Guest Editor - University of South Africa

Guest Editor : Christelle Auriacombe
Assistant Editors : Phil Mtimkulu/Eric Nealer
Book Review Editors : Jo-Ansie van Wyk/Sarita Kant
Benita Roberts
Editorial Committee
Johan Adlem, Dirk Brynard, Murray Faure, Eddie StroÈ h, Christopher Theunissen,
Ina Uys, Clive Napier, Susan Botha, Gerhard Labuschagne, Pieter Labuschagne
Editorial Advisory Board
Dr Victor Ayeni (Commonwealth Secretariat, London)
Prof Petrus Brynard (University of Pretoria)
Prof Richard Chapman (University of Durham)
Prof Yezekhel Dror (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Prof Andre du Pisani (University of Namibia)
Prof Jan-Erik Lane (University of Geneva)
Dr John Makumbe (University of Zimbabwe)
Prof Vincent Maphai (SAB)
Prof Eugene Meehan (University of Missouri)
Prof Marie Muller (University of Pretoria)
Dr Adebayo Olukoshi (CODESRIA, Dakar)
Prof Louwrens Pretorius (Unisa)
Prof Annette Seegers (University of Cape Town)
Prof Ira Sharkansky (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Prof Themba Sono (Honorary professor, University of Pretoria)
Prof J E Spence (The Royal Institute of International Affairs/University of
London)
Prof Mark Swilling (University of the Witwatersrand)
Prof Daan Wessels (University of the Free State)
Cover design: Karin Maul
Set, printed and published by the University of South Africa, 2002.
# All rights reserved
Articles published in POLITEIA are indexed in the Index of South African
Periodicals and International Political Science Abstracts. An electronic
version is also available on Internet at http://www.unisa.ac.za/dept/press/
onjourn.html

Vol 21 No 3 2002
Journal of the Departments of Political Sciences and Philosophy and Public
Administration and Development Studies/
Tydskrif van die Departemente Politieke Wetenskap en Filosofie en Publieke
Administrasie en Ontwikkelingstudies.
Page
Editorial 1
Christelle Auriacombe
Articles
Why the king has kept his head: Foucalt on
power as sovereignty 6
Roger Deacon
Globalisation, integration and fragmentation:
forces shaping diplomacy in the new
millenium 18
Andre Stemmet
The political economy of Nigerian foreign
policy: the Abubakar Abdulsalami
administration (1998±1999) 39
Lere Amusan
Governmental relations in the management of
the Cederberg Wilderness Area: some
organisational aspects 58
Frank Smith
Viewpoints
Global inequality and competitiveness rankings:
Is human development the missing link? 80
Willie Breytenbach
1

Critical reflections on the National Working
Group report. 92
Samuel Koma
Book reviews
Van der Walt, G, van Niekerk, D, Doyle, M,
Kniper, A and du Toit, D, 2002.
Managing for results in government. 94
Frank Smith
Currie I and Klaaren J, 2002. The promotion
of Acces to Information Act commentary 00
Benita Roberts
2

EDITORIAL
Politeia Vol 21 No 3 2002 pp 3±5
The World Summit on Sustainable Development was held in Johannesburg,
South Africa, in September 2002. Johannesburg was home to tens of thousands of
delegates from all corners of the world who met to discuss the impact of
humankind on the environment and the need to stimulate development that
would be sustainable in the longer term. Despite the fact that disagreements were
loudly voiced and that networks of organisations threatened not to participate in
the events, the world was well represented at this auspicious occasion and
Johannesburg, for a brief period, truly became a global city. The world has
become a much smaller place, people communicate with an immediacy with one
another that was incomprehensible not too long ago, and the jargon of the times
has increasingly become globalised, with the political and economic implications
this entails. Throughout the academic world, scholars and experts are grappling
with the concept globalisation, trying to find the boundaries and discipline with
which to create understanding, while attempts are made to break down traditional
limitations that ruled politics and economics for a long time.
The contributions in this issue of Politeia ± even if only by implication ± all
touch upon issues of control. The article by Deacon, entitled `Why the king has
kept his head: Foucalt on power as sovereignty', raises the question why much of
modern political theory still uses the extent and limits of centralised sovereign
powers as point of departure. He bases his consideration of this issue upon
Foucalt's analysis of power relations as being far more complex, diverse, diffused
and productive than political theory admits. Until such a time when political
theory can rethink the nature of the state in terms of everyday power relations, the
king's head will remain attached to his body. Deacon argues that a new metaphor
will have to be found to describe power as a head without a king. In a globalising
world, the focus of much of political science's examination of power with terms
such as states, nation-states, elites and social classes prevailing seems to remain on
concepts that are essentially centrist in nature.
Stemmet grapples directly with globalisation and its impact on diplomacy in
his contribution entitled `Globalisation, integration and fragmentation: Forces
shaping diplomacy in the new millennium'. He explores the process of, and
driving forces behind, globalisation especially with regard to their likely impact
on the institution of diplomacy. He points out that the globalised world has meant
the loss of primary control by the state over diplomacy. New actors are taking over
subnational, supranational and anational constructs, as well as transnational nongovernmental
organisations and the media. Diplomacy is no longer being driven
by the foreign ministry of a state, but by new agendas, new types of diplomacy
and new structures. Stemmet also considers what the possible impact of this kind
3

Editorial
of diplomacy will be on the functioning of foreign ministries and the roles of
diplomats, if these are to survive in a globalised environment.
On a smaller scale, Amusan examines the foreign policy that prevailed in
Nigeria during the administration of Abubaker Abdulsalami (1998±1999).
Although the time frame covered by this article is relatively short, the author
considers Nigeria's politico-economic attempts to gain international legitimacy in
the wake of the demise of the Abacha regime. Apart from his focus on policies
that would fit into the interests of the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund and other Western economic concerns, he also attempted to hand over the
Nigerian economy to multinational corporations. The author contends that,
contrary to academic belief, Abubaker normalised the socio-economy of Nigeria
and his foreign policies bastardised the country's economy. Some conclusions are
drawn about what the foreign policies of the current civilian government should
be.
At a local level, Smith addresses organisational aspects of the Cederberg
Wilderness Area with reference to governmental relations. In the light of the
greater openness brought about by democratisation, this article is important as it
focuses on the different types of intergovernmental relations that are important in
managing and organising a wilderness area. The relations that are considered lie
on vertical and horizontal intergovernmental levels, vertical and horizontal
intragovernmental levels, as well as on extragovernmental level. These relations
all play important roles in the goal determination and realisation of this particular
area.
Two viewpoints are also published in this issue. In `Global inequality and
competitive rankings: is human development the missing link?' Breytenbach
considers the levels of global inequality as reported by the World Bank at the end
of the twentieth century. He considers the deterioration on development levels in
the context of globalisation and uneven development, which have resulted in
people not only remaining poor, but also being considerably worse off.
Koma reflects on the National Working Group report on higher education in
South Africa. He puts the findings of the report in the context of the challenges
posed by an increasingly global economy. The globalisation of the economy has
made it essential for policy makers and planners to adopt market values that are
fundamental to the transformation and sustainability of the higher education
system. Such institutions need to be based more on business principles and to
espouse the values of global economic trends. The author touches upon the
sensitive issue of merging institutions, and ensuring a leaner and more focused
higher education system as a whole.
From the contributions in this issue it is quite clear that the challenges arising
from such diverse phenomena as political science theories of power, the impact of
globalisation on diplomacy and foreign policy, and the economic implications of
a streamlined higher education system based on global economic principles have
all become more pronounced in a world where boundaries are increasingly vague.
4

Editorial
However, despite the changes that this has brought, much of academic thinking
remains focused on centralised visions of power and organisation. Globalisation
seems to have made the push and pull of forces that demand greater unity more
pronounced, while the necessity for control and order remains. Whether a more
globalised world will make sustainable development a reality, remains to be seen.
To achieve consensus among the nations of the world was one of the greatest
challenges facing delegates in Johannesburg.
Christelle Auriacombe
Editor 2002
5

Politeia Vol 21 No 3 2002 pp 6±17
WHY THE KING HAS KEPT HIS
HEAD: FOUCAULT ON POWER AS
SOVEREIGNTY
Roger Deacon
University of Natal, Durban
____
ABSTRACT
Why have we, in political theory, not yet cut off the head of the king?
Why does much modern political theory continue to concern itself with
the extent and limits of centralised sovereign powers (such as the state
and nation-states, e lites and social classes)? Foucault posed this question
in the course of his analysis of the disciplinary power relations he
understood to be far more complex, diverse, diffused and productive than
political theory wishes to admit. He argued that notions of power as
residing within sovereign and predominantly repressive institutions
remain widely accepted and practised in modern society for several
reasons: they disguise real relations of domination and justify their
necessity; they conceal the ubiquity of power relations and obscure the
venal conditions of possibility of modern liberal democracies, and they
help regulate and energise these disciplinary conditions even as they are
being colonised by them. It is likely that the King's head will remain
attached to his body until political theory is able to rethink the nature of
the state in terms of everyday, disciplinary relations of power.
____
1 INTRODUCTION
Conventional histories of political theory recount the familiar tale of how the
government of some by others has progressed, over several centuries, from
autocratic forms towards increasingly popular and democratic modes of rule. At
least since the Middle Ages, and specifically since the twelfth century
resurrection of Roman Law, the traditional questions with which political theory
has concerned itself have been formulated in terms of sovereignty: the king and
the prerogatives and limits of royal power. Jean Bodin's ruminations on the
concept of sovereignty, Machiavelli's precepts to a prince bent on establishing
political order out of chaos and, not least, the Hobbesian account of the
6

contractual constitution of a sovereign state out of its component subjects, have
provided at least the starting-point if not a substantial proportion of much modern
political theory (de Jouvenel 1952:34±46; Gray 1995:159; Berki 1977). It is these
theories of right or sovereignty, ostensibly concerned only with the centralisation
of political power in the state but complexly coupled with the development of
power technologies aimed at governing individuals, that Michel Foucault
considered to embody a `juridico-discursive' conception of power, namely, power
as sovereignty (Foucault 1981c:227). This article argues that, for several reasons,
and despite ongoing criticism of these theories (not least from Foucault himself),
the anachronistic metaphor of power as the head of a king will remain not only
dominant but necessary in political theory, until a new metaphor makes it
possible for power to be conceptualised as a head without a king.
2 THE KING'S HEAD
Roger Deacon
Starting out from a set of assumptions about man as an autonomous individual or
collective agent, conventional political thought conceives of the nature of the state
as a constituted phenomenon with law as its power.
[T]he juridical model of sovereignty ... presupposes the individual as the
subject of natural laws or primitive powers[;] ... sets out to account for the
genesis, in ideal terms, of the State[; and] ... makes law the fundamental
manifestation of power (Foucault 1980b:15).
As de Jouvenel notes, all theories `which explain and justify political authority
by its efficient cause ... are those of Sovereignty' (de Jouvenel 1952:34); and this
sovereign power, commonly identified with the state irrespective of whether the
latter is divine or popular in its derivation, is taken to be a right, legitimately
possessed and exercised (de Jouvenel 1952:39±40). Lukes elaborates by arguing
that in all modern theories `power is attributed to (individual or collective) human
agents' (Lukes 1977:6). In addition, with the possible exceptions of the work of
Parsons and Arendt, the tendency is also to treat power as restrictive and
determining: `A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to
B's interests' (Lukes 1974:34; see also Hall 1984:14±18, and Clegg 1989:156±59).
This perennial interest in the rights and powers of sovereign individuals in
relation to those of sovereign states was an indication, for Foucault, that, despite
numerous reformulations of the problem (from Machiavellian to contractarian,
liberal and Marxist), `[i]n political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off
the head of the king' (Foucault 1981a:88±9). The juridical problem of sovereignty
has persisted up to, and including, the modern period in which, even with the
emergence of a political science, it has become `more acute than ever' (Foucault
1979:19): Foucault believed that this conception of a power that declares `Thou
shalt not' is not limited to classical theories of sovereignty (Hobbes and Locke), let
alone superseded by later modern doctrines such as liberalism and Marxism, but
7

Why the king has kept his head: Foucault on power as sovereignty
is so widespread as to be discernible in psychoanalytic theory (Freud and Lacan)
and even in `the contemporary analysis of power in terms of libido' (a reference to
the work of Foucault's friend and fellow philosopher Gilles Deleuze) (Foucault
1980a:140).
Under this `juridico-discursive' conception, power is assumed to be rule-based
or law-like but above all negative: it represses, excludes, limits, refuses, censors,
blocks, divides and rejects.
A grim force, it is believed to be (Foucault 1981a:82±5; 1980a:139±140;
1986a:27±8), homogeneous and centralised, in the hands of a ruler, a state and its
apparatuses, an e lite or a ruling class. In such locations, self-conscious sovereign
individuals and groups are seen to possess and exercise it intentionally and
comprehensively in a unitary, top-down and dominating fashion over comparatively
powerless others. The intrinsic freedom of those who are dominated is as a
consequence either (justifiably) limited or, at times, (illegitimately) curtailed, by
prohibitory laws and customs, and should they transgress, they are liable to be
punished. Nevertheless, they may resist and even overcome their oppression, by
organising themselves into a counterpower. Power is also assumed to be external
to, and tending to the distortion of, knowledge, thus generating distinctions
between manifest truth and unsubstantiated belief, between science and ideology
and between the `disinterested' theorist and the `interested' ruler. This last,
power-distorted knowledge, is taken to mask the true nature of things, thus
concealing oppression, generating alienation, and making conscientisation and
resistance difficult.
This conventional account of power can be illustrated with reference to Marxist
theories of the state. Like liberalism and the classical `reason of state' that
preceded it, Marxist theories of the state (which, apart from Marx himself, can be
validly attributed only to Miliband, Poulantzas and, to a lesser extent, Gramsci)
assume that `ideally and by nature, power must be exercised in accordance with a
fundamental lawfulness' (Foucault 1981a:87). Even though it sees the legal
system that it criticises as merely a class violence aimed at justifying social
inequality and exploitation, Marxism does not challenge but reinforces the
conventional understanding of power as sovereign and repressive.
The excessive value attributed to the problem of the State is expressed,
basically, in two ways: the one form, immediate, affective and tragic, is the
lyricism of the monstre froid we see confronting us; but there is a second way
of over-valuing the problem of the State, one which is paradoxical because
apparently reductionist: it is the form of analysis that consists in reducing
the State to a certain number of functions, such as for instance the
development of productive forces and the reproduction of relations of
production, and yet this reductionist vision of the role of the State in
relation to everything else makes it absolutely essential as a target to be
attacked and a privileged position to be taken over (Foucault 1979:20).
8

Roger Deacon
This essentialist conception of the nature of the state as a relatively autonomous
mechanism attempting to maintain bourgeois class domination by repressing
opposition and reproducing the conditions of market production is, for Foucault,
far too simplistic to constitute an adequate account of the functioning of modern
power relations, primarily because it involves `a sort of schematism ± and which
incidentally is not to be found in Marx ± that consists of locating power in the
State apparatus, making this into the major, privileged, capital and almost unique
instrument of the power of one class over another' (Foucault 1980a:72).
Against this approach, Foucault was adamant that all roads to power in modern
societies do not lead to the state nor to any other comparable institution. The state
and its apparatuses, as well as governments, classes, parties, institutions,
constitutions, Bills of Rights and rules of law are rather `only the terminal forms
power takes' (Foucault 1981a:92; 1982b:213). He warned that any analysis of
power relations in terms of specific and often institutionalised rationalities (such
as state apparatuses, schools and families), though legitimate, must, firstly, take
care to avoid confusing power relations with institutional mechanisms of
reproduction and, secondly, recognise that a power relation's `fundamental point
of anchorage ... is to be found outside the institution' (Foucault 1982b:222;
1981a:95,96). While `fairly closely related' to power structures (Foucault
1988:265), institutions are only forms in which relations of power (and forms
of knowledge) materialise: traditional predispositions, legal structures, customs
and fashions, as in the family; apparatuses with specific loci, regulations,
hierarchies, and relatively autonomous functions, as in schools and military
institutions; and complex systems with multiple apparatuses such as the state,
with the function of general surveillance `and, to a certain extent also, the
distribution of all power relations in a given social ensemble' (Foucault
1982b:223; 1989:188).
Foucault, distinguishing his work from that of Goffman which focused on `total
institutions' as institutions (Goffman 1968), Foucault declared himself more
interested in `the history of rationality as it works in institutions and in the
behavior of people' (Foucault 1980c:4).
The state may be the `most important' form of power, and `in a certain way all
other forms of power relation must refer to it', but `this is not because they are
derived from it' but because `power relations have come more and more under
state control (although this state control has not taken the same form in
pedagogical, judicial, economic, or family systems)' (Foucault 1982b:224). For
example,
although the police as an institution were certainly organized in the form of
a state apparatus, and although this was certainly linked directly to the
centre of political sovereignty, the type of power that it exercises, the
mechanisms it operates and the elements to which it applies them are
specific (Foucault 1986a:213).
9

Why the king has kept his head: Foucault on power as sovereignty
Hence, without wishing `to minimise the importance and effectiveness of State
power', Foucault felt that `excessive insistence on its playing an exclusive role
leads to the risk of overlooking all the mechanisms and effects of power which
don't pass directly via the State apparatus, yet often sustain the State more
effectively than its own institutions, enlarging and maximising its effectiveness'
(Foucault 1980a:72±3; see also 1980a:122,158; and 1977a:213). Certainly, the
idea that fathers, husbands, employers and teachers `represent' a state power
which, in turn, `represents' a class power `takes no account of the complexity of
mechanisms at work' (Foucault 1980a:188).
3 WHY THE KING STILL KEEPS HIS HEAD
Nevertheless, notions of power as residing within sovereign and predominantly
repressive institutions remain widely accepted and practised in modern society
for several reasons: they disguise real relations of domination, and justify their
necessity; they conceal the ubiquity of power relations, and obscure the venal
conditions of possibility of modern liberal democracies; and they help regulate
and energise these disciplinary conditions even as they are being colonised by
them. First, `power is tolerable only on condition that it mask [sic.] a substantial
part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms'
(Foucault 1981a:86; 1989:98±9), and the role of the theory of right has in part
been to mask or `efface the domination intrinsic to power' (Foucault 1986b:231):
Right, in other words, exactly because it is anachronistic, has the
contemporary ideological function of masking disciplinary domination and
thus contributes to it (Fraser 1989:58; original emphasis).
The face of power is too terrible to reveal in full, not because power relations are
only about domination, but because to believe that they are not ± that power
relations are only a pure limit placed on people's otherwise infinite desires ±
leaves intact `a measure of freedom', slight but enough to ensure the continued
acquiescence of the oppressed (Foucault 1981a:86).
Second, this is linked to the degree of effectiveness of contemporary structures
of power: relations of power wearing the accoutrements of sovereignty are
tolerated and accorded legitimacy proportionate to the fear of the chaos which
allegedly will result from the absence of the king, whether he takes the form of
autocracy or democracy. For example, the effectiveness of the police, that
apparatus of the state closest to the dream of the managed society, is intertwined
not only with the amount of confidence and trust publicly invested in them, but
also the intensity of the threat:
What makes the presence and control of the police [``these uniformed men,
who ... carry arms, ... demand our papers [and] prowl on our doorsteps'']
10

Roger Deacon
tolerable for the population, if not fear of the criminal? (Foucault
1980a:47).
As the myth of the transition from a state of nature to society would have it,
individuals relinquish some of their powers to others to ward off the greater fear
of abdicating all their freedom ± despite the fact that the state of their freedom has
always been a product of these very powers which they arrogate to themselves but
which surpass them.
Third, the foundations of modern society could not survive the revelation that
relations of power extend well beyond the state, operating outside (and are even
constitutive) of the formal laws and rights intended to contain and regulate them.
`The presence of the law is its concealment' (Foucault 1990:33):
Power in the West is what displays itself the most, and thus what hides
itself the best: what we have called ``political life'' since the 19th century is
the manner in which power presents its image (a little like the court in the
monarchic era). Power is neither there, nor is that how it functions
(Foucault 1977b:157).
Fourth, though Foucault clearly accepts that the rise to power of the bourgeoisie
was `masked by the establishment of an explicit, coded and formally egalitarian
juridical framework, made possible by the organization of a parliamentary,
representative regime', these formal laws and rights were themselves made
possible by the spread of disciplinary procedures which `constituted the other,
dark side of these processes' (Foucault 1986a:222). Thus (bourgeois, as distinct
from monarchical) sovereignty does not veil disciplinary procedures as much as
being produced and utilised by them.
Fifth, it follows that, it is equally mistaken to treat conceptions of law, right and
sovereignty merely as `ideological' mystifications which conceal the `essential'
brutality commonly attributed to power; their persistence in the modern epoch is
also attributable to their regulative and strategic utility as `polymorphic' and
recurrent (Foucault 1981b:356), though perhaps ultimately `transitory' (Foucault
1981a:89), instruments of criticism not only of monarchical institutions but also
of their democratic successors, criticisms which assume that power relations are
fundamentally lawful (Foucault 1981a:88; 1980a:141). In the form of liberalism,
for example, power as sovereignty constitutes `both ... a schema for the regulation
of governmental practice and ... a theme for sometimes radical opposition to such
practice' (Foucault 1981b:356; see also Rose 1993:284).
Finally, and most importantly, the prevalence of the conception of power as
sovereignty can be explained by the fact that its very mechanisms are being
colonised and penetrated by 'new methods of power whose operation is not
ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by
punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms
that go beyond the state and its apparatus' (Foucault 1981a:89). Theories of
11

Why the king has kept his head: Foucault on power as sovereignty
sovereignty, by revealing what they take to be the transcendent principle
underlying and justifying power, in fact, in themselves `tend to render subjects
obedient' (de Jouvenel 1952:45). That sovereignty is becoming another tactic in
the arsenal of these new methods of power is something to which theories of
sovereignty are themselves blind, since by centring their focus upon states,
parliaments, e lites, bureaucracies, patriarchy or ruling classes, they prove unable
to explain or account for `the complexity of mechanisms at work, their specificity,
nor the effects of inter-dependence, complementarity, and sometimes of
blockage, which this very diversity [of relations of power] produces' (Foucault
1980a:188).
The persistence of this `juridico-discursive' conception of power thus has a
great deal to do with its naturalisation as a conventional wisdom, its necessary
concealment in liberal-democratic societies which pride themselves on their
ability to regulate and hold power in check, and its practical as opposed to
analytical usefulness. It follows that to call it into question is to threaten current
conceptions of the present and to endorse changes in hitherto taken-for-granted
political practices and beliefs. To sum up: `the juridical model of sovereignty'
(Foucault 1980b:15) ought to be criticised and abandoned, not merely because it
is inadequate, but because it is both a dangerous weapon and a stake of contention
in contemporary power struggles.
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative
terms: it `excludes', it `represses', it `censors', it `abstracts', it `masks', it
`conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains
of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may
be gained of him belong to this production (Foucault 1986a:194).
In order to escape from the juridico-discursive conception of power, Foucault
proposed the development of an `analytics', as opposed to a `theory', of power
relations (Foucault 1981a:82), or at least `theory as a toolkit' (Foucault
1980a:145). In other words, instead of attempting to say what power is, an
attempt should be made to show how it operates in concrete and historical
frameworks, in the sense of `By what means is it [power] exercised?' and `What
happens when individuals exert (as they say) power over others?' (Foucault
1982b:217).
4 HOW THE HEAD MIGHT LOSE ITS KING
By undermining the self-evidence and exposing the inadequacies of contemporary
theories and practices of power, an `analytics' of how power operates is intended
to contribute towards imagining and bringing into being 'new schemas of
politicisation' (Foucault 1980a:190), or `a new economy of power relations'
(1982:210). Foucault suggested that this may be achieved by approaching the
question of power relations simultaneously from two sides:
12

Roger Deacon
it is a question of forming a different grid of historical decipherment by
starting from a different theory of power; and, at the same time, of
advancing little by little toward a different conception of power through a
closer examination of an entire historical material. We must at the same
time conceive of sex without the law, and power without the king (Foucault
1981a:90±91).
The paradox inherent in attempting to produce a new conception of power on
the basis of an historical analysis which already assumes this new conception of
power, should be obvious; yet paradox is the hallmark of Foucault's approach.
Nor was he unfamiliar with this strange, almost back-to-front, task that he set for
himself: his Archaeology of knowledge had attempted to formulate the tools already
forged in the heat of his prior analyses of madness, illness and the order of things
(Foucault 1974:16).
Thus armed, as it were, with two crowbars, one speculative in that `a different
theory of power' can as yet only be imagined, and one concrete in that it is
grounded on historical data, Foucault aimed to pry apart and begin to dismantle
the struts and pilings of the conventional conception of power as sovereignty. The
ideal outcome would be similar to that radical transformation of medical
discourses between 1770 and 1830 to which Foucault refers, resulting in
the application of an entirely new grille, with its choices and exclusions; a
new play with its own rules, decisions and limitations, with its own inner
logic, its parameters and its blind alleys, all of which lead to the
modification of the point of origin (Foucault, in Elders 1974:150; original
emphasis; see also Foucault 1974:170; 1976:54).
While the application of a new `grille' to relations of power will lead to a
rewriting of their historical and theoretical trajectory, so too will a modification of
the `point of origin' of current theories of power (which Foucault categorised
under the term sovereignty and traced back to Hobbes) make possible a new,
practical, effective and productive `economy' of power relations.
A detailed account of the historical conditions of possibility and contemporary
`political anatomy' of modern disciplinary relations of power can be found
elsewhere (Deacon 1998a; Deacon 1998b; Deacon 2002). For present purposes,
however, and in lieu of a conclusion, the main features of a Foucauldian theory of
power, in which the King and his head have parted company, can be
schematically identified. First, it should already be clear that Foucault's insistence
on the complexity, diversity and relative autonomy of local, everyday relations of
power does not overturn Marxist accounts of the state and liberal theories of
popular sovereignty; it only exposes them as limited and inadequate. Where
Foucault differs from these theories is the extent to which local relations of power
are not merely distanced from states, sovereigns, institutions and organisations
but make them possible. Power relations, for Foucault, constitute a kind of `soup
13

Why the king has kept his head: Foucault on power as sovereignty
of the day', the ever-changing ground or condition of possibility of global forms of
domination, commonly characterised by overlapping and reciprocally supporting
institutionalised processes which regulate what their members do and how they
relate to one another as well as how they communicate and what skills or
capacities must be brought into play or be inculcated. Thus, relations of power ±
ubiquitous, localised, self-organising, refractory and contested ± must be
understood as the effects of, and the internal conditions for, countless historically
and contextually determined divisions and inequalities.
Second, Foucault's relational and multilevelled conception shifts the focus
away from power as a kind of scarce possession which is wielded over against
freedom, to power relations that are ubiquitous and premised on the existence of
free subjects capable of utilising or altering them (to the extent to which subjects
may consent to violence directed against themselves or others, or seek to impose
consensus, as much as they might resist such violent impositions). Freedom, for
Foucault, opens individuals up to forms of subjection: it is not a question of
power one-sidedly restricting or invading the freedom of individuals, but of power
relations governing freedom and provoking resistance by enjoining free subjects
to govern themselves. Third, it follows that, relations of power, perpetually
unstable, fractured and antagonistic, incorporate resistance as a dispersed and
volatile energy, not as some external opposition as if power had a centralised,
homogenous locus. This requires a change of focus to the relational nature of
power and to the struggles which are born within the bounds of these relations.
There can be no categorical answer to the question of whether or not one or other
exercise of power ought to be resisted: relations of power are neither good nor
bad, neither acceptable nor unacceptable, for to seek to govern or to structure the
field of possible actions of others is an irreducible feature of social life. No matter
how systematic or chaotic, necessary or contingent, repressive or benign, power
relations cannot avoid provoking resistance; and resistance is a productive
response to forms of government, not merely a defence against domination.
In the fourth place, people are not rendered incapable of understanding,
criticising, supporting or resisting modern political rationalities merely because
they cannot stand outside of them; on the contrary, for Foucault, `the essence of
one's life consists of the political functioning of the society in which one finds
oneself' (Foucault, in Elders 1974:167±8). Laws call transgression into being and
give it its form, and to that extent do not merely prohibit actions but also provoke
and structure reactions. At the same time, transgression reaffirms and buttresses
the laws even as it surpasses them; and one cannot know or experience the limits
of the laws without overstepping them. The very process of developing an
`analytics' of power relations is therefore itself a political act. Critical analysis
must multiply possibilities for political intervention, by opening up new angles
for engagement, and political actions ought to be contemplated and undertaken to
the extent to which they intensify, concentrate or challenge critical analysis.
Finally, Foucault's reconceptualisation of power relations in the form of war, a
14

perpetual battle or `agonism', rather than in either extreme of rational contract or
rapacious conquest, consensus or coercion, captures the manner in which local
power relations make global strategies of both domination and resistance
possible. Foucault reverses von Clausewitz, and for him politics is the
continuation of war by other means. In addition, the more or less willing
participation by the governed in their government suggests that war itself is less
about naked coercion, and more about moral, psychological and political force,
than is commonly assumed. A reconceptualisation of power as war incorporates
and goes beyond those characteristics commonly attributed to power by theories
of sovereignty: it allows for concentrations and confrontations, stark oppositions
and irreversible effects, objectives and intentions, but qualifies these by placing at
least equal emphasis on the everyday tactical engagements upon which broader
struggles depend, especially the unstable point of equilibrium ± government ±
where relations of power, states of domination and `technologies of the self'
intersect. The rules that regulate this world of war, literally of all against all, are
themselves forged in combat, including the totalising and individualising
functions of state apparatuses, and the desires and interests of the participants.
Thus, rather than just supplementing theories centred upon the state with a
Foucauldian emphasis on everyday relations of power, the state must itself be
rethought in terms of these multiple, various, specific and reversible strategic
relations. Then, and only then, might political theory, and political life, be left
with a head, without any king.
REFERENCES
Roger Deacon
Berki, R N. 1977. The history of political thought: A short introduction, London: Dent.
Clegg, S. 1989. Frameworks of power. London: Sage.
De Jouvenel, B. 1952. Power: The natural history of its growth. London: Batchworth.
Deacon, R. 1998a. Rationalising the management of individuals: Theory, politics and
Subjects in the thought of Michel Foucault, unpublished PhD thesis, University
of Natal, Durban.
ÐÐ 1998b. Strategies of governance: Michel Foucault on power. Theoria 92,
1998 113±148.
ÐÐ 2002. An analytics of power relations: Foucault on the history of discipline. History
of the Human Sciences 15,1 89±117.
Elders, F. et al. 1974. Reflexive water: The basic concerns of mankind. London:
Souvenir.
Foucault, M. 1974. The archaeology of knowledge. London: Tavistock.
ÐÐ 1976. The birth of the clinic: An archaeology of medical perception. London:
Tavistock.
ÐÐ 1977a. Language, counter-memory, practice: Selected essays and interviews. Edited
by D F Bouchard. Oxford: Blackwell.
15

Why the king has kept his head: Foucault on power as sovereignty
ÐÐ 1977b. Power and sex: An interview with Michel Foucault. Telos 32, 152±
161.
ÐÐ ed. 1978a. I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and
my brother ... London: Penguin.
ÐÐ 1979. Governmentality. Ideology and Consciousness 6, 5±21.
ÐÐ 1980a. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972±1977. Edited
by C Gordon. New York: Pantheon.
ÐÐ 1980b. War in the filigree of peace: Course summary. Oxford Literary Review
4,2 15±19.
ÐÐ 1980c. M Dillon: Conversation with Michel Foucault. The Threepenny Review
1,1 4±5.
ÐÐ 1981a. The history of sexuality: An introduction. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
ÐÐ 1981b. Foucault at the Collge de France II: A course summary. Philosophy and
Social Criticism 8,3 350±359.
ÐÐ 1981c. Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a criticism of `political Reason'. In The
Tanner Lectures on Human Values II, edited by SM McMurrin. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
ÐÐ 1982b. The subject and power, Afterword to H L Dreyfus & P Rabinow Michel
Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutic. Brighton: Harvester.
ÐÐ 1986a. Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. Harmondsworth:
Peregrine.
ÐÐ 1986b. Disciplinary power and subjection. In Power, edited by S Lukes.
Oxford: Blackwell.
ÐÐ 1988. Michel Foucault: Politics, philosophy, culture. Interviews and Other
Writings 1977±1984. Edited by L Kritzman. London: Routledge.
ÐÐ 1989. Foucault live (Interviews 1966±84). Edited by S Lotringer. New York:
Semiotexte.
ÐÐ 1990. Maurice Blanchot: The thought from outside. In Foucault/Blanchot.
New York: Zone Books.
Fraser, N. 1989. Unruly practices: Power, discourse and gender in contemporary social
theory. Cambridge: Polity.
Goffman, E. 1968. Asylums: Essays on the social situation of patients and other inmates.
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Gray, J. 1995. Enlightenment's wake: Politics and culture at the close of the modern age.
London: Routledge.
Hall, S. 1984. The state in question. In The idea of the modern state, edited by G
McLennan, D Held & S Hall. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Lukes, S. 1974. Power: A radical view London: Macmillan.
16

Roger Deacon
Lukes, S. 1977. Essays in social theory London: Macmillan.
Rose, G. 1984 Dialectic of nihilism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Dr Roger Deacon
P O Box 50324
Randjesfontein
1683
South Africa
e-mail: deacon@nu.ac.za
17

Politeia Vol 21 No 3 2002 pp 18±38
GLOBALISATION, INTEGRATION
AND FRAGMENTATION: FORCES
SHAPING DIPLOMACY IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM
Andre Stemmet*
____
ABSTRACT
This article explores the impact that the process of globalisation is likely
to have on the institution of diplomacy in the new millennium. The
process of globalisation and the forces driving this process, namely
integration and fragmentation, are explored. The impact of globalisation
on the state and on the international/global environment resulted in the
loss of primary control by the state and its diplomatic institutions over
diplomacy: the power of the state in international relations is
consistently being undermined by new actors appearing on the
international/global scene. These actors include sub-national, supranational
and anational actors, transnational non-governmental actors and
the media, resulting in diplomacy becoming post-territorial in nature. In
this multi-centric world of globalised diplomacy, new diplomatic
agendas, new types of diplomacy and new structures for the organisation
of diplomacy have appeared, in general, more informal and autonomous
than the traditional locus of diplomacy, the foreign ministry. On a
practical note, an attempt is also made to predict how the functional
foreign ministry and the diplomat will have to adapt in order to survive
in a globalised environment.
____
1 INTRODUCTION
18
He who has power, conducts diplomacy. All analysis of possible
developments in tomorrow's diplomacy has to start from the evaluation
of the power factor in international relations ... the evolution of diplomacy
cannot be separated from the evolution of political systems. Diplomatic
changes run in a parallel way to changes in the organisation of political
power (Coolsaet 1998:2).

Andre Stemmet
Since the end of the Cold War, the world and the international system have
been undergoing profound changes. The year 1989 has often been compared with
1789, the date of the French Revolution. The French Revolution is regarded as the
event that gave birth to popular democracy, which marked the start of a shift of
power and sovereignty from absolute rulers to the people. Analysed in terms of
power, 1989 marked the end of the bipolar structure of state power that was
defining the Cold War period, resulting in what Huntington describes as a `unimultipolar
world' (1999:35±49).
However, another more subtle and less dramatic change in global power
relations has been taking place over a number of decades, which will have a noless
profound impact on the international environment.
Generally referred to as globalisation, this ill-defined process, the forces of
integration and fragmentation that are intrinsically linked to it, and the
appearance on the international scene of new actors challenging the state's
hegemony on power will have a profound impact on international relations, and
ultimately, on diplomacy. At the beginning of the twentieth century, World War I
shattered the balance of power system and the pillars of the `old' diplomacy, and
signalled the birth of the so-called new diplomacy. Old diplomacy was based on
the conduct of relations between sovereign states via resident diplomatic
missions, with the ambassador the key actor, and with secrecy a hallmark of
the system: secret negotiations resulting in secret agreements. The new diplomacy
departed from the established ways of the old diplomacy by demanding that
diplomacy should be open for public scrutiny, and by establishing the `standing
diplomatic conference', which became commonly known as the international
organisation (Muldoon 1998:4).
Multilateral diplomacy had increased in scope and intensity, especially since
the end of World War II, and was institutionalised in the United Nations (UN) and
its specialised agencies. Social and economic issues appeared on the multilateral
diplomatic agenda, and became intertwined with political issues.
Diplomacy had to adapt to these changes in order to deal with new issues such
as trade, aviation and education which became part of the agenda. Diplomats
became more specialised. Ministries of foreign affairs had to adapt their internal
structures, establish specialised multilateral branches and also had to adapt to
coordinate the activities of other government ministries which became actors on
the international scene (Barston 1997:5).
However, these changes to the environment, agenda and functions of
diplomacy appear to be insignificant to the challenges globalisation posed to
modern diplomacy. Muldoon (1998:2±3) argues that while the cornerstones of
the old diplomacy, namely the Westphalian principles of the territorial state and
state sovereignty, also formed the basis for multilateral institutions, these
principles are now being undermined by the dual forces of globalisation and
fragmentation. The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, says that the post-war
international institutions were built for an `inter-national' world, implying that
19

Globalisation, integration and fragmentation: forces shaping diplomacy in the new millennium
they are inadequate for the new global world: `Here, however, is the crux of our
problem today: while the post-war multilateral system made it possible for the
new globalisation to emerge and flourish, globalisation, in turn, has progressively
rendered its designs antiquated' (Report of the Secretary-General for the Millennium
Assembly nd:np).
The aim of this article is twofold: firstly, it will explore the process of
globalisation, the forces driving it, its impact on the traditional actor in
international relations ± the state ± and the emergence of new actors on the
international scene. Secondly, the impact of these global changes on diplomacy,
and its consequences for this centuries-old institution, will be explored with a
view to predicting how diplomacy, the diplomat and the functional foreign
ministry will have to adapt to survive and face the challenges of the new
millennium.
2 DEFINITIONS
To understand the process of globalisation, the forces driving it and its impact, it
is necessary to define relevant concepts and their interrelationships.
2.1 Globalisation/Globalism
Although the term globalisation is widely used in academic and political
discourses, it appears from the relevant literature that no single definition has
been coined to define the concept. 1 Halton (1997:21±2) is of the opinion that
theories with global themes have been in existence for about two-and-a-half
centuries, Marx and Engels being classic examples of thinkers who had already
identified the global dimensions of market-driven capitalism. Analysing the
development of civilisation and inter-civilisation contacts and influences, he
argues that globalisation in its contemporary form is the direct result of
capitalism, which is about 400 to 500 years old, and a much more recent and
broader social process, namely modernity, which subsumes capitalism. According
to this analysis, globalisation is a process with its roots in the industrialised
West which dates from about 1750, but which `took off' in the late nineteenth
century when the foundations for the global society were laid (1997:45±6).
Characteristics of the evolving global society were the formalisation of relations
between nation-states, the increase in the number of legal conventions and
agencies aimed at regulating international relations, the growth of trans-border
social movements and the establishment of the International Committee of the
Red Cross in 1863 as the world's first non-governmental organisation (NGO).
While few will dispute Halton's historic analysis, globalisation is generally
understood as a relatively recent phenomenon in international politics. While
difficult to constrain within specific time limits, it is usually defined as a post-
World War II process. This is clear from the approach taken by Viotti and Kauppi
20

Andre Stemmet
(1993:449±450), who identify globalisation together with realism and pluralism,
as one of the current paradigms within international relations theory. In this
context, globalisation is used as a theory to explain the lack of development of the
Third World. While tracing the roots of globalisation (Svetlicic 1996:107±123) 2 to
capitalism and ascribing uneven development to capitalist mechanisms, 3 this
economic analysis of globalisation links it to the time frame of the process of
decolonisation, which took place in the 1950s and 1960s.
Other observers have developed narrower, less abstract and more workable
definitions. Charlotte Bretherton defines it as a significant intensification of
global connectedness and a consciousness of that intensification, with a
corresponding diminution of the significance of territorial boundaries and state
structures (Bretherton & Ponton 1996:3).
Important interlinked and overlapping aspects of globalisation identified by
Bretherton are: technological innovations and change, the development of a
global economy, political globalisation and the globalisation of ideas. Rapid
technological innovation since the end of World War II has not only changed
modes of production, but has also produced systems of communication that are
both instantaneous and global. It enabled the integration of financial markets, the
operations of transnational capital and the dissemination of ideas reducing
governments' autonomy in the economic field. However, it also resulted in a new
range of problems that span international borders, such as the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the exploitation of resources on the seabed
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of states.
Technological innovation and knowledge drove economic globalisation. Apart
from financial globalisation which has already been touched upon, these factors
enabled the globalisation of production, not only increasing trade, but also
enabling corporations to research, produce and market products on a global scale.
Multinational corporations (MNCs) and financial institutions operating across
borders have become common features of the international landscape, creating
new modes of interaction across borders, such as direct foreign investment,
acquisitions and mergers, and co-operative agreements (Svetlicic 1996:109).
Scheuerman's (2000:53±69) analysis of the economic manifestations of
globalisation includes, apart from the transnationalisation of capital markets
and finance, increases in trade volumes, the importance of MNCs and the
international movement towards regional economic integration areas such as the
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the Asia Pacific Economic
Community (APEC) and the European Union (EU).
However, technological and economic globalisation were driven by the
industrialised states of North America, Europe and Southeast Asia, enlarging
the gap in development between the industrialised North and the less-developed
South.
As regards the effect of globalisation on the political front, Bretherton
(Bretherton & Ponton 1996:8) defines political globalisation as a tendency for
21

Globalisation, integration and fragmentation: forces shaping diplomacy in the new millennium
issues to be viewed as global in scope and consequently requiring global
solutions; the development of international organisations and global institutions
to address such issues, and the development of a global civil society consisting of
local groups and grassroots organisations from across the globe interacting both
directly and through the UN system. 4
The globalisation of ideas focuses, firstly, on the extent to which ideas
concerning social, economic and political relationships have obtained a global
scope and, secondly, the potential development of a cosmopolitan culture linking
people across physical and cultural boundaries (Bretherton & Ponton 1996:11).
For the analysis of diplomacy in the new millennium, the potential spread of
liberal democratic ideas and forms of governance is of special importance. 6
While Bretherton's definition and description of globalisation are adequate, it is
necessary to refer to three further aspects of this phenomenon: the compression of
time and space, the influence on the nation-state and the concept of global
governance.
Both Scheuerman (2000:55) and McGrew (1998:299±321) are conscious of the
spatial implications of globalisation, Scheuerman defining the most fundamental
aspect of globalisation as the `compression of the space and time horizons of
human experience', and McGrew noting that the exercise of power is being
influenced by the shift in the spatial patterns of human organisation from
national to inter-regional and transcontinental relations. According to the global
politics perspective on globalisation, this process has a twofold influence on the
state (Svetlicic 1996:109). In the first place, the state in the era of globalisation is
inadequate to respond to the challenges of transborder problems such as pollution
or conservation, and new non-state actors need to be admitted to the process of
formulating and executing policy. In the second place, the processes by which
globalisation transcends and undermines the concept of territory and the growing
importance of non-state actors such as MNCs in the international environment
serve to undermine the sovereignty of the state, even to the extent that it may
result in the eventual demise of the nation-state (McGrew 1998:304).
2.2 Global governance
The inability of the state to address these new transnational problems results in
the need for a new form of governance, namely global governance, defined as `the
entirety of different actions shaping the collective capacity of states to deal with
the evolving global sources of risk, and influencing the process of change
occurring in the international environment, thereby avoiding major crises' (Simai
1997:141±163).
Transnational problems such as human security, migration, contagious
diseases, financial crises, global crime, the degradation of the environment,
technology gaps and unfair trade practices require global solutions, which can
only be formulated within a multilateral context.
22

Global governance is therefore a process of multi-level governance, requiring
states, as the building blocks of the multilateral system, to undertake a new,
collectivist role within the multilateral context (Report of the Secretary-General for the
Millennium Assembly, par 43). In this regard, calls have been made for a new,
improved global architecture to deal with the challenges posed by global
governance (UNDP Report 1999:1 100).
2.3 Diplomacy
Andre Stemmet
Berridge (1995:1) defines diplomacy in terms of negotiation as follows:
`Diplomacy is the conduct of international relations by negotiation, rather than
by force, propaganda or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means (such as
gathering information or engendering goodwill) which are either directly or
indirectly designed to promote negotiation.'
It is suggested that this definition, for the purposes of this study, be applicable
to the bilateral, multilateral and global governance contexts of diplomacy.
3 INTEGRATION VERSUS FRAGMENTATION: THE FORCES
DRIVING GLOBALISATION
To understand the influence of globalisation on the state ± as hitherto primary
international actor ± and on the international environment in general, the
processes of integration and fragmentation ± intrinsic parts of the globalisation
process ± need to be explored in some detail.
Globalisation is essentially an integrative process. However, over the past
decades an opposite process, that of regionalisation, has been taking place also,
and sometimes especially, in the most highly globalised parts of the world, the
industrialised North. McGrew (1998:300) points out that the two concepts are
intimately related, and draws the distinction as follows: `if globalisation is
understood as a trans-regional or inter-continental phenomenon, regionalism can
be conceived as the intensification of patterns of interconnectedness and networks
of social/political/economic/military organisation, amongst geographically continuous
states which constitute a distinctive sub-system of the larger global
system'. 6 This trend, seemingly paradoxical to that of globalisation, is driven by
the force of fragmentation and finds expression in the establishment of regional
organisations, mainly aimed at economic co-operation, but also for security
reasons (Simai 1997:143). The cradle of capitalism, Western Europe, is also the
most regionalised region in the world, with overlapping economic, social and
security regimes such as the EU, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
and the Western European Union (WEU). The process of regionalism, driven by
factors, such as patterned interactions, common history, infrastructural facilities,
23

Globalisation, integration and fragmentation: forces shaping diplomacy in the new millennium
cultural affiliations and shared perceptions amongst geographically contiguous
states (Svetlicic 1996:118), has resulted in a move towards a tri-polar system of
trade blocks consisting of Europe, Japan and East Asia, and the Americas
(Svetlicic 1996:118).
Rosenau (1997:361) views globalisation from a somewhat different angle,
drawing attention to another process resulting from globalisation, namely
localisation. Localisation is defined as the opposite of globalisation: while the
former `compels individuals, groups and institutions to engage in similar forms of
behaviour and to participate in more encompassing and coherent processes,
organisations or systems', localisation `leads individuals, groups and institutions
to narrow their horizons, participate in dissimilar forms of behaviour and
withdraw to less-encompassing processes, organisations or systems' (1997:361),
because some peoples and groups conceive the incursions of globalisation as a
threat, seeking reassurance in a smaller, more familiar world. Globalisation is a
boundary-expanding dynamic, undermining the concept of territoriality; localisation
is a boundary-contracting dynamic which attaches more importance to
territory. Rosenau captures the causal link between the fragmenting forces of
localisation and integrative forces of globalisation by coining the word
fragmegration. 7
The effect of localisation manifests itself in practice in several ways. The breakup
of multi-ethnic states that took place after the end of the Cold War with the
implosion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Yugoslavia
increased the number of state actors in the international environment. The
continuation of the political fragmentation of existing states and the continuance
of the resultant historic trend towards ever more states, is, according to some
observers, being sustained by the process of globalisation (Holitscher & Sutter
1999:257; Schachter 1997:17). It has also become commonplace for constituent
parts of states, especially federations, to play a role in international relations,
particularly in the fields of trade, investment, culture and tourism, thus
undermining the state's primary role and increasing the number of actors in the
international environment (Langhorne 1997a:115).
4 THE INFLUENCE OF THE FORCES OF GLOBALISATION
ON THE STATE
Globalisation, and the forces of integration and fragmentation associated with it,
influence the state as an institution, its legitimacy and its functioning in the
global arena in a number of ways. The traditional power of states was based on
their territorial base and the Westphalian concept of sovereignty. The forces of
economic integration and the shift from primary and secondary modes of
production to service industries as sources of wealth, had the result that territory
is no longer an important basis for wealth creation. 9
The integrative forces of globalisation also mean that boundaries no longer
24

stand in the way of exchanges of people, goods, services, credit, investment and
intellectual property (Sur 1997:np). Hence, the state now finds that its freedom of
action and independence are curtailed by the forces of economic globalisation:
trade and investment flows, international media forces and the power of MNCs.
Instead of a situation of independence, states find themselves in a situation of
linked fates, a situation of interdependence (Mansbach 1992:93).
Furthermore, the development of multilateralism and transnational cooperation
regimes resulted in states being increasingly bound by norms, decisions
and procedures formulated by inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) while the
increased complexity and transnational nature of contemporary problems result
in states having to share responsibility for many functions with IGOs and other
international agencies (Simai 1997:143).
The third challenge to the authority and sovereignty of the state results from the
process of localisation: the development of sub-state identities that challenge the
central authority of the state (Schachter 1997:15), and the undermining of the
legitimacy of the state's role within its boundaries by new social actors from the
non-governmental field who are challenging many of the state's functions (Simai
1997:144).
It is therefore clear that globalisation has eroded the classic international/
domestic distinction (Sur 1997:426), challenging the Westphalian pillars of
territory and sovereignty as well as the foundations of international law and the
post-World War II international security mechanisms (1997:426).
Despite these unprecedented challenges to the legitimacy and authority of the
state, it is submitted that the state will remain the only viable basis for the
organisation of the international global community, pointing out that states are
the members of IG0s (willingly transferring sovereignty to such institutions) (De
la Madrid Murtada 1997:563), and are the only institutions that can adjudicate
claims from competitive social groups in order to provide social order (Schachter
1997:22).
5 IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON DIPLOMACY
Andre Stemmet
5.1 New diplomatic actors
The radical changes the unstoppable process of globalisation and the forces
driving it wrought in the structure of international relations must by necessity
have a severe impact on the institution of diplomacy and on the institutions
conducting diplomacy. Coolsaet (1998:4) predicts that diplomacy will increasingly
become post-territorial in nature, while Langhorne (1997:11) describes the
impact upon diplomacy as follows:
It is clear that the trend towards an ever-thickening texture in international
diplomacy continues to quicken. The loss of primary control by states and
25

Globalisation, integration and fragmentation: forces shaping diplomacy in the new millennium
their Foreign Ministries, a pattern which first became visible after the First
World War, is part of a process which has produced a balancing of state
representatives who are not members of the foreign services and, at least to
the same degree and possibly more, by officers who represent non-state
international bodies.
It therefore appears that far from becoming a redundant institution as a result of
the decline of the state as the exclusive focus of power in international relations,
diplomacy is surviving and thriving, albeit in a new form. A closer look will now
be taken at the consequences of globalisation for the institution of diplomacy.
The emergence of new actors on the international scene with transnational
influence has already been referred to. Coolsaet (1998:4) points out that the
situation at the beginning of the millennium is reminiscent of the pre-
Westphalian international order with numerous non-state actors sending envoys
around to protect and advance their interests. The new actors can be divided into
the categories of subnational, transnational, anational, non-governmental and the
media.
5.1.1 Subnational actors
As already pointed out, inter-state regional authorities are increasing their
presence in the international domain. This trend is especially present in the EU,
where regional interests often stretch across national borders (Coolsaet 1998:9). 11
The development of instant communications, and higher levels of education
and of social responsibility has resulted in private citizens ± whether in their
individual capacities or through organised pressure groups, social movements or
international links ± becoming influential in foreign policy and diplomatic issues
(Mansbach 1992:86). 12 The ability of the general public `to connect to world
politics and cope with its complexity' (1992:86) has led the national media in
many states to reflect, inform and even lead public opinion on issues of foreign
policy and diplomacy. 13
Ever since the inception of the 'new diplomacy' in 1991, but especially since
the end of the Cold War when the full force of globalisation started to affect the
international agenda, government agencies other than foreign ministries, such as
finance ministries, central banks and ministries dealing with trade, health,
population development and aviation among other things, have been practising
diplomacy (Muldoon 1998:9).
5.1.2 Transnational actors
Besides proliferating since World War I (Halton 1997:47), the influence and
autonomy of IGOs have also been growing steadily. The agenda of multilateral
organisations has been expanding steadily (Coolsaet 1998:12), especially since
the end of the Cold War, with economic, environmental and social issues gaining
26

prominence over the traditional security agenda (Muldoon 1998:9). 14 The major
reason for the growth in numbers and influence of IGOs is the nature of
contemporary international problems that impact across national boundaries. In
order to achieve their basic objectives, namely security and welfare, states need to
co-operate in multilateral forums in order to address transnational problems. 15
The activities of IGOs often result in intergovernmental co-operation regimes.
These legal regimes are often monitored and implemented by international
regulatory agencies with well-defined powers that are binding upon member
states. 16 Apart from these public international law regimes, globalisation has also
spurned private international law regimes regulating trade and commerce
(Scheuerman 2000:55).
IGOs with a regional character have also proliferated over the last decades, 17
especially in the fields of the economy and security. 18 The role and influence of
these organisations have also been increasing steadily, especially as a result of
functions related to trade policies, regulations and norms (Simai 1997:161).
Another innovation in conflict management, resulting from the UN's `strategic
overstretch' is the `subcontracting' of the management of regional conflicts to
regional organisations (Muldoon 1998:11). 19 The unilateral usurping of traditional
UN powers by NATO to intervene forcibly in Kosovo in 1999 added a new
dimension to the growing powers of regional organisations.
5.1.3 Anational actors
Andre Stemmet
The enormous power and financial resources that MNCs have obtained in the
global economy, to the extent where international financiers can even manipulate
the value of national currencies, has resulted in a situation where not even the
governments of the rich industrialised states can ignore the influence of these new
anational international actors (Muldoon 19988:11). The interaction between
governments and international business in many parts of the world, has been
described as follows:
[T]he globalisation of economies, business enterprises and financial
markets is bringing about a convergence of interests between government
and business in many parts of the world, where a partnership is recognised
as mutually beneficial. This trend deepens the business community's
participation in the diplomatic process in international economic affairs, as
governments rely more and more on markets to ``regulate'', the global
economy and on the private sector to strengthen the economic relationship
between countries.
5.1.4 Non-governmental organisations
The proliferation of IGOs since World War II has been outstripped by the massive
27

Globalisation, integration and fragmentation: forces shaping diplomacy in the new millennium
growth of NGOs and transnational and social movements, especially in the fields
of the environment and human rights. 21 This evolving `global civil society' has
also served to undermine the territorial foundations of the Westphalian order by
legitimising the principle of `duties beyond borders' (McGrew 1998:320). The
growing diplomatic role of such organisations, both at personal and organisatonal
level, is also obvious. NGOs have played important roles as diplomatic conduits
during conflicts 23 and as humanitarian organisations in areas of conflict.
However, the influence of these organisations has also been increasing steadily
in the fields of policy formulation and execution. It is now commonplace for
governments to include NGOs' representations on their official delegations to
international conferences (Langhorne 1997a:12). Within the UN system, NGOs,
many of which have received consultative status, play `a significant role in
shaping international decision making through their involvement in UN meetings
and conferences' (Report on the evolving relation between NGOs and the UN system 32).
NGOs are also now considered, in the words of UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, as `essential partners in the execution of policies, in work on the ground'
(Muldoon 1998:13). Since the end of the Cold War, NGOs have involved
themselves in a number of diplomatic areas which were previously the exclusive
domain of states and IGOs ± notably preventative diplomacy, conflict management
and humanitarian relief (1998:14) ± and appear to be especially valuable in
post-conflict reconstruction, larger NGOs being able to call upon considerable
expertise and other resources. NGOs active in less-developed countries have also
increasingly become the recipients of government and IGO funding (Gruhn
1997:328).
5.1.5 Media
Ever since the development of mass-printing presses in the nineteenth century,
the printed media have influence the decision-making in democratic states.
Technological advancements during the twentieth century have enabled the
powerful medium of television to go global and break down national boundaries.
The impact of international television services is particularly strong in the
shaping and mobilisation of public opinion which, in turn, influence diplomatic
agendas (Mansbach 1992:5). 24
6 NEW DIPLOMATIC AGENDAS
The destruction and loss of life during the two world wars and the ideological
conflict of the Cold War focused diplomacy's primary agenda on issues of military
security and stability. The UN Charter and the organisation's institutionalisation
reflect this focus. However, the repeated references to human rights (albeit in a
vague and non-enforceable form) in the charter, reflected a developing awareness
of the interests of humanity as a whole. In ensuing decades, the question of the
28

Andre Stemmet
protection of human rights in its manifestations relating to civil and political
rights, self-determination, gender issues, the rights of minorities and groups, the
rights of refugees, and social and economic rights would result in a distinct new
diplomatic agenda. The various legal instruments and the protection machinery
developed under the auspices of the UN and regional organisations form the
pillars of this new agenda, around which a plethora of non-governmental
agencies concerned with human rights protection sprang up.
The end of the bipolar international structure that characterised the Cold War
has resulted in a marked increase in intra-state conflicts, often resulting in gross
human rights violations such as genocide and ethnic cleansing. Violations of this
nature, together with the failed state syndrome especially prevalent in Africa
(Schachter 1997:18), where central authority breaks down to a point where law
and order no longer exist, has raised the question of the viability of a new doctrine
of humanitarian intervention in states to stop such abuses. 25 Recent events in
Kosovo and Chechnya have made it clear that the present UN structure, with the
Security Council reflecting the distribution of power and alignments of 1945,
`does not fully represent either the character or the needs of our globalised world'
(Report of the Secretary-General 44).
Human rights diplomacy has become a priority to a number of smaller states,
notably the Nordic states and the Netherlands, while also forming part of the
diplomatic agenda of regional organisations, such as the EU (Brandtner & Rosas
1998:468). 26
Transnational problems relating to the environment started to appear on the
global agenda in the 1950s, and may constitute the greatest danger to humans
since the decline of the threat of nuclear war at the end of the Cold War
(Mansbach 1992:5). Problems such as global warming, rising sea levels, ozone
depletion, energy shortages and pollution, can be directly linked to industrialisation
and technological innovations, and relate directly to the environment.
These issues, together with questions of human survival, such as the
population explosion, food scarcity and easily transmittable diseases such as
HIV/AIDS, can only be successfully addressed by global co-operation. Environmental
problems have, consequently, spurned the most intense form of global
interaction, both within IGO and NGO structures, while a significant connection
between these structures has also developed. The UN Earth Summit held in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992 represents the pinnacle of the process of global environmental
management. 27
Other issues that have appeared on the diplomatic agenda over the last number
of decades and that have, to a greater or lesser extent, elicited global responses,
institutionalisation and regime creation include arms control and disarmament,
migration, cross-border criminal activities (such as drug trafficking, the trade in
nuclear materials, money laundering and illegal trade in arms) and technical
issues such as aviation and shipping (Barston 1997:5).
29

Globalisation, integration and fragmentation: forces shaping diplomacy in the new millennium
7 NEW TYPES OF DIPLOMACY
The unprecedented increase in diplomatic actors and the expansion of the
diplomatic agenda have not only resulted in a rapid growth in the volume of
diplomacy, but also in new diplomatic strategies, styles and procedures. While
the traditional diplomatic channel of communication ran between states, and later
between states and IGOs, diplomacy in the globalised world also had to invent
new, less-formalised lines of communication.
7.1 Public diplomacy
While private actors such as NGOs and transnational organisations comprised of
individuals may sometimes work behind the scenes to promote a specific agenda,
they more often than not attempt to work in the public eye, thus influencing
public opinion. This is done by means of direct contact with legislatures or foreign
ministries, letter-writing campaigns to the media, seminars, talks and public
demonstrations (Langhorne 1997b:6).
The increased interaction with non-governmental actors also resulted in a
changed orientation for foreign ministries, which must now take input from that
sector into consideration in policy formulation and execution.
7.2 State±private sector diplomacy
The modern state can in a globalised environment only ensure wealth creation
and security if it develops sound long-term relationships with MNCs and foreign
investors. Consequently, it has become common practice for leaders of states to
focus attention, especially during foreign visits, on individual business leaders
and organised business, 28 while government departments such as foreign and
trade ministries have developed specialised economic and trade promotion
sections within their structures. 29
7.3 Private sector±multilateral diplomacy
Over the last decade, increased co-operation between multilateral bodies and
MNCs have taken place, resulting from a larger degree of confidence in the role of
organisations such as the UN as instruments of global management, and
commitments by the business world to self-regulation to ensure good global
governance, especially in the fields of environmental protection, sustainable
development and human rights. 30
7.4 South±South and North±South diplomacy
The economic disparities between the industrialised states of Europe, North
America and East Asia, on the one hand, and the Third World, on the other,
30

Andre Stemmet
which are being intensified by the forces of globalisation, have spurned new
diplomatic agendas and interactions. The developing states of the Third World,
keenly aware of being politically and economically marginalised by globalisation,
seek to revamp existing structures such as the Group of 77 (G77) and the Nonaligned
Movement (NAM), and to create new structures such as the South
Summit in order to engage the industrialised North. The South aims to restructure
the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), to be more amenable to the interests of the South and to
ensure a more even distribution of the benefits of globalisation. Structures for
dialogue and co-operation such as the North±South Summit and Africa±Europe
Summit have given a new dimension to multilateral diplomacy (Speech by
Foreign Minister).
8 STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF DIPLOMACY IN A
GLOBALISED WORLD: THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN THE
NEW MILLENNIUM
Traditional diplomacy has been defined by formal rules of procedure, protocol
and established diplomatic practice, which have evolved over many years, while
the primary practitioners of diplomacy, namely the institutionalised foreign
ministries, were hierarchically organised. While these practices continue to
dominate traditional state-centric bilateral diplomacy, no such formalised
structures exist for the new diplomatic actors operating in the multi-centric
world of globalised diplomacy. The new actors, especially non-bureaucratic actors
such as NGOs, are more autonomous, relatively equal in status, less concerned
with processes and more focused on outcomes (Rosenau in Carlson & Ramphal
1995:373). Alliance building is no longer limited to states, but now includes a
wide array of actors. The use of informal and short-term arrangements instead of
formalised alliances has also become a feature of diplomacy in a globalised world
(Barston 1997:7).
The foreign ministry had to adapt to the changes globalisation made to
diplomacy, finding its central role being eroded by these forces. While these
institutions had ample time to adapt to the new multilateral diplomacy, more
challenges were posed to diplomacy during the last three decades than during the
previous centuries.
The expansion of the diplomatic agenda resulted in increased specialisation by
diplomats. Even though other functional ministries became more involved in
technical issues, such as aviation or fishing which appeared on the agenda, the
policy coordinating role retained by foreign ministries had the effect that more
technical expertise is being expected of the diplomat than before. In the new
millenium a diplomat must be more than only a cultured, educated person in
command of a foreign language(s).
31

Globalisation, integration and fragmentation: forces shaping diplomacy in the new millennium
Consequently, foreign ministries had to focus more resources on the training of
diplomats, but many are severely challenged by financial constraints to recruit
and retain well-qualified individuals.
Most ministries have reacted to the increased importance of economic issues by
establishing specialised economic sections which, especially in the industrialised
states, face strong competition from the private sector as an employer (Barston
1997:7; Coolsaet 1998:17).
The creation of a significant number of new states, international co-operation
regimes, and regional and multilateral organisations and the consequent
intensification of diplomatic activity, have put enormous pressure on the
resources, human and financial, of foreign ministries. Foreign ministries have
attempted to cope by expanding the practices of multiple representation, nonresident
representation and the sharing of representational resources (Langhorne
1997b:6). 31
Foreign ministries had to adopt new practices in the multi-centric, globalised
world. Liaison with new actors such as the business community and NGOs, even
to the point of engaging them as partners, have become commonplace (Langhorne
1997b:12; Coolsaet 1998:17).
The technological revolution also impacted directly on foreign ministries.
Instant communication means that governments are expected to act much quicker
to unfolding events in remote parts of the world. Most foreign ministries have
therefore acquired modern communication systems in order for missions abroad
to inform their head offices on important developments and, in turn, to receive
instructions from the head offices or the political leadership ± the traditional
diplomatic pouch no longer being suitable for this purpose. Especially during
negotiations or multilateral meetings the modern communications systems prove
their value, with foreign missions, offering the facilities of instant and secure
communications, providing valuable back-up support to delegations.
The Internet has considerably enhanced the information-gathering activities of
foreign missions, which is especially useful to new states with limited capacities,
such as Slovenia (Langhorne 1997b:6).
Apart from the establishment of economic divisions, changing conditions also
elicited other structural responses from foreign ministries. Today most foreign
ministries of larger states have specialised, multilateral divisions comprising
sections dealing, among other things, with arms control and disarmament issues,
environmental issues, human rights and social issues. A state's specific policy
orientation will also dictate the focus of its foreign ministry: states of the South
are apt to focus on Security Council reform and the South±South/South±North
agendas. The South African Department of Foreign Affairs has, in view of the
country's leading role in the South, established a special section within its
Multilateral Branch tasked only with arranging international conferences such as
the NAM Summit, the Commonwealth Summit and the UN conference on Racism
of 2001. Its focus on African security issues resulted in the creation of a special
32

Andre Stemmet
peacekeeping desk within the Africa Branch and it is currently focusing on
restructuring its organisation in order to enhance its central policy aim of
promoting the African Renaissance.
Some foreign ministries also have to adapt to the involvement of subnational
actors in diplomacy: in the South African case, a provincial liaison directorate
was established as part of the protocol chief directorate in order to coordinate and
guide visits abroad by representatives of the respective provinces.
In contrast to the situation in the past when change in foreign ministries came
very slowly, most foreign ministries nowadays appear to undertake regular
administrative and policy reviews (Coolsaet 1998:2). 32
9 CONCLUSION
Over the last decades the foreign ministry has lost its exclusive hold on diplomacy
as a result of a number of factors: the decline in state power and sovereignty;
multilateralism; globalisation and global governance; the influence of new actors
on the diplomatic agenda, and the growing autonomy of the so-called technical
ministries. However, diplomacy has also become infinitely more complex,
requiring constant adaptation to new issues and changed circumstances. The
modern diplomat has to display or acquire new skills in order to stay abreast of
the rapid changes being wrought on diplomacy, and has to be much more
innovative than the representative of his or her profession of previous generations
± who mostly involved themselves with questions of procedure and protocol. 33 In
this sense, diplomacy now probably makes for a more challenging career than
before.
However, the question remains what the nature of diplomacy ± an institution
which for the past three-and-a-half centuries was built on the state as the primary
international actor ± will be like in another century's time.
Most observers agree that despite its relative decline, the nation-state will
remain the only viable basis for the organisation of the international system,
pointing out that states remain the basis of the multilateral system (de la Madrid
Hurtada 1997:563; Schachter 1997:22).
Conversely, it can be expected that the pace of globalisation and of global
governance tendencies will increase even further, to the detriment of the state's
influence and power. 34
The relative inequality of modern states, despite the legal fiction of equality,
will enhance this process. It can also be expected that regional organisations such
as the EU will continue to usurp power from member states, becoming ever more
important diplomatic actors. While there is no possibility that the role of the state
will become extinct, the profound impact of globalisation will change the
structure of diplomacy to a non-hierarchical, multilayered system, which will be
characterised by a diffusion of authority and an expansion and intensification of
global governance. Diplomacy is about to rediscover its pre-Westphalian roots.
33

Globalisation, integration and fragmentation: forces shaping diplomacy in the new millennium
NOTES
* Andre Stemmet is Senior State Law Adviser (International Law) at the Department of
Foreign Affairs, and previously served as a diplomat in Israel and Turkey. The views
expressed in this article are personal, and do not necessarily reflect those of the South
African Government or the Department of Foreign Affairs.
1 Rosenau (1997) refers to this conceptual confusion as follows: `a great variety of
activities is labelled as globalisation. Different observers use it to describe different
phenomena and often there is little overlap among the various usages'. Current History
(November 1997), 360±4.
2 While globalism is not always distinguished from globalisation, such a distinction has
been drawn: `Globalisation and regionalisation are regarded basically as processes or
instruments for the analysis of the world economy and system, while globalism and
regionalism are more concepts behind such trends'. M Svetlicic, Challenges of
globalisation and regionalisation in the world economy, Global Society, vol. 10, no. 2
(1996), 107±123. For the purpose of this article, no distinction needs to be drawn
between the concepts regionalism/regionalisation and globalisation/globalism, and the terms
globalisation and regionalisation will be used denoting an ongoing processes.
3 This particular view of the concept of globalisation is experienced today in the North±
South debate and South±South co-operation; both important aspects on the agenda of
developing states.
4 For definitional clarity, it is necessary to distinguish the concepts political globalisation,
in essence denoting the process described here, from the concept global politics, which is
an analytical perspective on international relations and is described by Bretherton as
follows: `Use of the term ``global'' implies an ideological and methodological
orientation based [on] and a conscious rejection of the term ``international'' '. This
involves an attempt to move away from the traditional, realist approach to international
politics, with its focus on interstate relations and issues of diplomacy and security, in
order to encompass both a more inclusive agenda and a range of non-state actors
(Bretherton & Ponton 1996:2).
5 Human rights is an important cornerstone of the diplomacy of a number of
industrialised states, such as the Nordic States, and regional organisations such as the
EU. The focus on human rights diplomacy will consequently ± in all probability ±
increase rather that decrease in future. According to an intellectual current in
contemporary liberalism, intensified international commerce and investment will
generate the social and political preconditions to extend the rule of law across
international borders (Scheuerman 2000:53).
6 Simai (1997:141) describes the processes of globalisation and fragmentation as
`simultaneous, interrelated and interacting'.
7 The political dynamic of the process of localisation is illustrated by the appearance and
successes of politicians using local and ethnic concerns and xenophobia as political
power bases, such as Jean Marie Le Pen in France, Patrick Buchanan in the USA and
Vladimir Zririnovsky in the USSR.
8 The contemporary phenomenon of semi-independent zones within states with different
economic and legal systems from that of the `mother' state, is a further manifestation of
34

Andre Stemmet
this trend: the Hong Kong and Macau self-administrative regions as well as the Shangai
province in the People's Republic of China (PRC) illustrate this trend.
9 Classic examples to illustrate this phenomenon are the city-state of Singapore and the
Hong Kong Self-Administrative Region of the PRC.
10 Sur, 1997:426, points to the catastrophic consequences, both at domestic and
international level, of state collapse, with reference to recent events in Yugoslavia,
Somalia and Rwanda.
11 Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996)
reserves the prerogative for the conduct of international relations to the national
executive (Section) 231(1), the provinces are in practice increasingly acting as
independent actors on the international scene, especially with regard to promoting
themselves abroad as attractive investment and tourism destinations. The premier of the
most independently minded of the provinces, the Western Cape, recently appointed two
`foreign affairs' advisers, one of whom is a former senior South African diplomat.
12 The large number of letters from private citizens that appeared in South African
newspapers during the land invasion crisis in Zimbabwe, in general critical of the South
African government's diplomatic approach to the issue, the Internet debate on the issue,
as well as the demonstrations by loosely organised groups of individuals at Zimbabwean
diplomatic missions serve as illustration.
13 The strong criticism expressed by the independent South African media on the South
African government's handling of the Zimbabwe crisis, and the silence of the South
African President on the issue, illustrate the media's role in diplomacy (in this case, an
ineffective role).
14 The series of UN conferences on social issues such as the environment (Rio de Janeiro,
1992), human rights (Vienna, 1993), population and development (Cairo, 1994), and
human settlements (Istanbul, 1996), illustrate the growing importance of the UN and its
agencies. The major international organisations in the economic field are the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), while those in the social field include the Food and Agricultural Organisation
(FAO), the United Nations Educational and Social Council (UNESCO), the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO).
15 In 1990, states participated on average in 30 inter-governmental organisations, with
industrialised states participating on a very large scale: the USA in about 200, and
France in 270. (Simai 1997:146).
16 The earliest legal regimes related to the conduct of warfare, such as the 1864 Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies
in the Field, while the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is an example of a latterday
regime of almost universal nature. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, still to enter into force, may in future form a basis for the development of
international criminal law. Since World War II, the field of disarmament has been the
focus of the development of regulatory regimes, such as the Treaty on the Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical
Weapons Organisation.
17 International law recognises organisations of a regional character with state membership
and legal personality in terms of international law as international organisations.
18 The EU is a classic example of a regional economic grouping, while NAFTA (North
America), MERCOSUR (South America), ASEAN (East Asia), ECOWAS (West Africa)
35

Globalisation, integration and fragmentation: forces shaping diplomacy in the new millennium
and SADC (Southern Africa) are more recent examples of regional trading blocs. In
Western Europe alone, three regional organisations are concerned with security: NATO,
the CSCE and WEU.
19 An example is the UN Security Council mandating ECOWAS to intervene in the civil
conflict in Liberia in the mid-1990s.
20 This relationship is illustrated by the fact that it has become common for leaders of
states when visiting foreign countries, to spend at least as much time with business
people and investors as with fellow political leaders and politicians.
21 Greenpeace and Amnesty International are respectively the most well-known
exponents. The International Committee of the Red Cross, established in 1863, is
considered as the first transnational NGO.
22 A good example of the impact of such global movements is the international solidarity
that developed on the issue of apartheid.
23 The Roman Catholic Church's role in establishing lines of communication between the
Frelimo government in Mozambique and the Renamo rebels serves as example, while
the ICRC has undertaken such roles on numerous occasions.
24 This trend has gained enormous momentum since the establishment of the international
news network CNN in the mid 1980s. The influence of television images to mobilise
public opinion and to put pressure on governments to act in line with the public's
expectations is strong in the cases of large-scale human rights abuses, such as in the
former Yugoslavia, Chechnya and Kosovo.
25 The South African Department of Foreign Affairs is currently developing a policy on
humanitarian intervention.
26 For a general background on human rights as a global question, see Mansbach, 1992
ch 15, and I Brownlie, Principles of public international law, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1990, ch. 24.
27 While the UN, states and UN-accredited NGOs met in the forum of the Earth Summit,
hundreds of non-accredited NGOs met a few miles away to discuss the same problems
under the banner of the `92 Global Forum.
28 The involvement of organised business in political issues illustrates the other side of the
coin, for example, the attempt by the South African Chamber of Business to engage the
Zimbabwean government on the possible negative consequences of instability in that
state on the business climate in South Africa, (Sake-Rapport, 30 April 2000, 1).
29 In the cases of Canada and Australia, these ministries have been combined into single
entities.
30 Donations by business tycoons to the UN and its agencies illustrate the closer
multilateral-MNC relationship, (Coolsaet, 1998:12±13).
31 European Commission diplomatic representation in what is considered to be important
states is an example and will probably be practised in future by other regional
organisations.
32 The South African Department of Foreign Affairs is currently, for the second time in as
many years, reviewing its organisational structure and policy orientation processes
which are overdue as a result of changes in the international position of the state.
33 The author's experiences as a junior diplomat in the 1980s attest to this conclusion.
34 However, some observers are of the opinion that similar processes have taken place in
previous centuries from which the state recovered its legitimacy and predict that this
will happen again.
36

Andre Stemmet
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Andre Stemmet
31 Tiger Road
Monumentpark
0181
Pretoria
South Africa
Tel: (012) 460 5081
Cel: 0832535293
e-mail: andres@global.co.za
38

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE
ABUBAKAR ABDULSALAMI
ADMINISTRATION (1998±1999)
Lere Amusan
In the end we [the military] have only succeeded in creating a defective
foundation on which a solid democratic structure can neither be
constructed nor sustained (General Abubakar Abdulsalami, 1999).
____
ABSTRACT
Abubakar's political economy was said to be almost a direct diversion
from that of his predecessors to acquire international legitimacy. He
craved for legitimacy and his attempt to portray himself as a democrat
populist spurred him on to introduce policy options that were in the
interest of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
other Western financial institutions. This connotes a tactical attempt by
his government to hand over the economy of the country to the
multinational corporations (MNCs). This article strives to analyse the
political economy of Nigeria under Abdulsalami to see if there was
diversion from the patronage system of his predecessors. His economic
policy could be viewed as containing a hidden agenda to bastardise the
economy of Nigeria. This is contrary to many scholars' beliefs that he
came to normalise the battered socio-economy of Nigeria. The article
further aims to see whether the new policies alleviate the questions of
unemployment, poverty, crime prevention, prebendalised politics and
corruption at high level. The conclusion will look into what the foreign
policy of the new civilian government should be.
____
1 INTRODUCTION
Politeia Vol 21 No 3 2002 pp 39±57
This article is an analysis of the problem at hand, examining it from the viewpoint
of the Dependencia school of thought (Baran 1978:265±277; Caporaso 1978:2).
Though some scholars may have opposing views on the use of this approach after
the demise of Soviet Communism, one incontrovertible fact is that Nigeria and
39

The political economy of Nigerian Foreign Policy: the Abubakar Abdulsalami Administration (1998±1999)
other Third World states should not expect the West and its international
financial institutions to develop their countries. It is a questionable practice, (to
say the least), for the IMF and the World bank to provide the same antidote to
every economic failure in the Third World, irrespective of the situation that led to
such economic underdevelopment. This article centres on the need for Nigeria to
develop its own economic development plan that will be more inward-looking.
Concepts such as privatisation, foreign public±private investment, debt equity conversion
and other development plans inspired by the West can hardly bring about
economic development. Rather, such approaches are draining the little resources
of the state in the form of transfer pricing, sharp accounting practices, overinvoicing
of import, under-invoicing of export, as well as over-invoicing of
technology. In addition, it facilitates the total dislocation of local small- and
medium-scale industries that could compete with the giant MNCs. This
subsequently affects the employment rate, poverty alleviation and the general
development of the state. The employment of labour is determined by whether the
production in a developing economy is labour intensive or capital intensive. The
high technological power of the MNCs creates employment for their technicians
from the West. However, it is usually the small and medium industries that create
employment for the local people, because their production is inherently labour
intensive.
2 NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Nigerian foreign policy has always kow-towed to the Western capitalist system,
even though this phenomenon was challenged in the mid 1960s when a civil war
broke out between the Federal government and the Ojukwu-inspired Biafra
secessionist movement of the Igbo-speaking people and again in the 1970s when
the Gowon government was overthrown by General Murtala Mohammed. The
changes in the 1970s could be attributed to the oil boom and the civil war in the
country. This made Nigeria adhere stricto sensus to the principle of non-alignment,
but tend more to the Communist world. 1 Despite Murtala/Obasanjo's stance on
some policy issues (such as the South African apartheid system, and the
indigenisation economic programme), Nigeria was unable to come up with an
indigenous economic policy that could turn the tables in favour of Nigerians.
The indigenisation policy spelt out some areas where foreigners could
participate while others were meant exclusively for Nigerians. It is argued
somewhere else that the aim of the government then was to punish Britain for its
uncompromising stance on the issue of apartheid in South Africa (Asobie
1983:151±2). The dependence of Nigeria on the North affected the pursuance of
the policy to a logical end. The result of this policy was the creation of
middlemen, of a petit-bourgeoisie. They served as a front for foreign investors to
control the economy of the state.
With the oil boom of the 1970s, Nigeria had the upper hand in the negotiations
40

Lere Amusan
for more economic concession from the North, and led the other Third World
states under the umbrella of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) to the
negotiation table with the European Economic Community (EEC). This eventually
led to the signing of the Lome Convention in February 1975. Its role in the
negotiation was said to be one of altruistic, hegemonic dominance in the black
diaspora. Nigeria did not benefit from the Lome Convention economically because
all the items subjected to preferential treatment did not contribute to foreign
exchange earnings in Nigeria. After the civil war, when agriculture was relegated
to a secondary position, oil was (and still is) the major source of foreign income.
From 1950 to 1965, cash crops ± cocoa, palm and rubber ± contributed to some 70
per cent of the state's gross domestic product (GDP).
The civilian government, headed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari (1979±1983) could
not control the momentum of the situation, partly because the unseen hands that
participated in the front business in the Obasanjo government were the same as
those that financially propped up the Shagari government in its electioneering
campaign, thus bringing about continuity in the economic dislocation for some
years.
The economic pressure in 1983 forced the Shagari administration to introduce
austerity measures. The aim of the programme was to be inward-looking in the
consumption of locally made goods, discouraging importation by a series of
economic regulations. However, politicians made a lot of money from import
licences and foreign exchange gains, opened foreign accounts and invested in
offshore portfolios. This led to the economics of disarticulation and a lack of
confidence in the second republic politicians.
3 MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
All the factors enumerated made a military incursion into the polity of Nigeria
inevitable. The Buhari-Idiagbon government came to power with no political or
economic agenda to transform the politico-economic quagmire inherited from the
civilian government. The issue of the IMF and Structural Adjustment Programme
(SAP) were put on the table for discussion as a sign of transparency in
governance. Public opinion then agreed that the micro-economic policy as
introduced by the IMF could not serve the interest of the state. Alternative to the
SAP was the introduction of trade by barter in a trapped economy (Ogwu &
Olaniyan 1989:93±5). Though some debts incurred by the Shagari government
were paid, attempts to look inward for the resuscitation of the economy were not
in the interest of the portfolio business people. This brought about a palace coup
d'etat in August 1985, headed by Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida.
Babangida came to power with a perceived populist government. He invited
the radicals and academics to form his government. The said broad-based
government was conceived to be one that would address the plight of the
populace. Babangida reintroduced the issue of the IMF. As expected, the idea
41

The political economy of Nigerian Foreign Policy: the Abubakar Abdulsalami Administration (1998±1999)
was not acceptable to the Nigerians, but the sinking economy, pressure from
the West and the need to consolidate his power without external interference
influenced him to take Nigeria to the IMF. In order to implement the fund
programmes, in 1986 he charged political economists of various universities
and research centres to look into the implications of Debt Equity Swap (DES),
privatisation and commercialisation in the development of the state's
economy. 2 The recommendation of the intellectuals that gathered in Kuru,
Jos and Benin were against the programmes. 3 Despite this, he went ahead and
actualised it, with little success (which came as no surprise). Because
Babangida intended staying in power ad infinitum, he annulled the elections
of 12 June 1993, won by Moshood Abiola, to consolidate his own unending
transition programme. When he could not contain the instability that came out
of his political decision, he had to abdicate power. This he did by appointing
Chief Ernest Shonekan, an industrialist, to head an interim government that
would supposedly usher in a true democracy in Nigeria.
Abacha short-circuited the Shonekan prote ge government by taking over power
on 17 November 1993. His economic policy could be characterised as a policy of
no direction. His foreign policy until his demise was a preventative diplomacy.
The killing of an environmentalist, Ken Saro Wiwa, the imprisonment of Abiola
and other human rights activists as well as some religious leaders coupled with
the unabated abuse of human rights in the era of globalisation made Abacha's
government the worst ever in Nigeria. This relegated the state to pariah status.
The EEC and the Commonwealth of Nations imposed sanctions on the Nigerian
government. Different governments imposed selective sanctions on him. This
made Abacha look towards Asia, and he awarded some lucrative contracts to
China and Iran for economic and political support. His plans to remain in power
came to an abrupt end with his death on 8 June 1998.
General Abubakar Abdulsalami, the head of the military, came to power on
9 June 1998. This development brought about a new look into the status of
Nigeria in Africa and abroad, and was welcomed by the West, since the EU and
the United States (US) lifted their selective sanctions and promised to support the
new government in its transition programme. Abubakar's intention to redeem the
battered economy and image of the Nigerian nation was accepted by the West as
the only condition for re-entering international institutions after having spent
some time in a cocoon. Abubakar's government set out to win new friends and
consolidate existing ones. To what extent this was achieved will be seen by
looking into Abubakar's policy towards South Africa and the West.
4 ABUBAKAR AND SOUTH AFRICA
Co-operation with South Africa was the uppermost foreign policy objective of the
government, as it appeared to be in the interest of the economic development of
the state, since the practical situation of political development in the global
42

Lere Amusan
system was that following the democratisation of South Africa, Nigeria had been
relegated to the background. For this reason, the first port of call for the new
Nigerian government in its image laundering and repair of damaged relations was
South Africa (The Star, 22 September 1998:14). In his address to parliament in
Cape Town, Abubakar said that `the relationship between Nigeria and South
Africa should always be that of cooperation and not rivalry' (The Star,
22 September 1998:4).
The implication of this diplomatic move could be viewed from various
developments in the history of Nigerian foreign policy and attitudes of external
environment to the Nigerian plight. It is worth noting that the West twice
neglected Nigeria in a time of need: during the civil war, the policy of the West to
the Gowon government was aimed at procuring crude oil from the Niger Delta
areas without problems. At the same time, they were using their quiet diplomacy
to warm to the Biafra for possible energy co-operation. This economic objective
led to tacit support for Ojukwu's Biafra secessionist. 4 It was not in their interest to
find a political solution to the crisis in Nigeria. The United Kingdom (UK) and US
did not announce their support for Biafra, but nevertheless gave it implied
recognition. The second time was when Nigeria was relegated to pariah status as a
result of killing Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other environmentalists.
This could have been the reason for Abubakar's return to South Africa in an
effort to get what the West felt reluctant to part with ± direct foreign investment,
localisation of technology to fall in line with the aspirations of the African
continent and the exploration of mineral resources based on equal exchange. One
of the immediate preoccupations of his government was how to woo the MNCs of
South Africa such as the Anglo American Corporation (AAC). On this drive,
Patrick Yakowa, Abubakar's Solid Minerals Minister, was of the view that the
only salvation for mining development in Nigeria was to invite South African
companies to inject their technology and expertise into the industry in Nigeria
(The Star, 5 February 1999:5). An agreement was therefore entered into between
the Solid Minerals Department and AAC for the exploration of gold and base
metals in Nigeria (Newsmonth, 12 September 1998:5). As a result of this, there was
a change in the focus of the Nigerian High Commission in Pretoria and the
Consular office in Johannesburg.
To show his readiness to do business with South Africa, Abubakar visited
South Africa twice in one month, first for a state visit and second to attend the
Non-aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Durban, South Africa. There therefore
seems to be a sign of better understanding between the two states. The South
African government reciprocated when President Thabo Mbeki visited Nigeria in
July 1998, after Abiola, winner of the 1993 elections, had died in prison.
As an olive branch gesture to end political animosity between the two,
US$10 million in cash was allegedly donated to the African National Congress
(ANC) for the 1999 election campaign. The sum was rumoured to have been
presented to the party by Alhaji Idris Gidado, Secretary to the Federal Military
43

The political economy of Nigerian Foreign Policy: the Abubakar Abdulsalami Administration (1998±1999)
Government of Nigeria, in person. 5 The nadir of their relationship was the
formation of a Bi-national Commission which was inaugurated in October 1999
in Abuja, Nigeria. The thawing in reactive foreign policy brought about an
increase in trade and investment between the two states.
5 NIGERIA AND THE WEST
The sudden death of Abacha and subsequent political overtures made by his
predecessor, General Abubakar Abdulsalami, to return the state to a democratic
government was perceived by the West as its diplomatic victory over the hawk,
Abacha. At the same time, they saw the new olive branch tactic as a way of
extending their business contacts in Nigeria. This made another scramble for
Nigeria imperative, during the very month Abacha died.
Probably because of historical links between Nigeria and the UK, coupled with
the amount of investment committed to the Nigerian economy from the time of
colonialism down to the present time, the UK continued to be blackmailed by
different governments in Nigeria. This partly explains why the UK usually
represents the interests of the West in Nigeria: it was assumed that London should
understand the political terrain better than any other country. 6 During the civil
war (1967±1970), Gowon made some empty sanction threats against the UK.
Obasanjo did the same when he nationalised British Petroleum (BP) and Barclays
Bank in 1978, partly because of the state's propping up of racialism in Rhodesia
(now Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Shagari's toothless government made some
provocative economic statements against the British on the eve of Zimbabwe's
independence. The Dikko affair during the Shagari government convinced the UK
that Nigeria was up to forcing it to take a policy position contrary to its foreign
policy objective (Eze 1984:185±198; Fadugba 1984:10±15.
Abacha's iron fist administration ± with the help of his foreign minister, Tom
Ikimi ± made a series of economic threats against the UK regarding the need for
the state to take a lead in normalising relations with Nigeria. Abacha was of the
view that the UK could avert EU and US sanctions against it if it wished. The
relations between the two states was at a low ebb until the death of Abacha on
8 June 1998.
The death of Abiola served as an avenue to penetrate the economy of the state
again in a more forceful way. Tony Blair was one of the first heads of state to have
a telephone conversation with Abubakar before sending his British Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Tony Lloyd, who also represented the EU, to Nigeria, in a bid to
normalise the relations between the two heads of government. Realpolitik
emerged as other states from the West came to Nigeria with a series of economic
development plans and promises. The 20 July 1998 announcement of full
privatisation of government-controlled companies and parastatals could be linked
to pressure from the UK and other Western countries. The Vision 2010 that was
drafted by the Abacha government in conjunction with the MNCs and the IMF
44

was said to be the guideline for the economic and political blueprint for the new
government. 7 On 8 July 1998, a pressure group comprising the Nigeria±Britain
Association; West Africa Committee and the West African Shippers' Association,
tabled their demand to the British-Nigerian Parliamentary Group at the House of
Commons chaired by Austin Mitchel (West Africa, 3±16 August 1998:629).
Among other demands, they called the UK to facilitate good relations between
Nigeria and other Western states. This overture was aimed at protecting their
business interests in Nigeria and seeing the Vision 2010 actualised to the
advantage of foreign investments in Nigeria.
6 ABUBAKAR'S ECONOMIC POLICY OF REJUVENATION
Lere Amusan
Personalisation of Nigeria's economic diplomacy by Abacha led to the economic
decision for the country to be in the hands of a few individuals (Ayoob 1995).
Ismaila Gwazo (security advisor), Chief Anthony Ani (finance minister) and
Chief Tom Ikimi (foreign affairs minister) dominated the economic policy. The
public treasury was better managed and directed by Abacha's family, as the
demarcated line between him and the state remained blurred. The members of the
Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) were relegated to nothing in economic
decision-making. Abacha had to remove the Central Bank Governor, Malam
Usman Mohammed, for his refusal to direct state funds to his family accounts
overseas. The Abubakar government promised to correct all such abuses.
On 20 July 1998, during his nationwide broadcast, Abubakar promised a
transparent government that would uphold the principle of the rule of law. To
actualise this, he disbanded all the political institutions put in place by Abacha. 8
In their place, he established alternative institutions to conclude the transition
programme. He invited the international organisations: the UN, the Commonwealth
of Nations, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and various nongovernmental
organisations (NGOs) to observe all the elections in the country. 9
Usman Mohammed was appointed as finance minister ± a populist decision to
rescue the battered economy. Abubakar had to contend with vast debts, on which
the interest alone cost US$2,5 billion. He had to commit US$3 billion as the
state's share of a joint oil venture with Anglo-Dutch Shell, Chevron, Texaco, Agip
and Mobil. His decision to court the IMF and the World Bank by giving them total
control over the state's economy left him little room to manoeuvre on economic
policy. His promise that short-term micro-economic measures would be
addressed to revitalising specific sectors to increase the productive sector,
household income and the purchasing power of Nigerians ± that is, the supply
and distribution of petroleum products and fertiliser, reliable power supply and
efficient communication services (West Africa, 28 September ± 11 October
1998:704) ± failed to materialise.
To garner some degree of credibility, a delegation comprising political
leaders jailed by Abacha were sent to the IMF in Washington to renegotiate
45

The political economy of Nigerian Foreign Policy: the Abubakar Abdulsalami Administration (1998±1999)
with the institution on debt rescheduling; and possibly some new loans to
jump-start the economy. Probably to minimise corruption or for the new head
of government illicitly to amass wealth for himself, he scrapped the Ministry of
Petroleum and put all matters relating to petroleum under the presidency. Aret
Adams, a former managing director of the Nigeria National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC) was appointed as advisor to the president. This was said
to be an attempt by Abubakar to stop prebendalised politics by Abacha. This
initiative brought the price of petroleum down and eased the long queues that
had been the order of the day.
Partly because of the unattractive demand for oil, the fall in the price of crude
oil on the international market gave the oil MNCs some leverage to impose some
demands on the government. Mobil, for example, indefinitely deferred its
development project for 9 000 barrels a day in the Yaho field. BP insisted on the
need for privatisation of the oil industry before 29 May 1999, before more
investments could be made in Nigeria. In the Niger Delta region, where the main
cash crop comes from, there was instability fomented by the poverty-stricken
unemployed youths from Ijaw, Ilaje and Urhobo communities (Africa Today,
October 2000). These movements demanded reparation from the oil companies
for environmental pollution. They took the law into their own hands, kidnapping
oil company staff, cutting pipelines and seizing flow stations. These activities
caused the government to lose about 33.3 per cent of the two million barrels a
day. All diplomatic solutions employed by Abubakar could not solve the problem.
Oil companies insisted on dialogue against the Government's iron fist solution to
protect their human and economic interests (African Research Bulletin (ARB)
November 1998: 1369.). Probably because he had not been in power long enough,
Abubakar could not solve the crisis in the Niger Delta region.
In Abubakar's economy of rejuvenation, the Lagos International Trade Fair
pointed to the wish of the international community to do business with Nigeria.
The anti-Abacha states ± the US, South Africa and EU ± participated in the trade
fair ARB, 15±16 December 1998:13685). They all promised to invest in the state
economy only if the privatisation of the ailing public utilities came to fruition.
Furthermore, they demanded that the dual foreign exchange system be scrapped,
as it benefited only the few individuals who had access to power. The US
specifically called for the privatisation of oil refineries and telecommunications
(1998:13685).
Abubakar was able to pay some part of the state's debt with European clubs
within a few days in office. In order to achieve economic gain from various
international financial institutions, Abubakar called for the formation of political
parties to vie for various posts in government. To achieve this, he set up an
Independent Electoral Commission (INEC). Slowly, the international community
began to perceive the Nigerian government as worth doing business with.
Abubakar invited various international organisations to supervise the elections
without any conditions attached and called for a broad-based government as the
46

genesis of bringing the state back to the comity of nations. This caused some anti-
Abacha states to rescind their confrontational attitudes towards Nigeria. The UN,
the Commonwealth of Nations and the EU supported the INEC financially and
logistically.
This was thanks to political steps taken by the Abubakar government.
Abubakar started by freeing some of the political prisoners incarcerated by
Abacha. Olusegun Obasanjo, Oluyemisi Falae and Bola Ige, among others, were
released from jail. The question of Moshood Abiola, the perceived winner of the
elections of 12 June 1993, had a natural solution, as he was allegedly poisoned,
and died in custody (The Guardian, 1±20 December 2000).
Other long-standing political problems were also amicably resolved. The first
sign came when Abubakar made his first-ever outing to South Africa to pay an
official visit at the request of President Nelson Mandela. A week later, he attended
the NAM Summit in Durban. This visit was interpreted in diplomatic circles as a
readiness of Abubakar's government to change Nigeria's pariah status. At the
Commonwealth of Nations, the same approach was employed as Abubakar's
government started to work with General Obasanjo to normalise relations with
different states and international organisations (IOs). This paid off, as many
states and IOs started to review their economic and diplomatic policy towards
Nigeria.
For the government to receive a boost from the comity of nations in the form of
direct foreign investment, further incentives were given to foreign investors to
make the country more attractive for investment. However, certain questions
remained, such as: how stable is the political temperature in Nigeria? and for how
long can the government protect the MNCs in the era of economic globalisation?
Incentives were given in terms of the exploration and marketing of solid
minerals. Deferment of royalty payments and other incentives were given to
potential foreign investors.
7 IMPLICATIONS OF INCENTIVES FOR MNCS ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMIC BASE
Lere Amusan
Though bedevilled with poverty as manifested in the employment statistics and
the rate of crime in the country, Nigeria needed some economic injections to
jump-start the ailing economy. However, the question was: to what extent the
Nigerian government should involve itself with the provision of services to the
MNCs that were said to be the agents of the present economic dislocation,
disarticulation and killer of small-scale industries in the burgeoning states.
Another issue was that of the extent to which Nigeria could continue to dance to
the tune of the MNCs that were the agents killing hundreds of Nigerians in the
Niger Delta on the pretext of economic modernisation. Finally, there was the
problem of the environmental hazards that usually accompanied the mining and
the dredging of resources. For instance, who should pay for the environmental
47

The political economy of Nigerian Foreign Policy: the Abubakar Abdulsalami Administration (1998±1999)
degradation of the eastern part of the country? These problems rendered many
Nigerians homeless and led to the loss of cultural attachment. At best, the
activities of the MNCs perpetuated poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and
dislocation of the ecosystem. Laissez-faire and its assumptions as propagated by
developed Western nations could not hold in every economic system, the most
capitalist state in the world included.
It is pertinent at this juncture to point out that the Nigerian government needs
to intervene directly, to regulate, promulgate and enforce the law of the land on
would-be investors. When Japan wanted to come out of the 1945 bombing
horrors, it introduced the principle of neo-mercantilism where importation was
discouraged and massive exportation encouraged (Owoeye 1995:2). The same
principle formed the basis of development in Europe and the US.
A lack of know-how made it inevitable for the Abubakar government to call for
foreign investment in solid minerals. Although Abacha attempted to encourage
the MNCs to invest in the Nigerian minerals, the political instability and gross
abuse of basic human rights made the efforts of different governments in Nigeria
bow to the pressure of unseen hands. Many trips were made to Europe and South
Africa by the Abubakar government looking for injections of foreign investment
into the economy of Nigeria. Not much headway was made. As Adeoye
(Akinsanya 1992:47) pointed out, there are two aspects to the problem: the effect
of the MNCs entering businesses in which local investors also have an interest;
and the strategy of the MNCs to distort local taste and create a form of cultural
imprisonment of consumers at local level. Isaiah Frank provided answers to these
questions when he commented on how local entrepreneurs were smothered when
MNCs, with their tremendous technological and financial resources and
established subsidiaries in developing countries. Frank was also of the opinion
that
[e]xisting firms (small-scale industries) may be forced out of business or
may decide to sell out to the multinationals. Moreover, barriers are created
to the entry of new, indigenous entrepreneurs as a consequence of the
advertising, promotion, and product-differentiation practices of multinationals.
With the entering of the MNCs into the economy of Nigeria, the decree passed
by the Abubakar government allowing competition in the economy only favoured
the multinationals. They were the only credible institutions that could challenge
the local monopoly in any sector of the economy.
Abubakar concentrated on the need to develop the mining and quarrying
sectors. This was followed by a series of incentives to the MNCs irrespective of the
implications in terms of employment opportunities and the general development
of the state (Olukoshi 1987). Sectors such as transport and construction were left
unaddressed in his long-term budget, which he aimed to achieve within a very
48

short time. The process of democratisation put in place by the Abubakar
government, caused investors to drag their feet in some sectors (eg telecommunications,
energy and the exploration of mineral resources). The US, UK, France
and South Africa were the major contenders in the bidding for control over the
economic future of Nigeria.
Yakowa announced certain incentives, but subject to compliance with
environment, health and safety: 10
. Three to five years' holiday
. Deferred royalties (depending on the magnitude of the investment and the
strategic nature of the project)
. Capitalisation of expenditure on exploration and surveys
. Extension of infrastructure such as road and electricity to the site
. Provision of 100 per cent foreign ownership in mining
. Low income tax of 20 to 30 per cent.
All these incentives provided avenues for the MNCs to exploit the resources of
the state even more. The incentives included an adjustment in terms of petroleum
products, and a reduction in the import prohibition list to encourage non-oil
export coupled with sea port reforms aimed at satisfying the IMF conditions and
at accelerating inputs to encourage intra-firm trading by MNCs. The 1999 budget
which called for support and promotion of productive activities in the rural areas
could be said to accelerate production of products that Nigerians were not
consuming, such as cocoa, palm produce and other cash crops introduced to the
economy of Nigeria by the colonisers (Ake 1983).
The fact that it was the same budget that established the Anti-dumping
Committee to protect home industries and to check trade malpractices, is both
contradictory and impracticable; contradictory because protecting the local market
against imported goods is antithetical to the liberalisation and the deregulation of
the economy ± an agreement which Nigeria entered into with the IMF. The same
protection encourages smuggling through the state's porous borders with the
Francophone states surrounding Nigeria; and impracticable because the law of
demand and supply will automatically bring competition which Nigeria was
trying to do by reducing the prices of goods and services.
8 ABUBAKAR'S ECONOMY OF DECEIT
Lere Amusan
Unlike his predecessors, Abubakar kept his promise: he handed over to a
democratically elected government on 29 May 1999. However, the question in
African politics is to what extent the so-called democrats take into account the
economic, political and foreign policies once they are in government. For
instance, the current economic malaise in Nigeria can be traced back to the era
when Obasanjo was the military head of state from 1976 to 1979 (Osagie 1987:8).
49

The political economy of Nigerian Foreign Policy: the Abubakar Abdulsalami Administration (1998±1999)
Today, the international community perceives Obasanjo as the only possible
saviour of the ailing economy and political instability of Nigeria.
The case of Abubakar is no different. His long-term economic policy, which
had to be achieved within a very short term, was a source of corruption. It was
expected that the civilian government would handle major economic policies,
such as privatisation and the commercialisation of all itemised incentives, since
the very survival of Nigerians hinges on the them. The applications of interested
parties were supposed to be dealt with in a fully transparent fashion, so as to
avoid the self-interest of government officials. Under this canopy, Abubakar was
able to award contracts worth billions of dollars to his cronies, families and other
army officers. These facts would have influenced the finance minister when he
expressed the view during a talk with the IMF Senior Africa Advisor, Hiyuki
Hino, that the economy stood no chance of matching the president's forecast (in
his budget speech in 1999) of three per cent growth.
The visit of the World Bank's Vice-President for Africa, Jean-Louis Sarbib,
brought some structural changes in the way people do business with Nigeria
(Africa Today, vol 4 no 11 1998:44±45).
Abubakar failed to realise the time factor when putting in place his agenda. His
promises to rectify the erratic supply of electricity, communication and clean
water were not kept, nor was the issue of fertiliser addressed: farmers still had to
purchase it on the black market.
Those who got the contract to import petroleum products turned out to be
Abacha mercenaries. The oil companies, as they were during the Abacha reign,
remained unchanged in their policy, which entailed the artificial creation of a
petrol shortage. They also had effective control over the formulation and
execution of foreign policy 11 . This could be seen from the Vision 2010 economic
blueprint drafted by the oil companies, international financial institutions and the
local petit bourgeoisie adopted by the government without any departure from
Abacha's economic neo-imperialism. The blueprint advocates for the integration
of the state economy with international economic relations regardless of the
impacts on human development. Though this document called for economic
development, it failed to take into consideration the policy option to fill the
lacuna between the North and South (The Guardian, 20 July 1998). Abubakar
promised to relinquish 40 per cent of government interest in some public utilities
such as the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), the NNPC, Nigeria
Telecommunications and other so-called unviable businesses to the private sector.
Economic pressure exerted on the government by international financial
institutions appeared to have merely contributed to Abubakar's empty promises
and lack of proper planning. Only the MNCs could comply with all the yardsticks
stipulated by his government, because of the high level of technology, expertise
and finance. The money from most of the shares sold to private individuals went
to army officers, whether serving or retired.
The decision to award 16 oil rigs to the retired generals was an attempt to
50

Lere Amusan
patronise the military industrial complex. This was contrary to Abubakar's
promise to restore accountability, transparency and probity in public life. He did
the same kind of thing with the partnership with Virginia Airways. The foreign
reserve was reduced from US$7,5 billion to US$3,2 billion on the pretext that the
elections, the peace missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the decrease in the price
of oil (from US$17 to US$13) and the crisis in the oil region had drained the funds
of the government treasury (ARB, 16 October±15 December 1998:13652).
Abubakar failed to appreciate how important it was to keep his economic
promises. The Niger Delta environmental problem, which was supposed to
receive immediate attention, was left untouched. The demands by the Ijaws and
other ethnic minorities in the region were met with a counter-offensive. In
November 1998, soldiers were deployed in the area not to save but to kill, maim,
raze and rape people and properties, while the government, in co-operation with
oil MNCs, inflicted hardship on the riverine people of the Niger Delta (Newsweek,
8 March 1999:19). Abubakar did not seem to be bothered by the economic crisis
that was consuming Nigeria. The Ken Saro Wiwa issue that continues to haunt the
existence of Nigeria, as well as the issue of the elections of 12 June 1993, was left
unattended (Soyinka 1997).
It got to a stage where Abubakar's power politics approach to the problem was
not even supported by the oil MNCs (although they benefited from the
government's armed protection of the oil rich areas). While the oil companies
were interested in dialogue with the environmentalists in the Niger Delta,
Abubakar saw no need for this. The 1998 Jesse inferno that killed about 1 000
people was not investigated. The unemployed people denied access in terms of
their most basic needs were forced to take the law into their own hands (ARB,
16 October±15 November 1998:1). The air and water pollution in the area
continued to impact on the flora and fauna. This inextricably affected the very
survival of the Niger Delta region. Yet the government did nothing. It even failed
to implement the recommendations of the Oladayo Popoola Commission
regarding the development of the Niger Delta area. 12 Instead of Abubakar
meeting the demands of the Niger Delta, his 1999 budget allocation to the area
was not aimed at any meaningful, sustainable development. Only 20 per cent
(N14,13bn) of his budget was allocated to the area.
There were allegations of a poor accounting system in the Central Bank,
followed by a testimony of high-level corruption and irregularities in the
management of a sum of US$2,5 billion. At the same time, on the eve of his
departure from office, Abubakar awarded billions of dollars worth of contracts to
his cohorts.
Privatisation and commercialisation in Nigeria as dictated by the IMF and the
World Bank failed to address the issue of human development. The role of any
state, according to the neo-liberal school of modernisation to which most
international financial institutions belong, is to maintain law and order.
Abubakar's reaction to environmental problems and the living conditions in the
51

The political economy of Nigerian Foreign Policy: the Abubakar Abdulsalami Administration (1998±1999)
Niger Delta was not in his interest. In his bid to enrich himself through the
patronage system and under the guise of the transition programme embarked
upon by his government, Abubakar failed to alleviate the plight of ordinary people
on the street.
The visit of Mr Camdessus, IMF Chief Director, appeared to have made the
Abubakar government focus even more on privatisation. For Nigeria to qualify for
the IMF relief packages and debt-rescheduling by other eurodollar financial
institutions, Nigeria had to set its house in order (The Economist, 27 March ±
2 April 1999:49±50). In order to do this, Abubakar devalued the Naira by 4.2 per
cent in March 1999. His promise to increase workers' salaries to make up for the
rate of inflation was cancelled after three months in operation.
An immediate problem facing the government on the issue of privatisation
was its inability to meet the quota system and development at the same time.
The quota system was to allow all the ethnic groups in Nigeria to get involved in
governance and in promoting development in the economic sector. However,
development cannot be achieved when a government refuses to carry more
capable hands on board. This problem has contributed to the non-performance
of many public corporations in Nigeria since independence. No foreign
government or private foreign investors would like to put their resources into
any enterprise lumbered with redundant workers who are not relevant in
production. The primary purposes of privatisation, among others, are: better
management; sustainable development; cheaper, competitive services, and
reduced liability. These are the issues that the government of Abubakar failed to
tackle.
Abubakar's secret privatisation of some utilities made Obasanjo believe that he
was another Abacha system brand. The case of Nigeria Airways in joint venture
with Virginia Atlantic Airways is instructive. Government did not allow open
bidding or allow the department concerned to look into the technicalities of the
transaction, job creation or improving people's living conditions. Other airlines
that showed an interest, such as Swiss Air, Lufthansa and British Airways, were
not invited to bid. This lack of transparency appears to have led Obasanjo, the
elected president, to declare that the `decision of the outgoing military dictatorship
to privatise some companies would not be binding on his administration'
(Tell, 12 April 1999:41).
CONCLUSION
Abubakar's regime failed, in its economic policy, to take cognisance of
contiguous states. Very little was ever heard about economic relations with other
adjacent states. Official visits to Benin and Niger were meant purely to consolidate
his political power.
Nigeria's attempt to be integrated into the global system economically is not a
new phenomenon. The Berlin Conferences of 1884 and 1885 were in favour of the
52

Lere Amusan
globalisation of the African economic system when the continent's economy was
moneytised (Okolo 1987:43±47). It could be said that Africa and other Third
World states had a raw deal, to the benefit of the Euro-America system.
More globalisation followed immediately after World War II when the US
became the only credible economic player in the international system in the style
of the liberal school (Okolo 1987:43±7), whereas the former Soviet Union was
tagged an economic giant until the 1980s, when it could not bankroll the procommunist
states in the world.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the eventual victory of the post-modernist
school is a testimony to the victory of the West in controlling the entire world
economically. The Marshall Aid Plan, such as to Africa and other Third World
states, bedevilled the recipient states. Many works have been published on the
question of HIV/AIDS as a cause of underdevelopment in the Third World
(Adejumobi & Momoh 1991). It is equally clear that instead of the conditionalities
package bringing about sustainable development, the recipient states, in
fact, continue to become even poorer. The IMF and the World Bank are the
institutions that represent the interests of the West, in order to amass surplus
from Africa.
The call for the privatisation of state assets is a tacit form of wielding effective
control over the resources of Africa. Foreign aid, in whatever form it comes, is
always a foreign raid. It is a means of arresting the minds of the recipient states to
look to the donors for any development projects. As Dan Omoweh rightly pointed
out, the Kainji Dam project in Nigeria, for instance, was financed by the World
Bank and the Ujamaa Project (Adejumobi & Momoh 1991). It is the contention of
this author that privatisation in Nigeria is aimed only at perpetuating and
satisfying the interests of a few individuals in the state, and that it is way to
subject Nigeria to servitude ad infinitum.
Having postulated on the economic policy of the Abubakar government, it is
important to take a prognostic look into what Obasanjo's foreign economic
policy will look like. There are many factors, both environmental and
external, inhibiting Obasanjo, causing him not to have effective control over
his foreign policy. Internally, the weak structure inherited by Obasanjo's
government, coupled with the political party that voted him in as a flag bearer,
would determine to what extent he could manoeuvre. It should be
remembered that those who donated to the party are the retired generals in
the army. In addition, they would like to defend the interests of the MNCs,
since many of them are chairpersons of almost 80 per cent of the
multinationals that operate in Nigeria today. They would like to have
someone whose language is not totally different from theirs. The level of
corruption they perpetrated individually or collectively would be defended to
the last. For instance, it is alleged that General Theophilus Danjuma, the
defence minister, chairs more than ten MNCs in Nigeria. The Constitution for
the Fourth Republic gave enormous power to the president, but its use will be
53

The political economy of Nigerian Foreign Policy: the Abubakar Abdulsalami Administration (1998±1999)
determined by the extent to which Obasanjo can manipulate his ways in the
face of legislature. Despite his influence, he cannot act as he did in 1978 when
he unilaterally nationalised BP and Barclays Bank.
Against the international milieu, Nigeria should understand that it is not an
island. There is a need to react to every development outside its territory. This is
where the issue of globalisation and America's hegemonic power over the rest of
the system come to the fore. These issues have to be addressed and
accommodated by any new government, and they affect Obasanjo's foreign
policy position as it was launched in Abuja on 12 December 1999. 13 This policy
put less emphasis on Africa as the cornerstone of Nigerian foreign policy.
According to Obasanja, the state's foreign policy `will now be guided by a global
orientation capable of taking the entire globe ... the canvass of its exertion'. 14
Obasanjo also called for the need to address the issue of globalisation, which
`professes development, human security, equity, ethics, inclusion, and sustainability'.
15
For a very long time Obasanjo has been known for his anti-SAP stance
(Obasanjo & Mosha 1992). The reality of the global system and the influence of
those who supported his candidature cannot be discounted. The financial support
alleged to have come from European states, the US and South Africa would have
some impact on his reluctant acceptance of the conditions of the IMF.
Debt rescheduling and an acceptance of more loans and aids for the
development of the Nigerian economic sector will persist. This is a tacit
acceptance of the capitalist mode of production. Privatisation and commercialisation
will remain the condition for getting more loans from international financial
institutions, and the gap between the rich and the poor will continue to become
wider. The problem that claimed some lives in the Niger Delta area will become a
way of life, since the interests of the MNCs will continue to be protected by the
ruling elite in Nigeria.
NOTES
* Lere Amusan is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Sciences, University
of South Africa, Pretoria. His thesis is on Nigerian±South African relations in the past
few decades. He co-authored Civil±military relations in Nigeria and Internationalisation of
Internal war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
1. Interview with Yemi Dipeolu, Nigeria's economic attache to South Africa (1994±1998)
He was of the view that since the main foreign policy investment in Nigeria came from
the UK, the use of economic reprisal/blackmail against it remains the only credible
instrument available to Nigeria to achieve some of its policy options.
2. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic
54

Lere Amusan
Studies together with the Central Bank of Nigeria were asked to see to the workability of
Debt Equity Conversion Programme.
3. The outcome of the seminar that looked into the whole concept and the way forward for
Nigeria could be seen in Nigerian Journal of Policy and Strategy (NJPS) vol 2, no. 2.
December 1987.
4. This was the intention of France and South Africa. Interview with Jeremy Sherer
28 April 1997. This they did by introducing the use of their mercenaries in the war.
With this the MNCs and the states benefit from a blank cheque type of mineral
exploitation (see Angola crisis for this).
5. Interview with a Nigerian diplomat in Pretoria 27 March 1998. Expectedly, the ANC
denied this gift. Another rumour had it that the money was returned to the Nigerian
government.
6. This point is difficult to defend as other states such as the US, Japan and China now
have direct access to the Nigerian government through series of financial incentives.
France, for example, was able to achieve cultural and economic control of the state
when sanctions were imposed on Nigeria by the other EU states in the wake of the
killing of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other Ogonis.
7. The aim of Vision 2010 was to privatise all public utilities regardless of the level of
employment, mode of production and quality of education in Nigeria.
8. It should be known that all five political parties financed by Abacha appointed him
unanimously to vie for the August 1998 election. This led the international community
to isolate his government further.
9. His address to the nation on 20 July 1998. This was an attempt to garner legitimacy at
an international level.
10. See the Department of Solid Publication, The Future of Mining in Nigeria, Abuja: Nigeria,
January 1998. This equally shows that there is a continuity in the economic policy of
the Abacha government in Abubakar's.
11. Another rumour has it that the same oil companies, especially Shell, conduct most of
the government quiet diplomacy and provide arms to the military to maintain stability
in the Niger Delta.
12. This commission was set up by Abacha to look into ways of addressing the development
of the oil-producing areas in the Niger Delta after the killing of the nine Ogonis.
13. See Obasanjo foreign policy as read by Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, Nigeria's vice president
at the NIIA's yearly patron dinner in Abuja. 1999.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adejumobi, S & Momoh, A eds. 1991. The political economy of Nigeria under military
rule: 1984±1993. Harare: Sapes Books.
Africa Today (London) 2000. 6 (10).2
African Research Bulletin (ARB). 1998. Oct.16±Dec.15.
Ake, C. 1983. Political economy of Africa. Lagos: Longman.
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The political economy of Nigerian Foreign Policy: the Abubakar Abdulsalami Administration (1998±1999)
Asobie, A. 1983. Nigeria and the EEC, 1970±1980. Nigerian Journal of
International Affairs, 9(1).
Ayoob, M. 1995. The Third World security predicament. Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers.
Baran, P. 1978. The political economy of growth. Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin Books.
Bashir, I L & Ojowu O eds. 1990. Policy in small-scale industrial development in
Nigeria. Jos: University of Jos.
Caporaso, J. 1978. Dependence, dependency, and power in the global system: A
Structural and behavioral analysis. International Organisation, 32 (1).
Eze, O. 1984. The legal implications of Umaru Dikko Affair. Nigerian Forum, Aug/
Sep. 185±198.
Fadugba, N. 1984. Nigeria±Britain: The Dikko divide. Africa 155, July 10±15
Levine, H M ed. 1992. World politics debated: a reader in contemporary issues. New
York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Newsmonth. (Nigeria Information Harare) Number 12:1998.
Newsweek. 1999. March 8. 19.
Obasanjo, O. 1993. Hope for Africa: Selected speeches. Abeokuta, Nigeria: ALF.
Obasanjo, O & Mosha F eds. 1992. Africa: Rise to challenge. Abeokuta, Nigeria:
ALF.
Ogwu, J & Olaniyan, O eds. 1989. Nigeria's international economic relations:
Dimensions of dependence and change. Lagos: NIIA.
Okolo, A. 1987. Foreign capital in Nigeria: Roots of underdevelopment. Lagos:
Heartland Publishing.
Olukoshi, A. 1987. Foreign inestment in the Nigerian economy: Problems and
prospects. Nigerian Journal of Political Sciences 2 (2).
Olusanya, G O & Akindele R A eds. 1986. Nigeria's external relations: The first
twenty-five years. Ibadan: University Press limited.
Onwuka, R I & Aluko, O eds. 1986. The future of Africa and the New International
Economic Order. London: Macmillan.
Osagie E. 1987. Nigeria's external debt: Origin, structure and management in the
context of the structural adjustment programme. Nigerian Journal of
International Affairs 2(2).
Owoeye, J. 1997. Japan's policy in Africa. Ibadan: College Press.
Onitiri H & Awosekun A. 1978. An Appraisal of the Lome Convention. Nigerian
Journal of International Affairs 14 (1 & 2).
Soyinka, W. 1997. Open sore of a continent: A personal narrative of Nigerian crisis.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Tell (Lagos). 1999. 15 April 12.41.
The Economist. 1999. March 27±April 2.49±50.
The Guardian (Lagos). 1998. 20 July.
The Guardian (Lagos). 2000. 1±20 December.
The Star (Johannesburg). 1998. 22 September. 14
56

Lere Amusan
West Africa (London). 1998. 3±16 August. 629.
West Africa. 1998. 28 Sep.±11 Oct. 704.
Lere Amusan
PO Box 13109
The Tramshed
PRETORIA
0126
e-mail: lere@hotmail.com
57

Politeia Vol 21 No 3 2002 pp 58±79
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
CEDERBERG WILDERNESS AREA:
SOME ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS
Frank Smith
Department of Public Administration, University of South Africa.
____
ABSTRACT
The realisation of the goals of any public institution is dependent upon a
proper organisational structure and sound governmental relations.
Although the former has characteristics of the closed model of
organisation, this is offset by the need for governmental relations both
within, but especially with, the external environment of the institution
concerned. These aspects had a profound influence on the management
of the Cederberg Wilderness Area (CWA) in the northern section of the
Western Cape province since the Dutch occupation of the Colony of the
Cape of Good Hope (Cape Colony). Up to the present day a proper
organisational structure and sound governmental relations still play a
major role, not only in goal determination, but especially in goal
realisation in the CWA.
____
1 INTRODUCTION
In this article, cognisance will be taken of how an organisational structure for the
Cederberg Wilderness Area (CWA) was instituted and its influence on its
management. The article will start by explaining the use of the term Cederberg as
opposed to Cedarberg. This will be followed by an indication of the location and a
description of the CWA. The importance of an organisation realising predetermined
goals and the characteristics of open and closed organisations will
then be considered. Governmental relations in the management of the CWA are
all important. To this end, cognisance will be taken of vertical intergovernmental
relations, horizontal intergovernmental relations, vertical intragovernmental
relations, horizontal intragovernmental relations and extragovernmental rela-
58

tions. In such a study it is necessary to consider the type of organisational
structure ± whether it is indicative of an open or closed structure.
2 CEDERBERG AS OPPOSED TO CEDARBERG
The Cederberg range is named after the cedar trees that are found in the forests
near Clanwilliam and which were nearly exterminated in the past two centuries
for their fine timber (Bristow 1988:32), and should thus be spelt Cedarberg.
However, to prevent confusion, the spelling Cederberg was approved on 3 April
1981 by the then Minister of National Education on the recommendation of the
National Place Name Commission (Taylor 1996:3).
3 LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE CEDERBERG
WILDERNESS AREA
Frank Smith
The range forms an important and natural water catchment area in the drier
northern part of the Western Cape Province and lies east of the towns of
Clanwilliam and Citrusdal in the Olifants River valley (Taylor 1996:1, 3). The
range is a massive wall of mountain separating the area stretching from the coast
and the hinterland beyond, and is similar in appearance to the Atlas Mountains of
north Africa. For this reason, when a forestry station was established in the range
during 1904, it was named Algeria (Bulpin 1978:56). The whole range is 125 km
long (Bulpin 1978:56±57), 25 km wide at its widest point near the middle (Taylor
1996:3) and 2 150 m at its highest point (Bulpin 1978:56±57). The range is
traversed by three roads: the main road from Clanwilliam over the Pakhuis Pass to
Klawer and Calvinia in the north, a secondary road from Clanwilliam to Ceres in
the central part, and the main road between Citrusdal and Ceres which crosses a
narrow section in the southern part (Chief Directorate: Surveys and Mapping:
map 3218:1999). It extends from the Middelberg Pass on the road between
Citrusdal and Ceres to a point just north of the Pakhuis Pass and covers an area of
approximately 130 000 ha of which 75 000 ha is State forest land. The original
wilderness area comprised 71 000 ha of this land and on 27 July 1973 was
declared the second wilderness area declared on 27 July 1973, in terms of the
1971 amendment to the Forest Act, 1968 ± the first being the Drakensberg. The
area is divided into two parts by the provincial road which branches off the
national road between Citrusdal and Clanwilliam, and runs through the
mountains in a west±east direction to the farm Matjiesrivier, itself a nature
reserve, and from there to Ceres. This road passes the Cederberg Forest Station at
Algeria and is the main point of entry into the wilderness area. The CWA, in
common with other wilderness areas, enjoys the highest conservation status
possible (Documents File, The Cederberg Wilderness Area, Cederberg Forest Station,
page 1). Mention is made of the water catchment area, State land and wilderness
area on State land within the range (Chief Directorate: Surveys and Mapping:
59

Governmental relations in the management of the Cederberg Wilderness area: some organisational aspects
Cederberg: 1981). The term wilderness area will be used when referring to that
section in the range controlled by the state and now managed by the Western Cape
Department of Nature Conservation. This is in agreement with the map issued to
hikers and visitors to the area (Western Cape Department of Nature Conservation,
Cederberg Wilderness Area: Map and information brochure (s.a.)).
The range whose dark-blue tops are capped with snow in winter, rises in the
south ± a smaller and nearer range of low-lying karoo hills that seem to be a
continuation of the southern range towards the east. This also extends in a series
of peaks and sandstone battlements untill it joins the eastern end of the southern
range. Between lies veld and valleys, parched barren in summer, but clothed with
blooms and greenage in spring and winter (Kannemeyer 1999:16±17). These
topographical features of the CWA have a profound effect on the success of the
organisational structure, since they determine where personnel are stationed, and
the management of governmental relations.
4 IMPORTANCE OF AN ORGANISATION TO REALISE PRE-
DETERMINED GOALS
Organising the process of establishing an organisation consists of classifying and
grouping functions as well as allocating the groups of functions to institutions and
workers in an orderly pattern so that everything the workers do will be aimed at
achieving predetermined objectives. After the individuals have been grouped into
an organisational unit, attention has to be given to their mutual relations as
individuals within the unit and also their relations as a group towards other
groups (Cloete 1991:112±3), be they internal or external to the institution.
5 OPEN OR CLOSED ORGANISATIONS
The question can be raised whether the management of the CWA is indicative of
an open or closed organisational system. Katz and Kahn (1966:28) have, amongst
others, identified more dynamic relations between open organisations and their
external environments. Evan (1993:5) stated that the key concepts of the open
model of organisation referred to organisational input from the environment,
organisational output and feedback to the environment, accompanied by new
inputs from the environment providing support or making new demands on the
organisation. Furthermore, interaction with other organisational systems in their
environments is ongoing.
Hodge, Anthony and Gales (1996:14), however, identified the following
characteristics of closed systems: these systems are themselves responsible for
their survival in that they receive no input from their external environments in the
form of energy or resources. Consequently, there is no need for interaction with
their external environments. This means that closed organisational systems will
gradually consume their energy and resources, and die. Henry (1980:57) stated
60

that the closed organisation represented the formal actions related to a hierarchy
or structural framework. This structure is further characterised by particular
interactions such as communication, delegation and unity of action.
6 GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
During the establishment of a hierarchy or structural framework, cognisance
should be taken of, and the necessary steps taken to cater for, governmental
relations. These relations can be regarded as giving life to an otherwise dead
hierarchy and is an indication of whether an institution has an open or closed
organisational system. Cognisance will be taken of inter-, intra- and extragovernmental
relations (Hattingh 1986:74).
6.1 Intergovernmental relations
Intergovernmental relations refer to the mutual relations between governmental
institutions. The legislative framework for such relations is embodied in a
constitution or other legislation in terms of which governmental institutions are
established for specific purposes. Intergovernmental relations between the
various governmental institutions occur at both the horizontal and vertical levels
(Hattingh 1986:74).
6.1.1 Vertical intergovernmental relations
Frank Smith
Vertical intergovernmental relations come into play between governmental
institutions in different tiers of government and in the Republic of South Africa
(South Africa) ± they currently represent relations between the central, provincial
and local authorities. The possession of power is an important feature of these
relations. The central authority will wield more power than provincial authorities
which will, in turn, wield more power than local authorities (Hattingh 1986:77±
8).
An example of the impact of vertical intergovernmental relations is that once
forest land has been declared as demarcated, it cannot be alienated without the
approval of Parliament. For instance in 1952, Parliament approved the exchange
of forestry land for private land (Box file FCW L810/2 352, District Forest Officer,
Cape Town, letter L.810/2 dated 1952-02-11). This means that the Western Cape
Department of Nature Conservation, which currently manages the CWA, cannot
change the demarcated status of the forest land within the CWA without the
approval of Parliament. This seems to be the position notwithstanding the fact
that both the central authority as well as the provinces have, amongst others,
concurrent legislative competence for the administration of the indigenous
forests, the environment, nature conservation and soil conservation (Constitution
61

Governmental relations in the management of the Cederberg Wilderness area: some organisational aspects
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), schedule 4) (Constitution
Act, 1996).
6.1.2 Horizontal intergovernmental relations
These relations are indicative of governmental relations on the same tier of
government, such as those between the various provinces or government
departments, for instance, at the same level of governance. These relations differ
considerably from the vertical intergovernmental relations in that they are not
characterised by the formal concept of power. Secondly, there should be no
relative disparity in the respective negotiating and bargaining powers of
governmental institutions on the same tier of government. Thirdly, interdependence
between government institutions also occur in horizontal relations,
although the nature of interdependence differs according to the facilities mutually
required. Information and physical assistance will presumably be the main issues
discussed at the horizontal level (Hattingh 1986:78±9).
An example that can be used to explain the impact of horizontal intergovernmental
relations on various governmental institutions occurred in the management
of the CWA during 1892. Up to this date, the civil commissioner/magistrate
issued licences to the local population for grazing rights on forest land belonging
to the State, while the forester was responsible for the conservation of the CWA.
This meant that both the civil commissioner/magistrate and the forester were
forced into sound horizontal intergovernmental relations in the management of
the CWA. The CWA was by then no longer under the administrative control of the
civil commissioner/magistrate. This meant that control over the management of
the CWA was divided between two functionaries, a situation which was bound to
lead to dysfunctional situations. The forester could not execute his conservation
functions properly as he had no control over the number of grazing licences issued
by the civil commissioner/magistrate. This is an example of an unfortunate
grouping of functions in the execution of the management of the CWA. Under
these circumstances it was difficult to achieve the predetermined objectives of
conserving the CWA. This is borne out by a report which stated that it was
deplorable to witness how, for instance, the valuable cedar trees had been
ruthlessly burnt and the young trees destroyed by sheep and goats with the result
that the cedar forests were almost destroyed. A watershed policy change occurred
in 1891 when it was decided that in future the forester would issue all licences to
cut timber in the wilderness area (Report of the conservator of forests and district forest
officers 1891:94). This meant that for the very first time the forester was
responsible for both the conservation and utilisation of not only the cedar trees,
but also for the granting of grazing rights. It remains an anomaly that the civil
commissioner/magistrate should have issued licences for grazing, but that the
official responsible for the protection of the CWA was the forester.
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Frank Smith
6.2 Intragovernmental relations
The prefix intra seems to identify the official relations within a government
institution. In this regard a constitution will provide the general guidelines for the
creation of the internal structures. Individuals and institutions within any
government institution cannot function independently and without considering
the functions and activities of others within the same institution. Because of this,
all government institutions are characterised by an extensive internal network of
interdependent vertical and horizontal relations (Hattingh 1986:82).
6.2.1 Vertical intragovernmental relations
Government institutions and individuals within these institutions are grouped
according to a vertical structure of authority and at central government level, the
hierarchic structure is that of president, the legislature, Cabinet or the ministers
and the departments. A vertical structure of authority is essential for establishing
lines of authority and determining accountability and responsibility. It also
further facilitates control to ensure that the policy and decisions of a higher
authority will be implemented (Hattingh 1986:82±3).
In the following section, the development of vertical intragovernmental
relations in the CWA from the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape in 1652
will be described.
6.2.1.1 Development of a hierarchy for managing the Cederberg Wilderness Area
During the Dutch occupation of the Cape Colony, various measures were taken by
the authorities to protect the forests of the settlement at the Cape Colony and the
surrounding districts such as the promulgation of legislation and the appointment
of staff (Smith 1993:21). However, it seems as if the field of operations of these
appointees were limited to the near vicinity of the settlement at the Cape (Theal
1881:21). These measures to protect the forests were not successful, as
insufficient staff was appointed to control the activities of the woodcutters in
the whole of the settlement at the Cape and the surrounding districts.
In 1820, a number of British immigrants hailing from Ireland came to the Cape
Colony and it was decided to settle them in the CWA. At that time a governor was
heading the administration of the Cape Colony, assisted by a permanent public
servant known as the colonial secretary (Engelbrecht 1953:36). Locally, Clanwilliam,
the main commercial and business centre in the CWA, had a magistrate to
see to the local administration (Kannemeyer 1999:6). Later a clerk, a messenger of
the court, a clerk of the peace, a gaoler, a scavenger, a chief constable and six
constables were appointed (Blue book of the Cape of Good Hope 1849). However, their
activities were not limited to the conservation of the CWA only, as they were
mainly appointed to combat crime. A Heemraad represented the local inhabitants
(Engelbrecht 1953:77). The Irish immigrants who settled here were divided into
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Governmental relations in the management of the Cederberg Wilderness area: some organisational aspects
groups managed by four group leaders (Engelbrecht 1953:39). The system of
Heemrade was eventually replaced on 16 January 1844 with the justices of the
peace for each district. To assist these appointees in the administration of the
division of Clanwilliam, the Division was divided into a number of wards each
consisting of a number of districts with a field cornet appointed in each ward
(Notice 456 dated 4 May 1904).
The civil commissioners or magistrates of the divisions in which the forests
were situated managed the forests more or less as they saw fit. The situation was
addressed on 1 December 1872 when responsible government was instituted in
the Cape Colony, and the Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works
became the responsible minister (Muller 1973:161). For administrative purposes,
the Department of Crown Lands and Public Works was divided into two branches,
each directed by a responsible head. The Assistant Commissioner of Crown Lands
and Public Works had charge of, amongst others, the Crown woods and forests of
the Cape Colony (Cape of Good Hope civil service list 1886:40).
In 1876 `forests and plantations' were categorised as a distinct department of
the ministerial Department of Crown Lands and Public Works, its principal
officers corresponding directly with the ministerial office (Cape of Good Hope
civil service list 1886:41). This exposition represents the political office-bearers,
head office and `regional office' as well as the local civil administration when the
first forest officer was appointed in the CWA.
A further development took place on 28 June 1880 when the House of
Assembly voted for a salary for the first permanent head of the Department of
Woods and Forests (Cape of Good Hope Civil Service List 1885:35). After the
appointment of Count Vasselot de Re gne in January 1881 as Superintendent of
Woods and Forests, the Department of Forestry (the department) was organised in
the following manner: a governor assisted by a prime minister, colonial secretary
and a Commissioner for Crown Lands and Public Works (Muller 1973:161) acted
as the political office-bearers. De Re gne was the permanent head of the
department assisted by an assistant and a clerk at head office. He reported direct
to the Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works (Reports of the
conservators of forests 1893:18).
For administrative purposes, de Re gne divided the Cape Colony into four
forestry regions known as conservancies. Each conservancy was managed by a
conservator of forests. In turn, each forest district within a conservancy was
managed by a district forester, while each plantation within a district was
managed by a superintendent assisted by a number of foresters. The CWA was
part of the Western Cape Conservancy. This system of management remained in
force until the post of Superintendent of Woods and Forests was abolished in
September 1891 (Cape of Good Hope civil service list 1906:1). Since then each
conservator has been in direct communication with the permanent head of the
ministerial Department of Crown Lands and Public Works in Cape Town. The
result was that for the 14 years after de Re gne 's, departure each conservancy had
64

een more or less administered independently of one another and each
conservator continued with his professional duties and operations to the best of
his ability in the light of his own personal experience (Reports of the conservators of
forests 1905:1). However, the system of conservancies, districts and plantation
managers instituted by de Re gne remained in force until 1992 with the advent of
the South African Forestry Company Limited (SAFCOL) (Smith 1993:5).
From 1 October 1905, the Forestry branch was placed under the direct control of
the Chief Conservator of Forests as the permanent head who was accountable to
the minister, then known as the Secretary for Agriculture (Cape of Good Hope
Civil Service List 1907:198). This remained the position till 31 May 1910 when
the Forestry branch became part of a national Department of Forestry under the
management of a responsible minister (Jaarverslag van die hoofd bewaarder van
bossen 1911:1). The CWA remained under the control of the Department of
Forestry until 1986 when control over the area was ceded to the Cape Department
of Nature Conservation (Staatspresidentsminute no. 1109 gedateer 1986-11-18).
The above exposition explains the development of an organisational structure for
the realisation of not only the goals of the forestry department as set out in the
various legislative measures, but also that of the CWA.
6.2.1.2 Control over the forester
As explained earlier, a hierarchy to manage the Crown forests in the CWA and to
control the activities of the forester was already established when the first forester
was appointed on 1 September 1876 (Reports on condition of crown forests and drift
sands 1876:2). In 1882 the Cedar Forests were placed under the charge of the
Superintendent of Plantations at Rondebosch. In 1891 the forester was
empowered to obtain additional help during the summer months to combat fires
(Report of the conservator of forests and district forest officers 1891:93). In the same
year, the forester reported that the inspector then sent out was the first to be sent
by the government and who did his duty by going about in the wilderness area
with the forester so that he could obtain information (Box file 39, Agriculture
folios 106±114 to December 1895, letter by the forest ranger Algeria dated 1891-
04-01). This was the first recorded visit by his superiors since 1883 when the
Conservator of Forests, Western Division visited him (Box file 39, Agriculture
folios 106±114 to December 1895, letter dated 1887-12-14, by the district forest
officer, Tokai). The fact that the immediate supervisor of the forester was
stationed a considerable distance from the CWA can be regarded as a factor in the
overall management of the area as he had no expertise in the field of forestry
readily available to assist him.
6.2.1.3 Working plans
Frank Smith
Another way to effect control over the activities of the forester, was by way of
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Governmental relations in the management of the Cederberg Wilderness area: some organisational aspects
working plans. During 1905 it was decided that working plans for each forest or
plantation should be drawn up and submitted before any operations were
undertaken (Report of the conservator of forests 1906:8). Prior to this, the forester was
instructed to keep a diary to note the work done in the range, points visited from
time to time and to record any observations and suggestions. He had also to
maintain a list of all stock found trespassing and impounded, cases of wood
stealing and people who were caught starting fires and brought before the
magistrate. In addition, an abstract of the diary had to be forwarded to the
superintendent at Rondebosch, at the end of each month (Report of the
superintendent of woods and forests 1882:3, 19). Only much later were preparations
made to draw up a working plan and fire protection plan for the range (Annual
report of the department of forestry 1955:1). This resulted in a ten-year working plan
(Annual report of the department of forestry 1957:7). The original working plan drawn
up by the working plan officer for the period 1956/7±1965/6 was revised for the
first time in 1964 to cover the period 1964/5±1973/4 (Working plan: Algeria
Plantation: 1964/5±1973/4). Annual plans of operations form the basis of all field
work and include the working and planting plans (Annual report of the Department
of Forestry 1959:1).
During 1999 the Western Cape Department of Nature Conservation compiled a
comprehensive management plan for the range. This plan, which should be
approved and implemented soon, provides for, among other things, the zoning of
the area into pristine and primitive areas, special and degraded zones, and a
management infrastructure. Management activities include indigenous plant
management, rare, endangered and endemic plant species, and alien plant
management. Further activities provided for include fire management, rehabilitation
of certain areas, hydrological management and the conservation of cultural,
historical, archaeological and paleontological sites (Cederberg Wilderness Area
management plan 2000, Department of Nature Conservation, Algeria).
6.2.1.4 Staff component
An organisation basically concerns its staff and their activities. The staff stationed
at the CWA steadily increased over the years. However, it seems as if the forestry
operations in the CWA were never treated as a separate plantation under the
management of a superintendent. In 1891 for instance, the district forest officer
of Rondebosch (Tokai) reported on the activities at the Cederberg Forest (Report of
the conservators of forests and district forest officers 1892:89). In 1900 the district forest
officer Uitvlucht reported on conditions at the Clanwilliam Plantation (District
forest officer Uitvlucht letter dated 1900-09-20 to the conservator of forests,
Western Conservancy), while in 1947 the district forest officer of Cape Town, in
his capacity as overseer, reported to the Director of Forestry on matters concerning
the CWA (Box file FCW L810/2 352 letter L.810/2 dated 1947-09-19).
In 1954 the staff at the CWA consisted of a forester stationed at Algeria Forest
66

Station with foremen stationed at Algeria, Uitkyk, Welbedacht and Heuningvlei.
They were assisted by 18 non-European workers. Additional workers were hired
at Welbedacht and Heuningvlei as and when required (Verslag van die
interdepartementele komitee oor die Sederberg Bosreserwe 1954:7).
By 1968 the staff component in the CWA consisted of a forester, 3 foreman and
45 other employees. The forester and 1 foreman were stationed at the Algeria
Forest Station, the former being responsible for the office work. The other 2
foremen were stationed at Uitkyk and at Eikeboom (ex Kliphuis). Of the 45 other
employees, most stayed at the settlement at Algeria Forest Station while a number
out of necessity, such as fire fighting, stayed at Welbedacht, Kliphuis and
Heuningvlei (Box file FCW (M3104) M3200/112, letter M.3200/106 dated 1968-
12-20 by the Chief Regional Forest Officer: Western Cape Region to the Director of
Forestry). Up to 1986, when the management of the area was ceded to the Cape
Provincial Administrator, there had always been a forester stationed in the range
to manage it (Staatspresidentsminute no 1109 gedateer 1986-11-18). At present
the staff in the CWA consists of 26 members stationed at Algeria Forest Station,
Kliphuis and Matjiesrivier (Telephone interview with C du Pessis, Manager,
CWA, 27 September 2000).
From the very beginning, the workers were arranged in a hierarchy or structural
framework to reach predetermined goals. The following example is indicative of
this statement: A placaat was promulgated to protect the forests against overexploitation.
To enforce these prescriptions Jan van Riebeeck appointed a chief
wood-cutter serving under his supervision to oversee the utilisation of the timber
resources. Later, two wood-cutters controlled by the chief wood-cutter were also
appointed. This process of appointing staff and arranging them in a hierarchy to
reach predetermined goals was, as explained earlier, continued during the period
when the Cape Colony was administered by the British. As mentioned, this
procedure was also followed in the CWA. This, in turn, has the characteristics of a
closed organisational structure. The arrangement of a head office and a regional
office to oversee the activities in the CWA, is continued to this day (Cederberg
Wilderness Area: Accommodation and outdoor recreation:1).
6.2.2 Horizontal intragovernmental relations
Frank Smith
The formal seat of (macro) horizontal intragovernmental relations between
departments is the Cabinet, and the Cabinet ministers. However, this does not
exclude horizontal relations between government departments (on a particular
level) since regular discussions are held between departments on matters of
mutual interests, such as committees of investigation (Hattingh 1986:83±4).
The following is an example of micro horizontal intragovernment relations. In
1959 it was decided that the Forest Research Officer at Jonkershoek should take
over control of the cedar plantations in the CWA. The policy statement had a
provision that, in future, no silvicultural operations should be undertaken in these
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Governmental relations in the management of the Cederberg Wilderness area: some organisational aspects
plantations without the instructions of this official. However, the exploitation of
dead trees such as had been taking place in the past can continue provided that the
work is properly controlled to guard against any abuses, and that living trees are
not cut down. All other forestry activities remained under the control of the
forester stationed at Algeria (Box file 67 FCW R100/R1970, Forest research
officer, Jonkershoek Research Branch letter R.J. 32/1 dated 1959-03-23). Once
again, there was divided control over the forestry activities in the CWA.
6.3 Extragovernmental relations
Government institutions are involved in promoting the general welfare of the
community and relations of various kinds exist between government institutions
and members of the public (Hattingh 1986:85). By implication, this means that
external participants may also influence the activities of government institutions
and governmental relations in general. This is also a condition set by section
41(1)(b) of the Constitution Act, 1996, while section 41(1)(c) lays emphasis on
the provision of effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government.
The relationship between the authorities responsible for the management of the
CWA and the general public reveals whether the Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry and now the Department of Nature Conservation of the Western Cape are
open or closed organisations. The following examples from past actions are
considered in order to arrive at a conclusion.
6.3.1 Utilisation of the natural resources
The activities of humans in the CWA necessitated action by the authorities. The
agricultural activities of the stock farmers, such as the patch-burn system of veld
management for early summer grazing and to encourage the growth of the buchu
plant, led to the degradation of the veld (Taylor 1996:8). Furthermore, humans
also had a severe impact on the rich and diverse flora as only 30 per cent of its
former area remains (Taylor 1996:3). Apart from this, invasive alien plant species
were also introduced (Taylor 1996:9). Through over-exploitation, frequent fires
and possible decrease in seed predation, the cedar population has been reduced to
the point where its recovery by natural regeneration may become problematic
(Taylor 1976:8).
In 1820 the authorities decided to settle British immigrants from Ireland in the
unpopulated areas of the CWA as they could not be settled in the Zuurveld in the
eastern parts of the Cape Colony as originally intended (Engelbrecht 1953:36).
However, this project failed mainly because of the agricultural potential of the
land which was not suitable for the raising of crops.
In February 1891, a meeting was held with all stakeholders to decide whether a
plantation should be established on the commonage at Clanwilliam as water for
this purpose would be drawn from the public furrow that supplied the village with
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Frank Smith
water (Report of the conservator of forests and district forest officers 1892:94).
Permission to graze stock on land under the control of the department was
initially given to the local community on the commonage, both at Clanwilliam
and on the CWA (Letter A/7/91 dated 1891-09-15, pages 17±20 by the District
Forest Officer, Cape Town to the Assistant Commissioner of Crown Lands and
Public Works, Cape Town). However, all leases were terminated in 1938 (Annual
report by the conservator of forests, Western Conservancy 1938/39:3). Relations between
the department and the local population were also fostered in that buchu and bush
tea were collected in the CWA by the unemployed local population, thereby
creating much-needed job opportunities (Annual report of the department of forestry
1955:13).
The department also reacted to the need for more water for irrigation emanating
from the environment. By the end of the 1933/4 financial year, 300 000 morgen
(approximately 257 000 ha) of State land were held and administered by the
department especially for the protection of the water sources (Annual report of the
department of forestry for the year ended 31 March, 1934:1), although not declared
as such. Certain areas within the wilderness area were declared a water catchment
area on 11 June 1976 (Government Notice 984 dated 1976-06-11). On 27 January
1978 an enlarged area of the wilderness area was declared a water catchment area
(Government Notice 155 dated 1978-01-27). That the declaration of the water
catchment area in the Wilderness Area was necessary, is borne out by the fact
that, in 1909, the Director of Irrigation suggested an irrigation scheme on a
perennial basis by means of a canal system fed from a high weir with a
considerable storage capacity. Irrigation should then take place on as much land
as possible on both banks of the Olifants River and along the lower reaches of the
Doorn and Hol rivers. Not only the low-lying alluvian land would then be
irrigated, but also the greatest possible area of the high-lying natural soil which is
very vertile. To keep the scheme running, additional water will have to fill the
proposed weir. (Kanthack 1909:1, 5.)
It cannot be expected that the authorities alone should make land available for
conservation purposes. To this end, the local landowners assisted the authorities
in the establishment of the conservancies bordering on the CWA, such as the
Cederberg Conservancy and the Biedow Conservancy. The total area including the
CWA consists of 312 000 ha. Broad conservation goals are realised by means of
environmental management plans and ecological auditing (Map and information
brochure: Cederberg Wilderness Area: 5).
At present, a programme is being conducted in which schoolchildren are
involved in collecting cedar seed and placing them in prepared plastic bags for
later planting at various venues. This is to bring home the message that proper
utilisation of natural resources goes hand in hand with conservation measures
(Personal interview, Marius Brand, Assistant Manager, Algeria Forest Station, 28
March 2000).
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Governmental relations in the management of the Cederberg Wilderness area: some organisational aspects
6.3.2 Research programmes
The department actively co-operated with scientists in various scientific
disciplines. A team consisting of archaeologists, botanists, members of the
National Botanical Institute, foresters, local conservation personnel and research
staff from the Stellenbosch Herbarium undertook various research projects in the
CWA which were funded by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (Taylor
1996:1±41). The public also assisted members of the staff in research by
observing birdlife and wildlife (Report of the director-general: department of
environment affairs 1984:172).
During the period 1987 to 1998, the Widdringtonia cederbergensis Monitoring
Programme was conducted in the CWA on 5 225 ha of state land between The
Rift and Sneeukop by a group of scientists from the University of Cape Town. In a
report on the restoration programme conducted on the cedar trees, the researchers
came to the conclusion that fires are necessary for the propagation of the seeds of
fynbos and that it was possible for cedar trees to survive under such conditions,
the success rate being between 50 and 60 per cent (Shana Young, Environmental
and Geographical Science Department, University of Cape Town, March 1998).
Apart from the mentioned programmes, a leopard sanctuary was established in
the CWA with the assistance of private individuals who made their land available
for this purpose (Map and information brochure: Cederberg Wilderness Area:5).
6.3.3 Establishment of recreational facilities
The development of a caravan park at Algeria Forest Station was undertaken in
consultation with the Chairperson of the Western Province Caravan Owners'
Association (Box file FCW L2400/130±L2400/110, Forester Algeria letter L.2400/
106 dated 1968-10-29 to the Regional Director of Forestry, Cape Town). This
eventually resulted in 48 stands on the banks of the Rondegat River at Algeria.
Apart from this, there are ten sites available at the camping site in the Pakhuispas.
These facilities are supplemented by a further seven holiday houses in the CWA.
To limit the impact of visitors to the area and to maintain a wilderness
atmosphere, the CWA is divided into three zones of about 24 000 ha each. The
number of visitors is restricted to 50 people per zone per day (Map and
information brochure: Cederberg Wilderness Area:7).
6.3.4 Policy on the alienation of State land
In a departmental memorandum on an application by a private individual to buy
land which was part of the forestry reserve in the Wilderness Area, it was stated
that this forestry reserve was one of the most important reserves in the country
and that the alienation of any section thereof should not be allowed. It is the
policy of the department to buy land for its activities. Should negotiations not be
successful, attempts to reach a compromise are made to exchange forestry land for
70

private land. However, forestry land which is part of a water catchment area is
never sold or exchanged (Box file FCW L.810/2 352, departmental memorandum
in file L.1120 dated 1947-09-24).
In 1954 the Interdepartmental Committee on the Forestry Reserve conducted an
investigation into its management thereof. On completion of its investigations,
the committee submitted a report stating, among other things, that the purpose of
demarcation was to entrench the ownership of the land in what might be called
the interior economy of the state. This is done in such a way that it cannot be
disposed of lightly. No demarcated forest or portion thereof may be alienated
without the consent of Parliament. The procedure of demarcation is only applied
where the department is satisfied that the land should remain in the ownership of
the state forever. It stands to reason that as circumstances change, the need for the
retention of any particular piece of land may also change so that in actual practice
areas are often withdrawn from demarcation. It is the policy of the minister that
any section of the forestry reserve not intended for afforestation or for the
conservation of the water resources, but possibly suited to agricultural purposes,
should be alienated. The determining factor in the decision whether land in
dispute should be alienated or not was whether it was a sponge area where
streams or rivers rise. Considering the aforementioned, the objects of the
reservation and demarcation of the Cederberg Forest Reserve are the protection of
the cedar trees and the protection of the water catchment areas within the
Wilderness Area. Protection is necessary to supply water to the Bulshoek Dam
completed in 1917 and the Clanwilliam Dam completed in 1934. Lastly, the area
is also needed for the production of timber, mainly from exotic trees planted in
the Wilderness Area (Verslag van die interdepartementele komitee oor die Sederberg
Bosreserwe, afdeling Clanwilliam 1954:4±5 & 20). The minister approved the
recommendations of the committee. In executing the recommendations, he
decided, among other things, that a survey should be conducted to ascertain
which sections of the wilderness area should be retained by the state as a water
catchment area or for the purposes of soil conservation. Those areas not needed
for these purposes, should be sold to private individuals. Furthermore, the cedar
trees should be protected and action taken for the maintenance of the natural
vegetation and for the extension of the existing exotic plantations (Annual report of
the department of forestry 1955:3). In 1955 the recommendations to sell sections of
the reserve not needed for forestry purposes was implemented, the excisions
totalling 468,6 acres (approximately 190 ha) (Annual report of the department of
forestry 1956:1, 21).
6.3.5 Direct managerial assistance by the public
Frank Smith
Members of the public were consulted and later became members of the Advisory
Committee for the Cederberg Water Catchment Area, while fire prevention was
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Governmental relations in the management of the Cederberg Wilderness area: some organisational aspects
undertaken on a temporary basis by the Citrusdal Fire Protection Committee
(Annual report of the department of forestry 1978:48 & 60).
The Advisory Committee for the Cederberg Water Catchment Area eventually
finalised and approved a management plan for the area (Annual report of the
department of forestry for the period ended 31 March 1979:57). Attempts are made
to ensure that flower pickers on private property in the mountain catchment area
keep to the picking regulations as recommended by the advisory committees
concerned (Annual report of the department of environment affairs 1985/86:44).
7 TYPE OF ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
If the aforementioned explanation is taken into consideration, the organisational
arrangements for the management of the CWA have the characteristics of both the
open and closed organisational models. From the very outset, and soon after the
settlement at the Cape had been established, the authorities had to act to protect
the natural forests against the ravages of the inhabitants. Furthermore, private
individuals and institutions participated in the policy-making process and
management of the CWA. This represented a reaction to the input on the
environment with the result that legislation was promulgated and staff appointed
to address problems encountered in the CWA. This is indicative of an open
organisation. However, the hierarchy in which the staff was arranged, is
indicative of a closed organisational structure.
8 SUMMARY
The importance of an organisation was considered, as were the characteristics of
open and closed organisational systems. Governmental relations will to a large
extent be influenced by the fact whether an institution is indicative of an open or
closed organisational system. Open organisational systems have more dynamic
relations with their external environments. This leads to organisational input
from the external environment, output and feedback from the institution to its
external environment accompanied by new inputs from the environment. The
last-mentioned can consist of support or the making of new demands. Interaction
between an institution and other organisational systems is ongoing. Closed
systems, however, are themselves responsible for their survival as they receive no
input in the form of energy or resources from their external environments. There
will be no need for interaction with their external environments and they will
gradually consume their energy and resources, and die.
To ascertain whether the management of the CWA is indicative of an open or
closed organisational system, governmental relations were scrutinised. During
the period of the Dutch East India Company, it became necessary to appoint a
chief wood-cutter and two wood-cutters. This was in response to pressure from
the external environment to protect the forests. By 1828 there was a hierarchy of
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Frank Smith
officials responsible for the management of the CWA. The civil commissioner/
magistrate managed the forests more or less as he saw fit. Responsible
government was instituted on 1 December 1872. During this latter period the
CWA became the responsibility of the Assistant Commissioner of Crown Lands
and Public Works in the Department of Crown Lands and Public Works.
When establishing a hierarchy or structural framework, cognisance should be
taken of, and the necessary steps taken to cater for, governmental relations. These
relations can be regarded as giving life to an otherwise dead hierarchy and is an
indication of whether an institution has an open or closed organisational system.
Intergovernmental relations refer to the mutual relations between government
institutions at both the vertical and horizontal levels. The former refers to the
relations between government institutions at different tiers or spheres of
government. An example is that once forest land has been declared demarcated,
it cannot be alienated by the department without the permission of Parliament.
The latter refers to relations on the same tier or sphere of government and is not
characterised by the formal concept of power. There is no relative disparity in the
respective negotiating and bargaining powers, and there is a degree of
interdependence based on information and physical assistance. Up to 1892, the
civil commissioner/magistrate issued licences for grazing rights in the CWA,
while the forester was responsible for its conservation. This meant that they were
forced into sound horizontal intergovernmental relations in the management of
the CWA. This, in turn, meant that the management of the CWA was divided
between two functionaries, a situation which led to dysfunctional situations and
necessitated remedial steps.
Intragovernmental relations refer to official relations within an institution and
also consist of both vertical and horizontal relations. A constitution will provide
general guidelines for the creation of the internal structures as individuals and
institutions within any government institution cannot function independently
and without considering the functions and activities of others within the same
institution. A vertical structure of authority is essential for establishing lines of
authority and determining accountability and responsibility. When the 1820
British immigrants came to the Cape Colony, the administration was headed by a
governor and a colonial secretary. At Clanwilliam there was a magistrate assisted
by, among others, a clerk, a messenger of the court and a number of police officers.
In 1876 the first forester was appointed in the CWA. At the same time, forests
and plantations became a distinct department of the ministerial Department of
Crown Lands and Public Works, its principal officers corresponding directly with
the ministerial office. This represented a hierarchy of political office bearers, a
head office and a `regional office'. In 1881 the first permanent head of Woods and
Forests, a civil servant, was appointed. The Cape Colony was divided into four
forestry regions with the CWA becoming part of the Western Cape Conservancy.
Each conservancy was managed by a conservator of forests, while each forest
district within a conservancy was managed by a district forester. Each plantation
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Governmental relations in the management of the Cederberg Wilderness area: some organisational aspects
within a district was managed by a superintendent assisted by a number of
foresters. This system of conservancies/regions, districts and plantation managers
remained in force until 1992 with the advent of the South African Forestry
Company Limited. On 1 October 1905 the Chief Conservator of Forests became the
permanent head of forestry in the Cape Colony. On 31 May 1910 the Forestry
branch became part of the National Department of Forestry. The establishment of
a strict hierarchy for the management of forestry, including the CWA, was
completed.
A hierarchy was established in the management of the CWA when the first
forester was appointed and placed under the charge of the Superintendent of
Plantations at Rondebosch. Furthermore, the former was empowered to obtain
additional help during the summer months in order to combat fires. He was also
visited by his superiors who inspected his work and had to maintain a written
record of the work done by him. Working plans as further control measures were
later instituted. The number of workers under the control of the forester steadily
increased. From the very beginning the workers were arranged in a hierarchy or
structural framework to reach predetermined goals. The Cabinet is the formal seat
of (macro) horizontal intragovernmental relations between the various departments.
This does not exclude such relations between departments on a particular
level. This led to the Forest Research Officer at Jonkershoek taking over the
control of the cedar plantations in the CWA.
Government institutions are involved in promoting the general welfare of the
community and relations of various kinds exist between government institutions
and members of the public. These extragovernmental relations are a prerequisite
of the Constitution Act, 1996 for the provision of effective, transparent,
accountable and coherent government. These relationships between the authorities
responsible for the management of the CWA and the general public is an
indication of whether the official institutions are indicative of open or closed
organisational systems. Relations existed and still exist in the utilisation of the
natural resources of the CWA, in research programmes, in the establishment of
recreational facilities towards input in the determination of a policy on the
alienation of state land, and direct managerial assistance by members of the
public in the Advisory Committee for the Cederberg Water Catchment Area.
The organisational arrangements for the management of the CWA have the
characteristics of both the open and closed organisational models. Soon after the
establishment of the settlement at the Cape the authorities had to act to protect the
natural forests ± a reaction to an input from the external environment.
Furthermore, private individuals and institutions participated in the policymaking
process in the management of the CWA. These are characteristics of an
open organisational system. However, the staff was arranged in a hierarchy which
is indicative of a closed organisational structure.
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Frank Smith
9 CONCLUSION
It should be mentioned that the organisational arrangements for the protection of
the cedar trees prior to 1876 were not satisfactory. This is borne out by the fact
that when the first forester was appointed in the CWA during that year, he
reported that irreparable damage had already been done by amongst others, the
farmers and their animals. What must be taken into consideration is that the civil
commissioners/magistrates and the other civil servants such as the police were
not only responsible for the conservation of the CWA, but amongst other things
for combatting crime. The fact that both the civil commissioner/magistrate and
the forester were responsible for controlling the activities in the CWA, also meant
that a common approach to its conservation could not be formulated. For
instance, the former was responsible for issuing grazing licences to the local
population for grazing rights in the CWA. The animals nibbled at the growth
points of the cedar trees which the latter were suppose to protect. However, the
appointment of the forester did enhance the control over the activities in the
CWA. Another point to consider is that having the immediate overseer of the
forester stationed in Cape Town, meant that the forester had no trained forester to
assist him in his daily activities. Visits from the overseer were initially very
sporadic. Sound extragovernmental relations had in the past, and will
undoubtedly in the future, have a huge influence on the activities in the CWA.
This is clear from the goals of the new management plan for the area.
The possibility exists that the activities in the CWA may be commercialised.
This will create a rethinking of the present organisational arrangements. New
projects that would generate additional income should then be considered in
collaboration with the local population.
REFERENCES
Bristow, D. 1988. The scenic splendours of Southern Africa. Cape Town: Struik.
Bulpin, T V. 1978. Southern Africa: Land of beauty and splendour. 5th edition. Cape
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Cape of Good Hope. 1849. Blue book of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. Cape
Town: Government Printer.
ÐÐ 1877. Ministerial Department of Crown Lands and Public Works ± Crown
Forests. Reports on condition of crown forests and drift sands, 1876. Cape Town:
Government Printer. (G56/1877).
ÐÐ 1883. Ministerial Department of Crown Lands and Public Works. Report of the
superintendent of woods and forests for the year 1882. Cape Town: Richards &
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ÐÐ 1886. Civil service list. Cape Town: Juta.
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ÐÐ 1892. Report of the conservator of forests and district forest officers for the year 1891.
Cape Town: Richards & Sons. (G23/1892).
ÐÐ 1893. Department of Lands, Mines and Agriculture. Reports of the conservators
of forests for the year 1892. Cape Town: Richards & Sons. (G27/1893).
ÐÐ 1904. Appointment of a field-cornet for a ward in the Division of
Clanwilliam, notice no 456 dated 4 May, Government Gazette no 8646, 6
February, p 1755.
ÐÐ 1906a. Department of Agriculture. Reports of the acting chief conservator of
forests and conservators of forests for the year ended 30 September 1905. Including
reports on railway sleeper plantations in the midlands and western conservancies for
the 18 months ended 31 December 1905 and the year ended 31 December 1905
respectively. Cape Town: Cape Times. (G50/1906).
ÐÐ 1906b. Civil service list. Cape Town: Richards & Sons.
ÐÐ 1907a. Forest Department. Report of the chief conservator of forests for the year
ending 30 September 1906, including report on railway sleeper plantations for the
calendar year 1906. Cape Town: Cape Times. (G39/1907).
ÐÐ 1907b. Civil service list. Cape Town: Richards & Sons.
Cloete, J J N. 1991. Public administration and management. 6th revised edition.
Pretoria: van Schaik.
Engelbrecht, J J. 1953. William Parker en die nedersetting van die Ierse setlaars te
Clanwilliam in 1820. Ongepubliseerde MA-verhandeling. Pretoria: Unisa.
Hattingh, J J. 1986. Governmental relations ± an introduction. Pretoria: Unisa.
Henry, N. 1980. Public administration and public affairs. 2nd edition. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Hodge, B J., Anthony, W P & Gales, L. 1996. Organizational theory: A strategic
approach. 5th edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Jeffreys, M K red. 1944. Kaapse argiefstukke: Kaapse plakkaatboek, deel 1 (1652±
1707). Kaapstad: Cape Times.
Kannemeyer, J C ed. 1999. So blomtuin-vol van kleure: Leipold oor Clanwilliam. 2de
druk. Kaapstad: Tafelberg.
Kanthack, F E. 1909. Cape of Good Hope. Report on a proposed irrigation project in
the Clanwilliam and Van Rhynsdorp districts. Cape Town: Cape Times,
Government Printers. (G.52/1909).
Muller, C F J ed. 1973. Vyfhonderd jaar Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis. 5de druk.
Pretoria: Academica.
Personal interview, Marius Brand, Assistant Manager, Algeria Forest Station,
Clanwilliam, 28th March 2000.
Smith, F H. 1993. Doelwitbepaling en -verwesenliking in die Suid-Afrikaanse
Staatsboswese vanaf 1652 tot 1992. Ongepubliseerde DLitt et Phil. Pretoria:
Unisa.
South Africa. Cape Archives. Cape Town.
Box file 39, Agriculture Folios 106±114 to December 1895, letter dated 1887-12-
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14 by the District Forest Officer, Tokai to the Assistant Commissioner of
Crown Lands and Public Works.
Box file 39, Agriculture Folios 106±114 to December 1895, letter by the
Forest Ranger Algeria dated 1891-04-01.
Letter A/7/91 dated 1891-09-15, pages 17±20, by the District Forest Officer,
Cape Town to the Assistant Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public
Works, Cape Town.
Forest Department. Letters received and despatched 1896±1906, vol 64.
F2515 (Cont. F2626) ± letter dated 1900-09-20 by the District Forest
Officer Uitvlucht, to the Conservator of Forests, Western Conservancy.
Box file FCW L810/2 352, District Forest Officer Cape Town letter L.810/2
dated 1947-09-19 to the Director of Forestry.
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09-24 by the District Forest Officer, Cape Town.
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Forest Officer, Cape Town.
Box file 67 FCW R100/R1970, Forest Research Officer, Jonkershoek
Research Branch letter R.J. 32/1 dated 1959-03-23.
Box file FCW L2400/130±L2400/110, Forester Algeria letter L.2400/106
dated 1968-10-21 to the Regional Director of Forestry, Cape Town.
Box file FCW L2400/130±L2400/100, Forester Algeria letter L.2400/106
dated 1968-10-29 to the Regional Director of Forestry, Cape Town.
Box file FCW(M3104) M3200/112 47, Chief Regional Forest Officer:
Western Cape Region letter M.3200/106 dated 1968-12-20.
South Africa. 1934. Report of the Department of Forestry for the year ended 31st March
1934. Pretoria: Government Printers. (UG45/1934).
ÐÐ 1939. Annual report by the conservator of forests, Western conservancy for the year
ended 31st March 1939. Cape Town: Department of Forestry.
ÐÐ 1956. Annual report of the department of forestry for the year ended 31st March
1955. Pretoria: Government Printer. (UG35/1956).
ÐÐ 1958. Annual report of the department of forestry for the year ended 31st March
1956. Pretoria: Government Printer. (UG59/1958).
ÐÐ 1959. Annual report of the department of forestry for the year ended 31st March
1957. Pretoria: Government Printer. (UG33/1959).
ÐÐ 1960. Annual report of the department of forestry for the year ended 31st March
1959. Pretoria: Government Printer. (UG69/1960).
ÐÐ 1963. Department of forestry. Working plan: Algeria plantation 1964/5±1973/4.
Cape Town: Regional Representative, Western Cape.
ÐÐ 1964. Working plan for Algeria 1964/5±1973/4. Department of Forestry,
Clanwilliam.
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Governmental relations in the management of the Cederberg Wilderness area: some organisational aspects
ÐÐ 1968. Forest Act, 1968 (Act 72 of 1968). Pretoria: Government Printer.
ÐÐ 1976. Department of Forestry. Declaration of the Cedarberg Mountain
Catchment Area, Government Notice no 984, Government Gazette vol 132,
no 5152, 11 June, pp 4±9.
ÐÐ 1978. Department of Forestry. Declaration of the Cedarberg Mountain
Catchment Area, Government Notice 155, Government Gazette, vol 151,
no 5867, 27 January, pp 4±9.
ÐÐ 1979. Annual report of the department of forestry for the year ended 31st March
1978. Pretoria: Government Printer. (RP43/1979).
ÐÐ 1980. Annual report of the Department of Forestry for the year ended 31st March
1979. Pretoria: Government Printer. (RP39/1980).
ÐÐ 1981. Cederberg Wilderness Area. Mowbray. Chief Directorate: Surveys and
Mapping.
ÐÐ 1984. Report of the director-general: environment affairs for the period 1 April 1982
to 31 March 1983. Pretoria: Government Printer. (RP58/1984).
ÐÐ 1985. Report of the director-general: environment affairs for the period 1 April 1983
to 31 March 1984. Pretoria: Government Printer. (RP28/1985).
ÐÐ 1987. Annual report of the department of environment affairs 1985/86. Pretoria:
Government Printer. (RP32/1987).
ÐÐ 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996).
Pretoria: Government Printer.
ÐÐ 1999. Map 3218, Clanwilliam. (4th edition.) Mowbray: Chief Directorate:
Surveys and Mapping.
ÐÐ 1954. Verslag van die Interdepartementele Komitee oor die Sederberg Bosreserwe,
Afdeling Clanwilliam. Pretoria: Staatsdrukker
ÐÐ 1986. Staatspresidentminute no 1109 gedateer 1986-11-18. Pretoria: Kantoor van
die Staatspresident.
Taylor, H C. 1996. Cederberg ± vegetation and flora. Pretoria: National Botanical
Institute.
Telephone interview with Mr C du Plessis, Manager, Cederberg Wilderness Area,
27 September 2000.
Theal, G M. 1881. Abstract of the debates and resolutions of the Council of Policy at the
Cape from 1651 to 1687. Cape Town: Solomon.
ÐÐ Western Cape. (s.a.) Cederberg Wilderness Area: Accommodation and outdoor
recreation. Clanwilliam: Department of Nature Conservation.
ÐÐ Cederberg Wilderness Area: Map and information brochure. Clanwilliam:
Department of Nature Conservation.
ÐÐ The Cederberg Wilderness Area. Documents File, Department of Nature
Conservation, Algeria. Clanwilliam: Department of Nature Conservation.
Western Cape. 2000. Cederberg Wilderness Area management plan 2000, department of
nature conservation, Algeria. Clanwilliam: Department of Nature Conservation.
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Frank Smith
Young, S. 1998. Widdringtonia cederbergensis Monitoring Programme. Cape Town:
University of Cape Town.
Zuid-Afrika. 1911. Departement van Boswezen. Verslag van die Hoofd Bewaarder
van Bossen voor het jaar 1910, waarin wordt geinkorporeerd het verslag omtrent
spoorweg dwarslegger plantages voor het zelfde tydperk. Kaapstad: Cape Times.
(UG30/1911).
Frank Henry Smith
Senior lecturer
Department of Public Administration
University of South Africa
PO Box 392
UNISA
e-mail: smith@unisa.a.za
79

Politeia Vol 21 No 3 2002 pp 80±89
VIEWPOINT: GLOBAL INEQUALITY
AND COMPETITIVENESS RANKINGS:
IS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT THE
MISSING LINK?
Willie Breytenbach
University of Stellenbosch
____
1 GLOBAL INEQUALITY AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
The global condition at the end of the twentieth century is a mixture of prosperity
and poverty: one-sixth of the world population of 6,2 billion is better off; another
one-third has experienced rapid growth in incomes, but is not rich; and more than
half is still battling with poverty (Kennedy 2002:1). That represents more than
3 billion people, of which 1 billion are still not just very poor, but worse off
(Business Day, 6 August 2001).
Who are the 1 billion people? In the World Bank's 1998 World development
indicators, it was estimated that 1,3 billion people were living on less than US$1 a
day, of which South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific and sub-Saharan Africa
provided by far the most. The figure for Africa stood at 218 million ± the situation
deteriorated as the figure rose to 340 million Africans in 1999. The crux of this
problem is uneven development in the context of globalisation, despite some
improvements in many countries (Kennedy et al 2002:195).
The World Bank (2001) says that globalisation came in three major waves:
from 1870 to 1914 when global per capita incomes grew as a result of the spread
of capitalism during the imperial age; from 1950 to 1980 when richer countries
became more integrated and poorer countries more dependent on primary
commodities; and from 1980 when some poorer nations succeeded in breaking
into global markets through the export of manufactured products. This was seen
as a sign of greater openness, and an important trend in poverty reduction.
Many other analysts disagree with this characterisation of globalisation. Wade
(2001:79±82) argues that the global distribution of income was becoming more
unequal, from as early as after the industrial revolution, before 1870. Wade
80

Willie Breytenbach
(2001:80) then criticises the World Bank's World Development Report for 2000
which stated that rising inequality should `not be seen as negative'. He cites
studies that found that inequality became worse since 1988, during the latest
phase of globalisation.
These studies include the Gini coefficient for world income distribution,
combining within-country inequality and between-country inequality, and
measuring it in purchasing power-parity terms. While these studies of global
inequality confirm the general pattern of prosperity and poverty in the North and
the South, they still measure only the income distribution. North/South inequality
is about more than just that. It is also about the ability to reduce poverty and
inequality.
It is the central thesis of this article, that this ability is crucially linked to
efficiency which is not necessarily a function of income distribution but of human
development. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) played an
important role in designing a methodology for the measurement of human
development.
This will be correlated with competitiveness rankings, and the following
questions asked: whether competitiveness rankings with their more complex
methodologies are better equipped to measure global standings; and if not, why
not, and what type of rankings that might apply different methodologies are better
suited to measure nations' efficiencies on a global scale. Observations will be
made about the correlations between human development indexes and the
various kinds of competitiveness rankings
2 COMPETITIVENESS RANKINGS
Globalisation is about `world-wide connectivity' (McGrew 1998). It is about
technology, relations of political power and global capitalism, as will be
explained in this article.
Whether nations would prosper or become poorer in such an interconnected
world became the pre-occupation of international agencies and governments
around the world (Ambursley 2001). This is how the concept of global
competitiveness was born. According to Krugman (1996), the mercantilists took
the lead. They believed the purpose of trade is to generate exports and that would
create jobs. Openness is crucial in this context.
Quantifying this was not easy. Ambursley (2001) says that while there is
reasonable consensus on the factors that influence a nation's success in the global
marketplace, many disagree on the number and nature of factors to be included. It
is also often difficult to find reliable data that can be compared across countries.
For example, data required for the Gini coefficient methodology are either not
always available or not of the kind that may be used for country comparisons.
The first such ranking was made by the World Economic Forum (WEF) of
81

Viewpoint: Global inequality and competitiveness rankings: is human development the missing link?
Davos in Switzerland in 1980. Its emphasis lies mainly on openness. What is
really measured is global integration. Over time, Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew
Warner refined this methodology (Cook & Sievers 2000:84±85). The survey index
is a simple average of six factors, namely openness, governments' market
policies, private finance, quality of infrastructure (eg transport and electricity),
labour (flexibility) and institutions (eg effectiveness and political stability).
However, it was felt that efficiencies were under-measured and that human
qualities were not adequately assessed. Hence, the International Institute for
Management Development (IMD) (also in Switzerland) produced new competitiveness
rankings world-wide. The IMD measures four aspects, namely economic
performance including the cost of living, government efficiency, business
efficiency and infrastructure. Economic performance takes account of income
levels and skills, including education and literacy. Infrastructure takes account of
the cost of electricity and transport, and technology as well, not production of
technology but its application and diffusion.
These two methodologies produced different results. In 1996 for example, one
year prior to the financial crisis in Asia: according to the WEF, the top ten
countries in the world were Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand, United States of
America (US), Luxembourg, Switzerland, Norway, Canada, Taiwan and Malaysia.
The IMD's top ten were the US, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Denmark,
Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Germany.
Commenting on these lists, Andre Roux (1999:2) wrote that the most notable
general differences between the two lists were the prevalence of East Asian
countries in the WEF's top ten. This is attributed to structural and policy reforms,
including the opening of economies, the scaling back of government spending
and widespread privatisation. Furthermore, these reforms have been complemented
by very high domestic savings rates, concomitantly high investment
rates, flexible labour markets, and low social expenditures. New Zealand's third
place is ascribed to a decade of structural and policy reforms, including
widespread privatisation.
The WEF relegated the US to fourth place because of its moderately high rate of
government spending and taxation, and its low savings rate were expected to
constrain future economic growth. In a similar vein, the European Union (EU)
was found to be slipping behind many parts of the world due to the heavy fiscal
burden incurred by social welfare systems.
According to the IMD the US retained its place at the top of the list by virtue of
the fact that it was, among other things, by far the world's largest market for
consumer goods and the world's most productive economy. The second to fourth
places were also unchanged from 1995 as Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan
continued their firm performances with respect to finance and high levels of skills
and technology ± all were in the WEF's top ten, with the exception of Japan. Their
high rankings were also influenced by the positive perceptions of some 3 200 top
executives around the world.
82

The remaining six countries in the IMD top ten list were, in marked contrast to
the WEF rankings, European nations, some of them `welfare states' such as
Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany.
Positive factors involved here were infrastructure, science and technology, and
finance. It is no surprise that the WEF ± which focuses to a large extent on
openness, ranks liberalised economies higher than some of Europe's welfare
economies, which were rated higher in the IMD rankings. This might not be very
relevant if the same nations were top-rated in both rankings. But they are not the
same. Only Singapore, Hong Kong, the US, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Norway
were on both lists. The IMD's list also included Japan, Denmark, the Netherlands
and Germany. It is assumed that these, as well as other top IMD rankings will
also do well in Human Development Indices. The point is that the IMD
methodology that measures human efficiencies to a greater extent may give the
welfare states a better ranking than the more open ones.
Unfortunately, both the WEF and the IMD rank only about 49 and 75 states
respectively ± all the nations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), which includes the G8 nations, plus about two dozen
emerging market economies such as Brazil, India, China and South Africa, plus
arbitrarily selected countries. All other developing countries ± the bulk of the socalled
South are mainly excluded. This is one of the biggest limitations of these
competitiveness rankings: they just do not rank all nations, especially the poorer
ones. There is therefore little, if nothing, in these methodologies that could
compare `openness' and `efficiency', also as far as the poorer developing world is
concerned.
Commenting on these rankings, Rodrik (2001:55±59) says that the international
financial institutions `incessantly repeat the openness mantra', and that
global integration has become a substitute for development strategy, but that
countries brought into the integration orthodoxy are discovering that openness
does not deliver on its promise. The point is that the link between trade and
openness and growth is not irrefutable. Rather, the missing link between
integration and growth is not openness but appropriate development strategies
that also reduce poverty (Rodrik 2002). This is why the IMD's methodology is
perhaps better suited than the WEF's in assessing human development in an era
of globalisation.
It is therefore important that world-wide rankings be used that are both
sensitive to human development issues as well as taking cognisance of worldwide
connectivity in the fields of technology, political power relations and global
capitalism.
3 TECHNOLOGY, POWER AND CAPITALISM
Willie Breytenbach
Technology has become crucial to the production, financial and knowledge
structures in the world economy (Strange 1988 & Rosenau 1990). The major
83

Viewpoint: Global inequality and competitiveness rankings: is human development the missing link?
technological invention of the past was the role of steam used in powering
machines and ships. It laid the foundation for the industrial revolution, the
exploration of foreign lands and colonialism. It revolutionised global transportation
systems, and intercontinental communication ranging from Vasco da Gama's
ships which `connected' Europe and Asia in 1498, to the World-wide Web (www)
and the Internet which connect people today.
The contemporary phase commenced with the invention of the www in 1990
and the browser in 1993. It makes the telegraph almost obsolete and it cuts
distances. It is the new medium through which production, finance and
knowledge are made more efficient. It has the potential for the raising of
standards in the Third World. However, the benefits remain uneven globally.
The UNDP report for 1999 stated that the richest 20 per cent in the world
produced 86 per cent of global products, and the bottom 20 per cent only 1 per
cent of global products. It also stated that the richest 20 per cent had access to 93
per cent of Internet coverage, as opposed to the other 80 per cent of the world
having access to the remaining 7 per cent. Moreover, in sub-Saharan Africa ± the
last connected region today, only 0.1 per cent of the total population has access to
the Internet (UNDP 1999:63).
Technology is also about industry, machines and medicines. This set of
conditions gave rise to two other issues: rules for the transfer of technologies
(West±West, and especially North±South); and rules for the protection of
intellectual property rights, for which the Paris Convention made patent rights
and the Berne Convention made copyrights (Sell 1998). The North-based trade
blocs, for example the EU now tries to make trademark rights, such as global rule,
by insisting that they be observed in trade agreements. The protection of names of
origin such as champagne, port, sherry, ouzo, grappa, corn and jaggertee in the EU±
South Africa free trade agreement is a case in point (Galloway 2000).
There is a school of thought that says that technology is nothing other than
sophisticated tools, and tools do not make decisions. Tools are only useful in the
hands of the powerful. This approach sees globalisation as contingent upon state
behaviour, especially hegemonic states. It says that powerful states determine the
global rules of the game (Gilpen 1987; Waltz 1979). A powerful example of this,
is the US's coercive diplomacy via Section 301 (the Crowbar Act) of the United
States Trade and Tariffs Act, in terms of which the US is entitled to retaliate (Up to
100 per cent tariffs) against nations it deems to practise `unfair' trade against the
USA, including intellectual property rights violations (Carbaugh 2001:203±204).
This is a case of unilateralism as it sidelines the multilateral procedures for
dispute resolution proposed by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Because the
Western nations cannot control the WTO in the same way the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) World Bank are controlled, the developed North took the
lead in negotiating bilateral agreements that appear to be not fully consistent with
WTO principles, but include trade-unrelated issues, such as intellectual property
rights, competition policy, labour standards and rules of origin varying by sectors
84

and countries for each bilateral trade agreement signed (Bhagwati 2001). The
point that Bhagwati makes is that powerful states abuse their power.
This is more so if great powers collectively control international organisations
(Keohane 1987). Quite often this is referred to as the ``Washington consensus'',
implying the consensus between the USA Treasury, the IMF and the World Bank
± and being championed by Wall Street, which collectively form the locus of this
power, through insistence on the adoption of neo-liberal policies, and bilateral
`free trade' agreements.
This last of the three approaches to globalisation, is that of global capitalism.
This is the oldest of the interpretations of globalisation (Wallerstein 1979). It is
also the dominant paradigm. Older theories refer to imperialism, core-periphery
relations, mercantilism and the underdevelopment of the South (Frank 1969).
However, the emergence of Southeast Asia, despite these arguments, challenged
this hypothesis.
More recently, de Soto (2000:191) reminds that the lifeblood of capitalism is
not the Internet or fast-food machines. It is capital. The crux of capital is property.
Yet it is not capitalism that produces property; it is property that produces capital.
Capitalism survived the Cold War. While communism failed, capitalism was not
an unqualified success either. Only the wealthy have the capacity to accumulate
assets. De Soto (2000:191) says that the poor remain outside, which is why
capitalism is viewed outside the West with increasing hostility; as an apartheid
regime most cannot enter.
If de Soto is right, then the international financial institutions and the donor
states of the North should pay much more attention to the introduction of property
relations ± freehold rights and incentives ± into their poverty-reducing development
efforts. Strangely, this is hardly the case in existing practices.
Instead of seeing an affluent and stable one-world emerging out of
globalisation, some critics observe greater fragmentation and inequality globally
(Rodrik 2001, 2002). The anti-globalisers blame this on globalisation. Others
propagate `an Asian way', and disengagement from the West. The Asian way
believes in neo-mercantilism, in state-driven trade policies, in export orientation,
but also in benign state intervention in the market place through emphasis on
skills, education, literacy, infrastructure and technology (Wade 1990). Singapore,
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan are examples of this: they were poor after 1945,
but today do well in all kinds of competitiveness rankings. This is probably
because they also do well on the UNDP's human development indices as will be
explained later.
4 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
Willie Breytenbach
Among the weaknesses inherent in the competitiveness rankings are the underweighted
roles that human development and democracy play in the measuring of
85

Viewpoint: Global inequality and competitiveness rankings: is human development the missing link?
global status. This article will, however, not explore the link between
development and democracy.
The United Nations (UN) grappled with human development. It sought to
redefine development as an alternative to neo-liberalism, that is, to refocus on the
expansion of people's choices in an era of increased globalisation (Jolly 1997). In
doing so, it produced the UN HDR annually for which it designed an index, the
Human Development Index (HDI), based on reliable data that can be compared
across countries.
Unlike the WEF's and the IMD's competitiveness reports, the UNHDI covers all
countries. As an index, the HDI, combined per capita income on the basis of
purchasing power parity, longevity and adult literacy. These data are accessible
and comparable world-wide.
In the first HDI of 1990, 160 countries were ranked. The top 15 were Japan,
Canada, Iceland, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, US, the Netherlands, Australia,
France, United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, Finland, Germany and New Zealand.
The best African rankings were Mauritius (47th), South Africa (57th), Seychelles
(63rd), Libya (76th), Tunisia (90th) and Botswana (95th). Of the bottom ten, all
were African, except Afghanistan (4th last, at 157th) (UNDP 1990). Although
Japan was the only Asian nation in the top 15, three others were in the top 50,
namely Hong Kong (25th), South Korea (35th) and Singapore (37th).
In 1995, the top 15 were Canada, USA, Japan, the Netherlands, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, France, Spain, Sweden, Australia, Belgium, Switzerland,
Austria and Germany. The best in Africa were Mauritius (60th), Seychelles
(62nd), Libya (73rd), Botswana (74th), Tunisia (75th), Algeria (85th) and South
Africa (95th). This time, 174 countries were ranked with the bottom ten all
African, again with the exception of Afghanistan (5th last, in 170th position)
(UNDP 1995). Although Japan dropped to third place, Hong Kong improved to
24th, South Korea to 31st and Singapore to 35th.
In 2000, the top 15 were Canada, Norway, US, Australia, Iceland, Sweden,
Belgium, Netherlands, Japan, UK, Finland, France, Switzerland, Germany and
Denmark. The best African rankings were Seychelles (53rd), Mauritius (71st),
Libya (72nd), Tunisia (101st) and South Africa (103rd). The bottom 10 were all
African, with Afghanistan not ranked. In Asia, Japan dropped to 9th place, Hong
Kong now part of China, to 26th place, South Korea remained at 31st, but
Singapore improved to 24th, the highest-ranked emerging market and member of
the developing world.
How do the IMD and UNDP indexes compare in 2000? In 2000, the IMD's
World competitiveness yearbook ranked 47 states of which South Africa was the only
African state. South Africa was ranked 38th out of 47, higher than Argentina,
Turkey, India and Russia. The top 15 were the US, Singapore, Finland,
Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Ireland, Germany, Sweden, Iceland,
Canada, Denmark, Australia, Hong Kong and the UK. In the top 15 of the UNDP,
no less than 11 of the IMD's top 15 also ranked, namely Canada (11th), USA
86

Willie Breytenbach
(1st), Australia (13th), Iceland (10th), Sweden (9th), Netherlands (4th), United
Kingdom (15th), Finland (3rd), Switzerland (5th), Germany (8th) and Denmark
(12th). Only four UNDP countries in the top 15 did not make it onto the IMD's top
15, namely Norway, Japan, France and Belgium, which are all ranked in the
IMD's top 20. In Asia, both Singapore (now 2nd) and Hong Kong (now 14th)
were ranked higher than Japan's 17th place. Taiwan ranked 22nd, Malaysia 25th
and South Korea 28th.
They all rank very high in education, and this is one of the most important
variables in determining how much and how fast developing countries benefit
from globalisation. Educational skills facilitate access to technology. The success
of Taiwan and South Korea, and other nations in Southeast Asia is largely due to
this factor. Education also empowers people to move up the value chain of
production making the best of liberalised trade (Business Week 2000:136).
The latest HDI report (2001) makes the point that while basic education and
literacy are necessary, they are not sufficient in meeting the new challenges
shaped by the information and biotech revolutions. Commenting on this Report,
Elliot ± who is the author of this report ± writes that it is imperative that one
figures out how the poor can benefit from these new technologies (Time 30 July
2001).
It is therefore no coincidence that well-educated and high-technologyconnected
nations do well in IMD competitiveness rankings, and not necessarily
the powerful ones, such as the members of the G8. For example, in the IMD's
world competitiveness rankings for 2000, only the USA and Germany are
members of the G8. G8 nations excluded from the IMD's top ten are Canada
(11th), the UK (15th), Japan (17th), France (19th), Italy (30th) and Russia (47th)
(the only one worse than South Africa). South Africa dropped to 42nd, one
position behind India. South Africa's major strengths were low electricity costs,
low costs of living and investments in telecommunications. The weakest aspects
related, once again, to people: unemployment, skills and education. Overall,
South Africa ranked 47th out of 49 for economic performance, 46th for
infrastructure (ie, electricity, transport and technology), 38th for government
efficiency and 32nd for business efficiency. This says much about entrepreneurship,
banking, insurance and corporate governance. In 2002, South Africa
improved to 39th on the IMD rankings, better than India and still better than
Russia, but far behind Singapore (5th), Hong Kong (9th), Taiwan (24th) and
Malaysia (26th). The major improvements are in purchasing power parity and
education.
As the UN press release that accompanied the 2001 HDI report reminded: it is
knowledge that is available, accessible and affordable, which will drive progress
in the twenty-first century. Singapore's progress during the twentieth century
(2nd in competitiveness and 5th in HDI) holds a lesson. Singapore moved up the
global ladder only when its human development improved. The report concluded
by saying: `the poor cannot eat computers, but if computers can bring the
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Viewpoint: Global inequality and competitiveness rankings: is human development the missing link?
knowledge to mobilise the means to move people out of poverty, then the choice
is clear.'
REFERENCES
Ambursley, F. 2001. SA must adapt for global competitiveness. Business Day,
10 December 2001.
Bhagwati, J. 2001. Bilateral pacts cause confusion. Business Day, 7 March 2001.
Business Day Staff 2001. World Bank warns on economic reforms. Business Day,
6 August 2001.
Business Week Editorial Staff. 2000. Global capitalism: can it be made to work
better? Business Week, 6 November 2000.
Carbaugh, R J. 2001. International economies. 8th. Cincinnati, South-Western.
Cook, L & Siever's S. 2000. The Africa competitiveness report 2000/2001. New York:
Oxford University Press.
De Jonquires, G & Alden, E. 2001. Leaders agree to free trade zone of Americas.
Business Day, 23 April 2001.
De Soto, H. 2000. The mystery of capital. New York: Bantam Press.
Elliot, M. 2001. It's what's behind the economy, Stupid. Time, 30 July 2001.
Frank, A G. 1967. Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America. New York:
Monthly Review Press.
Galloway, D. 2000. Grappa and ouzo misted over benefits of EU pact. Business Day,
12 April 2000.
Gilpen, R. 1987. The political economy of international relations. Princeton: University
Press.
Jolly, R. 1997. Human development: an alternative to neo-liberalism?, Globalisation
and Development. First SEF-UNDP Conference. Stiftung Entwicklung und
Frieden, Bonn.
Kennedy, P. 2002. Global challenges at the beginning of the twenty-first century,
In Global trends and global governance, edited by P Kennedy, D Messner & F
Nuscheler. Development and Peace Foundation: Pluto Press.
Kennedy, P, Messner D & Nuschler F eds. 2002. Global trends and global governance.
Development and Peace Foundation: Pluto Press.
Keohane, R. 1987. After hegemony. Princeton: University Press.
Krugman, P. 1996. Making sense of the competitiveness debate. New York: Oxford
University Press.
McGrew, A. 1998. The globalisation debate: putting the advanced capitalist state
in its place. Global Society, 12(3).
Nel, P. 2001. Untangling the `Gamble on Investment': SA government conception
of and responses to globalisation. Speaking Notes for RAU ± Konrad
Adenauer-Stiftung Workshop, Johannesburg, 19 June 2001.
Sell, S K. 1998. Power and ideas: North±South politics of intellectual property and
antitrust. New York: State University Press.
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Willie Breytenbach
Turner, A 2001. Whose capitalism is best? Business Day, 20 March 2001.
Rodrik, D 2001. Trading in illusions. Foreign Policy, March±April 2001.
ÐÐ 2002. Is the global institution at last beginning to understand growth?
Sunday Times, 10 February 2002.
Rosenau, J 1990. Turbulence in world politics: A theory of change and continuity.
Princeton: University Press.
Roux, A 1996. World competitiveness updated and revisited. Stellenbosch: Institute for
Futures Research.
Strange, S 1988. States and markets. London: Pinter Publishers.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 1999. Development Report 1999.
New York: UNDP.
Wade, R 1990. Governing the market: economic theory and the role of government in East
Asian industrialisation. Princeton: University Press.
ÐÐ 2001. Global inequality: winners and losers, The Economist, 28 April 2001.
Wallerstein, I 1979. The capitalist world economy. Cambridge: University Press.
Waltz. 1979.
World Bank 1999. World Development Indicators 1998. Washington.
ÐÐ 2001. Globalization, growth and poverty. Washington: Oxford University Press.
Prof W Breytenbach
Department of Political Science
University of Stellenbosch
Private Bag X1
Stellebosch
7602
South Africa
Tel:
(021) 808 2388 (Office)
(021) 887 5583 (Home)
Fax: (021) 808 2110
e-mail: wjb2@akad.sun.ac.za
89

Politeia Vol 21 No 3 2002 pp 90±93
VIEWPOINT: CRITICAL
REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL
WORKING GROUP REPORT
Samuel Koma
South African Netherlands Programme on Alternatives in Development
____
Recently, the National Working Group (NWG) released a report on the
restructuring of the institutional landscape of the higher education system in
South Africa. This group, chaired by a leading business executive, Saki
Macozoma, made recommendations that have far-reaching implications for
higher education institutions in particular. Soon after the report, mixed reactions
ensued, especially from the broader academic fraternity.
The purpose of this article is to provide critical reflections upon the report,
based on political, economic, social and educational perspectives. The report as it
stands provides an overview of how the South African higher education system is
currently structured, shaped and contextualised, and further highlights the harsh
realities facing the higher education system, taking into account educational,
financial, economic and social imperatives.
By and large, it would be shortsighted to focus on a debate based on the
recommendations outlined in the report without looking at the ideological
paradigm driving the authors and perhaps the underlying framework of the
report. It is worth noting that the current higher education system in South
Africa is faced with enormous challenges posed by the so-called global
economy. This phenomenon also has a profound impact on the shape and form
of the higher education system in developing countries, and notably in South
Africa.
The globalisation of the economy necessitates prominent policy-makers and
planners to adopt core market values that are deemed and hailed as fundamental
for the transformation and sustainability of the higher education system. These
market values entail efficiency, effectiveness, productivity, downsizing, competitiveness
and value for money. The bottom line is that higher education
institutions should begin to operate in a more business-like manner. In addition,
some would strongly assert that the present transformation discourse is
influenced by neo-liberalism.
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Samuel Koma
The NWG notes that in order to ensure the sustainability of the higher
education system it is imperative to consider reducing the number of
institutions, leading to the creation of a lean and mean higher education
system. The rationalisation of higher education institutions is also informed by
fiscal austerity measures imposed by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution
(GEAR) strategy.
The macroeconomic policy (the GEAR strategy) advocates mainly for the
efficient, effective and economical use of public financial resources. It is not
surprising that the NWG recommended the merging of institutions that it
considered less productive, efficient and effective in terms of their utilisation of
scarce resources coupled with a failure to respond and adapt to new and
competitive environments in a proactive fashion. Consequently, a number of
historically disadvantaged institutions are supposed to merge as per the
recommendations of the NWG report.
The NWG had a plethora of benchmarks to take into account, notably, financial
capacity, student enrolment, graduation rates, staff qualifications and research
output. All black institutions failed to pass the aforementioned performance
indicators. This is not unprecedented. Over the past years black institutions have
been faced with serious, perennial problems centring primarily on financial
instability/mismanagement, a lack of qualified academic and administrative staff,
low research output, declining student enrolment and bad governance.
The question of the research agenda has not been earnestly prioritised by black
institutions over the past years. In fact, black institutions continue to perform
poorly in respect of research output, and underachieve in terms of research output
according to both national and global standards. This unpalatable situation is
further confirmed in a World Bank Report (2000) entitled Higher education in
developing countries: Peril and promise, according to which public universities in
Africa and Asia devote 80 per cent of their budgets to personnel and student
maintenance costs, leaving limited resources for infrastructure maintenance,
libraries, equipment or supplies ± all key ingredients of maintaining a research
establishment.
Though the NWG did not contemplate the merging of well-established white
institutions based on `fitness of purpose' and geographical proximity, this raised
serious discontent in certain quarters, including academia. The NWG notes that
the University of the Witwatersrand and the Rand Afrikaans University are stable,
well-managed and in a good financial position. However, despite their strengths,
they do not meet all the NWG's criteria for well-functioning institutions. This
fundamentally relates to issues of addressing equity in both their academic and
administrative staff profiles. It is an indisputable fact that both these institutions
are still predominantly white and that only a tiny minority of blacks are employed
in both low and high positions. The report thus reflects that in 2001, 57 per cent
of the students enrolled at the University of Witwatersrand were black, but only
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Viewpoint: Critical reflections on the National Working Group report
20 per cent of all permanent academic staff and 22 per cent all professional staff
were black. At the Rand Afrikaans University in 2001, only 7 per cent of
permanent academic staff and 8 per cent of its total of permanent staff were black.
The University of Pretoria is not immune from such glaring racial imbalances
either.
One of the immediate implications of merging institutions is job losses. This is
inevitable given the drive to cut costs, including labour costs. At the same time,
the proposed closing down of black institutions such as the University of the
Transkei would result in harsh economic conditions for those relying on that
institution for material benefits and survival. This could compound the current
socio-economic circumstances facing both the working poor and neighbouring
communities. The NWG is quite aware of this and notes that if the new
institutions emerging from the merging process ± particularly the medical
University of South Africa (Medunsa) and the Universities of the North, and
Venda ± were to take all the current academic staff of the three institutions, it
would, according to the national benchmarks, probably be overstaffed. Most of
such overstaffing is likely to be in the humanities and this would have to be
addressed.
CONCLUSION
It is important to note that since the advent of the democratic order in South
Africa, the transformation of the higher education sector has been going at a
snail's pace in terms of redressing the imbalances, disadvantages and inequities
created by the apartheid regime. This is manifested through the failure of white
institutions to redress their racial compositions progressively in line with the
noble goal of building a non-racial and non-sexist South African society. Indeed,
white institutions have a long way to go in order to meet the broader objectives of
reconstruction and development in South Africa. The NWG report provides the
basis on which the debate on the transformation of the higher education system
should be articulated, shaped and advanced in line with the official policy
frameworks. Equally, the report exposes the ideological paradigm that underpins
the transformation agenda of higher education in South Africa, which is neoliberalism.
The composition of the NWG also leaves much to be desired as it is largely
dominated by business technocrats, executives, experts and, of course, a few
academics. It is no coincidence that most of the recommendations of the group
are business inclined. It would have been sensible to have drawn the majority of
the group members from academia. Academics are well placed and versed in the
present complexities and challenges facing the higher education system of which
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Samuel Koma
they are part, and they should be given enough room to lead and to provide input
regarding any process of change.
Samuel Koma
University of the North
School of Law
Private Bag X1106
Sovenga
0727
email: samuelb@webmail.co.za
93

Politeia Vol 21 No 3 2002 pp 94±96
BOOK REVIEWS
Van der Walt, G; van Niekerk, D; Doyle, M;
Knipe, A; and du Toit, D. 2002 Managing for
results in government. Johannesburg, Heinemann
Publishers. 346 pp.
This book is the second in a two-part series
which attempts to address some of the
management issues and challenges facing
public officials. In the first book, Service
excellence in governance, the focus was placed
on basic service delivery issues in the lower
administrative sections or echelons of government.
In this book the emphasis is on the
management functions, the processes and the
structures necessary to ensure that the set
policy objectives are realised. In any case, success in government service delivery
will not be possible without effective and efficient management.
The authors of this book claim that it is the result of a thorough consultative
process within both the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) and
National Qualifications Framework (NQF). This process was driven through a
National Advisory Committee (NAC) which included members of government on
all three spheres of government, professional institutions, student representatives
and academics. Through the contact with, and deliberations in the NAC, specific
conceptual and analytical competencies within the following broad functional
areas forming the contents of this book were identified:
In chapter 1 under the heading `Public financial and procurement management'
`financial management' and `procurement' are defined. The goals of government
with regard to public financial management are considered and democratic
principles for public financial management are described as well as the role of the
legislative, executive and administrative institutions. The importance of
modernisation of public management and, lastly, the main principles of the
Public Financial Management Act 1999 (Act 1 of 1999) and the regulatory
guidelines for procurement in South Africa are highlighted.
In chapter 2 strategic human resource management is considered. Cardinal
aspects attended to are an overview of human resource management, the statutory
and regulatory framework for public human resource management, an overview
of strategic human resource management, labour relations, specialised human
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Book reviews
resource management skills, grievance and disciplinary procedures, human
resource management information systems, health and safety issues such as
dealing with AIDS and affirmative action.
Governmental relations are the main concern in chapter 3. The chapter
commences with a definition of governmental relations and its context. In turn,
the macro-environment, the intermediate and the micro-environment of governmental
relations are considered.
In chapter 4 the all-important aspect of information management is scrutinised.
First of all, definitions of certain concepts are given followed by explanations of
management information systems, cybernetics and the systems theory and an
explanation of the systems theory. It is necessary that information should be
monitored and controlled. The question, however, can be raised as to what should
be monitored and controlled. The role of management in MIS and MIS, and data
management is all important as are reports and the role they play. Lastly,
information management, systems and technology in the South African public
sector are explained.
Chapter 5 highlights public policy management by considering definitions of
public policy and public policy management, the environment of public policy,
and the need to rethink policy development and public policy management. In the
final section, cognisance is taken of the policy process.
Programme management is scrutinised in chapter 6. At the outset programme
management is defined, followed by a description of the programme management
process, organisation planning and the linkage concepts in programme management.
This chapter is concluded by explaining programme management in the
public sector.
Chapter 7 explains strategic public management and defines basic concepts
related to the heading as well as the strategic management process.
Public accountability and its importance in the public sector is described in
chapter 8. Of importance is conceptualising public accountability and what
financial accountability encompasses. Other aspects considered under this
heading are public accountability in South Africa, public accountability and
values, policy and institutions for accountability, trends in public accountability,
and accountability through reporting.
Chapter 9 gives a perspective of research methodology and especially for the
postgraduate students. A synoppsis of the research process is given followed by
the characteristics of post-graduate research in public management. At the
practical level, guidelines are given on compiling a research proposal, research
and the Internet, ethical considerations in public management research, the
writing of a research dissertation and evaluating postgraduate research.
New trends in the field of education are attended to in chapter 10 where
experiential learning and related educational aspects within the field of higher
education are considered. Of interest is outcomes-based education, the NQF, the
SAQA, co-operative education, experiential learning and the recognition of prior
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Book reviews
learning (RPL). Knowledge of this last chapter is necessary for academics and
learners alike to ensure that they comply with these educational directives.
Students in study year levels 3 and 4 (Bdegree and BTech) should find this book
especially suitable for their studies. It should also be of assistance to practitioners
at middle-management levels and academics.
F H Smith
University of South Africa
I Currie and J Klaaren 2002. The promotion of Access to Information Act
commentary. Claremont: Siber Ink. 283 pages (soft cover).
One of the most important pieces of legislation enacted in South Africa in recent
years is without a doubt the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2000 (Act 2
of 2000). The primary objects of this Act are to give effect to the constitutional
right of access to information, and to promote transparency and accountability in
both public and private institutions. The Act has farreaching implications for the
said institutions and it is therefore imperative that they should be informed and
educated about its requirements and stipulations. This commentary written by
Professors Currie and Klaaren of the University of the Witwatersrand is at present
the only comprehensive work published on the subject of the Act. Persons in
public and private institutions wishing to gain insight into and an understanding
of the obligations and responsibilities placed on them in terms of the Act, will
thus do well to get hold of a copy of the book and to make a study of it.
The authors recognise the complex and detailed nature of the Act, and their
interpretation is aimed at making the Act, along with its supplementing
regulations, more accessible and understandable. This Act is the first of its kind
in South Africa, which means that there is much to be learnt from countries such
as Canada, Australia and the Unitad States of America where similar legislation
has been in place for a number of years. For this reason the authors have drawn
extensively on foreign jurisprudence that interprets such legislation in order to
gain a better understanding of that of South Africa and its implications. The book
starts out by providing an overview of the drawn-out and sometimes controversial
drafting process of the Act, which commenced as early as 1994. It then goes on to
discuss matters relating to legal interpretation. In this regard the authors highlight
the dual character of the Act (as a statute, and as legislative interpretation and
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Book reviews
supplementation of a constitutional provision) which would require that it be
interpreted purposively. The focus also falls on the relationship of the Act with
other legislation which either restricts/prohibits access or permits access. The rest
of the book mainly provides clarity on the various institutions to which the Act
applies, the nature of records that can be requested, the format of requests, the
access procedure, the grounds for legitimate refusal of requests and the available
appeal mechanisms. The full Act appears as an annexure to the book and will be
extremely convenient for those who are not yet in possession of a copy of the Act.
Although it is understood that the book serves as a commentary and not as a
practical guide to the Act, in some instances practical examples and flow charts
explaining the process of accessing information would have been useful. In spite
of this, this book is a valuable contribution which belongs on the bookshelves of,
amongst others, lawyers, magistrates, officials, chief executive officers, private
persons and academics.
Benita Roberts
Department of Public Administration and Development Studies
Unisa
97