due to acreage expansion and

increased number of cattle rather than as the result of

increased productivity. However, nothing was done to

reform land rights to ensure that farmers had access to

land, nor to introduce adequate technologies to increase

productivity. Price increases of many agricultural inputs

made them unaffordable for most farmers. To make it

worse, the deregulation of markets led to significant

increases in consumer prices, which negatively affected

the marketing of dairy products. These developments

reduced the net-income of farmers and their families.

Bakunda summarizes that, “liberalisation has contributed

to the deepening of rural poverty” (Bakunda 2006).

3.3 The Poverty Eradication Action Plan

The ERP was followed by the Poverty Eradication

Action Plan (PEAP) 1996, which is the Ugandan version

of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). It was

developed as a response to a debt relief requirement of

the World Bank and IMF. Within the PEAP-framework,

the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) was

developed as the strategy on the agricultural sector. The

objective on poverty reduction outlined in the PEAP is

to reduce the percentage of poor people among the

population to less than 10 percent by the year 2017.

Trade policies are not prioritised under PEAP policies

(SEATINI 2005a). Only some sector strategies like the

PMA contained trade-related aspects.

The PMA strives for commercialisation of agrarian

production. In this context, the extension service

for farmers was privatized and became the National

Agricultural Advisory and Development Service

(NAADS). NAADS was founded in 2001 under

Ugandan government legislation. It was created to

empower farmers to demand services for payment.

The Government of Uganda had planned to set up a

procurement committee in each sub-county. But donors,

who refused to provide the necessary money, opposed

this. Now the district boards perform the procurement

without having adequate knowledge (focus group civil

society). At the same time, when NAADS started its

work, production started to decrease. Today only 14

percent of the farmers use fertilizers. Farmers can hardly

afford veterinary services any more (focus group civil

society). According to Bakunda, the PEAP and the PMA

have not been realized since most of the processing

industries are imported.

Still today, the World Bank and IMF strongly influence

Ugandan policies. Since the state is heavily indebted,

both organisations have a say in national policies (focus

group civil society).

3.4. Farming in Uganda

Nowadays Ugandans do not have a positive impression

of farming. There is a Ugandan proverb that says: “It

is better to be an American cow than to be an African

farmer.” The youth, in particular, do not see a future in

farm life. Many of the rural young migrate to urban areas.

The word “farmer” is even used as a threat to children:

“If you do not go to school you will end up as a farmer!”

This expresses that most of the farmers are illiterate or

not well educated even though agriculture is the backbone

of the country (focus group civil society). Farmers

in remote areas like West Nile, especially, lack sufficient

knowledge on farming. Many of them do not produce

enough food to feed their families (focus group civil society).

Most small-scale farmers do not view farming as a

business, but as a way of life. Furthermore, they have the

feeling of being ripped off by the private sector.

The Government of Uganda spends only 4 percent of

its budget in agriculture. Thus, it does not fulfil the

Maputo protocol of the African Union in which States

have pledged to spend a minimum of 10 percent of

their budget on agriculture. The major part of Uganda’s

budget is spent on roads, education, public sector

management, healthcare and on the armed conflict in

the northern region (Rukundo 2009).

Farmers can receive price information on commodities

by text message pm mobile phones, but since they do

not have bargaining power they often sell at lower prices

(focus group civil society). Since the co-operatives have

been destroyed, there is hardly any solidarity or trust

among farmers. They hesitate to market collectively.

As many of them have bad experiences with the

Government in the previous co-operatives, they have

become very suspicious (focus group civil society).

Small-scale farmers face a dual disadvantage. Developed

markets do not favour them, thus they deal with

middlemen who also do not favour them (Expert EU).

One of the major problems is the poor quality of production

inputs. While initially all seeds were produced

in Uganda, they are increasingly imported from foreign

countries like from India (focus group civil society).

Furthermore, the deregulated market does not reward

good quality. The Ministry of Agriculture recognizes the

responsibility of the government to enact laws that address

this issue. The government should improve monitoring

mechanisms and install systems to trace the origin

of inputs. According to the FAO, the Government of

12 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


Uganda has addressed this problem by supporting the

National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) to

improve the quality and diversity of seeds and livestock.

Another constraint is extension services. In the past,

extension services have been financed and implemented

by the government. While the Ministry of Agriculture

praised the high quality of the service in the past

(since all staff members at least held a diploma), the

FAO criticized a lack of efficiency. In 2003, NAADS was

introduced. NAADS is financed by public funds but

services are delivered by the private sector. Farmers

form groups at the community level and select three

key enterprises (crops). These steps are repeated at the

parish and then at the sub-county level. The government

provides the necessary money to hire services from

the private extension sector and channels the services

through the district and sub-county authorities to

the community. If the service is bad, the farmers can

cancel the agreement. The government’s intention in

introducing this system was to create a demand and

to place a value on extension services. The FAO views

NAADS as a better alternative than the previous system,

but also still sees it as a constraint.

According to civil society, farmers are not aware of EPAs.

The Commissioner for Crop Production and Marketing

of the Ministry of Agriculture was also not aware of

the content of the EPA framework at the time of the

interview during the investigative mission.

From a gender perspective, it is important to note that

the majority of Ugandan women do not own land even

though they perform the primary agricultural work

(focus group civil society). Traditionally, women do not

inherit land and there is nothing that contradicts this

in national law. Thus, only rich women can manage to

own land by purchasing it outright.

Before deregulation, the parastatal Uganda Dairy

Corporation (UDC) operated under near monopsony

conditions as it was the only institution in the formal

market which bought milk from farmers’ cooperatives

and which supplied milk to the formal market. The

cooperatives could bargain the selling price and

since there were hardly any competitors, UDC could

agree on a price that also benefited the farmers.

Generators for cooling the milk were subsidized by the

Government. When subsidies were removed, farmers

and their cooperatives could not cover the costs and

the infrastructure collapsed. As another consequence of

liberalisation, the prices for imports of inputs like drugs

for treatment of cows rose tremendously, some even

doubled. Veterinary services were privatized and the

government stopped offering extension services free of

charge. Trainings were offered by NGOs or CBOs only,

and they did not operate in all regions.

3.5 Dairy

Milk has always been both a food crop and a cash crop

in Uganda. In 1992, the parastatal Uganda Dairy Cooperative

was privatized and transformed into the company

Dairy Corporation Limited (DCL). At this time, the

first major private companies entered the dairy sector,

which was completely liberalized in the mid nineties.

According to a study based on data from the 2002/03

Uganda National Household Survey, the average number

of cows per dairy farm was 19 and they produced 113 l

of milk per day, of which 78 l were sold. This means that

each cow produced an average of 6 l per day of which 4

were sold. Most of the farms (82 percent) were located

in rural areas and the majority of the farmers sold to

local markets. Large-scale farmers with more than 50

cows received higher prices per litre than small-scale or

medium-scale dairy farmers. They could sell a litre for up

to 900 UGS (0,52 USD) while the average price was 316

UGS (0,18 USD) (Mwebaze 2004). Since the majority

of cows were grass fed, production of milk fluctuated

between wet and dry seasons. Production during wet

season was much higher than during the dry season.

In the course of deregulation, dairy companies were

allowed to purchase milk from individual farmers, not

just from farmers’ cooperatives. This was attractive for

farmers since they received only vouchers from UDC

and had to wait for payment. The opportunity for

farmers, as individuals, to sell milk led to a collapse of

the cooperative system. But the emerging companies

did not invest in collecting and cooling infrastructure.

Consequently, there is no guarantee that the farmers

will be able to sell their entire production of milk, nor is

there a guarantee that they will be paid at the market

price for their milk. “The collapse of the cooperatives

meant that the voice of farmers has been removed from

the marketing system.” (Bakunda 2006) Furthermore,

the quality control systems broke down which led to a

deterioration of the quality of milk.

As a response to the lack of quality, the Dairy Industry

Act was enacted in1998, and in 2000 the Dairy

Development Authority (DDA) was established to

regulate the sector. But even today, the DDA hardly

possesses any infrastructure outside Kampala.

13


In response to the signals of market deregulation, dairy

farmers either successfully changed their herds from indigenous

to exotic breeds or cross-bred to get higher

yields. Between 1992 and 2004, milk production almost

tripled from 511 million to 1,450 million l. This positive

development was undermined by a lack of corresponding

expansion of the processing and marketing

sub-sectors. Especially during wet seasons, dairy supply

was much higher than demand. In Mbarara, this gap led

to the closure of most of the milk processing factories

(Bakunda 2006).

The deregulation of the milk sector also led to a decline

of milk the farm gate price 3 . Milk buyers did not consider

the production costs of farmers as the UDC did.

While in 1995 the farm gate price for one litre of raw

milk was 200 UGS (0,20 USD), in 2004 farmers received

only 200 UGS (0,11 USD) due to inflation. Farmers can

hardly cover their production costs by this price. At the

same time, consumer prices for pasteurized milk went

up from 600 UGS (0,60 USD) per litre in 1995 to 1,200

UGS (0,64 USD) per litre in 2004. Thus, dairy farmers

were at a double disadvantage resulting from deregulation.

They lost the guarantee to sell all their milk and

they received lower prices. In reaction to falling prices at

farm gate, new dairy cooperatives emerged from 2004

onwards (Bakunda 2006). On August 1 st , 2006, UDC

was taken over by Sameer Ltd. Since this takeover, the

farmers’ cooperatives generally sell to Sameer.

During the wet season, when raw milk is abundant,

farmers sometimes throw the milk out since they cannot

sell all the milk which they produce, not even on the

informal market. Experts estimate that a daily average

of 100,000 l of milk is wasted because of inadequate

cooling and processing capacities (Interview Bakunda).

Recently, local micro markets and informal markets have

gained more importance. Experts estimate that 80 percent

of the milk produced is sold through these channels

(Bakunda 2006). However, this milk is not processed,

which can pose health risks for the consumers (Interview

Bakunda). While the informal sector helps the farmers

sell their products, cooperatives complain that low

prices on the informal market undermine prices on the

formal market. Firstly, to maximise profits, many traders

mix milk with water before they sell it to the consumer.

Secondly, cooling, storing and packing systems in the

informal market are poor. Since milk is a highly perishable

good, it often perishes before the consumer reaches

home. Thirdly, during the wet season, when milk is

abundant and the price is low, informal traders often

sell at an even lower than average price. These trading

practices have led to the collapse of some processing

plants and discourage potential formal investors.

The Ministry of Agriculture sees a big potential in dairy

farming to contribute to the alleviation of poverty,

since dairy is not a seasonal business. According to the

Commissioner for Crop Production and Marketing, the

national market is more promising compared to the

external market. The Commissioner is not aware that

imports may harm the development of the internal

market. Neither does he see any way to prevent

potential impacts due to Uganda being bound by

international law under the WTO. But he is aware of

the government’s responsibility to develop the dairy

sector. The commissioner believes that the sector

should develop cattle breeds that can best adapt to

the Ugandan environment. Furthermore, it should train

farmers, support proper transport facilities, processing

and marketing. At the same time, he states that he is

unable to facilitate this due to the general policy of the

government to fully liberalize the Ugandan economy.

In the big supermarkets in Kampala, milk products from

various processing companies and various countries are

sold. Fresh and UHT milk from Ugandan and Kenyan

companies are offered. Among the suppliers of milk

powder, Nestlé possesses the biggest share with its

product “Nido”, followed by Pearl from New Zealand

and Hassani Baby Food and Milk Powder, with its

product “Safa”, from the United Arabic Emirates. The

Ugandan branch of the Kenyan-based dairy Company

Sameer, started milk powder production only in May

2008 4 . Its product is offered in big supermarkets for

a slightly cheaper price than its competitors Quoted

prices at Shoprite from January 5 th , 2009: Nido: 10,000

UGS/500g (6 USD/500g); Safa: 8,000 UGS/500g (4.80

USD/500g); Sameer: 7500 UGS/500g (4.50 USD/500g)).

Cheese is produced by the dairy company Paramount and

imported from EU countries. Milk, in general, is hardly

processed and exported. When it is, export countries are

the neighbouring countries of Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda,

Burundi and Congo.

Milk consumption in Uganda per capita is 50 l per year,

which is relatively low. But the demand for milk powder

and fresh milk has increased since 2006. The local

dairy companies cannot always supply the demand,,

especially not during peak seasons like the beginning of

school terms. Imports are necessary to fulfil the demand

and discourage local companies to invest in processing

plants and milk collecting centres. The prices of dairy

products have increased, while they have increased more

slowly for fresh milk slower than for other milk products.

Unlike at farm gate, there is hardly any seasonal price

fluctuation for the supermarkets.

3 The farm gate value of a cultivated product in agriculture is the net value of

the product when it leaves the farm, after marketing costs have been subtracted.

Since many farms do not have significant marketing costs, it is often understood

as the price of the product at which it is sold by the farm (the farm gate price).

The farm gate value is typically lower than the retail price consumers pay in a store

as it does not include costs for shipping, handling, storage, marketing, and profit

margins of the involved companies. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farm_gate_price)

4 NewVision, 6th May 2008

14 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


3.6 Maize

Traditionally, maize has not been a staple food in Uganda.

It was typically seen as a food that serves institutions –

like boarding schools, orphanages or prisons - and as

an export to Kenya and Tanzania. This tradition has

changed, but maize is still mainly a commercial crop. In

the early 1980s, the Government of Uganda identified

maize as one of five non-traditional agricultural export

crops for promotion. The government offered Export

Guarantee Schemes to promote export, which were

supported by the Bank of Uganda and USAID (RATES

2003). The Produce Marketing Board (PMB), established

as a state-trading enterprise in 1968, procured, stored,

graded and marketed the commodities. All maize was

sold to the PMB 5 . Furthermore, the PMB sold maize to

areas in Uganda suffering from food shortages in order

to guarantee food security. Procurement prices were

discussed with the farmers and fixed for one season.

Only after serving the national markets and needs was

the surplus was exported. Nevertheless, among the

main shortcomings of the PMB was an inability to reach

rural farmers and lack of prompt payment to farmers

(Bakunda 2006).

In the framework of the ERP, the Ugandan Government

started to deregulate the maize sector in the early

1990s. This policy was aimed at increasing efficiency

and at restoring price incentives. The PMB was

privatised in 1993 through the Public Enterprise

Diversification Program (PEDP), which was set-up under

the Privatisation Unit of the Ministry of Finance. After its

dissolution, many companies have stepped into trade.

The market was opened to any person or company who

wanted to step in. As a consequence, the number of

traders increased drastically. The increased demand has

impacted traditional food consumption patterns in that

nowadays more people eat maize as a staple food.

5 This has not been confirmed by farmers in Bugiri. See chapter 8

Since the trade sector has been under-capitalized and

faces shortage of liquidity, small-scale traders mainly appeared

on the market scene who did not invest in infrastructure

and storing facilities. Those small traders offer

low prices and cannot purchase all available quantities

for sale. Furthermore, post-harvest losses are high and

reach approximately 20 percent (Bakunda 2006).

At the same time Government did not set any

standard regarding maize grading and classification.

Consequently, the quality of maize declined. This is an

obstacle to the export opportunities for Uganda’s maize

and for approaching the largest buyer in the region: the

World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP has certain

procurement criteria on quantities and quality. Although

WFP’s procurement of Ugandan maize has increased

from 20,000 metric tons in 1995 to approximately

60,000 metric tons in 2003, small-scale farmers have

not benefited due to low quantities and poor quality of

their own production (Bakunda 2006).

The maize sector was totally deregulated in the midnineties.

The area planted with maize increased between

1999 and 2004 from 608 thousand hectares to

750 thousand hectares and production increased from

1,053 metric tonnes (t) to 1,330 metric tonnes (2004

figures estimated, Werth et al. 2005). This increase

was possible due to an expansion of land sizes of farmers

and the use of improved technologies, mainly ox

ploughing. But the market for the increased quantities

had not been developed.

Maize provides an income or contributes to food security

for approximately 2.5 – 3.0 million Ugandan households.

The crop is predominantly grown by small-scale

farmers who cultivate 0.2 – 0.8 ha and medium-scale

farmers who cultivate 0.8 – 2.0 ha. Maize production

in Uganda is generally characterized by low yields

(Bakunda 2006).

The price for maize at farm gate has been declining

since the mid 1990s, while price volatility has increased.

Farmers could sell one kg of maize for 300 – 350 UGS

(0,30 – 0,35 USD) in 1995, and currently they receive

only 80 – 100 UGS (0,04 – 0,06 USD). At the same time,

costs for inputs, labour and livelihood have increased.

While in the past farmers paid a worker 1,000 UGS

per day, today the worker receives between 1,500 and

2,500 UGS per day. The costs for maintenance of ox

ploughs have increased from approximately 80,000 UGS

(52 USD) in 2000 to 200,000 UGS (114 USD) in 2005.

However, while farmers complain about low farm gate

prices they appreciate that they are paid cash directly

since the abolition of the PMB.

Despite declining farm gate prices, the consumer price

for maize flour has continuously increased. In the year

2008, one kg of maize flour was sold for 1,000 UGS

(0,60 USD), while the milling and transport costs remained

relatively low at 100 UGS/kg (0,06 USD/kg) and

50 UGS/kg (0,03 USD/kg), respectively. Thus it is obvious

that the traders are benefiting at the expense of the

farmers. Farmers need to sell all of their maize produc-

15


tion to gain money for basic goods like salt and soap.

They cannot wait for the off-season to get a higher price.

One NGO representative who tried to organise farmers

to bargain collectively has received threats by traders

and claims that she may unorganise farmers since they

refuse to sell. NGOs are convinced that there is political

power behind the maize traders, and that this power is

determining prices (focus group civil society).

A positive impact of deregulation of the maize sector

can be seen in the appearance of mills, which add value

to the crop by processing maize flour. Due to the large

number of mills, competition has reduced the milling

costs for farmers. This development not only diversified

farmers’ markets but also their diets. Before opening up

the market, farmers could eat only maize cobs, but now

can eat more maize-based products (Bakunda 2006).

Agrofuels

Maize is not yet exported for production of agrofuels.

However, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, an

Indian investor has already announced interest to grow

maize for agrofuel production in Uganda. The Ministry of

Agriculture and civil society organisations fear that farmers

will sell all maize and will not have food if the agrofuels

boom reaches Uganda. This happened when vanilla

production was introduced as a cash crop in Uganda a

few years ago. But the Ministry does not see any way

to stop investors from carrying out their plans. The only

solution the Ministry strives for is to increase production.

Civil society organisations refer to the example of a palm

oil plantation at Sese Islands when they complain about

the lack of transparent information on agrofuel projects.

This project has been promoted by the Government, which

states that a) the palm oil is meant for cooking oil (instead

of agrofuels) and b) that due to palm oil production, every

Ugandan will become rich (focus group civil society).

In the course of liberalisation, Uganda has stopped storing

grain in centralized silos of the PMB, which previously

served the needs of Ugandans in times of food

insecurity. The silos, constructed in Jinja in 1990 with aid

from the Danish Development Agency, lost their function

as a national food security institution due to privatisation

policies of the PEAP “as a condition of multinational

finance institutions – the World Bank and IMF”

(Rukundo 2009). Today, they are leased to private companies.

Instead, the Government now promotes storing

food households. The export ban has been lifted and

Uganda sells maize to neighbouring countries. However,

due to lack of quality standards maize is exported mostly

through informal channels (Bakunda 2006).

4. Uganda’s trade policy since 1996

Uganda has been a member of COMESA since its

foundation in 1994. In compliance with WTO rules,

COMESA members strive for preferential treatment in

the form of duty reductions on imports to each other on

a reciprocal basis.

Uganda became a member of the WTO in 1995. The

Ugandan Government has adopted the policy of

deregulation in all sectors, including agriculture. The

Government implemented the WTO Agreement on

Agriculture (AoA) and the Agreement on Customs

Valuation – using transaction value as the first method

for assessing taxes on importers. The current bound

tariff 6 for Uganda under the WTO for milk products

(tariff lines 401 to 406) and for maize (tariff lines under

1005) is 80 percent. On the applied level, parastatal

marketing institutions and so-called trade barriers have

been abolished or reduced one by one. In 1998, the

Government reduced tariff bands to two (0.7% and

15%) and lifted almost all import bans.

An important step took place in 2005: the East African

Community Customs Union entered into force. Within

the Union, Uganda adopted the common external tariff

(CET) system with two bands: 0.10 percent on raw material

and capital goods and 25 percent on intermediate

goods and finished products (DENIVA 2006). The applied

tariffs for most milk products are 25 percent. According

to the WTO, two tariffs are applied to maize: 25 percent

for tariff line 100510 (maize seed) and 50 percent

for tariff line 100590 (all maize except seed corn) (WTO

Consolidated Tariff Schedules Data Base).

Currently, Uganda has the lowest tariffs in Africa and the

lowest among LDCs. The average tariff for agricultural

crops is 11 percent. From 2010 onwards, trade within

the EAC will be tariff free (Interview Bakunda).

6 Bound tariff is the maximum rate of tariff allowed by the WTO to any member

state for imports from other member states.

16 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


4.1 Uganda’s trade relation with the

European Union

The European Union (EU) is a major export market

for Ugandan products. It accounts for 47 percent of

all exported goods. Main destinations are the United

Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands (DENIVA 2006).

At the same time, the EU also exports many goods to

Uganda. Between 2000 und 2004, Uganda imported

from the EU maize (corn) totalling a value of 11,748,036

USD and dairy products totalling a value of 3,408,760

USD (DENIVA 2006, calculations of the author)

The EU is also a primary external supplier of agricultural

products for Uganda. EU exports have a huge impact

on the Ugandan Economy since there is a tremendous

imbalance between the agricultural sectors in the EU and

in Uganda. The EU exports products in approximately

150 tariff lines and hence discourages value additions

within Uganda. Small-scale farmers and those who

have invested in processing cannot compete with EU

products. Thus, the local market share of agro-processing

industries is declining in Uganda (Interview Bakunda).

For example, while the EU is the biggest milk producer

worldwide, the dairy sector is still developing in Uganda.

Despite the set limitation of maximum quantities, the

EU produces a surplus of milk that is exported mainly

to developing countries where it is processed into

milk powder or butter. EU dairy exports are generally

subsidised to be competitive on the world market, while

Ugandan dairy farmers do not receive any support from

their Government.

4.1.2 Trade under the Everything But Arms

Initiative

Parallel to the CPA, the EU started the Everything But

Arms (EBA) Initiative in 2001.

The EBA is part of the EU Generalised System of

Preferences (GSP) to least developed countries. Currently

it offers duty- and quota-free access to the EU market

for all products of LDCs except arms, ammunition, rice

and sugar. The tariffs for rice and sugar were reduced

to zero until 2009, and then only arms and ammunition

will continue to be excluded. Uganda already exports

goods under the EBA. It is a unilateral offer of the EU

to LDCs and not a bilateral agreement. Therefore it may

not provide the same level of legal predictability as EPAs

would (DENIVA 2006, Werth et al. 2005).

4.2 Dairy sector and trade relations

In the dairy sector, the EU is the biggest external

supplier 7 to Uganda. Together with the Middle East and

South Africa, the EU supplies 50% of the market with

increasing tendency to supply more. Additionally, the EU

exports to Uganda via South Africa (with which the EU

has a Free Trade Agreement) (Interview Bakunda). The

total value of imports of dairy products into Uganda in

the years 2005 and 2006 averaged 289 mio. USD. The

value of direct imports of dairy products from the EU fell

between 2005 and 2006 from 488,000 USD to 289,000

USD. The primary imported dairy product from the EU is

milk powder. In 2006, its import value was 273,810 USD

(Reichert et al 2009).

4.1.1 Trade under the Lomé Conventions

Uganda is a least developed country (LDC) and a member

of the group of Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific countries

(ACP countries), which had special trade agreements

with the EU. Under the four Lomé Conventions, between

1975 and 2000 all ACP countries were been granted

duty-free access to the EU on most of their products (except

sugar andrice). Under the Lomé Conventions, these

non-reciprocal preferences were not in conformity with

rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on mostfavoured-nations

and non-preferential treatment. Thus

in 2000, EU and ACP countries established a new trade

agreement providing for negotiations on reciprocal trade

rules between the two parties. This so-called Cotonou

Partnership Agreement (CPA) is valid for 20 years and

provides the framework for negotiations and implementation

between EU and ACP countries on Economic Partnership

Agreements (EPAs). It arranges for negotiations

on EPAs between 2000 and 2007 and for an implementation

phase from January 2008 onwards (CPA Art. 37).

EPAs should be compatible with WTO regulations, thus

providing for reciprocal market access arrangements.

7 “External” refers to countries outside the EAC countries.

17


4.2.1 Ugandan dairy imports from the EU

The data on dairy exports from the EU to Uganda reflect

the increasing prices at the world market since 2004

and the parallel emerging dairy production in Kenya and

South Africa:

Export of dairy products from the EU to Uganda

by value (USD) and net weight (kg)

TARIFF LINE 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000

401 milk & cream not concentrated or

sweetened

402 milk & cream concentrated or

sweetened

3459 $

1600 kg

38,844 $

8,413 kg

40221 milk powder 38,789 $

8,400 kg

403 buttermilk, curdled milk and

cream, yogurt, kephir and other

fermented or acidified milk

and cream

13,039 $

16,300 kg

9,603 $

5,011 kg

214,539 $

54,100 kg

193,359 $

47,200 kg

2,275 $

300 kg

3,750 $

400 kg

538,439 $

150,800 kg

497,346 $

141,200 kg

no data 147 $

100 kg

654,685 $

208,300 kg

650,742 $

205,700 kg

no data 36,888 $

36,000 kg

404 whey no data no data no data 11,728 $

900 kg

405 butter and other fats and oil

derived from milk

76,562 $

7,100 kg

406 cheese and curd 363,098 $

52,912 kg

5,028 $

700 kg

57,104 $

9,432 kg

767,831$

260,600 kg

762,272 $

258,300 kg

58,227 $

62,500 kg

no data no data 5,140 $

1,700 kg

76,994 $

15,161 kg

22,386 $

2,300 kg

22,772 $

17,400 kg

674,127 $

277,500 kg

641,515 $

250,200 kg

1,711 $

600 kg

no data

973,112 $

371,100 kg

972,118 $

370,800 kg

17,416 $

16,700 kg

no data

493,417 $

230,900 kg

483,644 $

229,100 kg

no data

no data no data no data 32,456 $

16,000 kg

64,703 $

14,219 kg

no data no data no data

383,028 $

74,100 kg

2,748 $

600 kg

15,888 $

3,607 kg

Source: www.comtrade.un.org

4.2.2. Recent developments in EU milk policy

While during the time of the Investigative Mission, there

was little evidence that EU imports have a major impact

on marketing opportunities of domestic milk producers

in Uganda, there are reasons to fear that this might

change in the future:

1. Milk quota: In April 2008, the EU decided to increase

its milk quota (the ceiling for milk production in the

EU) by 2 percent. In November, in its “Health Check”

decision, the EU council agreed to further increase

this quota annually by one percent until 2013, after

which the quota would be abolished entirely. “In general

terms,” according to the EU Commission, “the

phasing-out of milk quotas would expand production,

lower prices and increase the competitiveness of

the sector.” (European Commission 2008: 9). The EU

hopes to increase exports, not least for skimmed milk

powder, which in the past has often been sold in great

quantities on African markets. A change as little as 0.3

percent, according to the estimates of the Dutch bank

Rabobank, can determine whether the world market

price is ruinous or bearable (Reichert 2008). If production

increases, according to the calculation of the

Commission, the European milk price will sink, and European

milk products will find their way into the world

market even without export subsidies.

2. Export subsidies: Since mid-2007 the EU had not paid

export subsidies on dairy products. However, in January

2009, the EU Commission took the decision to reintroduce

such export subsidies on butter, cheese and

milk powder. While shortly after the announcement

of new export subsidies, the German Minister of Agriculture

promised that these would not be granted

for exports to poor countries, the actual list of excepted

countries reveals the opposite: While countries

like the US, Australia and Canada are exempted, all

developing countries but South Africa are not. Thus,

there is nothing that prevents the EU from granting

export subsidies to ACP countries, including Uganda.

The statement of the EC that only very few dairy exports

end up in poor countries, is not true. Instead, in

2007, 68 percent of EU exports reached developing

countries. 13 percent of EU exports ended up in ACP

countries (Oxfam 2009).

3. International prices: The main reason for the EU not

providing export subsidies for awhile, was the high

level of world market prices for dairy products, especially

in 2007. However, since 2007, prices have fallen

dramatically. According to the FAO, skim milk powder

(SMP) prices fell to USD 3,025 per tonne in September,

41 percent below their peak in mid 2007, and whole

milk powder prices fell to USD 3,262 per tonne, 34

percent below their previous peak. In November 2008,

the FAO warned: “An important issue will be if prices

decline much further, as export prices for the European

Union may again fall below intervention levels and

induce a reinstatement of export subsidies. Previous

experience suggests that if this were to occur, price

declines could then accelerate as other exporters try to

compete with subsidized product.” (FAO 2008)

18 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


4.2.3. Trade on dairy products with Kenya

Uganda also exports and imports milk powder to and

from Kenya. Since the EAC Customs Union has been

launched in 2005, trade of milk powder has increased

between the two countries.

Specific Exports of Milk Powder from

Kenya to Uganda

Year Total Exports in Kg Infant Formula in Kgs

2007 429,288 384,731

2006 375,335 353,334

2004 278,153 287,153

2003 2550 2000

Exports of dairy products

from Uganda to Kenya

Year

Total imports in litres

2007 230,120

2006 442,298

2005 400,760

2004 0

2003 0

Source: Kenya Dairy Board

Source: FAO 2008

Meanwhile, what the FAO had feared has become a

reality. The decline of international prices has accelerated,

especially since the reintroduction of export subsidies

from the EU. Comprehensive studies of the FAO on

import surges suggest that these surges have generally

occurred in times of low world market prices. Thus the

danger of such import surges is increasing, not least

in African countries, which have generally been most

affected by import surges in the past (FAO 2006).

• As a reaction to the reintroduction of export subsidies,

countries like Russia have increased their import

tariffs on dairy products to protect their farmers from

dumping. Such an increase of tariffs will no longer

be possible in Uganda under the EPA framework

agreement (see chapter 5).

4.3 Maize sector and Trade relations

Uganda’s maize exports and imports enjoy lower tariffs

within the COMESA countries (RATES 2003). As a member

of the East African Community (EAC), together with the

other four EAC members, Uganda strives for the establishment

of a common customs union. Uganda offers preferential

tariffs on maize imports from Kenya and Tanzania

ranging between 0 and 4 percent. Maize has become the

most traded commodity within the EAC and COMESA

(Bakunda 2006). But the increase in trade has not led to an

increase in the price farmers received for selling their crop.

Uganda imports some maize seeds and maize/corn from

the EU, but the majority of its imports are for food aid for

internally displaced people (IDP) who live in camps in the

war regions in Northern Uganda as well as in Rwanda

and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The World

Food Programme (WFP) implements the distribution of

the food aid. At the same time, the WFP is the main

maize buyer in Uganda. According to the Ministry of

Agriculture, Uganda does not compete in maize exports/

imports with the EU (Interview MAAIF).

Since the WFP buys only the best maize, some traders

developed the strategy to follow the WFP trucks to

buy maize from internally displaced people (Interview

Bakunda).Hence, although unintended, maize supplied

as food aid reaches the local markets. This could cause

dumping effects on the Ugandan maize market since

those traders can offer high quality maize for low prices.

Maize is also exported to neighbouring countries like

Sudan and Kenya. Due to the political crisis in Kenya in

the first months of 2008, agricultural production went

down. Since maize is a staple food in Kenya, Kenyan

19


traders bought huge quantities in Uganda. But despite

this increased demand, Ugandan farmers did not receive

a higher farm gate price.

The import data for maize show volatility in weight and

value 8 .

Maize Imports from EU by Weight (Kg) & Value (UGX)

Tariff line Product 2000 2001 2002 2003

1005.10.0 Maize Seeds 500

556,849

1005.90.00 Other maize (not seeds),

and corn

4,012,030

1,530,340,230

2,168,200

889,836,148

4,904,102

1,347,525,589

5,044,692

4,253,833,937

10,988,561

8,342,206,321

999,028

759,560,327

9,105,800

4,209,892,829

Tariff line Product 2004 2005 2006 2007

1005.10.0 Maize Seeds 668,000

356,539,112

1005.90.00 Other maize (not seeds), and corn 3,231,000

1,563,475,137

Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics

226,741

585,427,294

7,907,610

4,148,725,054

no data

3,722,400

1,844,894,385

no data

no data

5. Uganda’s negotiations on

an Economic Partnership

Agreement

Uganda started the first phase of its EPA-negotiations

within the regional group of East and Southern African

countries (ESA 9 ) on February 7 th , 2004. At that time, the

Government of Uganda did not have an explicit national

trade policy 10 (SEATINI 2005a). ESA had agreed on a

three step process towards EPAs:

1. March – August 2004: setting of priorities and

negotiation procedures; (Preparatory period according

to CPA Chapter 2, article 37 (3));

2. September 2004 – December 2005: substantive

negotiations in the six clusters (Development Issues,

Market Access, Agriculture, Fisheries, Trade in Services

and Trade-Related Issues) with the aim to have a draft

EPA at the end of the period;

3. January 2006 – December 2007: solving issues of

disagreement, finalising and ratifying the EPA.

4. In eac country, the ESA States agreed to set-up a

multi-stakeholder National Development and Trade

Policy Fora (NDTPF) representing the public and

private sectors, civil society and academia. The idea of

the NDTPF was to develop national positions, which

would then be presented at the Regional Negotiating

Forum (RNF) by three representatives per country. The

RNF would meet at least quarterly to find common

positions. A Brussels-based Ambassador and a

Minister led negotiations on each of the six clusters.

8 The data are questionable, for example the incresase of value for maize seeds

from 2004 (534 UGX/kg) to 2005 (2582 UGX/kg)

9 ESA countries comprise Burundi, Comoror, Democratic Republic Congo,

Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda,

Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

10 The first draft of a national trade policy was elaborated by Premium Consulting

Limited and presented in April 2005.

Uganda organised its NDTPF accordingly and invited

representatives of the four stakeholder groups

(DENIVA 2006).

5.1 Negotiations between the EU and EAC

Due to the diverging interests of the 16 ESA countries

on sensitive products, no agreement was reached. Due

to this reason, the EAC 11 started to negotiate on its

own. Lead negotiator for the Ugandan Government

was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). On November

14 th , 2007 the EU and EAC concluded, at a meeting in

Brussels, that they would finalize an EPA framework no

later than only 9 days later on November 23rd. The EPA

framework “fell from the sky” as a Ugandan civil society

representative described it, “it was not negotiated”. In

Uganda, the framework EPA has been initialled by the

Cabinet. The Parliament Committee on Trade had been

briefed but not consulted. Parliament would only later

ratify the comprehensive EPA.

Civil society organisations assume that the EAC, itself,

might have been interested in this EPA framework since

its members have not been in line with the ESA. There

are speculations that the private sector (the East African

Business Council), and mainly the flower and fish exporters

within the private sector, pushed the framework

through in order to safeguard their favourable access to

the European market (focus groups civil society).

The framework EPA provides a transition period of 15

years that should begin 7 years after the signing of the

comprehensive EPA, which is scheduled for July 2009

11 EAC members are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda

20 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


(MTTI 2008). From 2015 to 2030, substantially all trade

(82 percent of the tariff lines) will be affected. The EAC

agreed on a list of sensitive products, amongst which

are dairy products and maize (Reichert et al. 2009). With

the framework EPA in force, the EAC cannot offer better

conditions to the EU than to EAC partners (Interview

Bakunda).

The EPA framework leaves the EAC with limited policy

space to negotiate mainly because of:

• the stand still clause (article 13) which does not

allow for the increase of tariffs after the signing

of the framework except to prevent dumping and

comparable policies and to apply safeguard measures

for a limited time period. In any case, the EU has to

agree to the measures taken. By accepting this rule,

the EAC loses its policy space provided under the

WTO to increase its tariff up to the bound tariff of 80

percent if a national economy sector is threatened.

• the prohibition to negotiate any other free trade

agreement with more favourable conditions for the

EAC (article 16). This might mean that the EAC will

have to consult the EU before it can sign agreements

with other countries 12 .

According to trade experts, the Interim EPA is not

favourable for Ugandan farmers. In the long run it may

impoverish them (Interview Bakunda).

5.2 EU position

According to the EU office in Uganda, the EU perceives

the overall impact of an EPA to be positive for Uganda

because it would create opportunities for the Ugandan

economy, since the EU is the biggest export market for

Uganda. An EPA would create a legal basis for trade

between the two regions and simplify the rules of origin.

64 percent of the 80 percent of commodities that

have to be liberalized under EPA already, reach the EAC

tariff free. However, one has to take into account that,

despite the Lomé Conventions, Uganda exports mainly

raw products. It remains unclear how an EPA would help

Uganda to export processed goods since the EU continues

to demand high quality standards for imports.

According to the EU, most agricultural products and

value additions are listed as sensitive products in the

Interim EPA. At the same time, Uganda is not among

the main future target markets of the EU. Instead, these

target markets areare the US, Japan and Australia.

Thus, the very limited space to adjust tariffs due to the

stand still clause of the Interim EPA , would not have

a major impact on Uganda. The interest of the EU is

to support development via trade and to encourage

European companies to invest in developing countries

like Uganda. The EU expert does not see a solution in a

more protective policy since Uganda has been protecting

its economy in the past, without progressing it.

12 It can be supposed that this clause has been integrated for geoplitical reasons,

to prevent that EAC signes favorable contracts with China (Interview Bakunda).

Internal constraints of the Ugandan economy would

be addressed under the European Development Fund.

Among these problems are how to organise farmers to

increase their bargaining power and how to improve

the overall infrastructure. The EU expert does not see a

link between internal constraints and any impact on EU

exports to Uganda.

The EU already supports the solution of internal

constraints by funding 70 percent of the PMA and 80

percent of NAADS. At the time of the interview, the

EU office in Uganda was finalizing the Uganda country

strategy within the 10 th European Development Fund

(EDF). Approximately 435 mio. Euro will be provided

for five years for budget support and for development

projects on infrastructure, rural development and other

sectors. The priorities have been discussed with the

Government of Uganda.

The EU office in Uganda sees a significant problem in

that political leaders mislead farmers. Their claims do

not merge with the capacities of farmers and markets.

The message of the Government of Uganda is to “go

big”. But there is still a lack of demand within the national

market, which hinders the growth of the processing

industries.

According to the EU expert, import shares of milk powder

from the EU are currently below 1 percent and there will

be no significant increase in imports in the course of the

EPA. The EU expert is also not aware of maize imports

from EU. However, he does not realize that even a slight

increase in imports might harm Ugandan dairy farmers

and discourage national dairy companies to invest, since

dairy farming in Uganda is neither mechanised nor

subsidised like it is in the EU.

The key issue for the negotiation on a comprehensive

EPA will be market access in the course of sanitary and

phytosanitary standards (SPS) for EAC exports, since the

standards of supermarkets regarding documentation of

production within the EU are high.

5.3 Civil society position on EPA

The strategy of the Ugandan civil society coalition

regarding the EPA negotiations was to convince the

Government not just to sign an EPA, but also to cooperate

with civil society during the preparation phase. The

coalition demanded that the Parliament stand up and

insist to be involved in the negotiations. Furthermore,

civil society undertook efforts to raise public awareness

on the EPA.

NGOs presented three petitions on the EPA. The first one

was presented to the Parliament on October 1 st ,2007

(Action Aid International Uganda et.al. 2007). In that

petition, CSOs expressed their concern about the potential

negative impact of an EPA on Uganda’s development,

mainly on livelihoods, employment, and regional

integration. They pointed out that Uganda’s exports

continue to be unprocessed goods, despite the longterm

preferential trading relationship with the EU. At the

same time, the share of EU imports coming from ACP

21


countries has declined. Hence, CSOs do not see how the

EPA will change this. Instead they fear a negative impact

on livelihoods and employment, which is an obstacle to

regional integration. They demanded Parliament to engage

itself more actively in trade related policies, and to

scrunitize the EPA negotiations to ensure that the Government

protects the livelihoods of Ugandans.

The second petition of the CSOs was addressed to the

meeting of the EAC and EU on EPA negotiations in Brussels

on November 14 th , 2007 (Uganda Joint Christian

Council et.al. 2007 13 ). CSOs expressed their concern

regarding the agreements on market access and development,

mainly that the EAC had offered to deregulate

81 percent of its imports from the EU after a certain transition

period, without a commitment of the EU to reduce

their export subsidies and other non-trade barriers and

to provide a precise commitment to development cooperation.

The signing organisations forecasted deindustrialisation

and further impoverishment of EAC inhabitants

and economies due to the EPA. They recognise the offer

of the EU to guarantee duty-free and quota-free market

access, but they do not see anything new about this

offer since this was already guaranteed to ACP countries

under the Lomé Conventions. They demand that

development should be a core issue of EPAs and point

out that EU had repulsed all stakeholders who reject the

proposed EPA framework.

The third petition was handed in to Parliament on March

11 th , 2008 (Oxfam GB in Uganda et.al. 2008). It criticised

the content of the EPA framework, as did the petition of

November 14 th , and the Rendez-vous Clause (article 37)

which provides for the continuation of negotiations on

wide-ranging areas which will limit Government’s policy

space to realize development. They conclude that the

EPA is not only in line with SAPs, but it will even be more

harmful for the country than SAPs, since the EPA strives

not only for tariff reduction, but also for irreversible

tariff elimination. The undersigning NGOs do not think

the sensitive products are protected enough since the

provided trade defence measures like antidumping and

countervailing measures have been adapted from the

WTO. According to them, most developing countries

had difficulties applying them in the past.

In article 16(2) of the framework EPA, the CSO see a

threat to regional trade integration since this commits

EAC to avoid making better trading arrangements with

other trading partners.

Furthermore, CSOs expressed their concerns about a

lack of democratic procedures since stakeholders, such

as Parliaments, have not been consulted. Thus they

demanded Parliament to debate the agreement and to

monitor the developments in the negotiations.

Later, CSOs organised a peace march, three radio talk

shows and a workshop (focus group civil society) to raise

awareness on the devastating effects of EPAs on Uganda.

Civil society organisations predict that the full

implementation of the EPA will lead to the death

of the farming sector, because the farming sector

cannot compete with imports from the EU. They fear

that Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) will enter

through the back door and create dependency. Farmers

will not be in a position to determine what they sell

(focus group civil society).

6. Dairy farming in Mbarara

District

Mbarara is a district in Western Uganda. Its capital is

also called Mbarara. Mbarara known in Uganda as the

main cattle raising area t It is even called the “home of

milk”. Milk is an important income earner in this region.

While in the past, cattle were mainly held to show the

status of a farmer they are now kept for business. Most

farmers do mixed farming. Apart from cattle raising,

they grow mainly millet, groundnuts, maize and matoke

(banana). The majority of farmers have only small plots

for cultivation. They do not use preservation technologies

and face food scarcity from October to December.

Due to land scarcity, Mbarara dairy farmers had crossbred

the traditional cattle breed, the Ankole Long Horn

Cattle, by artificial insemination with exotic breeds.

Crossbreeds produce more milk than the traditional

breed. Thus the farmers need fewer acres of pasture

to produce the same amount of milk. Dominant is the

black and white breed (Friesen/Schleswig Holsteiner), for

which farmers use sperm from Germany. Other breeds

are Usher and Jersey. The disadvantage of the black and

white is that it is not resistant against droughts.

According to dairy farmers, production has increased

during the last years because of high yielding cows.

Cows are generally fed with grass. Farmers have not yet

adopted the techniques of haymaking. Only 400 cows

in Mbarara are on zero grazing - not fed by grass but by

grain. The average price for one Jersey cow is 1 million

UGS (600 USD). Friesen cows cost a bit less.

13 Uganda Joint Christian Council et.al. 2007; www.epa2007.org/print.

asp?id=499 , [28.01.2008] )

22 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


Nyakisharara Village

Nyakisharara is a small village with 34 farms 16 km away

from the town of Mbarara. On average, seven people

live on every farm. The village has a local council with

a chairman and an executive committee comprising 9

people.

Nyakisharara is not connected to the national electricity

network. Only 4 farms have running water as the result of

to their own efforts. The village has a primary school. The

next hospital is 16 km away. By tradition, all households

are headed by men.In Nyakisharara, all land is owned

individually. The average acreage per farm is 50 acres.

Farmers calculate that 1 acre is need for every 2 cows.

Most of the farms have less than 100 cows. Out of the

34 farms, a maximum of 3 households have only up to

3 cows, 5 households have between 4 and 10 cows, 10

households have between 11 and 20 cows. All the others

own anywhere up to 200 cows. But there is a tradition

in Ankole not to talk about the number of cows a farmer

owns: “Never mention the number of your animals,

otherwise they will die.” Farmers perform farming in a

semi-commercial way. None of them is a member of a

cooperative.

In the village the main human diseases are malaria and

anaemia from which mainly the children suffer. Medicine

to treat malaria is available at the hospital. HIV/AIDS and

tuberculosis are not common, nor is there a high child

mortality rate.

Most processing materials have to be imported from

other countries. Packing papers, for example, are

imported from Kenya. During the Kenyan political crisis

in January/February 2008 it was difficult to get those

packaging materials. Also liquid nitrogen, which is

needed to clean the flasks for the milk, is scarce due to

the Kenyan crisis.

But the main bottleneck for the farmers is the marketing

of milk. Marketing is difficult since the important market

in Kampala has been flooded with milk from farmers

around Kampala. To be closer to the main market, some

farmers have moved from Mbarara to Kampala. This

indicates that cooling and transporting infrastructure is

a major problem within the supply chain.

The dependence on grass to feed their cows makes

farmers easily affected by the seasons and other climate

conditions. During the rainy season their milk abounds.

Cows may deliver 10 l per day. Then the buyers say:

“Coolers are full, do not bring milk tomorrow.” In the

dry season a cow delivers between 0 and 7 l per day.

In 2005, the Uganda Crane Creameries Cooperative

Union Ltd. was founded to market milk collectively. The

cooperative members see a high potential to increase

milk production and consumption in Uganda. Production

is already steadily growing. The following quantities of

milk are sold in the formal markets of the districts:

• Bushenyi: 150,000 l/day

• Mbarara: over 150,000 l/day

• Ibanda: over 160,000 l/day

In the informal markets, where most people buy milk,

almost the same quantities are sold

Members of Cooperative Union see imported milk as

a threat to their business. Ugandan farmers cannot

compete with imported milk powder, because they do

not receive subsidies. According to the members of

the cooperative, most farmers are not well-educated.

They do not incorporate modern technology into their

farming practices.

Members of cooperatives and farmers in the village

prefer the system, when the Uganda Dairy Cooperative

was active and bought the milk. Compared to today,

farmers had the following advantages:

• they could approach the management, while today

management does not listen to them;

• the price was fixed and fair; the working environment

was positive;

• due to fixed prices production went up;

• each collection point had to handle fewer farmers

On the other hand, members mentioned a negative

aspect of working under the Uganda Dairy Cooperative

was that that they had no bargaining power. Farmers in

the village have the opposite view. Before deregulation,

farmers’ representatives were active in the cooperative

and bargained with Government in the interest of

farmers, while today they have no bargaining power.

The price of milk is just set by the trader.

The farmers in the village find extension services

inadequate since they were privatised. The Government

provides extension services if the farmers ask and pay

for them, but the services are weak. Farmers also have

to pay the veterinary and transport costs. Furthermore,

there is only one veterinary at the sub-county level.

Dairy farmers in Nyakisharara

Most of dairy farmers in Nyakisharara hold land as

customary tenants. The majority of their cows are

cross-bred. In dairy farming, the farmers all depend on

seasons. No farmers use the zero grazing method for

dairy production. On average, during the wet season,

their cows produce between 5 and 8 l per day. During the

dry season they produce less, and some cows even dry

up. None of the farmers sell to the formal market. Many

of them employ farm workers. Apart from dairy farming,

the families grow bananas for commercial purposes and

beans, maize, cassava, groundnuts, soybeans and sweet

potatoes for home consumption.

Their farming costs are higher during the dry season than

during the wet season because the cows need to be watered

during dry periods. The farmers do not receive any

support from the Government. Those who have the necessary

knowledge even vaccinate their cows themselves.

23


6.1 Dairy Supply Chain

Farmers who are members of a cooperative bring their

milk to a milk collection centre. Those centres are, on

average,5-6 kilometres away from the farms. Farmers

have to cross that distance by bike. From there, the milk

is brought to the District Dairy Farmers Cooperative

Union and then brought to the umbrella organization,

the Uganda Crane Creameries Cooperative Union Ltd.

The latter cooperative markets the milk.

One problem is that milk is highly perishable. Bacteria

begin affecting the quality of the milk after 6 hours and

the milk also loses quality via the bike transport.

A major marketing problem is the fact that farmers do

not collect all milk produced during the wet season when

there is surplus. They sell the surplus to informal traders

at low farm gate prices. In April 2008 the price of milk at

the informal market was 100-150 UGS/litre (0.06 – 0.09

USD/l) while the cooperative price was 300 UGS/litre (0.18

USD/l). In Kampala, one litre of pasteurised and packaged

milk is sold at 1,500 UGS/litre (0.90 USD/l). While the trader

in the informal market sets the price, the cooperative

negotiates and prices are fixed for three months.

During the wet season, the price per litre of milk paid

to cooperatives is higher than the price on the informal

market,. This can switch during the dry season. In this

case, the cooperative renegotiates the price.

On its way from the farm to the consumer, the milk sold in

the formal sector is tested three times. To avoid that farmers

dilute the supplied milk, the cooperatives test temperature,

alcohol, and water when they receive the milk at the

collection centre. Before the collected milk is loaded into a

tanker it is tested again. And a third test is made when the

tanker reaches the processing plant in Kampala.

Main processors are the private companies Sameer Agricultural

Livestock Processors, JBK Processing and Alpha

Dairies. Farmers claim that they are at the mercy

of those processing companies. The companies do not

honour different qualities. In 2007, two months of production

were lost due to poor processing. The cooperative

does its own lactoscan, but when the milk reaches

the processors they often report that water has been

added. One cooperative member claimed: “They cheat

farmers just to discourage them.” One farmer from

Nyakisharara had tried to sell to Alpha Dairies but he

stopped when the company offered a lower price than

the vendor. However, the non-organised farmers did not

experience cheating by processing companies. It seems

that the companies uses this practice only on cooperatives,

which might become competitors in future.

To produce better quality milk, farmers see the need

to have processing plants closer to production sites.

That is why the Uganda Crane Creameries Cooperative

Union Ltd. plans to set up its own processing plant. The

business plan is in place. The National Environmental

Management Authority (NEMA) has already awarded

the certificate. Members of cooperatives are convinced

that a successful dairy sector needs to hold production,

processing and marketing in one hand.

Sumpca Dairies

Sumpca Dairies is a milk trading company. The company

runs one collection point and three selling points in

Mbarara and has 11 employees. Sumpca only cools

the milk; it does not process it. The company buys from

farmers and vendors and sells to private people and to

the dairy companies Paramount, Alpha and others. In one

of their selling points they have a tank with a capacity of

800 l and sell up to 1,000 l per day from 7 am to 8 pm.

The other two selling points have capacities of 500 and

400 l. They buy milk for 300 UGS/litre (0.18 USD) and sell

it at selling points for 400 UGS/litre (0.24 USD/l) during the

wet season. To the dairy companies they sell 1 litre for 420

UGS (0.25 USD). During the dry season they buy 1 litre for

400 UGS (0.24 USD) and sell it for 500-600 UGS (0.30 –

0.36 USD). According to one of their employees, the price

of milk has not changed during the last four years.

Since the privatisation of the Uganda Dairy Cooperation

in 1992, all the farmers in Nyakisharara sell their milk

to local vendors in the informal market. Those vendors

sell to families, coolers, restaurants and the factories of

the dairy processing companies GBK, Alpha and Sameer.

The vendors are not organised. Everybody works on his

own. Therefore, it is very important for the vendors to

keep good relations with their farmers and customers.

Otherwise, they might lose business due to high

competition. The vendors have to guarantee the farmers

that they will collect the milk every day. If they are sick,

they need to find someone to replace them. If they do

not collect the milk, they have to refund the farmer his

loss of income. From the surpluses, the wives of milk

farmers make butter mainly for home consumption.

The vendors sell milk on the open market in Mbarara for

500 UGS/l (0.30 USD/l) during wet season and for 700

UGS/l (0.42 USD/l) during dry season. Some of them see

supermarkets as a competitor.

Vendor A

Vendor A buys milk from three farmers only in the morning

and sells the milk in Mbarara. During the wet season he

buys 150 l/day and he pays 250 UGS/l (0.15 USD/l).

He sells the milk for 300 UGS/l (0.18 USD/l). During the

dry season he buys 100l/day and pays 300 UGS/l. He

sells at 400 UGS/l (0.24 USD/l). He collects the milk by

motorcycle and always buys all the milk the three farmers

are willing to sell. He sells to hotels, private families and

coolers. All his customers pay the same price. He pays

7,000 UGS (4.20 USD) for fuel per day. Thus, his daily

profit during the wet season is 500 UGS (0.30 USD), and

during dry season it is 3,000 UGS (1.8 USD). He uses his

own lactometer to test the quality of the milk. The time he

needs for buying and selling is 3 hours per day, from 7h

to 10h am. He pays the farmers every 10 days. He gets

paid by hotels and families once a week and by coolers

every 5 days.

Apart from trading milk, he works as a carpenter in his

own workshop in Mbarara. From carpentry work he gets a

daily income of approximately 8,000 UGS (4.80 USD).

His customers determine the price, and he calculates

it according to demand. He does not compete with

supermarkets since his customers prefer raw milk.

24 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


6.2 Development of Prices and Costs

Before deregulation the farm gate price was stable. According

to farmers, one could earn enough income from

six cows to feed a family and to pay school fees up to

the university level. But according to a dairy farmer “the

good old days have gone by.” 15 years ago farmers got

50-80 UGS/litre (0.05 – 0.08 USD/l) while production

costs remained steady at around 40-50 UGS/litre (0.40

– 0.50 USD/l). But in the last couple of years costs for

drugs have increased faster than farm gate prices. At

first glance, when only considering the farm gate prices,

which have increased to 300 UGS (0.18 USD), farmers

should be better off today (at the time of publication, 1

USD was equivalent to 1,700 UGS while 15 years ago, 1

USD was equivalent to 500-600 UGS). However, considering

the increase of living and production costs, it is obvious

that farm gate prices have decreased dramatically

in real value.15 years ago, 1litre of fuel was 200 UGS

(0.20 USD). Today the price is 2590 UGS (1.56 USD) for

1 liter of fuel. 15 years ago, 100 kg of maize was 1,000

UGS (1 USD), today 1 USD can only buy 1 kg of maize.

According to the members of the Crane Creameries

Cooperative Union, in 2003 costs of milk production

averaged 150 UGS/litre (0.09 USD/l). The farm gate price

was 200-250 UGS/liter (0.12 – 0.15 USD/l). Currently,

costs of production are 200-225 UGS/litre (0.12 – 0.14

USD/l), while the cooperative receives 300 UGS/l (0.18

USD/l). Since part of the overall price of a liter of milk is

kept by the cooperative, the overall profit of the farmer

who sells to the cooperative makes is 50 UGS/litre (0.03

USD/l). Only the hope that they will someday own

their own processing plant makes the members of the

cooperative stay members. Meanwhile, some farmers

have already shifted from dairy to beef. Those who still

produce butter can sell 1kg for 6,000 UGS (3.60 USD).

On the open market in Mbarara, butter is sold for 7,000

UGS/kg (4.20 USD/kg) during the wet season, and for

8,000 UGS/kg (4.80 USD/kg) during the dry season.

Main factors of milk production costs are:

• drugs for medical treatment of cows

• food supplements

• iinjectables

• vaccinations

• acaricides (pesticides that kill mites)

Farmers in Nyakisharara do not belong to a cooperative.

They do not have the same opinions on cooperatives

as people in Mbarara. Some famers in Nyakisharara

think that their profits would rise if they had a national

cooperative that could subsidise vaccines and other

production factors. Others still remember the past

when farmers were not paid in a timely fashion. They

are also aware that the cooperatives need to pay their

staff, which reduces the farmer’s income. The farmers

interviewed in Nyakisharara are not aware of their

production costs. They estimate that they spend half of

their money on farm costs, but they do not calculate

costs of their own labour.

Besides the production costs, members of the cooperative

rank the costs which take up most of their income in the

following order:

1. education;

2. medical care

3. transportation

4. telecommunication

Housing is not a significant cost for them and clothes are

bought only seasonally (e.g., at Christmas and Easter).

Still, farmers cannot cover just the costs listed above.

They commonly borrow money from different sources.

Some farmers are heavily indebted since interest rates

from banks are high.

6.3 Gender

In the village men traditionally head the family. When

a head of a family dies, the family sits together and

decides on a successor, which is typically one of the sons

of the deceased. The new head of the family can sell

the land only if the widow of the former head of the

household agrees.

Farm work is shared between men and women but

each has his/her special tasks. The men do the milking,

the watering of cattle, the fencing and the general

maintenance, and they sell the milk. Women do the

churning of butter and crop husbandry. In the past,

women have produced and sold ghee (butter), but

nowadays men sell all milk and receive all the money

earned by dairy production.

Besides the dairy production, women grow bananas,

cassava, sweet potatoes, groundnuts, peas, beans,

millet, maize, oranges, watermelon and mangoes. The

farmers sell only the milk, livestock and bananas. All

other crops are for home consumption. Thus, women

contribute mainly to the food security of the family.

6.4 Food Security

The members of the cooperatives stated that dairy

farmers do not face food shortages since they also have

banana plantations and gardens. Small farmers cultivate

sweet potatoes and cassava. Only the landless do not

enjoy food security.

Some farmers in the village face hunger during the dry

season. Among the individually interviewed farmers, two

were obviously exposed to food shortages. Especially

small-scale farmers, who have only 3 cows, have no

milk during the dry season. They may also borrow a cow

from their neighbours and milk it until it dries up. While

farmers were able to save money before deregulation,

incomes are currently too low for the farmers to save

money. Therefore they cannot compensate for their

lower income during the dry season. Products that

have become too expensive for farmers to be able to

afford them during the dry season are sugar, bread and

meat. The Government does not help in those times.

25


Therefore, the Ankole Food Security Network, of NGOs,

plans to introduce food collection centres to prevent

food shortages in future.

Farmer B

Dairy Farmer B is 35 years old. He is married and has

five children. The economic basis of the family is dairy

farming. They have 10 cows of which 5 produce milk in

the rainy season. Today, the cows produce 17 l of milk

in total. B sells all this milk for 300 UGS /liter to a private

vendor who sells the unprocessed milk directly to local

people in the villages. According to B, there is no contract

between himself and the vendor that would guarantee a

stable and secure market. Sometimes the vendor does

not stop by B’s farm on his rounds. B then has no income

for that day.

B complains that the dairy business does not provide

him enough income to feed his family. Without his small

cultivation of banana, sweet potato and beans, the family

would suffer from hunger throughout the year. In the dry

season, the harvest is still not big enough to feed his

family. These are the times when the family is forced to

buy maize flour for 800 UGS/kg. As this is too expensive,

the family must reduce the number of meals to two.

The main reason for low incomes and food shortage

are low farm gate prices, the small number of cows and

high living and production costs. Every three weeks B

spends 15,000 UGS for paraffin. He spends 10,000 UGS

per trimester on school fees for his two eldest children.

Currently he has to pay high fees for malaria treatment for

his 8-year-old daughter. “In the hospital, last time, they

asked almost 30,000 UGS”, he says.

Furthermore, problems are caused by storms that

sometimes occur in September/October and destroy

banana gardens. According to the farmers, this problem

has been considered by the Government, which plans to

set up a drying plant to produce banana flour to make

banana bread.

6.5 Findings in Mbarara

There is no direct competition between local milk

production in the Mbarara village and imports from

the EU. The local production reaches the informal

market while imports reach the formal market. Only

the members of cooperatives may be affected by

imports since they supply the formal market chain. The

farmers fear that imports reduce prices and discourage

investments in processing plants. The Uganda Crane

Creameries Cooperative Union’s plan to set up their

own processing plant might be threatened by the EPA

since an increase of imports of dairy products might

undermine the building up of their new business.

Even if there is no direct competition of imports with

local products in the local markets, imports might

affect marketing opportunities of farmers in Mbarara.

According to expert interviews, imports occupy a large

share of the formal market and might be one of the

reasons why local milk is not processed and does not

ultimately enter the formal market.

Dairy farming is associated with some accumulation of

wealth. Nevertheless the investigative team observed

that hunger occurs amongst dairy farmers, as well. The

team found evidence that some dairy farmers suffer

food shortages. One of the four farmers interviewed

said that he faces food shortages during the dry season.

The paradox exists of a growing production of milk, a

growing demand of dairy products and at the same time

a growing poverty among dairy farmers. This situation

can be attributed to two main factors. First, the increase

of production required considerable investment to

replace indigenous cows by crossbreeds and Friesian

cows. Second, following the deregulation and the

privatisation of processing and marketing since 1992,

farmers have entirely lost access to the formal dairy

supply chain and only sell their milk to local informal

vendors. According to the farmers, for the last 15 years,

the nominal average price per litre of milk, during wet

season, has increased only from 50 to 200 UGS, which

in real terms means a drastic decrease in purchasing

power due to inflation, and increasing consumer prices

for daily needs like medicine, school fees, food, and

increasing production costs.

Farmers reported that more milk collecting points

were in place before privatisation of the Uganda Dairy

Corporation. Farmers could sell all their milk to UDC,

received a higher and more stable price while production

costs were lower than today. Thus the farmers were

better off before deregulation. New private companies

entering the sector have not been motivated or forced

by law or other governmental regulations to invest in

this infrastructure.

The level of financial recordkeeping is low at the village.

Farmers do not know and/or record their costs of

production. They have not developed techniques (like

making hay) to become more independent from the

effects of the seasons and the environment, which is

necessary to ensure the food security of the poorest of

the farmers. Government has released farmers into the

deregulation climate without preparing and assisting

them properly in coping with the new situation, in

which everybody struggles on his own.

The women have lost access to milk, markets and

income due to privatisation of UDC and deregulation

of the sector. While they usually received a share of the

milk to produce and sell butter, the men now sell all

marketable milk. Thus the women have lost a source

of income.

While experts and members of Uganda Crane Creameries

Cooperative say that milk is poured at the farms, this

was not reported by any of the farmers in Nyakasharara.

Two factors might explain this: the farmers sold only to

the informal market and the village is relatively close

to the market in Mbarara town. Due to the fact that

milk is a perishable good, the distance to the market is

probably a crucial factor. Farmers who live far away from

Mbarara or from a cooling facility may not be able to sell

all the milk. Thus, there is a need for the Government to

invest more in infrastructure like roads and electricity.

26 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


Dairy farmers have not experienced any real bargaining

power in the last 20 years. Since the production of

good quality milk is not honoured by the market, the

Government should introduce a regulation on quality

and assist farmers to bargain a price accordingly.

“Cheating” of farmers by processors has not been experienced

by the community and the vendors, but only by

the cooperative (bulk selling). The reason for this might

be the fact that the cooperative is a future competitor

for the processors since it plans to build its own processing

plant. Government should not view farmers’ cooperatives

only as economic actors on the market like they

view solely commercial companies since the cooperatives

contribute to food security. Instead, Government should

set rules to strengthen the cooperatives and make them

more attractive to farmers. Part of this strengthening

could come fromoffering the farmers legal advice and

improving the judicial system so that cooperatives and

their members have easier access to courts and receive

judgments in a reasonable time frame.

7. Maize farming in Bugiri

District

Bugiri, a district in Southeast Uganda, is one of the

main maize growing regions of the country. It extends

to the Uganda-Kenya border in the east and to Lake

Victoria in the south. It has a total population of

413,477 people. According to the findings of the Bugiri

District Advocacy Coalition (BUDAC), 86 percent of the

households are food insecure for four to six months

per year. Approximately 40 percent of the households

have access to safe water. Most of the farmers practice

subsistence farming (BUDAC 2007). Farmers themselves

call Bugiri a food basket due to its fertile soil. Since

2003, farmers have struggled against Stryga, a disease

that affects maize.

Farmers in Bugiri have formed an association, which is

called Bugiri Farmers District Association. In 1993 they

started to organise themselves at the village level, in

1998 at the district level and finally joined the Uganda

Farmers Federation. In 2008, the association had 4,950

individual members, men and women, incorporated

into 132 community-based groups. In addition, farmers

are grouped according to the crops they produce. The

association undertakes surveys, capacity building and

advocacy on production and marketing. The construction

of its office has been funded by DANIDA, the Danish

development organisation; the district authorities have

donated the compound. The NGO VECO supports them

with seeds, goats and coffee plants. Together they

address issues of food security and household income.

The majority of the farmers (approx. 60 percent) are

small-scale farmers who cultivate less then 2 acres. 30

percent have between 2 and 15 acres of arable land and

10 percent cultivate more than 15 acres. For commercial

purposes, farmers produce maize, coffee, rice and some

plan to start dairy farming. Maize is a cash crop and a

food crop. Almost every farmer in Bugiri grows maize.

Farmers do not do monocropping. They plant only

certain shares of their land with maize. Since the year

2000, the members of the farmers association have been

growing maize commercially and using oxen to plough.

They would like to produce more but they lack skills and

are discouraged by bad roads and poor transport, which

lowers the farm gate price. Furthermore, the market

chain is too long due to middlemen.

Farmers have been encouraged by a rural farmers’

project scheme of the Ministry of Agriculture to produce

maize. At the time of that project there was a demand

on maize. But farmers did not benefit from lending

schemes to invest in the new crop. Loans had to be

paid back during the off-season. The farmers also felt

that bank policies on lending were unfavourable for

farmers. Their interest rates are very high, reaching up

to 30 percent, and loans have to be paid back within 6

months. One of the interviewed farmers was harassed

by his bank to force him to pay back his credit. “The

bank came with policemen even at night.” Microcredit

agencies are also active in Bugiri. They offer loans for

farmers, but according to those interviewed, the farmers

remain indebted.

Some farmers use hybrid seeds. In 2003, when Uganda

Seed was still under the Ministry of Agriculture, they

grew the brand 2b. Since 2005, Uganda Seed has

been privatised and called FICA. President Museveni,

of Uganda, owns FICA. In 2008, some farmers used

hybrid seeds grew Long 6h and 6h7, which did not

germinate. Thus the farmers will have to buy new seeds

every season. Since deregulation, the quality of seeds

has dropped while the price has increased. There are

projects to introduce high yielding maize, but those

projects have failed to create markets. Thus farmers do

not see an incentive to use them.

The farmers wish that Government would retain the

manufacturing of seeds and fertilizers since the quality

of those products was better under the Government.

They appreciate that the Government did not work on a

profit-oriented level. They also wish that the Government

would introduce irrigation to them. Farmers wish to

receive subsidies from the Government so that they can

compete with subsidized crops from other countries.

One big buyer of crops is the World Food Programme

(WFP), but it is hardly possible for small-scale farmers to

sell to the WFP due to its specific criteria (see chapter 8).

Farmers could take out credits from banks to meet the

WFP criteria, but the banks demand repayment after six

months. Due to late payment by the WFP, farmers are

not yet able to refund the banks on time.

Farmers are aware of the maize imported into the US

in 1980, from Zimbabwe between 1990 and 1993 and

from South Africa in 1997. They have never heard of

maize imports into the EU. GMO maize is imported from

South Africa and the US. Farmers have not heard about

agrofuels.

27


Bukyansiko village

110 families, with an average of five household members

in each family, live in Bukyansiko, which is 9km 2 large.

Women head ten of the households. The village has

a chief and a local council.The village does not have a

school, but it has a health centre. The next school is 2 km

away. People get water from 5 boreholes. Bukyansiko is

not connected to the electricity network. The inhabitants

faced droughts and famines in 1939/40, 1980 and 1990-

93 that led to migration. In the past, they also suffered

from sleeping sickness.

There are two types of land ownership: customary owned

land and bought land Neither group holds formal land

titles. 90 out of 110 families cultivate their own land. 60

percent of the farmers own less than 2 acres.

70 percent of the land is cultivated with maize. Other crops

are rice, groundnuts, cotton, coffee, beans, cassava,

sweet potatoes and soya beans. The whole village

produces approximately 500 t of maize per season. All

farmers sell maize to middlemen. There is no maize mill

in the village.

60 farmers are members of the farmers’ association. Only

these members get support from the Government through

its extension services (NAADS). Farmers have observde a

loss of soil fertility during the last 20 years. Additionally,

the Stryga disease reduced the harvest.

Farmers have never sold to the Ugandan Produce

Marketing Board.

7.1 Maize Supply Chain

Maize farming in Bugiri has two seasons. The first is from

January to July and the second from July to December.

January is the time of ploughing. In February the seeds

are planted. Farmers apply the fertilizer DAB in March

and the women weed in April and May. When the

maize is knee high they apply a fertilizer called Urea The

harvest starts in June and ends in July. After harvest the

farmers directly start to plough.

Maize is sold in three ways:

• as green corn within its leaves

• as whole corn

• as grain already shelled.

Farmers produce maize for consumption, either for their

families, for food aid or for the market. They do not mill

the maize. Milling is done exclusively by millers. Millers

produce maize flour for consumption and for animal

feed. They sell the maize flour back to the farmers, at

the time of the research at 1,000 UGS/kg (0.60 USD/

kg). Out of 100 kg maize, they get 75 kg of high quality

flour or 80 kg of lower quality flour.

Middlemen buy at farm gate. They know when farmers

are under pressure to sell and come, for example, at times

when parents have to pay school fees. Sometimes farmers

even sell to middlemen before harvest. “A farmer is like

a beggar. He cannot take a decision on the price he sells

the crop for. The middlemen dictate the price.” The price

also depends on the distance to the market in Bugiri.

Some farmers store maize, but only in small quantities,

which they sell during off season. The middlemen,

however, do the storing.

The main maize market had been shifted from Busia, a

town at the border to Kenya, to Jinja. According to the

farmers, the shift is due to political reasons. “People in

Busia do not respect the Government.” Farmers believe

that President Mujseveni’s daughter, Natasha, is behind

this shift. According to the farmers, she trades maize

in huge quantities even to Zambia. The FAO explains

that she is a middlewoman who manages to sell huge

quantities and supply the WFP.

In the past, some middlemen sold to the auction in

Busia. But during the political crisis in Kenya in 2007,

the market broke down. However, Kenyan traders do

not buy Bugiri maize ndirectly from the farmers. They

buy only from middlemen and the farmers do not know

at what price the traders purchase the maize.

Millers in Bugiri buy mainly from the middlemen. They

sell flour locally to shops, traders or boarding schools.

Only some bring it to Kampala. Their market in Bugiri

is limited and challenges are transportation, costs for

electricity, and lack of capital. A few of them do milling

and trading. The middlemen are independent, but

sometimes millers pay the middlemen to buy maize for

them. At the time of investigation, there were 15 millers

in Bugiri. According to some of the remaining millers,

seven had to close down prior to the investigation due

to power problems,.

The Bugiri District Commercial Office also sees the

marketing deficit. According to its staff, the main

problem is that the farmers cannot sell in bulk, neither

to the auction in Busia, nor to the WFP. Thus, farmers

depend on middlemen. They see the following main

challenges for farmers:

• Farmers do not control the weather, and insurance

against unfavourable weather does not exist.

• Farmers have to sell at low prices, which do not allow

them to buy seeds for the next season.

• Exploitation by middlemen occurs, since farmers

bargain individually.

• Harvest handling: farmers do not have proper storage

facilities.

• Some cooperatives do not pay immediately; therefore

farmers lose trust.

• Limited support: lack of training on value adding.

• Lack of access to loans with lower interest rates.

The district has a District Livelihood Support Programme

approach on natural resource management and

agricultural development. Farmers are also supported

by NGOs: mainly GOAL Uganda, and FOCRIF.

According to the commercial officers, production was

easier for farmers in the time of the Uganda Produce

Marketing Board because the UPMB connected smoothly

28 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


with farmers. Today, a quality problem can be observed.

While the UPMB used to control quality, nowadays

everybody can sell bad quality maize, but for lower

prices. The officers blame corruption for the decease

of the cooperative system. One farmer said, “It died by

itself due to corruption.” Farmers sold their maize to

the cooperative but never got paid. Thus, they left the

cooperatives when the market was deregulated.

From the perspective of the local government, the

PMA functions but does not focus on the maize sector.

District authorities and NAADS support maize farmers,

but NAADS could create markets. For the years 2007/8,

Bugiri District received 215 mio. UGS (129,000 USD)

under the PMA. This amount will mainly be spent for

agriculture, roads, water and dairy. Before the money

arrived, sub-county chiefs were informed to consult the

farmers. Additionally, the district selected 30 villages

randomly for interviews. The NAADS approach is to

respond to farmers’ demands. The community has to

identify an enterprise (eg. maize). Local authorities can

use the money for needs they have identified. But one

does not feel that the funds will have a strong impact

on agriculture.

The farmers criticise the District Commercial Office

because it does not know their real problems. They also

see a lack of participation. Although Commercial Office

invites the farmers for consultation, the farmers are only

allowed to listen. Demands to also let the farmers talk

have been rejected. Additionally, those hearings are

announced only with short notice, approx. three days

in advance.

Maize farmer 1

He and his wife are customary tenants and cultivate

maize (hybrids), soy, groundnuts, beans and cotton on

11 acres. Out of these, they sell maize, soy and cotton.

For maize growing they use the fertilizers DAB and Urea.

The farmer sells the maize to different middlemen. The

family normally eats three times a day, but in May and

June they eat only twice a day. In contrast to the general

observation, their income generated by maize is better

now than it was during the 1980s. This might be because

the farmer always sold to middlemen and not to the

Produce Marketing Board.

7.2. The World Food Programme

A few farmers have sold to the WFP through commercial

farmers’ associations or private companies. But they do

not continue selling because of the late payment.

WFP has strict criteria on quality and quantity:

The minimum quantity of maize, which WFP buys

from a supplier, is 50 t per season.

The whole 50 t must be kept in one place.

• WFP does not pay on the spot, but only three months

later.

The moisture of the grain must be within a certain

range.

The grain needs to be uniform and whole.

The grain must be free of insects.

Small-scale farmers can hardly comply with this criterion,

especially not with the quantity component.

One of the farmers sold 250 t in 2005 to the WFP, but

he did not continue because of the late payment by the

WFP. He had to take a credit to be able to supply the

WFP and the banks harassed him to pay the money back

even before the WFP paid him.

7.3 Development of Prices and Costs

Farmers complain about high costs of production. From

1999 to 2002, they harvested 18 to 22 bags (1 bag =

100 kg) per acre per growing season. For this harvest,

they needed 10 kg of seeds, 50 kg of DAB fertilizer and

50 kg of Urea fertilizer. They could sell a kilogramme (kg)

for 50 UGS (0.03 USD). Farmers estimate that they had

seasonal earnings of approximately 100,000 UGS (66

USD) per acre. In 2008, the members of the Bugiri District

Farmers Association received 200 UGS/kg (0.12 USD/kg),

but the outcome is only between 8 and 12 bags per acre

per growing season. Thus they have a seasonal income

per acre of 200,000 UGS (120 USD). Costs, however,

have increased faster than the selling price.

According to the farmers they would need:

10 kg of seeds 32,000 UGS

ox ploughing

DAB fertilizer

Urea fertilizer

40,000 UGS

85,000 UGS

85,000 UGS

2 x weeding labour 80,000 UGS

planting

harvesting

shelling

Total Amount

10,000 UGS

20,000 UGS

20,000 UGS

372,000 UGS (223 USD)

If the farmers would spend this on maize cultivation

they would make a loss of 172,000 UGS (103 USD) per

acre and season.

Farmers in the village Bukyansiko receive between only

100 and 150 UGS/kg (0.06 – 0.09 USD/kg) and harvest

only 7 bags per acre per season. None of the farmers

use fertilizers or pesticides and only two of them use

ox ploughing and buy hybrid seeds. They have seasonal

production costs of 40,000 UGS (24 USD). The selling

price at farm gate has remained stable since 2001, while

the buying price for maize flour has doubled from 500

UGS/kg (0.30 USD/kg) to 1,000 UGS/kg (0.60 USD/kg)

from the year 2007 to 2008. From 2005 – 2007 the

price was stable. Prices for maize flour have increased

tremendously from 2007 to 2008. While the price

for one kg levelled out to 600 UGS/kg (0.35 USD/kg)

in 2003, it increased suddenly to 1,000 UGS/kg in

2008. According to the FAO, this was caused by the

procurement of huge quantities of maize by Kenya and

Tanzania. Additionally, prices for energy and transport

have increased significantly.

29


The prices for non-hybrids have increased during the last

five years. While 1 kg of seeds was 700 UGS (0.41 USD)

in 2003, prices went up to 3,200 UGS (1.92 USD) in

2008. And the quality is sometimes bad. Hybrid seeds

were at 1,200 UGS/kg (0.84 USD/kg) in 1999, 2,000

UGS/kg (1.16 USD/kg) in 2002 and 2,800 UGS/kg (1.68

USD/kg) in 2008. The price of fertilizer followed a similar

pattern. While 1 kg was 500 UGS (0.29 USD) in 2003,

in 2008 the price was 1,900 UGS (1.14 USD). Fertilizers

are the inputs that cause the highest production costs.

Due to the negative relation between earnings and

production costs, many farmers have already dropped

out of commercial maize farming. They have diversified

to rice and groundnuts, which have a better market.

At the same time, the selling price at farm gate hasn’t

really changed since 2003. Since then it has stayed

at about 200 UGS/kg (0.12 USD/kg). Farmers get the

highest prices in March and September when the school

semester starts and the demand for maize is high,

because schools need it to prepare students’ meals.

But farmers cannot store maize until that time, because

insects easily invade it.

The millers buy one kg of maize for 450 UGS (0.27 USD)

during the off-season. During harvest season they pay

less 14 . Out of a bag of 100 kg, the middlemen make 1,000

UGS (0.60 USD) profit. Millers sell maize flour for 750-

800 UGS/kg (0.45 – 0.48 USD/kg). The price decreases for

larger quantities. For a bag of 100 kg, millers take 35,000

UGS (21 USD). Since boarding schools do not pay on time

of supply but only at the end of a term middlemen demand

a higher price of 900 UGS/kg from them (0.54 USD/

kg). In Kampala, they get 820 UGS/kg (0.49 USD/kg) cash.

Millers give a commission to young boys to sell the maize

flour. Millers are aware that there are many competitors.

They do not control the quality of maize flour and have

never sold maize to the WFP. Millers are aware that traders

from other countries buy maize flour in Kampala, but

according to them, they do not buy in Bugiri.

When a farmer brings maize, including maize bran, for

milling and takes it back to his farm then the price is 100

UGS/kg (0.06 USD/kg). When the farmer wants to leave

the maize bran, then the price is 80 UGS/kg (0.05 USD/

kg). A miller processes 80 bags per day (24 hours) – if

there is no loss of electricity. He employs three workers

for that the processing. None of the millers in Bugiri

has a generator. Costs for electricity are 500 UGS/unit

(0.30 USD/unit). They need 12 units to process 100 kg,

which costs6,000 UGS (3.60 USD). One of the millers

had a electricity bill for 70 mio. Millers get loans from

banks, but conditions of payment are not favourable for

them. Even the most successful miller had lost his house

to the bank due to high interest rates.

The highest household expenditures of farmers in

Bugiri district are medical care, followed by food and

education. Those three items consume 70 percent of

the farmers’ income.

7.4 Gender

In general, women do most work at the farm. While the

men do bush clearing, ox ploughing, planting, applying

of fertilizer, and harvesting, the women do planting,

weeding, harvesting, applying of fertilizer, drying and

shelling. But there are also families where the women

do all the work and men perform just the selling and

control the money. In most of the families, men make

the decisions on how the money is spent. Therefore,

women depend financially on their husbands.

According to the men, women want them to take the

lead in the family. “Women have the attitude to ask the

men to take decisions.” Women have a different view.

They are not satisfied with the situation that they bear

most of the workload, but earn only little money and

do not own land. Some women run a small business to

earn their own money. They sell tomatoes or cabbage.

Although women do most of the work on the field they

do not wear protective clothes like gumboots, while

some of their husbands do.

In the past, women organisations existed to support

women economically. But those organisations died off

due to low selling prices at the market. None of the

interviewed women are members of Bugiri District

Farmers Association, but some of their men are.

According to the women, domestic violence is common.

Many of the women are beaten when they use their

husband’s money to buy food or soap, even in times of

famine.

While the men stated, that during the meals at home

the husbands are served last, the women said that

the husbands are served first. Both agreed that his

plate is fuller than the plates of the other household

members. Women say that fill their mens’ plates higher

to encourage their husbands to buy more food.

To improve their situation, the women wish to have

improved seeds, oxen for ploughing, ox ploughs, land

rights and an available market for their products,which

includes a clear policy to defend them in selling and

keeping the price stable.

Female farmer A

“My husband, I, and our five children are landless. We

have leased 1.5 acres from a farmer to grow maize

and groundnuts. I use traditional seeds because I

experienced losses when I tried the hybrids. We harvest

7-8 bags of maize per season of which we use 4 for home

consumption. I never received any training on agriculture.

We face food shortages from April to June. During those

times we eat posho, potatoes and groundnuts only once a

day. Sometimes I can take only tea with roasted grundnuts

the whole day. My husband does not help me to cultivate.

But we are a group of women who help each other. When

I’m in the field my children are alone at home.”

14 The price they indicated (150 UGS) was too low to be reasonable; otherwise

middlemen wouldn’t benefit at all.

30 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


7.5 Food Security

There is strong evidence that farmers and their families

face hunger. Main periods of food shortage are from

April to June, and from October to December. This has

been the case as long as our interview partners can

remember. According to the farmers, the families that

suffer from food shortages mainly live around Bugiri

town. Most of the farmers in the village still eat twice

a day, but out of 12, three eat only once a day. Famine

affects even medium-scale farmers. In times of famine,

poor farmers used to work for fellow farmers who were

faring better to sustain their livelihoods.

Total land area in relation to the population is low, and

therefore land sizes are often too small to feed a family.

Additionally, the crop disease Stryga 15 has affected

production. To be food secure, farmers plant cassava

and potatoes

Farmers in the village faced hunger even at the time of

the investigative mission. The harvest in December 2007

was poor. Therefore, many farmers didn’t earn enough

money to feed their families. “We used to have three

meals, but now we have only one.”

Members of Bugiri District Farmers Association, however,

claim to be food secure. Some said that they even assist

their hungry neighbours with food.

Poverty in Bugiri district forces young people to migrate

to urban centres to find employment in factories. “For

the youth, farming means to remain in poverty. And

when they go to the cities they never come back.”

Farmers from Bukyansiko reported that so far the young

people have not left the village. But they are aware that

the district faces this problem.

Millers reported that only those with large families suffer

from food shortages.

Small scale maize farmers’ desire the

following from the Government

The male farmers wish for:

• One tractor for the sub-county

• Supply of inputs (fertilizers, etc.)

• Better prices

• Better market access through processing, packaging,

etc.

• A food safety net scheme whereby Government buys

maize at minimum prices and redistributes it during

famine

• Reduction of high interest rates

The female farmers wish for:

• Improved seeds

• Oxen and oxploughs

• A policy to protect women against men so that they

can market their goods

• Land rights

• An available y market for their products

• Stable prices

7.6 Findings Bugiri

There is no impact of EU-policy on the Bugiri maize sector.

None of the interviewed persons had information about

imported maize from EU. They only suspected that the

WFP buys imported maize instead of local maize.

There is an alarmingly high level of hunger and malnutrition

among small-scale maize farmers in the village of

Bukyansiko in Bugiri District. Although small-scale farmers

acknowledge that there is a market for maize, they

express the wish to shift to other crops due to low farm

gate prices, which hardly cover their production costs.

Before harvest, between April and June, families of

smallholders suffer food shortages and hunger. Most of

those affected are women. They reportedly face discrimination

regarding food consumption while they shoulder

the biggest part of the workload in food production.

The consumer price of maize has doubled in the last year

while the price at farm gate has remained stable. This

causes a risk of food security. Medium- scale farmers do

not face hunger, but individual interviews showed that

they have to cut down on food before harvest. Small

scale farmers are disadvantaged since they get lower

prices for maize than medium-scale farmers.

Women hardly have access to land since they can neither

inherit it by tradition nor by law. As they lack the right to

inherit land they depend on their husbands or must lease

land to acquire it. Furthermore, they have no access to

the market since their husbands take all harvested maize

to sell it. Thus, they cannot generate income out of their

maize production. Additionally, they face domestic violence

even when they try to feed the family.

15 Stryga reduces nutrients in the soil. It can stay in the soil for over 20 years.

31


Production of maize has gone down due to the Stryga

disease and due to the deteriorating quality of seeds and

fertilizers since liberalisation of the market. At the same

time, production costs have increased tremendously

since privatisation of input supplies.

Furthermore, farmers do not have access to credits

since loan conditions are not favourable for them. That

is one reason why they cannot take advantage of the

purchasing policy of WFP.

There is a lack of market information for farmers. They do

not know the prices on the national level. Additionally,

since the cooperatives have been destroyed, every

farmer bargains on his or her own. Both factors diminish

the bargaining power of farmers. The governmental

programme to promote marketing organisations does

not reach the interviewed smallholder farmers yet. They

get lower prices than the medium-scale farmers.

Farmers are neither well informed about national and

international policies like the current boom of agrofuels.

Thus, they can hardly adapt timely to market demands.

Even the district administration concluded that

deregulation of the maize sector has failed.

Only large-scale farmers and traders seem to benefit

from the deregulation of the market - among them the

President’s family. While President Museveni himself

owns a company, which supplies farming inputs, one of

his daughters is a large-scale maize trader.

To summarize, in the course of deregulation, risks

within the maize supply chain and risks of food security

have shifted towards farmers and benefits have shifted

towards traders.

8. Impact of EU Agricultural and

Trade Policies

So far, a direct impact of EU agricultural trade policy

on the interviewed small-scale maize farmers could not

be found. Current imports of European dairy products

do not compete directly with the products of small

and medium dairy farmers, as these imported products

usually do not enter the informal markets. However,

studies as well as interviews with experts, retailers and

government officials indicate that imports of processed

dairy products like milk powder, butter, cheese and

yoghurt together already represent about 50 percent of

the formal dairy supply, partly as a result of the rise in

supermarkets in Kampala. The EU is the third biggest

external supplier of dairy products for Uganda.

The market for processed milk products have been

growing quite fast together with the growth of

supermarkets in Kampala. Supermarket managers

confirmed the sales of imported milk products are

increasing much faster than for local milk. It is difficult

to understand why milk products are imported in large

quantities, when 100,000 l of local milk are poured out

(wasted) on average every day. There is a danger that

imports impede the development of the domestic dairy

industry and thereby hinder the progressive fulfilment of

the right to food of smallholder dairy farmers.

Even though direct European imports are not the main

share of Ugandan imports, there is some evidence that

European imports in South Africa and Kenya indirectly

lead to an increase of Ugandan imports coming from

these countries as well. The fact that the EU has

increased and is further increasing the milk quota and

recently reintroduced export subsidies on dairy products,

raises fears that Ugandan dairy farmers will face more

competition from the EU in the future.

Dairy imports from the EU might significantly increase in

the future as a result of the ongoing reform of the EU

milk market regime and the framework EPA inititated in

November 2007 between the EU and the East African

Community (EAC). This might happen because:

• In 2008,the EU decided to increase its milk quota by

2 percent, which, according to its own projections,

will allow for a significant increase in milk powder

production and exports. In November 2008, the EU

Council decided to further increase the quota by 1

percent annually until 2013, after which the quota

system would be abolished entirely. This would

pave the way for unlimited production and exports.

It is especially concerning that, in the Health Check

decision in November 2008, the EC has kept the

door open for the maintenance of the instrument

of export subsidies even after 2013, even though

in the WTO negotiations, it had already committed

itself to end these subsidies by 2013. Contrary to this

commitment, the EC reintroduced export subsidies in

January 2009. The EC thereby accelerates the rapid

downwards trend of international dairy prices and

increases the danger of import surges.

32 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


• Even though the EPA does not require a further

reduction of import tariffs on European dairy imports,

a standstill clause does not allow for increasing tariffs

in the future except with the consent of the European

Commission. This provision eliminates the policy

space previously granted within the WTO up to the

bound level of 80 percent. While other countries, like

Russia, as a reaction to the reintroduction of export

subsidies, have increased import tariffs, Ugandan

dairy tariffs will have to remain at the currently low

applied level of 25 percent. Uganda has lost the policy

space that might be necessary to properly protect the

market and the right to adequate food of Ugandan

dairy farmers in the near future.

9. Recommendations

Based on the findings, the recommendation to the EU

and EAC are:

1. to conduct a Human Rights Impact Assessment on

the EPA before any further negotiations are held –

as recommended by the Special Rapporteur on the

Right to Food, Oliver De Schutter, in his recent report

to the Human Rights Council on the relationship

between trade agreements under WTO and the

State’s obligation to respect the human right to food

(De Schutter 2009).

2. to revise the Interim EPA: Both the EU and the EAC

have to make sure that the EPA will not limit the

policy space of Uganda to protect and promote the

right to adequate food for small-scale farmers. No

liberalisation commitment or standstill clause shall

hinder the Ugandan Government to increase tariffs

whenever European imports threaten market access

and incomes of food insecure people. The revision

process, as well as further EPA negotiations, must

allow substantial participation of parliaments and

civil society organisations. We urgently request the

EU not to put pressure on the EAC to conclude a

comprehensive EPA, which would include services,

investment, intellectual property rights or public

procurement;

3. to revise the EU decision to increase the milk quota

by 2 percent. Furthermore, we recommend to

maintain the milk quota system beyond 2013 and to

phase out export subsidies immediately. The recently

reintroduced export subsidies need to be withdrawn.

The EU must make sure that surplus dairy products

are not exported to Uganda at dumping prices.

4. to support smallholder food production in its desire

for official development assistance. Smallholder

farmers feed the people and should get more support

from governments and donors.

The World Food Programme should increase its efforts

to purchase maize from Ugandan smallholder farmers.

Measures could be:

• to pay on the spot,

• to assist the Ugandan Government to set up a credit

scheme, which benefits smallholders, and which is

accessible to them

• to accept lower quantities than 50 t.

The Ugandan Government should:

1. increase the efforts to facilitate access to internal

markets through self determined marketing groups of

farmers. These marketing groups will likely strengthen

the bargaining power, especially of smallholders,

towards informal vendors or middlemen and facilitate

access to formal markets at fair prices that allow for a

life in dignity and free from hunger;

2. increase the public spending on agriculture from 4

to 10 percent, as agreed in the Maputo Declaration.

Uganda, with support of its development partners,

should put special emphasis on promoting the access

of smallholder farmers to inputs like high quality

seeds (locally adapted in close cooperation with local

communities), extension services, low interest loans,

storing and processing facilities at affordable prices.

3. guarantee women the right to inherit land by law.

This law should be developed together with women’s

rights organisations and be enforced by public

awareness raising campaigns and trainings for local

authorities and land registrars. Furthermore, a policy

needs to be put in place to fight domestic violence.

4. increase its efforts to improve quality of public schools

and to reduce or to abolish school fees of secondary

schools. School fees are the highest expenditures

of the farmers and might discourage them from

sending their children to secondary school. A higher

educational level will help the future generation of

farmers to improve their production and gain more

bargaining power against traders.

33


References

• Action Aid International Uganda et.al. 2007: CSO

Petition, Uganda Civil Society Organisations Petition

Presented to the Deputy Speaker of the Parliament

of the Republic of Uganda, Achieving sustainable

development through trade: Rethinking economic

partnership agreements, Kampala 1 st October 2007.

• Baffoe, John. K. 2000: Structural adjustment and

agriculture in Uganda, Working Paper 149, Geneva,

International Labour Office, http://www.ilo.org/

public/english/dialogue/sector/papers/uganstru/

index.htm#_Toc478975713 [12.08.2008].

• Bakunda, Geoffrey 2006: The Impact of Trade

Liberalisation on Poverty in Uganda, A Perception

Study on the Dairy and Maize Sub-Sectors, Final

Report submitted to DENIVA for CUTS-TDP Project.

• Bertow, Kerstin/Schultheis, Antje 2007: Impact of

EU’s Agricultural Trade Policy on Smallholders in

Africa, Bonn, Germanwatch.

• Blake, Adam/McKay, Andrew/Morrissey, Oliver

2007: The Impact on Uganda of Agricultural Trade

Liberalisation, Nottingham, Centre for Research

in Economic Development and International Tade

(CREDIT).

• Bugiri District Advocacy Coalition (BUDAC) 2006:

Summarized Baseline Survey Report on Food Security

Situatoin and Access to Market, aimed at Establishing

the Food Security Situation and Access to Market

Levels in Bugiri District.

• Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

1999: General Comment No. 12, The Right to

Adequate Food, Geneva, United Nations.

• Dairy Development Authority 2004: Annual Report

2003/2004, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry

and Fisheries

• De Schutter, Olivier 2009: Promotion and Protection

of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to

Development, Report of the Special Rapporteur on

the right to food, United Nations, Human Rights

Council, 4 February 2009, A/HRC/10/5/Add.2.

• DENIVA 2006: Impact of the Economic Partnership

Agreement (EPAs) with the European Union on

the Ugandan Economy, A Synthesis of Existing EPA

Impact Studies.

• East African Community/European Community

2007: Agreement Establishing a Framework for an

Economic Partnership Agreement between the east

African Community Partner States on One Part and

the European Community and its Members States on

the Other Part, www.bilaterals.org/IMG/doc/EAC_

framework_EPA_initialled.doc [02.04.2008].

• European Commission Directorate General for Trade

2007: Update: Interim Economic Partnership Agreements,

Trade Policy in Practice, 19 December 2007.

• European Commission 2008: Proposal for a council

regulation establishing common rules for direct

support schemes for farmers under the common

agricultural policy and establishing certain support

schemes for farmers. Brussels, 20/5/2008

• http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/healthcheck/prop_

en.pdf [20.08.2008]


• FAO 2006: Import Surges: What are their external

causes? FAO Briefs on Import Surges No. 3, Rome,

ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/j8674e/j8674e00.

pdf [02.03.2009].

• FAO 2008: Food Outlook November 2008, Rome:

http://www.fao.org/docrep/011/ai474e/ai474e10.

htm#31

• FIAN International 2003: Trade and Human Rights,

Human Rights Come Before Trade Agreements,

Heidelberg.

• Kintu, James 2007: Realization of the Right to

Adequate Food – the Case for Uganda, unpublished

background paper for the FIAN-seminar: Promoting

the Right to Food and the Right to Food Guidelines

- Concrete implications for national food security

efforts in Uganda.

• Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI) 2008:

An Overview of the East African Community – EU

Framework Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA);

What is in it for Uganda?

• Mwebaze, Thomas 2004: Profitability of Dairy Farming

in Uganda, Focussing on the Factors of Production

and Marketing, Linz, Johannes Kepler University.

th

• NAADS 2006: Newsletter, December 20 , http://

naads.or.ug/manage/publications/newsletter%20

dec%202006.pdf [19.01.2009].

• Oxfam GB in Uganda et.al. 2008: Petition to

Parliament, Achieve Sustainable Development

Through Trade: Rethinking the Economic Partners

Agreements (EPAs), Kampala, 11 th March 2008.

• Oxfam Germany 2009: Fact Sheet: Hintergrundinfos

EU-Milch-Politik, Berlin.

• Paasch, Armin 2007: Agricultural Trade and the

Human Right to Adequate Food, Methodology

Guide for Human Rights based Case Studies on

Trade Policies, Draft, Geneva, Ecumenical Advocacy

Alliance.

• RATES Center 2003: Maize Market Assessment And

Baseline Study for Uganda, Nairobi.

34 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


• Reichert, Tobias u.a. 2009: Entwurf des

Hintergrundpapier zu Interim EPAs mit Schwerpunkt

Afrika; Germanwatch.

• Rukundo, Peter Milton 2009: Empowering Civil

Society to Monitor the Right to Food; A Case Study

Report on the Ugandan Experience, FIAN/WHH.

• SEATINI 2005a: Achieving fair-trade through the

global partnership for development under the MDG

framework, A case for Uganda.

• SEATINI 2005b: Mainstreaming Human Rights and

Social Justice in the Multilateral Trading System

(MST).

• SEATINI 2008a: The Implications and Challenges of

Implementing an Economic Partnership Agreement

for Uganda with Particular Reference to the Market

Access Cluster.

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Partnership Agreement for Uganda’s Fisheries Sector.

• Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) et. al. 2007:

CSO statement on the Joint Conclusion of the 1tsd

East-Africa Community - European Commission

Meeting on Negotiations on an Economic Partnership

Agreement (EPA) 14 th November Brussels.

• Werth, Alexander a.o. 2005: Sectoral and Analytical

Studies to Guide Uganda in the EPA Negotiations,

Final Report submitted to Uganda Programme for

Trade Opportunities and Policy, Kampala.

• Ziegler, Jean 2005: Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights, The Right to Food, United Nations,

Commission on Human Rights, 24 January 2005, E/

CN.4/2005/47.

35


Annex I: Questionnaire

Questionnaire for semi-structured interviews

A) Interview with resource persons/experts

belonging to important reference groups outside

the community itself (“the most inside of the

outsiders”)

0. Personal data: Name, function, institution

1. Basic data on milk and maize: farming, commerce

and consumption

1.1 Agro-economic structure of production (per

regions & per type of producers)

1.2 Processing and marketing structure

1.3 Development of production, prices and

markets since the 1990s (including major

peaks)

1.4 Development of imports and their impact

on national prices (farm gate prices and

consumer prices)

1.5 Development of national consumption

1.6 Geographical origin of imports and possible

relevance of (trade in) agriculture policies

of the exporting countries (including

dumping).

2. Policies

2.1 Trade in agriculture policies: Liberalisation of

the milk and maize market (how and when)

2.2 Domestic agriculture policies: Protection of

the national producers (how and when)

2.3 Role of political actors and specific

responsibilities: (government, political

parties, influence of business, social groups,

international actors (World Bank, IMF, WTO,

others)

2.4 Trade Strategy (Uganda’s policy in EAC, esp.

common external tariff)

2.5 Food security strategy (and relation to EPA

negotiations)

3. Consequences and effects (in the past and

perception of future developments)

3.1 Beneficiaries of the policies described above

3.2 Effects of these policies on Ugandan

society (urban/rural segments of society,

gender effects, producers/consumers, most

vulnerable groups)

3.3 Effects on the community level: producers/

consumers

3.4 Hunger, malnutrition, food insecurity (when,

where, in which context) in relation to the

market liberalisation

Statistical data required (1990 – 2008)

- National production

- Destination of produce & processing

- National consumption

- imports & origin of imports

- exports

- prices (producer prices, consumer prices and import

prices)

- Tariffs and quota systems

- Poverty rates - for specific groups

- Food insecurity and chronic malnutrition – broken

down to vulnerable groups

B) Interview with experts/community leaders

inside the community

0. Personal data: Name, function, institution

1. General information

1.1 Name and location of the community

1.2 Formal status of the community and the

producers (cooperative, association etc.)

1.3 Number of persons/families living in the

community/belonging to the group

1.4 Total number of farmers in the community /

number of female producers. How many are

involved in milk/maize

1.5 Existing infrastructure: streets, schools,

health post, drinking water, sanitation,

electricity etc.

1.6 Community history (regional context,

migration, conflicts, natural disaster,

environmental problems etc.)

2. Community organization

2.1 Political organization / local authorities /

societal leadership

2.2 Organization of the milk/maize production

(including gender relations)

2.3 Production / Marketing

2.4 Collective / Individual (Mechanisms of

redistribution, collective assistance to the

most vulnerable)

2.5 Land tenure / conflicts

36 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


3. Agricultural production

3.1 Quantity and value of milk/maize production

in relation to other agricultural products

3.2 Type of production (agro-industrial/

sustainable)

3.3 Aim of production (auto consumption /

market-oriented production)

3.4 Commercial & trade structure / buyers of the

milk/maize

3.5 Agro-technical assistance/credits/inputs

3.6 Marketing support programs

3.7 Profitability calculation

4 Change since 1990

4. 1 Development of production and marketing

since 1990

4.2 Collapse of production / farm gate prices

/ markets during 1990 – 2008, including

explication of the reasons from the

community’s viewpoint

4.3 Role of imports within the reasons

4.4 Have the collapses described above been of

general or of specific nature (describe how

the neighbouring communities / the region /

the nation have been affected)

4.5 Responsibilities and key factors for these

collapses

4.6 Alternative sources of livelihood / economic/

agricultural options for the community

5. Effects of the changing milk/maize market

5.1 At the economic/agro-economic level

(hunger / change in crops / land tenure)

5.2 At the social level (forms and functions

of organizational structures / migration /

gender / youth / elderly)

5.3 Vulnerable groups in the community

2. Production

2.1 Current milk/maize production

2.2 Development of production since 1990

2.3 Relationship between self consumption and

market oriented production

2.4 Collapse of production / farm gate prices

/ markets during 1990 – 2008, including

explication of the reasons from the viewpoint

of the family

2.5 Total family income / income from milk/

maize production and changes since 1990

2.6 Profitability calculation of milk/maize (if

possible: profitability in different periods

over the last years and in relation to market

liberalization)

2.7 Support, subsidies, extension services

provided by the government or other actors

3. Effects of the changing rice market

3.1 Hunger / malnutrition / food insecurity /

sources to get food

3.2 Consequences for production / impact on

rural development: changing crops, loss of

investments, loss of means of production

3.3 Purchasing power / change in consumption

patterns

3.4 Vulnerability of different family members

(men, women, boys and girls)

3.5 Economic alternatives inside and outside the

community / migration

C) Interview at the household level

0. Personal data: Name, sex, age, profession

1. Basic information

1.1 Family members, age, profession and sex

1.2 Since when you are living in the community

/ productive entity?

1.3 Size of productive land & where it is located

1.4 Type of land tenure / financial situation

(including possible indebtedness) / credits

1.5 Housing (house garden and agricultural land

nearby?)

37


Annex II: Persons interviewed

Expert Interview:

-- Geoffrey Bakunda

-- George Walusimbi-Mpanga

Focus Group Interview with Civil Society

-- Jacqueline Amongin, PAM

-- Miriam Talwisa, ACTADE

-- Mouson Rwakakamba, Uganda National Farmers

Federation

-- Happy James, Suswatch Network

-- Godfrey Ssali, SEATINI

-- Paul Walakila, UNBS

-- Caroline Mayiga Nabalema, Katosi Women

Development Trust

-- Olive Zaale Otete, LDR Consultants

-- Agnes Kirabo, VEDCO

-- Samuel Kasirye, SEATINI

-- Kaweese M.B., CAA

Focus Group Interview with Mbarara District

Farmers Association and Uganda Crane

Creameries Cooperative Union Ltd., Mbarara:

-- Tumwebaze Lauben, farmer

-- Rev. Canon Ganaafa, Rukaka d.f.c.s. ltd.

-- Dr. William Mwebembezi, vet. Officer

-- Moses Turyaramya, Chairman Uganda Crane

Creameries Cooperative Union

-- George Nuwagira, Vice Chairman Uganda Crane

Creameries Cooperative Union

-- Capt. Dick Kajugiira, treasurer Mbarara District

Farmers Association

-- Elly Karegire, Chairman Mbarara District Farmers

Association

-- Timothy K. Bitter, Chariman Kashari Dairy Farmers

Cooperative

Focus Group Interview with dairy farmers in

Nyakisharara

-- Edward Nyamalya

-- Peninah Besigye

-- A. Tibesigwa

-- Justus Mambo Kurinogira

-- Robert Kasasi Shokye

-- Benon Bwengye

-- Patrick Byaruhanga

-- Emmanuel Muzoora

-- Elly Beinomugisha

Expert Interview with representatives of Bugiri

District Farmers Association in Bugiri town:

Paul Oteba, Chairman

-- George Migero, Vice Chairman

-- James ?, Farmer

Focus Group Interviews with Bugiri District

Farmers Association in Bugiri town

-- Mugoya Awali Ogonzaki

-- Ekisa Longino, Hope Farmers Association

-- Nulu Namusoke

-- Rose Simuye

-- Joseph Wakhonya

-- Agnes Nangobi

-- Timothy Tibita

-- Sam Kyerekizibu

-- Awoli Mugoya, treasurer

-- Sulay Musenero, Tufungize farmers group

-- James Mangeni, advisor

-- Mutamba Mabango Twaha

-- George Migero

-- John Odongo

-- Richard Buyinza

-- Christopher Maka

-- Paul Oteba Opisai

-- Moses Makaka

-- Mutwalibu Kyebanbe

-- Henry Bageja

-- David Mudhalya

-- Sam Muhoya

-- Bane Nyende

Expert Interviews in Bugiri District Commercial

Office

-- Hussen Musikho (Commercial Officer)

-- Mulabya Esau (Assistant Commercial Officer)

-- Francis Ekiro Etomet (Chairman Production)

Focus Group Interviews in Bugiri with

representatives of small millers

-- Skiria Ddalaus Haji

-- Musoga Abdullah

-- Jakola Samwe

-- Hadji Asamwe

-- Lawrence Kiago

Expert Interviews in: Bukyansiko, Kasita Parish,

Nabukalu Sub-county, Bugiri District

-- George Migero, Vise Chairman of Bugiri District

Farmers Association

-- Musa Kabwangu, General Secretary of Local Council

and Chairman of Parish

Individual Interviews in: Bukyansiko, Kasita

Parish, Nabukalu Sub-county, Bugiri District

-- Skovia Timogiva

-- Acord Fatma

-- Mutumba Mohamad

-- Lukia Tibaga

38 The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers


Focus group interviews in: Bukyansiko, Kasita

Parish, Nabukalu Sub-county, Bugiri District

-- with women:

Idah Mukama

Jane Mukana

Kekulina Mutumba

Fawuza Nawkreya

Zabiya Naigoga

Babuletenda

Fatuma Namuganza

Joy Mwondia

Pro Mutisi

Rose Namusabya

H. Nangobi

T. Namutamba

Zaniza Mutesi

Sarah Nabirye

Lulinja Musobya

-- with men

Lukungu Hussein

Bakumo Maliki

Kiremu Abumani

Mukama Jamal

Kaabwangu

Naluswa Senefansiyo

Mafaala Muhamad

Bagoye Wilson

Pasikali Katabagi

Were Fred

Wachana S.

Kasolo Mukamal

Kowa James

Ichuma

Migero George

Expert Interview: EU Office Uganda:

-- Alex Nakajjo

-- Uwe Bergheimer

Expert Interview: Ministry of Agriculture:

-- Kaasai Opolot, Commissioner for Crop Production

and Marketing

Expert Interview: FAO

-- Percy Msika

-- Charles Owach

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FIAN INTERNATIONAL

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