Latin America; in English (pdf) - Transboundary Freshwater Dispute ...
Latin America; in English (pdf) - Transboundary Freshwater Dispute ...
Latin America; in English (pdf) - Transboundary Freshwater Dispute ...
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Public <strong>in</strong>frastructure project (road construction) <strong>in</strong> El Alto, north of La Paz, Bolivia. Photo credit: USAID.<br />
Antofagasta-Bolivia for the use of the Silala<br />
waters. As of 2004, no bills have been paid<br />
(Toromoreno 2000).<br />
Bolivia claims ownership of the Silala River<br />
because it orig<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>in</strong> spr<strong>in</strong>gs on the Bolivian<br />
side of the border and is “carried” artificially to<br />
Chile, rather than be<strong>in</strong>g a naturally occurr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
phenomenon. Bolivian scientists believe the water<br />
comes from an aquifer below the surface and its<br />
natural discharges are what emerge from the<br />
spr<strong>in</strong>gs (Silala 2004). The water would not travel<br />
to Chile without the works of the Chilean railroad<br />
companies almost 100 years ago. Hence, Bolivia<br />
believes it can control the flow and/or charge<br />
Chile for the use of the water.<br />
Chile’s position is much more simple than<br />
Bolivia’s po<strong>in</strong>t of view. Chile claims that the<br />
waters were never diverted from the spr<strong>in</strong>gs to<br />
form a river, but that they naturally canalized to<br />
establish the Silala River. By this logic, the Silala<br />
is therefore an <strong>in</strong>ternational river and, under the<br />
1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of<br />
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses,<br />
Chile has the right to a “reasonable and<br />
equitable” share of the water. It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
note that Chile voted for and Bolivia absta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
from the vot<strong>in</strong>g of this Convention (see Map 7b).<br />
Hence, Chile does not believe it should pay for<br />
the use of the Silala and has not done so up until<br />
this po<strong>in</strong>t. Chile does not recognize the Silala<br />
concession to DUCTEC, because Chile has<br />
asserted a sovereign right to the water as an<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational watercourse.<br />
On the surface, the entire debate seems to<br />
be over whether the Silala River is an <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
bas<strong>in</strong>. But, because of the underly<strong>in</strong>g issues<br />
of politics, economics, sovereignty, and history,<br />
the Silala has become one of the most hydropolitically<br />
vulnerable bas<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> the world. Drivers<br />
such as Chile’s use of the water for its worldlead<strong>in</strong>g<br />
copper m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dustry and Bolivia’s<br />
threats to cut the water off if Chile does not grant<br />
land for a Bolivian port on the Pacific are not<br />
small issues that are easily resolved.<br />
The problem is only exacerbated by the fact<br />
that the two governments do not have official<br />
diplomatic relations, although they do have<br />
Farmers, villagers, and local officials build a reservoir to supply water to<br />
farms <strong>in</strong> Santa Rosa de Ocana, <strong>in</strong> A yacucho, Peru. Photo credit: USAID.<br />
Chapter 3. Hydropolitical Vulnerability, South <strong>America</strong> — 65