Report of Proceedings - International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

criteria to determine whom, in the words of Security Council, “played a leading role in the
genocide of Rwanda or who committed a serious violation of the law”; the ICTR held a
workshop of senior trial attorneys. Nevertheless, with the decision on the Completion Strategy
by the Security Council, ICTR had to in February 2004 focus on the issue of selecting cases for
prosecution.
Once faced with the deadlines, the OTP had to conscientiously determine what cases to
retain, prosecute, transfer or discontinue. It was concluded that three factors were critical: the
status of the accused in Rwanda at the time (e.g., whether he was senior military or government
figure?) and the extent of his or her participation. Geographic spread was also established as a
consideration, so as not to exclude certain parts of the country. That could give rise to issues of
discriminatory selection and impede the prospects for national reconciliation. A third factor
was the nature of the offence itself. Offences of sexual violence or those directed against
children would, where the evidence and the law permitted, be given priority in prosecution.
The prolonged nature of the investigations, ongoing ten years after the event, and due to
conclude only by end of 2004 posed a challenge to prosecution. Investigations of such crimes,
face many challenges but nonetheless with the lapse of time questions as to quality of results
may arise.
Unlike in the ICTY, the ICTR Bureau should not have a role in deciding whether an
indictment will go forward for confirmation. The Bureau does not have access to sufficient
information, such as the entire database of targets to enable it determine what cases are more
serious than others.
Only the Prosecutor who is aware of the entire data base is in a position to do so. The
arrangement also raises constitutional questions relating to the exercise of the Prosecutorial
discretion.
At present, multiple-accused cases are posing a great challenge for the court. Therefore, the
OTP is moving toward single-accused cases. Existing multiple-accused cases have been
ongoing for years and remain unfinished. In such cases, there are multiple defence counsels
and witnesses. This often leads to more delays due to the absence of one or more of the actors.
Current policy has as a result shifted to the strategy of single accused cases which tend to
proceed more quickly. The new indictment policy also requires that before an indictment is
submitted for confirmation, all steps must be taken to ensure that the case is trial ready upon
confirmation.
In order to maintain a unified case theory of the genocide, the OTP needs to improve coordination
among trial teams. With nine trial teams, all headed by enthusiastic senior trial
attorneys, this has been a challenge. Staff must avoid taking conflicting positions with regard
to the overall case theory. The position taken by one trial team should not hurt another.
It is quite easy to fall into, the error of dealing with each of the trials at the ICTR as an
isolated case. Whereas in truth there was a single genocide. All the cases are merely intended
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